Ople v Torres

FACTS
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996. Senator Blas
F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is
that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a
legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation
of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive
and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of
congress.

ISSUE
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate.

HELD
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution
has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.

The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also
has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific

aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and embodies
changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies -
the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters
of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Manila Jockey Club v CA

FACTS
On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309, entitled An Act to Regulate Horse
Racing in the Philippines. This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended inconsistent
provisions relative to horse racing. It provided for the distribution of gross receipts from the
sale of betting tickets, but is silent on the allocation of so-called breakages. Thus the practice,
according to the petitioners, was to use the breakages for the anti-bookies drive and other
sales promotions activities of the horse racing clubs.

On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued creating the Philippine Racing
Commission (PHILRACOM), giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the
conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races. By virtue of this power,
the PHILRACOM authorized the holding of races on Wednesdays starting on December 22,
1976.

Petitioners made a joint query regarding the ownership of breakages accumulated during
Wednesday races. In response to the query, PHILRACOM rendered its opinion in a letter dated
September 20, 1978. It declared that the breakages belonged to the racing clubs concerned.

On December 16, 1986 President Corazon Aquino amended certain provisions Sec. 4 of R.A.
6631 and Sec. 6 of R.A. 6632 through Executive Orders No. 88 and 89.

On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to the Office of the President asking
which agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds of the breakages derived from the Tuesday
and Wednesday races.

In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., replied that the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs
to PHILRACOM, not only those derived from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also
from the Tuesday and Wednesday races in accordance with the distribution scheme prescribed
in said Executive Orders.

Controversy arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent a series of demand letters to
petitioners MJCI and PRCI, requesting its share in the breakages of mid-week-races and proof of
remittances to other legal beneficiaries as provided under the franchise laws.

ISSUE
Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from mid-week races? This issue
also carries an ancillary question: assuming PHILRACOM is entitled to the mid-week breakages
under the law, should the petitioners remit the money from the time the mid-week races
started, or only upon the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89?

HELD
A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the determination that the entities
enumerated in the distribution scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632, as amended
by Executive Orders 88 and 89, are the rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week
races. Petitioners should therefore remit the proceeds of breakages to those benefactors
designated by the aforesaid laws.

The holding of horse races on Wednesdays is in addition to the existing schedule of races
authorized by law. Since this new schedule became part of R.A. 6631 and 6632 the set of
procedures in the franchise laws applicable to the conduct of horse racing business must
likewise be applicable to Wednesday or other mid-week races.

A fortiori, the granting of the mid-week races does not require another legislative act to
reiterate the manner of allocating the proceeds of betting tickets. Neither does the allocation
of breakages under the same provision need to be isolated to construe another distribution
scheme. No law can be viewed in a condition of isolation or as the beginning of a new legal
system.

Proceeding to the subsidiary issue, the period for the remittance of breakages to the
beneficiaries should have commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the holding of
mid-week races because R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632 were already in effect then. The petitioners
contend that they cannot be held retroactively liable to respondent PHILRACOM for breakages
prior to the effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89.

They assert that the real intent behind E.O. Nos. 88 and 89 was to favor the respondent
PHILRACOM anew with the benefits which formerly had accrued in favor of Philippine Amateur
Athletic Federation (PAAF). They opine that since laws operate prospectively unless the
legislator intends to give them retroactive effect, the accrual of these breakages should start
on December 16, 1986, the date of effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89. Now, even if one of the
benefactors of breakages, the PAAF, as provided by R.A. 6631 and 6632 had ceased operation,
it is still not proper for the petitioners to presume that they were entitled to PAAFs share. When
the petitioners mistakenly appropriated the breakages for themselves, they became the
implied trustees for those legally entitled to the proceeds.

While herein petitioners might have relied on a prior opinion issued by an administrative body,
the well-entrenched principle is that the State could not be estopped by a mistake committed
by its officials or agents. Although there was an initial interpretation of the law by PHILRACOM,
a court of law could not be precluded from setting that interpretation aside if later on it is
shown to be inappropriate.

SM LND, INC v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPEMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the BCDA opened for
disposition and development its Bonifacio South Property. Jumping on the opportunity, SM
Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the development of the lot
through a Public-Private Joint Venture Agreement which was accepted by the BCDA. However,
the BCDA clarified that its act should not be construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint
venture agreement with SMLI but only constitutes an authorization to conduct detailed
negotiations with SMLI and iron out the terms and conditions of the agreement.
Upon arriving at mutually acceptable terms and conditions, a Certification of Successful
Negotiations (Certification) was issued by the BCDA and signed by both parties with the
provisions that the BCDA undertook to subject SMLIs Original Proposal to Competitive
Challenge and committed itself to commence the activities for the solicitation for
comparative proposals. Then, instead of proceeding with the Competitive Challenge, the
BCDA corresponded with SMLI stating that it will welcome any voluntary and unconditional
proposal to improve the original offer, with the assurance that the BCDA will nonetheless
respect any right which may have accrued in favor of SMLI. In turn, SMLI increased the total
secured payments with an upfront payment.
Without responding to SMLIs new proposal, the BCDA sent a memorandum to the Office of the
President (OP) categorically recommending the termination of the Competitive Challenge.
Alarmed by this development, SMLI urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge
as agreed upon. However, the BCDA, via the assailed Supplemental Notice No. 5, terminated
the Competitive Challenge altogether. In the meantime, the BCDA issued in favor of SMLI a
check without explanation attached to it but its value corresponds to the proposal security
posted by SMLI, with interest. SMLI attempted to return the check but to no avail. The BCDA
caused the publication of an Invitation to Bid for the development of the subject property.
This impelled SMLI to file an Urgent Manifestation with Reiterative Motion to Resolve SMLIs
Application for Temporary Restraining (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.
The Court issued the TRO prayed for by SMLI and enjoined BCDA from proceeding with the new
selection process for the development of the property. For its part, SMLI alleged in its petition
that the Certification issued by the BCDA and signed by the parties constituted a contract and
that under the said contract, BCDA cannot renege on its obligation to conduct and complete
the Competitive Challenge. The BCDA relies chiefly on the reservation clause in the Terms of
Reference (TOR), which mapped out the procedure to be followed in the Competitive
Challenge, which allegedly authorized the agency to unilaterally cancel the Competitive
Challenge. BCDA add that the terms and conditions agreed upon are disadvantageous to the
government, and that it cannot legally be barred by estoppel in correcting a mistake
committed by its agents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not BCDA correct in issuing Supplemental Notice No. 5, which unilaterally aborted
the Competitive Challenge, and in subjecting the development of the project to public bidding?
RULING:
NO. SMLI has the right to a completed Competitive Challenge pursuant to the Detailed
Guidelines for Competitive Challenge Procedure for Public-Private Joint Ventures (NEDA JV
Guidelines) and the Certification issued by the BCDA. The reservation clause adverted to by
the BCDA cannot, in any way, prejudice said right. NEDA promulgated the NEDA Joint Venture
Guidelines, which detailed two (2) modes of selecting a private sector Joint Venture partner: by
competitive selection or through negotiated agreements. Competitive selection involves a
selection process based on transparent criteria, which should not constrain or limit
competition, and is open to participation, by any interested and qualified private entity.
Furthermore, it is well to point out that after BCDA accepted the unsolicited proposal of SMLI
and after both parties successfully concluded the detailed negotiations on the terms and
conditions of the project, SMLI acquired the status of an Original Proponent.
An Original Proponent, per the TOR, pertains to the party whose unsolicited proposal for the
development and privatization of the subject property through Joint Venture with BCDA has
been accepted by the latter, subject to certain conditions, and is now being subjected to a
Competitive Challenge. In this regard, SMLI insists that as an Original Proponent, it obtained
the right to a completed Competitive Challenge. A scrutiny of the NEDA JV Guidelines reveals
that certain rights are conferred to an Original Proponent. As correctly pointed out by SMLI,
these rights include the right to the conduct and completion of a competitive challenge. By
their mutual consent and in signing the Certification, both parties, in effect, entered into a
binding agreement to subject the unsolicited proposal to the Competitive Challenge. Evidently,
the Certification partakes of a contract wherein BCDA committed itself to proceed with the
Third Stage of the process and simultaneously grants SMLI the right to expect that the BCDA
will fulfill its obligations under the same. The preconditions to the conduct of the Competitive
Challenge having been met, what is left, therefore, is to subject the terms agreed upon to a
Competitive Challenge