DAVAO SAWMILL v. CASTILLO
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
Where the improvements or ornaments
placed by the lessees are not to pass the owner at
the expiration of the lease, they remain movables
for chattel mortgage purposes.
Machinery may be installed by the agent of
the owner but not by the tenant, usufructuary or
any other person having only temporary right unless
such person acted as an agent of the owner.
BERKENKOTTER v. CU UNJIENG
New machinery placed in a mortgaged
central, to replace old machinery, becomes subject
to the prior real estate mortgage.
LOPEZ v. OROSA
A building is real property whether it was
built on a rented land or not and whether built by
the owner or not.
ASSOCIATED INSURANCE v. IYA
As personal properties could only be the
subject of a chattel mortgage, the execution of a
chattel mortgage on a building is invalid and a
nullity, the registration of the chattel
notwithstanding. (Note: 3rd party Iya assailed the
chattel mortgaged agreement 3rd party is
prejudiced so the parties to the chattel mortgage
are in estoppel)
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS v. MERALCO
The steel towers built by MERALCO are not
buildings or constructions since they are removable
and merely attached to a square metal frame by
means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily
by dismantled and moved from place to place.
MERALCO SECURITIES v. BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS
The Pipeline System of Meralco Securities is
classified as real property and subject to tax they
being machinery or improvements.
MERALCO v. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS
While the two storage tanks are not
embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing
its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It
is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed
with some degree of permanence as receptacles for
the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco
for its operations.
CALTEX v.
Equipment and machinery, as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed
owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty
tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the
operation of the gas station, for without them the
gas station would be useless, and which have been
attached or affixed permanently to the gas station
site or embedded therein, are taxable
improvements and machinery. Improvements on
land are commonly taxed as realty even though for
some purposes they might be considered
personalty. (Note: Here, it is the owner, Caltex, who
placed the equipment as opposed to Davao Sawmill
who is only a tenant.)
BENGUET CORP. v. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT
Whether a structure constitutes an
improvement so as to partake of the status of realty
would depend upon the degree of permanence
intended in its construction and use. The expression
"permanent" as applied to an improvement does not
imply that the improvement must be used
perpetually but only until the purpose to which the
principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. It
is sufficient that the improvement is intended to
remain as long as the land to which it is annexed is
still used for the said purpose.
The subject dam falls within the definition of
an "improvement" because it is permanent in
character and it enhances both the value and utility
of petitioner's mine. Moreover, the immovable
nature of the dam defines its character as real
property under Article 415 of the Civil Code.
TUMALAD v. VICENCIO
Parties to the contract are estopped from
claiming that an immovable like a building is real if
they treated the same in the contract as personal.
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION v.
RAMOS
Conspicuously absent in Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution is the provision in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to
grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization
of natural resourcesby such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of public domain
through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION v.
RAMOS (MR)
LABITAG PROPERTY CASE DOCTRINE 1
 An intent to eradicate service contracts
cannot be definitively and conclusively established
from the mere failure to carry the same expression
or term over to the new Constitution, absent a more
specific, explicit and unequivocal statement to that
effect.
CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
The mere reclamation of certain areas by
PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain there must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open
to disposition or concession.
CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (MR)
Government owned lands, as long as they
are patrimonial property, can be sold to private
parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations. Once converted to patrimonial
property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal corporation to private parties, whether
Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.
USERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
The phrase others of similar character
includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a
river. It is a property belonging to the public domain
which is not susceptible to private ownership.
MANOTOK v. HEIRS OF BARQUE
The sale of friar lands shall be valid only if
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). (Note: Atty
Labitag: Friar land is patrimonial property. Thus it
may be subject to prescription.)
LAUREL v. GARCIA
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi
lot is outside the commerce of man and can not be
alienated. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such. An abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under
Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. A
mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi propertys original purpose.
Non-use does not immediately convert a
property of public dominion into patrimonial
property. Conversion can be done generally by
Congress.
2 LABITAG PROPERTY CASE DOCTRINE
TANTOCO v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
The property of a municipality, whether real
or personal, necessary for governmental purposes
cannot be attached and sold at public auction to
satisfy a judgment against the municipality. Auto
trucks used by a municipality in sprinkling its
streets, its police patrol automobile, police stations,
and public markets, together with the land on which
they stand, are exempt from execution.
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA
If the property is owned by the municipality
in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control
over it. But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation.
SALAS v. JARENCIO
In the absence of title deed to any land
claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing
that it was acquired with its private or corporate
funds, the presumption is that such land came from
the State upon the creation of the municipality.
As a general rule, regardless of the source or
classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own
funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit
of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subiect to
the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of
the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an
agent for the performance of a part of its public
work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration.
CEBU v. BERCILLES
Since that portion of the city street subject
of petitioners application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL v. FERNANDEZ
Public funds are not subject to levy and
execution. The reason for this was that they are
held in trust for the people, intended and used for
the accomplishment of the purposes for which
municipal corporations are created, and that to
subject said properties and public funds to
execution would materially impede, even defeat and
in some instances destroy said purpose. It is the
settled doctrine of the law that not only the public
property but also the taxes and public revenues of
such corporations cannot be seized under execution
against them, either in the treasury or when in
transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the
proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers
of the law, are not subject to execution unless so
declared by statute.
Appropriation in the form of an ordinance
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, necessary
before any money of a municipality may be paid
out.
GOVERNMENT v. CABANGIS
As the lots in question disappeared by
natural erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide,
and as they remained in that condition until
reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the
Government, they belong to the public domain for
public use.
HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO SANTIAGO v. HEIRS OF
MARIANO SANTIAGO
The settled rule is that a free patent issued
over a private land is null and void, and produces no
legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land
as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership
like a duly registered possessory information or a
clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession, by present or previous
occupantsis not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land, because the Public Land
law applies only to lands of the public domain. The
Director of Lands has no authority to grant free
patent to lands that have ceased to be public in
character and have passed to private ownership.
LABITAG PROPERTY CASE DOCTRINE 3