SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged

farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform
compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide
attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates
tried to intervene for the strikers cause.

The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decisioni[1] of the Office of
the President (OP), issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a
one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called
Win-Win Resolutionii[2] on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying
its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory.
The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-
industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered
the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.

But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the
contending parties?

The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court
urging us to annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin
respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian
Reform from implementing the said Resolution.

Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal
effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of the President on
its earlier Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already
become final and executory?

The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings,

may be stated as follows:

1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao,

Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The
property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371iii[3] of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.

2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the

Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI),
a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop
Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of
title. The lease expired in April, 1994.

3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under
compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.iv[4]

4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and

was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-
576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the
DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their
authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or
activities concerning the subject land until further orders.v[5]

5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional
Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC
and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just
compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these
moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the
DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings
undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the
valuation of the subject property.

6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus

Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to
seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992; (b)
nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21,
1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c)
directing the Land Bank to return the claim folder of Petitioner
NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders.vi[6]

7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the
trust account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.vii[7]

8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of

Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No.
6,viii[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along
Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones
where the subject property is situated.

9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES)

Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:

Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on
March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying
144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an
opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality,
provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may
authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land
area and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee

approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the
instant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in
behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).

Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial

Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its
Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic
Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now
docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived
by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to have the following
components:

1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the

following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for
Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24
hectares;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for

corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine,
rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol
and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as
juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores;
public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for

recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover
33 hectares; and

4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room

hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of
20 hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4,

1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon
Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise
favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of
Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the
Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental
Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing
By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao;
the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D.
Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial

Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S.
Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION
to the proposed conversion as long as the development cost of the
irrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished
by the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi
Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no
objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it will
provide more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside
investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be
generated by the projects to be put up x x x.

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation

held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director
Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary
Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.

Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on

November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers
to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued
an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject
land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same
under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution
thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation

facility;

2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition

(NCA);

3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is

not applicable;

4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for

the beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for
agro-industrial project has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series
of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January

9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7,
1995).ix[9]

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to
proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
property.x[10]

11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealedxi[11] the order of

denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be
more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.

12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC,

on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition with preliminary injunction,xii[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 37614.

13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez,

then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation
of the proposed project, sent a memorandumxiii[13] to the President
favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR
Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the
province for the conversion of the land.

14. Also, in a memorandumxiv[14] to the President dated August 23,

1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the
conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with a
request that the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to
distribute the land in question.

15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.

37614, issued a Resolutionxv[15] ordering the parties to observe status
quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case
on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested
before the said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of
the applications of farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect status
quo pending the resolution of the petition.xvi[16]

16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No.
96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretarys
decision, the pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which
the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the
instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao,
Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great
opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the
area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the
other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not
even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime

agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention
that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an
irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property
(as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower
portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not
irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by
the Philippine Packing Corporation.

On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal
or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state
that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992.
Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that
under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly
be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the
lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or
until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing
any activity or activities covering petitioners land.

On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing
family has already contributed substantially to the land reform program
of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in
the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of
Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not
received just compensation up to this time.

Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible

compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as,
in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land
is not tenanted as already stated.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the

subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the
very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in
the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language
of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for
any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to
convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal

mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various
government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated
November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian
Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.xvii[17]

17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP
decision.

18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March

29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the
former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the
establishment of the NQSR High School.xviii[18]

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare
donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property
was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of
both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it
filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President
filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just
compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11,
1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under TCT No. T-50264xix[19] of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance
of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had
it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-
3536xx[20] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaintxxi[21] with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed
as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title,
damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997xxii[22] and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,xxiii[23] restraining the
DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Orderxxiv[24] was issued by then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996
OP decision had already become final and executory.

21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration
of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.

22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.

23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their

hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest
the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons
claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a
motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P.
Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion
of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.xxv[25]

24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and
promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He
created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by
Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and
recommend possible solutions to the problem.xxvi[26]

25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the

strikers protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the

President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29,
1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only

with respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare
portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares

traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable
for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to
said portion from the highway provided in the portion
fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other
concerned government agencies are directed to immediately
conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the
property and generation of titles in the name of the
identified farmer-beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to

carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
 4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further
directed to expedite payment of just compensation to
NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the
CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by
NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render

full assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on

October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since
it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.

SO ORDERED.xxvii[27]

A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O.

Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and
NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997xxviii[28] and, on December 4, 1997,
they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under
Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervenexxix[29] was

filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they
are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare
property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposedxxx[30]
by the petitioners.

In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners

claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said
resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-
beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely
political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the
Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.xxxi[31] Thus, petitioners
further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November
1997.xxxii[32] They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari
because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.xxxiii[33] They never filed a motion for
reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or
contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration
.xxxiv[34]

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and
prayed that it be dismissed outright on the following grounds:

(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for
review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition; and

(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including
the incident on the motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-
beneficiaries.

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of

petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an
error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal.xxxv[35] On the other hand,
an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction.xxxvi[36] This error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.xxxvii[37]

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-
judicial functions,xxxviii[38] including the Office of the
President,xxxix[39] may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a
verified petition for reviewxl[40] within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
said judgment, final order or resolution,xli[41] whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.xlii[42]

However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in

Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an
allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegalxliii[43] and
was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent
Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdictionxliv[44] when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which
had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue
raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment
which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate
remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners
have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxx xxx x x x.

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases

cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void.xlv[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved
by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the
proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated
in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals

and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari,xlvi[46] prohibitionxlvii[47] and mandamus.xlviii[48] But
the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the
Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of
a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of
Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have
clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al.,xlix[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa,
thus:

x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well

as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction)
is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
(formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable
in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and
by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to
issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations
omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the
judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely:l[50] Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,li[51] Torres vs.
Arranz,lii[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,liii[53] and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et.
al.liv[54] As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to

issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction

over the present petition in the interest of speedy justicelv[55] and to
avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the
issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later,
we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners
to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate
what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:lvi[56]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again,
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case
from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case."

As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal

procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state
that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a
patent nullity,lvii[57] as will be taken up later.

With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by
the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a
complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present
petition, constitute forum shopping.

We disagree.

The rule is that:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in

one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits
filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in
the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case,
in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This
specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145
SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No.
86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.'lviii[58]

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of
forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated
the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A
cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys
order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the
following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner
NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and
void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made
without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely
different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated
November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous
two cases were instituted.

The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for
intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny
for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the
farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in
interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master
List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was
made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed
Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and meticulously
determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those
purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other
words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party

who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.lix[59] Undoubtedly,
movants interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo,
they are not real parties in interest.

Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their

motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for
intervention has no leg to stand on.

Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated
March 29,1996 can still be substantially modified by the Win-Win
Resolution.

We rule in the negative.

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President
of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7
thereof provides:

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,

except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be

allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
(Emphasis ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply
in a suppletory character whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one
has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only
one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious
cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the
act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept
that accord finality to administrative determinations.

In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.lx[60] we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of
the President had long become final and executory, the same can no
longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our
jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
(1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata
which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within
their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the

judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose
is to write finis to disputes once and for all.lxi[61] This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always
be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act
which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.

Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified

the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly
void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A.
Streetlxii[62] in a 1918 case,lxiii[63] is a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.lxiv[64]

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged

Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President
in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is
hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Fortich vs. Corona

G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF

BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO,
BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,

owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development
Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered
by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Bukidnon.

In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine

Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a
multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop
Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of
title. The lease expired in April, 1994.

In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under
compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare
donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property
was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of
both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it
filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President
filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just
compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11,
1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it
registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-
3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Malaybalay, Bukidnon docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against
DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, restraining
the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.

Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D.

Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order
further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by

alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real
parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR
as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of
this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.

In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners

claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said
resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-
beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely
political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the
Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further
allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction
when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They
availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They
never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because
(it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to
seek reconsideration.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to

file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance
with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for

reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the
present petition; and

(3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

Held:

1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or

not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an
error of jurisdiction.

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-
judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken
to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.

However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is

inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation
that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato
C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the
earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and
executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error
of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal
under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the
assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent
portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases

in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved

by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in
the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is
stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals

and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of
these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act
relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court
which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless
otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly
discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts ,
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary
writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the
judicial policy to be observed.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction

over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid
future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy
which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest
because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the
assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of
time and money.

2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the

President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18.
Section 7 thereof provides:

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,

except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be

allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply
in a suppletory character whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one
has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that
only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious
cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the
act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept
that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of
the President had long become final and executory, the same can no
longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our
jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res judicata which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within
their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the

judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose
is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always
be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act
which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.

3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion

in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits
filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in
the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case,
in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This
specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction.

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez and
that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No.
86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of
forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated
the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A
cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys
order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the
following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner
NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and
void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made
without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely
different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated
November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous
two cases were instituted.