REPUBLIC V.

CA
FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and
issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land
shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent.
The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon
finding that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint
for cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed
the complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land
within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides thatlands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the
application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant
The contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as
contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the
property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the
Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel
subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of
a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private
person or entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to
the public domain.
BATASnatin Matched Content

Re: Financial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the

RTC
Branch 67, Paniqui Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-07-414 RTC
FACTS

This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical
inventory of cases conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar
M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006.
The Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum dated 11 July
20051[2] that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be
directed to explain the following within ten (10) days from notice:
(a) why 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of
entries in the civil registry were granted without the required
hearing and publication, in gross violation of the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules on Civil Procedure;
xxx
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an
Explanation dated 1 August 2005,2[5] giving the following reasons for their
actions:
(a) As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without
hearing and publication
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod
explained that almost all of these petitions may be
covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 90483[6] which
authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to correct
clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change
the first name or nickname in the civil registry without
need for a judicial order. The petitions were filed before
the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil
Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on
these petitions under R.A. No. 9048. Since R.A. No. 9048
allows corrections of entries without hearing and
publication for as long as the necessary documents are
submitted, the trial court considered the same procedure
as applicable to the petitions for correction of entries filed
before it. The Clerk of Court still held
ex parte
hearings to
receive the evidence. In resolving these petitions which
are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court
adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant
is declared in default and the court renders judgment
based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and grants such
relief as may be warranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The trial court adopted this
procedure to expedite the resolution of said petitions to
afford the court more time to devote to the resolution of
criminal and civil cases that required more attention.

ISSUE

Whether trial courts still have jurisdiction over petitions for

correction of clerical errors and change of first name and nickname in the
civil registry. Assuming that the trial courts retain such authority, the
corollary question is whether the summary procedure prescribed in R.A.
No. 9048 should be adopted in cases filed before the courts, or should the
adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 be followed.

HELD

Yes. The procedure in the Rules of Court should still be followed.

Ratio

Articles 376 and 412 of the New Civil Code are the substantive
laws covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Civil registry records are public documents and are accepted as
prima
facie
evidence of the facts contained thereinwhich is why prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9048, changes or corrections thereof could be
made only upon judicial authorization. Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide the procedure for such alterations in the civil
registry.
The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a
proceeding
in rem
and as such strict compliance with all
jurisdictional requirements
, particularly on
publication, is essential in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction
. The reason for this is that a
change of name is a matter of public interest.
Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are governed by Rule 108
. This rule covers petitions for
corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, as well as
petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries
for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are
followed.
R.A. No. 9048
, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles
376 and 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
SECTION 1.
Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname may be corrected or effected by
the concerned city or municipal registrar or consul general, without
need of any judicial order.
T
he obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is merely to make
possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical
errors in entries and the administrative change of first name or
nickname in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial
proceedings.

There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the

authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil
registry.
It can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has
primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction
of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname, with R.A. No.
9048 prescribing the procedure that the petitioner and local civil
registrar should follow.
Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative
summary proceeding before the local civil registrar it would be
inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for the
correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts.
The
promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive
domain of the Supreme Court
Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be
signed and verified by the person desiring a change of name, and set
forth compliance with the residency requirement, the cause for
which the change of name is sought, and the new name asked for.
The court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, shall issue an order reciting the purpose of the petition
and fixing the date and place for the hearing of the petition, and
direct the publication of the order before the hearing at least once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province
. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition, with the Solicitor General or city fiscal
appearing on behalf of the Government. The court shall grant the petition
only when satisfactory proof has been presented in open court that the
order had been published as directed, the allegations in the petition are
true, and proper and reasonable causes appear for changing the name of
the petitioner.
Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for
cancellation or correction of entry once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province; and that the civil registrar and all persons who claim any
interest and who would be affected by the petition be made parties to
the proceeding and be allowed to file their opposition to the said
cancellation or correction within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition or from the last date of publication.Whether the proceeding
under this rule is summary or adversarial, depending on the type of
errors to be corrected, the procedural requirements under this rule
still need to be complied with, the nature of the proceeding
becoming adversarial only when any opposition to the petition is
filed and actively prosecuted.
Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the
civil registry are actions
in rem
, the decision on the petition being
binding not only on the parties thereto but on the whole world.
An
in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication

REPUBLIC VS CAPOTE
FACTS:

Giovanni was born on 1982 before the effectivity of the Family Code. Invoking Art. 176 of the
Civil Code, Giovanni wanted to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. What action and under what rule
should he file? Explain.
The proper remedy is a Petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition
through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified
and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due
notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a
proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
YES, proceedings for change of name should be adversarial.
Giovanni complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation a notice of the filing of the petition. The trial court
thereafter furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to
oppose the petition including the OSG. Will the fact that no one came forward including the
OSG affect the proceedings as it in effect made said proceedings non-adversarial, having
no one to oppose it?
NO. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The OSG cannot void the
proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein.

In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry

in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966,
March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155
FACTS:

Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to
drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his
middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried
in a person's name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he
reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.

ISSUES:

Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

HELD:

Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When
an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's
surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated
and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must
show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

Republic vs. CA
G.R. No. 100995
September 14, 1994
FACTS:

On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a residential lot located at Daet,
Camarines Norte.

On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an
order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed an
opposition.
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolors counsel marked as Exhibits A to D,
respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor
of the Weekly Informer, and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court
confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive property.
ISSUE:

Petitioner assailed the trial courts decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground.
Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the requirements
specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order
1 By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines; Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were complied
with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988 before its Branch
Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, ,
rationalizing thus
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant
case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration had been published in
the September 10, 1988 issue of the Weekly Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official
Gazette issue of October 17, 1988
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional
requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court.
Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there
was no notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988. Petitioner
concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA which

affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the application of private
respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property described therein is
DENIED.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court
which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it
was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.
The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the
fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as shown by those
documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance of
its own record. But, the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the scheduled
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20 December
1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with.
Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of
the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however released for
publication only on 31 January 1989
In petitioners brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no apparent reason, the
issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could have easily resolved
the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent evidence but also by
ample jurisprudence
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the
provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides
that before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given
notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. In Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.
So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of
jurisdiction. And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks
authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial
hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the
property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application
should not be granted.
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in
the Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious, the publication should precede the date of
initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication
only on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of
reference in establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was
only on that date when the notice was made known to the people in general. Verily, the late
publication of the notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro
forma notice.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to
use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to
do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo

FACTS:

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo claimed that his parents were never married and
filed a petition in QC to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng
(using the maiden name of his mother)

Respondent submitted proof

o
Mother has no record of marriage from NSO
o
Records which show that he has been using the surname of Coseteng since childhood
(academic records)

Trial Court granted petition and ordered Civil Registrar to:

o

Delete the entry date and place of marriage(of parents) in respondents live birth
certificate
o

Change entry of Last name from Magpayo to Coseteng

Delete entry of Coseting from Middle name

Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for Father

Republic filed a motion against the order of the court stating that:
o
The change of name of respondent also calls for a change of civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate.
o
Court exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered deletion of name of the father

A person can effect a change of name under rule 103 using valid grounds:
o

when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce

o

when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation

when the change will avoid confusion

when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage

a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody
o

when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest

Issue:

WON respondents change of name was affected through an appropriate adversary proceeding
Held:

Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as anyone of the recognized
grounds in rule 103 (respondent denies his legitimacy by affecting his legal status in relation to
his parents)

Since respondents desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected (Makati, not QC) and "all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties
to the proceeding.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated

Decision of Trial Court was nullified

On a side note, there were other cases mentioned in this case to try and explain rule 108 better. I
didnt include them here anymore but if you want to read them, here is a link to the
original case.
Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is
issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has
organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as
ruled by the lower court.

HELD:

The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it
failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest
therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the
local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court
ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in
his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the
delicate facts present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality
which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY
applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the
foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment
based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence
points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To
him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

G.R. No. 16902 : March 5, 2010

Maria Virginia V. Remo,
Petitioner, vs.
The Honorable Secretary of Foreign
Affairs,
Respondent.
Ponente:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
FACTS

Maria Virginia V. Remo

is a married Filipino citizen whose passport was
then expiring on October 27, 2000

Being married to
Francisco R. Rallonza
, the following entries appear:
surname: Rallonza
given name: Maria Virginia
middle name: Remo

Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied
for renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to
revert to her
maiden name
and surname in the
replacement passport

Petitioners request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana
III, representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA expressing a similar
request

On August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied (#2) the
request, stating:
it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use
of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name
has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the
conditions when a woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in
cases nnulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos
case does not meet any of these conditions.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was

denied (#3) in a letter dated October 13, 2000

On November 15, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the
President. On July 27, 2004, the Office of the President dismissed (#4) the
appeal with the same argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239)

The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a
general and special law, the latter will control over the former regardless of
the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general rule, it
should yield to RA 8239.

The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on October 28, 2004,
the Office of the President denied (#5) the motion.

Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and on May
27, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed the
ruling of the Office of the President.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied (#7)
in its Resolution dated August 2, 2005.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Whether there is a conflict between the general law (Civil Code Article 370)
and the special law (RA 8239).
RULES/LAW
1.Title XIII of the Civil Code
governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husbands surname, or
(3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs.
2.RA 8239: The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine
Passport Act of 1996
Section 5.
Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall be
issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative
is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the
following requirements: xxx
(d)
In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced, or widowed, or
whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the
certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or
certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the
Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree,
annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant
may revert
the use of her maiden name
: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized
under the existing laws of the Philippines; xxx
3.Section I, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 8239
The passport can be amended only in the
following cases:
(a)
Amendment of womans name due to marriage
(b)
Amendment of womans name due to death of spouse, annulment of
marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
(c)
Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a
subsequent marriage of his parents
4.
The DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time
to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt to her
husbands name

Ceruila v. Delantar
FACTS:
Spouses Platon and Librada Ceruila filed an action for annulment and cancellation of
the birthcertificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, the child-victim in the rape case
involving RomeoJalosjos for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an
instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it
falsified all material entries therein.On April 11, 1997 the RTC rendered its decision
granting the petition. On July 15, 1997 Rosilynrepresented by her legal guardian filed
with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment in thepetition for cancellation of
entry of her birth certificate claiming that she and her guardian werenot notified of the
petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only fromthe news
on May 16, 1997. On June 10, 1999 the CA granted the petition and declared null
andvoid the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed by spouses
Ceruila wasdenied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the requirements of Rule 108 were complied with.

HELD:
In the case at bar only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons,
who,however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient
to complywith the requirements laid down by the rules. The claim that lack of
summons on Rosilyn wascured by publication of the order setting the case for hearing
is not correct. Summons must stillbe served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts
with jurisdiction, but to comply with therequirements of fair play on due process. This
is but proper to afford the person concerned theopportunity to protect her interest if
she so chooses.

Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of
her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor
General.

LEE vs. CA
G.R. No. 93695 February 4, 1992

FACTS:

On November 15, 1985, a complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International
Corporate Bank, Inc. against the private respondents SACOBA MANUFACTURING CORP.,
PABLO GONZALES, JR. and THOMAS GONZALES who, in turn, filed a third party
complaint against ALFA and the petitioners RAMON C. LEE and ANTONIO DM. LACDAO
on March 17, 1986. On September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the third party complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in
an Order dated June 27, 1988. Meanwhile, on July 12, 1988, the trial court issued an
order requiring the issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a
consequence of the petitioner's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA
was erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had
been transferred to the DBP. On August 16, 1988, the private respondents filed a
Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the
trial court granted. On motion for reconsideration, petitioners contend that Rule 14,
section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and that the private respondents should have availed of another mode
of service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e.,through publication to effect
proper service upon ALFA. In their Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration dated
September 27, 1988, the private respondents argued that the voting trust agreement
dated March 11, 1981 did not divest the petitioners of their positions as president and
executive vice-president of ALFA so that service of summons upon ALFA through the
petitioners as corporate officers was proper. On January 2, 1989, the trial court upheld
the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners. On second
motion for reconsideration, petitioners reiterate their stand that by virtue of the voting
trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no
longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA. On April 25,
1989, the trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order and declared
that service upon the petitioners who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot
be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. On May 15, 1989, the private
respondents moved for a reconsideration of the above Order which was affirmed by
the court in its Order dated August 14, 1989 denying the private respondent's motion
for reconsideration. On September 18, 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly
submitted by the private respondent before the public respondent. Meanwhile, the
trial court, not having been notified of the pending petition for certiorari with public
respondent issued an Order declaring as final the Order dated April 25, 1989. The filed
petition for certiorari before the CA was given due course setting aside the orders of
respondent judge dated April 25, 1989 and August 14, 1989. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of voting trust agreement divests the petitioners of their
positions as president and executive vice-president of ALFA.

RULING:

A voting trust agreement results in the separation of the voting rights of a stockholder
from his other rights such as the right to receive dividends, the right to inspect the
books of the corporation, the right to sell certain interests in the assets of the
corporation and other rights to which a stockholder may be entitled until the
liquidation of the corporation. However, in order to distinguish a voting trust
agreement from proxies and other voting pools and agreements, it must pass three
criteria or tests, namely: (1) that the voting rights of the stock are separated from the
other attributes of ownership; (2) that the voting rights granted are intended to be
irrevocable for a definite period of time; and (3) that the principal purpose of the grant
of voting rights is to acquire voting control of the corporation.

Both under the old and the new Corporation Codes there is no dispute as to the most
immediate effect of a voting trust agreement on the status of a stockholder who is a
party to its execution from legal titleholder or owner of the shares subject of the
voting trust agreement, he becomes the equitable or beneficial owner.

Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a director, strictly speaking, cannot
be adversely affected by the simple act of such director being a party to a voting trust
agreement inasmuch as he remains owner (although beneficial or equitable only) of
the shares subject of the voting trust agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the
stockholder's shares in favor of the trustee is required (section 36 of the old
Corporation Code). No disqualification arises by virtue of the phrase "in his own right"
provided under the old Corporation Code.
With the omission of the phrase "in his own right" the election of trustees and other
persons who in fact are not beneficial owners of the shares registered in their names
on the books of the corporation becomes formally legalized. Hence, this is a clear
indication that in order to be eligible as a director, what is material is the legal title to,
not beneficial ownership of, the stock as appearing on the books of the corporation.

The facts of this case show that the petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust
agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their shares through assignment and
delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at
least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required under
Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with
the management of the enterprise. The petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the
transfer of the petitioners' shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective
positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholder of ALFA to
the DBP is the essence of the subject voting trust agreement.
Silverio v. Republic
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto
to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for
reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male
but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that
there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or
if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he
intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of
entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the
petition.

Reyes vs. Alejandro

141 SCRA 65
FACTS:
In October 1969, Erlinda ReynosoReyes prayed for the declaration of absence ofher
husband Roberto
L. Reyes who have beenabsent in their house since April 1962 due to a misunderstanding
over personal
matters. Since then she doesnt know his whereabouts. He left no will or debts.She said
they acquired no
properties or debts during marriage. She said
her only purpose infiling the petition is to establish the absence of her husband
, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil
Code.CFI
dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
WON Roberto must be judiciallydeclared absent.

HELD:

No. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property.Ratio:Rule

107 of
the Rules of Court is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code
onabsence. The
provision is concerned with theinterest or property of the absentee. The purpose of the
declaration is to
provide an administrator of the property.
The reason and purpose of the provisions ofthe New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381
to396)
are:1. The interest of the person himself who has disappeared; 2. The rights of third parties
against the
absentee, especially those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the
absentee; and
3. The general interest of society which may require that property does not remain
abandoned without
someone representing it and without an owner (Civil Code by Francisco,Vol. 2, pp. 930-
931, 1953
Ed.).When to declare for absence:1. when he has properties which have tobe taken cared
of or
administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article384, Civil Code);
2. the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, CivilCode)
or
3. his wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the
marriage be
transferred to her (Article. 196,Civil Code).For civil marriage law-Necessary to judicially
declare spouse
an absentee only when (1) there are properties which have to be taken cared of or
administered by a
representative appointed by the Court (2) the spouse of the absentee is asking for
separation of property
(3) wife is asking the Court that the administration of property in the marriage be
transferred to her-
Otherwise law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to he living,
that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and thespouse present so
believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage
RESULT: in this case, since there were noproperties to speak of, it was right for the TC to
dismiss the
case
KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 128054, October 16,
1997]
FACTS:

A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF) were use for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleges that DILG-NCR collaborated with
Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI), the former
approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical and sports equipment that was
distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of election.

Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove
probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting from
the said transaction of DILG-NCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims. The new
paper clippings was regarded as hearsay.

Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the
production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the evidence
by using public funds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the constitution
gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was denied, thus this
petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondents

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC can be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants
failure to prove probable cause.

HELD:

NO, Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the COMELEC is the
"public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the
prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the
competent court."

The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill
of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed
innocent.

Petitioner KILOSBAYAN must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support
of the allegations in its letter-complaint, to prove probable cause. It certainly demands more than
"bare suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic"

The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense
complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an
alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of
having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility,
to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant.
RENE B. PASCUAL, Petitioner, vs. JAIME M. ROBLES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 182645 (December 15, 2010)
FACTS:

On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment

of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez
(Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC [of Iriga City].
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs
of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the
great grandchildren of Antonio. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a
general default against the whole world, except the Republic of the Philippines. After
presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of
the petition.
Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or
individually, one including Jaime Robles.
In his opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular
administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain
portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022
located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal.
After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the
RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of
kin of decedent Hermogenes. On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended
Decision reversing its earlier finding. The RTC dismissed the opposition of Robles.
Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of
Appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22,
1999 for Robles' failure to file a record on appeal.
Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court.
I
SSUE:

Whether or not Robles is an indispensable party and his failure to be impleaded

is a valid ground for the dismissal of an action

RULING:

In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured

or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a
final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed
without his presence.7 Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision,
considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would
render the petition for certiorari defective.8
Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.

Marinduque Mining v. CA and NAPOCOR

FACTS:
 - NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against Marinduque Mining for the
construction of the AGUS VI Kauswagan 69 KV Transmission Line Project on the
latters property (7,875 sq.m.)
- Marinduque Mining filed its Answer with Counterclaim and alleged that the
expropriation should cover not just the portion that NAPOCOR wants but the
entire parcel of land
- It maintained that partial expropriation would render the remaining portion of
their property valueless and unfit for whatever purpose
- RTC Iligan:
o Fixed the market value at P115/sq m
o Directed commissioners to determine fair market value of dangling
area affected by the installation of NAPOCORs transmission lines
o Supplemental Decision: dangling area, consisting of 48,848.87 sq m. at
P65/sq m
o Marinduque Mining is entitled to consequential damages because the
expropriation impaired the value of the said are and deprived it of the
ordinary use of its property
- NAPOCOR initially filed MR, but then filed a Notice of Appeal w/out waiting for
resolution on MR
- Marinduque filed a motion to strike out or declare as unfiled the Notice of
Appeal by NAPOCOR for having been served by registered mail instead of
personally (ROC 13.11)
- NAPOCOR opposed, alleging that its legal office was severely undermanned (1
secretary handling 300 active cases in Mindanao), and that it was highly
irregular for the corp to question its mode of service, having been made by
registered mail since inception
- RTC: denied notice of appeal
- CA: petition for certiorari (GAD) granted (RTC to give due course to NAPOCORs
appeal)
o Service by registered mail was previously resorted to by both parties
o First time that corp questioned NAPOCORs mode of service
o Large amount of public funds involved
ISSUE(S):
w/n NAPOCOR failed to comply with ROC 13.11
HELD:
No. Under ROC 13.11, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general
rule and made mandatory whenever practicable in light of the circumstances of time,
place and person. Resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception.
When recourse if made to the other modes, a written explanation why service or filing
was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no explanation is offered to justify
resorting to other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading
comes into play.

Here, the explanation offered by NAPOCOR is acceptable. Lack of manpower to effect

personal service is a circumstance that made it not practicable.

On NAPOCORs failure to file a record on appeal

Not fatal to its appeal.

No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules of Court so require. The
reason for multiple appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the trial court
and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes
indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate
court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of
the trial court.
Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for
expropriation because there are two stages in every action for expropriation.
1. first stage the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit
order of expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing a record on
appeal
2. second stage the determination by the court of the just compensation for
the property sought to be expropriated
a second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just
compensation.
In this case, since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable issues in the
complaint for expropriation, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal.
In its first Decision, the RTC already determined NAPOCOR's authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and fixed the just compensation for the property sought to
be expropriated. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. But after the trial court
denied the motion, NAPOCOR did not appeal the decision anymore. Then, in its 19
March 2002 Supplemental Decision, the trial court fixed the just compensation for the
"dangling area." NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial court denied
the motion. NAPOCOR then filed a notice of appeal. At this stage, the trial court had no
more issues to resolve and there was no reason why the original records of the case
must remain with the trial court. Therefore, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a
record on appeal because the original records could already be sent to the appellate
court.

Republic v. Marcos [G.R. No. L-31065. February 15,

1990]

PONENTE: Grino-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese National, was previous married to Sia Bian alias Huang
Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, and she gave birth to a daughter named
May Sia alias Manman Huang born on January 28, 1958.
On January 12, 1959, Pang Cha Quen caused her daughter to be registered as an
alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the
father had abandoned them.
Mary Pang had always used this name at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic
School where she studied.
On August 16, 1966, Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen.
Mary Pang has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo, as her own
father, and she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her
name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz.
 On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen praying that her
daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to
Mary Pang De la Cruz.
The petition was based on the following: (1) desire of Mary Pang to use the last
name of her stepfather, (2) to provide her stability, and (3) conformity of Alfredo
Dela Cruz to the petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading.
Pang Cha Quen further asserted that the petition was neither made for the purpose
of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not committed any nor to
evade the execution of a judgment as she has never been sued in court. The
petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to any third person.
The RTC granted the petition but the Government through the Solicitor General
appealed to the Supreme Court alleging the petition is against the law based on
the grounds that: (1) her other alias Mary Pang was not stated in the title of the
petition when it was published, and (2) for failure to state the proper/reasonable
cause for changing the name.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Pang Cha Quen presented proper/reasonable cause to justify her
petition to change the surname of her daughter.
2) Whether or not the publication of the petition is valid since it omitted her other
alias Mary Pang.
HELD:
1) No, Pang Cha Quen did not present proper/reasonable cause to justify her petition
to change the surname of her daughter.
2) No, the publication of the petition is not valid since it omitted her other alias Mary
Pang.

RATIONALE:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the RTC.

General rules on name change:

(1)Change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family
relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008,
October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs.
Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we
specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the
surname of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of
their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of their
paternity.

(2)The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change
his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his
behalf. If minor, as in this case, when she reached the age of majority, she may file
the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for
the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to
make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The
reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her
stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide:
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in
the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other
person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
 (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.

(1)A change of name is a privilege and not a right (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-
8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L-22040, November 29, 1965) and
therefore, it must be supported by valid grounds.

The following are the valid grounds for a change of name:

(1) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) When the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29,
1966; Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Taada, et al.,
L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, L-51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31,
1980); or
(5) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29,
1965).

Reason why all aliases must be stated in the title of the petition for
publication:
In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained the
reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the
other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of
the published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption
of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change
of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the names
mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The
probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if
they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. Moreso, it defeats the
purpose of publication.