Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing
upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it
and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually
shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would
be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing
as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm
or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only
safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of
RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate
policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions
of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law)
is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term
primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents
in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could
very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service
provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals
operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching
of reproductive health education

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services
does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private
and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise

PROCEDURAL

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the
RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident
that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case
or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the
locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters
or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
 Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
reproductive health and responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
sustainable human development as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the
public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another
health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra
vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017,
implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the
newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law
enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential
Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-
shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that
the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION , Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON,
AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a government-owned and -controlled corporation vested with authority under Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended, to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power, production of electricity from any and all sources, construction, operation
and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, main transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other works for
the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and to supply such power to the
inhabitants thereof.

In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for
the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. 2 Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property, with a total area of
14,257 square meters, which was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9696 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.

In light of its Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, NAPOCOR contends that the expropriation has become without basis for
lack of public purpose as a result of the retirement of the transmission lines; that if expropriation still proceeds, the Government will be unduly burdened
by payment of just compensation for property it no longer requires; and that there is legal basis in dismissing the proceedings, citing Metropolitan Water
District v. De los Angeles35 where the Court granted petitioners prayer for the quashal of expropriation proceedings and the eventual dismissal of the
proceedings on the ground that the land sought to be expropriated was no longer indispensably necessary in the maintenance and operation of
petitioner's waterworks system.

The issue to be considered and resolved is whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

Ruling of the Court

The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4,36 Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable.

Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of eminent domain.

The right of eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within
the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.37 But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the
Governments exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to
the property owner.38 These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated.39cralawlawlibrary

Public use, in common acceptation, means use by the public. However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the
benefit of the public

It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for
the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of
the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason
that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the
pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings.
Ray Peter O. Vivo Versus Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation (PAGCOR)

G.R. No. 187854

November 12, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCORs
Managing Head of its Gaming Department. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCORs
Human Resources Department, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time
being placed under preventive suspension.

On February 26, 2002, the petitioners counsel, replying to Elas letter, assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for
placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry,
instructing him to appear before PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002. At the petitioners request, however, the inquiry was
conducted at his residence on said date. His statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished the memorandum of charges
that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its
investigation report to PAGCORs Adjudication Committee. The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in
order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date,
but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel
moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request.

The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002
meeting to the effect that he was being dismissed from the service. In its resolution dated April 11, 2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the
petitioners right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. On February 27, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process.

Issues:

1. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioners right for due process was not violated transgressed the fundamental rules in administrative
due process.

2. The Court of Appeals decision in setting aside CSC Resolutions Nos. 070732, dated 01 April 2007, and 071485, dated 01 August 2007, is contrary
to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.

Ruling:

The petition for review lacks merit.

The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR. He received the letter from Ela
apprising him of his being administratively charged for several offenses, and directing him to submit an explanation in writing. He was later on properly
summoned to appear before the CIU, which conducted its proceedings in his own residence upon his request. During the administrative inquiry, the CIU
served him a copy of the memorandum of charges, which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions constituting his
alleged offenses. He was also given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions. Lastly, he was
informed through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from the service.

In contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by PAGCOR as set forth herein. He made no credible
showing of the supposed violation of his right to due process. He was heard through the written statement he submitted in response to the
memorandum of the charges against him. He actively participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own residence. He was
afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings before the Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the adverse decision to
dismiss him from the service to the CSC. There is also no question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice requirement prior to the termination of his
employment, the first notice being made through Elas letter dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being administratively charged for the
offenses mentioned, and the second being through the letter dated May 15, 2002 advising him that PAGCORs Board of Directors had resolved to dismiss
him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded. The right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service. It is noteworthy, however, that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the administrative
case against him.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments
in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for
less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well
as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under
Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise
of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second,
the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the
ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:

No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and
hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the
State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a
day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used
as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then
it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived
of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

Puno. J.,

Facts:

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as
closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That compensation
and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed
under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]

The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1)
the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade
[SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of
class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.

Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to
some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause,
provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and
the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of
employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP
subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status
with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the
BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the
proviso.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by
the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the
quality of life for all." 108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government
employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their
efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-
and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be
given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is
unconstitutional.

Human Rights Law Case Digest: Stonehill V. Diokno (1967)

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Right against warrantless searches and seizures

Laws Applicable: bill of rights

FACTS:

In violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code, 42 warrants were issued
against petitioners or the corporation where they are officers to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of their books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) which are the subject of the offense.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued alleging the search warrants to be void since (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law
ISSUE: W/N the seizure is valid

HELD: YES. warrants for the search of 3 residences null and void; searches and seizures made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction issued

the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups,
namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had
not been disturbed
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
2 points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
- not met
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. - not met
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
 To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE VALDEZ G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A.
No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details
under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the
area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his
nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the
seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public
domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he
does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana
plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at
him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then
brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized
by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a
search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that
police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against
any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves
the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used
as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have
admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however,
must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for
said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." To
justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.