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EXISTENCE OF DIVINE ESSENCE

BY AHLUSSUNNAH WAL JAMA:AH

A REPLY OF THE 13TH CHAPTER OF BOOK NON

EXISTENCE OF GOD BY
Nicholas EVIRITT
OMNIPOTENCE OF DIVINE ESSENCE.
Preliminary A

Ahlussunnah Diuband are the Defenders of Asha:iah and Maturidiah. But they are
also the defenders of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama:ah. Not only Ahlussunnah they are
the defenders of Isla:m. Not only Isla:m they are the defenders of All Abramamic
religions and their set of Intersections. They Defend in General the Theism.It is their
duty and resposiblity.

When Mr. Nicholas Everitt wrote the book Non Existence Of God it is their Duty to
write a Proper Reply to his work.

In this section it is tried to Reply the 13th Chapter of the Book The Non Existence of
God.

Preliminary B

The word God is often misused and some time Atheists say that God should be
spelled backwards [Naiudhu:billah]. So it is better to use the word Deity instead of
it. But the best way is to use the word Divine Essence or Divine Per Se Subsistent
Essence. The Divinity of the Divine Essence is Identical to It.

So Deity is Divine Essence and Divine Essence is the Deity.

Preliminary C

A logical thing is Divided into two .

Either it is Per Se Absurd [Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t] or it is not .

If it is then its Existence is Per Se Absurd.

It it is Not then it is Per Se Possible [Mumkin Bidh Dh:a:t Al A:m]

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If it is Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t Al A:m then either it is Per Se Necessary [Va:jib Bidh:
Dh:a:t] or Per Se Contingent [Mumkin Bidh: Dh:A:t ] Al Kh:A:s: .

If a thing is Per Se Necessary then its Non Existence, Annihilation,

Distruction,Negation ,Mutation etc. all are Per Se Absurd.

A Per Se Contingent is One whose Neither Existence Nor Existence are Per Se
Absurd.

If a Per Se Possible is Neither Per Se Necessary nor Per Se Contingent then it is Per
Se Implied by the Divine Essence and is the Essential Attribute of the Divine
Essence. The Per se Necessary is Per Se Subsistent but this is not and Subsisteth
with the Divine Essence. Its Negation, Non Existence, Annihilation, Destruction all
are Per Se Absurd.

A Pararadox whose existence and Non Existence both are Per Se Absurd is a Per Se
Absurd.

Preliminary D

Divine Omnipotence is an Attribute of Divine Essence that is Over each and Every
Per Se Contingent.

It is incorrect to say that Divine Attribute of Omnipotence is upon each and every
Per Se Possible but it is one each and every Per Se Contingent.

Since ages these things are known to Ashri and Maturidi Theologians and Scholars
and they did continue to debate and discuss on the Divine Omnipotence.

Preliminary E

Time Is Per Se Contingent and any definition of time what so ever it may be which
implieth that it is not so is incorrect

Preliminary F

There are two types of Implications 1] Per Se or Intrinsic Implication and 2] Per Quod
or Extrinjsic Implication.

If a Per Se Possible Implieth a Per Se Absud then either it implieth be an Implication

Which Is Per Se Implication or it Implieth by an Implication which is Extrinsic. If by
the former then it is Per Se Absurd since any thing which Per Se Implieth a Per Se
Absurd is Per Se Absurd.So Such Implication Between Per Se Possible and Per Se
Absurd is Per Se Absurd.. It is Per Se Absurd for Per Se Contingent to imply a Per Se
absurd by Per Se type of implication.

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If it impieth by the latter type of the implication then the Per Se Contingent
remaineth as Per Se Contingent and Per Se Absurd remaineth as Per Se Absurd.

It is Per Se Absurd for Per Se Necessary to imply a Per Se absurd by any type of
implication.

Preliminary G

The term Logically Absurd/ Logically Impossible in Secular Logic is equivalent to the
term Per Se Absurd in Theological Logic. But it also incluseth many Absurdities
which are Logically Absurd if there is a Per Se Necessary Essence.

There are three traditional Principles in Secular Logic.

1] Law of Identity [Al us:u:l Al Ainiah]

A is A , and if A is Not B then A is Not B.

2] Law of Non Contradiction. [Al Ijtima: An Naqi:d:ain]

It is false that Ais B and A is Not B.

3] Law of Excluding the Middle [Al Irtifa: An Naqi:d:ain]

It is false that A is neither B nor Not B.

The forth one in Theological Logic is as fallow.

An Naqs: Alalla:hi Muh:a:l Bidh:Dh:a:t.

That is Defects, Flaws, Imperfections Upon the Divine Essence is Per Se Absurd
[Logically Impossible].

There is a difference between Possible and Contingent. These two terms are often
used alternatively but they are not.

As for Logical Necessary it includeth both Per Se Necessary and Necessary for the
Per Se Necessary Essence.

The second one may be termed as Per Se Possible but it is Not Per Se Contingent.
Since a Logically Contingent is one Whose Neither Existence is Per Se Absurd nor
Non Existence is Per Se Absurd.

As for them they are Not Per Se Necessary since they are Per Se Implied by Per Se
Necessary [Al Lava:zim Adh: Dh:a:tiah] and their Non Existence , Annihilation, etc.
are Per Se Absurd.

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Preliminary H

An Essence is One that is Per Se Subsistent. These are alternative terms . An

Attribute is one that is not Subsistent and Subsists with a Per Se Subsistent and is
Per Se Implied By it. Divine Enistence is not an Attribute [S:-f-h, Pl S:ifa:t] but the
Essence that is the Divine Essence [Dh:a:t] Itself.

Divine power
Leaving on one side for the moment the question of Gods omnipotence,
how should we understand Gods power in general? The reason for asking
this question is that it seems clear that our power to act and Gods power to
act are importantly different. In general, when we do things, we do one
thing by doing another (or by doing a range of things). For example,
Charles is a revolutionary who wishes to foment a revolution. He decides to
do this by assassinating the President. He assassinates the President by
shooting him with a gun. He shoots the gun by pulling the trigger. He pulls
the trigger by squeezing his index finger. And so on. And he has to achieve
his aims in this indirect way because he cannot control directly (by the mere
power of thought, as it were) the course of events. If he simply wills a revo-
lution to occur, or the President to be assassinated, or the President to be
shot, etc., nothing happens. He can perform one of these actions only
by
performing another.
Theists are generally agreed that Gods power is not essentially like that.
ANSWER : The Divine Power is the Absolute Attribute of Deity.
It is Essential and Positive, Eternal and Its Negation is Per Se
Absurd.
Although he could choose to operate in the world in this indirect manner, he
does not have to. He can by-pass all the indirect methods which humans per-
force use to achieve desired states of affairs, and he can bring into being, or
actualise
directly
, whatever states of affairs he wishes to. If he wishes to
make the President die, he does not have to bring it about that the President

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is shot (or poisoned, or incinerated, or savaged by hungry lions, or struck by

OMNIPOTENCE
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lightning, etc.). He can simply make the President drop dead, without there
being any intervening causal chain between his (Gods) will and the end at
which it aims. If he wishes the gun to fire, he can simply make the bullet
shoot out of the barrel he does not have to make that happen by making
the trigger move or the hammer strike the head of the cartridge, or the
charge explode.

This may sound at first like a completely mysterious kind of power about
which the sceptic should indeed be sceptical. But the theist can urge that on
a more modest scale, a similar sort of power is familiar to us all from our
own experience. Although in general, we do one thing by doing another, this
cannot be the case
universally
, for that would generate an infinite regress. If
everything has to be done by doing something, then nothing can be done
unless infinitely many things are done. At some point, the theist will say, we
all recognise that we have a divine sort of power to do things directly
direct in the sense that merely by our willing something to be, it comes
about. Exactly what sorts of actions are of this kind has been a disputed
question. Some authors have thought that squeezing your finger is one kind
of action of this kind. Other have argued that you squeeze your finger
by
contracting your finger muscles. But even if that is true, how do you con-
tract your finger muscles? Perhaps the only thing we do directly is to put our
brain in such a state that it will bring about the contraction of our finger
muscles. But at some point in this regress (the theist will insist), we all have
to recognise that anybody who can do anything at all can do at least some
things in this direct way. As it is sometimes put, every agent can perform
some
basic
actions. The distinctive thing about Gods capacity for action,
then, is not that it has absolutely no parallel with the capacity of humans. It
is simply that his capacity for basic action is very much more extensive than
ours. It is no doubt this fact that Descartes has in mind when he says in his
third Meditation that although Gods will has greater scope than Descartess
own, it does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the
essential and strict sense (Descartes 1984 vol. II: 40).
The theist is therefore able to point to something in human experience
which renders intelligible to some degree the kind of power that God has.
Although this is a limited achievement (because the relevant kind of human

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power is also philosophically very puzzling) it is a real and worthwhile

achievement. For although a puzzle remains about how basic action itself is
possible, and a further puzzle about how Gods power can be so extensive,
the theist can plausibly claim that it is not
utterly
mysterious to us what
kind of power it is.
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The concept of omnipotence
Let us turn then to the concept of omnipotence. What does it mean to say of
any being that it is omnipotent? Here is one natural definition that seems
initially obvious:
Definition 1
X is omnipotent = X can do everything
Some writers have accepted this simple definition. Descartes, for example,
thought that God could even do something which was inconsistent with the
laws of logic. God could have made the universe in such a way that 2 + 2 =
5, or triangles had four sides. That Descartes should have believed this helps
to explain how it is so important to his epistemology that he should be able
to prove that God exists, and that God is no deceiver, and why he thinks
that an atheist mathematician cannot achieve any certainty even in mathe-
matics.
ANSWER: This is an incorrect version. Divine Omnipotence is
an Attribute that is upon each and every Per Se Contingent
and Per Se Possible, Upon every thing whose Negation is not
Per Se Absurd.
However, most writers have thought (surely correctly) that God
cannot break the laws of logic (or alternatively, that he could not have made
the laws of logic to be other than they are).
ANSWER: THEY ARE NOT MADE BUT ESSENTIAL AND
NECESSARY.
(Notice how this thought fits
nicely with the idea that God is a supremely rational being, who does noth-
ing arbitrarily or whimsically.) But most writers have also thought (again
surely correctly) that this is not a genuine incapacity or limitation in Gods
power, since this does not imply that there is (as it were) a realm of the do-
able from which God is excluded. To say that something is logically
impossible is precisely to exclude it from the realm of the do-able. So to say
that God cannot do what is logically impossible is not to say that his power
is limited in any way.
This leads us naturally to a second understanding of divine omnipotence:
Definition 2

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X is omnipotent = X can do everything which it is logically

possible to do.
ANSWER: This is a correct definition but it is misinterpreted by
the author of the book.
A better Definition is as Follow:
X is Omnipotent = X Hath Power over each and every Logical
Contigent [Per Se Contingent].
This definition Excludes not only Divine Essence but also
Excludes Divine Essential Attributes. Since the are Logical
Necessaries. Divine Essence is Unimplied by any thing what so
ever and Divine Essential Attributes are Per Se Implied by the
Divine Essence. Negation , Non Existence, Annihilation,
Destruction, and Mutation of each one of them is Logically
Absurd. A Contegent is not a Paradox so Paradoxes are
included in Logical Absurdities and and Per Se Absurd.
Although it might seem that the move from Definition 1 to Definition 2 is a
small one, and a move which is forced on us by the obvious faults in Defin-
ition 1, it provides the theist with a powerful resource. Whenever the atheist
finds an example of something which God cannot do, the theist can try to
argue that the task in question contains some hidden logical impossibility,
and hence that Gods incapacity is not proof of his lack of omnipotence.
ANSWER: Thing is actually topsy-turvy. Athiests often try to
present things which have a logical Absurdity in them ,Theists
only exposes them in general.
A range of problem cases
Let us see how the debate might proceed from Definition 2. What possible
actions can the atheist provide which God will be unable to perform? Prima
facie, there is a range of things which are possible, because humans actually
do them, but which are ruled out for God by Gods other properties. One
set of examples concerns actions which humans can do because they are not
OMNIPOTENCE
258
morally perfect. Humans can behave in a mean, cowardly, cruel, selfish,
hypocritical way, etc. But since God is by definition morally perfect, it seems
to follow that he cannot act in any of these ways.
ANSWER: There are some types of Acts which are Per Se
Possible Upon Human Essence but Per Se Absurd Upon Divine
Essence and Essential Divine Attributes. They form a Principle
or a Law equal to Law of Thoughts in the Theological System of
All Theologians and is stated as follow: AN NAQS: ALAL
LA:HI MUH:A:L BIDH: DH:A:T That is Defect/Imperfection/Flaw
Upon the Divine Essence and Essential Divine Attributes are
Per Se Absurd. Sowhen an act is Per Se Possible for a Created

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Essence say a Human Being it is Per Se Possible Upon Divine

Essence. So this is nothing new. For Example Urination and
Homosexuality etc. are Per Se Possible for Human Essences
but not for Divine Essence, due to the above Principle . So they
are not in Power Of Divine Essence. But there are several types
of acts that are not upon the Essence of Agent but upon the
Essence of Created Essences. They are in Divine Power.
A second set of examples concerns actions which humans can do but God
cannot, and comes from the fact that humans have bodies and God does
not. For instance, it is logically possible for humans to walk, since they have
legs. It is not logically possible for legless beings to walk. Since one of Gods
defining properties is that he is immaterial, i.e. has no body, it follows that
he has no legs, and this in turn implies that he is unable to walk. Clearly,
there will be many things which humans can do which logically presuppose
that they have a body, and hence which will be logically impossible for a
being without a body to do, such as winking, standing up, sitting down,
running around, coughing, spluttering, kissing, hugging, scratching ones
nose, and so on.
ANSWER:These are logically Possible upon a Created Essence
and not Upon the Divine Uncreated Essence. So they are
included in the Acts which are logically Possible of Non Divine
Essence and are Logically Impossible for the Divine Essence .
The Problem is that the the term Logically Absurd contain all
Acts and Attributes which are Logically Impossible and Per Se
Absurd Upon Divine Essence and Essential Attributes of Divine
Essence. Also an Logically Absurd Kissing or hugging is
different from Logically Contingent Kissing or Hugging. The
difference between the two types are often neglected. For
further details see AL J-HD AL M-QL by Shaikh: Al Hind
Maulana Mah:mu:d Al H:asan who has explained the difference
of these two acts with clearity.
A third example of a limit on Gods omnipotence is raised by a very tradi-
tional though frivolous-sounding question, namely Can God create a stone
which is too heavy for him to lift up? (let us label this a superheavy stone).
The thought here is that the answer must be either yes or no. But either
way reveals a limitation on Gods power. If the answer is yes, then there
can be a stone too heavy for God to lift, so he is not omnipotent; if the
answer is no then there is a superheavy stone which God cannot create, so
he is not omnipotent. Since omnipotence is a defining characteristic of God,
and we have just shown that the concept is self-contradictory, it follows that
no
being can be omnipotent, and hence that God does not exist.

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ANSWER : These acts are Impossible and Logically Impossible

since all Divine Essential Attributes are Beyond the Divine
Omnipotence and it is Per Se Absurd for the Divine
EssentialAttributes to be Self Contradictory and Paradoxial. So
they are beyond the Divine Omnipotence. But their Exclusion
from the Divine Omnipotence doeth not Imply any Limitation
on It.
A fourth class of actions which promises to create difficulties for the theist
concerns humans ability to end their own existence: they can commit sui-
cide. But can God commit suicide? It would be natural (even if ultimately
indefensible) to say that an omnipotent being must be able to do everything
which we (as
non
-omnipotent beings) can do,
and more
; so that if we can
commit suicide then so too can an omnipotent being. Certainly, if we accept
Definition 2, it will follow that an omnipotent being can commit suicide. But
many theists would find this conclusion unacceptable. They have wanted to
say that if God exists at any time, he exists at all times.
On the face of it, then, there seems to be a range of things which it is logi-
cally possible to do (since
we
do them), and hence which an omnipotent
being ought to be able to do; and yet which God cannot do. So, if to be God
a being would have to be omnipotent, it would follow that God cannot
exist. How is the theist to reply to this pro-atheist argument?
ANSWER : Once again the learned author have commited a
Gross Error. For centuries the Theologians are dividing the
Realities in Three types. 1] Per Se Necessary (Va:jib Bidh:
Dh:a:t). 2] Per Se Absurd (Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t). 3] Per Se
Contingent (Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t or Mumkin Bdh:Dh:at Al
Kh:a:s:.) It may be noted that One That is Not Muh:a:l Bidh:
Dh:a:t is termed as Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t Al A:m (Per Se
Possible).
Divine Omnipotence is Only Upon Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t Al
Kh:as: [In Short Mukin Bidh: Dh:a:t]. Divine Life is an Essential
Attribute and any Flaw upon any Essential Attribute of Divine
Essence is Per Se Absurd.
So commiting suicide for Deity is Per Se Absurd. Once again
Flaws, Defects Upon Per Se Necessary Existent are Muh:a:l
Bidh: Dh:a:t. This implieth either there is no Divine Essence or
such acts say death ,suicide are Per Se Absurd Upon Divine

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Essence and Divine Essentialn Attributes. Things, Actsand

Attibutes etc. which are Per Se Contingent Upon Per Se
Contingent are Per Se Absurd Upon Per Se Absurd like An
Identical Copy of Divine Essence [Naz:i:r] and Upon Divine
Essence. So a Logical Absurdity Upon Divine Essence is not
necessary a Logical Absurdity Upon a Non Per Se Possible
Essence. The Problem with the learned Scholar is that he does
include each and every Logical Absurdity in his definition but
does not include the any Per Se Absurd in them which is
Logically Absurd Upone the Per Se Necessary Existent by the
Principle ANNAQS: ALAL LA:HI MUH:A:L BIDH: DH:A:T that
is the reason he argues as such.
Coming back to a conclusion this is not a new objection and
scholars are aware of this objection since ages. The Essence of
this Objection is that there are may Attributes and Acts which
are not Logically Absurd on Non Divine Essences yet the are
Logically Absurd on Divine Essence. So the proper answer is
that they are Absurd in Regard to the Agent. The are Logically
Absurd Upon Divine Essnce but not Upon None Divne Essence.
For Example Temporality [H:du:th:]. It is not Logically Absurd .
If it would have been Logically Absurd it must have been
absurd on the World and there must have nothing non Eternal
in the world even if the World was Eternal. But the thing is
different in case of Divine Essence. It is Per Se Absurd
[Logically Absurd] Upon Divine Essence. So Divine Essence can
not be a Locus [M-H-L] of H:du:th:] Since it is logically absurd
Upon Divine Essence. The Problem of Limilation emerges from
incorrect classification of Acts and Attributes and
Misconception about Divine Omnipotence [Qudrah]. There are
Three types of Acts and Attributes.
1] One those which are Logically Absurd in all cases. Like To
make a thing which Existeth and Existeth Not simultaneously.
2] Two Which are Logically Contingent .
3] Three Which are further Divinded into two Sub-types.
3.1] They ate Logically Absurd Upon Divine Essence.3.2] Which
are Logically Contingent [Possible] on Non Divine Essence.
So if a thing whether it be an Act or an Attribute is Logically
Contingent upon Non Divine Essences it is Logically Absurd
[Logically Impossible] Upon Divine Essence. For Example
Contradictions and Paradoxes of Pe Se Necessary Existing
Essence. For Example the Divine Essence cannot Annihilate It

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Self since if It is Per Se Necessary then Its Non Existence is Per

Se Absurd [Logically Absurd] and Not Logically Possible
Logically Contingent]. In such cases one must say that It is
Infinitely Wrong to say that Such type of Acts are Logically
Possible hence by the alleged definition they are included in
Divine Omnipotence. They are Absurd inregard to the Agent.
That is some of their sub types are Logically Contingent and
Some Of their types are Logically Absurd. So when it is said
that All Logically Contingents are in Divine Omnipotence they
are excluded Per Se Necessarily . Now in Secular logic there
are three or four laws of thought. In religious Logic there is an
other Law of thought or an Axiom equlal to Law of thought and
That is
NAQS: ALAL LA:HI MUH:A:L BIDH: DH:A:T] and it is
generally explained as Naqs: On the Divine Essence and
Divine Essential Attributes of Divine Essence are Muh:a:l
Bidh:Dh:at]. As the Secular logic does not Include it as an
Independent Axiom of it, it consider it as some thing incorrect
but in religious and heological Logic it is one of the Most
Fundamental Axiom. But it can be shewn that it is Logically
Absurd even in Secular Logic.
For Example Divine Essence is Logically Possible to be
Annihilate Per Se Impleith that Divine Essence is Not Divine
Essnce and that is a Logical Contradiction. Divine Essence
Intercourseth Implieth Divine Essence is Not Divine Essence.
Since it Implieth Mutation in Divine Essence and If Divine
Essence is A Per Se Necessary Existent then it is Per Se Absurd
that and thing which Per Se Implieth Divine Essnece is Not
Divine Essence is Logically Absurd. Also Divine Only Excludeth
Logical Impossibilities it also excludeth Logical Necesaries like
Divine Essence It Self and Divine Essential Attributes of Divine
Essnece.
So
Some possible replies
The theist, however, has a range of possible replies, different replies to dif-
ferent lines of attack. Let us consider first the superheavy stone, the one
OMNIPOTENCE
259
which is so heavy that not even God can lift it. Rather surprisingly, it seems
that the theist can find a consistent line of defence for either a yes or a no
answer. Consider first the case for a yes answer, i.e. for saying that God
can

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make a stone too heavy for him to lift up. The theist has at least two lines of
argument here. According to the first, he could say that God
can
create the
superheavy stone, and that as long as he does not do so he remains omnipo-
tent. Of course if he were to create the stone, there would be something that
he would not then be able to do, and he would then no longer be omnipo-
tent. But if he never creates such a stone, he is, was and will be omnipotent
for all time.
This is incorrect. For sake of an argument let it be supposed
that Divine Essence Hath the Power to Create this Stone of
Supreme Heaviness . If such a stone is In Power Of Divine
Essence then such a Stone is Per Se Contingent. But any thing
that Contradicteth Either Divine Essence or any One Of the
Divine Essential Attributes Of the Divine Essence is Per Se
Absurd [Logically Absurd]. If it is so then it is not in Divine
Power. The learned Scholar has supposed that any thing which
contradicteth a Divine Essential Attribute is Logically
Contingent. But it is not the case . If infinite many stones are
Logically Possible such that each one of them is Logically
Possible to be elevated, then it is not implied that a stone is
Logically Possible such that its Logical Contingency to be
Elevated Contradicteth Divine Essential Attribute of
Omnipotence. Since If there is a Divine Essence and If there
are some Divine Essential Attributes of the Divine Essence
then they are Logically Necessary and any thing which
contradicteth a Logical Necessary is Logically Absurd.
The problem with this first line of reply is that if omnipotence is one of the
defining characteristics of God, then a being who is not omnipotent at any
time cannot at that time be God. But could a being exist as God at one time,
and while continuing to exist, cease to be God because he had deprived him-
self of one of Gods defining propersties? We considered this issue in Chapter
1, when we looked at whether God could be interpreted as a title. We
accepted there that theists were entitled to impose a constraint on the inter-
pretation of God, namely that if God exists at all, he could not continue to
exist while ceasing to be God. It was this consideration which ruled out the
idea that God is a title. Similarly, in this context, the idea that God could
destroy his own omnipotence and hence his divinity, while continuing to
exist, will be unacceptable. So, the theist cannot solve the problem of the
superheavy stone by saying that God has an unexercised power; for this
would be saying that God ..
Theist have solved the Problem of this type of Supposed
heavy Body. Since such a Heavy Body say stone is Per Se

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Absurd since it Contradicteth the Logical Necessary Existent i.e

the Divine Attribute of Omnipotence. Similarly the Divine
Essence cannot Annihilate Its Own Omnipotence since it is
Logically Necessary and any Existent that is Logically
Necessary is Not In Divine Omnipotence. It must be noted that
the Negation of Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Absurd. Similarly
there is no Per Se Possibility of Limitation of Divine Essence
and Divine Essential Attributes.
could
cease to be omnipotent (if he were to exer-
cise the power), whereas we are agreeing that God
cannot
lose any of his
defining properties.
ANSWER : This type of Stone is Per Se Absurd, Since Divine
Omnipotence is Upon each and every Per Se Contingent. Such
a Stone or a body of any material is Per Se Absurd. 1] If it is
Per Se Contigent then Divine Essence Hath No Power over a
Per Se Contingent. This is Per Se Absurd. This is the reason
that such a Body whether it be a Stone or Metal is Per Se
Absurd and Per Se Impossible. Even on Secular level it is
Logically Impossible since such a Massive Stone which cannot
be in the Power of an Omnipotent is Per Se Absurd if there is
any Omnipotent. So this is just like the question can the Divine
Essence make an other Deity /Divine Essence like
Himself/Itself? Since such a thing which excludes from the
Divine Omnipotence is nothing but Per Se Absurd , and a Per
Se Absurd is Logically Impossible. It must be noted that it to
walk or to hug or to intercourse is neither Logically Possible
not Impossible but one types of these acts are Logically
Possiblew and an other types of these acts are Logically
Impossible. As the Secular Logic do not include Defects Upon
the Divine Essence Logically Impossible things the result is
that the learned scholar has incorrectly assumed that Defect
and Imperfection Upon Divine Essence are Logically Possible.
So they are included in Logically Impossibles in Theological
Logic. Any thing which contradicteth Omnipotence is Logically
Absurd. Since It is absolute and Infinite. So if a thing Per Se
Necessarily Implieth the Limitation of Divine Omnipotence it is
Logically Absurd since Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Necessary
and its Limitation, Non Absoluteness, Annhilation and
Finiteness are all Logically Impossible. For Example let it be

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defined that A Logical Necessary is one Whose Negation is Not

Logically Possible and is Logical Absurd. Now by this definition
any thing which implieth its Negation is Logically Impossible.
However, there is a second line of defence for giving a yes answer. Sup-
pose that God when he creates the superheavy stone intends that it shall be
too heavy to be lifted by anyone, even by himself. If this is a logically possi-
ble task, then he can indeed do it.
It is not a Logically Possible
If it is not a logically possible task, then he
cannot do it but by Definition 2, the fact that he cannot do it does not
show him not to be omnipotent.
The second definition has been Misinterpreted. Contradictions
of Divine Essential Attributes are Logically Absurd. Also not
only Logically Absurds are not in Omnipotence but Logically
Necessaries are also not in Divine Omnipotence. The fallacy in
the second definition is that the difference in the Possible and
Contingent is neglected. A Possible is some thing that is not
Logically Absurd, but a Contingent is one that is neither
Logically Necessary Nor Logically Absurd. In the definition the
word Possible is used for Contingent and not for Possible so in
Theological Logic there is a difference between Possible and
Contingent , which is neglected by the learned Scholar and
such a Stone or any other body of any other matter is Logically
Absurd.
Further, if it is logically possible for God to
create the stone, and he does create it, the theist need not then concede that
since God cannot lift it, God cannot be omnipotent. For by Definition 2,
Gods omnipotence requires only that he be able to do whatever it is logi-
cally possible; and (so the theist can argue)
it is not logically possible to pick
up a stone which an omnipotent being has made unliftable.
IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE SINCE ANY THING WHICH IMPLIETH
LIMITATION TO OMNIPOTENCE IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. SINCE
ABSOLUTENESS OF DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE IS LOGICALLY NECESSARY
AND A LOGICAL NECESSARY IS ONE WHOSE NEGEATION IS LOGICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE.
This objection is based upon two misconceptions. A] Neglection of the
reality that any thing Which Negateth or Contradicteth Divine Essence
and Divine Essential Attributes are Per Se Absurd i.e Logically Absurd.
B] Neglection of the Reality that an Essential Attribute of Per Se
Existing Essence Is One Whose Negation is a Logical Absurdity.
Similarly whose limitation is a Logical Absurdity.

14
 15

. For if it were
possible to lift the stone, that would have shown that the omnipotent being
had failed to achieve a logically possible task and
that
would surely be
self-contradictory.
That is certainly Not the case . Such a stone is Logically Absurd
since such a Stone Contradicteth the Necessary Essential
Attribute of Divine Essence as stated several times . See
above.
(Alternatively, if the omnipotent being had failed in the
task, that would prove that the task is not logically possible, contrary to
hypothesis.)
Such a Stone is Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t , that is Self Absurd Per Se
Impossible. The hypothesis of the Possibility of such a stone is
False, and Wrong .
One can present some more such questions and each one can
be Replied on these grounds.
1) Can Divine Essence make a close champber/box such the
Divine Essence cannot See inside It?
2) Can Divine Essence make a thing which Divine Essence
Itself is unable to Destroy? A generalized version of this
questions is as follow:
Can Divine Essence Create a thing such that Divine Essence is
Unable to Annihilate It?
3) Can Divine Essence make a Rod so Strong such that Even
Divine Essence is Unable to bend it?
4) Is it in Power of Divine Essence to make mutation in
Divine Omniscience?
5) Can Divine Essence make a Lance such that it can break
any shield , and Can Divine Essence make a Shield which
cannot be broken by any Lance , and what shall happen if
this Lance hits this Shield?
6) Can Divine Essence make another Divine Essence ?
Such Questions are answered as follow:=
It is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to Make a Box or a
Chamber such that Divine Essence cannot See inside it
since such a Box or a Chamber implieth a Contradiction the
Divine Attribute of Sight , which is an Essential Attribute
and there fore such a Box or a Chamber is Per Se Absurd.

It seems then that the theist can consistently allow that God can create the

15
 16

superheavy stone. Could he also consistently take the other option and deny
OMNIPOTENCE
260
that God could make the stone? If the idea we sketched above is correct,
then it seems he could. For the argument would then be that although God
could not make the stone, this does not show that he is not omnipotent,
since making such a stone is not logically possible.
This is the correct answer. Let it be seen what is the objection
on this answer.
It is not logically possible
to make something which is too heavy to be lifted by an omnipotent being,
i.e. a being who can lift up anything which it is logically possible to lift up.
In brief, the theist can argue either that it is logically impossible to
make
the stone (because it is logically impossible to make something too heavy to
be lifted by a being who can lift anything which it is logically possible to
lift); or that it is logically impossible to
lift
the stone (because it is logically
impossible to lift something which has been made by an omnipotent being
with the intention that no one should be able to lift it). Either way, the inca-
pacity in God is no evidence that he is not omnipotent, since it involves
something which it is
logically
impossible to do.
The learned Scholar has accepted that this is not Problem. But
Suppose for a while that A Stone is Logically Contingent such
that its Elevation is Not Logically Possible. In such a case such
a Stone is Logically Contingent to be Created yet Logically
Absurd to be Elevated does not limit the Divine Omnipotence
since Divine Omnipotence is On Each and Every Logically
Contingent ,and anything which is not Logically Contingent is
either Logically Absurd or Logically Absurd. Such a Stone if is
Logically Contingent its Elevation is Logically Absurd implying
that Divine Omnipotence is not Contradicted. But this is just
for sake of an argument. Since if a thing Contradicteth a Divine
Essential Attribute say Omnipotence then it is Per Se Absurd
since Contradiction of any Essential Divine Attribute is Per Se
Absurd [Logically Absurd].
The theist would be in diffi-
culty only if there was something which it is logically possible to do but
which God cannot do, and no such possibilities are raised by the superheavy
stone.

16
 17

Although this problem of the superheavy stone is in a way trivial, we have

pursued it at some length partly because it is one of those problems which
naive atheists think is sufficient to convict theism of paradox, and partly
because it reveals how difficult it can be to find an example which will allow
an alert theist no room for manoeuvre. On reflection, we can see that the
problem of the superheavy stone is an unlikely candidate to put Definition 2
under pressure. What will put Definition 2 under pressure are examples of
actions which are uncontroversially logically possible (e.g. because we per-
form them) yet which God cannot perform.
This shall be discussed latter with some historical background
of the problem. Ahlussunnah Of Diuband and Khairabadi Cult
continued to debate over the issue :
Can Divine Essence Speak a False Sentence?
Creating superheavy stones is
not something which we do, and it is far from obvious whether it is logically
possible either to create or to lift such a stone. The atheist does better to
stick to a range of obviously possible actions, such as sinning, or ending
ones own existence, and ask whether those possible actions are possible for
God.
As the Learned Author has accepted that this is not a Strong
argument, and in reality it is not an argument in the least
meaning one may proceed to the next case of alleged Divine
Sin.
Can God sin?
History:
There are two types of Acts which a Created
Suppositum/ Essence hath Power to do.1) Those
which are Not Immoral like eating, drinking sleeping,
urination, vomiting,sextual relations with wives,
forgetting .2) Some of them are Immoral, but are are
either special cases of the first or both belong to
same type, like sextual relations with mothers,
cannibalism, homosexuality, etc. Some are morally
incorrect like to speak a false statement, to make a
false promise , Injustice ,to punish an infallable for
no sin/transgression, to act against wisdom while
being wise , misery etc.
Khairabadi cult does not differentiate between them and consider them all alike.Ahlussunnah of
Deoband How ever consider the last type in divine omnipotence and exclude the firt two types. Yet
both agree that exclusion of the first two do not imply any problem to the absolute omnipotence. In
this reply the ahlussunnah diuband approach and ash sha:h isma:i:l shahi:d approach is used.

17
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What is Sin
Sin is a Transgression of Laws of Supreme Authority.
Divine Essence is the Supreme Authority. To accept the
Logical Possibility of Sin for Supreme Essence is to Accept
the Logical Possibility of a Superior Authority then the
Supreme and that is a Contradiction. So it is perfectly
correct that Divine Essence Hath no Power to Do a Sin other
wise this is no thing but the Logical Contingency of An
Essence higher than the Highest. How ever there are
atleast two types of Acts, 1] Which are Immoral for Created
Rational Supposita and are Not In Divine Power since they
Logically Absurd Upon Divine Essnce. 2] Which are Immoral
for Created Essences but in Power of Divine Essence.
What about the thought that humans can act immorally and God cannot?
One mistaken way for the theist to reject this claim would be to challenge
the view of divine perfection which the objection is implicitly resting on. Let
us agree that God is by definition morally perfect, i.e. that no being could
count as God unless it were morally perfect. Would this mean that God
could not
act immorally?
Once again the Learned Scholar has missed the Point. There is
no Logical Possibility of an Act Upon Divine Essence. So if an
Act is such that its Logical Possibility is either Upon the
Essence of the Agent, or it is an Immanent Act or the Act is of
such Nature that the Necessary and Sufficient Condition for its
Logical Contingency is to be Associated with the Divine
Essence or the Necessary and Sufficient Condition of the Per
Se Contingency of the Act is to Subsist in the Essence of the
Agent then it is Per Se Absurd and Logically Absurd. Similarly
the acts of Bodies are Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence. But
those acts which are not upon the Agent and are upon
Essences other then the Essence of the Agent are them selves
Susbistent are In Power of Divine Essence. How ever if any one
of such Act is in Divine Omnipotence then it cannot be called a
Sin or a Transgression.
Note: An Immanent Act is an Act which occureth within the agent.
In other words its Logical Contingency is in the Essence of the Agent or Associated
with the Essence of the Agent or Subsisteth in the Essence of the Agent like eating,
feeling of hunger, or commiting suicide or Sexual Activities, Biological reproduction
etc. One may include in them such acts like Robbing, Stealing, etc. since the
Logically Imply i.e Per Se Imply that Per Se Necessary Existent is Per Se Contingent

18
 19

Existent , which Per Se Impieth that Per Se Necessary Existent is not Per Se
Necessary Existent. Let all of such types of Acts be termed as Immanent Acts in this
article whether they be Immoral for Created Rational Supposita like Homosexuality
or raping etc. or not Immoral for Created Rational Supposita like eating of vegetable
, or eating of Non Vegetables etc.
Or would it be enough to say, more weakly, that
although God
could
act immorally, he never does, and it is that fact which
makes him morally perfect?
There is no weakness in this answer as for as those act are
Concerned which are in Divine Omnipotence as discussed
above.
1
If this is a tenable interpretation of moral per-
fection, then moral perfection and omnipotence would be compatible.
OMNIPOTENCE
261
Although this may sound like a neat solution for the theist, in fact it
quickly leads him into an untenable position.
It is a correct solution as for as the acts as for as Non
Immanent Immoral Acts are concern but it is an Incorrect
solution for Immanent Immoral Acts. The centuries old debates
between the Ahlussunnah of Diuband and Khairabadi cult are
in regard to this types of Acts. Where Ahlussunnah Of Diuband
believes that Such Acts are in Divine Omnipotence like
Injustice [In the Meaning to Punish a Person for nothing, to
Speak a false Statement/Sentences in regard to Exoteric
Declarative Positive and Declarative Negative Speech
[Akh:ba:r ofAl Cala:m Al Lafz:i:]. It is necessary at this point
to write some of the basic points of the old controversy so that
the Learned Author may understand the debate. Ash Sha:h
Ima:i:l RH argued that if to speak a False Sentence is not in
Divine Power but it is in the Power of Human Beings then the
Power of a Human Being become than the Divine Power atleast
in regard to Sentences. Respected Fad:l Haq and his followers
replied that in this case what shall be said about acts like
Eating , Sexual Activities, Drinking etc. Since it is agreed upon
that they are in human power but they are not in Divine Power.
What Shaikh:ul Hind replied to the followers is summerised as
follow:= that there are two different types of acts in the power
of Created Supposita. 1] One that are Naqs: Upon the Divine
Essence 2] Those which are Naqs: Upon Gh:airullah . Like

19
 20

Falsehood upon Al Cla:m Al Lafz:i: . etc. To confuse both types

of acts is a fallacy.
So the argument of Ash Sha:h Isma:i:l Shahi:d is valid for the
second type. He did not use this argument for the acts of the
first type.
A number of Muslim Scholars who had gained enmity of
Theological Discussions declared this debate as useless . But it
is now clear that such discussions are beneficial since we can
anticipate Atheistic Arguments and work for their answers.
Since no one has to learn any thing from Atheists since they
did not say any thing which is not known priorly.
Suppose he grants that God
does have the power to act immorally (since he is omnipotent). We then
have to ask what the position would be if God exercised this power. It
would surely follow that he was then no longer perfect; and since moral
perfection is a defining feature of God (i.e. he
must
have it if he is to be
God), this means that he would have deprived himself of his divine status.
As the Immanent Acts are not in Divine Power whether they be
Moral or Immoral for Created Human Essences they are Per Se
Absurd Upon Divine Essence. It is not the question of Divine
Omnipotence over them but their Per Se Contingency is Per Se
Absurd for the Divine Essence, that is their Logical
Contingency is Logical Absurdity Upon Divine Essence. So if
their Per Se Contingency is assumed then it is implied that Per
Se Necessary is Per Se Contigency and that Per Se Implieth Per
Se Necessary is Not Per Se Necessary. In an other sentence
Necessary Existent is Not Necessary Existent. Any Act that Per
Se Implieth Necessary Existence is Not Necessary Existent is
Per Se Absurd.
However for Non Immanent Acts, they are in Power of Divine
Acts. The question is what happeneth if Divine Essence
Excercises His Omnipotence upon these types of acts is a
fallacy. If Divine Essence Excerciseth them they do cease to be
Immoral. Since it is not Immoral for Divine Essence to Exercise
an Act that is in the Omnipotence of Divine Essence.
He would have brought about his own non-existence as God. This is pre-
cisely the position which the theist hoped to avoid when he denied that
God was a title which could be laid aside.
Clearly, then, the theist needs to say that Gods perfection consists not in
the fact that he never does wrong, but in the fact that he

20
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cannot
do wrong.
Almost all the discussion has been done and no further
discussion is required . However they may be repeated in the
end.
But how can this be reconciled with the claim that God can do anything
which is logically possible?
It is correct in the meaning that if some acts are accepted
Logically Contingent Upon Non Divine Essences but Logically
Absurd for Divine Essence since they Intrinsically Imply that
their Agent is Per Se Contingent and Not Per Se Necessary.
Some theists at this point simply add to Defin-
ition 2 a further clause saying that something counts as omnipotent only if it
does not believe of anything which it does that it would be better if it did
not do it (see, for example, Stewart 1993: 28). But by itself, this is a poor
response for two reasons. First, it is simply arbitrary to add to a definition of
omnipotence a clause (namely about what it would be
better
to do) which
has no intuitive connection with omnipotence.
One need not to defend all the definitions , but even this
definition may be defended. How ever one may leave this
definition to those who like it for defending it.
Surely an omnipotent being
ought to be
able
to do X even if it does believe that it would be better if it
did not. Perhaps its belief has the consequence that it does not actually
do
X
but this does not show that it is unable to do it. Second, it still leaves God
unable to do things which any human can do, namely perform an action
while believing that it would be better not to perform it.
There is however a more promising line of reply for the theist, which we
will shortly explore in connection with Definition 3.
Divine Omnipotence is Upon each and Every Per Se Contingent
and by definition it Excludeth Per Se Absurds and Per Se
Necessaries.
Gods lack of a body
What then about the second category of cases produced by the atheist of
things which God cannot do, namely those which depend upon the fact that
humans have bodies and God does not?

21
 22

Any act which per Se Implieth that its Agent Must be a Body is
Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence since to be converted into
a Body is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essnce to Become a Body.
One possible line of reply here for
the theist is to argue that God can perform such actions, because God can
have a body.
What this means is not that God
standardly
has a human body, for he is
by definition an omnipresent spirit, and both of these characteristics are
incompatible with being a human body. The thought is rather that on par-
ticular occasions, God could assume a human form. If this is so, then God
could
do that range of things whose performance by us depends essentially
on the fact that we are embodied beings, and indeed beings with a very par-
ticular type of body (we have arms, legs, toes, fingers, etc.).
Incarnation of Per Se Subsistent Essence is Per Se Absurd.
Divine Essence Cannot Assume any Non Eternal Form since it is
Per Se Absurd.
It is unclear what force this line of reply has. Let us assume that it is
OMNIPOTENCE
262
possible for God to create (maybe
ex nihilo
) a human form, and to speak
and act through this human form. Would that mean that if that human form
did something (e.g. scratched its nose) that was
literally
God scratching his
nose?
If Divine Essence Createth a human or an animal form it is just
a creation and it is Separate from Divine Essence. Hence it is
Not the Divine Essence. It is just a form if it lacketh a
Subsistent Essence in it or it is itself Per Se Subsistent. If it
Subsisteth in some other Subsistent Creation then it is the
form of that Subsistent Creature/Creation.
If this line of argument is to be effective against the claim that we can
do things which God cannot, the answer must be Yes, that would literally
be God scratching his nose. But we might well be uneasy with this response,
for the following reason. When I scratch my nose, it is indeed
I
who am
scratching

22
 23

myself
. It is not just that I am bringing about a scratching of
something which I own or control: it is I who am being scratched. The
person who does the scratching is
identical with
the person who is
scratched. But when the God-created human form scratches
his
nose, it
seems that what is happening is that God is bringing it about that a being
who is not identical with God scratches his nose. For this reason, it is not
clear that this line of reply to the objection (that we can do things which
God cannot) is really compelling.
2
Can God destroy himself?
We considered above whether Gods omnipotence implied that he could
bring about his own non-existence
as God
, by envisaging his doing some-
thing as a consequence of which he loses one of his defining Godly
properties.
This has been answered in previous answers but this may be
dealt with some additional discussions:
Divine Essence is a Per Se Necessary Existent. If such an
Essence Existeth the Following things of the Divine Per Se
Necessary Existence are Per Se Absurd and Logically Absurd.
1] Annhilation of Divine Essence. 2] Non Existence of Divine
Essence 3] Distruction of Divine Essence.
4] Mutation of Divine Essence. Per Se Contingency of the
Divine Essence. 5] Per Se Absurdity of Divine Essence.
So Divine Essence is One That is Per Se Necessary in Existence
and its Non Existence is Per Se Absurd. In an other sentence it
is said as follow:
A Per Se Necessary Existent is One Whose Non Existence is
Logically Absurd. So either such an Existent Existeth or It
Existeth Not. If it Existeth then Its Non Existence , Annihilation,
Destruction, Mutation etc. are all Logically Absurd. A Logically
Absurd is not in Divine Omnipotence.

We were there presuming that although before the change he

was God, and after the change he was not, he was the same individual
before and after the change. And we accepted then that such a conclusion

23
 24

would be unacceptable to theism. This might make it seem otiose to con-

sider the related question whether Gods omnipotence implies that he can
bring about his
total
non-existence.
The Learned Scholar has once again neglected that Divne
Essence is Per Se Necessary in Existence [Va:jib Al Vuju:d Li
Dh:a:tihi]. Divine Essence is not Per Se Contingent in Existence
[ Mumkin Al Vuju:d Li Dh:a:tihi Al Kh:a:s:]. A Per Se
Contingent Essence is One Whose Existence is Per Se
Contingent and Whose Non Existence is also Per Se
Contingent. But it is LogicallyAbsurd for a Per Se Necessary
Existent to Not- Exist if such an Existent Existeth. So even if it
is assumed that there is not Divine Essence and Each and
Every Essence that Exist is a Contingent Essence, in the
Universe of this assumption the following statement would
have been Perfectly true:
If there would have been a Logically Necessary Existent then
its Annihilation, Distruction, Non Existence, Mutation etc,
would have been Logically Absurd.
In the case there is a Necessary Existent it is still true.
The question is not just whether he
can produce a change as a consequence of which he loses his divinity, but
whether he can produce a change as a consequence of which he ceases to
exist altogether. Clearly the theist who denies that Gods omnipotence
extends to the first alternative will also deny that it extends to the second.
These are Logically Absurd and Logically Impossible and if
these are excluded from Divine Omnipotence there is no
problem at all .
But there may be certain logical costs to such a denial, which we now need
to explore.
Let the alleged costs be seen .
We can certainly say that God could not have the power to destroy him-
self if he exists necessarily, i.e. if some versions of the ontological and
cosmological arguments are sound. For the conclusion of all versions of the
ontological argument, and at least some versions of the cosmological argu-
ment is not merely that God exists, but that he necessarily exists he could
not
not
have existed. Now
if
the impossibility of Gods non-existence is logi-
cal impossibility, then the theist can rightly claim that Gods omnipotence

24
 25

under Definition 2 would not require (and indeed would not permit) that he
could bring about his own non-existence. For his omnipotence (we are
assuming) requires only that he can do everything which is logically possible;
OMNIPOTENCE
263

and if his own non-existence is not logically impossible, the fact that he
cannot bring it about does not show that he is not omnipotent.
In fact, if we take Gods existence to be logically necessary in this way, it
means that he cannot lose
any
of his defining properties (not merely that he
does not or will not lose them, but that he cannot). This means, for example,
that God not merely never has done and never will do anything immoral,
but that he
cannot
do anything immoral. But these incapacities will not
undermine his omnipotence, since it is logically impossible to do anything
which will bring about the non-existence of a logically necessary being. We
see here how a line of argument (namely the ontological argument) which
might at first glance seem unpromising, can nonetheless be one which theists
would hope could be patched up; for it has helpful consequences of a remote
kind for the theistic enterprise.
This is correct that if Divine Essence is a Logically Necessary Existent then the
Annihilation, Destruction , Non Existence, Mutation of Divine Essence are
Logically Absurd and it is also Logically Absurd that such an Essence be a
Substratum/Locus [M-H:L] OF Non Eternals [H:udu:th:].
However, most theists would be willing to concede that whatever kind of
existence God has, it is not logically necessary: atheism is not actually self-
contradictory. If that is so, then, the problem for theism returns: given that
committing suicide is a logically possible action, why cannot an omnipotent
being commit suicide?
Either there Existeth a Divine Per Se Subsistent Existent or there is no Per Se
Subsistent Essence. If it Existeth then it is A Logically Necessary Existent.
Now the question becometh Is there A Logically Necessary Existent or there
is not Logically Neceesary Existent. If there is then Non Existence,
Annihilation etc. of that Essence is Logically Absurd.
It must be noted that Suicide of Divine Existent is Per Se Absurd. Since Divine
Essential Attributes are Necessary For Essence [Neither Identical Nor
Separate (La: Ain Vala: Ghair)] or they are Identical [Ain] to the Divine
Essence. In any case they exclude the Divine Omnipotence. It must be noted
that not only Logical Absurdities are not in Divine Omnipotence but also the
Logical Necessaries are not in Divine Omnipotence. Negation and Non
Existence of Divine Essential Attributes are Logically Absurd [Al Muh:a:l Al
Mant:-qi:]. So Divine Suicide is Per Se Absurd, since negation of Divine Life is
Per Se Absurd and any thing that Contradicteth the Essential Attribute of
Divine Life is Per Se Absurd. Last but not the least Suicide [ A SPECIAL CASE
OF MAUTH (DEATH)] is a Defect [Naqs:] and it has been said that
An Naqs: Alal La:hi Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t,
So Suicide Upon the Divne Essence is Per Se Absurd [Al Maut Alal La:hi
Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t].

25
 26

Omnipotence relativised to God

The problems which we have been exploring reveal how Definition 2 allows
the theist to cope with a range of initially problematic cases, actions which
we can perform but which God cannot. The general technique of the theist is
to show that when ascribed to God, the action contains some hidden logical
impossibility, and hence is excluded from the scope of his omnipotence. But
nevertheless, there remain some problem cases. In particular, if Gods exis-
tence is not logically necessary, why cant he bring about his own
non-existence, and why cant he sin?
Divine Essence is Per Se Necessary , and to deny that Divine Essence is not
Per Se Necessary is a type of Atheism. Even if the believer is a claimant of
being a theist. So in this case we leave the two groups to deal with one
another.
To resolve these problems, the theist is likely to relativise omnipotence to
the being in question as follows:
Definition 3
X is omnipotent = X can do everything which it is logically
possible for X to do (i.e. everything which is logically consistent with
Xs other defining properties)
Relativised to God, this gives us:
Definition 3a
God is omnipotent = God can do everything which it is
logically possible for God to do (i.e. everything which is logically consis-
tent with Gods other defining properties)
The new definition immediately gives the theist the ability to deal with cases
which were problematic under Definition 2. It explains at once why God
cannot sin: it is logically impossible
for God
to sin, since he is by definition
OMNIPOTENCE
264
perfect, so his inability does not compromise his omnipotence.
To impose this condition does not make any sort of Difference . If this
condition is dropped from the definition no proper objection can be made.
Since If Divine Essence Hath Power over each and every Per Se Contingent
then there are things which are of two types. A] That is Per Se Absurd or
Logically Absurd. B] That is Per Se Contingent or Logically Contingent. So if
it is saind that Divine Essnce Hath Omnipotence opon each and every Per Se
Contingent, it is not required to add it in the definition of Divine
Omnipotence.
Another of
the defining features of God is that he is immaterial, or pure spirit. This
means that it is not logically possible
for God
to scratch his nose, cough, etc.
and hence his inability to do so will not be a limitation on his omnipotence.
Definition 3 also enables the theist to cope with a range of cases which
otherwise threaten to be a threat to divine omnipotence, namely human free
actions.
We noted in Chapter 12 how theists often seek to solve the problem
of evil by relying on the free will defence; how the sceptic challenges the free
will defence by asking Why didnt God make humans with free will, but
make them so that they always freely choose to do the best?; and how

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theists tried to answer that sceptical question by appealing to an incompati-

bilist account of freedom. According to an incompatibilist, if agent A freely
decides at time t to perform action X, there does not exist at any time before
t a set of conditions which guarantee that A will decide to do X. The only
person who can bring it about that A freely decides to do X is A herself.
A freedom of a Per Se Contingent Created Rational Suppositum that
Contradicteth Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Absurd.
But it is not a problem of Divine Omnipotence but it is the problem of Free
Wills of Created Rational Supposita.
Although God can bring it about that conditions propitious for or hostile to
As decision prevail, he cannot bring it about that As free decision is made
.
Putting the matter slightly differently, in creating free agents, God is exercis-
ing his omnipotence to bring it about that there are some further states of
affairs which he cannot bring about: the free actions of the beings whom he
has created. This move is essential to the free will defence because it
explains why if God gives humans freedom, he
cannot
ensure that they use
it properly.
This objection is multifold and may be seen that any freedom which
contradicteth Divine Omnipotence is Impossible and Which doeth not is
bestowed as Divine Essence Hath the Essential Right to Bestow or to Create
that is in the Divine Power and Potentiality.
He cannot ensure this (according to the incompatibilist) because
an action cannot be both freely performed by person A and also brought
about by God. Does this mean that after creating free agents, God is no
longer omnipotent?
A freedom which contradicteth Divine Omnipotence is Logically Absurd. As
stated earlier this
is not a problem of Divine Omnipotence but it is the problem of Free Wills of
Created Rational Supposita.

Definition 3 enables the theist to answer no. Although

As freely doing X is certainly logically possible (and hence is something
which an omnipotent being by Definition 2 could bring about), it is not log-
ically possible
for God
to bring about, so Gods limited power in this respect
does not count against his being omnipotent.
Limitation of Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Absurd since like all Essential and
Eternal Divine Attributes Omnipotence is not in Divine Omnipotence and this
doeth not Limit the definition.
Strictly speaking, this theist argument is not that performing As free
actions is incompatible with one of Gods
defining
properties, but that it is
incompatible with one of Gods
necessary
properties, namely Gods non-
identity with any of his creatures. It is because God is not A that he cannot
perform As free actions.

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As actions are Per Se Contingent upon A as but Per Se Absurd Upon Divine
Essence.
But we can charitably allow the argument through,
by interpreting defining widely to include necessary.
However, a further source of complication comes from the fact that there
may be some kinds of action that are, as we might put it, possible at one
time but not at another.
In 1754, God had the power to cause or to prevent
the earthquake which hit Lisbon in 1755. In 1756, given that he had
allowed the earthquake to occur, he no longer had the power to bring it
about that the earthquake had never occurred. Is it then logically possible
for God to prevent the 1755 earthquake? Given the meaning which Defin-
ition 5 attaches to that question, i.e. would be it be consistent with Gods
OMNIPOTENCE
265
other defining properties, we would have to say yes. But we can now see
that this answer is too simplistic.

In such arguments the learned scholar have supposed that time is an

independent quantity. In Mechanics time is taken as an Undefined Term.
Some may have tried to define it. In Theology there are several definitions
of time.Whether in Physics or in Theology the definitions of time which are
acceptable must satisfy the following conditions.

1] Whether time is Continuous or Discrete it must by Logically Contingent ,

neither Logiclly Absurd nor Logically Necessary. In terms of Theological
Logic neither it be Per Se Absurd nor Per Se Necessary but Per Se
Contingent.

2] It Must have a Beginning.

3] It must be a Creation of Divine Essence.

4] Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes Must Necessarily Be

Beyond Time and Transients it.

5] Parallel times [Naz:a:ir] are Per Se Contingent. [Maulana: Qasim Nanati

is of the view that Parallel Times are Per Se Contingent].

So one may discuss the questions raised by the Learned Scholar a little
latter.

In the era when time travelling and its Logical Contingencies are under
discussion the Learned Scholar uses it as an argument against Divine
Omnipotence.

The Learned Scholar is requested to study these discussions before

arguing against the Divine Omnipotence.

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How ever it is necessary to make an answer according to the basic

principles.

RELATION OF TIME TO THINGS IN TIME.

Time is a Container [Z:arf] and Things in Time are Contained [Maz:ru:f].

Both Obey the Laws of Z:arf and Maz:ru:f .

Under these conditions let it be supposed that at time 1 an event 1

occurred. This means that Time 1 was Created by Divine Essence. And in
time 1 the event 1 was Created. Now at Divine Essence Annihilateth
them and Createth a New Time say 2 and an other event in 2

Say 2. As time is Per Se Contingent and the Event which Occurreth in it is

also Per Se Contingent . Now as according to Principle It is Per Se Absurd
for a Per Se Contingent to become a Per Se Necessary or to become a Per
Se Absurd, this implieth that it is Per Se Contingent even if it ceaseth to
Exist.

So it is Per Se Possible for the Divine Essence to Create the time 1 once
again after it ceaseth to Exist or is Annihilated. Divine Essence may not
Create event 1 in it but event 2. This shews that that as Divine Essence ,
Divine Essential Attributes and Divine Act of Creation are beyond time
they are not considered in Time and Laws of time are only applicable to
things that are in time and not on those thing which are not in time
therefore it is Logically absurd to apply the laws of Time to those which if
they do exist they are not in Time. This does shew that Divine Essence
Hath the Power to recreate a Contingent Period of time which is
annihilated by the Divine Essence. As there is no Super Time which
includeth both the Created Time and the Divine Essence ,Its Attributes and
Its Act of Creation , so it must be a fallacy to Apply the laws of time to the
them .

Maulana Qa:sim Nanatavi believes that Past , Present and Future all Exist
[See His Book Hadyatushshi:ah] and events [Vaqa:I] in them. But he
cannot be an Eternalist since he cannot believe Time and Events in Time
as Eternal. Further e cannot believe in an infinite future. Although cannot
be believe that the future shall cease to be , he means that finite types of
futures are created and the process of there creation is continuous.Once a
future is created it existeth and is never ANNIHILATED.

Returning back to the question that Doeth Divine Essence Have the
Omnipotence to Change the Past the argument is based upon the Belief on
Presentism.

[Eternalists believe that the past, present, and future all exist; i.e., some nonpresent
things and times exist. Time Cannot be Eternal as according to Maulana Qa:sim since he

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have explicitly accepted the Necessity of beginning for the Time. Yet if the word Eternalist
does not imply an Eternal Past he may be termed as so.]

Any how the ancient question that Doeth Divine Essence Hath the Power to change the
Past and an argument against the Omnipotence of Divine Essence is based upon the
Presentism.

[ Presentists believe that only the present exists; i.e., only present
things and times exist.]

It is like to use nowhere argument against the time travelling

theories.

Someone who advances The Nowhere Argument against the

possibility of time travel must presume presentism . The argument
is essentially that, if presentism is true, then it is impossible to time
travel, as the traveller would be trying to get to somewhere that
does not exist. This is a common concern about time travel. The
same is true for the Learned Scholar who uses Presentism against
the Divine Omnipotence.

The Learned Scholar is using the dogma of Presentism against the Divine
Omnipotence. This means that according to the Learned Scholar to change
the Past Divine Essence is just trying to do some in a time that doeth not
exist.

So an answer should be given which may satisfy a Theist whether he

belongs to Presentists or Eternalists.

If the time of Past Existheth then there is no Logical Absurdity in making

changes in it . It is doeth not then it is Still Per Se Contingent and it is Per
Se Contingent to be Created.Since if a thing is Per Se Contingent its
Creation is also Per Se Contingent.

If existence of past is incorrect as according to Presentists , eve then if a

Presentist if he believes in Omnipotence of Divine Essence cannot deny
the Divine Omnipotence and the Per Se Contingency of the time of Past
and its Recreation. So Divine Essence can change the past just by
recreating it.

An other question is whether Divine Essence Hath the Power to Save the
Twin Towers after 9-11 just changing the past. The answer is that if Divine
Essence Createth the Past 9-11 in which the towers were destroyed and

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Saveth them it s just Per Se Contingent. Now the question is about the
consequences of the change of past. The answer is they are also
contingent rather Per Se Contingent so they may be re created or chosen
other wise.

For example if Divine Essence sendeth a person back in time by creating

the Past Time and the person some how saves the twin towers from the
destruction the question is whether the twin be still be standing in the
time just after he is sent and entire history be changed. A proper answer
is that it dependeth upon the Choice of the Freest Agent i.e Divine Essnce
whether the Divine Essence Willeth to change the Entire History or just
some short Period of time . In the latter case although the twins are saved
from destruction for the moment but as the entire history is not changed
the are found fallen on the very next day even if they are saved on the
previous day with out a reason.

Many things can be said and Per Se Contingencies are Infinite.

The theist needs to relativise Gods power

to a time: something can be logically possible for God at one time and not at
another.
This argument assumes that Time is an Independent quantity and not in
Divine Power. It presuppose Atheistic Presentism in its worse form. If a thing
is T is logically Contingent at time A then it is still Contingent at time B where
B is relativelyin Future to A. There is no need to modify the definition as
presumed by the Learned Scholar/
So Definition 3 needs to give way to
Definition 4
X is omnipotent = at every time, X can do everything which
it is logically possible for X to do at that time (i.e. everything which is
logically consistent with Xs other defining properties)
This is a misconception since Per Se Contingent cannot be converted to Per Se
Absurdity , Per Se Contency cannot be Converted to Per Se Necessity. This is
Per Se Absurd
There are, however, some doubts which one can raise about Definition 4
omnipotence, stemming from the very undemanding nature of the concep-
tion of omnipotence which it provides. First, it opens up the possibility of
there being great numbers of omnipotent beings.
This statement of the Learned Scholar is based on the neglection of Uniqueness of
the Per Se Necessary Existent.
Of course there would be a
great many things which these omnipotent beings were powerless to do; but
as long as their powerlessness was a logical consequence of some of their
defining properties, it would not show that they were really not omnipotent.
Certainly there could be a
sequence
of different omnipotent beings.
Pro-vided omnipotent being A exercises his power to limit his omnipotence, he
could be followed by omnipotent being B, who in turn limits his own

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omnipotence, making possible the emergence of omnipotent being C and so

on.
This is certainly incorrect since it is stated that Divine Omnipotence is a
Divine Essential Attribute of Divine Essence and No Essential Attribute is in
Divine Omnipotence . This is thus Per Se Implied that Divine Omnipotence is
not in Divine Omnipotence . Essential Divine Attributes i.e Divine Essential
Attributes are not in Divine Omnipotence since their Negations are Per Se
Absurd.
So a sequence of omnipotent beings is possible.
Plurality of Omnipotent Existents is Per Se Absurd and any thing which Per
Se Implieth it is also Per Se Absurd, So the supposed Series or sequence what
so ever is meant be the Learned Author is Per Se Absurd.
But it looks as if the
simultaneous .
existence of many omnipotent beings is possible too.
Let it be studied what the Learned Scholar says.
Suppose
we define perfectrons as beings who by Definition 4 are omnipotent (i.e. can
do anything which is not logically excluded by their other defining proper-
ties); and whose dominant preference is never to thwart the preferences of
any other omnipotent beings. Then it seems that the universe could contain
many perfectrons. For if we make it one of their defining characteristics that
they wish not to thwart the preferences of other omnipotent beings, it
follows that if they are unable to thwart those preferences, this is not a limi-
tation on their omnipotence. For by Definition 4, any powerlessness in a
being B which is implied by the defining features of B does not count against
B being an omnipotent being.
We can even, it seems, imagine an absurd case which is consistent with
this definition of omnipotence. Let us define a nullipotent being as a being,
one of whose defining features is that he cannot do
anything
. He will then
count as omnipotent by the revised definition. For it will be true of him that
he can do everything which it is logically possible for a nullipotent being to
do, i.e. nothing at all. It would clearly be absurd to describe a nullipotent
being as omnipotent, so any definition of omnipotence which allows us to
do this, as Definition 4 does, must also be absurd.
A Per Se Possible doeth not convert into Per Se Necessary or Per Se
Contingent or both. This is Per Se Absurd. So the Divine Power over time is
accepted since Time is Per Se Contingent and each moment of time or each
Period of time how so ever large or small is Per Se Contingent. So It is in
Divine Omnipotence to Create a time which Divne Essence Hath Created and
Do a different thing in It. A Lot depends upon the chosen definition of time.
But only proper Definitions of Time are those in which Time is a Per Se
Contingent and a Creation of Deity. Any other Definition in which Time is not
in Per Se Contingent is not accepted.
Is there any way forward for the theist? Can he amend Definition 4 to
avoid the absurdity which it would allow? Some theists have suggested:
Definition 5
X is omnipotent = at every time, X can do everything which
it is logically possible for X to do at that time (i.e. everything which is
OMNIPOTENCE

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This is based on the assumption that Logical Contingencies become Logical Absurdities as time
passes AND Vice Versa . This is incorrect [Al Inqila:b Adh:a:ti:] This is Per Se Absurd.
266
logically consistent with Xs other defining properties); and no being, Y,
greater in overall power than X, can be conceived
3
Although nullipotent beings qualify as omnipotent by Definition 4, they do
not qualify by Definition 5 because they fail the final clause: we
can
conceive
of beings greater in power than nullipotent beings. Does this provide the
theist with a satisfactory account of omnipotence?
The revised definition still leaves the theist with some problems. There is
first a problem about precision. The definition uses the notion of one entity
being of greater power than another. But how are different degrees of
power to be measured? Do we really have a sharp enough grasp of this con-
cept to be able to make use of it in a definition? If one being A can do only
X, and a second being B can do both X and Y, then clearly B is more power-
ful than A. But often the capacities of agents do not bear this simple
relation. We find that A can do X, Y and Z, and B can do R, S and T.
For an Omnipotent Existent it is Necessary to Have Power over each and every
Per Se Contingent , including very time itself since time if not Per Se
Contingent then it is Per Se Absurd but not Per Se Necessary . So there is no
problem of A or B or Z or
.
How
are we to judge whether the power to do the former is greater or less than
the latter? No doubt in some cases we will have some strong intuitions
about the matter, but in other cases it will be very unclear which power is
the greater. Suppose A can work out in his head all the prime numbers up to
10,000,000, and B can compose elegant sonnets in his head. Which power is
the greater?
As there is only one Omnipotence Existent and there is none other all these
discussions are invalid. Plurality of Eternal and Per Se Necessary Essences is
Per Se Absurd as an Accepted Axiom of Theological Logic. T-addud ul Vujba:
Adh: Dh:tiah Muh:a:l Didh: Dh:a:t]
More seriously, from a theistic perspective the definition is both too lax
and too demanding. It is too lax in that it allows that an omnipotent being
could commit suicide (at least on the assumption that the ontological argu-
ment fails), whereas most theists would prefer to avoid having to accept this
consequence.
If an Omnipotent Existent can Commit suicide then it ceeasth to be Per Se
Necessary Essence and it Per Se Necessary Implieth that Divine Essence is
Not Divine Essence. So this is Logically Absurd.
On the other hand, it does not let in enough, for it will exclude
God from being omnipotent. To see that this is so, compare what God can
do, with what a semi-God-like being (call him Semigod) can do. Semigod is
omniscient, eternal, omnipresent, etc.
Plurality of Divine Existents and Existence of Semi Divine Essences are Per Se
Absurd. This is against the Divine Uniqueness.
In fact, he has all of Gods properties
except for moral perfection.
Such an Existent is just a Divine Essence and this Implieth Plurality of Divine
Essences. It is to confuse one issue with the other . It must be dealt

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separately. But it is a well proved theorem of Theology that Divine Essence

cannot make an other Divne Essence and any Essence that is like It in
Essential Attributes. Shari:k Al Ba:ri: Muh:a:al Bidh: Dh:A:t.
In terms of power, he can do everything which
is logically consistent with his other defining properties. Since his actions are
subject to fewer constraints from his other defining properties (no moral
constraints, for example) than Gods actions are constrained by
his
defining
properties, Semigod can do everything that God can do, and more.

This is incorrect since any thing that is not Per Se Contingent cannot be done
by both and any thing that is Per Se Contingent is in power of both. A detail
answer may be given but as Only Divine Essence is Omnipotent ,it is therefore
out of the scope of the present work to answer this argument , since such an
Existent is Per Se Absurd. Further if it is a Problem it is for followers of Rad:a
Ibn Naqi: Ali: [1856-1930] of Bans Baraily of U. P British India [1858-1947],
since they believe that the Holy Prophet is Omnipotent and Omni Valent [ AL
Mukh:ta:r Al Kull] not for others.
He can
sin and God cannot. Semigod would therefore be greater in overall power
than God; hence God would fail to meet the final clause of Definition 5;
hence God would not count as omnipotent by Definition 5. Nor does the
definition entail that there can be only one omnipotent being. For all that the
definition tells us, there might be a set of omnipotent beings, all of very great
but equal power, and no other being could be conceived of with greater
power than each of them had.
Every thing has been answered and replied and nothing is needed to say
further. If any thing is Per Se Contingent and not in Divine Omnipotence but in
the Potentiality of any other Existence then there is a Problem. But if an act
is Per Se Absurd upon Divine Essence and Per Se Possible upon some Non
Divine Agent, such a comment cannot be made. It cannot be the case that the
Non Divine Essence is more Powerful then the Divine Essence or hath more
Power. How ever if it becongeth to the class of those CTS WHICH WERE
DISPUTED BETWEEN Ima:m Ahlussunnah Ash Sha:h Isma:i:l Shahi:d
[Martyr] and Imam of Khairabadi Cult, it may be a problem for the followers of
the latter.
OMNIPOTENCE
267
Conclusion
We have now reprised, in Definitions 1 to 5 the main course which is fol-
lowed in discussions of this topic.
4
The conclusion that emerges is that the
very idea of an omnipotent being, in the most natural reading of that term,
is logically impossible. The most natural reading of that phrase is given by
Definition 2; and all the subsequent amendments which we have considered
have been attempts to find a sense of omnipotence which (a) allows that an
omnipotent being is logically possible, and (b) renders consistent the thesis
that God is omnipotent with a variety of other theistic claims about God.
What can we conclude from the discussion?
The atheist may well conclude that there cannot be an omnipotent being;
that God (if he existed) would be omnipotent; and therefore that God

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cannot exist. The theist is likely to reply to this, It is we who are defending
the claim that an omnipotent God exists, so it is up to us, not up to you the
atheist, to say what we mean by omnipotent. And by our definition of the
term, it
is
logically possible for there to be an omnipotent being, and an
omnipotent being moreover who can have the other divine attributes. This
is in one way a reasonable response, and in another way unreasonable. It is
reasonable that anyone arguing for any thesis should have the right to spec-
ify what the thesis is. In that sense, it is indeed up to the theist and not the
atheist to say how the concept of omnipotence is to be interpreted. But it is
unreasonable in the sense that if the defence of the thesis in question requires
extensive semantic deviance, then a more straightforward and perspicuous
expression of the theists position would be to say God of course is not
omnipotent because no being could be. Nor is he the most powerful being
consistently describable because he is constrained in his power by, for
example, his essential goodness. He may not even be describable as the most
powerful being that there is since some ranges of power are simply incom-
mensurable. All we can honestly claim is that he is indeed very powerful.
Further reading
Many sources provide helpful accounts of debates over omnipotence. Planti-
nga (1967) is an old but still useful guide. More recent contributions which
lead the search for a definition into the present century are Swinburne
(1986), Martin (1990), Gale (1993), Stewart (1993), Rosencrantz and Hoff-
man in Quinn and Taliaferro (1997). For a sophisticated modern analysis
which tries to accommodate the points made in this chapter, see Flint and
Freddoso in Craig (2002).
This is just a Summery and there is no need to answer it once again. How
ever some thing may be added latter.

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