BONDAGJY V. BONDAGJY
00 after the
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina
(then 20 years of age) were married on February
3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under
Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months
before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by
conversion. However, the conversion was not
registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two (2)
children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989,
and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990. The
children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time
of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent
was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom
helater divorced. After their marriage, the
couple moved in with respondent's family in
Makati City. In 1990,the parties migrated and settled in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than
two years. Sometime in December 1995, the children
lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile
Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not
see his children until he got an order from the court.
Even with a court order, he could only see his children
in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa
City .On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children
baptized as Christians and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from
Amouaje Bondagjy
to Amouage Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on
various occasions Sabrina was seen withdifferent men
at odd hours in Manila ,and that she would wear short
skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such
clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs.
Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep
their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.
children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees
them in school, the children would be happy to see
him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead,
they would ride the jeepney in going home from
school. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of
marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to
maintain status quo until further orders from said
court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083
is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi
filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued
that at the inception of the case, both parties were
Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by
conversion. The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No.
1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to
this case because the spouses were not yet divorced.
The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to
care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that
respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor
children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to
Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted
back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound
by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her
fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare
of the minors is the controllingconsideration on the
issue. The Court also said that the factors that
determine the fitness of any parent are: [1] the ability
to see to the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the children, and [2] the ability to give them
a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the
parents. The standard in the determination of sufficien
cy of proof, however, is not restricted toMuslim laws.
The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in
deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent.
What determines her capacity is the standard
laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a
Muslim .Indeed, what determines the fitness of any
parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational,
social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability
to give them a healthy environment as well as physical
and financial support taking into consideration the
respective resources and social and moral situations of
the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides
that the father and mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common
children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where
the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the
father and mother shall jointly exercise just and
reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.
IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE ASTORGA
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie AstorgaGarcia. He averred
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that
Stephanie had been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed
that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia,
her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia
be changed to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for
adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189
of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that
Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower
court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she
is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA
8557.Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father.
IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULUSAN WANG
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name of entry in the
civil registry of Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner sought to
drop his middle name and have his registered name
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian
Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his
best interest to drop his middle name as this would
help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into
Singaporean society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his
middle name to be changed. - NO
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is t
hat there be proper and reasonable cause for which
the change is sought. to justify a request for the
change of name, the petitioner must show not only
some proper reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for the change of name which
have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name and was not aware
of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose.
JOCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO V. CRISANTO
GUALBERTO
Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente
lite of their almost 4 year-old son, Rafaello, whom her
wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and
his school when she left
him. The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody
pendente lite, since the wife failed toappear despite
notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the
mother does not care for the child as she very often
goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the
child. Another witness testified that after surveillance
he found out that the wife is having lesbian
relations. The judge issued the assailed order reversing
her previous order, and this time awarded the custody
of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason
stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as
provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should
be awarded to the mother.

Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213.
In case of separation of parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant
consideration, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
This Court has held that when the parents separated,
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs
the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing
from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art
363. In all question on the care, custody, education
and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her
child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reason for such measure.
NOEL BAGTAS V. HON. RUTH SANTOS
SUMMARY: Maryl Joy was left by her mother with
Bagtas, with a letter evidencing her relinquishment of
her rights over Maryl Joy in favor of Bagtas. Maryl Joys
maternal grandparents, the Gallardos, tried to obtain
custody by filing a petition for habeas corpus. Bagtas
and the Gallardos then entered into an agreement
concerning the custody. However, the Gallardos
violated the agreement. RTC dismissed the Gallardos
habeas corpus petition for mootness, since Maryl Joy
was already in their custody. Bagtas appealed, saying
that the RTC should have dismissed the petition for the
violation of the agreement and not because of
mootness. It in effect gave premium to the act of the
Gallardos of not turning over the child to Bagtas.
Likewise, it was tantamount to rewarding them for not
producing the child in court in violation of the Order.
RTC and CA held against Bagtas, ruling that the sole
purpose for the filing of the petition is to cause the
production before the Court of the person of Maryl Joy,
not a determination of the legality or illegality of
custody. Also, the Gallardos had a clear right for the
custody as grandparents. Supreme Court remanded
the case for a full blown trial to determine what would
be the best interest of Maryl Joy, since her interest is
the most important consideration and not agreements
and even the legal right of the grandparents. In cases
involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas
corpus is not limited to the production of the child
before the court. The main purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful
custody over the child. It is true that Article 214 of the
Civil Code states that in case of absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. Article 216 also states that in default of
parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
surviving grandparent shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child. However, in
determining who has the rightful custody over a child,
the childs welfare is the most important consideration.
The court is not bound by any legal right of a person
over the child.
NATURE: Petition for Review on certiorari
FACTS:
 Antonio and Rosita Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are
the parents of Maricel Gallardo. After graduating
from high school, Maricel ran away to live with her
boyfriend. She became pregnant and gave birth to
Maryl Joy S. Gallardo. Maricels boyfriend left her.
Maricel returned to her parents. On the same day,
she ran away again and lived with Noel B. Bagtas
and Lydia B. Sioson in Antipolo City. Maricel went to
Negros Occidental and left Maryl Joy in the custody
of Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter, Maricel
relinquished her rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and
his wife.
The Spouses Gallardo, Maryl Joys maternal
grandparents, tried to obtain custody from Bagtas
and Sioson. They refused. Unable to settle the
matter, the Gallardos filed with the RTC a petition
for habeas corpus.
The RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the
deputy sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to
summon Bagtas and Sioson to explain why they
were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy.
The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas, and Sioson entered
into a compromise agreement, which the RTC
approved and ordered effective, that the child
should be placed in custody of the Gallardos on
Friday, Saturday and Sunday; that the child should
be returned to Bagtas and Sioson on Sunday at 8PM
subject to visitorial rights of the Gallardos anytime
of the day; and that the child can be brought by
Bagtas and Sioson to Valenzuela but should be
returned to the Gallardos on Friday morning. The
parties are ordered to comply strictly with the
agreement under pain of contempt in case of
violation. (October order)
Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita Gallardo
brought Maryl Joy to Samar. Bagtas and Sioson
prayed that the Gallardos be directed to produce
Maryl Joy before the RTC, that they be directed to
explain why they violated the Order/Compromise
Agreement, and that they be cited in contempt.
They also prayed for the dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition filed by the Gallardos, because of
the Gallardos failure to comply with the Order
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of
Court. "If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails
xxx to comply with xxx any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the courts own motion.
RTC dismissed the habeas corpus action of the
Gallardos for mootness, Maryl having been turned
over to them. It cited the Spouses Gallardo in
contempt, fined them P500, and ordered them to
produce Maryl Joy before the trial court.
(December order)
In their motion for reconsideration, Bagtas and
Sioson alleged that the ground for the dismissal
of the action was erroneous. The action
should have been dismissed pursuant to
failure of the Gallardos to comply with the
order and not because of mootness. They
prayed that Maryl Joy be returned to them to
preserve the status quo ante. Bagtas and Sioson
stated:
o The Honorable Court very clearly issued a
conflicting Order because It has cited the
[Spouses Gallardo] in contempt of court
for violating the previous Order that the
child should be returned to Bagtas and
Sioson on Sunday evening, and yet the
Court has dismissed the petition for being
 moot and academic. This is in effect giving
premium to the act of the Gallardos of not
turning over the child to Bagtas and
Sioson. Likewise, this is tantamount to
rewarding them for not producing the child
in court in violation of the Order. Moreover,
the Court was unreasonable in stating that the
dismissal of the case is without prejudice to the
filing of the proper action for custody of the
minor by the Gallardos. Why would the
Gallardos still file the proper action for custody if
they now have the custody of the minor?
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. It ruled
that the sole purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus was the production of Maryl Joy and that the
Spouses Gallardo exercised substitute parental
authority over Maryl Joy, therefore entitling them to
custody.
o The allegations in the Petition show that the
sole purpose for the filing of the Petition is to
cause the production before the Court of the
person of Maryl Joy, not a determination of the
legality or illegality of Bagtas and Siosons
custody of the child, Gallardos being aware of
the fact that the child was left by their daughter
in the custody of Bagtas and Sioson.
o The Petition is therefore, essentially not a
petition for Habeas Corpus as contemplated in
Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court which is
resorted to in all cases of illegal confinement by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, but
is resorted to also where the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised
Rules of Court. In order that the special remedy
of Habeas Corpus be invoked, it is necessary
that there should be an actual and effective
restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or
moral restraint is not sufficient. Since the
purpose of the Petition has already been served,
as the child has been produced and delivered to
the Gallardos, the Petition logically has become
moot and academic.
o The Gallardos are, under the law (Art. 214,
Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
the entitlement to the legal custody of the child
being necessarily included therein to make
possible and/or enable the Gallardos to
discharge their duties as substitute parents.
o There is no inconsistency between the October
and December orders, as the 2nd was issued
pursuant to an incident, an interlocutory matter,
that is, the failure of the Gallardos to comply
with the agreement. The first Order is not a
resolution of the case in the main, as it did not
terminate the case. The 2nd Order on the other
hand, terminated the case, and considering that
the dismissal of the case was unqualified, the
same amounted to an adjudication on the merits
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules
of Court Procedure, therefore, the agreement
earlier entered by and between the herein
parties is deemed terminated.
Bagtas filed an appeal with the CA, which the CA
dismissed. The CA affirmed the RTC:
o In the second part of [Section 1, Rule 102, of the
Rules of Court], habeas corpus may be resorted
to in cases where the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper
 remedy to enable the Gallardos to regain the
custody of their minor granddaughter who was
admittedly left by her natural mother in the care
of Bagtas and Sioson.
o In custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal or involuntary restraint is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the
writ of habeas corpus as a remedy; rather, the
writ is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody of a child. By
dismissing the petition, the trial court in effect
upheld Gallardos right of custody over the
minor involved as against that of Bagtas.
o While it cannot be gainsaid that Gallardos
obtained initial custody in violation of a valid
court order, we nonetheless sustain and validate
such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is
because the Gallardos are the grandparents of
Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over her in the
absence of her parents. What is more, in
awarding custody to the Gallardos, the best
welfare of the child was taken into consideration
inasmuch as the implementation of the
agreement would cause more psychological
damage and traumatic experience to Maryl Joy.
The violation of a court order pales in
significance when considered alongside the best
interest of the minor whose welfare requires
that she be in the custody of her grandparents
rather than Bagtass. Under the factual and
legal milieux of the case, there is no question
that as grandparents of the minor, Gallardos
have a far superior right of custody over her
than Bagtas.
ISSUE: Was the sole purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus the production of Maryl Joy before the trial
court and that it would be moot upon said production?
NO.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states
that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases where the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. In cases involving minors, the
purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not
limited to the production of the child before
the court. The main purpose of the petition
for habeas corpus is to determine who has
the rightful custody over the child.
Tijing v CA: The writ of habeas corpus extends
to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be
in the custody of a third person of his own
free will. It may even be said that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of illegal
and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the
writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for
the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child.
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action
for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have
 conducted a trial to determine who had the
rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing
the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the
petition for habeas corpus and awarded the
custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without sufficient basis.
o Laxamana v. Laxamana: Mindful of the nature of
the case, the court a quo should have conducted
a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the
parties to submit the case for resolution on the
basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr.
Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from
questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the
courts primary basis in awarding custody to
respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision.
The fundamental policy of the State to promote
and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
It is true that Article 214 of the Civil Code states
that in case of absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. Article 216
also states that in default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the
child. However, in determining who has the
rightful custody over a child, the childs
welfare is the most important consideration.
The court is not bound by any legal right of a
person over the child. In Sombong v. Court of
Appeals:
o The controversy does not involve the question of
personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone until
he attains majority age. In passing on the writ in
a child custody case, the court deals with a
matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by
any mere legal right of parent or guardian,
the court gives his or her claim to the
custody of the child due weight as a claim
founded on human nature and considered
generally equitable and just. Therefore,
these cases are decided, not on the legal
right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in
the case of adults, but on the courts view
of the best interests of those whose
welfare requires that they be in custody of
one person or another. Hence, the court is
not bound to deliver a child into the custody of
any claimant or of any person, but should, in the
consideration of the facts, leave it in such
custody as its welfare at the time appears to
require.
o Considering that the childs welfare is an all-
important factor in custody cases, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that
in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration. In the same vein,
the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the
welfare of the child so demands, deprive the
parents concerned of parental authority over the
child or adopt such measures as may be proper
under the circumstances.
 In Sombong, the Court laid down three requisites
in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors:
(1) the petitioner has a right of custody over
the minor,
(2) the respondent is withholding the rightful
custody over the minor, and
(3) the best interest of the minor demands
that he or she be in the custody of the
petitioner.
In the present case, these requisites are not
clearly established because the RTC hastily
dismissed the action and awarded the
custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without conducting any trial.
The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to
be desired. While a remand of the case would mean
further delay, Maryl Joys best interest demands
that proper proceedings be conducted to determine
the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care of
her.
DISPOSITION: Case remanded for the purpose of
receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the
Gallardos to have custody of Maryl Joy.