ANC (TSHWANE) LEKGOTLA

OCTOBER 2016
VELMORE HOTEL ESTATE (96 Main rd. Hennopsrivier, Erasmia) TSHWANE

BASELINE DOCUMENT for STRATEGY & TACTICS

(Effective Opposition)
Conveners of Commission: Cdes.: [later Jonny Mohlala] & Derek
Fleming
The expressions herein contained, including the sketched resolutions, are not necessarily those of the
Lekgotla Task Team or the Commissions Conveners; and are presented tentatively as a starting point for
session discussion within the Lekgotla as final arbiter.

NEW CONDITIONS of CONTESTATION

In the aftermath of the 2016 Local Government Elections the political
terrain is changed with the ascendency, with EFF connivance, of a
minority DA metropolitan administration inclusive of fringe parties. The
EFF stands aloof from its enabling handiwork with supposed
independent presence but with a declared interest in working with the
DA on an issue-by-issue basis. Within DA circles the prospects of this
arrangement (more collusion than coalition) lasting the full term of five
(5) years is considered scant. They, therefore, expect in time to abort
power.
Meanwhile, ahead of the first budget, that will need EFF support to pass
and Council to lawfully continue, the administration of Mayor Solly
Msimanga under tutelage and management-by-remote of DA Federal
Head Office in Cape Town, is bent on dismantling the achievements of
our movement since 2000.
The DA in its essential nature is not a movement proper but a party
political entity based on an ideological adherence, with local tweaking,
to the international Neo-Liberal agenda, obedient to the logic of global
economy. This is not to say the DA is a business movement let loose.
Historically it emerges from the tenure of Tony Leon of the Democratic
Party and his Chief Political Strategist, Ryan Coetzee, who formed the
DA by merging with the rump of the apartheid apparatus of the
disintegrating National Party. In Tshwane, formerly the capital of the
Apartheid State, this resulted in the worst of the regime becoming
Councillors. DA assumes the mantle of the National Party.
The next significant elections in Tshwane will be for Ward Committees
in February 2017. This represents opportunity to contest the DA agenda
in its own wards. Given their effective suspension in the last term after
protracted legal wrangling the minority administration is certain to
rewrite the ground rules such as who may vote: residence etc. defined by
statute on which level of real proof; presiding officer templates;
scheduling and venues of voting night. Stricter formalizing expected.
Questions for discussion:
1. When can/will the minority Msimanga administration fall?
2. What events (in Council and in the City) will trigger it?
3. What exploitable factors can be used to accelerate the toppling of
the DA? Rise of the DA black caucus. Deconstruction?
4. Who are these reprehensibles in the DA Council caucus and what
dynamics play out in their Mayoral Committee (2nd round
appointments)?
 5. Ryan Coetzees legacy: (a) the merged parties forming DA - all
except DP left (b) Fight Black campaign (c) electoral obliteration
of UK Liberal Democrats when made Strategic Director (d) Britain
leaves European Union (Brexit) after he assumes role of Director
of Strategy for the remain-in camp: legacy effects of personality
the rise of Solly Msimanga and Koh-i-Noor faction.
6. Deciding between Confrontation and Contestation in Council? Or
Chair Tossing vs. Argument Making under provocation?
7. Nature of EFF in Council? Its relationship with its national
leadership?
8. To what extent are Musi & Helen directing City management here
under Msimanga, Topham, Englebrecht and NEL nexus?
9. What is to be done about the EFF across the city and within the
formality of Party Politics?
10. Scope and means of reversing the Neo-Liberal agenda and
its local disciples?
11. Assignment of roles within the Alliance in the new offensive
to regain peoples power?
12. Who are the DA targeting personally?

BALLOTS not BOMBAST

Elections are lost and won, not on polling day, but between elections.
The results of 3 August surprised the DA itself. The EFF made its
projection exactly (25 seats). Pundits and experts say factors working
against us were, among others, economic conditions; national ANC
dynamics; better DA groundwork; ANC List controversy (Mayoral
succession; national question candidates) burning of the city; one-
madam-one-vote turnout; public resentments. Demographics are
rapidly changing: over half of all South Africans are aged under 26:
youth voters; voter education (speakers push under budget for this not
utilized). Scholar and student mobilization strategies may become a
priority: Stalwart sclerosis vs. Ageism.
Structurally the Electoral Act penalizes high ward wins with low PR seat
numbers identified by the ANC (NEC) as the strange phenomenon
of the design of the Act by former DP leader, Frederick van Zyl
Slabbert.
Given the DA sense of political tempo and a possible forfeiture of their
tenure before 2031, the pace and intensity of politics is probably going
to be very high if not frenetic. Public astonishment and embarrassment
at Council thus far makes the DA prefer meetings every second month.
Questions for discussion:
1. What are the DA electoral campaigning strengths?
2. In a Party Political sense and function does the DA deal with
problems we confront: list selections; funding; media (rise of
Gerstner under Msimanga); relationship management with higher
structures?
3. What policies, vision and organization need adjusting, if any, in
the light of the election results?
4. Council caucus vs. Regional caucus: nature, roles, and missions
compared? The list formation nexus every 5 years; feeding in and
coordinating propaganda in intervening period? Others?
5. Alliance Partners, union SAMWU particularly, and a division of
labour in dismantling DA designs or making the Cape Town
agenda here ungovernable?
6. Why was ANC Tshwane proposal for changing the Electoral Act
ignored when it was solicited (Hayes formula removal and end of
the strange phenomenon)?
 7. When does our next campaign start (a) for 2019 national elections
(b) the fall of the DA minority administration by the second budge
latest with the MEC for Local Government intervening when the
EFF does not agree to a joint coalition with us (c) Ward
Committees?
8. What do we need to do differently in such a campaign and what
must we keep?
9. What realistically are our goals on Ward Committee election
nights?
10. What significance must be given to the Youth Vote?
11. Role of public polling (eNCA controversy) effects? No
published polls how long before Election Day? Amendment of
Electoral Act (Parliament).
12. EFF relationship: Confront? Ignore? Re-direct subliminally?
Deconstruct?

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL LESSONS from other

NATIONAL CAPITALS

ZIMBABWE: Harare City Council

Since the setback for Zanu (pf) in the 2000 constitutional referendum,
the opposition steadily has taken control of all of the 28 Zimbabwean
Urban councils, including National Capital, Harare. This reflects the
mobilizing strength of working class support outside rural areas, the
mainstay of the ruling party. Despite subsequent splits among the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition Zanu (pf) has not
wrested back control of any council. Of late Zanu (pf) has started a
comeback.
The initial impetus for MDC mobilisation methodologically was the
Zimbabwe Trades Union (ZTU). Resources to MDC were and are being
supplied by Australia, the Europeans and North Americans who
simultaneously apply sanctions against Zanu (pf) leaders.

During the Liberation Struggle ( Chimurenga II, 1966 1980) trades

unionism was marginalised by the Patriotic Front and closely monitored
and suppressed by the Smith regime. ZTU played no significant role in
the use of force, disruptive and supportive, against the Rhodesian
repressive state apparatus.

Around the mid-1990s MDC (T) faction leader and originator, Morgan
Tsvangarai, starting as an activist in Harare organising strikes among
city manufacturing labour; made the cross over into a loose political
agenda of reaction with foreign support. Thus a cognisant working class,
with workerist shop stewardship was moved to first endorsing and then
advancing an anti-working class, neoliberal agenda, primarily by
festering resentments propagated by the enemies of Zanu(pf) both
foreign (Britain in particular) and domestic (local comprador
bourgeoisie around mining and agriculture).

It is to be noted that the USSR Party School for cadre development

teaches resentment is the strongest and longest self-sustaining political
motive force across any societal formation Tsvangarai grasped this
even though his sponsors in London and supporters in the then
Democratic Party Johannesburg were embraced as Africans. Tony
Leon and DP/DA strategists, Ryan Coetzee and Greg Krumbok, wanted
to supply a printing press to the MDC in Harare, and were only rebuffed
before a scheduled personal mini-summit with Tsvangarai when
COSATU warned off ZTU about the dangerous contradiction. Unionist
stuck with unionist for the time being. This was the first and last
ideological correction taken by MDC-T outside of the Anglo-American
camp. Total Neoliberal co-option then ensued.
Besides building resentment around working conditions for municipal
and state workers the MDC made inducements:
Supposed anti-corruption rectification.
Target for ridicule Zanu (pf) councillors reputational attack one
state appointees.
Systematised complaints about food price inflation; working
conditions of residents even though outside the competency of
Harare City Council.
Administrative incompetency, inefficiency initially as personality
driven then systemic by the ruling party on CAPEX and OPEX.
Productive labour in municipal enterprises portrayed as scare while
employee numbers put down as bloated.
Gaining access to community leaders and using them as MDC
conduits of persuasion: foremost unionised teachers (High schools
and University Zimbabwe); clergy; Law enforcement (ZRP).
Limited success was made within the military and state youth
organisations.
Accelerating, initial despondency among Zanu (pf) activists
following the MDC rolling campaigns in Towns and Cities.
Promises of jobs, economic security; food abundance and free
education.

Zanu (pf) ROLL BACK 2016

National Mood: A general malaise afflicts the MDC factions following

the internal divisions (prominent being that of geographical centres of
cleavage: Bulawayo vs. Harare) and the lack-lustre performance of
Tsvangarai as Prime Minister under the Inclusive Agreement. Zanu (pf)
keeps control of all other state formations.

Supervening National offices and competencies: Unlike our Municipal

Systems Act, Zimbabwe has no Provincial oversight over
Municipalities. Until recently the MDC-T, controlling HCC has enjoyed
free reign, however the Zimbabwean Public Works & National Housing
Minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, started a forensic audit of HCC owned
firms and joint ventures on contracts and cash flows. The MDC-T has
delayed these efforts as lacking structure and being intrusive without
legal basis. Nonetheless they are rattled. The MDC-T allegedly fears the
audit would unearth anomalies in recruitment of employees, the majority
of which were appointed on partisan basis. The root Ministerial concern
is councillor corruption.

Significant perhaps is who Saviour Kasukuwere is besides being

Minister: he is also a Zanu (pf) Political Commissar. He clearly knows
and has deployable method.

Social Mobilisation through Rural base: Zanu (pf) vigorously running

a campaign through rural families whose members may work in the cites
and support MDC factions to re-align back to the ruling party before the
next elections in 2018. On Zimbabwean holidays most industrial
workers return to ancestral homesteads. However, MDC cannot run a
reverse operation to influence rural support from an urban base on
account of more numerous, structurally isolated, traditional sentiment
with strong local party branches.

Removing the Town Clark (equivalent to our City Manager) of HCC.

The elected mayor of Harare, Bernard Manyenyeni, was also recently
forced out of office on administrative action. In other towns he has
arrested and removed errant councillors and officials without successful
legal challenge. He was reversed in case of Gweru Town Council all of
whose members he sacked. MDC-T still appears impotent.

Discussion Pointers:

Tshwane does have a rural component is it related or significant to

operate as political leverage on city folk? Is the site of campaigning and
voter education places where urban, rural, both?
Is Cde. MEC (Local government Gauteng) Paul Mashatile, while not
working within exact same legal parameters as Minister Kasukuwere, a
similar fall back mechanism for dislodging opposition, city control?
How could/should he make interventions? Under what timetable of
action? With what triggering event(s)?

Are we relatively stronger than Zanu (pf) in mobilising with significant

unions on our side (SAMWU)?

NICARAGUA MANAGUA CITY

Our sister party in Nicaragua, the Sandinista Party (FSLN), became in
1979 the second revolutionary party after Cuba to win power in the
Caribbean. Led by Tomas Borge and Jose Daniel Ortega the progressive
administration that defeated the long-standing dictatorship of the
Samoza family supported by the United States, faced an insurgency
across a common border with Honduras (CONTRA War). The conflict
was protracted and bitter and became a zone of confrontation during the
Cold War between the USA on one side and the USSR and Cuba on the
other.
The national capital, Managua, was a bastion of cronyism under the
Samoza dictatorship and with the triumph of the Sandinista revolution,
the structure of city administration was redrawn from the beginning. The
relentless propaganda and armed warfare against the FSLN resulted in
electoral defeat in 1996. The working poor and social projects were set
back until Ortegas return to power (still current) in 2006. Some
parallels seem to exist between Nicaragua and South Africa with object
lessons for us in our own struggle against a similar enemy in different
form.
The FSLN in its first five years in power did not have total control of all
levers of the state. Collative style compromises were made.

Managua was and remains judicial, legislative and administrative capital

of Nicaragua.
After six years of Violetta Chamorros rule the working poor were
deeply impoverished and their material condition improved on Ortegas
win and into his second year (2008) of rebound election to power.
Characteristics of FSLN Defeat 1979
One initial wave of disbelief greeted the election results. Nicaraguan
metro rules are less complicated than ours. It is a bruising winner takes
all. All Party organization shut down effectively for over a year due to
factionalism and cadre despondency.
Over reliance on foreign assistance (outside Latin America) locally;
Canadian support did however give Ortega much international
credibility outside the few remaining Socialist Countries. Venezuelan
support materially inter party Chavez-Ortega later was significant in the
FSLN roll back campaign 2004- 2006.
Socially significant, the Church aligned itself with the United States
position that the Sandinista movement was atheist and Marxist.
Covert, low-intensity psychological operations directed against FSLN by
the USA military and Intelligence organs.

Resurgence FSLN 2006:

NGOs with the Party helped the poor and workers in the barrios
(townships) of Managua and thus provided continuity and presence of
the FSLN in residents lives.
Cultural content of struggle has always been prominent in the
Nicaraguan revolutionary tradition. Ortega himself believes he possesses
Extra Sensory Perception; and is a poet. Besides solace in the lean years,
culture (versifying, song and pectoral arts) allowed popular expression
and modes of propaganda outside of Catholic Church influence
(significantly to gain reelection Ortega had to yield and deny abortion
rights for mothers whose lives were endangered by prospective birth.
The Church, initially repelled by the development of Liberation theology
under the Sandinistas, with the Vatican declaring it heresy, shift its
antagonistic stance because in its pastoral work it saw the decline of
living conditions across barrios and wealth disparities widening with the
wealthy neo-Liberals.
Resentment amongst Managuans against Chamorro reforms modeled on
Neo-liberal consensus with the USA. The sharpest persuader was a
decline in their living standards in health and education services.
The Sandinista revolutionaries did not query their effectiveness when in
power and were always unapologetic. This confidence was at first
portrayed as bluster and bluff by their enemies but allowed them to
always appear consistent for example, despite a cooling of relations
with Havana, the FSLN never repudiated the Cuban revolution.
End of Cold war.

Questions for discussion:

1. One difference between Tshwane and Managua is the
revolutionary party in America started its municipal organization
from scratch (except for some technical) while we inherited ours
from the Apartheid state, personnel, modes of office organization,
contracting and engineering were the compromises we needed
make did and do these imposed ongoing disadvantages?
2. What parallels exist between the DA regime here now and the
Chamorro city administration in Managua besides the enduring
love affair with the rightist United States (before Clinton and
Obama presidencies): comparative anatomy of the Neo-Liberal
agenda?
3. What parallels would prove analytically helpful between FSLN
restoration and their roll back of reaction and our current project in
Tshwane City?
4. How does Msimanga deal with the Western Cape madam when it
comes to our Executive Mayors proposal to have Tshwane
become legislative and Administrative capital of South Africa?
Irreconcilable contradictions in explaining himself to residents? Is
this as unanswerable an example as the item on building
crematoria in our majority black African wards which is culturally
unacceptable? How will EFF vote on this item? Will it be
unAfrican if they support the DA proposal?
5. In the fashion of the FSLN revolutionary schools a slogan for
cadres in political endeavor was to conduct oneself Ruthlessly,
Relentlessly and Remorselessly. Should we adopt the same at the
levels outside of physical conflict across Tshwane? Informed
endeavour vs. directed enthusiasm?
6. Supportive role of NGOs in ANC wards with shifts away from
people- centered development to fiscus-driven rationale after the
Cape Town model?
[insert Mohlala eight pages here]

PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS

Strategically WE:

Reaffirming: the fundamental purpose of the ANC lies at a higher level

than that of the strict formalism of the Party Political; and remains truly
in the nature of an enduring, revolutionary movement mindful of its
historic legacy and the national significance it retains into the present
day.

Recognising that the nature of political contestation has changed since

Local Government Elections 2016 with the advent the minority DA
control of the Tshwane Metro and the need for new emphases of effort.

Nevertheless holding that the broad objective tasks of Alliance forces

remain unchanged in mobilising progressive fractions of society,
foremost defending and advancing the cause the working poor and the
improvement of the material conditions of all across our City of
Tshwane.

Mindful of our own municipal history, and that of other progressive

struggles example, in particular that of National Capitals in Nicaragua
and Zimbabwe, we engage reactionary, neoliberal formations arrayed
against us with deliberate effort to deconstruct their agendas and
alliances.

Recognising further that the Economic Freedom Fighters, so called, are

indeed the enablers of DA control of Council while eschewing
responsibility with a putative independence of their votes henceforth as
if to disavow the necessary consequences of their act.
Identifying and confirming that the real characteristic of the DA-EFF
arrangement in council is that of stealthy Collusion and not working
Coalition. EFF councillors independence and potential for maverick
thoughts is constrained by their own national leadership. Sluggish
responsiveness by the EFF in council works to our Alliances advantage.
Individual EFF councillors will most likely not survive on the next lists
accordingly our play is through them to their national leadership.
Alienating them is wasted effort with little political benefit.

Further understanding the contingent nature of the DA-EFF

relationship and their differing internal dynamics, ideology and praxis,
our responses in the arena of Council, the Administration of the
Officials and inter-party dealing, we separate a treatment for each based
on our political manoeuvre intending the fall of the DA, the realignment
of the EFF and the full restoration of Alliance power.

Holding as significant the Tshwane DA (Gauteng North Region) is not

a self-run entity under espoused Federal Principles it takes direction
by a supervising and reviewing cohort from the Western Cape as it did
during local government elections with two minders. Since then the
temporary and volunteer Mayoral spokesperson from Cape Town is
a case in point.

Mindful further that the Movement of the DA leadership, in part, from

Cape Town to Johannesburg reflects more assertiveness of the
commercial hub over the traditional Cape liberal establishment and the
preparation of the intended springboard for Provincial power in Gauteng
in the 2019 elections (Stanley Greenberg plan).

Working off the hypothesis that the co-ordinating mechanism across

Gauteng formations for the DA structures is the Koh-i-Noor FM Lodge
and related formations in the Western Cape, we focus scrutiny on them.
Being emboldened on the fact that within DA Tshwane counsels the
prospect of their retaining Council control for five years is considered a
challenge:

Prepare now for new elections: (Ward in February 2017; National

2019): discerning the end-game for the DA minority regime will come
when they fail to pass a budget a necessary No-Confidence Motion
ensues given the balance of relative party strengths, the EFF may not
join the ANC in securing control of council resulting in a hanged
situation of paralysis needing the MEC for Local Government taking the
Council under administration. The Collusion may stumble past one
budget; a second is far more remote prospect in 2018. With Provincial
and National elections scheduled for 2019 the re-run of Tshwane local
government under management might be neatly folded into that process
for economies sake

Remain steadfast in ensuring the Deconstruction of the DA

interregnum continues after they have been removed from control of
Council. Rehabilitation follows on deconstruction.

RESOLVE at the Tactical level of implementation to:

Use Deconstruction as a political method understood to mean the

thorough-going exacerbation of contradictions identified across enemy
formations and seizure of opportunity, namely

Within the DA Councillor caucus: personal and political

The content of their arguments in council and the press (print,
electronic and local and national radio)
Estrangement of all rapport between the EFF and DA and between
themselves on emerging issues and decisions of council
 Shut down DA introduced Council items on the vote with the EFF;
inducing the EFF to shy away from their inherently bad content, to
supporting ANC amendments and nodding supportively for ANC
arguments.
Immobilising all DA levers of power, the Cape Town supervision
and example foremost, in the public mind and across the formalism
of administration.
Challenge the moral and legal basis of the DA agenda of tabled
items.
Throttle lawfully and with the directed weight of public outrage at
the roll out of the Neoliberal agenda.
Negate, wherever it rears its head, all LAWfare by the DA
Collusion arrangement.
Wherever practicable and immediately refer for dispute resolution
and declarative rectification to the MEC for Local Government and
the Minister in the National Assembly all contentious infractions
of legislation (MMFA etc.).

Be politically pervasive and forceful while alert to antagonistic,

physical and ideological confrontation with the EFF being counter-
productive even though provocative at times; the true enemy remaining
the DA, its local presence and Cape Town, then too the remnants of the
Apartheid state (FF+).

Conduct a systematic, on-going briefing of EFF councillors about their

collusion partners such as the unreconstructed apartheid personages in
their ranks and now Council administration; and the emergence of the
black DA caucus despite attempts by Msimanga (K-i-N) and Cape Town
DA Head Office to suppress it.

Achieve Deconstruction of the minority regime using co-ordinated

action across both ANC Regional and Caucus entities without taking
away or duplicating from eithers current range of responsibilities.
Raise issues in the public arena of Council sessions based on ANC
councillors analyses that enable and directs political operations between
Council caucus, regional structures and our Alliance partners too.
Reciprocal representation at each ones working committees is mandated
with media and information development being prominent.

Brief and consult with regularity the state of play in Tshwane Metro
with the MEC for Local Government and the Minister in the National
Assembly. Driving forensic audits of the minority regimes projects and
council resolution implementation. Other parts of the state apparatus to
be activated such as the Public Protector and the Human Rights
Commission etc.

Strengthen and jointly act with Organised labour, COSATU in

particular, for a common purpose in our goal as our fellow combatants:
same struggle...new phase.