Maxwell Albone

Professor Casper

PLSC 300

28 October 2016

Research Design Proposal

I: Research Question

What are the institutional factors that effect voter turnout in developing democracies?

This is an important question to address because institutional factors are a focus of much of the

research surrounding voter turnout. However, the effect of some institutions, such as

unicameralism and proportional representation, are disputed, as their effect is supported by some

research but placed in doubt by other research. Furthermore, the effect of institutions on voter

turnout is largely confined to research on industrialized and developed democracies. Therefore,

research on the effect of institutions on developing democracies is lacking. Furthermore, the little

research that has focused on developing democracies has lacked high levels of variance. Thus,

my research topic is important because it addresses conflicts in research on institutions and

focuses on the effects of institutions on developing democracies.

II: Literature Review

Political Institutions are the focus of much of the research surrounding voter turnout. It is

a widely held belief that political institutions have a major impact on voter turnout. However,

there is considerable disagreement regarding what institutional factors influence voter turnout.

Furthermore, there is considerable disagreement regarding whether the same institutional factors

have an impact on industrial democracies impact voter turnout in developing democracies. For

example, there is no consensus the impact of PR electoral systems on the voter turnout in
democracies. In Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout by Andr Blais and

R.K. Carty, Blais and Carty represented their dependent variable, voter turnout, as the number of

votes cast divided by the number of registered voters. The authors defined their independent

variable, electoral regime, as categorical represented by PR, plurality, or majority. They

conducted their analysis by including a number of control variables: constituency structure,

compulsory voting, unicameralism, universal male suffrage, female suffrage, direct presidential

elections, and federalism (Blais and Carty 1990, 169-172). Furthermore, the authors developed

intervening variables in order to test explanations for the impact of PR systems on voter turnout.

These variables include competitiveness, electoral disproportionality, number of parties, and one-

party majority government (Blais and Carty 1990, 172-174). To test for the effects of PR

systems, the authors, first, use their main independent variable, electoral system, to explain voter

turnout without any control variables. They found that PR systems foster turnout that is about ten

percent greater than turnout in either majority systems or plurality system (Blais and Carty 1990,

174). Furthermore, when they added their control variable, they found that PR systems still had a

significant positive effect on turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, 174). Then, the Blais and Carty

tested the effect of their intervening variables, but they found that, with the addition of these

variables, PR systems still showed a great impact on turnout (Blais and Carty 1990,177). These

result indicate that, while many claim PR systems increase turnout by increasing

competitiveness, increasing the number of parties, and decreasing disproportionalities, the

traditional explanations for the effect of PR systems do not hold under their analysis. Therefore,

although the authors show that PR systems have a significant effect on turnout, they cannot

provide an explanation of why this is the case. In his paper Political Institutions and Voter

Turnout in the Industrial Democracies, Robert Jackman also studies the effect of political
institutions on voter turnout in developed democracies. However, Jackman, in contrast to Blais

and Carty, defines voter turnout as the percentage of the eligible voting population that cast a

vote (Jackman 1987, 407). In his analysis, Jackman examines the effect of a number of variables,

nationally competitive districts, electoral disproportionality, multipartyism, unicameralism, and

compulsory voting, on voter turnout. Furthermore, Jackmans measure of PR systems is slightly

different from that of Blais and Carty. Jackman chose to measure nationally competitive districts

based on a scale from one to four developed by Bingham Powell (Jackman 1987, 411). Jackman

found that nationally competitive districts, another measure of electoral system, are positively

related to voter turnout (Jackman 1987, 416). Jackman explains the effect of nationally

competitive districts by claiming that they create a more competitive environment that is

attractive to voters; however, Blais and Carty show that this explanation is insufficient in their

analysis (Jackman 1987, 407). Therefore, the authors agree in their conclusion that PR systems

foster turnout, but disagree on the reason for why this is the case. In Turnout in Electoral

Democracies by Andr and Agnieszka Dobrzynska, the authors examine the effects of three

groups of factors, socioeconomic factors, institutional factors, and party factors, on voter turnout.

The institutional factors, which they examined, include compulsory voting, decisiveness of

elections, voting age, PR systems, and political rights (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 244-246). In

their analysis, the authors defined voter turnout in the same manner as Blais and Carty. They

defined PR systems as a set of dummy variables that represent the presence of PR, plurality,

majority and mixed systems (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 245). The results of the authors

analysis of institutional effects on turnout indicate that PR systems have an effect on voter

turnout; however, the authors found that this effect is only minimal (Blais and Dobrynska 1998,

247). Their results correspond with those of previous works; however, they show PR systems to
be less substantively significant than the previous two works. In her their work Explaining Voter

Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000, Carolina Fornos, Timothy Power, and James Garand

focus specifically the institutional, political, and socioeconomic factors that influence turnout in

new democracies by examining turnout in presidential and legislative elections in Latin

American from 1980 to 2000. They measured their key dependent variable, voter turnout, by

dividing the number of those, who cast a vote, by those, who are eligible to vote. Their

institutional model measures the effect of their key independent variables: nationally competitive

elections, electoral disproportionality, multipartyism, unicameralism, compulsory voting, and

concurrent elections (Fornos et al. 2004, 918-920). The authors use Powells measure of

nationally competitive districts to measure this variable (Fornos et al. 2004, 918). The results of

their analysis indicated that PR systems actually had a negative effect on voter turnout in Latin

America in both presidential and legislative elections (Fornos et al. 2004, 925-926). These results

contrast with those in the previous studies on the effects of PR systems. Therefore, PR systems

may only have a significant effect on turnout in industrial democracies. Finally, in Voter

Turnout Dynamics in Post Communist Europe, Tatiana Kostadinova, studied the effect of the

early sequence of elections, electoral system, party characteristics, and economic development

on voter turnout. Kostadinova measured voter turnout as the percentage of registered voters that

cast a vote (Kostadinova 2003, 743). Furthemore, she coded PR systems as a dummy variable in

which one represents the presence of a PR system and zero represents the absence of one

(Kostadinova 2003, 744). Her analysis of institutional variables shows that the presence of PR

systems bolster voter turnout in post communist democracies (Kostadinova 2003, 753).

Therefore, Kostadinovas result imply that PR systems have a positive effect on voter turnout in

developing democracies. Furthermore, these result conflict with those of Fornos, Power, and
Garand, who found that PR systems had a negative effect on developing democracies in Latin

America. As is evident from the literature, there is a great deal of debate surrounding the effects

of PR systems on voter turnout in industrial and developing democracies.

Another institutional factor, whose effect on voter turnout is often studied, is

unicameralism. For example, unicameralism was examined by Jackman in Political Institutions

and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies. In his analysis of the effect of institutional

factors on voter turnout, Jackman gauged unicameralism using an index, which ranks

unicameralism on a scale from one to four, from strong bicameralism to strong unicameralism

(Jackman 1987, 408). After his analysis of institutional factors effect on turnout, Jackman found

that unicameralism had a strong positive effect on turnout (Jackman 1987, 416). Blais and Carty

also examine the effect of unicameralism on voter turnout in their work Does Proportional

Representation Foster Voter Turnout? In their research, Blais and Carty looked primarily at the

effects PR systems on voter turnout; however, they use unicameralism as a control variable and

come up with interesting findings. Blais and Carty defined unicameralism as a dummy variable

coded as one for countries with unicameralism and zero for those without it (Blais and Carty

1990, 170). After their analysis of the effect of PR systems on turnout using control variables, the

authors found that the presence of unicameralism, contrary to previous findings, had no

significant effect on voter turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, 175). Therefore, the findings of Blais

and Carty conflict with those of Jackman, who found that unicameralism has a strong positive

effect on voter turnout. Carolina Fornos, Timothy Power, and James Garand also study the

effects of unicameralism on voter turnout; however, they confine their study to developing

democraciesspecifically those in Latin America. In their analysis of institutional effects on

voter turnout the authors include unicameralism, which they replicate using Jackmans index for
unicameralism (Fornos et al. 2004, 919). Through their analysis, the authors concluded that

unicameralism has a strong positive effect on voter turnout in Latin American democracies

(Fornos et al. 2004, 925-926). Therefore, they provide evidence that unicameralism has a strong

positive impact on voter turnout in new democracies. Further, their research supports the findings

of Jackman, but disputes the findings of Blais and Carty. There is evidence to suggest that

unicameralism both does and does not have an effect on voter turnout. Therefore, unicameralism

requires further examination to determine its effect on turnout.

Finally, compulsory voting is an institutional variable widely studied as a factor that

influences voter turnout. Compulsory voting is often cited as a strong positive determinant of

voter turnout. For example, in his article Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the

Industrial Democracies, Jackman examines the impact of compulsory voting as an institutional

factor affecting voter turnout. Jackman measures compulsory voting as a dichotomous variable in

which one signifies the presence of compulsory voting laws and zero does not (Jackman 1987,

409). Through his analysis, Jackman concluded that compulsory voting has a strong positive

effect on turnout. In fact, he found that compulsory voting increased voter turnout by thirteen

percent (Jackman 1987, 416). Blais and Dobrzynska also examine the effect of compulsory

voting on turnout in their work Turnout in Electoral Democracies. The authors, like Jackman,

measured compulsory voting as a dichotomous variable. Furthermore, the findings of Blais and

Dobrzynska support those of Jackman. That is, they found that there is a strong positive

relationship between compulsory voting laws and voter turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998,

247). Furthermore, in Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000, Fornos,

Power, and Garand study the effect compulsory voting on voter turnout as part of their

examination of institutional, political, and socioeconomic factors that effect turnout in Latin
America. However, unlike Jackman, Blais, and Dobrzynska, the authors use a four-point index to

capture the severity of sanctions within compulsory voting laws (Fornos et al. 2004, 919).

Fornos, Power, and Garand found that compulsory voting has a considerable positive effect on

voter turnout in both presidential and legislative elections (Fornos et al. 2004 925-926). Finally,

in her book Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior, Pippa Norris disputes

the previous findings that compulsory voting positively impacts voter turnout. Norris reinforces

the findings of Jackman, Blais, and Dobrzynska with her examination of the effect of

compulsory turnout in established democracies. She found that compulsory voting laws had a

considerable positive impact on voter turnout in established democracies (Norris 2004, 8).

However, she found that, in newer democracies, the presence of mandatory voting laws had a

slightly negative impact on voter turnout (Norris 2004, 8). This result conflicts with the findings

of Fornos, Power, and Garand, who concluded that compulsory voting had a large positive

impact on turnout in the newer Latin American democracies. While there is considerable

consensus in the literature that compulsory voting laws have a strong positive impact on voter

turnout in older democracies, there is conflicting evidence on the impact of these laws on turnout

in newer democracies.

III: Theories or Hypotheses

Through my research, I plan to test a number of hypotheses related to institutional effects

on voter turnout. First, I plan to test the hypothesis that PR electoral systems positively affect

voter turnout. As I have shown in my literature review, the effect of PR systems on electoral

participation is a widely studied and debated topic. Much of the research on established

democracies supports the theory that PR systems foster, at least, small increases in voter turnout.

For example, Blais and Carty, Jackman, and Blais and Dobrzysnka found that PR systems has a
positive impact on established democracies. Jackman believes that this impact is a result of PR

systems increasing the competitiveness of elections (Jackman 1987, 407). However, Blais and

Carty find that this explanation is inaccurate (Blais and Carty 1990,177). There is also some

debate on the electoral impact of PR systems in new democracies. While Kostadinova found

evidence to support the hypothesis that PR systems also foster turnout in new democracies,

Fornos, Power, and Garand found that PR systems actually have a slightly negative impact on

voter turnout rates in young Latin American democracies (Kostadinova 2003, 753; Fornos et al.

2004, 925-926). Therefore, I plan to test the hypothesis that the PR systems foster turnout on

developing democracies in order to determine whether the effects the PR systems on established

democracies also hold in new democracies. Finally, I would like to replicate the study of

intervening variables by Blais and Carty in order to determine whether the PR systems increase

turnout in developing democracies because they bring about more competitive elections.

Next, I plan to test the hypothesis that unicameralism is positively related to voter

turnout. This hypothesis is also a commonly researched and often debated topic in the literature

surrounding voter turnout. Jackman believed that unicameralism brings about greater turnout

rates because there are fewer checks on the legislative institution in policy-making. Therefore,

the benefits of voting or the benefit of the victory of ones candidate is greater in unicameral

legislatures (Jackman 1987, 408). Jackman finds support for his theory in his analysis and

concludes that unicameralism has a positive effect on turnout (Jackman 1987, 416). Furthermore,

Fornos, Power, and Garand, using the same measure of unicameralism, find similar effects of

unicameralism in early democracies in Latin America (Fornos et al. 2004, 919). However, Blais

and Carty tested this hypothesis and found that unicameralism had no significant effect on the

countries in their sample (Blais and Carty 1990, 175). Consequently, I would like to test the
hypothesis that unicameralism is an institutional factor that fosters increases in voter turnout on

early democracies.

Finally, there is much support in the literature for the hypothesis that compulsory voting

dramatically increases voter turnout. For example, Jackman, Blais, and Dobryznska found that

mandatory voting laws have a large and statistically significant positive effect on turnout in

established democracies (Jackman 1987, 416; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 247). Furthermore,

Fornos, Power, and Garand replicated these results in their study of turnout in Latin American

democracies (Fornos et al. 2004 925-926). However, Norris contests these findings in her book

Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. She found that compulsory voting

laws only showed positive effect on voter turnout in established democracies. But, compulsory

voting laws showed a slightly negative impact on turnout in her analysis of newer democracies

(Norris 2004, 8). Therefore, I would like to test the hypothesis that compulsory voting laws

foster large increases in turnout on newer democracies in order to contribute to a debate in the

literature.

To test these hypotheses, I will need to create variables that represent voter turnout, PR

electoral systems, unicameralism, and compulsory voting. So, to measure voter turnout I will use

the percentage of registered voter that cast a vote. To measure PR systems, I will use the coding

scheme developed by Blais and Dobryznska in Turnout in Electoral Democracies. Therefore, I

will use a set of dummy variables for PR, majority, plurality, and mixed systems (Blais and

Dobrzynska 1998, 245). One will represent the use of an electoral system and zero will represent

the absence of that electoral system. To test the effect of unicameralism on voter turnout, I will

measure unicameralism as a dichotomous variable. This method is utilized by Blais and Carty in

Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout? (Blais and Carty 1990, 170). Finally,
to test the impact of compulsory voting, I will also use a dichotomous variable. This method is

consistent with the work of Jackman, Blais, and Dobryznska (Jackman 1987, 409; Blais and

Carty 1990, 244). Finally, I will use the measures of competitiveness, electoral

disproportionality, and one-party majority government that were developed by Blais and Carty to

test common explanations for the impact of PR systems on turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, 172-

174).

In my analysis I will also need to use control variables to mitigate possible bias in the

data that can be attributed to the effects of other factors. Therefore, I will control for

socioeconomic impacts on voter turnout. I will use a number of the variables studied by Fornos,

Power, and Garand (Fornos et al. 2004, 920-921). These include literacy, GDP per capita, and

change in GDP per capita. I will obtain data for literacy from United Nations publications.

Furthermore, I will obtain data for GDP per capita from The World Bank. Next, I will control for

corruption in the countries in my dataset, as new democracies often have higher rates of

corruption than do established democracies. I will use measures of corruption obtained from the

corruption index developed by Transparency International. Finally, I plan to control for the

possible effects of party factors. Therefore, I will control for the effective number of parties in

each country. In order to measure the effective number of parties, I will use the measure of

number of parties, created by Laasko and Taagepera, that Jackman utilizes in Political

Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies (Jackman 1987, 410).

IV: Research Design

To research my question, I will use my three primary independent variables to explain

variation in voter turnout in new democracies. I will also use the control variables above in my

analysis to ensure that my results are not skewed. I plan to run a regression using my three
primary independent variables, electoral system, unicameralism, and compulsory voting to

predict voter turnout, my dependent variable. In my regression, I will control for the possible

effects of corruption, socioeconomic, and party factors. Finally, if I find that PR systems have a

significant positive effect on voter turnout, I will test for the intervening variables used by Blais

and Carty.

To select my cases, I will use all democracies that have been added to the list of

electoral democracies by Freedom House in the past twenty years. Therefore, my time period

will contain data from 1995 to 2015. To be classified as an electoral democracy, a democracy

must must have an electoral process score of seven or greater and a political rights score of

twenty or greater to be considered an electoral democracy. Political rights scores are represented

by ten political rights indicators, which can be scored from zero to four. Electoral process is one

of the subcategories that comprises the political rights scores. It is comprised of three indicators,

which can also be scored from zero to four. Since I am exploring attributes of government

institutions, my units of analysis in this research design are government institutions.

V: Feasibility

The necessary data to conduct my research design is available and accessible. As I have

mentioned, I will use data from Freedom in the World 1989-90 to 2016 in order to select my

sample of democracies. Furthermore, I can use data from the IDEA Voter Turnout Database to

measure voter turnout. Because the database contains data on voter turnout from 1945 to 2016, I

can use this data for my sample, which only spans from 1995 to 2015. Furthermore, I can use

data from the IDEA Voter Turnout Database to measure compulsory voting from 1945 to 2016.

Again, this will be sufficient to run my analysis because it covers the entire time period of my

research design. Furthermore, the IDEA Electoral Systems Design Database contains information
for 51 democracies on whether a country employs a PR, majority, plurality, or mixed system.

However, this dataset only contains information on the current electoral systems employed by a

country. Therefore, I will have to identify whether any of my countries underwent a change in

electoral systems during the time period in order to account for these changes in my analysis.

Finally, the PARLINE Database on National Parliaments contains data on the structure of the

legislatures in 193 countries. Further, this dataset contains data from the 1960s to the present;

therefore, I will be able to use this data to in my analysis of the effect of unicameralism.

I will also be able to find readily accessible data for my research design. I have found

data on literacy from 1995 to the present in the United Nations Educational Characteristics

Dataset. Furthermore, I can draw data on GDP per capita from the World Bank from 1960 to

2015. I will also be able to obtain data on corruption by using Transparency Internationals

Corruption Perceptions Index, which contains data on corruption in 178 countries since 1995.

Finally, I have yet to find data on the number of parties in each countrys legislatures. However, I

am certain that I will be able to find data on this information by talking to Political Science

faculty.

I believe it is reasonable to implement my research design for the topic of voter turnout.

Regression analysis has been the method implemented by the authors of the majority of the

literature that I have read on my topic. One difficulty that I anticipate may be a lack of variance

in some of my variables. Fornos, Power, and Garand consider that their result of a negative

relationship between PR systems and voter turnout may be due to a lack of variance, because

Latin American democracies are predominantly PR systems (Fornos et al. 2004, 926). Therefore,

I believe that a lack of variance in one or more of my variables could potentially hinder my

results.
VI: Advice

I plan to seek out Political Science faculty to solve two problems that I have. First, I

would like any possible advice on finding an alternative dataset on electoral systems, because I

have only been able to find data on current electoral systems. Therefore, I will not have data on

this variable for the entire time period of my dataset. Next, I would appreciate any advice on

finding data on the number of effective political parties in the legislatures of democracies.

Finally, I am open to any advice on potential flaws in my research design that I have not

identified.
VII: Works Cited

Blais, Andre, and R. K. Carty. "Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout?"
European Journal of Political Research Eur J Political Res 18.2 (1990): 167-81. Web.
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Blais, Andre, and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. "Turnout in Electoral Democracies." European

Journal of Political Research 33.2 (1998): 239-61. Web.
/.latest_citation_text

Fornos, C. A. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." Comparative

Political Studies 37.8 (2004): 909-40. Web.
/.latest_citation_text

Freedom House. (2016). Freedom in the World 2016. Retrieved from

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016

IDEA. (2016). Electoral Systems Design Database. Retrieved from

http://www.idea.int/esd/index.cfm

IDEA. (2016). Voter Turnout Database. Retrieved from http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm

Jackman, Robert W. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies."
The American Political Science Review 81.2 (1987): 405. Web.
/.latest_citation_text

Kostadinova, Tatiana. "Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." European Journal

of Political Research 42.6 (2003): 741-59. Web.
/.latest_citation_text

Norris, Pippa. "The Consequences of Voting Behavior: Turnout." Electoral Engineering: Voting
Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004. N. pag. Print.

PARLINE. (2016). PARLINE Database on National Parliaments. Retrieved from

http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm

Transparency International. (2015). Corruption Perception Index. Retrieved from

http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#downloads

United Nations. (2016). United Nations Educational Characteristics Dataset. Retrieved from
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dybcensusdata.htm

The World Bank. (2015). World Development Indicators. Retrieved from

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dybcensusdata.htm