A.

DAMAGES

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES
BONIFACIO, respondents.

Placido B. Ramos and Renato L. Ramos for petitioners.

Trinidad & Borromeo for respondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
the P.I.1 and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a
consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido
Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the
time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido.
PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant
Andres Bonifacio.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961,
finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were
ordered to pay the plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral
damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees,
with costs.

Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants appellee to the Court of
Appeals.

Said Court, on January 15, 1964, affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar
as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving
defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the plaintiffs'
contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of
its driver Bonifacio.
Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this petition for review of the
Court of Appeals' decision. And appellants would argue before this Court that
defendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to show that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection of its driver in question.

Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's

favor, thus:

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of

defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first
hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department;
that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking
into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous
experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool
house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination,
all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a
member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense that
defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the choice or selection of defendant driver'. In the case
of Campo vs. Camarote No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in
appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a
rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not
have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of
service." Defendant Company has taken all these steps.2

Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the decision under
review by taking issue with the testimony of Anasco upon which the findings
of due diligence aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now contended that
Aasco being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and interested witness;
and that his testimony is not believable.

It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise herein an issue of fact
and credibility, something as to which this Court has consistently respected
the findings of the Court of Appeals, with some few exceptions, which do not
obtain herein.3

Stated differently, Aascos credibility is not for this Court now to re-examine.
And said witness having been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his
testimony, as accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be assailed. As We
said in Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, L-9194, April 25, 1957, assignments of
error involving the credibility of witnesses and which in effect dispute the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these
proceedings. For a question to be one of law it must involve no examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. 4 And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.5

From all this it follows that for the purposes of this appeal, it must be taken
as established that, as testified to by Aasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully
examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his qualifications, experiences
and record of service, taking all steps mentioned by the Court of Appeals in
its decision already quoted.1wph1.t

Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the
required due diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court
in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant
may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a
family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service."

It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as

to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of
the Civil Code provides inter alia:

... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.

And construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code, this Court said
in Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
 From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
(2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by PEPSI-
COLA is only due diligence in the selection of its driver. And, parenthetically,
it is not surprising that appellants thus confine their arguments to this aspect
of due diligence, since the record as even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17)
reflects in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness would
show sufficient evidence to establish due diligence in the supervision by
PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.

Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview of

this Court's reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI- COLA
violated the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and rules and regulations related
thereto, not having been raised and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot
be ventilated herein for the first time. 6 And the matter of whether or not
PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the negligent act of its driver is a factual issue
not proper herein.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez

and Castro, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

May 16, 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Petitioners seek a reconsideration1 of Our decision2 in the instant case

affirming in toto the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals absolving
respondent PEPSI-COLA from liability. In Our decision, We refrained from
passing on the merits of the question whether PEPSI-COLA, in operating the
tractor-truck and trailer, violated the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law 3 and the rules
and regulations related thereto, for the procedural reason that it did not
appear to have been raised before the Court of Appeals.

It now appears, however, that said question was raised in a motion to

reconsider filed with the Court of Appeals which resolved the same against
petitioners. Due consideration of the matter on its merits, convinces Us that
the decision of the Court of Appeals should still be affirmed in toto.

Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars. 1 and 4(d), par.

(a), Sec. 27 of M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951, in that
at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of
30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond
the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor
provided with a helper for the driver.

The cited provisions read:

SECTION 27. Registration, operation, and inspection of truck-trailer

combinations, semi-trailers, and tractors.

(a) No trailer or semi-trailer having a gross weight of more than 2,000

kilograms and is not equipped with effective brakes on at least two
opposite wheels of the rear axle and are so controlled that the brakes
will act in unison with or preceding the effective action of the brakes of
the tractor-truck shall be registered for operation on public highways of
the Philippines; provided, that the trialers without brakes may be
registered from year to year for operation under the following
conditions:

1. No such trailer shall be operated at any time at a speed in excess of

15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck, the actual
gross weight of which is less than twice the weight of the trailer.

xxx xxx xxx

4(d) Tractor-trucks shall be either equipped with rear-vision mirror to

enable the driver to see vehicles approaching mirror the rear or shall
carry a helper who shall be so stationed on the truck or trailer that he
will constantly have a view of the rear. He shall be provided with
means of effectively signalling to the driver to give way to overtaking
vehicles.
 4(e) No truck and trailer combination shall be operated at a speed
greater than 30 kilometers per hour.

It will be noted that the 15 k.p.h. limit in subpar. 1, supra, refers only to
trailers or semi-trailers having a gross weight of more than 2,000
kgms., AND which are "not equipped with effective brakes on at least
two opposite wheels, of the rear axle and are so controlled that the
brakes will act in unison with or preceding the effective action of the
brakes of the tractor-truck..." This is the condition set in the proviso in
par. (a), supra, wherein "trailers without [such] brakes may be
registered from year to year for operation ..." i.e., they should not "be
operated at any time at a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in
conjunction with a tractor-truck ...". But there was no finding by the
Court of Appeals that the truck-trailer here did not have such brakes. In
the absence of such fact, it is subpar. 4(e), supra, that will apply. And
petitioners admit that the truck-trailer was being driven at about 30
k.p.h.

It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the

night of the collision since he was found to be driving alone. However, there
is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be
sure, the records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman who
went to the collision scene, testified that he saw the tractor-truck there
but he does not remember if it had any rear vision mirror. 4 This cannot prove
lack of rear-vision mirror. And the cited provision subpar. 4(d) is
complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having a rear-vision mirror or a
helper, is present. Stated otherwise, said provision is violated only where
there is a positive finding that the tractor-truck did not have both rear-vision
mirror and a helper for the driver.

Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of
the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, providing that:

No motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall exceed the following

dimensions:

Overall width ................ 2.5 meters.

xxx xxx xxx

since there was an express finding that the truck-trailer was 3 meters
wide. However, Sec. 9 (d) of the same law, as amended, providing that

 SEC. 9. Special permits, fees for.-The chief of the Motor Vehicles
Office with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications shall establish regulations and a tariff of additional
fees under which special permits may be issued in the discretion of the
Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office or his deputies, for each of the
following special cases, and without such special permit, no such motor
vehicles shall be operated on the public highways.

xxx xxx xxx

(d) For registration or use of a motor vehicle exceeding the limit of

permissible dimensions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of section
eight-A hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

expressly allows the registration, or use of motor vehicles exceeding

the limits of permissible dimensions specified in subsec. (b) of Sec. 8-A.
So, to conclude that there was a violation of law which undisputably
constitutes negligence, at the very least it is not enough that the
width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it
must also appear that there was no special permit granted under Sec.
9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is missing. There
was no proof much less any finding to that effect. And it was
incumbent upon petitioners-appellants to have proved lack of such
permit since the tractor-truck and the trailer were
registered.5 Compliance with law and regularity in the performance of
official duty in this case, the issuance of proper registration papers
are presumed6 and prevail over mere surmises. Having charged a
violation of law, the onus of substantiating the same fell upon
petitioners-appellants. Hence, the conclusion that there was a violation
of the law lacks factual basis.

Petitioners would also have Us abandon the Bahia ruling.7 In its stead, We are
urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We
cannot however, abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit
mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against
all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very
explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence consists of, namely,
diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.
Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence,
not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to
properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees. We do not
and have never followed the respondent superior rule. 8 So, the
American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are
not authoritative here.

In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-24101. September 30, 1970.]

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES

P. CUADRA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALFONSO
MONFORT, Defendant-Appellant.

Rodolfo J. Herman for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Luis G. Torres & Abraham E. Tionko for defendant appellant.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of

First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed
by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us
since the facts are not in issue.

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in
Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962
their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed
the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young
girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm
and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object
hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and
treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen
and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who
thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in
the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents
spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria
Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor
daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monforts father, the
defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of the suit.

The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his
minor child which causes damage to another under the specific facts related
above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles
2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.

x x x

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage."cralaw virtua1aw library

The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or
negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness
or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one
person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself
liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as
that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The
basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault
or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be
drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage."cralaw virtua1aw library

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden
of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of
diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a
particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in
his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no
meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers
to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual
case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the
damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in
failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary,
his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was,
as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less
guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the
tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate
her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but
only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed,

without pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Fernando, J., did not take part.

Barredo, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that

the act of appellants daughter does not constitute fault within the
contemplation of our law on torts. She was 13 years and should have known
that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was likely
that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.

As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no

evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and
not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to
show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage
caused upon plaintiff child.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA
CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)
resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of
Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286.
The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed
entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the
second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being
verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even
if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural
and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building
owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by
the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents
and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing
facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided
by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of
gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in
a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the
fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied
in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138
SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en
banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall
be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts,
the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a
motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate
Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the
rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144
SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained
the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the

promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on

February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which
expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate

Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was
filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the
grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of
the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the
grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should
not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners'
view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse
of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a
building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private

respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to
this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the

instant petition for lack of merit.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-54357. April 25, 1988.]

REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO PASCO, Petitioner,

v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA
and ARANETA UNIVERSITY, Respondents.

Ponciano G. Hernandez for Petitioner.

Marcelo C. Aniana for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR HEADS OF

ESTABLISHMENT FOR DAMAGES CAUSE BY PUPILS AND STUDENTS;
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION LIABLE AS EMPLOYER. As stated by Justice
Sarmiento, my view is that while the educational institution is not directly
liable, yet the school, as the employer, may be held liable for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE. The school, however, may exculpate
itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is whether the
provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody."cralaw virtua1aw library

is equally applicable to academic institutions.

The facts of this case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Petitioner,

together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the
private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said
university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by
Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of
the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as
a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU)
Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life.

On October 5, 1979, Petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a

complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private
respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as Civil Case
No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based on the
aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the

following grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under
which it was sued applies only to vocational schools and not to academic
institutions;

"b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability in this case
arises from a criminal action which the defendant in University has not
committed;

"c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the
plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an action for damages
against defendant University." (Rollo, p. 96)

On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order ** granting said Motion
to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of Dismissal but the
motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient
justification to disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition
for Certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440, praying that judgment be
rendered setting aside the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the
complaint as against respondent school and the order of July 17, 1980
denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal, with costs
against respondent school.chanrobles law library : red

We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to

educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the
issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school
or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable.
We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned
speaks only of "teachers or heads."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (C.J.) and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent. See attached.

Sarmiento, J., I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the

basis for the liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora Et. Al. v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201).

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.

As stated by him, my view is that while the educational institution is not
directly liable, yet the school, as the employer, may be held liable for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal
duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). The school, however,
may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary