DR. ESTEBAN MEDINA, DR. JOSE DE LA ROSA, MR.

ENRIQUE
SANTAMARIA, and BENGUET DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., versus CITY OF
BAGUIO.

G.R. No. L-4060, August 29, 1952

EN BANC, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

FACTS:

Esteban Medina (Medina) and Jose Y. de la Rosa (de la Rosa), owners and
operators of movie houses in the City of Baguio, paid, under protest, the
amounts of P1, 200 and P1,800, respectively, for municipal license pursuant to
Ordinance no. 99. Further, Medina and Enrique Santamaria (Santamaria), also
an owner and operator of a movie house in the city of Baguio, paid for
additional taxes under Ordinance no. 62. On the other hand, Benguet
Development Co., Inc., (BDC) paid under Ordinance No. 100 the amount of P3,
554.44 as specific tax for gasoline and oil. Thereafter, Medina, de la Rosa,
Santamaria and BDC brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
seeking to nullify Ordinances Nos. 62, 99and 100 of the City Council of Baguio
on the ground that they were enacted without authority or power, and are
oppressive, unjust and unreasonable, and to recover the taxes and fees they
had paid as itemized in the complaint. After trial, the court rendered decision
declaring Ordinances Nos. 99 and 100 valid and legal but rendering Ordinance
No. 62 null and void while denying the claim of the plaintiffs for reimbursement
of the different amounts paid by them. From this decision only the plaintiffs
appealed assigning from errors as committed by the lower court.

ISSUE(S):
WON respondent City of Baguio has the power to levy a tax upon
theaters and gasoline stations which are operated within its limits

DECISION:
Under Republic Act No. 329, the city council of Baguio has now the power
to tax, to license and to regulate provided that the subjects affected be one of
those included in the charter of the City of Baguio. In this sense, Ordinance No.
99 of Baguio, which fixes the license fees to be paid by persons, entities or
corporations who may engage in business within said City, cannot be
considered ultra vires whether its purpose be to levy a tax or impose a license
fee. The terminology used is of no consequence.

The city council of Baguio does not have the power to levy a specific tax
on items or articles covered by the business of the taxpayer. Unlike a sovereign
state, a municipal corporation is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. Its
charter must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed strictissimi
juris. An examination of section 2553(c), of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended, will reveal that the power given to the city of Baguio to tax, to
license and to regulate only refers to the business of the taxpayer and not to
the articles used in said business. In other words, the power to levy a
percentage tax or a specific tax has been expressly withheld. Therefore,
Ordinance No. 100 of Baguio, levying a specific tax on gasoline and oil sold in
that city, is null and void.

UY MATIAO & CO., INC.,

Versus THE CITY OF CEBU, MIGUEL RAFFIAN, as MAYOR; ANATOLIO

YNCLINO, as City Treasurer and JESUS E. ZABATE, as Assistant City
Treasurer of Cebu City

G.R. No. L-4887, May 30, 1953

EN BANC, PADILLA, J.

FACTS:
UY MATIAO & CO., INC a domestic corporation, paid under protest the
fees for the storage in its warehouse in the City of Cebu of copra and/or hemp
and/or for engaging in buying and/or selling copra and/or hemp in the said City
provided for in Ordinance No. 38, series of 1948, as amended by Ordinance No.
46, series of 1947, of the City of Cebu on the ground that the fee imposed by
said ordinance is un- authorized.

ISSUE(S):
WON City of Cebu is authorized under its charter to impose the collection
of tax or license free provided in Ordinance No. 38, series of 1948, as amended
by Ordinance No. 46, series of 1947.

DECISION:
Section 17, Commonwealth Act No. 58, provides that the Municipal Board
shall have the following legislative powers: xxxx

(m) To tax, fix the license free for, regulate the business, and fix the
location of xxxx , coal, oil, gasoline, benzine, turpentine, hemp, cotton,
nitroglycerine, petrolium, or any of the products thereof and of all other highly
combustible or explosive materials, and other establishment likely to endanger
the public safety or give rise to conflagrations or explotions, xxxx.

The fact that copra is not mentioned in section 17 (m), Com. Act No. 58,
does not mean the copra is excluded, because oil is in the enumeration and
the main component ingredient or constituent part of copra, which is the dried
meat of the coconut, is oil. There is then an express authority of the city of
Cebu Tax, fix the license fee for regulate the business and fix the location of
match factories, etc., the storage and sale of gun powder, oil, etc., and other
establishments likely to endanger the public safety or give rise to the
conflagrations or explosions. Also, under its charter the City of Cebu May Tax or
impose a license fee on any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
business of buying and selling the storing copra in a warehouse located in the
city, oil being the main component ingredient of copra, house used for keeping
or storing copra is an establishment likely to endanger the public safety or
likely to give rise to conflagrations or explosions or explosions. True, copra is
not highly combustible or explosive material, but once ignited, the fire
resulting therefrom, because of oil it contains, is difficult to put under control
by water and to extinguish it the use of chemicals would be necessary. For that
reason such a warehouse is likely to endanger the public safety or likely to give
rise to configlations.

THE SHELL CO. OF P.I., LTD., versus E. E. VAO, as Municipal Treasurer

of the Municipality of Cordova, Province of Cebu
G.R. No. L-6093, February 24, 1954
EN BANC ,PADILLA, J.

FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Cordova, Province of Cebu, adopted the
following ordinances: No. 10, series of 1946, which imposes an annual tax of
P150 on occupation or the exercise of the privilege of installation manager; No.
9, series of 1947, which imposes an annual tax of P40 for local deposits in
drums of combustible and inflammable materials and an annual tax of P200 for
tin can factories; and No. 11, series of 1948, which imposes an annual tax of
P150 on tin can factories having a maximum output capacity of 30,000 tin
cans. The Shell Co. of P.I. Ltd., a foreign corporation, filed suit for the refund of
the taxes paid by it, on the ground that the ordinances imposing such taxes
are ultra vires.

ISSUE(S):
1. WON ordinance No. 10, series of 1946 is discriminatory and hostile
because there is no other person in the locality who exercises such
"designation" or occupation.

2. WON Ordinance No. 9, series of 1947 and No. 11, series of 1948 are
unauthorized and illegal

DECISION:
1. The fact that there is no other person in the locality who exercises
such a "designation" or calling does not make the ordinance discriminatory and
hostile, inasmuch as it is and will be applicable to any person or firm who
exercises such calling or occupation named or designated as "installation
manager."

2. The permit and the fee referred to may be required and charged by
the Municipal Council of Cordova in the exercise of its regulative authority,
whereas the ordinance which imposes the taxes in question was adopted under
and pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 472, which
authorizes municipal councils and municipal district councils "to impose license
taxes upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising
privileges in the municipality or municipal district, by requiring them to secure
licenses at rates fixed by the municipal council or municipal district council,"
which shall be just and uniform but not "percentage taxes and taxes on
specified articles."

Lastly, Ordinance No. 11, series of 1948, is valid and lawful, because it is
neither a percentage tax nor one on specified articles which are the only
exceptions provided in section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 472. Neither does it
fall under any of the prohibitions provided for in section 3 of the same Act.

JULIO LLAMADO versus COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-28809, May 16, 1983
FIRST DIVISION, PLANA, J.
FACTS:
Llamado's plane was involved in a smuggling operation when it was used
to bring lamps for the transportation of blue seal cigarettes. A warrant of
seizure and detention of the plane was issued and after the hearing it was
forfeited by the government applying Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. On appeal, the CTA affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs.
Llamado contends that the plane cannot be forfeited under the Code for it did
not come from a foreign country nor did it carry or unload cigarettes in any
place in the Philippines. It was not actually used in transporting the cigarettes
but was merely used to bring the lamps to the airstrip and as such, it is not
subject to forfeiture under Philippine laws.

ISSUE(S):
WON the Cessna plane was used in the unlawful importation of cigarettes
within the meaning of Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code.

DECISION:
Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code, provides that "Any
vessel or aircraft, cargo or articles and other objects shall, under the following
conditions, be subject to forfeiture:" (a) Any vessel or aircraft, including cargo,
which shall be used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of articles into
or from any Philippine ports or place except a port of entry; and any vessel
which, being of less than thirty tons capacity shall be used in the importation
of articles into any Philippine port or place except into a port of the Sulu sea
where importation in such vessel may be authorized by the Commissioner, with
the approval of the department head." Under the foregoing legal provision, in
order to warrant forfeiture, it is not necessary that the vessel or aircraft must
itself carry the contraband. There is nothing in the law that so requires.
 In the case at bar, it is undeniable that the Alabat adventure was entirely
and solely a smuggling operation; and the Cessna were deliberately used to
insure its successful prosecution. It brought the smugglers to Alabat and
subsequently delivered the necessary lighting paraphernalia to citable the
cargo plane to take off without peril and transport the smuggled cigarettes to
Luzon. In our view, this complementary if collateral, use of the Cessna for
smuggling operation is sufficient for it to be deemed to have been used
unlawfully in the importation or smuggling of blue seal cigarettes. The
participation of the Cessna as above described, was legally an active
involvement of the said plane in, and constituted an unlawful use thereof for
smuggling or illegal importation within the meaning of Section 2530 (a) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Note that "importation," by law, commences when
the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with
intention to unload; and it is "deemed terminated (only) upon payment of the
duties taxes and other charges due upon the articles, or (the same has been)
secured to be paid . . . and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been
granted." (Tariff and Customs Code, Section 1202).

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS versus ACTING

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-24247, May 13, 1968
EN BANC, CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Vessels Rita Maersk and Effie Maersk docked at the Bugo pier at the port
of Cagayan de Oro, for doing which the Collector of Customs of the port levied
and assessed on them the sum of P379.25 as berthing fees. The petitioner
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, as agent of the ships, protested the
imposition and collection of the fees on the ground that the Bugo pier is owned
and operated by the Philippine Packing Corporation, and that under Section
2903 berthing fees are assessable only against a vessel berthing at a
Government pier or wharf. It maintains that such charges can be collected only
if the Government affords pier and wharf facilities in the port. The petitioner
contending that it was exempt from the payment of such fees, asked for a
refund of what it had paid.

ISSUE(S):
WON a vessel, engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately-
owned wharf or pier is liable to the payment of berthing fees under Section
2903 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

DECISION:
A vessel, engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately-owned
wharf or pier is liable to the payment of berthing fees under Section 2903 of
the Tariff and Customs Code. The governments right to collect berthing
charges is not planted upon the condition that the pier be publicly owned. The
statute employs the word pier - without more. Nothing there said speaks of
private or public pier. Where the law does not exact the nature of ownership as
a condition, that condition should not be read into the law. The law is clear. It
thus results that a vessel which as much as comes within any slip, channel,
basin, river or canal under the jurisdiction of any port in the Philippines is
subject to the charge. It is unnecessary that the vessel be moored to a pier or
to a berthed vessel. Port facilities afford benefits to the vessels mentioned in
the statute; and the maintenance and development of the port, and the
purchase, conditioning and replacement of the equipment thereof - all to
enable such vessels to make use of pier or wharf are the concern of the
government. Petitioners vessels enjoy the benefits of such governmental
undertaking. Petitioner should thus contribute thereto.
 GOOD DAY TRADING CORPORATION versus. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-6574, July 31, 1954
EN BANC, MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS:
Good Day Trading Corporation (GDT) imported cases of Chesterfield
cigarettes and sold them to one Buenaventura Isletas companions, the sale
being conditioned on the buyer paying all the specific taxes or filing a surety
bond with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). When Isletas companions
failed to show evidence that they had either paid the specific taxes or filed the
corresponding surety bond, GDT decided to rescind the sale and made an
initial payment of P8,800 to the Collector of BIR as special taxes and withdraw
from storage 40 cases of cigarettes. The warehouseman, however, refused
delivery saying that Isleta and companions claimed ownership of the whole
shipment because they already had submitted with the BIR certificates of
indebtedness (Back Pay) for payment of all the specific taxes, which according
to them have already been approved and accepted by the Bureau. GDT then
asked for the refund of the P8,800 paid by it in cash, in view of the full
payment of the specific taxes on the cigarettes by the buyers. The Collector of
BIR granted the refund and his action was approved by the Secretary of
Finance. No appeal was taken from said decision; but because the amount
involved was more than P5,000 the case was brought before the BTA for final
resolution. The Board not only reversed the decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue granting the refund of P8,800 but it also rejected the payment of the
entire amount of specific taxes in certificates of indebtedness, and ordered
petitioner to pay the balance in cash.

ISSUE(S):
1. WON the Board of Tax Appeals had neither authority nor jurisdiction to
order petitioner to pay the whole of said specific taxes.
2. WON Backpay certificates can be used for the payment of Taxes.

DECISION:
If a shipment stored, pursuant to existing law, in a bonded warehouse
under the custody of the Bureau of Customs is sold, while in storage to another
person, the specific taxes on the shipment may be paid either by the importer
or the buyer, as owner under section 125 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Where no appeal was taken from the decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, as approved by the Secretary of Finance, authorizing the refund of
specific taxes paid by the importer, in view of its full payment by the buyers of
the stored shipment, and because the amount involved exceeded P5,000 the
approval of the Court of Tax Appeals under section 9 of Executive Order No.
401-A becomes necessary, the latter court should consider only the amount
and propriety of the refund and nothing more.
Whether or not owners of backpay certificates should be given
certificates of indebtedness ostensibly to be used to pay taxes but in reality to
be speculated upon and negotiated by some unscrupulous person, is not for
the Court of tax Appeals to determine, but is wholly the legal concern of the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Department to be affected after by the use
of said certificate of indebtedness.
LUZON BROKERAGE CO., INC. versus JUAN POSADAS, JR., as Collector
of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 27822, December 24, 1927
 EN BANC , VILLA-REAL, J.

FACTS:

The present appeal was taken by the plaintiff, the Luzon Brokerage Co.,
Inc., from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which affirmed
the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the internal-revenue tax
imposed on certain playing cards, upholding the action taken by him under the
provisions of Act No. 3246, and dismissed the complaint, with the costs.

According to the stipulation of facts and the admissions made during the
trial, the boxes of playing cards arrived in the port of Manila on November 20,
1925, at 8 oclock in the morning, but were not declared for payment of the
internal-revenue tax until December 1st of the same year, neither was the
amount of the estimated tax deposited, nor was permission requested to
withdraw said boxes from the customhouse, except on December 2, 1925.

ISSUE(S):
WON the date of the withdrawal of said playing cards from the
customhouse determined the rate of internal-revenue tax to be paid thereon.

DECISION:

The law in force for the payment of internal-revenue taxes on imported

merchandise at the time of the arrival of the playing cards in question, was
section 7, Act No. 2835, amending section 1498 of the Administrative Code,
and the one in force on the date upon which the declaration for the payment of
the internal-revenue tax on said imported merchandise was made, was Act No.
3246, which became effective December 1, 1925.

If the importer or owner of the imported merchandise may select the

time in which he should pay the amount of the internal-revenue tax on the
same from the time it arrives in the port of Manila until it is withdrawn from the
customhouse, and the herein plaintiff-appellant not having taken advantage of
the favorable provisions of section 1498 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by section 7 of Act No. 2835, and not having paid the internal-
revenue tax while said section was in force, but only after the new law, Act No.
3246, went into effect, it cannot now make claim for the recovery of the
internal-revenue tax paid under the law in force at the time payment was
made.

Briefly, then, the time for the payment of the internal-revenue tax on
merchandise, from the date of arrival in port until just before it is withdrawn
from the customhouse, depending upon the will of the importer or owner, the
law in force at the time the payment is made must prevail; because, voluntary
human acts are governed by the laws in force at the time they are done, unless
there is a legal provision to the contrary.