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G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director
of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has
been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given
by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual
practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office,
or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent
Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application
of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of
the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was
imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of
Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
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Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144).
(Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first
place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training,
still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or
to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the
Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one
year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the
application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation
of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the
cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of
the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after
the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not
being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's
refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article
or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the
patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws,
legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or
a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory
license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a
court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions.
Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal
fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his
duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is
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a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his
legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course,
the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of
technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required
to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to
submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the
United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent)
has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are
entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and
prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of
any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted
to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of
Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be
submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in
the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United
States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing
the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of
good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney
shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or
who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular,
letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may
be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is
authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination.
We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
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SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to
hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service
to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,
our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving
such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not
inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating
to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to
enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the
effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for
said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to
submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason
why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated,
such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs,
may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an
examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing,
may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the
Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No
costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
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removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes
of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is
found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he
is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
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The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the
Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree
No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant
of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

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xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by
the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent
acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
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13
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient
to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to
itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility,
to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching
and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
9 | Page

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
10 | P a g e

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the
law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines
of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members
of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
11 | P a g e

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do
not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined
as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for
the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid.,
p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should
be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines,
legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice
wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are
both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
12 | P a g e

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications
of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors,
the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of
the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first
hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law
is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many
as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
13 | P a g e

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable
to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews
the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding
both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of
flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
14 | P a g e

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands
of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of
the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate
counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of
the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is
a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received
by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a
dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in
the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and
15 | P a g e

as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such
as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as
the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for
the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of
competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua
nonfor foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
16 | P a g e

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has
no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once
or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which
really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the
definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising
others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising
law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII,
Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

17 | P a g e

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission,
and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in
front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any
blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an
adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to
comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the
position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was
to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
18 | P a g e

Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at
least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is
the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of
medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a
lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or
a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative
of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People
vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of
office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice
law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-
359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the
term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
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4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional
qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the
tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law,
like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in theactive and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for
not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ
with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the
same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why
we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been
found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
20 | P a g e

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law
only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D.
902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation
the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these
acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of
the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn
his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law,
ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten
years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished
himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his
resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law.
Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved
that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified
for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or
another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote
behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how
he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty
is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance,
and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He
is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
21 | P a g e

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower
courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice,
except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice
envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and
involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one
year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he
practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief,
South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

22 | P a g e

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain
degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal
knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-
defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in
his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the
practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court,
and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving
of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
23 | P a g e

substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901.
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also
be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if
he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that
is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection
with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no
doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People
v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more
especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at
law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified
to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as
to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his
services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v.
Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a
Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
24 | P a g e

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of
office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice
law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan,
864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also
should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of
doing business. This was our ruling in the case ofAntam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
25 | P a g e

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during
office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
(2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation
of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
26 | P a g e

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems,
just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s)
of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer
from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers
legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between
"legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public
policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public
of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .
27 | P a g e

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which
contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse,
this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication
of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
28 | P a g e

the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer
using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development
in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding
on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession,
but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields
of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court,
but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them
to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
29 | P a g e

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to
answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that
it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding
foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name
30 | P a g e

The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who
gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for
under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to
employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country
for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot
nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory
31 | P a g e

and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee
is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case
before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides
the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances
and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and
the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite
party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is
not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
32 | P a g e

Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer,
such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A"
and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of
action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice
on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation in
their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law .
. . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
33 | P a g e

prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice
of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
34 | P a g e

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we
agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients
in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
35 | P a g e

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of
the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation
was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do
also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this
were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and
named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state
for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem
for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
36 | P a g e

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also
stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate
from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies
and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such
as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by
FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their
legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known
his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
37 | P a g e

profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons,
of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a
quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless
and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by
herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers
after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
38 | P a g e

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind
used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be
passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter,
in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication
or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and
from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738 Complainant - v e r s u s ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate,
Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu [2] and Antonio
Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties
reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. [5] When the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head
of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,
however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
39 | P a g e

sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and
he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there
was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective
position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. [7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard
the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in
the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: [8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the
IBP Board of Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable
penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule
applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by
that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice
of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
40 | P a g e

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12] governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;
and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided,
That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a
definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713,
the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of
the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to
render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they
are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason
because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
twice a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can
engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. [17] Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
41 | P a g e

permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case
of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and
public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to
obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent
failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
[18]
Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
[19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers oath [20] and/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a
lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G.
Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
42 | P a g e

G.R. No. L-28899 May 30, 1974

ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent.

ANTONIO, J.:p

In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao
to hear Administrative Case No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar.

In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why
he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual
averments which petitioner knew were false, to wit:

The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court show that you prepared and/or
caused to be prepared a verified petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312
in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging therein as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate was lost by the herein
petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be found and
is therefore now presumed to be lost," and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo Cinco, when you know very well that the
owner's duplicate copy has always been in the custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of
Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that as a result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon.
Vicente P. Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967, directing the Register of Deeds of the City
of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312.

In view thereof, you are hereby given seventy-two (72) hours from the receipt hereof to explain why you shall not be removed or
suspended from the practice of law.

Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967 denying the material averments of respondent Judge's
letter and explaining the circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition.

Apparently not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter filed and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and,
together with Adm. Case No. 58 against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course thereto and set the same for hearing on January 24 and 25, 1968. At
the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one
for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the subject matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved
that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the administrative case in view of the latter's conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the
same time. The oral motion was denied.

On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against petitioner. At the said hearing Municipal Judge Saludares
testified by more or less reiterating the testimony he previously gave at the hearing of the petition for relief from the order in Misc. Case No. 2968
allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate of title. The continuation of the hearing was set for April 26, 1968.

On April 15, 1968, petitioner filed the present petition, and on April 17, 1968, this Court gave due course thereto and ordered the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond.

Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension
of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance. Petitioner
also contends that assuming arguendothat courts of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.

We find petitioner's contentions without merit.

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1. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the
practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An
attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in
which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his
continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of
misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the
enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of
First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.

The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:

SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy
and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending
the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of
his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses
in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25, respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which read:

SEC. 22. Suspension of lawyers. Courts of First Instance may suspend a lawyer from the further practice of his profession for
any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such lawyer will not be privileged to practice
his profession in any of the courts of the Islands until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

SEC. 23. Proceedings upon suspension. Upon such suspension the judge of the Court of First Instance ordering the
suspension shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the
facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer
permanently from the roll as it shall find the facts to warrant.

SEC. 25. Hearing of charges. No lawyer shall be removed from the roll or be suspended from the performance of his
profession until he has had full opportunity to answer the charges against him, and to produce witnesses in his own behalf and
to be heard by himself and counsel, if he so desires, upon reasonable notice. But if upon reasonable notice the accused fails to
appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

2. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and
the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own
motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. 1 Indeed it is
not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney,
when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said
court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character
essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice.
44 | P a g e

3. Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court). 2

While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a reasonable notice, Sec. 9 of Rule 139, of the Revised Rules, provides that as far
as applicable, the procedure outlined by the preceding actions of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys
in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance." Section 2 of Rule 139, provides that the respondent lawyer in disciplinary proceedings is
granted 10 days from service of a copy of the complaint within which to file his answer. It is desirable, therefore, that a similar period should be
granted by the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the purpose of uniformity in procedure. We find, however, that in the case
at bar, petitioner not only failed to question as unreasonable, the period granted to him by the court within which to answer the complaint, but
actually was not substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint within the period of 72 hours from receipt thereof.

Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that as far as may be applicable, the procedure for the investigation by the
Solicitor General of complaints against lawyers referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints
against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General, and not respondent Judge, should be the one to
conduct the present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of
Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said
office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections
28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to another and final
investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and the
statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the
facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant."
In other words, under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General would, therefore, be unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the present person is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs
against petitioner.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The practice regulating disbarment proceedings is not as we have noted regulated by statute, but all courts of general
jurisdiction have at all times in the history of the law possessed the inherent power to suspend and disbar attorneys for
professional misconduct of such a character as showed them to be unworthy to hold the place of officers of the court; and the
books are full of cases in which the court, on its own motion, has instituted proceedings like this. Indeed, we think that it is not
only the right, but the duty, of a judge of a circuit court to institute, upon his own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension
or disbarment of an attorney when from information laid before him, or from his personal knowledge, it appears to his
satisfaction that the attorney in so demeaning himself as to be unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

xxx xxx xxx

In Rice v. Com., 18 B. Mon. 472, which was a disbarment proceeding, this court, in answering an objection that the judge of the
circuit court did not have authority to institute, on his own motion, the proceeding, said:

This objection is founded on a misconception as well of the power as of the duty of the court. The defendant in the rule was an
attorney at law and an officer of the court. All courts have the power to control and regulate to a certain extent, the conduct of
their officers, and to inflict on them for their official misconduct such punishment as the law prescribes. If a court have knowledge
of the existence of such official misconduct on the part of any of its officers, it not only has the power, but it is its duty, to institute
an appropriate proceeding against the offender, and to bring him, if guilty, to condign punishment. And it is much to be regretted
that this duty, which the law devolves upon the court of the country, is so little regarded, and that the obligations which it imposes
are so frequently overlooked or neglected.

In Walker v. Com., 8 Bush, 86, it was again said:

45 | P a g e

It is a well-established rule of common law that courts may inquire into the conduct of their officers, such as attorneys and
counselors who practice in their courts, and punish for offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

In Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552, the Supreme Court, quoting with approval from an opinion by
Chief Justice Sharswood, said:

We entertain no doubt that a court has jurisdiction without any formal complaint or petition, upon its own motion, to strike the
name of an attorney from the roll in a proper case, provided he has had reasonable notice, and been afforded an opportunity to
be heard in his defense. (Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 176 S.W. 948, 953.)

2 In re MacDougall, 3 Phil., 70 (1903); In re Calderon, 5 Phil., 658 (1906); In re Cuenco, 41 Phil., 32 (1920).

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

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IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO
PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon.
Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar
Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and
67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say
that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination?
Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects
Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang,
alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining
to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971
to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo,
Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104,
rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
47 | P a g e

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination
booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in
Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it
was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as
Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon
University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino
F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp.
45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to
do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were
required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same
became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law,
affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather
low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the
further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the
notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with
4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
48 | P a g e

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I
received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and
myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and
policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the
Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar
examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of the
same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit
of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing
examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at
about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with
him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me
to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according
to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and
he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have
erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with
the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total
grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
49 | P a g e

brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by
reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of
the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I
wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar
Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee
had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant
was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with
the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to
verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed,
the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to
see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review
the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee
pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971,considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as
unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%.
After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other
subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his
malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the
review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
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3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction
of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled
the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive
any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words
"we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I
had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked
that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can
recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and
submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said
request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper
in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other
items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new
grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in
my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial
Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified
from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest
that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to
presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

51 | P a g e

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and
every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25%
to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that
one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his
final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar
Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of
the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned
should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually
swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have
52 | P a g e

them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation.
Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not
remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee
during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50%
in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his
integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification
of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in
their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners
earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office
(Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the
moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight
becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed
on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right
sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954',
the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked
as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This
number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a
number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with
said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from
1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the
53 | P a g e

number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo
and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November
27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be
recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From
then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the
possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the
youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was
on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the
contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness
of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and
later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the
attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines,
namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade
of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%)
in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It
turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo
(The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo
and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original
grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or
re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his
subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless
very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April
12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on
the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In
54 | P a g e

his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once
when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof;
why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know
each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly
entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo
in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported
to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as
regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was
done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of
passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the
influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar
confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming
all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work
that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and
which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance
of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to
the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to
make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through
the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached
Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations
that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
55 | P a g e

extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-
evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's
word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-
Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang
still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-
examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider
the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of
said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal
problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further
believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of
the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the
changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-
39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the
latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public
International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice
of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar
Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation,
the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in
four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet
in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law,
56 | P a g e

as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points
to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because
he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he
initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is
746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular
re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one
subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that
he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the
same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more
subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last
phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-
evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only
one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed
all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed
to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34,
rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the
others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after
he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number
1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook
because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest
of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-
evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5)
MAJOR SUBJECTS.
57 | P a g e

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade
74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of
the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang
thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on
the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to
the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order
was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide
them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-
examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo
too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as
the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who
were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of onlyrespondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively
representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two
(2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade
of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.
58 | P a g e

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already
narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice
of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the
possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who
Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks
are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average,
whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly
act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of
the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol.
VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted
average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more
deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other
examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of
grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far
better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz
violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court
59 | P a g e

as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the
wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-
thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners
concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting
(Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of
Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that
the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43,
49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged
sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent
Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of
respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to
him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in
Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated
with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing
Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out,
replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24,
Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained
passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in
which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below
50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee
with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular
notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of
any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by
respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
60 | P a g e

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other
failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47%
in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

61 | P a g e

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was
considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant,
thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that
they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94
Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman
and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison
officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to
the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions
in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees
to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial.
What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for
admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to
62 | P a g e

fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided
by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against
the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent
Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as
already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it
could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal
or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under
oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is
no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared
by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of
that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other
officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against
him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of
the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when
he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in
court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and from
the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a
felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the
true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and
his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding
at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some
of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the
victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the
present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member
of the noble profession of law.
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While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending
criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly
irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or
withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself
as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction.
WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds,
among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico,
resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court
Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral
character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57
Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the
Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of
the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration
or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-
examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the
circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of
respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter
to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete
grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have
easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really
deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in
Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the
exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one
causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours).
And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can
re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I
asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to
go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
64 | P a g e

lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent
influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 &
5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the
further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..."
(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is
representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written
in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in
view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971,
considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation
adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their
conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached
to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations
in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary
action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation
in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings
and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing
up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be
pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
65 | P a g e

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice
Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the
latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a
favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades
of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to
see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho
that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a
member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act
tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February,
1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374
square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only
on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said
house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913:
date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date
of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price
of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971
in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972
statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of
P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did
not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the
first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17,
1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even
presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a
loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And
furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in
Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who
has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion,
66 | P a g e

therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the
foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of
P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument;August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes,
Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol.
III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was
unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed,
however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this
car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed
in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets,
excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed
total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-
mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo
with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar
examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn
statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end
in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and
sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he
bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
67 | P a g e

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up
during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high
school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to
1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the
affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the
position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record,
p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which
is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and
even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was
already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).
[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school
year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and
claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent
Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring
buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City
Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E.
Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit
was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 46, rec.).
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German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and
served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th
Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for
any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations
of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in
September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending
petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from
probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to
submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2)
senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation
had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the
criminal case.
69 | P a g e

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense
therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of
the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on
their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he
had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his
death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound
discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the
practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to
the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of
the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most
traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural
or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys
and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit
of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh
his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
70 | P a g e

lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a
better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign
the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Resolution, p. 8.

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by
the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
71 | P a g e

Annex A.......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-
25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B.......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C.......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.Jksm

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981
( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal
259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida
R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the
Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to
practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28,
1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment
of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still
pending.
72 | P a g e

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed,
and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and
pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly
believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and
be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner
wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary. Esmsc

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until
he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22,
1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents
suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice
of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present
time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did
not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from
the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
73 | P a g e

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice
is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues
to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

74 | P a g e

[A.C. No. 2797. October 4, 2002]

ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant, vs. JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case
No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After respondents comment to the complaint and complainants reply thereto, this Court, on March 29,
1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice. Commissioner George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked to investigate the case. Commissioner Briones
was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato Cunanan. Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed
upon, the parties filed their respective position papers.

Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant alleged the following facts:

When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left
by the said decedent. All in all, complainant and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who helped her
settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.

Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation that would develop the said
real properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently sincere proposals,
complainant and her daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly registered corporation
in which they assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then registered in the name of the corporation.

Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, President, General
Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also made complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement. Respondent
likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from
her deceased husband. She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain Tion Suy Ong who became the
new registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for the proceeds of said transfers.

In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the
amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) using as collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her daughter
contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for
brevity). Complainant later on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and bamboo which could not
have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan secured.

For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single installment. As a result, the LBP, in a letter
dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent that the past due amortizations and interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred Twenty-nine
Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25). The LBP made a demand on respondent for payment for the
tenth time. Meanwhile, when the BCC commenced its operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the rentals of BCCs tenants. On
October 28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due to non-payment of the loan.

Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold the corporations right to redeem the mortgaged
properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud Jammang through a fake board resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with the authority to
do so. Complainant and her daughter, the majority stockholders, were never informed of the alleged meeting held on that date. Again, respondent
never accounted for the proceeds of the sale of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to Jammang a parcel of land belonging to complainant
and her daughter which was contiguous to the foreclosed properties and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted
for the proceeds of the sale.

Sometime in 1983, complainants daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home had been demolished and that her mother,
herein complainant, was being detained in a small nipa shack in a place called Culianan.Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie was able
to locate her mother. Rosemarie later learned that respondent took complainant away from her house on the pretext that said ancestral home was
going to be remodeled and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to Tion Suy Ong, using another spurious
board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series of 1992. The resolution contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting
75 | P a g e

of the directors of the corporation and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin Fernando and Gabriel Solivar. Complainant and her
daughter did not know how these persons became stockholders and directors of the corporation. Respondent again did not account for the
proceeds of the sale.

Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of the real properties they allegedly assigned to the
corporation, for an accounting of the proceeds of the LBP loan and as well as the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by BCC. But the
demands remained unheeded. Hence, complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as
their lawyer and repeated their demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the 19 titles that respondent
transferred to the corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in a letter dated August 3, 1985.

Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) that Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to
respondents refusal and neglect, failed to submit the corporations annual financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General Information
Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984; Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and 1984; and Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for 1982,
1983 and 1984.

Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants of BCC and issued handwritten receipts which he
signed, not as an officer of the corporation but as the attorney-at-law of complainant.Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to dry his
palay and did not keep the buildings in a satisfactory state, so much so that the divisions were losing plywood and other materials to thieves.

Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and relatives that she had become insane to prevent them
from believing whatever complainant said. According to complainant, respondent proposed that she legally separate from her present husband so
that the latter would not inherit from her and that respondent be adopted as her son.

For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing deceit and machination in convincing complainant and
her daughter to assign their real properties to the corporation; that they freely and voluntary executed the deeds of assignment and the voting trust
agreement that they signed; that he did not single-handedly manage the corporation as evidenced by certifications of the officers and directors of
the corporation; that he did not use spurious board resolutions authorizing him to contract a loan or sell the properties assigned by the complainant
and her daughter; that complainant and her daughter should be the ones who should render an accounting of the records and revenues inasmuch
as, since 1984 up to the present, the part-time corporate book-keeper, with the connivance of the complainant and her daughter, had custody of
the corporate records; that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the operation of BCC when they illegally took control of it in 1986; that he
never pocketed any of the proceeds of the properties contributed by the complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the ancestral home
followed legal procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan but she freely and voluntarily lived with the family of P03 Joel
Constantino as evidenced by complainants own letter denying she was kidnapped; and that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed for
being premature, considering the pendency of cases before the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.

Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner Renato Cunanan, in his report [1] dated July 1, 1999,
recommended respondents disbarment based on the following findings:

A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were stockholders of a corporation, together with respondent, named
Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.

Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex A of Complainants Position Paper, complainants subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding
capital stock while her daughters consists of 18%, giving them a total of 73%. Respondents holdings consist of 24% while three other
incorporators, Rosauro L. Alvarez, Vicente T. Maalac and Darhan S. Graciano each held 1% of the capital stock of the corporation.

B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two Deeds of Transfer and Assignment conveying and transferring
to the corporation 19 parcels of land in exchange for shares of stock in the corporation.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent accepted said assignment of properties and titles in behalf of the
corporation as Treasurer. The deeds were signed on April 5, 1981.

xxx xxx xxx

76 | P a g e

Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750 shares comprising the authorized capital stock of the
corporation of 97% thereof.

No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.

F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on April 4, 1981 he was elected as Chairman and Director and on
April 5, 1981 he was elected President of the corporation. Respondents own Annexes marked as G and G-1 of his Comment show that on April 4,
1981 he was not only elected as Chairman and Director as he claims but as Director, Board Chairman and President. The purported minutes was
only signed by respondent and an acting Secretary by the name of Vicente Maalac.

Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.

Respondents Annex H and H-1 shows that in the alleged organizational meeting of the directors on April 5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was
elected Treasurer. Bucoys name does not appear as an incorporator nor a stockholder anywhere in the documents submitted.

The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed only by respondent Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo
Martin.

G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4, 1981 as respondents own Annexes G to G-1 would show, then
complainants claim that respondent was likewise acting as Treasurer of two corporations bear truth and credence as respondent signed and
accepted the titles to 19 parcels of land ceded by the complainant and her daughter, as Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was already
purportedly elected as Chairman, President and Director.

H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed the minutes marked as Exhibit H to H-1 by stating that the
same was duly signed by all the Board of Directors when the document itself shows that only he and one Verisimo Martin signed the same.

He also claims that all the stockholders signed the minutes of organizational meeting marked as Annexes G and G-1 of his Comment yet the same
shows that only the acting Chairman and acting Secretary signed.

I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the stockholders comprising 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, as
required by law, to mortgage the parcels of land belonging to the corporation, which were all assigned to the corporation by complainant and her
daughter, by virtue of Annex I and I-1: attached to his Comment.

The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their conformity to the said resolution: respondent Balicanta who
owned 109 shares, Vicente Maalac (1 share), Daihan Graciano (1 share).

Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of the 1,750 outstanding capital stock of the corporation were not represented in the
purported stockholders meeting authorizing the mortgage of the subject properties.

The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent proceeded to mortgage the subject 9 parcels of land by the
corporation.

J. Respondent further relies on Annex J of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of a special meeting of the Board of Directors authorizing him to
obtain a loan and mortgage the properties of the corporation dated August 29, 1981. This claim is baseless. The required ratification of 2/3 by the
stockholders of records was not met. Again, respondent attempts to mislead the Commission and Court.

K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the organizational meeting of the stockholders electing the members of
the Board, have not been duly signed by the stockholders as shown in respondents annex G which was purportedly the organizational meeting of
the stockholders.

L. Also, Annex J of respondents Comment which purportedly authorized him to obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only
signed by himself and a secretary.
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M. In said Annex 'J' of respondents Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura Cordon was on leave by virtue of a voting trust agreement
allegedly executed by complainant in his favor covering all her shares of stock. The claim is baseless. The voting trust referred to by respondent
(annex D of his Comment), even if it were assumed to be valid, covered only 266 shares of complainants yet she owned a total of 1,039 shares
after she and her daughter ceded in favor of the corporation 19 parcels of land.

Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her interest was safeguarded. Yet, complainant was apparently and
deliberately left our (sic) on the pretext that, she had executed a voting trust agreement in favor of respondent.

It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21 August 1981 and immediately thereafter, the resolutions
authorizing respondent to obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land were passed and approved.

N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to happen where, with the exclusion of complainant as director the
result was that there remained only 4 members of the Board,.

O. Respondents own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.

1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed deceit and machination in convincing the complainant and her
daughter to sign the articles of incorporation of Rosaura Enterprises and in ceding to the corporation 19 parcels of land in Zamboanga City,
because they freely, intelligently and voluntarily signed the same, yet, in his Position Paper, respondent took another stance.

In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12 years later, respondent claimed that it was actually the idea of Atty.
Rosaura L. Alvarez that a corporation be put up to incorporate the estate of the late Felixberto D. Jaldon.

2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not directors, hence they were not notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6
(c) of his Comment he blamed the other stockholders and directors for the corporations inability to comply with the Land Banks demands saying
that they have consistently failed since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual stockholders meetings and (i.i) for the monthly board meeting.

His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since 1981 to the present. If (sic) so, it was his duty to convene the
stockholders and the directors for meetings.

Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he needed to make a loan of p2.2 million; when he sold the
corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation to Jammang, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT
62,807 to Jammang in addition to the 9 parcels of land which were foreclosed, and when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by
TCT No. 72,004.

It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do anything to save the corporations properties from being
foreclosed because the stockholders and directors did not convene.

This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and immoral conduct especially because, in all his acts constituting
conveyances of corporate property, respondent used minutes of stockholders and directors meetings signed only by him and a secretary or signed
by him and persons who were not incorporators much less stockholders.

It is worthy of note that in respondents Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his position paper, there were 7 new stockholders and complainant appeared
to have only 266 shares to her name while her daughter Rosemarie had no shares at all. Respondent did not present any proof of conveyance of
shares by complainant and her daughter.

It is further worth noting that complainants voting trust (annex D of respondents Comment) where she allegedly entrusted 266 shares to
respondent on August 21, 1981 had only a validity of 5 years. Thus, she should have had her entire holdings of 1,283 shares back in her name in
August 1986.

Respondents purported minutes of stockholders meeting (Exhs. 15 and 17) do not reflect this.

There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant and her daughter lost their 97% control holding in the corporation.
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3. As a further contradiction in respondents pleadings, we note that in paragraph 2.7.C of his Comment he said that only recently, this year, 1985,
the complainant and her aforenamed daughter examined said voluminous supporting receipts/documents which had previously been examined by
the Land Bank for loan releases, during which occasion respondent suggested to them that the corporation will have to hire a full-time book-
keeper to put in order said voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to which they adversely reacted due to lack of corporate money to pay for
said book-keeper. But in respondents Position Paper par. 6.3 he stated that:

Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should render a detailed accounting to the corporation of the corporate
records as well as corporate revenues/income precisely because since 1994 to the present:

(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the indispensable connivance and instigation of the complainant and
her daughter, among others, has custody of the corporate records, xxx

4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position paper that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the BCC
operations of the corporation by illegally taking over actual control and supervision thereof sometime in 1986, xxx

Yet respondents own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15 and 16 where the subject of the foreclosed properties of the corporation
comprising the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC) was taken up, complainant and her daughter were not even present nor were they the
subject of the discussion, belying respondents claim that the complainant and her daughter illegally took actual control of BCC.

5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of the corporation, attached to the
complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts
were issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing
his printed name.

It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.

6. With regard to respondents claim that the complainant consented to the sale of her ancestral home, covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion
Suy Ong for which he attached as Exhibit 22 to his Position Paper the minutes of an annual meeting of the stockholders, it behooves this
Commission why complainants signature had to be accompanied by her thumb mark. Furthermore, complainants signature appears unstable and
shaky. This Office is thus persuaded to believe complainants allegation in paragraph 3b of her position paper that since September 1992 up to
March 1993 she was being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel Constantino and his wife under instructions from respondent Balicanta.

This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993, Annex H of complainants position paper, where respondent ordered
Police Officer Constantino to allow Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie Jaldon to talk to Tita Rosing.

The complainants thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky signature lends credence to her claim that she was detained in the far flung
barrio of Culianan under instructions of respondent while her ancestral home was demolished and the lot sold to one Tion Suy Ong.

It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainants consent by getting her to affix her thumb mark in addition to her signature.

7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in addition to being the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the
corporation. Yet, respondent submitted to this commission documents which are supported to be in the possession of the Corporate Secretary
such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.

The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that prove on no uncertain terms that respondent, who was the legal counsel
of complainant in the latter part of the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, committed unlawful, immoral and deceitful conduct
proscribed by Rule 1.01 of the code of professional responsibility.

Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same code which provides that A lawyer should observe candor fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Respondents acts gravely diminish the publics respect for the integrity of the profession of law for which this Commission recommends that he be
meted the penalty of disbarment.
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The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga filed by complainant against respondent does not preclude a
determination of respondents culpability as a lawyer.

This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in 1985 by complainant, and old widow who deserves to find hope and
recover her confidence in the judicial system.

The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by both parties lead to only one rather unpalatable conclusion. That
respondent Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, in his professional relations with herein complainant did in fact employ unlawful, dishonest, and immoral
conduct proscribed in no uncertain terms by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, respondents actions clearly violated
Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code.

It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having committed acts in violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility,
thereby causing a great disservice to the profession, be meted the ultimate sanction of disbarment.[2]

On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanans recommendation for respondents disbarment was pending review before Executive
Vice-President and Northern Luzon Governor Teofilo Pilando, respondent filed a motion requesting for a full-blown investigation and for
invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or remedial action under Section 11, Rule 139-B, Revised Rules of Court, alleging that he had evidence
that Commissioner Cunanans report was drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno. He presented two
unsigned anonymous letters allegedly coming from a disgruntled employee of Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received these letters
in his mailbox.[3]

Respondents motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted Commissioner Cunanans report was accompanied by a
complaint praying for the disbarment of said lawyers including Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658.
After Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan filed their answers, a hearing was conducted by the Investigating Committee of the IBP
Board of Governors.

On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution [4] dismissing for lack of merit the complaint for disbarment against Attys.
Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan. And in Adm. Case No. 2797, the Board adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against herein respondent Balicanta the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 5 years for
commission of acts of misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a lawyer to gain material benefit
for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-Cordon and caused serious damage to the complainant.[5]

To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondents fraudulent acts in the very same documents he presented to exonerate himself. It
also took note of respondents contradictory and irreconcilable statements in the pleadings and position papers he submitted. However, it regarded
the penalty of disbarment as too severe for respondents misdeeds, considering that the same were his first offense.[6]

Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, [7] the said resolution in Administrative Case No. 2797 imposing the penalty of
suspension for 5 years on respondent was automatically elevated to this Court for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of the complaint
for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of
any petition for review.

This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent committed condemnable acts of deceit against his
client. The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds
entrusted to him. At the very outset, he embarked on his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and
Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. [8] As
Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19 titles that complainant and her daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed,
Farnacio Bucoy, did not appear to be a stockholder or director in the corporate records. The minutes of the meetings supposedly electing him and
Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore the signatures of respondent and the secretary only, contrary to his claim that they were signed
by the directors and stockholders.

He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9 of the properties of the corporation previously
belonging to complainant and her daughter was ratified by the stockholders owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock when in fact
only three stockholders owning 111 out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3% assented thereto. The alleged authorization granting him the power to
contract the LBP loan for Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by the required minimum of two-thirds of
80 | P a g e

the outstanding capital stock despite respondents claim to the contrary. In all these transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned
1,711 out of the 1,750 outstanding shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation. Neither were they informed thereof.

Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of these transactions.

Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly executed by complainant and her daughter for the
reason that it authorized respondent to represent complainant for only 266 shares.

Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham resolutions, he failed to explain several discrepancies in his
version of the facts. We hereby reiterate some of these statements noted by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.

First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for the required annual meetings since 1982. However,
respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang the
corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to
Jammang, when he mortgaged the 9 parcels of land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and when he sold the complainants
ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.

Second, the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board, disclosed that complainant and her daughter own
1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the outstanding capital stock of the corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds of transfer of the
properties. But respondents evidence showed that complainant had only 266 shares of stock in the corporation while her daughter had none,
notwithstanding the fact that there was nothing to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever conveyed their shares to others.

Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing the 266 shares after the lapse of 5 years from the time
the voting trust certificate was executed in 1981.[9]

The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the outstanding shares but respondent never bothered to
explain why they were never asked to participate in or why they were never informed of important corporate decisions.

Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and her daughter to his proposal to hire an accountant,
the corporation had no formal accounting of its revenues and income. However, respondents position paper maintained that there was no
accounting because the part-time bookkeeper of the corporation connived with complainant and her daughter in keeping the corporate records.

Fourth, respondents claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the operations of the corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact
that complainant and her daughter were not even present in the alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to discuss the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The truth is that he never informed them of such meeting and he never gave control of the corporation to
them.

Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:

5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint
as Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were
issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his
printed name.

It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondents stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones. [10]

Sixth, respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the
corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the investigating commission documents which were supposed to be in the official possession of the
Corporate Secretary alone such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.

Seventh, he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the establishment of the corporation that would invest the properties
of the complainant but, in his position paper, he said that it was a certain Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to put up the corporation.
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After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal
profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left
to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.

Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he thought could exculpate him were the very
same documents that revealed his immoral and shameless ways. These documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man who
knew the law and abused it for his personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and opportunism
beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [11] If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. [12] Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. [13] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality,
not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity.[14] Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. [15] This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he
is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.[16]

Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz cannot find a more relevant application than in this
case:

There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their selfish ends. In this group of men, the most dangerous
is the man of the law who has no conscience. He has, in the arsenal of his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison and disrupt society
and bring it to an ignoble end.[17]

Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.[18] He is bound to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. [19] The relation between an attorney and
his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their
clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.[20]

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these duties over
the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the
complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction.

The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set aside the veil of corporate entity. For
purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered in the name of the corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant
and her daughter. The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter. The properties
conveyed fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or mortgaged at
all. Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who may have contracted with him in good faith.

Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondents offenses cannot be adequately matched by mere
suspension as recommended by the IBP. Instead, his wrongdoings deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal and
civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.