LAND TITLES AND DEEDS CASES

SET1
U.S. Supreme Court
Chavez v. United States, 175 U.S. 552 (1899)

Chavez v. United States

No. 14

Argued October 17-18, 1899

Decided December 22, 1899

175 U.S. 552

APPEAL FROM THE COURT

OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS

Syllabus

In Mexico, in 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power

or authority to make a grant of lands, and the fact that the governor presided at a
meeting of the territorial deputation at the time such a grant was made, makes no
difference, as the power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the
territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter.

The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims refusing to
confirm the title of the appellant to

Page 175 U. S. 553

some 5,000 acres of land in New Mexico, about one league from the Manzano grant.
The title is evidenced by a grant by the territorial deputation of New Mexico, made
in 1831, and the first question in the case relates to the authority of that body to
make the grant.

It is also contended that if the territorial deputation did not have the power to make
the grant, and that power rested with the governor of the department, his presence
in the territorial deputation as its ex officio president when the grant was made,
and, so far as the record shows, his not protesting but acquiescing in its action, was
equivalent to and the same as a grant made by himself in his official character as
governor.

It is further stated that, by reason of the action of the governor in writing the letter
dated December 22, 1831, and hereinafter set forth, that officer ratified and
confirmed the grant, and in effect made it his own.

It appears from the record that, on February 28, 1831, citizen Nerio Antonio
Montoya petitioned the honorable corporation of Tome, and asked it that it would
append to his petition its own report to the most excellent deputation, so that that
body should grant him the land described in the petition. The corporation of Tome,
on the 19th of March, 1831, granted the prayer of the petitioner, and adopted a
resolution which provided that his petition should

"go before the most excellent territorial deputation, which, as the authority
competent, may accede to the donation of the land prayed for by the said petitioner
without injuring the pastures and watering places for the passers-by."

The resolution was accordingly forwarded to the territorial deputation, and that
body on November 12, 1831, took action as follows:

"(Extract from record of proceedings of the territorial deputation,"

"session of November 12, 1831)"

"The foregoing record having been read and approved, a petition of citizen Nerio
Montoya, a resident of Valencia, in which he asks for the donation, for agricultural
purposes, of a tract of vacant land in the Manzano within the limits of the Ojo de en
Medio as far as the rancheria, was taken up and the

Page 175 U. S. 554

report of the respectable corporation council of Tome, in which it is set forth that
there is no objection to the concession of the said land, having been heard it was
ordered that it be granted."

"* * * *"

"The session was adjourned."

"Santiago Abreu, President (Rubrick)"

"Juan Rafael Ortiz (Rubrick)"

"Anto. Jose Martinez (Rubrick)"

"Jose Manl. Salazar (Rubrick)"

"Teodosio Quintana (Rubrick)"

"Ramon Abreu, Secretary (Rubrick)"

In accordance with this action, the following direction by the deputation, signed by
its secretary, was given the alcalde of the proper jurisdiction:
"Santa Fe, November 12, 1831"

"The honorable the deputation of this territory, having received the report of the
constitutional council of Tome, appended to this petition, has resolved in this day's
session to grant the land prayed for by the petitioner, charging the alcalde of said
jurisdiction to execute the document that will secure the grantee in the grant
hereby made to him."

"Abreu, Secretary"

The alcalde thereupon executed a document which, after reciting that,

"In obedience to the decree of the most excellent deputation of this territory made
under date of November 12 of the current year on the margin of the petition which,
under date of February 28, the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya, resident of this said
jurisdiction, presented to this honorable council, and on which petition is recorded
the report made by this council, in accordance with which report its excellency has
deemed it proper to accede to the petition of Montoya, granting him full and formal
possession of the tract he prayed for,"

etc., declared that

"Montoya, whenever he may choose or think best to do, may notify me to proceed
with him to the locality to place him in possession of the property

Page 175 U. S. 555

granted him, with all the customary formality,"

etc. This was dated December 7, 1831, and signed by the alcalde.

On December 12 in the same year, the same alcalde,

"in compliance with the provision made by this most excellent deputation of this
territory and the notification given me by the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya,"

proceeded with Montoya to the tract of land granted him and placed him in
possession thereof, the act being signed by the alcalde.

There was also put in evidence on the trial of the action in the court below, on the
question of ratification, the following:

"Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico"

"By your official communication of the 20th instant, I am advised of your having
executed the decree of the most excellent deputation granting to the citizen Nerio
Antonio Montoya a tract of land."

"But in regard to the inquiry you make of me, as to how much your fee should be, I
inform you that I am ignorant in the premises, and that you may, if you choose to
do, put the question to the assessor (asesor), who is the officer to whom it belongs,
to advise the justices of first instance in such cases."

"God and Liberty. Santa Fe, December 22, 1831."

"Jose Antonio Chavez"

"To Alderman Miguel Olona"

Various mesne conveyances were put in evidence on the trial, showing the transfer
to the appellant of whatever title Montoya had to the land described, and it was
then admitted that the appellant herein has succeeded to all the rights of the
original grantee, if any, in this case. Evidence of possession under this grant was
also given.

The court below held that the departmental assembly or territorial deputation had
no power or authority to make a grant of lands at the time the grant in this case
was attempted to be made, and that the fact that the governor may have presided
at the meeting at the time the action was taken made no difference, as the power
to make the

Page 175 U. S. 556

grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation had no
jurisdiction in the matter. The claim was therefore rejected.

We think that in thus deciding, the court below was right.

We refer to some of the cases which show the territorial deputation did not have the
power to make a grant, but only the power to subsequently approve it.

In United States v. Vallejo, 1 Black 541, it was held that the Mexican law of 1824 and
the regulations of 1828 altered and repealed the Spanish system of disposing of
public lands, and that the law and the regulations from the time of their passage
were the only laws of Mexico on the subject of granting public lands in the
territories. It was also held that the governor did not possess any power to make
grants public lands independently of that conferred by the act of 1824 and the
regulations of 1828. Mr. Justice Nelson, who delivered the opinion of the Court in
that case, refers to the various sections of the law of 1824, and also to the
regulations of November, 1828, for the purpose of showing that the governors of
the territories were authorized to grant vacant lands within their respective
territories with the object of cultivation or settlement, and that the grants made by
them to individuals or families were not to be definitively valid without the previous
consent of the departmental assembly, and when the grant petitioned for had been
definitively made a patent, signed by the governor, was to be issued, which was to
serve as a title to the party. This case did not decide that the territorial deputation
could not make a valid grant, because the grant was made by the governor, but the
various extracts from the law and regulations indicate very plainly that the authority
to initiate a grant of public lands existed in the governor alone, and not in the
assembly.

In United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, it was held that departmental assemblies
(territorial deputations) had no power to make a grant.

In his argument at the bar, counsel for this appellant contended that the territorial
deputation had lawful power and
Page 175 U. S. 557

authority to make the grant to Montoya, and in order to maintain that proposition,
stated that it was necessary to discuss the effect of the decision of this Court in
United States v. Vigil. He claimed that what was said as to the lack of power in the
territorial deputation to make a grant was not necessary to the decision of the Court
in that case, and that such expressions as were therein used regarding the question
would not therefore constitute a precedent now binding on this Court.

In Vigil's case, there was a petition to the departmental assembly, through the
Governor of New Mexico, asking for a grant of land which in fact amounted to over
two million, the grantees binding themselves, if the grant were made, to construct
two wells for the relief and aid of travelers, and to establish two factories for the use
of the state, and to protect them from hostile invasion. The governor transmitted
the petition to the assembly, but declined to recommend that favorable action
should be taken upon it. The assembly, notwithstanding this refusal, granted the
tract on January 10, 1846, for the purpose of constructing wells and cultivating the
land, etc., and the question was as to the validity of this grant.

The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Davis, who stated that it had been
repeatedly decided by this Court that the only laws in force in the territories of
Mexico, for the disposition of public lands, with the exception of those relating to
missions and towns, were the act of the Mexican Congress of 1824 and the
regulations of 1828. In the course of his opinion, he said:

"These regulations conferred on the governors of the territories, 'the political chiefs,'
as they are called, the authority to grant vacant lands, and did not delegate it to the
departmental assembly. It is true the grant was not complete until the approval of
the assembly, and in this sense the assembly and governor acted concurrently, but
the initiative must be taken by the governor. He was required to act in the first
instance -- to decide whether the petitioner was a fit person to receive the grant,
and whether the land itself could be granted without prejudice to the public or
individuals. In case the

Page 175 U. S. 558

information was satisfactory on these points, he was authorized to make the grant,
and at the proper time to lay it before the assembly, who were required to give or
withhold their consent. They were in this respect an advisory body to the governor,
and sustained the same relation to him that the Senate of the United States does to
the President in the matter of appointments and treaties."

A subsequent portion of the opinion dealt with the case upon the assumption that
the grant had been made by the governor, and even in that case it was said the
grant would have been invalid because it violated the fundamental rule on which
the right of donation was placed by the law; that the essential element of
colonization was wanting, and that the number of acres granted was enormously in
excess of the maximum quantity grantable under the law. This in nowise affected
the prior ground upon which the opinion was based, that the departmental
assembly had no power to make the grant. That was the essential and material
question directly involved in the case, while the second ground mentioned was
based upon an assumption that, even if the governor had made the grant, it would
still have been void for the reason stated. The court did not base its decision that
the departmental assembly had no power to make the grant because of its
enormous extent. It held that the assembly had no power to make any grant, no
matter what its size. It is, as we think, a decision covering this case.

In Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, the grant was by the territorial deputation
of New Mexico, and it was stated by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, speaking for the Court,
that

"it cannot be in reason held that a title to land derived from a territory which the
territorial authorities did not own, over which they had no power of disposition, was
regularly derived from either Spain or Mexico or a State of the Mexican nation."

No presumption that the territorial deputations had authority to make grants can
arise from the fact that in some instances those bodies assumed to make them. The
case in this respect bears no resemblance to United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51,
32 U. S. 96, or to United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 33 U. S. 447, 33 U. S. 453. In
those cases, it was not denied that the governor had authority in

Page 175 U. S. 559

some circumstances to make grants, and it was therefore held that a grant made by
him was prima facie evidence that he had not exceeded his power in making it, and
that he who denied it took upon himself the burden of showing that the officer by
making the grant had transcended the power reposed in him. There is in the case
before us no evidence that the territorial deputation had the power, in any event, to
make grants other than the fact that in some instances it assumed to make them.

The cases heretofore decided in this Court, and some of which have been above
referred to, show that such fact is inadequate to prove the existence of the
authority.

It is, however, urged that the record of the action of the territorial deputation in
regard to this grant shows that the governor and ex officio president of the
deputation was present when the deputation decided to make the grant as
petitioned for, and that his being so present and attesting the action of the
deputation was equivalent to the making of the grant himself as governor. We do
not think so. He did not assume to make any grant whatever, and certainly none in
his character as governor. It does not even appear beyond doubt that he was
present when the deputation made the grant. His signature is perfectly consistent
with a mere authentication of the previous action of that body.

The petition of Montoya was addressed primarily to the corporation of Tome, and he
requested that corporation to send his petition, approved by it, to the deputation to
make him a grant of the land described in his petition. Acting under that request,
the corporation of Tome sent his petition to the "most excellent territorial
deputation," and asked that body to accede to the donation of the land prayed for.
In conformity to the petition, the territorial deputation itself made the grant. The
fact that the governor, being ex officio a member of the deputation, signed as
president of that body the record of the act of the deputation is not the equivalent
of a grant by him in his official character of governor, nor does such act bear any
resemblance to a grant by him. No one on reading the record would get the idea
that the governor

Page 175 U. S. 560

was himself making the grant, or that he thereby intended so to do. It does not even
show that he was in favor of the grant as made by the deputation. His signing the
record constituted nothing more than an authentication of the act of the deputation.
It purported to be nothing else. He might have properly signed the record if in fact
he had voted against the grant, and had been opposed to the action of the
assembly. He might have signed the record as an authentication, and yet have been
absent at the time of the action of the assembly. In any event, it was his signature
as an ex officio member or presiding officer of the deputation, attesting or perhaps
assenting to its action, and it was not his action as governor making a grant in that
capacity. The signature by the secretary alone, to the instrument (above set forth,
dated November 12, 1831) which recites the previous action of the deputation, and
charges the alcalde of the jurisdiction to execute the document which will secure
the grantee in the grant, is simply a direction to the alcalde, and has no materiality
upon this branch of the case other than as confirming the view that the grant was
solely that of the deputation.

We cannot hold that, when the power was given under the laws of Mexico to the
governor to make grants of lands, he in any manner exercised that power, or
performed an act equivalent to its exercise, by presiding ex officio at a meeting of
the territorial deputation which made a grant of lands in conformity to a petition
solely addressed to it and by authenticating as president the action of the
deputation in deciding that the grant should be made.

The two positions, president of the deputation and governor, are separate and
distinct, and the action of a governor merely as president of the deputation, and of
the nature above described is not in any sense and does not purport to be his
separate and independent action as governor, making a grant of lands pursuant to a
petition addressed to him officially. As governor, he might refuse the grant upon a
petition addressed to himself, when as president of the deputation he might sign
the record authenticating its action in regard to a petition

Page 175 U. S. 561

addressed solely to that body. And it is obvious from the wording of the record that
the president of the deputation was not assuming to act as governor upon a petition
addressed to himself, but only as the president of the deputation. It might have
been that he acquiesced in the assumption by the deputation of the right to make
the grant, but his act of signing the record cannot be tortured into a grant or as the
equivalent of a grant by himself.

It is further urged that there has been what amounts to a grant by the governor by
reason of his letter of December 22, 1831, signed by him and above set forth, thus,
as is claimed, ratifying the grant of the deputation and making it his own.

The only evidence that the person who signed the letter was the governor at that
time is the heading of the letter, "Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico." It will
be also noted that the person signing it is not the same one who signed the record
of November 12, 1831, as president of the deputation. But, assuming that Chavez
was governor in December, 1831, when he signed the letter, he therein simply
acknowledged the receipt of the official communication of the alcalde, in which that
officer reports that he had executed the decree "of the most excellent deputation,
granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land." In reply to the
question as to how much the alcalde's fee should be, he answered that he was
ignorant of the premises, and advised the alcalde to put the question to the
assessor, the officer to whom it belonged to advise the justices in the first instances
in such cases.

Now what does the governor ratify by this letter? Nothing.

The contention in favor of the grant, based upon the letter, is that, assuming the
governor had power to make the grant, it was his duty when he learned from the
report of the alcalde that one had been made by the deputation, and that
possession had been delivered under it, to protest against and to deny the power of
the deputation to make such grant, and unless he did so, his silence was evidence
of the fact that he not only approved the act of the deputation in making the grant,
but that he approved it as his own, and that such

Page 175 U. S. 562

approval was the same as if the governor had himself made the grant, and in
substance and effect it was his grant.

This contention, we think, is not founded upon any legal principle, and is in itself
unreasonable. The writer of the letter is not the same person who signed the record
of the proceedings of the deputation. The report of the alcalde gave him the
information which, it is true, he may have had before, that the deputation had
assumed the power to grant the land. His protest as to the legality of such action
would not have altered the fact that it had occurred, while, on the other hand, his
silence might simply be construed as evidence of his unreadiness at that time to
dispute, or possibly of his belief in the validity of the action of the deputation. Or his
silence might have been simply the result of his approval of the act of the alcalde in
obeying the commands of the deputation, while he thought it was not the proper
occasion upon which to contest or deny the validity of the grant which the
deputation had actually made. Many reasons for his silence might be suggested, but
the claim that it equaled in law a positive grant by the governor is, as we think,
untenable.

While such silence is entirely consistent with other views that might have been held
by the governor, it certainly cannot properly be ascribed, as a legal inference from
the facts stated, to his desire to make the grant himself, nor could it be said that his
desire (if he had it) was the legal equivalent of an actual grant.

His knowledge that another body had assumed to make a grant is not equivalent to
the making of the grant himself, and he was the person who alone had power to
make it. There is nothing in the letter which aids the plaintiff herein.

Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length
of time to prove a valid title. In United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, the
possession was under the claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to
the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by
witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as was stated
in the opinion

Page 175 U. S. 563

(page 159 U. S. 460), to warrant

"the finding of the court below that the complainants' title was derived from the
Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the date when the United
States acquired sovereignty in the Territory of New Mexico, within which the land
was situated."

We do not question the correctness of the remarks made by MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS in
regard to evidence of possession and the presumptions which may under certain
circumstances be drawn as to the existence of a grant.

We do not deny the right or the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper
case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of
a rightful possession under a legal title. We recognize and enforce such rule in the
case of United States v. Chavez, decided at this term, in which the question is
involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not of a duration long
enough to justify any such inference.

There is no proof of any valid grant, but, on the contrary, the evidence offered by
the plaintiff himself and upon which he bases the title that he asks the court to
confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to
make it, and which therefore conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the
evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that
possession of the lands was taken. We cannot presume (within the time involved in
this case) that any other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the
plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in
1848, had not been long enough to presume a grant. Crespin v. United States, 168
U. S. 208; Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, 170 U. S. 649; Hays v. United
States, ante, 175 U. S. 248. The possession subsequently existing, we cannot
notice. Same authorities.

We think the judgment of the court below should be

Affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 1413 March 30, 1904

ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUEL MURCIANO, defendant-appellee.

Montagne and Dominguez for appellants.

Del Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

I. The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as follows:
First. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them, entered into the
peaceful and quiet occupation and possession of the larger part of the lands
described in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to wit [description]:

Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation and
possession of the said lands, as above set forth, these lands and every part thereof
were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and belonged to the then existing
Government of the Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and
possession of the said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to cultivate and
improve them in a quiet and peaceful manner.

Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy and possess
the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until the year 1892, by themselves, by their
agents and tenants, claiming that they were the exclusive owners of said lands.

Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano, defendant
in this proceeding, acting on behalf of and as attorney in fact of Candido Capulong,
by occupation a cook, denounced the said lands to the then existing Government of
the Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands every part thereof were public,
untilled, and unoccupied lands belonging to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the sale of the same to him.

Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned, various
proceedings were had for the survey and measurement of the lands in question at
the instance of the defendant, Murciano, the latter acting as agent and attorney in
fact of said Candido Capulong, a written protest, however, having been entered
against these proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.

Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie Ibarrola, secretary
of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac, in his official capacity as such secretary,
executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which said lands were sold and
conveyed by him to the defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said
Candido Capulong.

Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong executed a
contract of purchase and sale, by which he sold and conveyed the said lands to the
defendants, Manuel Murciano.
Eight. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at no time
occupied or possessed all of the land mentioned, but has possessed only certain in
distinct and indefinite portions of the same. That during all this time the plaintiffs
have opposed the occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the
time in question have been and are in the possession and occupation of part of the
said lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and by their agents and
tenants.

Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the defendant,
Manuel Murciano, been in the peaceful and quiet possession and occupation of the
said lands, or in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any part thereof.

Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the defendant on
the ground that the plaintiffs had lost all right to the land by not pursuing their
objections to the sale mentioned in the sixth finding. The plaintiffs excepted to the
judgment and claim in this court that upon the facts found by the court below
judgment should have been entered in their favor. Their contention is that in 1890
they had been in the adverse possession of the property for thirty years; that,
applying the extra ordinary period of prescription of thirty years, found as well in
the Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the absolute owners of the land
as against everyone, including the State, and that when the State in 1892 deeded
the property to the defendant, nothing passed by the deed because the State had
nothing to convey.

The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not during the
years from 1860 to 1890 a private person, situated as the plaintiffs were, could
have obtained as against the State the ownership of the public lands of the State by
means of occupation. The court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in
1860 the lands were vacant and were public lands belonging to the then existing
Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever obtained from the Government
any deed for the lands, nor any confirmation of their possession.

Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the subject a general statute of
limitations in which the State was not expressly excepted would run against the
State as to its public lands we do not find it necessary to decide. Reasons based
upon public policy could be adduced why it should not, at least as to such public
lands as are involved in this case. (See Act No. 926, sec. 67.) We are, however, of
the opinion that the case at bar must be decided, not by the general statute of
limitation contained in the Partidas, but by those special laws which from the
earliest times have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies.
Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription against the State as to
these lands; and if so, to what extend was it recognizes? Laws of very early date
provided for the assignment of public lands to the subjects of the Crown. Law 1, title
12, book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias is an example of them, and is
as follows:

In order that our subjects may be encouraged to undertake the discovery and
settlement of the Indies, and that they may live with the comfort and convenience
which we desire, it is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go
out to people the new territories, houses, lots, lands, peonias, and caballerias in the
towns and places which may be assigned to them by the governor of the new
settlement, who in apportioning the lands, will distinguish between gentlemen and
peasants, and those of lower degree and merit, and who will add to the possessions
and better the condition of the grantees, according to the nature of the services
rendered by them, and with a view to the promotion of agriculture and stock raising.
To those who shall have labored and established a home on said lands and who shall
have resided in the said settlement for a period of four years we grant the right
thereafter to sell and in every other manner to exercise their free will over said
lands as over their own property. And we further command that, in accordance with
their rank and degree, the governor, or whoever may be invested with our
authority, shall allot the Indians to them in any distribution made, so that they may
profit by their labor and fines in accordance with the tributes required and the law
controlling such matters.

And in order that, in allotting said lands, there may be no doubt as to the area of
each grant, we declare that a peonia shall consist of a tract fifty feet in breadth by
one hundred in length, with arable land capable of producing one hundred bushels
of wheat or barley, ten bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as two yokes
of oxen may plough in a day, and for the planting of other trees of a hardy nature as
much as may be plowed with eight yokes in a day, and including pasture for twenty
cows, five mares, one hundred sheep, twenty goats, and ten breeding pigs. A
caballeria shall be a tract one hundred feet in breadth and two hundred in length,
and in other respects shall equal five peonias that is, it will include arable land
capable of producing five hundred bushels of wheat or barley and fifty bushels of
maize, as much land for an orchard as may be ploughed with ten yokes of oxen in a
day, and for the planting of other hardy trees as much as forty yokes may plough in
a day, together with pasturage for one hundred cows, twenty mares, five hundred
sheep, one hundred goats, and fifty breeding pigs. And we order that the
distribution be made in such a manner that all may receive equal benefit therefrom,
and if this be impracticable, then that each shall be given his due.

But it was necessary, however, that action should in all cases be taken by the public
officials before any interest was acquired by the subject.
Law 8 of said title 12 is as follows:

We command that if a petition shall be presented asking the grant of a lot or tract of
land in a city or town in which one of our courts may be located, the presentation
shall be made to the municipal council. If the latter shall approve the petition, two
deputy magistrates will be appointed, who will acquaint the viceroy or municipal
president with the council's judgment in the matter. After consideration thereof by
the viceroy or president and the deputy magistrates, all will sign the grants, in the
presence of the clerk of the council, in order that the matter may be duly recorded
in the council book. If the petition shall be for the grant of waters and lands for
mercantile purpose, it shall be presented to the viceroy or municipal president, who
will transmit it to the council. If the latters shall vote to make the grant, one of the
magistrates will carry its decision to the viceroy or president, to the end that, upon
consideration of the matter by him, the proper action may be taken.

It happened, in the course of time, that tracts of the public land were found in the
possession of persons who either had no title papers therefor issued by the State, or
whose title papers were defective, either because the proper procedure had not
been followed or because they had been issued by persons who had no authority to
do so. Law 14, title 12 book 4 of said compilation (referred to in the regulations of
June 25, 1880, for the Philippines) was the first of a long series of legislative acts
intended to compel those in possession of the public lands, without written evidence
of title, or with defective title papers, to present evidence as to their possession or
grants, and obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership. That law is as
follows:

We having acquitted full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands territories, and
possession not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands
which are held without proper and true deeds of grants be restored to us according
as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration
not only their present condition, but also the future and their probable increase, and
after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we
may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designated, at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period
within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to
them, and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or
by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to deed if he proves
a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must
make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his
deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner.

In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those
lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or
by the kings who proceeded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might
be lands no so granted, that did not being to the king. It excludes the idea that the
king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person
had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all
the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities
named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had
good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is
apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length
of time should make the possessors the owners of the lands possessed by them
without any action on the part of the authorities. It is plain that they were required
to present their claims to the authorities and obtain a confirmation thereof. What
the period of prescription mentioned in this law was does not appear, but latter, in
1646, law 19 of the same title declared "that no one shall be 'admitted to
adjustment' unless he has possessed the lands for ten years."

In law 15, title 12, book 4 of the same compilation, there is a command that those
lands as to which there has been no adjustment with the Government be sold at
auction to the highest bidder. That law is as follows:

For the greater good of our subjects, we order and command that our viceroys and
governing presidents shall do nothing with respect to lands the claims to which
have been adjusted by their predecessors, tending to disturb the peaceful
possession of the owners thereof. As to those who shall have extended their
possession beyond the limits fixed in the original grants, they will be admitted to a
moderate adjustment with respect to the excess, and new title deeds will be issued
therefor. And all those lands as to which no adjustment has been made shall,
without exception, be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase
price therefor to be payable either in cash or in the form of quitrent, in accordance
with the laws and royal ordinances of the kingdoms of Castile. We leave to the
viceroys and president the mode and from in which what is here ordered shall be
carried into effect in order that they may provide for it at the least possible cost;
and in order that all unnecessary expense with respect to the collections for said
lands may be avoided, we command that the same be made by our royal officers in
person, without the employment of special collectors, and to that end availing
themselves of the services of our royal courts, and, in places where courts shall not
have been established, of the town mayors.

And whereas, title deeds to lands have been granted by officers not authorized to
issue them, and such titles have been confirmed by us in council, we command that
those holding such a certificate of confirmation may continue to possess the lands
to which it refers, and will, within the limits stated in the confirmation certificate, be
protected in their possession; and with respect to any encroachment beyond such
limits will be admitted to the benefits of this law.

Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of October 15,
1754 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, 673). Articles 3, 4, and 5 of
this royal cedula as follows:

3. Upon each principal subdelegate's appointment, which will be made in the

manner prescribed in article 1 of this cedula, and upon his receipts of these
instructions, of which every principal subdelegate already designated or who may
hereafter be appointed shall be furnished a copy, said subdelegate will in his turn
issue a general order to the courts in the provincial capitals and principal towns of
his district, directing the publication therein, in the manner followed in connection
with the promulgation or general orders of viceroys, presidents, and administrative
courts in matters connected with my service, of these instructions, to the end that
any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether
or not the same shall be cultivated of tenanted, may, either in person or through
their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles
and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will
designate as the period within which such documents must be presented a term
sufficient in length and proportionate to the distance the interested party may have
to travel for the purpose of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the
same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their
title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they
will be deprived of an evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others.
4. If it shall appear from the titles or instruments presented, or if it shall be shown in
any other legal manner that said persons are in possession of such royal lands by
virtue of a sale or adjustment consummated by duly authorized subdelegates prior
to the said year 1700, although such action may not have been confirmed by my
royal person, or by a viceroy or president, they shall in no wise be molested, but
shall be left in the full and quiet possession of the same; nor shall they be required
to pay any fee on account of these proceedings, in accordance with law 15, title 12,
book 4 of the Recopilacion de los Indias, above cited. A note shall be made upon
said title deeds to the effect that his obligation has been complied with, to the end
that the owners of such rival lands and their successors may hereafter be free from
denunciation, summons, or other disturbance in their possession.

Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient
if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; provided,
however, that if the lands shall not be in state of cultivation or tillage, the term of
three months prescribed by law 11 of the title and book cited, or such other period
as may be deemed adequate, shall be designated as the period within which the
lands must be reduced to cultivation, with the warning that in case of their failure so
to do the lands will be granted, with the same obligation to cultivate them, to
whomsoever may denounce them.

5. Likewise neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted by the various

subdelegates from the year 1700 to the present time be molested, disturbed, or
denounced, now or at any other time, with respect to such possession, if such sales
or adjustments shall have been confirmed by me, or by the viceroy or the president
of the court of the district in which the lands are located while authorized to
exercise this power. In cases where the sales of adjustments shall not have been so
confirmed, the possessors will present to the courts of their respective district and
to the other officials hereby empowered to receive the same, a petition asking for
the confirmation of said sales and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by
the subdelegates in their order with respect to the measurement and valuation of
the said lands, and with reference to the title issued therefor, shall have been duly
completed, said courts and officials will make an examination of the same for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the sale or adjustment has been made without
fraud and collusion, and for an adequate and equitable price, and a similar
examination shall be made by the prosecuting attorney of the district, to the end
that, in view of all the proceedings and the purchase or adjustment price of the
land, and the media anata having been duly, etc., paid into the royal treasury, as
well as such additional sum as may be deemed proper, there will be issued to the
possessor, in my royal name, a confirmation of his title, by virtue of which his
possession and ownership of lands and waters which it represents will be fully
legalized, to the end that at no time will he or his heirs or assigns be disturbed or
molested therein.
The wording of this law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is seen by the
terms of article 3, any person whatever who occupied any public land was required
to present the instruments by virtue of which he was in possession, within a time to
be fixed by the authorities, and he was warned that if he did not do so he would be
evicted from his land and it would be granted to others. By terms of article 4 those
possessors to whom grants had been made prior to 1700, were entitled to have
such grants confirmed, and it was also provided that not being able to prove any
grants it should be sufficient to prove "that ancient possession," as a sufficient title
by prescription, and they should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient
possession" would be at least fifty-four years, for it would have to date from prior to
1700. Under article 5, where the possession dated from 1700, no confirmation could
be granted on proof of prescription alone.

The length of possession required to be proved before the Government would issue
a deed has varied in different colonies and at different times. In the Philippines, as
has been seen, it was at one time ten years, at another time fifty-four years at least.
In Cuba, by the royal cedula of April 24, 1833, to obtain a deed one had to prove, as
to uncultivated lands, a possession of one hundred years, and as to cultivated lands
a possession of fifty years. In the same islands, by the royal order of July 16, 1819, a
possession of forty years was sufficient.

In the Philippines at a later date royal of September 21, 1797 (4 Legislacion

Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, p. 688), directed the observation of the said royal
cedula of 1754, but apparently without being subject to the period of prescription
therein assigned.

The royal order of July 5, 1862 (Gaceta de Manila, November 15, 1864), also ordered
that until regulations on the subject could be prepared the authorities of the Islands
should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of
1786, and the said royal cedula of 1754.

The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de Terrenos, p. 51),
directed the provincial governors to urge those in unlawful possession of public
lands to seek an adjustment with the State in accordance with the existing laws.
The regulations as to the adjustment (composicion) of the titles to public lands
remained in this condition until the regulations of June 25, 1880. This is the most
important of the modern legislative acts upon the matter of "adjustment" as
distinguished from that of the sale of the public lands.

The royal degree approving these regulations is dated June 25, 1880, and is as
follows:1
Upon the suggestion of the colonial minister, made in conformity with the decree of
the full meeting of the council of state, I hereby approve the attached regulations
for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands.

Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, and part of article 6 are as follows:

ART. 1. For the purpose of these regulations and in conformity with law 14, title 12,
book 4 of the Recompilation of Laws of the Indies, the following will be regarded as
royal lands: All lands whose lawful ownership is not vested in some private, persons,
or, what is the same thing, which have never passed to private ownership by virtue
of cession by competent authorities, made either gratuitously or for a consideration.

ART. 4. For all legal effects, those will be considered proprietors of the royal lands
herein treated who may prove that they have possessed the lands without
interruption during the period of ten years, by virtue of a good title and in good
faith.

ART. 5. In the same manner, those who without such title deeds may prove that they
have possessed their said lands without interruption for a period of twenty years if
in a state of cultivation, or for a period of thirty years if uncultivated, shall be
regarded as proprietors thereof. In order that a tract of land may be considered
cultivated, it will be necessary to show that it has been broken within the last three
years.

ART. 6. Interested parties not included within the two preceding articles may legalize
their possession and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means
of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner: . . .

(5) Those who, entirely without title deeds, may be in possession of lands belonging
to the State and have reduced said lands to a state of cultivation, may acquire the
ownership thereof by paying into the public treasury the value of the lands at the
time such possessors or their representatives began their unauthorized enjoyment
of the same.
(6) In case said lands shall never have been ploughed, but are still in a wild state, or
covered with forest, the ownership of the same may be acquired by paying their
value at the time of the filing of the claim, as stated in the fourth paragraph."

ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose
possession they are unlawfully enjoying within the time of one year, or, the
adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their
obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the
treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the
ownership of the State over the lands, and will, after fixing the value thereof,
proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same which either because it may
have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone is not
deemed advisable to preserve as the State forest reservation.

The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which applications should
be made for adjustment, and the proceedings thereon.

Do these regulations declare that those who are included in article 4 and 5 are the
absolute owners of the land occupied by them without any action on their part, or
that of the State, or do they declare that such persons must seek an adjustment
and obtain a deed from the State, and if they do not do so within the time named in
article 8 they lose all interest in the lands?

It must be admitted from the wording of the law that the question is not free from
doubt. Upon a consideration, however, of the whole matter, that doubt must, we
think, be resolved in favor of the State. The following are some of the reasons which
lead us to that conclusion:

(1) It will be noticed that article 4 does not say that those persons shall be
considered as owners who have occupied the lands for ten years, which would have
been the language naturally used if an absolute grant had been intended. It says,
instead, that those shall be considered owners who may prove that they have been
in possession ten years. Was this proof to be made at any time in the future when
the question might arise, or was it to be made in the proceedings which these very
regulations provided for that purpose? We think that the latter is the proper
construction.

(2) Article 1 declares in plain terms that all those lands as to which the State has
never executed any deeds are the property of the State that is, that on June 25,
1880, no public lands belonged to individuals unless they could exhibit a State deed
therefor. This is entirely inconsistent with the idea that the same law in its article 4
declares that the lands in question in this case became the property of the plaintiffs
in 1870, and were not in 1880 the property of the State, though the State had never
given any deed for them.

(3) The royal decree, by its terms, relates to lands wrongfully withheld by private
persons. The word detentados necessarily implies this. This is inconsistent with the
idea that by article 4 of the plaintiffs, in 1870, became the absolute owners of the
lands in question, and were not therefore, in 1880, withholding what did not belong
to them.

(4) In the preface to this decree and regulations, the following language is used:

SIR: The uncertain, and it may be said the precarious, state of real property in
various parts of the Philippine Islands, as yet sparsely populated; the necessity for
encouraging the cultivation of these lands; the advantage of increasing the wealth
and products of the Archipelago; the immense and immediate profit which must
result to all classes of interests, public as well as private, from the substitution of
full ownership, with all the privileges which by law accompany this real right, for the
mere possession of the lands, have long counseled the adoption of the provisions
contained in the following regulations, which, after consulation with the Philippine
council, and in conformity with an order passed at a full meeting of the council of
state, the subscribing minister has the honor to submit for the royal approval. These
regulations refer not only to tenants of royal lands in good faith and by virtue of a
valid title, but also to those who, lacking these, may, either by themselves reducing
such lands to cultivation or by the application of intelligence and initiative, causing
their cultivation by others who lack these qualities, be augmenting the wealth of the
Archipelago.2

This preface is the most authoritative commentary on the law, and shows without
doubt that those who held with color of title and good faith were, notwithstanding,
holding wrongfully, and that true ownership should be substituted for their
possession.

(5) This doubt suggested by the wording of the law was the subject of inquiries
directed to the officers in Manila charged with its execution. These inquiries were
answered in the circular of August 10, 1881, published in the Gaceta de Manila
August 11, 1881, as follows:
Should possessors of royal lands under color of title and in good faith seek
adjustment?

It is evident that they must do so, for it is to them that article 4 of the regulations
refers, as also the following article covers other cases of possession under different
circumstances. It should be well understood by you, and you should in turn have it
understood by other, that the adjustment of lands whose ownership has not passed
to private individuals by virtue of cession by competent authorities, is optional only
for those within the limits of the common district (legua comunal) as provided by
article 7. In all other cases where the interested parties shall fail to present
themselves for the adjustment of the lands occupied by them shall suffer the
penalties set forth in article 8 of said regulations.

In determining the meaning of a law where a doubt exists the construction placed
upon it by the officers whose duty it is to administer it is entitled to weight.

(6) There is, moreover, legislative construction of these regulations upon this point
found in subsequent laws. The royal decree of December 26, 1884, (Berriz Anuario,
1888, p. 117), provides in articles 1 that

All those public lands wrongfully withheld by private person in the Philippines which,
in accordance with the regulations of June 25, 1880, are subject to adjustment with
the treasury, shall be divided into three groups, of which the first shall include those
which, because they are included in articles 4 and 5, and the first paragraph of
article 7, are entitled to free adjustment.

There were exceptions to this rule which are not here important. Article 10 provides
that if the adjustment is free for those mentioned in articles 4 and 5, who are
included in the second group, the deed shall be issued by the governor of the
province. Article 11 says that if the adjustment is not free, because the applicant
has not proved his right by prescription, then no deed can be issued until the proper
payment has been made. The whole decree shows clearly that the legislator
intended that those mentioned in article 4 and 5 should apply for a confirmation of
their titles by prescription, as well as those mentioned in article 6. In fact, for the
adjustment of those of the first group, which necessarily included only those found
within articles 4 and 5, a board was organized (art. 15) in each pueblo whose sole
duty it was to dispatch applications made said two articles.

(7) The royal decree of August 31, 1888 (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 120), is another
legislative construction of this regulation. That decree repealed the decree of 1884,
and divided all lands subjects to adjustment under the regulations of June 25, 1880,
into two groups. In the first group were all those lands which bordered at any points
on other State lands, and those which, though not bordering on State lands,
measured more than 30 hectares. In the second group were those which were
bounded entirely by lands of private persons and did not exceed 30 hectares. For
the second group a provincial board was organized, and article 10 provides a
hearing before this board, and declares

If no protest or claim shall be filed, and the adjustment must be free because the
occupant has proved title by prescription, as provided in articles 4 and 5 of the
regulations promulgated June 25, 1880, the proceedings shall be duty approved,
and the head officer of the province will, in his capacity of deputy director general of
the civil administration, issue the corresponding title deed.

The policy pursued by the Spanish Government from the earliest times, requiring
settlers on the public lands to obtain deeds therefor from the State, has been
continued by the American Government in Act No. 926, which takes effect when
approved by Congress. Section 54, sixth paragraph of that act, declares that the
persons named in said paragraph 6 "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received
the same." Yet such persons are required by section 56 to present a petition to the
Court of Land Registration for a confirmation of these titles.

We have considered the regulations relating to adjustment that is, those laws
under which persons in possession might perfect their titles. But there were other
laws relating to the sale of public lands which contained provisions fatal to the
plaintiff's claims. The royal decree of January 26, 1889 (Gaceta de Manila, March 20,
1889), approved the regulations for the sale of public lands in the Philippines, and it
was in accordance with such regulations that the appellee acquired his title. Article
4 of those regulations required the publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the
application to purchase, with a description of the lands, and gave sixty days within
which anyone could object to the sale. A similar notice in the dialect of the locality
was required to be posted on the municipal building of the town in which the land
was situated, and to be made public by the crier. Articles 5 and 6 declared to whom
such objections shall be made and the course which they should take. Article 8 is as
follows:

ART. 8. In no case will the judicial authorities take cognizance of the suit against the
decrees of the civil administration concerning the sale of royal lands unless the
plaintiff shall attach to the complaint documents which show that he has exhausted
the administrative remedy. After the proceeding in the executive department shall
have been terminated and the matter finally passed upon, anyone considering his
interests prejudiced thereby may commence a suit in the court against the State;
but in no case shall an action be brought against the proprietor of the land.

Similar provisions are found in the regulations of 1883, approved the second time
by royal order of February 16 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883). Articles 18 and 23
of said regulations are as follows:

ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of alienable royal
lands shall be obliged to apply for the ownership of the same, or for the adjustment
thereof within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the bulletin
of Sales of the notice of sale thereof.

ART. 23. The judicial authorities shall take cognizance of no complaint against the
decrees of the treasury department concerning the sale of lands pertaining to the
state unless the complainant shall attached to the complaint documents which
proved that he has exhausted the administrative remedy.

This prohibition appears also in the royal order of October 26, 1881 (Gaceta de
Manila, December 18, 1881) which relates evidently both to sales of public lands
and also to the adjustments with the occupants.

Article 5 of this royal order is as follows:

During the pendency of proceedings in the executive department with respect to

grants of land, interested parties may present through executive channels such
protest as they may deemed advisable for the protection of their right and interests.
The proceeding having once been completed, and the grant made, those who
consider their interests prejudiced thereby may proceed in court against the State,
but under no circumstances against the grantees of the land.

The American legislation creating the Court of Land Registration is but an

application of this same principle. In both systems the title is guaranteed to the
petitioner, after examination by a tribunal. In Spanish system this tribunal was
called an administrative one, in the American a judicial one.

The court finds that the plaintiffs made a written protest against the sale to the
defendants while the proceedings for the measurements and survey of the land
were being carried on, but that they did not follow up their protest. This, as held by
the court below, is a bar their recovery in this action, under the articles above cited.

The plaintiff state in their brief that a great fraud was committed on them and the
State by the defendant in applying for the purchase of this lands as vacant and
belonging to the public, when they were in the actual adverse possession of the
plaintiffs.

We have seen nothing in the regulations relating to the sale of the public lands
which limited their force to vacant lands. On the contrary there are provisions which
indicate the contrary. In the application for the purchase the petitioner is article 3 of
the regulations of 1889 required to state whether any portion of the land sought has
been broken for cultivation, and to whom such improvements belong. Article 9
provides that if one in possession applies to purchase the land, he renounces his
right to a composicion under the laws relating to that subject. By article 13 the
report of the officials making the survey must contain a statement as to whether
any part of the land is cultivated or not and if the applicant claims to be the owner
of such cultivated part.

In the regulations of January 19, 1883 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883) is the
following article:

ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of royal alienable
lands shall be obliged to apply for the ownership of the same, or for the adjustment
thereof, within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the Bulletin
of Sales of the notice of sale thereof.

In view of all these provisions it seems impossible to believe that the legislators
even intended to leave the validity of any sale made by the State to be determined
at any time in the future by the ordinary courts on parol testimony. Such would be
the result if the contention of the plaintiffs is to be sustained. According to their
claim, this sale and every other sale made by the State can be set aside if at any
time in the future it can be proved that certain persons had been in possession of
the land for the term then required for prescription.

If this claim is allowed it would result that even though written title from the State
would be safe from such attack by parol evidence, by means of such evidence
damages could have been recovered against the State for lands sold by the State to
which third persons might thereafter prove ownership but prescription. The
unreliability of parol testimony on the subject of possession is well known. In this
case in the report which the law required to be made before a sale could be had it is
stated by an Ayudante de Montes that the tract had an area of 429 hectares, 77
ares, and 96 centares uncultivated, and 50 hectares, 19 ares, and 73 centares
broken for cultivation. The official report also says (1890) that the breaking is
recent. Notwithstanding this official report, the plaintiffs introduced evidence from
which the court found that the greater part of the tract had been occupied and
cultivated by the plaintiffs since 1860.

It is hardly conceivable that the State intended to put in force legislation under
which its property rights could be so prejudiced.

We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which
the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
action by the State, and that the judgment below declaring the defendant the owner
of the lands must be affirmed.

II. What has been said heretofore makes it unnecessary to consider the motion for a
new trial, made by the defendant on the ground that the findings of fact are not
supported by the evidence.

III. The exception of the defendant to the order vacating the appointment of the
receiver can not be sustained. The defendant at no time made any showing
sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver.

The case does not fall under No. 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Neither party in his pleadings asked any relief as to the crops. They were not,
therefore, "the property which is the subject of litigation."

Neither does the case fall under No. 2 of section 174, for the same reason.

Moreover, under No. 2 it must be shown that the property is in danger of being lost.
There was no showing of that kind. The pleadings say nothing upon the subject. In
the motion for the appointment of the receiver it said that the plaintiffs are
insolvent. There is no evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to support this statement.
A bare, unsworn statement in a motion that the adverse party is insolvent is not
sufficient to warrant a court in appointing a receiver for property in his possession.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover costs in this
court.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 2468. July 16, 1906. ]

MAGDALENA CANSINO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GERVASIO VALDEZ, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Wade H. Kitchens, for Appellants.

Isabelo Artacho, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Valenton v. Murciano (3 Phi. Rep., 537) followed to

the point that the statute of limitations does not run against the Statute.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :
The decision in this case was announced on the 30th of April, 1906. The grounds of
that decision are as follows: The case is almost identical with the case of Valenton v.
Murciano 1 (2 Off Gaz., 434), decided on the 30th of March, 1904. The similarity
extends even to the dates and to the location of the land, for we judge from the
description of the property involved in this suit and the description of the property
involved in the case of Valenton v. Murciano that they are two adjoining tracts of
land, one situated in the Province of Pangasinan and the other in the Province of
Tarlac, the boundary line between the two tracts of land.

In the case of Valenton v. Murciano, the defendant bought the land from the Spanish
Government by a deed dated the 14th of July, 1892. In this case the plaintiff,
Magdalena Cansino, bought the property question, as public lands of the State from
the Spanish Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of October,
1893. In the former case the plaintiffs went into possession of the land in 1860 and
claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years. In this
case some of the defendants testified that they went into possession in 1862 and
they claimed the ownership of this land by the same extraordinary prescription. In
either one of the cases did the occupants have any written title to the land.

In Valenton v. Murciano we decided that title to lands such as were involved in that
case could not be acquired by prescription while they were the property of the
State. The decision in that case governs and controls this case and upon its
authority judgment in this case was affirmed.

U.S. Supreme Court

Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands

No. 72

Argued January 13, 1909

Decided February 23, 1909

212 U.S. 449

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Syllabus

Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to
this Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former
is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for
registration of land.

Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of
the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new
titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration
under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.

While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute,

practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new
sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to
the former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.

Page 212 U. S. 450

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands
occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32
Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it
for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the
Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.

The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many
years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to
comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.

Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying
land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is
entitled to the continued possession thereof.

7 Phil. 132 reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Page 212 U. S. 455

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the
registration of certain land. The application was granted by the court on March 4,
1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet
on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United
States, those governments having taken possession of the property for public and
military purposes. The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the
application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court,
7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of error.

The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot
of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the
Treaty of

Page 212 U. S. 456

Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors
had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained
fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country,
some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had
cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for
pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he
had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom.
No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in
1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal
decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps,
information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be occupied
for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out
by the Philippine government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a
petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered
to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.

Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The
government has spent some energy in maintaining that this case should have been
brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the
mode adopted was right. The proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity
to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute
of the type of the Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of
Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an assertion of
legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of
error is the general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the exception,
confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not applying the general rule
to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U.
S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.

Page 212 U. S. 457

Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested that,

even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine
Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others
from its operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of new titles by
homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun under the
Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is entitled to
registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of 1902, which
established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine
Archipelago," 2, and authorized in general terms applications to be made by
persons claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is
entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained.

We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely,
whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, shortly stated,
is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines
except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no
prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880,
required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's
land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land;
that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has
no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct
that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty
of Paris, to which the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without
argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier
decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those

Page 212 U. S. 458

in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in legal theory,
sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may
assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary
in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are
matters for it to decide.

The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the
Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration
to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would
have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical
position of Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had
lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his
land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles
throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the want of
ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power
to enforce.

The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the
United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American
Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is
obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was
different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do
justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic
Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights acquired
there by the

Page 212 U. S. 459

United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It is
reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with
regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will
claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards
of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It
provides that

"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws."

5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from 12, it is hard to
believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any
person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property"
only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part
of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what
they, by native custom and by long association -- one of the profoundest factors in
human thought -- regarded as their own.

It is true that, by 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact

rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not
all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not
more than sixteen hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his
ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if
confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and
had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to
give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We
hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a
paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It is true
again that there is excepted from the provision that we have quoted as to the
administration of the property and rights acquired by the United States such land
and property as shall be designated by the President for military or other
reservations,

Page 212 U. S. 460

as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what property and
rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.

Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the
necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the
government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to
say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the
Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether
justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond
a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of
Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it
was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the
power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet
sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof."

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such
clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the
land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff
in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning
some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to
convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even into
tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes
de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537,
while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it

Page 212 U. S. 461

begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all
titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was
that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond
this recognition in their books.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3
Phil. 546:

"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."

It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the
principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by
the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was
recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper
sovereignty.

The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of
royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This
begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must
have been a grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by
providing that, for all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain
times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is
enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into effect,
the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it
is said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration
proceedings that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get a
document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it
does not appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations purport to
have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals." (We follow the translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear
that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided
that

"interested parties not included within the two preceding

Page 212 U. S. 462

articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may
legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands,
by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner."

This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners
by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment
of the lands of which they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year,
and threatens that the treasury "will reassert the ownership of the state over the
lands," and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve. The applicant's
possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him
or his father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural construction
of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts
forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost all
property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general rules on the
principle that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession,
recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and
then suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize
their possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may
prove" possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree,
but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of
it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.

Page 212 U. S. 463

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal
decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of
adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought,
should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a
matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by
the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the common law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition. We have
deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of
sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to
be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion that law and
justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not
be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was
his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906

F. STEWART JONES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT,Defendant-

Appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General, for appellant.

Pillsbury and Sutro, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court
of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of
land situatd in the Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act
No. 636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and opposed the
inscription upon the ground that the property was public land. At the trial he
objected to any consideration of the case on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to register land situated in that reservation. The objections were
overruled and judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the
Government appealed to this court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction
throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was approved August 31, 1904,
and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over
lands situated in the Province of Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by
which the court was given jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to
land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648. Act No. 648 provides in
its first section that -

The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive order to

reserve from settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands the use of which is not otherwise directed by law.

Section 2 provides: "Whenever the Civil Governor, in writing, shall certify that all
public lands within limits by him described in the Philippine Islands are reserved for
civil public uses, either of the Insular Government, or of any provincial or municipal
government, and shall give notice thereof to the judge of the Court of Land
Registration, it shall be the duty of the judge of said court" to proceed in accordance
with the provisions of Act No. 627. Act No. 627, which relates to military
reservations, provides that when notice is given to the Court of Land Registration of
the fact that any land has been so reserved, it shall be the duty of the court to issue
notice that claims for all private lands within the limits of the reservation must be
presented for registration under the Land Registration Act within six months from
the date of issuing such notice, and that all lands not so presented within said time
would be conclusively adjudged to be public lands, and all claims on the part of
private individuals for such lands, not so presented, would be forever
barred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by Governor Taft
to the judge of the Court of Land Registration:

SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648,
entitled "An act authorizing the Civil Governor to reserve for civil public purposes,
and from sale or settlement, any part of the public domain not appropriated by law
for special public purposes, until otherwise directed by law, and extending the
provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred and twenty-seven so that public lands
desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for public uses, or private lands
desired to be purchased by the Insular Government for such uses, may be brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act;" that the Philippine Commission
has reserved for civil public uses of the Government of the Philippine Islands the
lands described in Act No. 636, entitled "An act creating a Government reservation
at Baguio, in the Province of Benguet," enacted February 11,
1903.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act and become registered land in the meaning
thereof, and that you proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648.

Very respectfully,
(Signed)WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."

The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor, issued
the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice Jones, the
appellee, within the six months referred to in the notice, presented his petition
asking that the land be registered in his name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not
complied with in the respect that this letter of the Governor did not amount to a
certificate that the lands had been reserved. The Solicitor-General says in his brief:

To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648 it was
necessary for the Civil Governor first to certify that these lands were reserved for
public uses, and second to give notice thereof to the Court of Land Registration.

We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648 conferred power
upon the Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make that
power exclusive. The Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to
itself make reservations in the future, if it saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any
reservations which it had formerly made. The contention of the Government is true
when applied to a case where the land has not been reserved by the Commission. In
such a case it would be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an executive
order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration, but where the land
had already been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not necessary
for the Governor to issue any executive order reserving the land but he had no
power to do so. In such cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice to
the Court of Land Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was
given in the letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question from
Sioco Cario, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the office
of the registrar of property on the 8th day of May of the same year. Prior thereto,
and while Sioco Cario was in possession of the land, he commenced proceedings in
court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information he caused to be
recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 12th day of March,
1901.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence shows that Sioco Cario was born upon the premises in question; that
his grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift of the property to
Sioco. This gift was made more than twelve years before the filing of the petition in
this case - that is, before the 16th day of January, 1904. Sioco's grandfather,
Ortega, was in possession of the land at the time the gift was made, and has been
in possession thereof for many years prior to said time. Upon the gift being made
Sioco took possession of the property, and continued in such possession until his
sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in possession of the
land, and is now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the
presentation of the petition the land had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and
the evidence is sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and to show such an adverse possession thereof for ten
years as is required by the section. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows that what
he did in the way of presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a
deed of the land was done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to
securing a measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt
the running of the statute of limitations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure shall be applicable to all proceedings taken under either one of these
acts. These acts in effect provide that in determining whether the applicant is the
owner of the land or not, the general statute of limitations shall be considered, and
shall be applied against the Government. The evidence showing, as we have said,
such an adverse possession, the petitioner proved his ownership of the land if the
Commission had authority to make the statute of limitations applicable to these
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby
disposes of public lands; that Congress is the only authority that can take such
action, and that it has never authorized or approved the action of the Commission in
applying the statute of limitations to proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627. We
do not think that this contention can be sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, provides as follows:
 SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the
Philippine Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other
property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military
and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed
under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this act.

This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands,
and of all public lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is some
provision in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or limits that
power. The government says that such limitation is found in section 13 of the act.
That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:

SEC. 13. That the Gonvernment of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions
of this Act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural
character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for
the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral
lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law
until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the
President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next
ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said
session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the
Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen
hectares in extent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of
the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of
Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of
title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without
compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not
more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been
actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
 SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for
the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise,
not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person, and for the sale and conveyance
of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the
purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon
actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold
for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee
can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall
not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the
distribution of the estates of decedents.

It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral
lands are expressly excluded. If the Commission should pass laws relating to
mineral lands without submitting them to Congress, as it has done (Act No. 624),
their validity would not be determined by inquiring if they had been submitted to
Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if they were inconsistent with
other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In other words, the fact that
such laws were not submitted to Congress would not necessarily make them
void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and 57
contain provisions. By section 57 this Government is authorized to issue all needful
rules and regulations for carrying into effect this and preceding sections relating to
mineral lands. Such regulations need not be submitted to Congress for its approval.
Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands, was not submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands
beloning to religious orders. Section 65 provides as to those lands as follows:

SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute
a part and portion of the public property of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and may be held, sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not
exceeding three years after their acquisition by said Government, on such terms
and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations and conditions
provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired by the Government shall have the preference over all others to lease,
purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as may be
determined by said Government.

Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a
submission to Congress of legislation concerning such land? If it does, then Act No.
1120, which contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so
submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:

That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with
such modifications and amendments as may be made by the Government of said
Islands, are hereby continued in force.

Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its

approval? If they must be, then Act No. 1148, relating thereto, is void, because it
was not so submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal
lands, and lands bought from religious orders need not be submitted to Congress. If
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the
same subjects, they are valid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general

power all property acquired from Spain. When it required the Commision to
immediately classify the agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations for
their sale, we do not think that it intended to virtually repeal section 12. Such,
however, would be the effect of the rule contended for by the Govenrment. If,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in any way directly or
indirectly affects injuriously the title of the Government to public lands must be
submitted to the President and Congress for approval, the general power given by
section 12 is taken away. An examination of some of the laws of the Commission will
show that a holding such as is contended for by the Government in this case would
apparently require a holding that such other laws were also void. Act No. 496, which
established the Court of Land Registration, the court that tried this case, provides in
section 38 that the decrees of the court shall be conclusive on and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof. Neither the
President nor Congress ever gave their consent to this law. They never consented
that the title of the Government to public lands should be submitted to the
judgment of the courts of the Islands. That this law provides a means by which the
Government may be deprived of its property in such lands is apparent. In this very
case, if the Government had not appealed from the judgment, or if it should
withdraw its appeal, the lands would be lost to it--lands which the Attorney-General
claims are public lands. The land could not be more effectually lost by the law
shortening the statute of limitations than by this law making the decrees of the
Court of Land Registration binding on the Government. In fact, the former law could
not in any way prejudice the Government if it were not for the latter law making the
judgments of this court binding upon it. Both of these laws in an indirect way affect
the title to public lands, but we do not think that for that reason they are included in
the terms "rules and regulations" used in section 13 of the act of
Congress.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Act No. 1039 granted to the Province of Cavite and to the pueblo of Cavite certain
public lands. This act never was submitted either to the President or Congress. Acts
Nos. 660 and 732 authorized the leasing of parts of the San Lazaro estate. The
Government leased the sanitarium at Benguet, and provided for its sale. None of
these acts were ever submitted to the President or Congress, which authorized such
disposition. The Government owns many isolated tracts of land, such as the Oriente
Hotel, for example. It has reclaimed from the sea a large tract of land in connection
with the works of the port of Manila. If the Government should desire to sell this
reclaimed land or to lease a part of it for the site of an hotel, or should desire to sell
the Oriente Hotel building, we do not think legislation to accomplish such purposes
would require the previous approval of the President and of Congress. The general
purpose of section 13 was to require the Government to classify agricultural lands
and to pass a homestead law - that is, a law which would state the rules and
regulations by virtue of which title to the public lands of which it can be decided in
every case whether an act of the Commission constitutes a rule or regulation within
the meaning of section 13. It is sufficient to say that the law in question (Act No.
648), making a statute of limitations run against the Government when the title to
few scattered tracts of land throughout the Archipelago is under consideration, is
not such a rule or regulations as required previous submission to the President and
Congress. It will be observed that be section 86 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, Congress reserves the right to annul all legislation of the
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein
mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No.
648 submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied
to one not a native of the Islands, because forbidden by this section; and that this
section limits the power of the Commission to declare possession alone sufficient
evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in which the amount of
land does not exceed 16 hectares.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes
mineral and timber lands. So far as it relates to proceedings theretofore taken under
Spanish laws its benefits are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to tracts not
more than 16 hectares in extent. Where the only claim is possession, no possession
for any definite time prior to August 13, 1898, is required, nor is proof of any
possession whatever after that date demanded. According to the strict letter of the
section a native would be entitled to a patent who proved that he had been in
possession for the months of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated whether
or not one who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years
thereafter, as required by section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person
who was in possession for the month of August, 1898, would be entitled to a patent
in preference to the actual settler spoken of in section 6. When legislating upon the
subject-matter of section 14, the Commission, in Act No. 926, did not make such a
limitation as has been suggested. Section 54, paragraph 6, of that act is as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public land, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act,
except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under
the provision of this chapter.

It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to tracts not
exceeding 16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the power of the
Commission is so limited would require a holding that this section is void as to
foreigners and as to all tracts of land over 16 hectares in
extent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of Act No.
648 and an extension of its provisions to all the lands of the
Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To adopt the construction contended for would lead to an unjust result. By the terms
of the first part of section 14 the Commission has the power to perfect the title to
100 hectares of land as to which a Spaniards may have done nothing more than to
file an application relating thereto, and of which he never was in possession, while
by the last party of the section the Commission would be entirely without power to
make any rules by which a native who by himself and his ancestors had been in
possession of 100 hectares. Such a discrimination in favor of foreigners and against
the natives could not have been intended. It could not have been the purpose of
Congress to give the Commission ample power to legislate for the benefit of
foreigners and to limit its power to legislate for the benefit of
natives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that will be entirely free from objection. But we do not think that
authority given by the Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of
land of which he was in possession during the month of August, 1898, was intended
to limit the general power of control which by section 12 is given to the
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in
accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the cause be remanded to the
lower court for proper procedure. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.
 Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a

complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the
parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the
sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the
land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of
P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in
question was a property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon,
which was made in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her,
with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the
judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela
Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding
that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the
annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the
ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of
Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of
the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
 The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in
question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of
P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi
for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the
execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the
proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public,
without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when
Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein
after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment
in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit
E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through
the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on
August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed
and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land
for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and
sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of
Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate
the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible
entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
(Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years.
While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon
in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling
as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof.
When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it
can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time
being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In
favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied
with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of
no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already
become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the
judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover
possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3793. February 19, 1908. ]

CIRILO MAPA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-

Appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellant.

Basilio R. Mapa, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. The phrase "agricultural public lands"

defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have
registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent, situated in the barrio of
San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A motion for
a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no exception was taken to
the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the evidence.
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6
which follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when
prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received
the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library

The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-
General is the question whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within
the meaning of the section above quoted. The findings of the court below upon that
point are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has
been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of the
petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said
period, and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The
witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between
the sea and the said land."cralaw virtua1aw library

The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as
defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found not only in section 54 above
quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction
must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law.

The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called

agricultural lands unless they are such by their nature. If the contention of the
Attorney-General is correct, and this land because of its nature is not agricultural
land, it is difficult to see how it could be disposed of or what the Government could
do with it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner thereof. It could
not allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926 allows
the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands" in the Philippine
Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10 only
authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral agricultural public land in the
Philippine Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred
and two." It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the
said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands, as
defined by section eighteen and twenty of the act of Congress approved July first,
nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in passing that there is perhaps some
typographical or other error in this reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither
one of these sections mentions agricultural lands. The Government could not give a
free patent to this land to a native settler, in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter IV, for that relates only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."cralaw virtua1aw library

In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing
with this land except to lay out a town site thereon in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter V, for section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about
agricultural land.

The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been
given to that phrase by the act of Congress. An examination of that act will show
that the only sections thereof wherein can be found anything which could be called
a definition of the phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of
this act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural
character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for
the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral
lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect of have the force of law
until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the
President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next
ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said
session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the
Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen
hectares in extent.

"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for
the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise,
not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance
of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the
purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon
actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold
for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee
can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall
not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the
distribution of the estates of decedents."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the
phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the word "agricultural" does not
occur.

There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to
say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of
Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it
means land which in its nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in
the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from Spain
except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below adopted this view,
and held that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came within the definition
of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was
applicable thereto.

1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the
phrase "agricultural land." The Commission in enacting Act No. 926 expressly
declared that such a definition could be found therein. The President approved this
act and it might be said that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly
approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of
Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be
given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we have referred. If the phrase is
not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be
granted can not be determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has
the right to sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can
lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for which it can
give free patents to native settlers in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV,
and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none of those chapters could be put
into force and that all that had up to this time been done by virtue thereof would be
void.

2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has
defined agricultural lands as those lands which are, as the Attorney-General says,
by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural" does
not occur in section 15. Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify
according to its agricultural character and productiveness and shall immediately
make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public
lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing as saying that the
Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands
according to its agricultural character and productiveness; in other words, that it
shall classify all the public lands acquired from Spain, and that this classification
shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and according to
its productiveness.

One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would
be very difficult to apply it in practice. What lands are agricultural in nature? The
Attorney-General himself in his brief in this case says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the
hand of man."cralaw virtua1aw library

The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and
any kind of crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded,
but it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was not
agricultural in nature. Such lands may be found within the limits of any city. There is
within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part thereof an experimental
far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the same city, is a
large tract of land, Camp Wallace, devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city
walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the Luneta on
the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in
extent and is in nature agricultural. The Luneta itself could at any time be devoted
to the growing of crops.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is

emphasized when we consider that whether certain land was or was not agricultural
land, as defined by the act of Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry,
to sale, or to lease in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 926, would be a
question that would finally have to be determined by the courts, unless there is
some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers to
determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No. 926 relating to
homesteads provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily
determine whether the land described is prima facie under the law subject to
homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of public lands, provides
simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the
certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is
more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says nothing about
his decisions as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its nature. Section 26
relating to the lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry
whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber
purposes and further summarily determine from available records whether the land
is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or salts. Section 34 relating
to fee patents to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the
Chief of Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land applied for.

After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the
administrative officers on the theory that the lands were agricultural lands by their
nature, to leave the matter of their true character open for subsequent action by
the courts would be to produce an evil that should if possible be avoided.

3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after a careful consideration of the question we are
satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by
the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "Make rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than
timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition that can be said to
be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones v. The Insular Government
(6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these same section of the act of Congress were under
discussion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that would be entirely free from objection."cralaw virtua1aw library

But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any
other one that has been suggested.

There is nothing in this case of Jones v. The Insular Government which at all conflicts
with the result here arrived at. The question as to whether the lands there involved
were or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither
discussed nor decided. In fact, it appears from the decision that those lands, which
were in the Province of Benguet, were within the strictest definition of the phrase
"agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been cultivated for more than
twelve years. What that case decided was, not that the lands therein involved and
other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were not agricultural
lands but that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were
not rules and regulations within the meaning of section 13.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J. and Torres, J., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.

Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel
No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan,
Exhibit 1, of the Government.

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract

of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year
1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a
possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896.
Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of
Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant
petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition

was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a
good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the
ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors
and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.

As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the

provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize
that for land to come under the protective gis of the Maura Law, it must have
been shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not
land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the land was, even as
long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is the
fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.

We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following

the doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to
Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United States, where some recital is
claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having taken
cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs.
McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United States [1869], 10
Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor
in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as
amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July,
nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The
first relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of what, for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public
land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of

such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to
actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about
one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the
Government, following:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described
in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land?lawphil.net

The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is
that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership
of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl
[1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a
number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract
in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It
is here only necessary to apply the general rule.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts.
446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is
in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of
the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.

The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public
land." The law affirms that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st,
1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections
13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously
denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and the
third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a precise
definition, when it makes the determination of whether the land is more valuable for
agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on
numerous occasions, what was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government
([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not
clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from
objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapa
vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does exist in
the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or

mineral in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here,
again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character." This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the
purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public
forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest,
shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With reference
to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record,
as to whether this land is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes.

The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural
growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that he word
"forest" has a significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace
land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of
considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262;
People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H.

Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:

Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found
either to exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand,
to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for
example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has
neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the course f time it is hoped
will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take in all such lands, would also
take in much that was not wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed with
reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would be almost sure to) include a
garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.

B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:

A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no

means a mere collection of trees, but an organic whole in which all parts, although
apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently
unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any
other beings and conditions in nature.

The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:

During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question
of forest and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is
clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of
Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses.
Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration since the
passage of this act construed this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what
was necessary to protect, for the public good; waste lands without a tree have been
declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past. The term 'timber'
as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood
suitable for construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the
application of new methods every plant producing wood has some useful purpose
and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest lands or
lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same
land will not bring the financial return that timber will or if the same land is needed
for protection purposes.

xxx xxx xxx

The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly
appointed boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands are
more valuable for forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable
under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands without
a single tree on them are considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain
sides which are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and which, if
cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big natural resource of the
soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as forest land and in time would be
reforested. Of course, examples exist in the Mountain Province where steep hillsides
have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even then the mountain
people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover which they
from experience have found protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged
protests with the Government against other tribes on the opposite side of the
mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes from cutting timber or
destroy cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.

Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if
mankind could not devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will
preserve this source of like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be, yet
equally discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade from
the earth because of the ruin it has accomplished."

The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in

order to determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest
purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the
conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of
questions in which the different characters of the land under inspection are
discussed, namely:

Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.

Exposure: North; South; East; West.

Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.

Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber
mixed, dense forest.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under
cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?

State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and
estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each
species.

If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for
agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with timber.

Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in
full.)

Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or

communal forest? Description and ownership of improvements.

If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his
place of residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds
upon which he bases his claim.

When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for,
the corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a
privately claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court
of Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for
forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file
an opposition, sending him all data collected during the inspection and offering him
the forest officer as a witness.

It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time
intervening between the notice for the trial on an expediente of land and the day of
the trial, and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in
question greatly hinder the handling of this work.

In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means
of his delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring
to the present forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with
the alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title
issued by the proper authority or evidence of his right to the land showing that he
complied with the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him
in the least as such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain;
but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then the public or private
character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should be
established not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical
condition and soil characteristics of the land, and by comparison between this area,
or different previously occupied areas, and those areas which still preserve their
primitive character.

Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should
be conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the
spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment
must be restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's
wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of our Government as
represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government
of the United States, believes in "the control of nature's powers by man for his own
good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that
land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of
the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private
ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.

If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that
the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public
land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the
claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director
of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be
stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the
technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal
opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.

We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of
land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section
54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill
and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant
the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special
finding as to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAULINO

ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.

Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from
the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance for the registration under the
Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her appeal. In that
case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land
included in her petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in
that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber
purposes than for agricultural purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of
the lower court. In the course of that decision the Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have examined the plans and all the evidence presented
in this case and are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in its declaration
that this send a did not mean the old road to Bogabon. The fact that nearly all the
northern property is forestry land is a further indication that the applicant's
possessory information title did not include the land running up to the road to
Bongabon, because all the papers which the applicant has regarding this property
call the land palayero." 1 chanrobles virtual law library

Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an
amended plan in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land in
question which she was entitled to have registered. We have no evidence before us
showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno was ever complied
with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the
land included in the former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting
Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the registration,
under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality of San
Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former action.
She presented her opposition in the present action, claiming the very land which
she claimed in the former action. The only proof which she presented in support of
her claim in the present action was the proof which she had presented in the former
action. No proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree
showed that she was entitled to the registration of any other parcel of land than
those which had been conceded to her in the first action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C.
Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name
of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243,
which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the
former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground that
the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land included in her
opposition in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents
some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in question is not forestry
land but that much of it is agricultural land. With reference to said motion for
rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof which is presented in support thereof
existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable diligence, have been
presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered now. It is not newly discovered
evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would not be sufficient to justify
the granting of a new trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during
the trial of this cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first cause, we
are fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is
more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is
a question of fact and must be established during the trial of the cause. Whether
the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in
each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry
or mineral purposes the particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant
made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had
been decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry
purposes. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Avancea, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.

VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.

Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.

Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MOIR, J.:

In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the
appellants sought to register the three lots or parcels of land involved in this appeal,
which registration was opposed by the Director of Forestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small
portion of lot 1154 and all of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants
had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts
of these lots to which opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The
claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and brought the case to
this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104,
1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano
Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the year 1880, and,
after his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists
and that these latter are not spontaneous plants utilized by said heirs.

2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is
rice and pasture land that was possessed as owner by Bibiano Jocson during his
lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession continued by his heirs who
still enjoy the use of the land up to the present time.

3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158,
there has existed since the year 1890, and still exists, a fish hatchery which has
been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more
than 27 years, not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.

4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are
forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven by the sole and absurd testimony
of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous growth and in not
planted; and , as the photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the lot,
the court also erred in holding that the whole lot was covered with firewood trees,
while in fact but a very small portion of it is covered with trees which protect the
nipa plants and the fish hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot
was sown with rice and used as pasture land.

5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158,
covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land, and in not holding to have
been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are drained at
low tide; errors committed with manifest violation of law and disregard of the
jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippine.

6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their
peaceable, public, and continuous possession for more than forty years, as owners,
including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired by prescription
lots 1104, 1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which,
without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to private parties, and by
extraordinary prescription of thirty years.

7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in
consideration of the possession they have had for more than forty years, form the
time of their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus violating the legal
provision whereby the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years
prior to the enactment of the land law, Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine
Commission, are to be deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be
presumed to have applied for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws
and all the proceedings required by the Royal Decrees on the composition of titles;
and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be
adjudicated to the possessors thereof.

8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the
motion therefor being based on the ground that his findings of facts, if there are
any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.

It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question
involved is whether manglares [mangroves] are agricultural lands or timber lands. If
they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for
ten years prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public
Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.

This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states
that lot 1104 was in possession of claimants and their ancestors for more than thirty
years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be
wholly "forestal." The are of the lots does not appear.

The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in
possession of all of those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under a claim of
ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is
not a word of proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up no documentary
title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are "mangles" with
nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and that
in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces) which was later
abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay and
part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied
registration are public forest and cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all
"manglares are public forests."

In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of
the Philippine Islands, and in mentioning forestry land the Act of Congress used the
words "timber land." These words are always translated in the Spanish translation of
that Act as "terrenos forestales." We think there is an error in this translation and
that a better translation would be "terrenos madereros." Timber land in English
means land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree
in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it can not be called "timber land."

The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two
places there were trees growing on this land, but the forester who testified for the
Government always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are
growing on the lands are of no value except for firewood. The fact that there are a
few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general
character of the land from manglar to timber land.

That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber
lands" in the Act of Congress has been definitely decided by this Court in the case of
Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:

Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented
substantially together, all being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-General in
behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic
citations he described that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands
known as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said
that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow
various kindered plants which will not live except when watered by the sea,
extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also
germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists
naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the
opinion that they can not be so regarded in the sense in which the term is used in
the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them
are not available for purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains."
The court on page 573 further said:

It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep.,
175).

As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune
to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The issue was, whether lands used as a
fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some desistance from
the sea, and asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide,
could be registered as private property on the strength of ten years' occupation,
under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The
point decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being that
Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must
be included in tone of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must
of necessity fall into the division of agricultural land.

In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that
the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of

1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war of force majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under
the provisions of this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in
possession of agricultural public lands under the conditions mentioned in the above
section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have
a grant to such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them.
(Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)

While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition
and ownership when it is fully proved that the possession has been actual, complete
and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own
merits.

One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads
of firewood from the lands occasionally. The possession must be more complete
than would be required for other agricultural lands.

The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and
their ancestors before that date, and they should have been declared the owners
and title should have been issued to them.

There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower
court, with instruction to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael
Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot

located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the
applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the
lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that
the lower court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot
to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act
(C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under
the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in
interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in
the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19,
Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212
U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is
entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of
the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on
the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having
purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a
decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The
benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null
and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It
is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the
application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed,

without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967

HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all
surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE
CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-
appellees.

Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.

Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City)
dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of
107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San
Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."

The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.

On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above
described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had
been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired
the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos"
issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be
not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII,
Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the
land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the
application.

Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:

x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of

107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for
registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the
Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over
the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas
have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open
continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being
in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from
raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other words, the cause
of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has
no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case
having transferred to the Director of Lands.

On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as
oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its
opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been
declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.

The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss
by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is
declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be
the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only
the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent
or by homestead."

In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor
the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by
applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying
the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question
to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for
judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty
years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
amended. This provision reads as follows:

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public

domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter.1wph1.t

The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by
Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of

their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect"
title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It
may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the
judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since
the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive
notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to
be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed
or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the
aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public.
The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the
land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but
rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.

On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the

necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that
they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its
purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1wph1.t

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
oppositors-appellees.

Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.