G.R. No.

88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner

VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms

dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasans failed coup

5. Communist insurgency movements

6. secessionist movements in Mindanao

7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return
in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the
interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.

Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.

Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power
although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-
23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.
She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power
to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on
the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has
to uphold the Constitution.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp

Citation. 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255, 1936 U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Curtiss-Wright (Defendant), a weapons manufacturer, was
convicted of selling arms to warring nations in South America in violation of an Executive Order
that was made pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The non-delegation doctrine does not bar Congress from delegating
great authority and discretion to the President of the United States (the President) in the conduct
of foreign affairs.

Facts. Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to ban the sales of arms to
countries involved in the border dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. The President
immediately made an Executive Order banning such sales. The Defendant was indicted for
conspiracy to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia in violation of the Joint Resolution and the
Executive Order.

Issue. May Congress delegate law-making authority to the President in matters of foreign affairs?

Held. Yes, the President has broad authority to conduct foreign affairs.

Discussion. There is a fundamental difference in the role of government in foreign affairs and
domestic affairs. The federal government has both constitutional and inherent authority to
conduct foreign affairs as it sees fit. The President is the United States sole representative to
foreign nations. In order to achieve the United States foreign policy aims, the President is better
able than Congress to judge conditions that exist in foreign nations and is afforded substantial
discretion and wide latititude in those decisions. The President has confidential information as
well as consular, diplomatic and foreign affairs officers to help in his decision.
[CHAVEZ VS PCGG CASE DIGEST (CONSTI 2: RIGHT TOINFORMATION)]

March 8, 2010

Right to Information, access to public documents7 CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

Facts:

-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former
governmentofficial) initiated this original action seeking(1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents
[PCGG and its chairman] from privately enteringinto, perfecting and/or executing any agreement
with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located inthe Philippines and/or abroad including
the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and(2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be theyongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating
to such negotiations andagreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the
same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies whocommitted
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of thecountry's
economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several newsreports 2
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news itemsreferred to
(1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in variouscoded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between
thegovernment (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-
PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreementspertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims
that anycompromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
publicinterest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be
greatlyprejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general
have aright to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-
RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with
theMarcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is
noshowing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And
evenif he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms
andconditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.-PETITIONER
INVOKES

Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
berecognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts,transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development,shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

h a n n a m a p a n d iPage 2

[CHAVEZ VS PCGG CASE DIGEST (CONSTI 2: RIGHT TOINFORMATION)]

March 8, 2010-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to

completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL
AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and
all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in
the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED
to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES

AUTHORITY
384 SCRA 152

FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then
president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later,
PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These
two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA
as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the
lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates
of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an
investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the
conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure
of the renegotiations happening between the parties.

ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed
or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources
are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain,
natural resources cannot be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750
hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged
areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the
actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be
incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain,
waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore
and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of
the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the
law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 A report by Charles Aguilar

FACTS: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On September 28,
2005, t

he President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensur

ing Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution,

and For Other Purposes, w

hich, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. ISSUES: 1.

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2.

Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;
and 3.

Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. HELD: 1.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it
is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation. 2.
Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed
to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. 3.

Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the
same is exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct effect on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Due process requires that the people should have been
apprised of its issuance before it was implemented

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

[G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010]

1.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had his compulsory retirement on May 17, 2010, seven days after
the coming PresidentialElections on May 10, 2010.

2.All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the
incumbentPresident can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.3.The
JBC, in its

en banc

meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of fillingup the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbentChief Justice
Honorable Reynato S. Puno.4.The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the
Philippine DailyInquirer and ThePhilippine Star.5.On February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to
proceed to the next step of announcing the names of thefollowing candidates to invite the public
to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,not later than February 22,
2010. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and ThePhilippine Star issues
of February 13, 2010.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the
Judiciary.

Ruling:

1. No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the SupremeCourt or to other appointments to the Judiciary.The Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.

Theframers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because
their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates
for judicialpositions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer bemidnight appointments to the Judiciary.Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article
VIII

, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of
thelower courts.

The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC.

Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court

before

the occurrence of the vacancy.2. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to
the President the list of nominees to fill avacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the
President to appoint one of them within the 90-day periodfrom the occurrence of the vacancy.3.
The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because
that shortensthe 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the
appointment. For the JBC to do sowill be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the
Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of .

Rufino vs. Endriga GR No 139554, July 21 2006 EN BANC CASE MAIN POINT: Appointing
authority may be given to other officials than the President provided the appointment is in a rank
lower than the appointing official. (ARTICLE 7, SECTION 16: APPOINTING POWER CAN
BE VESTED IN OTHER OFFICIALS)

FACTS: Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are
contesting each others appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current

members, was appointed by then-President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino
group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada. Endriga group
avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed PD 15

creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, appointment

into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential appointments
can only be made when the Board is

entirely vacant to uphold the CCPs charter of independence from pressure or

politics. Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on
appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution.
The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow
members is constitutional HELD: No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by
the trustees themselves is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. While it is stated that appointing powers
may be delegated by the President, such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower
than the appointing authority. In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member
transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke
autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the limitation of delegative appointing
power because such invocation puts CCP outside the control of the President.