Contextualism

This article is about epistemological and ethical contex- 3. Conclusion: Therefore, I don't know O
tualism. For information about semantic contextualism,
see Context principle. Contextualist solution is not to deny any premise, nor to
say that the argument does not follow, but link the truth
Contextualism describes a collection of views in value of (3) to the context, and say that we can refuse (3)
philosophy which emphasize the context in which an ac- in contextlike everyday conversational contextwhere
tion, utterance, or expression occurs, and argues that, in we have dierent requirements to say we know.
some important respect, the action, utterance, or expres- The main tenet of contextualist epistemology, no matter
sion can only be understood relative to that context.[1] what account of knowledge it is wedded to, is that knowl-
Contextualist views hold that philosophically contro- edge attributions are context-sensitive. Then the truth
versial concepts, such as meaning P, knowing that values of out term know depend on the context in which
P, having a reason to A, and possibly even be- it is used . We can realize that in the context in which the
ing true or being right only have meaning relative standards to claim truthfully knowledge are so highe.
to a specied context. Some philosophers[2] hold that e., in skeptical contextif we said something like 'I know
context-dependence may lead to relativism;[3] neverthe- that I have hands then this statement would be false. Nev-
less, contextualist views are increasingly popular within ertheless, if we utter the same proposition in an ordinary
philosophy.[1] contexte.g., in a cafe with friends--, where lower stan-
In ethics, contextualist views are often closely associ- dards are in place , the statement would be truth, even
ated with situational ethics, or with moral relativism.[4] more, its negation would be false. So, only when we par-
ticipate in philosophical discourses of the skeptical sort,
In architectural theory, contextualism is a theory of de-
do we seem to lose our knowledge. However, once we
sign wherein modern (not be confused with modernism)
leave the skeptical context, we can truthfully say we have
building types are harmonized with urban forms usual to
[5] knowledge.
a traditional city.
That is, when we attribute knowledge to someone, the
context in which we use the term 'knowledge' determines
the standards relative to which knowledge is being at-
1 Epistemology tributed (or denied). If we use it in everyday conversa-
tional contexts, the contextualist maintains, most of our
1.1 Introduction claims to know things are true, despite skeptics at-
tempts to show we know little or nothing. But if the
In epistemology, contextualism is the treatment of the term 'knowledge' is used when skeptical hypotheses are
word 'knows as context-sensitive. Context-sensitive ex- being discussed, we count as knowing very little, if any-
pressions are ones that express dierent propositions thing. Contextualists use this to explain why skeptical
relative to dierent contexts of use.[6] For example, arguments can be persuasive, while at the same time pro-
some terms that are relatively uncontroversially consid- tecting the correctness of our ordinary claims to know
ered context-sensitive are indexicals, such 'I', 'here', and things. It is important to note that this theory does not al-
'now'. While the word 'I' has a constant linguistic mean- low that someone can have knowledge at one moment and
ing in all contexts of use, whom it refers to varies with not the other, for this would hardly be a satisfying episte-
context. Similarly, epistemic contextualists argue that the mological answer. What contextualism entails is that in
word 'knows is context sensitive, expressing dierent re- one context an utterance of a knowledge attribution can
lations in some dierent contexts. be true, and in a context with higher standards for knowl-
Contextualism was introduced, in part, in order to under- edge, the same statement can be false. This happens in
mine skeptical arguments that have this basic structure: the same way that 'I' can correctly be used (by dierent
people) to refer to dierent people at the same time.
1. I don't know that I am not in an skeptical scenario HWhat varies with context is how well-positioned a subject
(e.g., I'm not a brain in a vat) must be with respect to a proposition to count as know-
ing it. Contextualism in epistemology then is a semantic
2. If I don't know that H is not the case, then I don't thesis about how 'knows works in English, not a the-
know an ordinary proposition O (e.g., I have hands) ory of what knowledge, justication, or strength of epis-

1
2 1
temic position consists in.[7] However, epistemologists put into the empirical, that is, neuroscientic context of
combine contextualism with views about what knowledge consciousness.[8]
is to address epistemological puzzles and issues, such as
skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the Lottery paradox.
Contextualist accounts of knowledge became increas-
ingly popular toward the end of the 20th century, particu-
larly as responses to the problem of skepticism. Contem-
porary contextualists include Michael Blome-Tillmann,
Michael Williams, Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, David
Lewis, Gail Stine, and George Mattey.
Thus, the standards for attributing knowledge to some-
one, the contexualist claims, vary from one users context
to the next. Thus, if I say John knows that his car is
in front of him, the utterance is true if and only if (1)
John believes that his car is in front of him, (2) the car is
in fact in front of him, and (3) John meets the epistemic
standards that my (the speakers) context selects. This is
a loose contextualist account of knowledge, and there are
many signicantly dierent theories of knowledge that
can t this contextualist template and thereby come in a
contextualist form.
For instance, an evidentialist account of knowledge can
be an instance of contextualism if its held that strength
of justication is a contextually varying matter. And one
who accepts a relevant alternatives account of knowledge
can be a contextualist by holding that what range of al-
ternatives are relevant is sensitive to conversational con-
text. DeRose adopts a type of modal or safety (as it has
since come to be known) account on which knowledge is
a matter of ones belief as to whether or not p is the case
matching the fact of the matter, not only in the actual
world, but also in the suciently close possible worlds:
Knowledge amounts to there being no nearby worlds in
which one goes wrong with respect to p. But how close is
suciently close? Its here that DeRose takes the modal
account of knowledge in a contextualist direction, for the
range of epistemically relevant worlds is what varies
with context: In high standards contexts ones belief must
match the fact of the matter through a much wider range
of worlds than is relevant to low standards contexts.
1.2 Example
It is claimed that Neurophilosophy has the goal of con-
textualizing. We must contextualize questions usually
dealt with in the physical and epistemological domains
into the context of the empirical domain, the domain
of observation in third-person perspective. Rather than
approaching the metaphysical and epistemological issues
[about the nature and features of brain and mind] from
a mind-based (as in traditional philosophy) or brain-
reductive (as in neuroscience) perspective, we therefore
pursue a brain-based strategy and thus a non-reductive
neurophilosophy. The various arguments against the
material or physicalistic view of consciousness...are di-
rectly compared with the empirical data and are thus
EPISTEMOLOGY
1.3 Criticisms
However, contextualist epistemology has been criticized
by several philosophers. Contextualism is opposed to any
general form of Invariantism, which claims that knowl-
edge is not context-sensitive (i.e. it is invariant). More
recent criticism has been in the form of rival theories, in-
cluding Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), mainly due
to the work of John Hawthorne (2004), and Interest-
Relative Invariantism (IRI), due to Jason Stanley (2005).
SSI claims that it is the context of the subject of the
knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic stan-
dards, whereas Contextualism maintains it is the at-
tributor. IRI, on the other hand, argues that it is the
context of the practical interests of the subject of the
knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic stan-
dards. Stanley writes that bare IRI is simply the claim
that whether or not someone knows that p may be de-
termined in part by practical facts about the subjects
environment.[9] (Contextualism is a misnomer for ei-
ther form of Invariantism, since Contextualism among
epistemologists is considered to be restricted to a claim
about the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions
(or the word knows). Thus, any view which main-
tains that something other than knowledge attributions
are context-sensitive is not, strictly speaking, a form of
Contextualism.) DeRose (2009) responds to recent at-
tacks on contextualism, and argues that contextualism is
superior to these recent rivals.
An alternative to contextualism called contrastivism has
been proposed by Jonathan Schaer. Contrastivism, like
contextualism, uses semantic approaches to tackle the
problem of skepticism.[10]
1.4 Experimental research
Recent work in the new eld of experimental philoso-
phy has taken an empirical approach to testing the claims
of contextualism and related views. This research has
proceeded by conducting experiments in which ordinary
non-philosophers are presented with vignettes which in-
volve a knowledge ascription. Participants are then asked
to report on the status of that knowledge ascription. The
studies address contextualism by varying the context of
the knowledge ascription, e.g., how important it is that
the agent in the vignette has accurate knowledge.
In the studies completed up to this point, no support for
contextualism has been found.[11] This critique of con-
textualism can be summed up as: stakes have no im-
pact on evidence. More specically, non-philosophical
intuitions about knowledge attributions are not aected
by the importance to the potential knower of the ac-
curacy of that knowledge. Some may argue that these
 3

empirical studies for the most part have not been well [6] Stanley (2005), p. 16.
designed for testing contextualism, which claims that
the context of the attributor of knowledge aects [7] Stanley (2005), p. 17.
the epistemic standards that govern their claims. Be- [8] Northo, Georg (2014) p. 351
cause most of the empirical studies don't vary the stakes
for the attributor, but for the subject being described, [9] Stanley (2005), p. 85.
these studies are more relevant to the evaluation of
[10] Schaer (2004).
John Hawthornes Subject-Sensitive Invariantism or Ja-
son Stanleys Interest-Relative Invariantismviews on [11] See Feltz and Zarpentine (2010), May, Sinnott-
which the stakes for the putative subject of knowledge Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman (2010), and
can aect whether that subject knowsthan they are of Buckwatler (2010).
contextualism. However, Feltz & Zarpentine (forthcom-
[12] See, for example, Schaer and Knobe (2011).
ing) have tested the stakes for both the subject and the
attributor, and the results are not in keeping with contex-
tualism. Experimental work continues to be done on this
topic.[12] 4 References and further reading
Annis, David. 1978. A Contextualist Theory of
2 See also Epistemic Justication, in American Philosophical
Quarterly, 15: 213-219.
Anekantavada Buckwalter, Wesley (2010). Knowledge Isn't
Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Lan-
Degrees of truth
guage. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 1
Exclusive disjunction (3): 395406. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3.

False dilemma Cappelen, H. & Lepore, E. 2005. Insensitive Seman-

tics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech
Fuzzy logic Act Pluralism, Blackwell Publishing.
Logical disjunction Cohen, Stuart. 1998. Contextualist Solutions to
Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and
Logical value
the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
Multi-valued logic 76: 289-306.

Perspectivism Cohen Stuart. 1999. Contextualism, Skepticism,

and Reasons, in Tomberlin 1999.
Principle of Bivalence
DeRose, Keith. 1992. Contextualism and Knowl-
Propositional logic edge Attributions, Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research 52: 913-929.
Relativism
DeRose, Keith. 1995. Solving the Skeptical Prob-
Rhizome (philosophy) lem, Philosophical Review 104: 1-52.
Semiotic anthropology DeRose, Keith. 1999. Contextualism: An Expla-
Truth nation and Defense, in Greco and Sosa 1999.

Epistemology at Wikiversity DeRose, Keith. 2002. Assertion, Knowledge, and

Context, Philosophical Review 111: 167-203.

DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism:

3 Footnotes Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Vol. 1, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
[1] Price (2008).
Feldman, Richard. 1999. Contextualism and
[2] Feldman (1999). Skepticism, in Tomberlin 1999.
[3] Mackie (1977) Feltz, Adam; Zarpentine, Chris (2010). Do
[4] Timmons (1998).
You Know More When It Matters Less?".
Philosophical Psychology. 23 (5): 683706.
[5] Jencks, p. 78-79 doi:10.1080/09515089.2010.514572.
4 5 EXTERNAL LINKS

Greco, J. & Sosa, E. 1999. Blackwell Guide to Epis- Rysiew, Patrick. Epistemic Contextualism.
temology, Blackwell Publishing. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy..
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries, Epistemic contextualism at the Indiana Philosophy
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ontology Project
Jencks, Charles (2002). New Paradigm In Architec-
ture (7th ed.). Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-
09512-0.
Mackie, J.L. 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and
Wrong, Viking Press, ISBN 0-14-013558-8.
May, Joshua, Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Hull, Jay
G. & Zimmerman, Aaron. 2010. "Practical Inter-
ests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attribu-
tions: An Empirical Study", Review of Philosophy
and Psychology (formerly European Review of Phi-
losophy), special issue on Psychology and Experi-
mental Philosophy ed. by Edouard Machery, Tania
Lombrozo, & Joshua Knobe, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.
265273.
Northo, Georg (2014). Neurophilosophy of con-
sciousness: from mind to consciousness. Minding
the Brain: A Guide to Philosophy and Neuro-
science. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 351. ISBN
9781137406057.
Price, A. W. 2008. ' 'Contextuality in Practical Rea-
son' ', Oxford University Press.
Schaer, Jonathan; Knobe, Joshua (2011). Con-
trastive Knowledge Surveyed. Nous. 46 (4): 675
708. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00795.x.
Schaer, Jonathan. 2004. From Contextualism to
Contrastivism, Philosophical Studies 119: 73-103.
Schier, Stephen. 1996. Contextualist Solutions to
Scepticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
96:317-33.
Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical In-
terests. New York: Oxford University Press.
Timmons Mark, 1998 Morality Without Founda-
tions: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism Oxford
University Press US.
Tomberlin, James (ed.). 1999. Philosophical Per-
spectives 13, Epistemology, Blackwell Publishing.

5 External links
A Brief History of Contextualism - DeRose on the
history of contextualism in epistemology.
Contextualism in Epistemology - an article by Tim
Black on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic contextualism at PhilPapers
 5

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