STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL discovered that he was not separated.
Thus, she severed her relationship with him to
G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua
Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella
Ponente: J. Puno
Facts:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 03, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter. The following facts were presented:
(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;
(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also
an employee of the company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage,
Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should
resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20,
1998.
(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a
co-employee whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them
pursuant to the aforementioned company policy. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled
to resign in view of an illegal company policy.
(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also
a co-worker, whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella
impregnated. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to
immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who
misrepresented himself as a married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she
avoid dismissal due to company policy.
(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-
one (21) days as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21,
1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the gate. She was directed to the
personnel office and handed a memorandum that stated that she was being dismissed
for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an explanation but she was
dismissed nonetheless. She resigned because she was in dire need of money and
resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents Motion for Reconsideration through
a Resolution.
On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:
(a) The petitioners dismissal from employment was illegal:
(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their
dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10% of
the award and the cost of the suit.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
The issues raised by this petition are:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is
violative of the constituional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and
of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and
(2) Whether or not the respondents resignations were far from voluntary.
Held:
(1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is
violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and
or Article 136 of the Labor Code:

(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer

to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage.)

G.R. No. 192571 July 23, 2013
ISSUE(S):
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories, Philippines published in major
HELD:
broadsheet that it is in need of Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager
stating therein the responsibilities and qualifications of said position.
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the abovementioned
position which was an item under the companys Hospira Affiliate Local
Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department.
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which stated,
inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months
beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005.
She underwent pre-employment orientation where she was briefed on her
duties and responsibilities.
On March 3, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from the HR Director
explaining the procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary
employees and further indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation system
for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given copies of Abbotts Code of
Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules which she had to apply in line
with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.
On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting
immediate action on the staffs performance evaluation as their probationary
periods were about to end. This Alcaraz eventually submitted.
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with her immediate
supervisor and the former HR Director where she was informed that she failed
to meet the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs
Manager. Thereafter she was asked to tender her resignation, else they be
forced to terminate her services.
She filed a case of illegal dismissal against Abott and its officers.
Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint for lack of merit.
NLRC reversed and set aside the LAs ruling and ordered Abott to reinstate
and pay Alcaraz moral and exemplary damages.
CA affirmed NLRC decision.
1 Whether or not Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards
to qualify her as a regular employee; and
2 Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment.
1 Yes, Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards. The
employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when dealing with a
probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the
employer must make such communication at the time of the probationary
employees engagement. If the employer fails to comply with either, the
employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.
A punctilious (detailed) examination of the records reveals that Abbott had
indeed complied with the above-stated requirements. This conclusion is
largely impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties
and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of
her engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment.
2 A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure.
However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized
causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of
the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for
failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the
engagement.
A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee;
the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that "if the termination is
brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the
employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a
written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the
effective date of termination."

As the records show, Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated
May 19, 2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and again on May 27,
2005. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper
evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards
for her regularization considering her lack of time and people management
and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the performance of her
functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written notice
sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause
and manner of Alcarazs dismissal as a probationary employee under the
parameters set by the Labor Code.
 for guiding and overseeing the welfare and training needs of the staff of the Materials
Management Department. Due to the nature of respondents functions, petitioner
corporation considers his position as confidential.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims for 13th and 14th
month pay, bonuses and other benefits, as well as the payment of moral and exemplary
G.R. No. 181490 April 23, 2014 damages and attorneys fees. It is the contention of respondent that he was illegally
MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION AND EDGARDO A. dismissed by petitioner corporation due to the latters non-compliance with the twin
BAUTISTA, Petitioners, requirements of notice and hearing. He asserts that while there was a notice charging
vs.
him of unjustified refusal to submit to random drug testing, there was no notice of
JOSELITO A. CARO, Respondent.
hearing and petitioner corporations investigation was not the equivalent of the hearing
required under the law which should have accorded respondent the opportunity to be
heard.
PRINCIPLE:

In a decision dated August 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog found
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers and
respondent to have been illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter also found that the
board of directors who may only be held personally liable for damages if it is
quitclaim purportedly executed by respondent was not a bona fide quitclaim which
proven that they acted with malice or bad faith in the dismissal of an
effectively discharged petitioners of all the claims of respondent in the case at bar. If at
employee. Absent any evidence on record that petitioner Bautista acted
all, the Labor Arbiter considered the execution of the quitclaim as a clear attempt on the
maliciously or in bad faith in effecting the termination of respondent, plus the
part of petitioners to mislead its office into thinking that respondent no longer had any
apparent lack of allegation in the pleadings of respondent that petitioner
cause of action against petitioner corporation.
Bautista acted in such manner, the doctrine of corporate fiction dictates that
only petitioner corporation should be held liable for the illegal dismissal of
respondent. On appeal to the NLRC, petitioners alleged that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion for being contrary to law, rules and established
jurisprudence, and contained serious errors in the findings of facts which, if not
FACTS:
corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage or injury to petitioners. The
NLRC, giving weight and emphasis to the inconsistencies in respondents explanations,
Petitioner Edgardo A. Bautista (Bautista) was the President of petitioner corporation
considered his omission as unjustified refusal in violation of petitioner corporations
when respondent was terminated from employment.
drug policy. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioners filed a
motion for partial reconsideration of the NLRC decision. In a Resolution dated June 30,
Respondent was hired by Mirant Pagbilao on January 3, 1994 as its Logistics Officer. 2006, the NLRC denied both motions.
In 2002, when Southern Company was sold to Mirant, respondent was already a
Supervisor of the Logistics and Purchasing Department of petitioner. At the time of the
ISSUE:
severance of his employment, respondent was the Procurement Supervisor of Mirant
Pagbilao assigned at petitioner corporations corporate office. As Procurement
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly held that Edgardo A. Bautista
Supervisor, his main task was to serve as the link between the Materials Management
(President of petitioner corporation) should be personally liable for
Department of petitioner corporation and its staff, and the suppliers and service
respondents dismissal.
contractors in order to ensure that procurement is carried out in conformity with set
policies, procedures and practices. In addition, respondent was put in charge of
ensuring the timely, economical, safe and expeditious delivery of materials at the right RULING:
quality and quantity to petitioner corporations plant. Respondent was also responsible
NO.
First. The policy was not clear on what constitutes "unjustified refusal" when the
subject drug policy prescribed that an employees "unjustified refusal" to submit to a
random drug test shall be punishable by the penalty of termination for the first offense.
To be sure, the term "unjustified refusal" could not possibly cover all forms of "refusal"
as the employees resistance, to be punishable by termination, must be "unjustified." To
the mind of the Court, it is on this area where petitioner corporation had fallen short of
making it clear to its employees as well as to management as to what types of acts
would fall under the purview of "unjustified refusal." Even petitioner corporations own
Investigating Panel recognized this ambiguity.
The fact that petitioner corporations own Investigating Panel and its Vice President for
Operations, Sliman, differed in their recommendations regarding respondents case are
first-hand proof that there, indeed, is ambiguity in the interpretation and application of
the subject drug policy. The fact that petitioner corporations own personnel had to
dissect the intended meaning of "unjustified refusal" is further proof that it is not clear
on what context the term "unjustified refusal" applies to. It is therefore not a surprise
that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA have perceived the term "unjustified
refusal" on different prisms due to the lack of parameters as to what comes under its
purview. To be sure, the fact that the courts and entities involved in this case had to
engage in semantics and come up with different constructions is yet another glaring
proof that the subject policy is not clear creating doubt that respondents dismissal was
a result of petitioner corporations valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Second. The penalty of termination imposed by petitioner corporation upon respondent
fell short of being reasonable. Company policies and regulations are generally valid and
binding between the employer and the employee unless shown to be grossly oppressive
or contrary to law50 as in the case at bar. Recognizing the ambiguity in the subject
policy, the CA was more inclined to adopt the recommendation of petitioner
corporations own Investigating Panel over that of Sliman and the NLRC.
To be sure, the unreasonableness of the penalty of termination as imposed in this case is
further highlighted by a fact admitted by petitioner corporation itself: that for the ten-
year period that respondent had been employed by petitioner corporation, he did not
have any record of a violation of its company policies.
As to the other issue relentlessly being raised by petitioner corporation that
respondents petition for certiorari before the CA should have been considered moot as
respondent had already previously executed a quitclaim discharging petitioner
corporation from all his monetary claims, we cannot agree. Quitclaims executed by
laborers are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of their legal
rights,52 especially in this case where the evidence on record shows that the amount
stated in the quitclaim exactly corresponds to the amount claimed as unpaid wages by
respondent under Annex A53 of his Reply54 filed with the Labor Arbiter. Prima facie,
this creates a false impression that respondents claims have already been settled by
petitioner corporation discharging the latter from all of respondents monetary claims.
In truth and in fact, however, the amount paid under the subject quitclaim represented
the salaries of respondent that remained unpaid at the time of his termination not the
amounts being claimed in the case at bar.
Finally, the petition avers that petitioner Bautista should not be held personally
liable for respondents dismissal as he acted in good faith and within the scope of his
official functions as then president of petitioner corporation. We agree with
petitioners. Both decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the CA did not discuss the basis of
the personal liability of petitioner Bautista, and yet the dispositive portion of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter - which was affirmed by the appellate court - held him
jointly and severally liable with petitioner corporation.
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers and board
of directors who may only be held personally liable for damages if it is proven that
they acted with malice or bad faith in the dismissal of an employee. 57 Absent any
evidence on record that petitioner Bautista acted maliciously or in bad faith in
effecting the termination of respondent, plus the apparent lack of allegation in the
pleadings of respondent that petitioner Bautista acted in such manner, the
doctrine of corporate fiction dictates that only petitioner corporation should be
held liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.