Pangasinan Transport Co. vs.

Public Service Commission

GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS:

This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco).
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the
province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public
Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2
additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of
certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper
delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the
administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view,
in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere
license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and
hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances
so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further
proceedings.

In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.

FACTS:

PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to operate additional buses with
thePublic Service Commission (PSC). The PSC granted the application but added several conditions for
PANTRANCOs compliance.

ISSUE:

PANTRANCO is questioning whether PSC can impose said conditions. If so, wouldnt this power of the PSC, as
provided for under sec. 15, CA 146, constitute undue delegation of powers?

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the same time forestall
overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent
deposition. But due to the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
subordinate legislation.

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to
carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper
and suitable manner.
Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara
was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of
the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the
Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the
EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is
the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly
passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l
Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before
the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking
further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine
the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI
1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly
and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying,
among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election
of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is
on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has
no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition
in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing
said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of
the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation
alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the
petitioner.

Romulo Macalintal vs Commission on Elections

Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within
the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile
is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a
voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an
absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice
presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.

G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.

Sec. 11 of Act 1446 provides:

Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other
person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final.

Said Act provides that for every franchise granted, terms as to the usage and compensation to be paid to
the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority vote is
required and this is final

Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme
Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALC

Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is the Pasay Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which
disclaimed any interest.

ISSUES: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case
HELD: No
 The Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power
and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as
strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic
Act.

The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26).

When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators

A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the
jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.

The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise
any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being
all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty.

section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the
Manila Electric Company

A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

Facts: Judge Manzano sent a letter to the SC stating that he was, through Executive Order RF6-04, designated by
Gov. Farinas as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which was created pursuant to
Presidential Executive Order No. 856 and was appointed as a member of the Committee. With that, he was asking
the Court to authorize him to discharge the functions and duties of the office and to consider his membership in the
Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge. He alleged that his membership in the
Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of
the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an
abandonment of his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
and as a member of the Judiciary.

Ruling: An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice
are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the
Committee are

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have
committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of
criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative
functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such
as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary
of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig ably sets
forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the
practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary
being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a
higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of
such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no
less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming
indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable
purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.

Republic v. CA (1991)
EN BANC
G.R. 90482
Ponente: Davide
Nature: Appeal by certiorari of the decision of the CA
Petitioners: Republic (acting through the Sugar Regulatory Administration), Republic Planters Bank
Respondents: RTC Judge, RTC Deputy Sheriffs, Reyes, Treyes and Fudolin
Quick Summary: SRA, an administrative body, cannot represent the Republic of the Philippines because
EO 18 did not give it the powers to do so.
Facts:
May 16, 1986 (EO 18 took effect May 28, 1986) Republic Planters Bank (RPB) filed a complaint in
the RTC for sum of money/delivery of personal property with restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National
Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA)
They asked the court to order PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA to render a faithful account of different
bank accounts being held; to render a faithful inventory of all the sugar stocks for the crop year 84-
85; to remit dollar accounts held; to deliver sugar stocks of crop year 84-85; pay interests and
penalties for accounts covered by unpaid sugar quedans, damages, attorneys fees and cost of the
suit
Before PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a compromise agreement was submitted and
was approved by the lower court
Three orders were issued
o First order dismissed separate petitions for relief from judgment filed by different sugar
associations (National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters, Sugar Central Inc, Independent
Sugar Planters)
o Second order granted a second motion to resolve a pending motion for issuance of a writ
of execution and allowed the issuance of an alias writ of execution
o Third order required officers of the RPB to appear before the court to explain why they
should not be cited in contempt for defying the alias writ of execution
CA denied the petition for the nullification of the orders because
o RPB accepted the appointment as Trustee whose obligation is to pay received benefits by
way of trustees fees and cannot question the right of private respondents to attorneys fees
o SRA may not lawfully bring action on behalf of the Republic because EO 18 says that
PHILSUCOM remains a judicial entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits against it.
o Petition should have been filed through the OSG and not through the OGCC; SRA cannot
lawfully represent the Government because it may only perform powers and functions as
may be authorized by the laws which created them
 SC required respondents to comment and issued TRO directing respondent Judge to desist and
refrain from further proceeding in the civil case
SC was informed that the Judge was ordering the implementation of an alias writ of execution
Issue/Held:
Did the CA err in holding that neither OGCC nor SRA can represent the Government in an action
before it? NO
Ratio:
Sol Gen says:
o SRA has no legal personality to file the instant petition under the name of the Republic
because under EO 18, it is not vested with the legal capacity to sue.
o EO 18 abolished PHILSUCOM but its juridical personality was to continue for three years
for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits.
o CA committed no reversible error
Private respondents says:
o Almost same with Sol Gen

RPB GOCC engaged in the banking business.

Petitioners have no legal personality to initiate petition because SRA is not a party in the
case before the TC (since it was filed against PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA).
o It cannot be presumed that SRA had substituted PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA in the case as
both continue to legally exist for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits in
liquidation of its affairs
SC says: CA correctly ruled that SRA may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines and that the OGCC does not have the authority to represent the petitioner in this
case.
o EO abolished PHILSUCOM and created SRA but PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as
a juridical entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against
itunder the supervision of the SRA
o Sec 3, EO 18 does not specifically include the power to represent the Republic nor the power
to sue and be sued.
o Sec 4, EO 18 specific functions does not include the power to represent the Republic
o CHARTER DOES NOT GRANT THE SRA THE POWER TO REPRESENT REPUBLIC IN SUITS FILED BY OR AGAINST IT.
SC says SRA is an administrative agency
o Administrative agency only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily
implied in the exercise; government body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation
o Power to represent the Republic withheld from SRA so it cannot institute the instant petition.
OGCC also cannot represent SRA or Republic
o OGCC is the principal law office of all GOCCs including subsidiaries; the president may not allow it to act as
lawyer for a specified GOCC or subsidiary.
o Since SRA is neither a GOCC or a subsidiary, OGCC does not have the authority to represent it

Aida Eugenio vs Civil Service Commission

In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was then recommended to be
appointed as a Civil Service Officer Rank IV. But her appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year,
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB). CESB is the office tasked
with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection, classification and compensation of the
members of the Career Executive Service.

Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not have the power to
abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to
do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board.

HELD: No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature. The creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for Constitutional offices. The power to restructure granted
to the CSC is limited to offices under it. The law that created the CESB intended said office to be an autonomous
entity although it is administratively attached to the CSC.
FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions
of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission
the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:

Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive
Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of
the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended
her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside

NO

1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed,
therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken
stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the
contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the
operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of
the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to reorganize is limited to
offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..

2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is
expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook.

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By
said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain
policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited
Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as
chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached
corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the
board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

NOTES:

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to
abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one
Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission
may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs

(4) The Office of Planning and Management

(5) The Central Administrative Office.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs

(14) The Office of Retirement

(15) The Regional and Field Offices.

Ople vs Torres GR No 127685 23 July 1998

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to
invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right
to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?

Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of
the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. Oples concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.