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The economic crisis provides some insights on the role of measurement systems
in society. Most notably, the role of credit rating agencies has been discussed by
political actors and in the news media.1 This discussion shows that measurement
is not a neutral device, but an active agent in societal processes. As in the case
of bond ratings, comparative measurement of international public administration
seems frail, technocratic, and overly aggregated (Arndt, 2007; Arndt & Oman,
2006; Van de Walle, 2006). Nonetheless, these indicators are increasingly being
used by journalists, aid organizations, foreign investors, and, indeed, rating agen-
cies for holding governments accountable. Hence, better measurement of public
administration performance is needed. The discussion that follows builds on study
Public Performance & Management Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2012, pp. 489508.
2012 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
1530-9576/2012 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/PMR1530-9576350306 489
490 PPMR / March 2012
factors, the main building blocks have become widely accepted foci of public
administration theory and practice.
Outcomes are the result of activities that convert inputs to outputs. The transfor-
mation of inputs, such as financial and human resources, to activities is mediated
by the structure of government, cultural predispositions, and institutional and
managerial arrangements. Outputs are the goods and services that public orga-
nizations supply in response to demand. Outcomes are the consumption of the
goods and services (intermediate outcomes) as well as the effects this consumption
entails (final outcomes).
The criterion for assessing outcome is added value (Moore, 1995). The added
value of a private firm is the result of the aggregation of individual decisions to
consume a service or good at a given price. A firms profit can be conceptualized
as its outcome in society, since it is the sum of the values that individuals attach
to a good or service, minus the costs of production. Free-rider problems3 and the
positive and negative externalities of consumption,4 however, mean that one cannot
rely on individual consumption decisions for all goods and services (Musgrave,
1959). For public services, although the criterion of added value remains intact, the
notion of public value replaces private value. In the absence of monetary profits,
it is much more difficult for public organizations to assess outcomes.
performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). Three broad but distinct
substantial definitions of performance might be:
s 0RODUCT PERFORMANCE REmECTS SUCCESS IN MATCHING RESOURCES TO DElNED TASKS
Government has to operate in an economical, efficient, and effective way. Product
performance reflects what Piotrowski (2010) calls mission-based values.
s 0ROCEDURAL PERFORMANCE REmECTS SUCCESS IN KEEPING GOVERNMENT FAIR AND HONEST
Government has to pursue honesty, fairness, and mutuality through the preven-
tion of distortion, inequity, bias, and abuse of office. Procedural performance is
not mission-based (Piotrowski, 2010).
s 2EGIME PERFORMANCE REmECTS SUCCESS IN KEEPING THE PUBLIC SECTOR ROBUST AND
resilient. Government has to operate even in adverse worst-case conditions
and to adapt rapidly in response to crisis and change. Regime performance is
another form of non-mission-based performance.
It is generally easier to measure product performance than process or regime
performance (see Table 1). For production, resources are allocated to defined
tasks and indicators are a means to assess goal attainment. This is not to say
that measurement is unproblematic, but at least conceptually it is unambiguous.
Processes in production cycles are usually repeated, which allows for learning
in measurement. Measuring levels of fairness and honesty becomes substantially
more complicated. Such measures will predominantly be about the absence of
fairness and honesty, measuring fraud, corruption, favoritism, and so forth. Typi-
cally, these activities are under the radar. They are, however, recurring events,
which makes the development of indicators somewhat easier. Indicators for ro-
bustness and resilience are even more complicated, since failures and worst-case
conditions that really put a strain on robustness are uncommon. As an alternative
to outcome measures, measures of capacity could be developed, but they are not
performance indicators (Hall, 2008).
The selected public administration dimensions discussed below touch upon two
of the three approaches to public values. Human resources management and bud-
494 PPMR / March 2012
ment rules across governments, and (4) core values. The latter were discussed
above in the section dealing with the guiding principles of outcome indicators.
The first three dimensions are used as a point of departure for the definition of
performance indicators.
(1) The objective of good workforce planning and management is to ensure an
appropriately dimensioned, appropriately structured, and representative workforce,
able to meet changing labor needs in the context of changing demands and rapid
developments in the wider labor market (OECD, 2007). A number of indicators
can be derived.
The workforce needs to be appropriately dimensioned and structured, with the
right size and education. At first sight, size and education are input indicators.
Yet it is the adverb appropriately that gives this objective an outcome flavor.
Well-functioning human resources management arrangements should bring about
a workforce that is adequately sized and educated in order to ensure undisrupted
and financially sustainable service delivery. Indicators that reflect the appropriate-
ness can be considered outcomes.
An important outcome of successful human resources management policies
in a competitive labor market is governments being an employer of choice
(Vandenabeele, 2008). A 2002 OECD study assessed this issue by asking
whether governments expect problems in recruitment and retentionnow or
soon. The study also asked whether there are critical skill shortages (OECD,
2002).
Duration of hiring is another potential indicator of workforce management.
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management used this indicator to assess the human
resources management performance of government agencies (2007). It defines the
indicator as the agencys percentage of hires within a 45-day timeframe. It uses
a hiring time-frame model to uniformly define the indicator.
The U.S. GAO uses hire rate and acceptance rate to assess the impact of hu-
man resources management practices. The hire rate is the ratio of the number of
people hired to the number the agency planned to hire as defined in its workforce
plan. The acceptance rate is the ratio of the number of applicants accepting of-
fers to the number of offers made. Acceptance rate is seen as a proxy for GAOs
attractiveness as an employer and an indicator of competitiveness in bringing in
new talent (GAO, 2007).
Many governments strive for a workforce that reflects society (Gualmini,
2008). Evidence of the impact of diversity on performance efficiency is diffuse
(Andrews, Boyne, Meier, OToole, & Walker, 2005), but representation also
reflects other public values, such as social mobility of minorities. Indicators on
equal opportunities reflecting the gender balance and minority representation are
thus potential outcome indicators.
(2) The objective of good staff performance management is to ensure a suitably
empowered and highly motivated civil service that is flexible and collaborative
500 PPMR / March 2012
and provides services in a cost efficient manner (OECD, 2007). This outcome
suggests a second set of performance indicators. First, consider staff satisfac-
tion. A satisfied workforce could be seen as an outcome for a human resources
department. Sick leave/absenteeism is another example. A reasonable measure
of successful human resources management is a low absenteeism rate. External
factors that need to be taken into account might include the age structure of the
workforce (younger people are healthier) and the task environment (idea-based
and relational tasks are probably less exhausting and more motivating than routine
physical jobs) (Hackman & Oldham, 1980). A third example may be indicators
on retention and turnover. Organizations invest in hiring and training people, and
thus presumably want to retain them. High retention rates may reflect workplace
attractiveness. Clearly, an important external influence will be the condition of
the general labor market and the resulting degree of private-sector competition
for critical skills.
(3) The objective of a good balance between human resources management
arrangements is to ensure that transaction costs in negotiating shared responsi-
bilities between governments are minimized, and that an active labor market is
supported for staff with distinctive public sector skills and competencies (OECD,
2007). A third set of indicators is implied in this outcome. An active labor market
is related to workforce mobility. First, there may be a learning effect. Mobility
broadens horizons, leads to the circulation of ideas, and in this way is an antidote
against tunnel vision. Second, mobility is in some instances a strategy against cor-
ruption and unethical behavior, especially in inspection services. The time spent
in a particular sensitive position is too short to develop unsound relations with
target groups (Abbink, 2004). Third, mobility may be a matter of allocation. Some
departments may have staff shortages while others have redundancies. Internal
labor markets should sort out these imbalances.
The kinds of indicators in this field are typically found in many larger orga-
nizations, both private companies and public bureaucracies. Hence, there seems
to be fertile ground for solid international and cross-sectoral comparison. The
main problem for comparative purposes is that, unlike for budgeting, there are
no internationally agreed upon standards and definitions.
Open Government
A third field of public administration to be highlighted as a case of comparative
measurement concerns the openness of government. Open government mostly re-
lates to procedural performance, and therefore performance measurement becomes
more difficult. It is a field characterized by measurement experimentation.
The OECD identifies four dimensions of accountability and openness (OECD,
2001). Transparency is the ability of the government to ensure that its actions,
and those who are responsible for its actions, are exposed to public scrutiny and
Van Dooren, De Caluw, and Lonti / MEASURING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE 501
Inclusive government
Responsive government
Accessible government
Transparent government
challenge. Accessibility in the public sector is achieved when the government can
ensure everyones capacity to obtain information and to utilize services at any
time, anywhere, and in a user-friendly manner. A responsive government is one
that can and will react to new ideas, demands, and needs of citizens. Inclusiveness
aims to ensure the broadest base of participation possible.
The four dimensions of openness and accountability are assumed to build on
each other (see Figure 2). Transparent government is a precondition for accessible
government. Citizens need to know their government in order to access it, and
citizens need to access government in order for government to respond to them.
Inclusiveness seems to be a different dimension, which assesses to what extent
government is transparent for everyone, accessible for everyone, and responsive
to everyone. The underlying logic of this scheme resembles Arnsteins ladder of
citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969): the higher on the ladder, the higher the level
of participation. In this model, it can be argued, open and accountable governments
are at the top of the pyramid.
Transparency is a key tenet of contemporary performance and accountability
relations (Dubnick, 2005; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002). Freedom of in-
formation laws are a key institutional arrangement for achieving transparency.
Performance indicators might reflect whether citizens (and companies and media)
actually refer to these laws or whether they remain dead letters. The catch is that in
very transparent public administration systems, there is no need to use information
laws. Interpretation of performance information in context and through dialogue
seems warranted (Moynihan, 2008).
The publication of annual reports, performance data, strategic plans, and legis-
lative timetables is a means of opening up government activity to the public eye.
Performance indicators could measure the extent to which target groups are actually
using available information. A good definition of target groups is necessary. It is
not realistic to expect ordinary citizens to read annual reports and strategic plans
in their leisure time. It is realistic, however, to expect media and interest groups to
502 PPMR / March 2012
The present article began with the observation that the economic crisis is also a crisis
of measurement in the ratings industry. Yet ratings are unlikely to disappear. More
generally, measurement seems to be a key tenet of modern society (Porter, 1995;
Scott, 1998). Performance indicators are increasingly used to make complex realities
tangible and to hold actors accountable. The vast array of activities and performance
Van Dooren, De Caluw, and Lonti / MEASURING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE 503
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in hospitals, schools, universities, local governments, and the like are captured by a
limited number of indicators in performance contracts, league tables, and star ratings
(Bevan & Hood, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Radin, 2006). The story of the rating agencies
also shows that the impact of these indicator regimes can be substantial. In order to
ensure that accountability for performance is providing the right effects in government
and society, the quality and diversity of indicators becomes crucial.
This is also the case for public administration indicators. The quality of public
administration indicators is often problematic, in particular when they are internation-
ally comparative. Nonetheless, they are increasingly used, among other purposes, to
inform funding, investment decisions, the rating of government bonds, and media
coverage (United Nations Development Programme, 2004). As a result, the develop-
ment of diverse and valid comparative indicators seems to be warranted. This article
builds on OECD initiatives with a conceptual discussion of indicators in the fields
of budgeting, human resources management, and open government.
The cases show that public administration performance measurement is at
least conceptually conceivable for all three fields. There are differences between
the cases, however. For budgeting, good comparative performance indicators can
be developed. The high level of standardization and cyclical nature of budgeting
contributes to the potential. For human resources management, the development
of performance indicators is also relatively straightforward, but international
comparison may be more difficult due to the lack of standardization. For open
504 PPMR / March 2012
Notes
1. The Obama administration has been very critical of the quality of Standard & Poors ratings
since the U.S. downgrade (President Obamas statement, 2011). In the media, there have been
some less critical accounts of the role of rating agencies (e.g., Tasker, 2011), together with more
critical and very critical perspectives (e.g., Credit-rating agencies, 2011; Rushe, 2011).
2. The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect
any opinion of the OECD or its member governments.
Van Dooren, De Caluw, and Lonti / MEASURING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE 505
3. A free rider is someone who enjoys the benefits of a public good without bearing the
cost. The image of someone who uses public transport without paying is illustrative.
4. Externalities are costs and benefits attributable to an activity that are not reflected in the
price of the goods or services being produced.
5. This is mainly done through the establishment of the so-called European semester, a
more frequent follow-up of national budgets by the EU, with new incentives and sanctions for
countries that do not provide qualitative budget data (Europa Press Release, 2011)
6. There is a parallel with private-sector annual reports. Only a selected audience of fi-
nancial journalists, analysts, and interest groups have the time and competence to assess these
reports.
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506 PPMR / March 2012
Zsuzsanna Lonti is the head of the statistics and indicators unit in the Budgeting
and Public Expenditures Division of the OECD Governance Directorate, Paris.
She leads the Government at a Glance project.