First Cause

Polkinghorne asks himself whether before the discoveries of

quantum theory and chaos theory an honest theologian was
impotent to talk convincingly of Gods action in the world. He
answers that classical theology, especially in the writings of Aquinas,
sought to preserve the uniqueness of divine action by speaking of
Gods primary causality, exercised in and under the multiple
secondary causalities of creatures. No explanation was given of how
this happens; it was simply said to be the case. Any attempt to
exhibit the causal joint by which the double agency of divine and
creaturely causalities related to each other was held to be
impossible, or even impious1. Here we see that Polkinghorne wants
a more complete answer, one that includes how this happens.
He then indicates three consequences of this point of view:
1. The ineffability of the mode of action of this primary
causality had the effect of totally repudiating any possibility of
an analogy between human and divine agencies2.
2. God is fully party to every event, not simply by allowing it to
happen by divine permission as the creation is held in being,
but in bringing it about through the exercise of divine will.
Nothing is outside direct divine control (). O felix culpa! is to
be written over all of human, terrestrial and cosmic history. 3.
3. Primary causality is so divorced in character from secondary
causality that it may be held to be active whatever form the
latter is believed by science to take4.
And finally finishes his critic saying that What, for its partisans, is
the strength of the idea of primary and secondary causality is, for its
critics, its greatest weakness. The strategy represents an extreme
case of a two-languages approach to understanding how theology
and science relate to each other5.
To answer this lets see what is primary causality and why we think
Polkinghorne has not completely understood it. To do this we will
1
John Polkinghorne, Faith, Science and Understanding (London: SPCK and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2000), p. 114.
2
Ibid., p. 115.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
begin with the account of divine action made by Artigas: after
disclosing his ideas about the intelligibility of nature he says that
the preceding reflections are most coherent with the existence of a
truly divine agency, a personal God who has conceived natural
dynamism and uses it to produce, according to natural laws, a world
of successive levels of emerging innovation, which ultimately makes
possible the existence of truly rational beings6.
In opposition to what Polkinghorne seems to think, for Artigas
analogy is very useful when we try to speak about God. He explains
that, on the one hand, God's action on nature should be seen as
completely different from natural causality but, on the other hand,
divine and natural causality must have something in common,
insofar as in both cases we are dealing with causes that produce
effects. In this context, analogy means that we apply the concept of
cause both to God and to creatures, partly in the same way and
partly in a different way7. This essential difference is expressed by
the terms First Cause and secondary causes.
To prevent some frequent misunderstandings in the relationship
between God and nature, Artigas presents a clarification made by
Ian Barbour: Some theologians have developed the thesis of
Thomas Aquinas that God as primary cause works through the
matrix of secondary causes in the natural world. God endows each
creature with intrinsic properties and empowers it to express them.
This differs from deism by asserting that the world does not stand
on its own but needs God's continual concurrence to maintain and
uphold it. It also differs from deism in acknowledging the
emergence of radically new forms of life and mind in evolutionary
history8. Note the differences with deism mentioned by Barbour.
Then finishes with two important assertions: There are no gaps in
the scientific account on its own level; God's action is on a totally
different plane from all secondary causes 9. An interesting passage
from a person who, according to Polkinghorne, rightly and
emphatically rejects the two-languages approach introduced by
primary causality10. According to them Barbour, Peacocke and
Polkinghorne this implies lack of unity in knowledge and truth.
6
Mariano Artigas, The Mind of the Universe (Philadelphia & London: Templeton
Foundation Press, 2000), p. 145.
7
Ibid.
8
Ian G. Barbour, Experiencing and Interpreting Nature in Science and Religion, Zygon, 29
(1994), p. 475, in Mariano Artigas, The Mind of the Universe, cit., p. 146.
9
Ibid.
10
John Polkinghorne, Faith, Science and Understanding, cit., p. 116.
To say that there are no gaps in scientific knowledge because Gods
action is on a different plane, does not mean that there is a double
truth. There is one truth that is manifold. To understand this let us
see a passage from the Summa Theologiae in which Aquinas shows
the progressive deepening in the understanding of causes:
The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step,
advanced to the knowledge of truth.
At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings
existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who
admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain
accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation,
by union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal
substance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for
these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect,
or something of that kind.
An advance was made when they understood that there was a
distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter
they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived
transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms.
Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes,
such as the oblique circle [The zodiac., according to Aristotle (De
Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. ()
Then others there were who arose to the consideration of being as
being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as these, or as such,
but as beings.
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings,
must be the cause of things, not only according as they are such by
accidental forms, nor according as they are these by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things11.
This universal cause of things is what we call First Cause. Why is it
necessary to admit a transcendental cause? Because all other causes
operate trans-forming, viz. changing the form. This includes causes
that produce substantial changes (generation/corruption) as well as
the causes of accidental changes12. All of these presuppose the
existence of something and do not produce the being as being, viz.
do not explain the totality of the effect. A proof of this is that the
generated being continues to exist even if the generator disappears.

11
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, 44, 2.
12
cf. Llus Clavell and Miguel Prez de Laborda, Metafisica (Roma: EDUSC, 2006), p.
339.
It is similar to the construction of a house: the architect builds a
house from existing materials, giving them a new accidental form 13.
In order to explain the act of being of creatures, it is necessary the
existence of a cause of it. This cause should be: primary, universal,
transcendental and by essence14.
The relationship between the First Cause and secondary causes is
one of a subordination, not union nor parallel influx in which divine
and creaturely action add up to produce an only effect 15. To
understand can be useful the analogy of an artist and a brush: a
work of art can be said to be produced both completely by the artist
and completely by the brush, though it is more appropriate to say
that it is attributed to the artist (The First Cause influences on the
reality of the effect more than secondary causes). Of course this is
only an analogy because an instrumental cause is different to a
secondary cause in that the former are used by God, whereas the
latter act according to their own natural order 16.
According to what we have just said it seems that Polkinghornes
critics are groundless. The causality of God does not imply a double
truth or double language, but gives the foundation to the action of
secondary causes. Artigas says that no dichotomy exists between
the two: they refer to different but complementary levels. This
perspective is consistent with a divine agency that not only respects
the created causes, but also fosters them. Even though an
omnipotent God can produce my effect directly, leaving aside the
created causes, we can easily understand that God would enhance
the created causes because it is God himself who has given them
their being and their powers. Therefore, scientific progress does not
contradict God's plan; on the contrary, the more we know how
created causes behave, the more we should admire the greatness of a
God who communicates to creatures the capacity to collaborate with
him to achieve goals that represent both the fulfillment of God's plan
and the perfection of the created agents17.

13
cf. Ibid., p. 340; cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, 45, 5 ad 1.
14
cf. Ibid., p. 343.
15
cf. Ibid., p. 345.
16
cf. Ibid., p. 346.
17
Mariano Artigas, The Mind of the Universe, cit., p. 146.