City of Manila vs Chinese
that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
Community of Manila
City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D),
31 October 1919
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that
certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and
claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity
existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a
cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was
covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not
be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation
of the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming
that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may
desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to
ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor
the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor;
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by
the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the
defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the
necessity of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511;
Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry.
etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The
power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right
of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that
general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly
within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which
the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether
the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely
legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and
propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of
eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in
a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa,
502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting
the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of
the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
(Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29,
1958
J. B. L . Reyes
Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal
council passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a
building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it
redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a
building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His
request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the
construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in
because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the
building due to its obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to
the question of the ordinances constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No, petition granted.
Ratio:
The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of
power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which
is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a
favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could
be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this
conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general
welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the
sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them
solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be
used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just
compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property
that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain,
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character.
The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following
discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds
of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and
issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee
which shall be determined by the municipal council and which
shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one
peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the
provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school
fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the
municipal council had either established fire limits within the
municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to
be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the
ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec.
2243 (c)
CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. PLDT
(1969)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American
corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US
and received by RCAs domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.
The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications,
after having set up its own Government Telephone System, by
utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk
lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint
overseas telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT
notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk
lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file
a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to
execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of
PLDTs telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing
trunk lines and restore those severed.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to
enter into a contract with the plaintiff.
HELD:
x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of
the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
to be determined by the court.
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No.
L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot
which, without prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale,
was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of
her lot which had been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of
Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the
said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by
prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be
sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process
of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument
for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is
for the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of
the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law
Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented
and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the
lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease
commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner
maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the taking of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation
by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when
the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must
enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period,
(3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public
use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the
government entered and occupied the property under a contract of
lease.
De Knecht v. Bautista
100 SCRA 660 (1980)
FACTS:
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately
linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the
expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.
Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to
make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del
Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to
the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route which save
the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation
proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets, among whom was petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a genuine need to expropriate the
properties owned by De Knecht and others similarly situated on
the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated
seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH.
HELD:
The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval. The Human Settlements
Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it
can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The
factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, while the factor of social and
economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on
the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development
are carried out for the benefit of the people.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [No. L-48685,September 30, 1987]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, March
01, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA)
filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing
facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This
included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.)
and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the
valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total
market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No.
1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private
property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation.
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero
issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of
land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this
petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing
the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed
under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due
process.
Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as
amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not
public use since it will benefit only a handful of people, bereft of
public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States
power of eminent domain.
(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the
property/properties to be expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair
valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors.
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their
parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue
of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge.
Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of
dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our
society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure
and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid
must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is
accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls within
the confines of public use.
(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be
taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may
be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or
gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate,
the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHAs
choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use,
enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has
to yield to the demands of the common good.
(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential
Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found
in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared
unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitute for just compensation.
(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as
amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate
taking of possession, control and disposition of property without
giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without
hearing.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-
59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are
the subject of this case is where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu
(EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in
which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to
the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent
Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the
latter contending that under PD 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared
by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this
petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and
mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode
of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation
constitutes impermissible encroachment to
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
the courts inutile in a matter in which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for
financial determination. The valuation in
the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in
 determining just compensation, but it may Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them
not substitute the courts own judgment as to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
to what amount should be awarded and how to
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be
arrive at such amount. The determination of
just compensation is a judicial function. used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
The executive department or the legislature information.
may make the initial determination but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
in the Bill of Rights that the private party organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
may not be taken for public use without just
Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
determination shall prevail over the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
courts findings. Much less can the courts against the taking of private property for public use without just
be precluded from looking into the justness compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
of the decreed compensation.
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
credible election.
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Issue:
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less
than one-half page for the common use of political parties and Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is
authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners
moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat
Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was
a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached
to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for
the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for
resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to
the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR
127820 (July 20, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012
G.R. No. 127820
292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of
1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for
expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of
land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577,
Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated
sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did
not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the
subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an
amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private
Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed
to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b)
the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated
as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA
7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its
power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its
legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a
law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code,
which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)
DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together
with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant
thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and
of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines
and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established
under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to
form a single company that now goes under the new name of
Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of
stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC
over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay
Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of
the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress
and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right
not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface
owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and
exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an
organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized under
Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the
mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas
affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA
ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL
TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and
means by which the foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to own
land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within
the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure.
The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas
on behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in
order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA.
Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are
still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other
than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely
facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and
shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its
implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just
compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of
Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the
payment of just compensation.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR SANCTIONING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS OF DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.
NO.
there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its
implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts from
their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation
proceedings involving mining operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the
authority to decide cases where surface owners, occupants,
concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating
involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of
the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board is final and conclusive. The determination is
only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is
nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of
Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a
preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected
landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains
intact despite the preliminary determination made by the
administrative agency.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942
AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO
THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over
mining operations. The following provisions thereof establish the
mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining
operations and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the
State to the role of a passive regulator dependent on submitted
plans and reports. On the contrary, the government agencies
concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to
influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the
corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the
exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining
enterprise.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE
ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS
IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES
PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the
inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do
with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical
assistance.
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a
conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive
wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression
agreements x x x involving either technical or financial
assistance in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE
CONTRACTS
NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the
1973 Constitution was not carried over to the present constitution,
sans any categorical statement banning service contracts in
mining activities, does not mean that service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would
invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject
to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however,
safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past
regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts.
But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between
foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on
the other, the government as principal or owner of the works. In
the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital,
technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in
the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive
enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR,
MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.
OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through
the application of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial review,
the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power; - involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash
of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40
has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into. The
FTAA holders have already been operating in various provinces of
the country.
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is
considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. (3) the
person challenging must have the standing" - personal or
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of
the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
! taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon
private property for more than a momentary period, and, under
the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use,
or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police
Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state
(and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully
delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation.On the other hand, police power is
the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent domain
have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a
mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of
the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall be
paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of
private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in
excess of their seating capacity (which would result in the
diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as
this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the
customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the
continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or
where property is destroyed because its continued existence would
be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking.
However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to
some public purpose, there is compensable taking.
! On different roles and responsibilities:
* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. (Executive
Order No. 279, 1987)
! in re: easements and taking
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition
of burden over a private property through easement was
considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is
required. The Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be established,
whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that
will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the
exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for
public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished
unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be
previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the
appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is
only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted
to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary
restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with
which the same is invested.
! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two
laws must be inconsistent.The former must be so repugnant as to
be irreconciliable with the latter act.