86 Sarah Williams Holtman

Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief1

by Sarah Williams Holtman, Minneapolis/Minnesota

Introduction

Those who do not specialize in Kants practical philosophy often are surprised
to learn that he has anything to say about state-funded poverty relief. His most ex-
tensive treatment of the topic requires only two paragraphs of the Rechtslehre.2
A small part of Kants more general treatment of state authority, this discussion
is easy to overlook. All the more so since it is flanked by famous (or infamous) ac-
counts of punishment and revolution.
Unfamiliar as it may be to non-specialists, though, many Kantians have ac-
knowledged the discussion as both puzzling and worthy of serious consideration.
For alternative readings support, and themselves find a foundation in, very differ-
ent accounts of justice and the aims and obligations of the state. On a minimalist
reading still popular with some, for example, Kant here envisions the state as a
mere night watchman.3 It is limited to preventing force and fraud and to enforcing
valid contracts. According to the minimalist, social welfare programs that supply
basic necessities are legitimate only as a tool to insure against crises (political up-
heaval, famine, severe economic depression) that threaten the states very exist-

1 Thanks to Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Norman Dahl, H. E. Mason, Valerie Tiberius and two anony-
mous referees for their insightful criticisms of earlier drafts. I am also grateful to an audi-
ence at VPI&SU and to meetings of the Midwest Study Group of the North American Kant
Society and 4M for their helpful comments. Finally, I am indebted to the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, which provided a summer stipend that allowed time for extensive
revisions.
2 The Rechtslehre, the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals, will be my primary topic here.
Quotations to The Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter MM) are from The Cambridge Edition
of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary Gregor. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 1996. The passage, at MM 6:32526, consists of the
first two paragraphs of Remark C in Kants discussion of the right of a state. For related dis-
cussion of the passage itself with particular attention to Allen Rosens interpretation see my
Justice, Welfare and the Kantian State. In: Proceedings of the Ninth International Kant Con-
gress. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher, eds. Vol. 4. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter 2001, 152160.
3 I take the term minimalism from Allen Rosen. For an excellent discussion and critique of
minimalism see his Kants Theory of Justice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993, Ch. 5.
For further discussion see Alexander Kaufman: Welfare in the Kantian State. New York:
Oxford University Press 1999, 257.

Kant-Studien 95. Jahrg., S. 86106

Walter de Gruyter 2004
ISSN 0022-8877
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 87

ence.4 Cash assistance and other tax-supported aid to the poor, then, have their
source neither in justices demands on behalf of those of limited means nor even in
virtues of charity or benevolence. Although the justification for such laws may be
moral rather than pragmatic, the focus of this justification is not on the needs of
the poor, but preservation of the state.
More recent interpretations suggest that we understand the Kantian state to
have a duty of poverty relief indeed focusing on the poor and often cast either as a
requirement of virtue, Kantian justice being narrowly concerned with preventing
force and fraud, or as what we might call a mixed duty.5 In the case of mixed duty,
some requirements stem from a more sophisticated justice whose primary concerns
remain force and fraud; others stem from virtues of charity or benevolence whose
subjects are more wide-ranging.6

4 Those offering a minimalist interpretation include: Bruce Aune: Kants Theory of Morals.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1979, 15660; Jeffrie G. Murphy: Kant: The Phi-
losophy of Right. London: Macmillan & Co. 1970, 1446; Howard L. Williams: Kants
Political Philosophy. New York: St. Martins Press 1983, 19598. Murphy does suggest that
Kants larger theory in fact commits him to more in the realm of public welfare. Williams
notes, with puzzlement, that Kant makes an exception to his minimalism in the case of pov-
erty relief and concludes that Kant founds the exception on overarching moral principle
rather than justice. The minimalist interpretation was common among Kant scholars for a
time during the second half of the 20th century. Though many recent interpreters have aban-
doned it, it remains a popular understanding of Kant particularly among non-specialists.
5 Rosens interpretation of the passage provides a nice example of the virtue-based account.
According to Rosen, the Kantian state takes over from its citizens the duty of benevolence. It
thus is charged not only with insuring that citizens are treated justly, but with providing for
their happiness. Most fundamentally, the state must, in fulfilling this duty of virtue, see to
the basic needs of its citizens. Although she does not interpret our passage in any of her rel-
evant writings, Onora ONeills expressly Kant-influenced work nevertheless provides us a
good sense of the reasoning underlying what I call a mixed account. ONeill agrees that jus-
tice requires the state to take substantial steps to insure that its citizens are not vulnerable to
force and fraud. Thus it must not only protect each from attack and deceit through the penal
system, for example, but also must provide for basic needs so that poverty does not render
citizens vulnerable despite these more direct protections. Since the concern of justice for
Kant is force and fraud, however, the state is not warranted, on grounds of justice, in offer-
ing social welfare benefits unconnected to prevention of these ills. The additional help that
citizens often require is rightly the province of virtue, which grants us a flexibility in time
and manner of satisfaction. In some cases, we best satisfy our duty to help others by assig-
ning its fulfillment to the state, which can coordinate efforts better and more efficiently than
individuals working on their own. In other cases assistance (always a matter of duty not of
choice), including provision for some basic needs, best is left in the hands of individuals. For
relevant discussions see Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development.
London: Allen & Unwin 1986; The Great Maxims of Justice and Charity. In: Constructions
of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press 1989, 219233. ONeills most recent
work (which again is not interpretive but strongly Kant-influenced) seems to depart from
her earlier position by somewhat expanding the scope of justice, see Towards Justice and
Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
6 ONeill and Rosen are not alone in their less restrictive readings of Kant. Other recent
examples include Paul Guyer: Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge
88 Sarah Williams Holtman

We certainly can find support for these various views in Kant. Nevertheless, I will
suggest that close examination of the passage and central elements of the accounts
of justice and citizenship provide strong reason to favor another interpretation of
the passage and an alternative version of the larger theory. Contra popular readings,
then, I will argue that Kants views on poverty relief are founded not on state sta-
bility or personal virtue, but on a rich account of justice, one demanding that we
meaningfully acknowledge and seek to promote the independence of individual
citizens.7 To this end, I examine Kants passage itself, the surrounding discussions of
justice and independence, and the relationship between justice and virtue on Kants
view. I will argue, in particular, that the scope of Kantian justice is much broader
than most have thought; it does not aim solely at preventing force and fraud.
Further, I will suggest that justice as Kant envisions it can be flexible in its dictates
and sensitive to context; it is as well-equipped as Kantian virtue to address an issue,
like poverty relief, that demands such sensitivity.
While we learn much from close textual argument, though, we best appreciate
the content and power of Kants account of poverty relief by recognizing the ways in
which it contrasts, in application, with familiar alternatives. So I will close by ask-
ing how Kant might respond to advocates and opponents of recent welfare reforms
in the U.S. Against both reform advocates and even some critics, I will claim, Kant
insists first that poverty relief best is viewed as a share of joint assets, not a handout
to subordinates. As it is properly aimed at fostering independence, a system of relief
on Kants model further must be structured not merely to provide sustenance or
even to prevent force and fraud (as the contemporary debate suggests). Rather, it
must be designed to foster self-respect, a sense of ones equality with others, and the
skills of argument and evaluation. Finally, while Kant well might applaud develop-

University Press 2000, Chs. 7 and 8; Kaufman: Welfare in the Kantian State; Harry van der
Linden: Kantian Ethics and Socialism. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company
1988. Of these, Kaufman understands Kantian justice as primarily aimed at preventing
force and fraud and van der Linden appeals more to the moral foundations offered in the
Groundwork than, as I do, to Kants positive account of justice. Guyer offers a rich account
of Kantian justice compatible, I think, with my own. His starting point is Kants discussion
of property rather than that of citizenship; thus his focus differs from mine. What we might
call a social justice interpretation of Kant also was popular among neo-Kantians of the early
20th century, though these readings again appealed more to Kants larger moral philosophy
than to his account of justice. For helpful commentary see van der Linden: Kantian Ethics
and Socialism, 291307.
7 Throughout, I will use the terms social welfare and poverty relief to refer to those state-
supported programs that provide basic necessities food, clothing, shelter to those too
poor to secure them alone. What I say also suggests Kantian implications for social welfare
more broadly conceived, but I will not pursue those here in any detail. For a discussion of
some of those implications see my Kant, Ideal Theory and the Justice of Exclusionary Zon-
ing. In: Ethics 110, 1999, 3258. As I argue there, provision for relief that goes beyond basic
needs or takes into account non-idealities Kant did not address requires augmentation of his
view, not mere interpretation. As will become clear in what follows, though, interpretation
does yield insights not only regarding the basic relief the just state must provide but the
spirit in which relief rightly is given and received.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 89

ment of the virtues of thrift and hard work lauded by reform advocates and critics
alike, these cannot be virtues that a welfare system on Kants model itself seeks
to instill. Given his views on justice and citizenship, its proper aim in this regard is
instead a virtue we might call civic respect and concern.

I. Kant on State-Funded Social Welfare

A. The Passage

We begin with the Rechtslehre passage itself. Among the rights that follow from
the nature of the civil union, according to Kant, is the states right to tax for the
support of the poor, those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary
natural needs (MM 6:326). Whatever its deeper foundations, this right to tax de-
rives from the peoples duty and stems from a more general right to impose taxes
on the people for its own preservation (MM 6:32526). Among the potential uses
for tax monies is support for the poor (MM 6:326).
To establish that a state may tax to relieve poverty in particular, Kant first re-
minds us that the general will of the people unites itself into an ongoing society
for whose perpetual maintenance it also submits to the states authority. In explain-
ing what he means by societys perpetual maintenance, Kant adds that we submit to
such authority in order to maintain those members of the society who are unable
to maintain themselves (MM 6:326).
Perhaps Kant has in mind that no society can maintain itself without insuring
basic sustenance for some minimum number of citizens. The well-being of this
number would be required not merely so that the state would have a populace, but
to make possible cooperative efforts in agriculture and industry, to perform govern-
mental functions and to produce future generations. Nevertheless, even this brief
examination allows us to see that the minimalist interpretation squares question-
ably, at best, with the passages language. First, Kant does not refer to stability
directly. He seems quite straightforwardly to equate societys maintenance with the
sustenance of its individual members. Second, his justification for imposing tax
burdens on the rich is neither that this is necessary for the protection and care of the
wealthy nor that it is warranted by the needs of the state. Taxes are justified because
they will be used to satisfy the needs of the people, which would include, but not be
limited to, social stability. Finally, Kants reference here to the general will a will in
which each citizen participates qua citizen recalls, as we will see, a larger account
of justice that demands respect for the freedom, equality and independence of each
citizen.
From this focus on individual welfare we might think that the states right to tax
for poverty relief derives instead from the duty of benevolence or charity that binds
all individual members as rational agents. This, however, is far from clear. Our pas-
sage is embedded in a detailed discussion of the nature and justification of the state.
90 Sarah Williams Holtman

If we want to know from what duty this right stems, we must look more closely at
the reason for which, according to Kant, we unite in an ongoing society. Thus we
carefully must examine, as we will in the next section, Kants discussion of the trio
of duties that requires us to form the state and submit to its authority, as well as his
discussions of the state of nature and the original contract. There seems as yet no
reason to suppose that persons unite primarily to meet obligations of benevolence
or charity as opposed to those of justice.8 Likewise, as yet we have no reason to be-
lieve that, for Kant, the concerns of justice themselves are limited to preventing
force and fraud. Ascertaining the subjects of justice on Kants view also must await
close examination of the larger theory.
Whatever the source of the duty the state assumes from its people, Kant does tell
us that it authorizes coercive taxes on the wealthy to provide the poor with the very
means of sustenance, to address their most necessary natural needs (MM 6:326).
The concern, then, is not with barriers to happiness in general, which might speak
for an underlying duty of benevolence, but with basic needs. Kant also expands
further on the reason for which we form the state. The wealthy (but presumably
others as well) submit to the states authority (or rightly can be taken to do so) be-
cause they require its protection and care [] in order to live (MM 6:326). We
form the state to maintain ourselves, at least in part by providing for our most basic
needs. Kant makes clear that the poor and wealthy alike require and use the state for
this purpose.
The passage, then, speaks importantly against the minimalist interpretation. It
is consistent, I think, with virtue-based and mixed interpretations, though such a
reading is far from obvious. Finally, while revealing little about the nature and
scope of justice, it does leave us doubtful that any underlying duty of justice is li-
mited to preventing force and fraud. What is most evident from the passages lan-
guage and context is that we must examine Kants more explicit discussions of the
states formation if we are to establish what duty of the people the state assumes.
For whatever duty it is, it is closely tied to our very reason for forming the state.

8 One might think that the fact that Kant speaks here of the states right to impose taxes
rather than its duty provides such a reason. However, Kant speaks in terms of rights
throughout this discussion of the state. Even punishment, which justice requires for every
proven criminal, is discussed in terms of the states right to punish. This language may
have its source in Kants claim that, while the state has substantial duties of justice to
citizens, they may not forcibly demand that it fulfill them. More, while duties of virtue do
possess a flexibility those of justice do not, whether or not we fulfill them is not up to us;
they indeed are duties. The language of right, then, provides no reason to suppose that
state-funded poverty relief concerns what the state may do and not what it must. At most it
seems to suggest that the state might address poverty by more than one route, compulsory
taxation being not only acceptable, but for Kant preferred.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 91

B. Forming and Justifying the State

Two foundational Rechtslehre discussions reveal the reasons to form the state
on Kants account. Consider first his division of duties of right (or justice) in the
Rechtslehres early pages. Each of us has what Kant calls an internal duty to as-
sert our own worth as a human being. We can capture this demand in terms highly
reminiscent of the Groundworks formula of humanity: Do not make yourself a
mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them (MM 6:236). Pre-
sumably because my humanity has value in itself, and not due to the fact that it is
mine, each of us has a further duty not to wrong others, a duty each must honor
even if this requires that we shun all society (MM 6:236). Where we cannot avoid
associating with others, this second duty gives rise to a third: enter into a society
with [others] in which each can keep what is his (MM 6:237).
The discussion, Kant makes clear, concerns perfect duties of justice. Among these
is a duty to join with others to form a civil society designed to secure just treatment
for each. This warrants genuine pause about any suggestion that Kant appeals to
benevolence or charity in discussing poverty relief. For underlying, and not merely
legitimating but requiring, the formation of the state is a duty to do justice. If the
people have a duty to the poor related to their purpose in forming civil society and
assumed by the state, it seems reasonable to believe that it is this one. Still, the con-
nection may seem tenuous to some since we know little so far about why civil so-
ciety is the vehicle through which we are to secure justice.
Kant, we further should recall, is a social contract theorist.9 True to that tradi-
tion, he employs conceptions of the state of nature and original contract as heuristic
devices to aid us in grasping the structure, substance and justification of the legit-
imate state. Kants appeal is not to an historical state of nature, nor more impor-
tantly to one (real or fictitious) that necessarily would be controlled by force and
wiles (MM 6:312). Rather, the difficulty with the state of nature (and the reason we
must form the state) is that it necessarily lacks the means to assist imperfect human
beings (the subjects of justice) in identifying, resolving conflicts among, and protect-
ing individual rights. Thus [e]very state [or] general united will consists of three
persons: the legislator, who makes laws per the demands of justice; the executive,
who enforces these laws; and the judge, who resolves disputes about the nature and
extent of the rights these laws accord us (MM 6:313).
So described the state identifies, enforces and sometimes interprets to our per-
sonal disadvantage demands of justice that would go unrecognized or unheeded in
its absence. Kant further holds these limitations to be fully legitimate only if we can

9 As should be evident in what follows, Kants claim is not (with some social contract the-
orists) that justice is founded on actual consent. Rather, his appeal to a social contract
(like Rawlss) serves to highlight the values and concerns we must address if we are to do
justice.
92 Sarah Williams Holtman

conceive of each, through the original contract, as having relinquished entirely his
wild, lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as such undiminished, in a de-
pendence upon laws (MM 6:316).
This inquiry into the foundations of the Kantian state illuminates the ends it is to
serve.10 When we lack means to specify, interpret and enforce the requirements of
justice, not one of us can be certain that we will be treated with justice or act justly
toward others. To make justice an ongoing reality for each, we must conceive of
ourselves as contracting to exchange a freedom unlimited by civil restrictions for a
state governed by laws that are made, interpreted and enforced in keeping with the
substantive requirements of justice, requirements we must fulfill for each.11 It thus
seems reasonable to conclude that when Kant speaks of a duty the state takes over
from the people, it is the duty to secure justice through the authorities that define
the state. Likewise, when he speaks of the obligation of wealthy persons to obey co-
ercive laws, it would seem to be one deriving not from benevolence or charity, from
the needs and permissible ends of others that each of us must (to a degree) make our
own. Rather, contra virtue-based and mixed interpretations, it is apparently an ob-
ligation to obey those laws by which the state legitimately seeks to secure justice for
each of its members.

C. The Scope of Kantian Justice

We now have good reason to suppose that tax-funded support for the basic needs
of poor people is founded, on Kants account, in justice. We do not yet know, though,
what the scope of justice is on his view. What problems or social ills is justice meant
to address? More particularly is Kantian justice, and thus the aim and ultimately the
extent of support, limited to what we reasonably can describe as prohibitions on
force and fraud? If we find the scope of justice to be sufficiently narrow, we might

10 I sometimes use the term Kantian to describe various positions and claims. I do so only to
make clear that I am speaking about the views I attribute to Kant and not, say, to justice or
virtue more generally. I do not here intend Kantian either to mark extensions or augmen-
tations of Kants views or to suggest that all must read him as I do.
11 In fact, our inability to achieve justice in a state of nature stems, most importantly, neither
from our tendency to err in applying the general requirements of justice to concrete cases
nor from self-interest or malevolence. Even absent these difficulties, the demands of the
principle of justice are inevitably underdetermined. Our status of moral equality prevents
any of us from requiring others to adhere to one of several equally good methods of realiz-
ing justice in concrete cases. Yet if we do not coordinate our actions under a single principle,
we will thwart not only self-interest, but justice as well. The state is, for Kant, the only
morally appropriate solution to this underdetermination problem. For a more thorough dis-
cussion see my Revolution, Contradiction and Kantian Citizenship. In: Kants Metaphysics
of Morals: Interpretive Essays. Mark Timmons, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.
Present purposes, though, require only that we recognize that the duty the state assumes
from its people is the duty to do justice.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 93

locate the justification for at least some basic support, from Kants perspective, in
charity or benevolence rather than justice. We might after all endorse either a vir-
tue-based or a mixed view.

1) Force and fraud

We can find grounds to believe that, for Kant, justice primarily is concerned to
prevent force and fraud in his most basic standard of justice and in the discussion of
the state coercion with which justice intimately is connected. Kants first law of jus-
tice commands: so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with
the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law (MM 6:231). Its focus
certainly seems to be on limiting ones chosen actions to the extent they may inter-
fere unduly with the choices or actions of others. The limits that most readily come
to mind, given their historical centrality to discussions of justice, are forbearance
from force and fraud. Force either functions as a threat that impedes freedom of
choice by attaching special burdens to some alternatives or presents a physical ob-
stacle to the action in which I have decided to engage. Fraud interferes with free
choice by seeking to procure choices that would not be made were facts or true cir-
cumstances known.
Our inclination to understand justice-relevant limits on freedom as those involv-
ing force gains strength from the intimate connection between justice and coercion
on Kants view. To appreciate this connection, we must grasp a central difference be-
tween justice and what Kant terms ethics. For my action fully to conform to moral-
itys demands, Kants Groundwork emphasizes, I not only must act as morality
requires, but must do so because this is a requirement of morality. Morality makes
demands both on my actions and on my motivations. Not so justice.
If I am to satisfy the demands of justice, I must insure that my chosen acts do not
unduly limit others choices or actions. My motivations in acting, however, are of
no consequence so far as justice is concerned. I may constrain myself from fear of
punishment or reprisal, from hope for reward or from commitment to justice itself,
and I will equally have satisfied my duty to act justly. The reason for this difference
between justice and ethics or morality lies in the very concept of justice, which takes
as its subject the effects that the chosen acts of one may have on the choices and
actions of others. (MM 6:230).12 Justice imposes no motivational demands on us
because there is no necessary connection between motivation and the effects that
are justices concern. A variety of different motivations may underlie the same just
(or unjust) act (MM 6:231).
Because justice is not conceptually linked to motivation, Kant believes, it is con-
ceptually linked to coercion, to what is a hindrance or resistance to freedom
(MM 231). In the normal course coercion, as a constraint on choice or impediment

12 This does not mean that I have no duty to act, as it were, from justice. Kant makes clear that
duties of justice also are duties of ethics. If I am to act morally, I must do what is just because
this is what justice requires (MM 6:231).
94 Sarah Williams Holtman

to action, conflicts with justice. In one employment, however, it is integrally con-

nected with it. This is the case when we use coercion to hinder injustice. In this
instance, coercion operates not as a problematic restriction on choice and action,
but as a protection against undue hindrances of them. That coercion thus can serve
justice helps found Kants claim that the two are importantly connected. Each dic-
tate of practical reason, Kant tells us, must have two components. One of these is
descriptive; it tells us what our duty is. The other is motivational; it gives us a reason
to act as duty requires (MM 6:218). While the requirements of justice number
among the dictates of practical reason, they do not share the motivational compo-
nent attached to requirements of ethics; thus they must find that component else-
where. Coercion that acts as a hindrance to undue hindrances to freedom supplies
this need and supplies it without appeal to an ethical commitment: one can locate
the concept of [justice] directly in the possibility of connecting universal reciprocal
coercion with the freedom of everyone (MM 6:232).13
That we can describe the very concept of justice in terms of limits on choice and
action enforced against each by external constraint may fortify the impression that
doing justice is, most centrally, a matter of preventing the misuse of force. Kant may
seem to suggest that, when we legitimately coerce, we simply use against the of-
fender the same methods he himself employs. And we most readily may think of co-
ercion itself as a threat backed by the force to carry it out. If we recall that manipu-
lation is another common sense of coercion, we may decide that the connection
between coercion and justice supports the claim that fraud prevention also is a main
Kantian concern.14

2) A broader freedom
Examining Kants own conception of freedom more closely, though, yields a quite
different impression.15 For this conception turns out to be more complex than we
might have guessed. As described in the Rechtslehres early pages, freedom as Kant
here intends it has several aspects or authorizations, which are not really distinct
from it(MM 6:237). These are: 1) innate equality; 2) the quality of being ones
own master or sui juris; 3) the quality of being beyond reproach or
iust[us]; and finally 4) the authorization to do to others anything that does not
in itself diminish what is theirs (MM 6:23738, emphasis in original).

13 To describe the relationship between justice and coercion on Kants view is not yet to ex-
plain why Kant believes we are justified in coercing those who commit injustice. But it is all
that is required for my purposes here. For helpful discussion of the latter point see Guyer:
Freedom, Law and Happiness, Ch. 8.
14 Due to the deep moral problem with dishonesty on Kants account, though, legitimate co-
ercion will not mirror fraud.
15 Here I use conception as Rawls does, to mark one of several ways in which one might fill
out a general concept. I have nothing metaphysical in mind. See John Rawls: A Theory of
Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971, 5.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 95

The last of these aspects is the one that squares with prohibitions on force and
fraud in their most straightforward forms. As among the infringements on freedom
that justice prohibits, it most obviously identifies actions that interfere directly and
unduly with the property of others or, one presumes, with their persons.16 Kant also
acknowledges some communications as undue interferences with freedom as he in-
tends it. Here again the concern is with direct infringements, those using deceit in
order to influence choice to anothers detriment, thus with fraud as typically under-
stood (MM 6:238).
What it is critical to recognize is that force and fraud fall under only one of four
separate categories of justice-related freedom. Under the aspect of innate equality,
for example, our freedom also is limited unduly if we treat some as though the limits
they legitimately may place on others choices and actions are less extensive than
those others may place on theirs. This aspect of freedom is one transgressed most
obviously when legal restrictions are placed on some, leaving others free to act as
they please. It is one we equally transgress when we apply the same strictures more
harshly or rigorously to some than to others, for example by imposing lighter pen-
alties on the wealthy than on the poor for the same offense.

i. Idealized citizens and independence

Most significantly for our purposes, the above demand of equality gives rise to
another. We violate innate equality, thus freedom, and thus justice if we fail to treat
a person as sui juris, his own master.17 Kant considers what it is to be sui juris much
later in his discussion of public right. Here, in describing free, equal and independ-
ent citizens, Kant equates the quality of being independent at least in part with that
of being capable of managing ones own affairs (in other words, of being sui juris).18
Paradigmatic examples of those who lack this capacity, says Kant, are minors,
women and, in general, anyone whose preservation in existence (his being fed and
protected) depends not on his management of his own business but on arrange-
ments made by another (except the state) (MM 6:314).19
Before we can consider the bearing of independence on the present discussion, we
must be clear about the role this standard plays in Kants account of justice. On a
first reading, it would be natural to understand independence as a bar, a standard
for distinguishing those a state properly may count among its citizens from those it

16 Although some interpreters suggest that, for Kant, justice principally is concerned with pro-
tecting private property, there is much both in his account of justice and in his treatment of
its relationship to private property to belie this interpretation. For a more extensive dis-
cussion of the relationship between justice and property in Kant see Paul Guyer: Freedom,
Law and Happiness, Chs. 7 and 8.
17 We also might investigate the implications of the demand that we treat others as beyond re-
proach. As this demand is less directly related to the present topic, I do not consider it here.
18 Kant does not, in fact, use the term sui juris in his Rechtslehre discussion of independence,
but does so in a similar discussion in the essay On the Common Saying, This May be Cor-
rect in Theory, but it is of no use in Practice. In any case, the connection seems quite clear.
19 Kants reason for excepting the state will become clear in what follows.
96 Sarah Williams Holtman

may not.20 Kant invites this interpretation by proclaiming that those society
members who lack independence may not vote and by suggesting that women never
can achieve independence.
To stop at this, however, would be to sell Kant short. In particular, it would be to
misunderstand the structure of the theory of justice he develops. In fact, Kant uses
the term citizen in at least three ways in his initial Rechtslehre discussion. Most
famously (or infamously), he distinguishes active from passive citizens. The
former realize independence to an adequate degree and may vote. Because they must
rely on others for their very preservation in existence the latter lack independ-
ence, and the state properly denies them political franchise. Independence, then, is
no bar to citizenship on Kants view. It simply distinguishes those citizens who may
vote from those who may not.
The significance of the more inclusive view of citizenship quickly becomes evi-
dent. State laws, Kant makes clear, must respect the freedom and equality of both
active and passive citizens. They also must respect the passive citizens potential for
independence, allowing that anyone can work his way up from this passive condi-
tion to an active one (MM 6:315).21 Thus Kant acknowledges that laws may or
may not treat actual citizens as free and equal, and especially that independence is a
quality to which the dependent may aspire.22
States are composed of active and passive citizens; these are the men and women,
professors and tutors, craftsmen and apprentices who form the populations of ac-
tual states. Not only do some realize independence (at least to a reasonable degree)
while others do not, but the laws in force may or may not adequately acknowledge
even the active citizens freedom and equality. As Kant makes clear when he contrasts
Hobbesian justice with his own account, active citizens may fear encroachments on
freedom and denials of equality, and indeed of independence, as much as passive
citizens.23
Kant also uses the term citizen, though, not to refer to the populace of actual
states, but to describe a model for lawmaking and a standard against which we can
determine the justice of proposed or extant laws. Thus he denominates as citizens
the members of a society that is governed by the general united will of the people.
Only a society whose laws conform perfectly to this general will is fully just. As ac-
tual societies will fall more or less short of this ideal, the citizenship Kant now de-
scribes cannot be that of any actual society. Rather, in this discussion each citizen is

20 For such an interpretation see Carole Pateman: The Sexual Contract. Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press 1988, 169.
21 I examine this requirement in detail in section D(1).
22 There is an important exception to this point. Although women are citizens to whom the
state owes justice, they apparently cannot advance to active citizenship on Kants view. I will
not consider here why Kant took this position, common enough in our own time as well as
his.
23 Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying, This May be Correct in Theory, but it is of no
use in Practice, 8:3034.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 97

a construct who possesses in full the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his
essence (as a citizen) (MM 6:314). Each fully realizes lawful freedom, civil
equality and civil independence as actual citizens will not.24 By taking up the
perspective of those we now might call idealized citizens, conceived not only as fully
embodying the essence of citizenship but as making laws for others like themselves,
we can progress toward a legal system that in fact respects the freedom, equality,
and independence of each.
Once we separate these three uses of citizen within Kants discussion, we can see
that one need not achieve perfect freedom, equality or independence in order to be a
citizen on Kants account. Rather than identifying who within a populace qualifies as
a citizen and who does not, these standards are to guide us in determining what it is
to treat actual citizens justly, what just laws must seek to foster and promote, and
where the laws themselves or applications of them diverge from the demands of jus-
tice.25 In short, the characteristics Kant attributes to citizens, paralleling the at-
tributes of freedom that he acknowledges, function not as entrance requirements for
citizens but as standards for determining what justice demands on their behalf.26

ii. Justice and independence

With this as background, we return to the elements of freedom that Kant ac-
knowledges. As some interpreters emphasize, even innate equality and the quality of
being sui juris, or independent, may be important to Kant because of their bearing
on force and fraud.27 If some are above the law, or subject to rather minimal penal-
ties for infringement of it, they may feel quite free to engage in certain coercive or
deceptive activities forbidden to others, but not to them. Only a bit more subtly, if
one depends on another for ones very preservation in existence, one may tolerate
a significant degree of force silently, even assist in its concealment, rather than risk
the loss of what is necessary to sustain life or make it minimally tolerable. Likewise,
one so positioned, her attention focused on mere survival, often will be ill-prepared

24 That Kant does not believe that actual citizens or societies perfectly realize freedom, equal-
ity, independence or justice is clear enough from his discussions of the cosmopolitan society
toward which we must strive to advance. See Immanuel Kant: Idea for a Universal History
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, 8:1731.
25 Again Kant does take failings of independence to bar some persons, at least temporarily,
from certain activities we think of as central to citizenship. But this is a conclusion about
how it is now appropriate to treat those who lack independence, not an indication that in-
dependence functions most basically as a bar. There is, of course, much reason to think that
some of Kants conclusions, for example about voting, are mistaken and that others, for in-
stance regarding women, are untenable.
26 Both Christine Korsgaard and Tamar Shapiro have put forward accounts of Kant that, like
mine, acknowledge the dual structure of his moral and political theory. See Korsgaards The
Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil. In Creating the Kingdom of Ends. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press 1996, 13358 and Shapiros What is a Child. In: Ethics 109, 1999,
71538. For further discussion of my own view see my Kant and Exclusionary Zoning.
27 ONeill discusses this point in detail. See, e.g., Faces of Hunger, Ch. 8; Towards Justice and
Virtue, Ch. 6.
98 Sarah Williams Holtman

to recognize attempts to cheat her out of the little she has. If she does have an ink-
ling of fraud, she may do all she can to blind herself to it since any objection is likely
to elicit force or, worse, the withdrawal of benefits.
Nevertheless, the aim of preventing unjustified force and fraud cannot account
for all that likely concerns Kant in acknowledging these further elements of free-
dom. We can use Kants description of idealized lawmaking citizens to help us ap-
preciate this point, focusing in particular on their independence. Again, we think of
these citizens as providing a model for just decisionmaking. If we want to know
what justice requires, we should take up the perspective of persons who realize civil
independence and legislate for others like themselves.28
As we know, independence is, first, the characteristic most central to ones quali-
fication as a voting member of the commonwealth, a participant in just legislation.
Perhaps less obvious, but equally important, Kants independent citizen is self-gov-
erning not only with regard to her voting behavior. She is self-governing also in the
sense that she makes her own choices about how her life will go, developing her own
values and larger life plan, a feature of independence Kant articulates in his dis-
cussion of enlightenment. Only one who has developed the ability to use her under-
standing without the guidance of another, to evaluate civil policies and institutions
and more personal commitments (e.g., religion) on her own, has developed fully as a
person and a citizen.29 Citizens who are to provide a suitable model for just lawmak-
ing surely must be independent in this larger sense. Civil laws on Kants model serve
the function of insuring for each the greatest freedom to pursue personal ends that is
compatible with a like freedom for all.30 A citizen who does not herself develop a set
of values and a long-term life plan cannot determine what laws appropriately respect
freedom, or what freedoms are especially valuable for citizens within civil society.
The independence that characterizes the Kantian citizen, then, must encompass
those capacities or characteristics that make possible appreciation of, commitment
to, and wise choice within the constraints of the dictates of justice. Evidently among
these are access to and ability to evaluate empirical facts, the capacity to reason well
regarding the relationship between relevant facts and requirements of justice, and a
full understanding of, commitment to, and ability to exercise good judgment re-
garding the basic demands of justice.
Certainly actions involving force and fraud may interfere with the capacities of
a voting citizen and self-governing individual. As we have seen, each may hinder, or
even vitiate, the ability to discern relevant facts, to reason about the implications of
these facts, or to develop or act on a commitment to justice. But these capacities
central to citizenship equally are jeopardized by dependence on others whether or

28 Again, the perspective of idealized citizens that Kant envisions requires amendment if it is to
serve as a reliable guide in concrete cases. See my Kant and Exclusionary Zoning and A Kan-
tian Approach to Prison Reform. In: Jahrbuch fr Recht und Ethik 5, 1997, 31531.
29 See Immanuel Kant: An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, especially
8:356 and 412.
30 See Kant: Universal History, 8: 22.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 99

not force and fraud are, or are perceived by the dependent to be, present. If I have
no occasion to collect facts or to reason about their implications (as I often will not
if I indeed am deeply dependent on others for my survival), I will be a poor judge of
the circumstances that do or may bear on questions of justice. If I lack the self-con-
fidence and even the self-respect required for deep commitment, or have little or no
occasion to develop such commitment, I also will lack the understanding of and
judgment regarding justice that are at least as central to the making of just laws as
empirical knowledge or reasoning capacity.
Prevention of force and fraud surely is one of the principal concerns of those who
seek to do justice. But those who are not sui juris are prevented for other reasons as
well from developing the qualities of legislators or, as persons, from exercising in-
dividual freedom to develop a plan of life. Thus the subjects of justice must extend
to these obstacles more generally; they cannot be limited to preventing force and
fraud, even when these are conceived broadly.
What we discover by examining his complex account of the freedom relevant to
justice, and the parallel account of citizenship, is that the subject of justice for Kant
is not, most fundamentally, the prevention of force and fraud. Threats to our capac-
ity to develop, evaluate and apply just laws to concrete cases or to develop and pur-
sue a life plan go beyond these perils. So too must the scope of Kantian justice,
which takes as its subject whatever is required for or fatal to the development of rel-
evant characteristics and capacities.

D. A Flexible Kantian Justice

I have not proven with certainty that Kant founds poverty relief on justice or that
the concerns of Kantian justice extend beyond force and fraud. But we now have
good reason for thinking this is so and for doubting not only minimalism, but vir-
tue-based and mixed approaches. Nevertheless, there remains an important con-
sideration favoring the latter two views.
Specialists and non-specialists alike often characterize the principles of Kantian
justice as unbending in the face of competing moral concerns and problematically in-
sensitive to context. There is good reason for this. Kants apparently absolutist posi-
tions on matters like punishment and revolution are well-known. No matter what
the competing moral considerations or surrounding circumstances, every criminal
must be punished and no forcible resistance to government can be justified. Further,
Kant distinguishes justice from virtue on precisely this point. Duties of virtue, he tells
us, are wide duties, often admitting of great leeway in the time and manner of their
fulfillment. By contrast, those of justice are narrow; they leave comparatively little
playroom [] for free choice in following [] the law (MM 6:390).
Poverty relief, though, is exactly the sort of area where we require standards that
can accommodate a variety of moral considerations and change with surrounding cir-
cumstances. We need to insure that relief programs attend to various moral concerns;
100 Sarah Williams Holtman

they must protect the better-off against undue burden and the poor against force,
fraud and dependency. More, what is required in order to do this will vary with the
circumstances. Even Kant himself seems to acknowledge that this is so. In considering
the various methods a state might use to raise and distribute relief monies, he notes
that some are likely to encourage laziness among the poor, others to increase tax
burdens on the wealthy. Although he argues in favor of one method (current contribu-
tions through legal levies) over others, his argument depends on empirical matters
that certainly could change with place and time. Given this, we still have reason to
doubt that it is a duty of justice and not charity that founds the states obligations to
its poor. For it seems only Kantian virtue can be sensitive to moral complexity and cir-
cumstance in the way that we and Kant agree a system of poverty relief must be.
Yet there is reason to think that Kantian justice is in fact more morally accommo-
dating and context-sensitive than it first seems and is so in the ways that a system
of poverty relief requires. Although I cannot demonstrate this to a certainty here,
I hope two examples will suffice to establish it as a reasonable claim.
1) Attention to multiple moral concerns
Consider again Kants distinction between active and passive citizens. As we
know, the practical consequence Kant recommends for the latter, who depend on
others for their survival, is that they have no vote, no participation in lawmaking.
This apparently follows from the demand that just practices and institutions reflect
not the fearful decisions of subordinates, but the well-informed and skillful reason-
ing of those who comprehend and are committed to justice. Yet we know too that
Kant hastens to qualify this political disability:
whatever sort of positive laws the citizens might vote for, these laws must still not be contrary
to the natural laws of freedom and of the equality of everyone in the people corresponding to
this freedom, namely that anyone can work his way up from this passive condition to an active
one (MM 6:315).
Here we might say Kant finds two demands of justice significant in shaping vot-
ing procedures. We must meaningfully acknowledge: 1) the freedom and equality of
each citizen; and 2) the potential of each to realize independence. Together these
requirements constrain us in our attempt to insure a vote that reflects the present
judgments of active citizens. We find them to be requirements relevant to justice not
by examining the nature of actual citizens, but instead by asking how to treat such
citizens, active or passive, so as to acknowledge guiding standards of freedom,
equality and independence. To insure a vote merely reflecting independent judg-
ment, we might do no more than acknowledge the decisions of active citizens. To
treat passive citizens justly, with due concern for their maturation, we must further
shape our voting procedures.31 Justice, then, responds to the relation among the sev-
eral concerns that define it.

31 That my understanding of these uses of citizen makes good sense of an otherwise perplex-
ing passage provides further grounds for understanding Kant as I do.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 101

2) Context sensitivity
Of Kants more concrete discussions in the Rechtslehre, that of punishment not
only is one of the most notorious, but that best exemplifying the alleged rigorism of
Kantian justice. The rule for determining the kind and degree of punishment owed
the criminal (presumably one convicted under just standards) is lex talionis, an eye
for an eye, a death for a death. Surely here if anywhere we find unbending rigor.
Blind to all other considerations, justice demands that we do to each criminal what
he has done (unless to do so itself displays inhumanity) (MM 6:33233).
Even in these infamous passages, though, we find a species of flexibility. Kants
reasons for concluding that morality requires like for like seem to be several. That
the wrongdoer both appreciates the cost to his victim and is deterred by the knowl-
edge that his transgression will involve equal cost to himself seem to be among
them.32 Yet by Kants own admission we insure neither of these by rigidly imposing
on the offender just what he himself already has done:
Now it would indeed seem that differences in social rank would not allow the principle of ret-
ribution, of like for like [S]omeone of high standing given to violence could be condemned
not only to apologize for striking an innocent citizen socially inferior to himself but also to
undergo a solitary confinement involving hardship; in addition to the discomfort he undergoes,
the offenders vanity would be painfully affected, so that through his shame like would be fit-
tingly repaid with like (MM 6:33233).

The flexibility we find here is not one that allows us to do other than perform the
just act on each occasion where the opportunity for doing so arises. Nor is it one
that requires intimate knowledge of individual circumstances. It is a sensitivity to
empirical circumstances affecting the degree to which the same response will satisfy
underlying aims on separate occasions. While Kantian justice determines matters
that virtue, with its imperfect duties, leaves open, it too accords a kind of flexibility.
We must both judge how to apply its general dictates to complex and varying cir-
cumstances and acknowledge that, since its fundamental commitments (captured in
the term freedom) in fact are several, a shaping or massaging of our responses
often will be required to accommodate them all.33 It is this very sensitivity to con-
text and ability to accommodate potentially competing moral concerns that any ad-
equate approach to poverty relief must provide.

32 For a fuller discussion of Kants penal theory see my Toward Social Reform: Kants Penal
Theory Reinterpreted. In: Utilitas 9, 1997, 321.
33 On the function of judgment in Kants moral and political philosophy see Onora ONeill:
Instituting Principles: Between Duty and Action. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy
36, suppl. 1997, 7996.
102 Sarah Williams Holtman

II. Practical Implications

At this point, I think, we have good reason to favor the view that poverty relief,
for Kant, is founded on a rich, and sometimes flexible, justice rather than on virtue
or even on virtue together with a justice that is narrower and more rigid. It would be
easy, though, to grasp this argument without fully appreciating Kants approach to
poverty relief. For it is difficult to appreciate philosophical positions on practical
matters without investigating practical implications.
In closing, then, I will suggest some of the concrete practical implications that
Kants theoretical commitments seem to imply.34 More particularly, how might Kant
weigh in on issues that have come to the fore as a result of welfare reform legislation
in the U.S.?35 What might he say, given my reading, about the popular view that the
poor receive a special benefit through the welfare system? How might he respond to
recent concerns about the relationship between welfare and dependency? What
about to charges, from opponents, that recent reforms cast the poor into ill-paid
jobs and abusive environments and condition relief on adherence to unreasonably
stringent procedures and other strictures? Finally, what might Kant say about the
popular view that any adequate welfare system will help foster virtues of charity in
the better-off and of hard-work and thrift among the poor?

A. Special Treatment

Some who favor recent welfare reforms argue that welfare recipients unfairly
burden the better-off. Even those who oppose reforms often agree that the poor take
something extra from the state that the wealthy do not. They argue that the state
and its wealthier citizens should display virtues of charity and generosity.
In Kants view, by contrast, those who need monetary assistance do not differ
from those who need protection for their property. We all are vulnerable where it
comes to basic physical and psychological needs. Some require the state to defend
holdings. Others require it to attain what is needed to sustain life and to develop as
agents and citizens. Neither case indicates, without more, that need or willingness

34 The idea is not to suggest that Kant addresses precisely the debate I do, nor is it to ask in any
detail what he would say about it. It is to highlight what is most significant in his view by
reference to a familiar case.
35 For the particulars of reform legislation see, The Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, U.S. Public Law 193. 104th Cong., 2d sess. (26 August
1996). The years from passage to the present have not changed the relevant issues, which
have been part of an ongoing debate regarding the Acts amendment and extension. See, e.g.,
Paul Street: A Chilling Consensus: Welfare. In: ZNET Daily Commentaries, 5 July 2002;
Richard W. Stevenson: Bush Urges Congress to Extend Welfare Law, With Changes. In: The
New York Times, 15 January 2003. While I take my example from U.S. politics, its rel-
evance does not stop at national borders. The concerns that spawned U.S. welfare reform
and fuel the contemporary welfare debate are international.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 103

to accept aid has its source in any moral failing or that assistance best is seen as lar-
gesse. Rather, on Kants view, the human condition is such that we all inevitably are
vulnerable to the many ways in which what sustains life and founds development
may be lost to us. Kants discussion of state-funded assistance arises from and re-
sponds to this inevitable fact.36

B. Dependency

Both advocates and opponents of welfare reform also appeal to connections be-
tween poverty relief and the independence of those who receive it. In particular, not
only reform advocates, but even many critics, worry that public assistance must
thwart independence. One who believes she can count on the state to support her,
many agree, will lose a taste for self-reliance and become a lazy, childlike ward of
the state. Kants discussion, as now before us, asks us to reshape our thinking about
the relationship between state-funded relief and independence.
First, if Kant is right, the concerns at the forefront of the contemporary debate
seem most likely to materialize where we allow the poor to become wards or ser-
vants of the better off. As dependents it is difficult for us to see ourselves, equally for
others to see us, as capable of competently evaluating options on our own and act-
ing on the resulting judgments without the influence (not merely the argument or
advice) of those on whom we depend. We do better, then, to place poverty relief in
the hands of the state. For properly conceived, it adopts and pursues our own com-
mitments to ensuring the freedom, equality and independence of each.37

36 Several passages in Kants early writings concern general injustice and lend further sup-
port to the interpretation advanced so far. General injustice is injustice in wealth distribu-
tion not attributable to acts of particular individuals, but to the operation of social and gov-
ernmental institutions. The duty to remedy these distributional inequities is one of justice.
It either may be satisfied by individuals or (it seems) assumed by the state. Those who suffer
such injustice must not be viewed as beggars nor those who remedy it as benefactors.
Rather, remedy is payment of a debt to an equal. See Kant,19:145; 20:1401; 27:416. For
helpful discussion of these passages, see Allen Woods General Introduction to The Cam-
bridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, xiii-xx.
37 This surely is the reason that Kant excepts recipients of state aid in identifying passive
citizens. His Tugendlehre consideration of gratitude and ingratitude further supports the
conclusion that he prefers state to private support out of concern to foster independence.
Here Kant perceptively notices that ingratitude, though a vice, is both common among us
and readily explicable: for we fear that by showing gratitude we take the inferior position
of a dependent in relation to his protector, which is contrary to real self-esteem (MM
6:459). Distinguishing between a benefactor or protector and a friend of man, Kant also
notes the pride that usually comes over those fortunate enough to have the means for be-
neficence(MM 6:473). When we give as a friend of man, and not a protector, we acknowl-
edge the equality among persons and recognize that the respect owed as between giver and
recipient is equal (MM 6:4723). On Kants view, it seems, state aid fosters independence in
part by encouraging self-respect in the recipient and discouraging (or at least not encourag-
ing) the pridefulness in benefactors that can undermine it.
104 Sarah Williams Holtman

This, of course, speaks against the states abandonment of poverty relief in favor
of private philanthropy. More interestingly, it urges us critically to evaluate recent
changes in the states administration of relief wrought by U.S. welfare reform. As we
know, Kants independent citizen is a full participant in decisions both political and
personal. As Kant makes clear, mere financial support is not enough to secure this
status, though it may be necessary to it. Thus we cannot, with many U.S. reform ad-
vocates, see employment full stop as our proper goal. Kant would agree with many
of reforms critics that this is especially true if available jobs fail to pay a living
wage. Adequate food and housing surely are prerequisite to independence. This is
both because the threats to life and comfort in their absence make us especially vul-
nerable to deception and coercion and because these basics are prerequisite to the
thinking and feeling that ground good deliberation.
Yet the perspective Kant provides might carry criticism of welfare reform beyond
these significant concerns of sustenance.38 It warns us first to be alert to the mes-
sages we send through our new brand of poverty relief. If a welfare system imposes
five-year lifetime limits insensitive to circumstance and severe penalties for those
who fail to follow job-seeking rules to the letter, for example, the message it sends is
that we are each on our own in securing survival basics and that those who do not
toe the line will suffer the consequences.39 This advocates no joint commitment to
the development of each as citizen and individual, but rather the callous isolation
that comes with commitment to ones own interest above all.
Second, as interpreted here, the Kantian perspective reminds us to examine more
tangible impacts on independence by attending, for example, to the nature of the
jobs that replace relief payments. Do these jobs encourage or thwart the develop-
ment of a critical perspective? Do they leave time for workers to develop or maintain
relationships with friends, spouses, children, or otherwise to develop as members of
a political body or as individuals. Are prevalent working conditions those we associ-
ate with independence or with subjugation? Suppose that too many of these jobs ex-
haust bodies and numb minds, that scant pay and benefits mean little free time, that
management engages in demeaning or threatening practices. Under such circum-
stances, we may conclude that these jobs, contra Kants warnings, stifle the ability to
evaluate laws and policies, to develop a plan of life, or to foster the mutual concern
and respect that are part of Kantian independence fully realized.40

38 Whether it does depends on how one understands reform legislation and its implemen-
tation, matters I will not argue here.
39 For consideration and criticism of some of the restrictions and penalties generated by wel-
fare reform see, e.g., Karen Houppert: Youre Not Entitled. In: The Nation, October 25,
1999, 1118.
40 For careful consideration of the barriers that faced welfare recipients and the working poor
even before the 1996 reforms and some commentary on the anticipated effects of 1996
restrictions, see Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein: Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Sur-
vive Welfare and Low-Wage Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1997. For a first-
hand account of the trials of low-wage work see Barbara Ehrenreich: Nickel-and-Dimed:
On (not) getting by in America. In: Harpers Magazine, January 1999, 3752.
 Kantian Justice and Poverty Relief 105

The worry that state-funded relief may foster dependence is one Kant must share.
To the extent a system fosters such dependence, reform is in order. Yet the independ-
ence justice requires us to seek, in Kants view, is a rich notion importantly distinct
from the ability to pursue ones own interest and extending well beyond the ability
to secure shelter and sustenance or even freedom from coercion and deception. It is
an independence that includes not only personal and political development, but an
appreciation of ones place in a community of individuals committed to one another.

C. Social Virtue

Finally, Kants approach to state-funded relief, framed by his views on justice and
citizenship, can respond to the calls to hard work, self-reliance and thrift from pro-
ponents of welfare reform and opponents alike. Certainly Kant may acknowledge
these three traits as virtues with moral consequence. They may help us appropri-
ately to value our own talents and capabilities and to show others respect by not un-
duly imposing on their limited energies and means. However, the relation of these
virtues to the ends of a state-funded social welfare system do not make them criteria
by which to judge the system or redesign it.
A system of state-funded relief perhaps should seek to instill virtues. Kantian vir-
tue aids in fulfilling moral demands, including those of justice. Yet for Kant these
virtues will not include those of work, self-reliance or thrift that reforms advocates
exalt and its opponents rarely dismiss. All may be virtues required of us if we are to
show due respect for others and ourselves in day-to-day life. If we shape the welfare
system to foster virtue, however, it should be virtue that rests on the concerns of jus-
tice. If we are to further Kantian justice, we must aim to encourage the better-off to
recognize that they are as beholden to the state as are those who require its financial
assistance, that each likewise is equally deserving of that assistance, and that each
stands with all others as equal member of a political community founded on those
mutual obligations and claims. More, we must aim for a system that encourages the
financially needy to recognize the support they receive not as a handout from others,
whether generous or grudging, but as a share of joint assets set aside to be used when
some member of the group faces a genuine threat to fundamentals. As such the sup-
port must be seen as at once one form of self-support, thus no threat to self-respect
but an affirmation of it, and as ones responsibility to maintain, thus not to be de-
pleted unduly or unnecessarily. There is, then, a virtue that a welfare system on the
Kantian model should seek to foster and that would help to insure its proper func-
tioning. But this virtue is none of those so often named, each of which is separate
from justice. It is instead a species of the virtue of justice itself, the internalization of
our commitment to justice. We might call it the virtue of civic respect and concern.
106 Sarah Williams Holtman

Conclusion

There is good reason to think that Immanuel Kant is no minimalist on the topic of
state-funded poverty relief and that he does not found that relief on personal virtue.
Instead, we might now conclude, state-funded relief is a matter of justice, a justice
that is flexible, sensitive to circumstance and concerned with the fundamentals pre-
requisite to citizenship and agency. So understood, Kants paragraphs on poverty re-
lief neither pay tired tribute to the unalloyed virtues of self-reliance nor call us to
practice benevolence or charity. Instead they urge us to acknowledge and act upon a
mutual respect and concern for each as free, equal and ideally capable of exercising
wise judgment regarding state policies and life-plans. For Kant, I have argued, it is
this respect and concern that must join us as members of a just society.