Case No.
8108 July 15, 2014 probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the
Page1
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent
Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate
conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of
influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and
Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita
III recommended that respondent beissued a warning not to
repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the
Commission will impose a more severe penalty. The Commission
adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are
Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in
Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the
filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was
representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the "Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases
filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the
illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs.3 In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were
dropped for lack of probable cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask
clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several
media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up"
allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its
own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such
hearing that respondenthad prepared the release order for his
three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of
complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that
respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had
thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They
argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ
letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on
respondents alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall
upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respectfor legal processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that
respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in
drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public
official, even though the latter was not a government
prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozanos verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed
with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as
CBD Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution
condemning the unethical conduct of respondent and showing
unqualified support for the VACCs filing of disbarment
proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his
Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by
Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases
to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report
and recommendation. RESPONDENTS VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest
Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of
immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the
high hopes of the accused, together with their families, came
crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his
clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity
to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release
order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet,
"if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be
expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted
release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore
remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained
unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was
adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his
Comment, respondent drafted the release order specifically for
the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft
order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended
to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued
a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own
investigation into charges against members of the bar,
irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before
it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party
to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.17
As to Atty. Lozanos withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we
reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly
executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in
finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively
liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating
Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of
his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." We
believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not
limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the
justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times
demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA refused to
release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ
Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only
recourse was to see the Secretary himself personally. The
Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasihe is
very political also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken that
day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas
time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng
Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko
Page2
raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So,
what I did was thinking as a lawyer nowI prepared the staff to
make it easy, to make it convenient for signing authority that if
he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to
PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office
of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will
see the Secretary first with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay
at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 oclock or 1:30
in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor.
Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down
with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway,
sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think that
kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor,
wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga
pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usapsabi niya
okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang
kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They
were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were
discussing the case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary
Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that "because of my practice
and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father
was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and
he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they
weretogether in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete
stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A.
Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally
acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that
close.21
These statements and others made during the hearing establish
respondents admission that 1) he personally approached the
DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending
before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of
the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being
unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the
case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear
intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a
government agency. This is precisely the type of improper
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the
bar. Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that
tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of
an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith inthe judicial process is
diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the
administration of justice.1wphi1 To that end, their clients
success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the
bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the
law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which
is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to
his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall
not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07,
mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with
the laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always
be within the bounds of the law.23 A self-respecting
independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an
attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case,
we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards.
Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the
wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the
offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw
fit to impose a six-month suspension against a judge who
likewise committed acts of influence peddling whenshe solicited
P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for
her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a
pendingcase with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge
was a former court attorney of the high court.24 We find that
the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano,
Jr. is found GUILTYof violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he
is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately. This also serves as an emphaticWARNING
that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondents bar
records. The Court Administrator is hereby directed to inform the
different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment
against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's
demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her
client purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their case
which was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February
2005, he, along with his siblings engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the
case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and
Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed
that sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the
sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) from him to
expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was
over and above the parties stipulated retainer fee as evidenced
by a contract.3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was
that, a month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had
already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for
the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was
to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court.
Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were
submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received P300,000 shall be used to expedite
the case which, in turn shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said
amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same
should not be included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be
returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of P500,000 has been advanced as part of expense
[sic] to expedite the process before the courts. The said amount
has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be
reimbursed to her by her siblings upon winning the case with
finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in
Page3
Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had already
denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De
Tazas representations that the case was still pending. He tried
to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be
found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a
complaint for disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also
attached several affidavits and documents9 from other
individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing
checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana
Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit10 which was attached to the
complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks11 in her
favor amounting to P481,400.00, which were all dishonored by
the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose
Affidavit12 was attached to the complaint, averred that Atty. De
Taza issued a check13 for P50,000.00 as payment for her loan.
Said check was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against
a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an
affidavit,14 stating that Atty. De Taza owes her P29,560.39 and
failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15
informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the
country as she was joining her husband in the United States of
America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was
required by the Court to file a Comment. However, the copy of
the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal carriers
notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then
resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to
send a copy to Atty. De Tazas office address at Romero De Taza
Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned unserved with
the notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008
that the complainant inform the Court of Atty. De Tazas new
address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by
giving Atty. De Tazas new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its
Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of Court
to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007
with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the latters
U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated
December 10, 2007 with the complaint was returned; this time,
with the postal carriers notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in
its Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009, held that the said
copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to
consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing of her
comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in
which they failed to appear. Thus, the parties were directed to
file their respective position papers. The complainant, in a
letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred that he was already
residing abroad and maintained that he had already submitted
his documentary evidence at the time of the filing of his
complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position
paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De
Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the practice of
law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar
Disciplines recommendation in a Resolution24 dated January 3,
2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents demand of [P]800,000.00 to expedite
the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case
had long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.25
(Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR
RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF
HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED.
Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able
to refute the accusations against her. Numerous attempts were
made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from the
complainants allegations, but all these efforts were only met
with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an
unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she
would certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all
means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to
oppose the complainants charges. Her failure and/or refusal to
file a comment will not be a hindrance for the Court to mete out
an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings
are investigations by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is
fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
As this Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the Proceedings for
Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27
"Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required."29
Based on the documentary evidence submitted by the
complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a
propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and
incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The
complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De
Tazas involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a
closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by
her other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting
when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent
when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a
lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a
symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.
The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the
remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious
effects of such act to the public interest and public
order.1wphi1 It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Tazas actuations towards the complainant and his SO ORDERED.

Page4
siblings were even worse as she had the gall to make it appear
to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE No. 7006
expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant
amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty.
De Tazas actions are reprehensible and her greed more than SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR Present:
apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud
October 9, 2007
her client.
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose
client showing that the money was spent for that particular
Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended
29.
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.31 In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge
demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order
demand should not have even been made in the first place. dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the
Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime
the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the
of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the
following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder,
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail
authority to do so.32
under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years
himself from further trying the case because of the harsh
when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to
insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34
lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly
the same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond
lawyer who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
by counsel for the accused.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao
suspension from the practice of law for four years was the
City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated
appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client into
November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to
paying P42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of a petition
Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond
for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to
at P40,000.
his client a copy of the petition with stamped receipt from the
trial court when in reality, no such petition was filed. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded
in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003,
P14,000.00 from the complainant to be put up as injunction
respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002
bond and asked for additional sums of money on other
and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was handling the
case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent
judge denied the respondents allegations. The complainant caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting
later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as the bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao
application for a writ was already denied by the trial court. Due Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts
to the foregoing, the Court suspended the respondent from the Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, reads:
practice of law for two years.
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."37 "The Judiciary
has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further
stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable
irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to
tolerated."38 allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of
the prosecution is weak.
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from
the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously
Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence
law for two years. to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear
reason.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO YEARS with a xxx
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court
infraction would be dealt with more severely.
of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the certiorari against the judge.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by
Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be
Judge Tan.
entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.
This is the only way that the public would know that there are
Page5
judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he said.[3]
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article,
Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in
court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be
cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the
article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its
lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the
article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution
as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser
inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge
Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open
court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting
himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent
that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark
Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused
the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a
press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-
bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies,
Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.[4]
Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge
Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason,
the phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers
Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press
conference, but refused to answer whether he made the
statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion
to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him
in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.[6] The Courts Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie
clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby
ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for
obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt and admitting that the article published in the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the
Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby
adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is
hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP
is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he
does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.[7]
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from
the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order
to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented
himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and
again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts
disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause
within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held
in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court
and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule
13.02 of Canon 13.[9]
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was
interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was
repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news
program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He
was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003,
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio
interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who
does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not
accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on
December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he
was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample
time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars
in order to properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the
motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in
contempt proceedings, and that respondents actions and
statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent
neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence.
The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the
chances he asks for, and ordered him to appear on January 12,
2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in
contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order
dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in
the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents
Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge
that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30,
2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to
comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his
comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of
court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend,
Tony Consing, at the latters instance. He justified his response
during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional
right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend
or malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor
Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal
profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct,
rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for
which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao
City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to
the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further
determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]
The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape
of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed
disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang
gamayng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin
pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-
huna karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you
not changed your mind yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling
pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa
balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges
who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. Thats it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong
Page6
guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga
Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami.
Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong
jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga
inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di
mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan
siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa
balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili
sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga
Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges
who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study
everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that
when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not
know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This
judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be removed as
a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his
Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga
nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong
order given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order
sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga
bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It
states that this Order was given in open court, and in Gods
mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond.
. . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik
dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your Honor, I have
the right to appeal. Then he came back and said, BJMP, arrest
Bagabuyo.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance
of the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where
you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon
matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero
angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang
pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti
mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is
not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . .
. practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should
know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a
braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at
that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to
the case of murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . .
Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan
nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya
kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo
sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por
Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr.
Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na
ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where
all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not
accord me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made
me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me
arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant
of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats
wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your
thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No
way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone
is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due
process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita
nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be
given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa
balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan
unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan
ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang
iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence
that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from
the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is
a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is
studying mahjong.[11]
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the
bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend
respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court[12] for any of the causes mentioned in Sec.
27[13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity
to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the
requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and
Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao
City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant
the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from the
practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of
suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar
Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondents
criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002,
which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with
Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office
by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process
was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity
to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the
implementation of the trial courts order of suspension dated
February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the
repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16]
that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral
conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any
Page7
lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad
enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a
lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his
private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his
continued membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered
to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should
insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to
the proper authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he
admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he
made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on
bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated
that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article
entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18,
2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents
statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No.
5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing,
respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the
court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant
of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent
should have set the example of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica[19] held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes
fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions
which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against
erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue
and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02,
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of
violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
No costs.SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the
business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution
of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name
"CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly
known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of
tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO
and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO
ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double
B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral
conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the
courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero)
purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned
goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver
spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a
colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food
and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination
confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27,
2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as
damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the
demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy
and, in any event, "outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and
incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they
were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And
the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of
the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to
the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004,
respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of
the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang
Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 122 which complainant found to contain
articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects
to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the
articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of
the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer
earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it
down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000,
P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his
Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place
paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature
to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an
Advertising Contract5 asking complainant to advertise in the
tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at
P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program
Profile6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also
asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the
following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b)
spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13
Page8
episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page
advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000
per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the
television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting
on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his
Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and
threatened to proceed with the publication of the
articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B-
Batas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of
a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which
announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha,
meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito
yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono,
433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin
sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang
may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan.
Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver
spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan?
Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g]
contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang
mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver
spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles
which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31-
September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an
article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another
article, he wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which
appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004
issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20,
2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG
PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his
column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG
TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread,"
Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng
CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil
sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);14 (d) "Uod sa
liver spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy,"
Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong
Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa
PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j) "May uod na
CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino
sa CDO," Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m)
"Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004
(Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO,"
Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published
in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng
CDO Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his
television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV,
repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the
"same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent
and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel
under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City.
The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the
present administrative complaint.28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-
2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of
Justice,29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???)
Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed
around, waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before
this Office would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed
by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually
kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can
Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe
that justice would elude them in this Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of
their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of
the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government
office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too
many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with
reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his
much coveted position in the past distributing products of the
Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and
behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this
Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in
their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should
investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to
file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough
and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he
filed his kidnapping charge here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31
which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-
respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of
whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly
deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.32
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case
against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case
No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City
and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo
order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles
against complainant34 and to malign complainant through his
television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his
October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty.
[Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004
(Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary
Page9
restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this
Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or
file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said
plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS
QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives
or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby
restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant
case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on
plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on
respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004.
Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10
December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December
2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and
the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from
"further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter
subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the
imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products",
respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles
on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas",
2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid
"Balitang Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule
13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A
lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases
To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent
made the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts
aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor
and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent
clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in
handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit
any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by
respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is
manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and
[m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o
[j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct
[b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and
herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly
prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and
Drugs recognized that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses
Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the
consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against
herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein
complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent
published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17
December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated,
respondent continued to come out with these articles against
complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary
restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such
actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said
articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public
service, that is, to expose the defects of complainants products
to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a
baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers
that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in to
respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the
tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants
explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true
motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against
complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent
consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he
himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for
approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared
said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to
lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled
in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with
the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself
against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was
helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality.
The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least,
deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring
supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114
dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the
necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to
refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful
conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against
CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the
tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the
issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to
the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks
against complainant and its products. At the same time,
respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order,
despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal
profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by
using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
Page10
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit
of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar
to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39
(Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting
standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs
a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of
the legal profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion
cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the
therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents
services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later
find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant
paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings
prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention
listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it
cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent,
have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein
respondents motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact
that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed
falsification charges against the therein complainant.43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the
lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record
and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts.
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES,
respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY,
ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL
AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA,
COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029,
Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791,
Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had
been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura
gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court
building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the
Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.
They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set
up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and
trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They
waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took
turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud
speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been
received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as
Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees,
had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that
the demonstration must cease immediately for the same
constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would
not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were
maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a
resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab,
Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson
Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees
in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C.
Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and
Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the
Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to
SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why
he should not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals
appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas,
in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of
petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an
operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders
concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described
acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated.
He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to
the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited
persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted
under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's
leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded
by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of
about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and
not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the
picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is
usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the
guardian of the Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully
understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide
by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the
Court required the respondents to submit a written
manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on
July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this
time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by
this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of
AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30,
1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than
an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from
the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not
hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the
law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the
Page11
Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the
proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or
other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as
impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the
citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural
and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to
shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of
courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced
by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to
have justice administered by the courts, under the protection
and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5
The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an
affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the
above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at
large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers
are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and
adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of
free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution,
any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through
the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no
longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they
realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of
advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the
shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when
his attention was called by this Court, did his best to
demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and
posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all
members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of
the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum
and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders
of the importance of a continuing educational program for their
members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents
are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets
intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting
one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the
vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.
A.C. No. 6943 March 13, 2009
ATTY. GODOFREDO C. MANIPUD, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
On November 21, 2005, Atty. Godofredo C. Manipud filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista for
alleged commission of forum shopping in violation of his
attorneys oath and in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for improper conduct.
Complainant narrated that he was a mortgagee of the property
allegedly owned by Jovita de Macasieb. When the mortgagor
failed to pay despite demands, he filed an application for extra-
judicial foreclosure of the said property with the Clerk of Court
and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City.
Thereafter, a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale was issued and the
public auction was scheduled on April 1, 2005.
However, on March 22, 2005, Atty. Bautista, as counsel for the
mortgagor, filed with the Regional Trial Court a verified
complaint for "Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Notice of
Extrajudicial Sale with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order with Damages" which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2005-0107-D. The case was raffled to
Branch 41 which issued a TRO. On May 18, 2005, the trial court
issued an order denying the prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction.
Thus, upon application of complainant-mortgagee, the sheriff
caused another Notice of Extrajudicial Sale. The public auction
was scheduled on July 29, 2005. However, on July 20, 2005, Atty.
Bautista filed another case for annulment of real estate
mortgage which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2005-0253-D.
According to complainant, the two complaints for annulment of
real estate mortgage filed by respondent contained the same
allegations, involved the same parties, the same subject matter,
the same facts, the same issues and sought the same relief.
Complainant argued that the act of respondent of filing the two
complaints constitutes a clear case of forum shopping, an
improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of
justice, and a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which commands all lawyers to
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession.
Complainant also alleged that when his counsel filed a Motion to
Dismiss the second complaint on the ground of forum shopping,
respondent promptly filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
In his Comment, Atty. Bautista alleged that the filing of the
second complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial sale was a
desperate attempt on his part to restrain the sale of his clients
property; that he is not guilty of forum shopping because he did
not act willfully, maliciously and with ill-intent; that he disclosed
in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping of the second
complaint the pendency of the first complaint, as well as in
paragraphs 18, 20 and 22 of the said second complaint; that he
filed the second complaint out of pity for his client who was
about to lose her family home due to the unconscionably high
monthly interest being charged by complainant; and that his
prompt filing of a motion to withdraw the second complaint was
indicative of his good faith.
On January 29, 2007, the case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP then directed the parties to attend a
mandatory conference during which the admissions, stipulation
of facts and definition of issues, shall be taken up. After the
mandatory conference, the parties were heard and thereafter
directed to submit their respective position papers.
In his Position Paper, complainant alleged that herein
respondent, Atty. Bautista, is a nephew of Jovita de Macasieb,
the registered owner of the mortgaged property. Although the
loans which were obtained in 2003 appeared to have been
received by Jovita de Macasieb, complainant learned,
particularly on October 3, 2006, that Jovita de Macasieb has
been dead since October 16, 1968.
Complainant alleged that respondent collaborated with an
impostor in filing the two complaints for annulment of extra-
judicial sale. Although the plaintiff in said complaints was
referred to as JOVITA DE MACASIEB, the complaints however
were signed by one JOVITA MACASIEB. Complainant argued that
respondent intentionally resorted to this ploy in order to mislead
the former. Since respondent was the one who notarized both
complaints hence, he should know that JOVITA DE MACASIEB
who was his aunt, and JOVITA MACASIEB who signed both
complaints, are two different persons. Complainant averred that
respondents act of resurrecting a dead person not once but
twice for the purpose of unjustly enriching themselves
demonstrates a character not befitting a member of the legal
profession.
In his Reply to complainants Position Paper, respondent alleged
that the only issue for resolution before the IBP is whether he
violated the rule on forum shopping; that assuming the IBP
could validly take cognizance of other issues, still it was
complainants fault that he transacted with an impostor; and
that he did not know the person of Jovita Macasieb until the
Page12
latter hired his services as lawyer.
In the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, she found that
respondent is not administratively liable for lack of showing that
the filing of the second complaint was done deliberately and
willfully to commit forum shopping. Thus:
To merit disciplinary action, forum shopping must be willful and
deliberate. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that,
should there be any pending action or claim before any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, a complete statement of its
status should be given.
In the present case, respondent explained his actions in this
wise:
In the second complaint the respondent called the attention of
the Court that there was a pending (sic) between the parties,
Civil Case No. 2005-178. Hence, the purpose is not to obtain
favorable decision, but to have the issue resolved in Civil Case
No. 2005-178. To bring home his point, the respondent attached
as Annex "E" the first complaint.
The respondent should not be blamed for the institution of the
second complaint. He was misled by the very act of the
complainant. Complainant had filed the application for
foreclosure on December 20, 2004. This was the subject of Civil
Case No. 178. All that he had to do was request the sheriff with
whom he had filed the application to proceed with the
foreclosure. There is absolutely no need for complainant to
make a second application. In making the second application, it
was impressed upon the mind of the respondent that it was
another foreclosure.
In sum, respondent acted in good faith in filing the second
complaint since it was established that it was his immediate
reaction upon finding out that a second application for
extrajudicial foreclosure was filed. If, indeed, there was intent to
commit forum-shopping, he would not have alleged in the
second complaint the fact of filing of the first complaint and
attached a copy of the same.
The objective of the rule against forum-shopping was cited in
Municipality of Taguig, et al vs. Court of Appeals. Said the
Supreme Court
What is truly important to consider in determining whether
forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts
and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
In this case, no undue vexation was caused to the Court and
petitioner as the fact of filing of the first case was alleged in the
second complaint and secondly, soon thereafter, inasmuch as
both cases were raffled to the same branch, the first case was
dismissed by the said Court. Hence, there was no danger of
different courts ruling on the same issues.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended
that the Complaint against respondent ATTY. FELICIANO C.
BAUTISTA be dismissed for lack of merit. (Citations omitted)
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in a Resolution dated February 6, 2008.1avvphi1
On June 2, 2008, complainant filed before this Court a Comment
on the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors with Motion for
Reinvestigation. He claimed that forum shopping was not the
sole issue raised for resolution but also respondents alleged
violation of the Oath of Attorney in relation to the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for improper conduct. He
argued that the IBP should have also discussed and resolved
respondents act of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb
from the dead and for allowing an impostor to impersonate the
dead.
The Court notes that in paragraphs 1-10 of the complaint filed
by Atty. Manipud before this Court, he narrated the antecedents
which led to the filing of two complaints for annulment of
extrajudicial sale by herein respondent. Then, in paragraphs 11-
19, complainant concluded that respondents acts amounted to
forum shopping. Clearly, respondent is thus being charged only
with commission of forum shopping in violation of his attorneys
oath and in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and for improper conduct.
Even assuming to be true complainants allegation that he only
learned on October 3, 2006, that the mortgagor, Jovita de
Macasieb, has been dead since 1968, still he failed to raise this
issue at the Mandatory Conference before the IBP where the
issues were defined. The transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the mandatory conference on September 13, 2007, long
after complainant allegedly knew of the death of Jovita de
Macasieb, shows that respondents act of allegedly resurrecting
Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and for allowing an impostor
to impersonate the dead was never raised as an issue, thus:
ATTY. DECANO:
The proceeding before this Honorable Commissioner is whether
there was a forum shopping.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Yes, the issue so will determine the relevance of that if you have
any objection.
ATTY. DECANO:
There is therefore a relevant because it appears thru a
representation
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Yes, will be noted. State your objection.
ATTY. DECANO:
It is irrelevant, immaterial and is being of .
ATTY. MANIPUD:
Your Honor, I would like to mark as Exhibit "D" is the National
Statistics Office showing that the plaintiff which was the
counselrespondent is already dead in October 16, 1968 to
prove that the first complaint and the second complaint is
tainted with fraud, Your Honor, and in violation of this attorneys
oath of office.
ATTY. DECANO:
We object vigorously because that is not an issue before this
Honorable Commission.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
That is why paero we are here for admissions, stipulation of
facts, and definition of issues.
ATTY. MANIPUD:
Yes, but, Your Honor,
COMM. QUISUMBING:
We have to start first with the admissions and then we can
proceed with the stipulations and issues. We can stipulate
ultimately on what issue is before this Commission. It is not for
the Commission to rule on those matters that you are presenting
paero.
ATTY. MANIPUD:
But it will had include this, Your Honor, in order to avoid nor
filing of multiplicity of suit because if its that taken in this forum
then another case will be filed.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
It is not the proper forum, paero. We are only limited on the
issues that pertains to the conduct of among selves as a lawyer
so we may proceed with the admissions and stipulations of facts With respect to the mortgagor, Your Honor, it is settled, Your

Page13
and issues. Honor, but with respect to this case, Your Honor, its not yet
settled.
ATTY. MANIPUD:
COMM. QUISUMBING:
I think the 2 complaints and the Motion to Dismiss are
documentary evidence to support forum shopping that I have So, let us reiterate the 2 issues now. Counsel whether there is
marked.1 forum shopping and number 2?

xxxx ATTY. DECANO:

ATTY. DECANO: Whether the settlement of the Civil Case No. 2005-0107
between Jovita Macasieb and Godofredo C. Manipud has put an
The other allegations in this proposed stipulation of facts for end to any controversy about whether there is forum shopping
being immaterial and irrelevant. already.1avvphi1

COMM. QUISUMBING: ATTY. MANIPUD:

Youre not stipulating that respondent and plaintiff Jovita de No, the forum shopping is beside the issue, Your Honor, as far as
Macasieb the indebtedness is concern it is a third.

ATTY. DECANO: COMM. QUISUMBING:

Because this is a new issue and the Supreme Court delegated That is on record so there is only one issue to be resolve here.
the Commissioner to subscribe only on the issues. Well, that concludes with the admissions, stipulation of facts and
definition of issues. x x x3
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Thus, since respondents act of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de
Okay, that is the rule paero. You have already submitted your
Macasieb from the dead and for allowing an impostor to
stipulation of facts lets now go to the issues.
impersonate the dead was never raised as an issue before this
ATTY. MANIPUD: Court or the IBP, then complainant could not raise the same in
this late stage of the proceedings. Moreover, we note that
Whether or not respondent violated the rule on forum shopping. complainant, in his Comment on the Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors with Motion for Reinvestigation filed before this
COMM. QUISUMBING: Court, failed to assail the findings and resolution of the IBP with
regard to the issue on forum shopping. As such, we find no
How about number 2? reason to disturb the same.
ATTY. MANIPUD: ACCORDINGLY, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-58 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines DISMISSING the complaint for alleged
Whether or not he violated Rule 1, Section 1 of Canon 1 of the
commission of forum shopping in violation of his attorneys oath
Code of Professional Responsibility.
and in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
ATTY. DECANO: Responsibility, and for improper conduct filed by Atty. Godofredo
C. Manipud against Atty. Feliciano M. Baustista, is AFFIRMED.
We have deny that because that is a .
A.C. No. 3731 September 7, 2007
ATTY. MANIPUD:
MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, complainant,
Whether or not respondent violated his attorneys oath?
vs.
ATTY. DECANO:
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.
We deny that.

ATTY. MANIPUD:
The Case
Whether or not respondent shall be disbarred or
administratively On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent)
COMM. QUISUMBING: for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding
final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and
Lets now proceed with the respondent.2 of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those
final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an
xxxx
administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory
COMM. QUISUMBING: tactics."

You can discuss that later on in the position paper, we are here
for stipulation. How about the issues paero?
ATTY. DECANO:
The issue is, whether there is a forum shopping.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Okay, so there is only one issue that to be resolved here,
paero, whether the respondent committed forum shopping.
ATTY. DECANO:
The other issue that we would like to maintain is whether the
settlement of the case I think complainant and the respondent
has put an end to this case.
ATTY. MANIPUD:
The Facts
Complainant alleged the following:
1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform who
represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases
which raised the same issues.1 Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee
of a land owned by complainants spouse and sister-in-law
(landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against
Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from
agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
rendered judgment ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the
payment of disturbance compensation.2 The RTCs judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals3 and the Supreme Court.4
2. Respondent, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for
Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. The RTC
dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of
Page14
action.5
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The
case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance
compensation.6
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since she misused the rules of
procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the
administration of justice.7
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the complaint lodged against her.8
After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit
Comment,9 respondent submitted her Comment alleging the
following:
1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not
authorized to prosecute the disbarment suit.10
2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorneys Oath"
and performed duties in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court.11
3. Respondents client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal
remedies to obtain benefits secured for him by law.12
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant
alleged that respondent did not confront the issues of her
disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon
with finality by the courts.13
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10 days from notice.14
On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June
1992 stating that respondent failed to comply with the 25 March
1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.15
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause
why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for failure
to comply with the Courts 25 March 1992 Resolution. The Court
also required respondent to Comment on the complainants 2
June 1992 Manifestation.16
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging
that she had substantially complied with the Courts orders
relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had
transferred to the Public Attorneys Office and since she was no
longer a "BALA lawyer," the cases involved in this proceeding
had become moot and academic.17
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the
administrative case against respondent "has not been mooted
and nothing set out in her Manifestation excuses her failure to
obey this Courts Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October
1992."18 The Court had also resolved to impose a fine of P500
or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to
comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992
Resolutions.19
On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating
that respondent had not complied with the Courts orders.20
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering
the arrest of respondent for detention at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that
respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7
October 1992 Resolutions.21
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI
detained respondent for five days and released her on 25
October 1993.22
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for hearing
and decision.23
On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder.
Respondent claimed that complainant had no legal personality
to file this case.24 Respondent also alleged that she was merely
protecting the interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in
her oath of office. Respondent contended that "she had
comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of
being disciplined by the latter if only to impart truth and
justice."25
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C.
Jose (Investigating Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and
recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose
enumerated respondents violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue the practice of
law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which
amounted to an obstruction of justice.26
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The
duplication or multiplication of suits should be avoided,27 and
respondents acts were tantamount to forum-shopping which is
a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and
proceedings.28
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at
everybody during the hearing on 25 May 1995.29 The want of
intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language used.
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of
IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30 March 1996. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating
Commissioner Joses recommendation that respondent be
"suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for Unethical
Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible
character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the
Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to
continue in the practice of law."30 Governor Angel R. Gonzales
recommended her "outright disbarment."31
In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP
Resolution suspending respondent indefinitely.32
On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to circularize the
resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending
respondent indefinitely from the practice of law.33
On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-99 informing all courts that
respondent had been suspended indefinitely.
On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the
Case Closed and Terminated. Respondent apologized for her
demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted.34
On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the
case to the IBP for report and recommendation.35
On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B.
Raval (Investigating Commissioner Raval) conducted a hearing.
Respondent claimed that she did not receive any notice of the
OCAs Circular on her indefinite suspension.36 Respondent
alleged that the Court Resolution which she received merely
noted the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension.37
Respondent claimed that she only knew of the suspension when
she filed an application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong
City.38
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to
practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City despite her
suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in
the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an implementation
of the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension.39
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another
hearing was held on 19 September 2003. Complainants counsel
asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of
her suspension and this constituted a violation of the suspension
order which she wanted to be lifted.40 Investigating
Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground
to lift the suspension order.41 Respondent requested that her
detention for five days at the NBI be converted into a five-year
suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she
would have served five years of indefinite suspension.42
Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to
Page15
file simultaneously their Verified Position Papers.43
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that
respondents motion did not state valid grounds to convince the
Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by
continuing to practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the
Supreme Court by showing that she can hoodwink another
branch of government."44 Complainant also prayed for
respondents disbarment due to the gravity of her offense.45
In respondents Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant
is not the real party-in-interest since the property that was
litigated was owned by complainants wife. She asserted that
she never betrayed her clients cause, she was never unfaithful
to her oath, and it was complainant who filed this case for
harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered
closed and terminated due to lack of merit.46
Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner
Raval and attached a copy of a Resolution in a Preliminary
Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended
that in this Preliminary Investigation case, she recommended its
dismissal because the offended party was not the real party-in-
interest.47
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the
personality to file the disbarment complaint against her; hence,
it should have been dismissed outright.48
After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April
2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Ravals
Report and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for
her "manifest flagrant misconduct in disobeying the SC Order of
her Indefinite Suspension."49
As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP
Resolution No. XII-96-149 which recommended respondents
indefinite suspension. "The term noted means that the Court
has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or
declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or
rendering a decision on the matter it does not imply
agreement or approval."50 Hence, the penalty of indefinite
suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not
attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this
complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the
evidence on record sufficient to support the IBPs findings.
However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on
respondent.
Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis51
and they belong to a class of their own.52 They are neither civil
nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of its officer.53 They involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance.54
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the
administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. This
Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable,
and reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence.55
"Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or
suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as
officers of the Court."56
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension
proceedings.57
The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply
with the Courts lawful orders in two instances:
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was
required to file a rejoinder within 10 days from notice. However,
she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after
she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the
Courts order.
2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was
required to comment on complainants manifestation. She
instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or almost
four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged
that she had substantially complied with the Courts orders.
However, the Court in its 1 March 1993 Resolution stated that
nothing set out in respondents manifestation excused her
failure to obey the Courts Resolutions.
These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 13858 of the Rules of
Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders
of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution.59 Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively."60 Respondents obstinate refusal
to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof."61
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment
for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold
the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.62
Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a
Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross
misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part
of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is
prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is generally
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional
purpose."63
In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,64 the Court held that failure to comply
with the Courts directive to comment on a letter-complaint
constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect.
In Cuizon v. Macalino,65 a lawyers failure to comply with the
Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his comment was one of
the infractions that merited his disbarment.
Furthermore, respondents defenses are untenable. Firstly,
respondent contends that complainant is not the real party-in-
interest since the property that was litigated was owned by
complainants wife. The Court is not persuaded with this
defense.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil
proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the
suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who
called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in
no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome."66 "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not
terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer."67
In Heck v. Santos,68 the Court held that "any interested person
or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings."
The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to
clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered
Page16
injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is
the proof or failure of proof of the charges.69
Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the
legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v. Tiamson,70 the Court
enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients
rights, they should not forget that they are first and foremost,
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice." Respondents act
of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the
final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. "To permit
lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of
the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the
purposes of the state the administration of justice."71
Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts.
Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed cases for Specific
Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality
of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same
issues. The Court held that "an important factor in determining
the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs.72 Indeed, "while a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the
expense of truth and administration of justice."73
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds
of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed
other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the
Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the proscription in
Canon 19.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case,
respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court
orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as
an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and
the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer
if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Respondent
also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Her suspension is consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE
YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
[A.C. No. 6084. September 3, 2003]
FELICITAS BERBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. WENCESLAO
BARCELONA, respondent.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed
by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts
and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the profession.[1]
In a sworn Affidavit-Complaint dated March 11, 1999 filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant Felicitas
Berbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona for
Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer,
Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.[2] Complainant
alleges:
1. I am one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, owner of a
244-hectare lot situated at Alabang, Muntinlupa, which property
is being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp. in a case pending with
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
Quezon City. The heirs of REH has appointed Mr. PORFIRIO DAEN
as their attorney-in-fact giving him authority to prosecute the
case for and in their behalf.
2. On January 26, 1999, Mr. Porfirio Daen was arrested by a
Muntinlupa police on the strength of an expired warrant of
arrest-it was issued on February 1990-and subsequently
detained at the Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan, Muntinlupa City,
until his release on February 18, 1999.
3. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his
release from incarceration, we tried to look for one. We told our
friend Naty Sibuya, about the predicament of Mr. Daen, who
recommended Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to us, his wife being
Natys cousin/relative.
4. So on January 26, 1999, at about 10:30 in the evening, Atty.
Wenceslao Barcelona arrived at the Muntinlupa City Jail and
conferred with Mr. Daen. We learned later that Mr. Daen has
engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for the latter to secure
the release of the former from prison. After their conversation,
Atty. Barcelona told us that if you could produce the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos he will cause the release
of Mr. Daen from prison the following day. I told him that it was
already late in the evening and I cannot any more produce the
amount. But he insisted that I must produce even just a small
amount. So, what I did was ask my relatives who were with me
at the time to contribute and we were able to raise FIFTEEN
THOUSAND SEVEN-HUNDRED (P15,700.00) Pesos. In the
meantime, Atty. Barcelona proceeded to Chowking Restaurant
which is just located across the city jail where he waited for us
there.
5. At the aforesaid restaurant, I handed to Atty. Barcelona the
amount who accepted the same. He reiterated his promise to
secure the release of Mr. Daen the following day. Before he left,
he asked us to meet him at Max Restaurant at around 12:00
noon at EDSA Crossing. He thereafter left because according to
him, he would go and see somebody, (a justice) from the
Supreme Court who could help the release of Mr. Daen. It was
already about 12:30 in the early morning of January 27, 1999.
6. As agreed upon, I, together with Romana Soriano, proceeded
to Max Restaurant. We arrived at around 12:00 noon. Atty.
Barcelona came at around 1:00 P.M. He even told us that he just
came from the Supreme Court where he fixed the case of Mr.
Daen. It surprised me though, that he did not have with him any
single document at the time. Then, I handed him a pay-to-cash
check for TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND (P24,000.00) Pesos, dated
January 29, 1999. We told him that the check may be encashed
on the said date. Although, he said that the Justices of the
Supreme Court do not accept check he nonetheless, accepted it
saying that he will have the same rediscounted. We thereafter
left.
7. The following morning, January 28, 1999, at around 7:00
oclock Atty. Barcelona called me up by phone to say that since
he was unable to have the check rediscounted, I must produce
the amount of P5,000.00 and give the amount to him at Max
Restaurant at EDSA Crossing at around 12:00 noon. We were
unable to meet him because we arrived at about 1:00 oclock
already. Nonetheless, we waited for him until 3:00 in the
afternoon. Thereafter, I called him through his pager saying that
we were waiting for him at Max. I also called up our house and
inquire (sic) if a lawyer has called up. I was able to talk to my
husband who informed me that a certain Atty. Barcelona called
up. That Atty. Barcelona wanted to meet us at McDonalds at
Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong. So we rushed to the place but he
was not there. I again paged him informing him that we were
already at McDonalds and to return my call through my cell
phone. After a while, his wife called up to inform us to proceed
to their house which was just five houses away from McDonalds.
Page17
When we reached their house, we were met by his daughter
who called her mother. We were ushered inside the house and
after introducing ourselves, we gave not only P5,000.00, but
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos in cash to his wife in the
presence of his daughter. Then we went to Putatan, Muntinlupa,
hoping that he might be there.
8. We arrived at Putatan, Muntinlupa at around 4:30 in the
afternoon and there we saw Atty. Barcelona. We informed him
that we left the P10,000.00 with his wife at their house. Since
Atty. Barcelona informed us that he could not secure the release
of Mr. Daen because the check had not been encashed, Mr. Gil
Daen, a nephew of Porfirio Daen, gave him FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000.00) Pesos in cash. I also gave him an additional
P1,000.00 for his gasoline expenses.
9. The next time that we saw Atty. Barcelona was on February 3,
1999, Wednesday at around 6:00 in the evening at Putatan,
Muntinlupa. He informed us that he just came from the city jail
where he had a conversation with Mr. Daen. He told us that he is
going to release Mr. Daen from prison tomorrow, February 4,
1999. However, in the morning of February 4, we learned from
the wife of Atty. Barcelona when she returned my call that her
husband had left for Mindanao early that morning on board a
private plane owned by Chiongbian allegedly to attend a peace
talk with the Muslims.
10. After more than a week, I went to Putatan, Muntinlupa,
because I was informed by the son of Mr. Daen that he saw Atty.
Barcelona there. When I saw him, I confronted him about his
undertaking to release Mr. Daen from prison, but he only
advised us not to worry and promised (again) that he will return
the entire amount of P64,000.00 more or less, on Thursday,
February 18, 1999. But I never saw him again since then. I have
repeatedly paged him to return my call but he never returned
any of my calls.[3]
In an Order dated April 15, 1999, Investigating Commissioner J.
Virgilio A. Bautista of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP, required respondent to submit his answer to the complaint,
with a warning that he will be considered in default and the case
will be heard ex parte, if he fails to do so.[4] Despite due notice,
[5] respondent failed to file his answer. Thus, complainant filed a
motion to declare respondent in default,[6] resolution of which
was held in abeyance by the Investigating Commissioner who
required the parties to appear for hearing before the
Commission on August 13, 1999.[7] On said date, respondent
again failed to appear despite due receipt of notice.[8]
Commissioner Bautista was thus constrained to consider
respondent in default and complainant was allowed to present
her evidence ex parte. Complainant testified and affirmed under
oath the truthfulness and veracity of her Affidavit-Complaint.[9]
Complainant also manifested that she will present the check in
the amount of P24,000.00[10] at the next date of hearing.
Further hearings were set by the Commissioner, on October 1,
1999, November 19, 1999, October 12, 2001, December 14,
2001 and June 28, 2002, but both parties failed to appear on
said dates despite due notice.[11]
Commissioner Bautista submitted his Final Report and
Recommendation on December 23, 2002 finding respondent
guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending that respondent
be disbarred and ordered to return to complainant the amount
of P64,000.00. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
Commissioner Bautistas findings but reduced the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for six years.
The Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governors in reducing
the penalty and upholds the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Bautista. Under the facts established by
complainant, respondent should not only be suspended, but
disbarred from practice.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish
the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from
the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar.[12]
In In re Almacen, the Court expounded on the nature of
disbarment proceedings, viz.:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis .
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest
is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. . . .[13]
As in the Ricafort case,[14] herein respondent chose to forget
that by swearing the lawyers oath, he became a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the
fair and impartial administration of justice a vital function of
democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.[15] In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[16] Considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.[17]
Complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint
and testimony before the Commission attesting to the truth of
the allegations laid down in her affidavit. Commissioner Bautista
and the IBP Board of Governors found her testimony together
with her affidavit sufficient to support the finding that
respondent committed the acts complained of . The matter of
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best done by
the investigating body (which in this case is the Investigating
Commissioner) because unlike appellate courts, it can weigh
such testimony in light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
the witnesses at the trial.[18] Witnesses are weighed not
numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may suffice if
trustworthy and reliable.[19]
The non-presentation of the check given to respondent does not
affect complainants case as it will merely serve to corroborate
her testimony and there is no law which requires that the
testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except where
the law expressly mandates such corroboration[20] which is not
so required in administrative cases.
The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the
hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due
notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Thus,
the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the
Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of several Canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
Page18
collected or received for or from the client.
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law,
legal processes and the courts but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal
processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession
by taking money from a client under the pretext of having
connections with a Member of this Court.
The Court has taken into consideration the penalties imposed in
other administrative cases involving similar offenses, e. g.:
In Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr.,[21] the respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for one month for failing to
promptly report and remit the amount of P16,500.00 he
received on behalf of his client.
In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza,[22] the respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for six months for charging his clients
the amount of P15,980.00 as filing fees when in fact no such
fees were due.
In Dumadag vs. Lumaya,[23] the Court ordered the indefinite
suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount
of P4,344.00 that he had received pursuant to an execution.
In Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty. Naldoza,[24]
the respondent was disbarred for obtaining from his client the
amount of US$2,555.00 allegedly as cash bond in an appealed
case before this Court, when in fact no such amount has been
paid or that the Court required such payment.
In the present case, respondent collected money from the
complainant and the nephew of the detained person in the total
amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee
through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme
Court. He deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law.
This is not the first time that respondent has been charged with
and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Gil T.
Aquino vs. Atty. Wenceslao C. Barcelona,[25] respondent
misrepresented to the complainant that he could secure the
restructuring of the complainants loan with the PNB through his
connection with a certain Gonzalo Mericullo, legal assistant in
the PNB. Based on such misrepresentation, respondent asked
and received the amount of P60,000.00 from the complainant
allegedly to be paid to the PNB. It turned out that there was no
such employee in the PNB by the name Gonzalo Mericullo and
the complainants property was eventually foreclosed. As in the
present case, respondent did not appear before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline despite receipt of the notices sent
and duly received by him. After due proceedings, the IBP Board
of Governors found respondent guilty of professional
misconduct, and recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law for six months and ordered to render the
accounting and restitute whatever remained of the P60,000.00
to the complainant. The Court adopted such finding and
recommendation and respondent was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for six months, effective immediately.
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting
to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief
they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be
given to such connections. In this case, respondent
misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of
Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court
Justice. Not only that, respondent even had the audacity to tell
complainant that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not
accept checks.
In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public
contempt. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,[26]
the Court expounded on a lawyers duty to the courts, viz.:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself,
and instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.
[People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is
to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he
owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. Faith in the courts a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice is a disastrous to the continuity of the government and to
the attainment of the liberties of the people. [Malcolm Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said a lawyer
that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal
profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial
system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible
and cannot be tolerated. Respondent made a mockery of the
Judiciary and further eroded public confidence in courts and
lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in the Aquino case
and in the present case. More so, when he misrepresented to
complainant that he has connections with a Member of the
Court to accommodate his client and that Justices of the Court
accept money. Indubitably, he does not deserve to remain a
member of the Bar any minute longer.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance
of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power
over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not
only a right but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect
and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.[27]
WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C.
Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further
directed to return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the amount
of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P64,000.00) within thirty (30)
days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies hereof be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondents personal record; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of
Justice; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the
land for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 5955 September 8, 2009
JOHN CHRISTEN S. HEGNA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, Respondent.
Before this Court is a letter-complaint1 dated June 3, 2002, filed
by complainant John Christen S. Hegna with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) against respondent Atty. Goering G.C.
Paderanga for deliberately falsifying documents, which caused
delay in the execution of the decision rendered by the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8, Cebu City, in Civil Case
No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip.
Herein complainant was the lessee of a portion of Lot No. 5529,
situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, which was owned
by the heirs of Sabina Baclayon. The heirs of Baclayon, through
their representative Gema Sabandija, entered into a contract of
lease with complainant for a period of ten (10) years,
commencing from June 26, 1994, with a rental of P3,000.00 per
year, or P250.00 per month.
On September 26, 2001, complainant filed a complaint for
forcible entry against therein defendants docketed as Civil Case
No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip,
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8 of Cebu
City. In said complaint, he alleged that in about the second week
of March 1996, therein defendants entered the vacant portion of
the leased premises by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; destroyed the barbed wire enclosing the
leased premises of complainant, then built a shop on the said
premises without complainants consent. He averred that
Page19
despite his demands upon therein defendants to vacate the
premises and demolish the structure built thereon, the latter
failed and refused to comply.2
When therein defendants failed to file their Answer, complainant
filed a motion that judgment be rendered in default.
On December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor
of complainant, ordering therein defendants to vacate the
leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory
damages for illegal occupation and use of the subject property,
as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court directs judgment against Defendants
MR. & MRS. ELISEO PANAGUINIP and directs them to vacate Lot
No. 5529 over the portion in an area of 1,596 square meters
thereof, as leased to herein Plaintiff, situated at Barangay Quiot
Pardo, Cebu City, and to pay Plaintiff the sum of PESOS: ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000) per month from the second week of March
1996 until the present date by way of compensatory damages
for the illegal occupation and use of the contested property,
subject to 12% annual legal interest until fully paid, and
thereafter pay the same amount per month until they vacate the
subject property hereof, and to further pay Plaintiff the sum of
P5,000.00 by way of Attorneys Fees, and the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.3
On February 8, 2002, the MTCC granted the Motion for Execution
of Judgment filed by complainant, and issued a Writ of Execution
on February 18, 2002.
On February 21, 2002, Sheriff Edilberto Suarin of the MTCC,
Branch 8 of Cebu City levied on certain personal properties of
therein defendants.4
On March 1, 2002, therein defendants requested the
complainant to move for the dismissal of the complaint against
them so as to prevent the issuance of the writ of execution
thereon. While therein defendants wanted to amicably settle the
case, however, they failed to mention the proposed settlement
amount stated in the decision dated December 21, 2001.
Subsequently, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim5 dated March 5, 2002 before
Sheriff Suarin, the sheriff executing the judgment in the said
civil case. In the said affidavit, respondent claimed that he was
the owner of Lot No. 3653-D-1 and a FUSO (Canter series)
vehicle, which he bought from therein defendants on November
27, 2001,6 and December 12, 2001,7 respectively, both of
which could be erroneously levied by a writ of execution issued
in the civil case.
On April 3, 2002, Sheriff Suarin tried to levy therein defendants
parcel of land and motor vehicle, but failed to do so because of
the third- party claim filed by respondent.8 Subsequently, on
April 24, 2002, respondent filed a Complaint9 for Annulment of
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO) with damages against
complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of
Cebu City, docketed as Case No. CEB-27614, entitled Mr. Eliseo
Panaguinip, Mrs. Ma. Teresa Panaguinip and Goering G.C.
Paderanga v. John Hegna, Mila Hegna, Judge Edgemelo C.
Rosales and Edilberto R. Suarin.
In an Order10 dated May 13, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the MTCC to desist from further
proceeding with the civil case, and the Sheriff to desist from
conducting a public auction of the levied properties of therein
defendants. The RTC subsequently dismissed respondents
complaint for annulment of judgment in its Decision11 dated
June 29, 2006.
In a letter dated June 3, 2002, filed with the OBC, complainant
alleged that he was filing a complaint against respondent for
"deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible
denial of justice to be served in Civil Case No. R-45146." He
alleged that after the decision in the said civil case was
rendered, therein defendants called him on the telephone,
requesting the stay of the execution of judgment, as the latter
would be settling their accounts within ten days, but they failed
to comply.
On March 14, 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint12 for
falsification of public documents against respondent; false
testimony and perjury against therein defendants; and
falsification under paragraph 6, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code against Atty. Elena Marie Madarang, notary public, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. Anent the
complaint against respondent, complainant averred that the
third-party claim was full of irregularities, to wit: (a) the Deed of
Absolute Sale involving Lot No. 3653-D-1, covered by TCT No. T-
11127, dated November 27, 2001, had no record of transfer in
the Register of Deeds of Cebu City; (b) the registration of the
motor vehicle allegedly owned by respondent by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 21, 2001 did not reflect
any change of ownership from May 4, 2001; (c) the two Deeds of
Absolute Sale dated November 27, 2001 and December 21,
2001 showed that both were notarized under Series of 2000 of
the notary public; (d) Notarial Register No. 177 on page 37, Book
II showed erasures and tampering done by substituting the
intended entry of Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Person to a
Deed of Absolute Sale under the names of the spouses Eliseo
and Ma. Teresa Panaguinip, therein defendants, representing the
sale of Lot No. 3653-D-1 under TCT No. 11127; and Notarial
Register No. 188 on Page 39, Book II of Atty. Madarang also had
tampering and erasures, as the entry of Affidavit of Loss was
substituted with a Deed of Absolute Sale under the name of Ma.
Teresa Panaguinip representing the sale of the FUSO (Canter
series); and (e) the Community Tax Certificate number
appearing in both Deeds of Absolute Sale was actually issued to
another person, not to therein defendant Ma. Teresa Panaguinip.
On April 28, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against respondent for lack of prima facie evidence
of guilt, as the allegations therein were similar to the instant
administrative complaint.13
In his Comment14 dated April 29, 2003 on the administrative
complaint filed against him, respondent argued that he did not
falsify any document and maintained that he had already
satisfactorily explained the irregularities before the Office of the
City Prosecutor. He added that the genuineness and due
execution of the deeds of sale had not been affected by the fact
that he failed to register the same. Also, he alleged that the
MTCC Decision dated December 21, 2001 was unjust and void
due to lack of jurisdiction, and for being based on spurious
claims.
In a Resolution15 dated July 9, 2003, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision
within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.
On November 21, 2003, the parties appeared in a mandatory
preliminary conference and, upon termination thereof, were
ordered to submit their respective verified position papers within
ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted
for resolution.16 Complainant and respondent submitted their
position papers on December 11, 2003,17 and December 2,
2003,18 respectively.
On June 1, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
submitted his Report and Recommendation, which contained the
following observations:
III. FINDINGS:
Based on the resolution of the City Prosecutors office in Cebu
City, the complaint against the Panaguinip spouses and Attys.
Paderanga and Madarang (the notary public) was dismissed for
lack of prima facie of guilt. Such resolution is accorded great
weight but certainly not conclusive considering the
administrative nature of this instant complaint. In criminal
prosecutions, a prima facie evidence is necessary but in this
instant case, substantial evidence is all that [is] necessary to
support a guilty verdict.
According to the Respondent, it was perfectly normal for him to
obtain properties without registering the same under his own
name. In his Position Paper, he even cited several other
transactions where he merely possessed Deeds of Sale but not
Certification of Registration or Transfer Certificates of Title. He
Page20
alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left
these properties in the name of the previous owner. The alleged
discrepancies in the notarization were fully explained as well.
The notary public explained that the erasures in her Notarial
Register were made to correct mistakes so that entries will
speak the truth. These corrections include the entries under
entry number 177 to indicate the correct entry which was the
Deed of Sale executed [by] the spouses Panaguinip. The original
entry, Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons, was actually
notarized but was later cancelled at the request of the same
affiants. The full explanation of these affiants, very doubtful and
highly suspect, was nevertheless taken into consideration by the
Prosecutor for reasons known only to him. The Respondents also
managed to convince the Cebu Prosecutor that the discrepancy
in the Residence Certificates was due to human error!
Not necessarily disagreeing with the findings of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City, the Resolution dismissing the case for
falsification is not entirely convincing. There were certainly
evidentiary matters which could have been better addressed by
a judge, namely, the affidavit of the secretary of the notary
public, the explanation in the incorrect entries in notarial
register, the affidavit of the two (2) witnesses who sought the
cancellation of their original affidavit, and the explanation of
Paderanga himself regarding the difference in the dates.
Complainant is a layman who filed his own Position Paper
unaided by counsel while Respondent is a lawyer. Nevertheless,
Complainant managed to present one (1) piece of evidence not
squarely addressed by Respondent Paderanga: the letter
handwritten by Respondents clients, written in Cebuano, asking
the Complainant for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the
forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if
indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties
owned by the Panaguinip spouses to their lawyer, Respondent
Paderanga. This letter, attached to the Complaint, was never
refuted in any way by Respondent Paderanga who may have
skirted the issue by inadvertence or by design. The letter dated
March 1, 2002 indicates that the Panaguinip spouses still believe
and assert ownership over these properties despite the
existence of a Deed of Sale allegedly dated March 5, 2002.
Complainant also went further by attaching an Affidavit by a
Third Person who stated that the Panaguinip spouses still assert
ownership over the parcel of land and vehicle.
Moreover, Complainant alleged that Respondent invited him
consecutive times after the issuance of the writ of execution in
the lower court; the first was at the Majestic Restaurant, the
second was at Club Cebu at Waterfront Hotel. There was an offer
to settle the judgment award of P100,000. During the first
meeting, the offer was P3,000, on the second meeting, this time
with the Panaguinip spouses, the offer was P10,000. When
Complainant refused to settle with Respondent, he received a
copy of the Affidavit of Third-Party Claim a few days later.
The parties did not stipulate this particular issue; however, this
Commissioner feels that for the final disposition of this case, it is
worthy to mention Article 1491 of the Civil Code. It specifically
states that:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigations or levied upon execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
xxx
This is a classic case where a lawyer acquired the interests of
his client in certain properties subject for execution. Regardless
of the courts apparent lack of jurisdiction, Respondent
Paderanga acquired the two (2) matters subject for execution in
the forcible entry case in violation of [the] Canon of Legal Ethics.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest
or litigation over it in court, but also the moment that becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge. x x x
In all likelihood, although Complainant failed to get a favorable
resolution from the City Prosecutors office in Cebu City, the
Affidavit of Third Party Claim was simulated to defeat the rights
of Complainant herein. It is immaterial that the decision of the
lower court granting a judgment award was subsequently
reversed or nullified. It is immaterial that the City Prosecutor did
not find a prima facie case of falsification. The fact remains that
there was a MULTITUDE of irregularities surrounding the
execution of the Affidavit and, coupled with the letter sent by
the Panaguinip spouses left unrebutted by Respondent
Paderanga, there is substantial evidence that the Affidavit of
Third Party Claim was purposely filed to thwart the enforcement
of the decision in the forcible entry case.
It is worthy to note that the proceedings before the prosecutors
office did not take into consideration the handwritten letter from
the Panaguinip spouses. For whatever reason, Complainant did
not present such letter, which if he did, the prosecutor may
come up with a different resolution.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
While Complainant cannot fully prove the existence of falsity in
the execution of the Affidavit of Third Party Claim, this
Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly
which constitutes a violation of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.
A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the
property of his client which is in litigation. x x x Respondent
necessitates a heavy penalty since the circumstances
surrounding the transfer of ownership of properties tend to
indicate an anomalous transfer aimed to subvert the proper
administration of justice. The numerous discrepancies in the
transfer document, some dismissed as clerical errors and other
explained by incredulous stories by way of affidavits,
compounded by the letter left uncontested by Respondent
Paderanga, inevitably lead a rational person to conclude that
Paderanga may not have acquired the properties prior to the
judicial action of execution. Even if the City Prosecutor found no
prima facie case of falsification, this Commissioner finds
substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Respondent
Paderanga committed an ethical violation and should be meted
the penalty of suspension of five (5) years from the practice of
law.19
In a Resolution dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that a lawyer ought to know that he cannot acquire
the property of his client which is in litigation, Atty. Goering
Paderanga is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.20
On March 23, 2006, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
and, on August 18, 2006, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated August 23, 2006, the Court referred the
motion for reconsideration to the IBP.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP issued a Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, and affirmed its Resolution dated
December 17, 2005.
Under Section 27 of Rule 13821 of the Rules of Court, a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority. In the present case, the Court finds
respondent administratively liable for engaging in dishonest and
Page21
deceitful conduct.
Although respondent denied having acted as counsel for therein
defendants, the Spouses Panaguinip, in the forcible entry case
filed by complainant, his involvement in the said case was still
highly suspect. After the writ of execution had been issued on
February 18, 2002, he went with defendants-spouses to
amicably settle with complainant on two separate occasions,
ostensibly to protect his own interests. Complainant claimed
that during those two meetings, respondent did not disclose his
ownership over the properties in question, leading the former to
believe that respondent was, in fact, the counsel for defendants-
spouses. He averred that respondent and defendant spouses
initially offered a settlement of P3,000.00, which he refused as
he had already spent P10,000.00 on court expenses. On their
second meeting, the offer had been raised to P25,000.00, which
again complainant declined, as the latter had, at that time,
spent P25,000.00. Complainant maintained that it was only after
said meetings had transpired that he received the affidavit of a
third-party claim executed by respondent, stating that the latter
was the owner of the property and motor vehicle. On the other
hand, respondent claimed that the meetings took place in April
2002, after he had filed a third-party claim.
Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and
motor vehicle that were still registered in the name of
defendants-spouses, he should have immediately disclosed such
fact immediately and filed a third- party claim, as time was of
the essence. Moreover, in their letter dated March 1, 2002,
defendants-spouses did not mention any transfer of ownership
of the said properties to respondent, as the former still believed
that they owned the same. The continued possession and
ownership by defendants-spouses was also attested to by a
certain Brigida Lines, who executed an Affidavit22 in favor of
complainant.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe
that when complainant and defendants-spouses failed to reach
an agreement, respondent came forward as a third-party
claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said properties.
He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,23 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this
rule, conduct has been construed not to pertain exclusively to
the performance of a lawyers professional duties.24 In previous
cases,25 the Court has held that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor; or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.
Notably, in the falsification case earlier filed, complainant was
able to cite several irregularities in the documents evidencing
the deeds of sale in question: the non-registration by
respondent of the sale transactions; a Community Tax Certificate
number appearing on said deeds which was different from that
issued to defendant Ma. Teresa Panaguinip; and the erasures of
the entries pertaining to said deeds from the Notarial Register.
Of these irregularities, only one can directly be attributable to
respondent his non-registration of the sale transaction. He
argues that the sales were valid despite non-registration, and
maintained that it was perfectly normal and regular for a lawyer
like him to choose not to register and cause the transfer of title
of the land and the FUSO jeepney after the execution of the
Deeds of Sale, so the transactions would not appear in the
records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the City Assessor or
the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office. He added
that he had also bought four lots, which had not yet been
transferred to his name, for estate planning or speculation
purposes. He claimed that he found it legally wise not to
immediately register after buying so that he would not pay for
the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to
sell; or place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying
estate and inheritance taxes upon his death.26
While the act of registration of a document is not necessary in
order to give it legal effect as between the parties, requirements
for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent
frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption that a recorded instrument exists and is
genuine.27 However, while the RTC was correct in holding that
said omission on respondents part may not be considered
falsification, he had shown an intent to defraud the government,
which had the right to collect revenue from him, as well as from
other persons who may have an interest in said
properties.1avvphi1
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he
should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do
no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further,
he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he
should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.28 Respondents act of non-registration of the deeds of
sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a
servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar
for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a lawyer are
greater than those of a private citizen. He is looked up to in the
community.29 Respondent must have forgotten that a lawyer
must refrain from committing acts which give even a semblance
of impropriety to the profession.
In cases wherein lawyers have similarly engaged in deceitful
and dishonest conduct, the Court has imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law ranging from six (6) months
to one (1) year.
In Spouses Donato v. Asuncion, Sr.,30 where therein respondent
lawyer filed a complaint for reformation of instrument to obtain
financial gain, and prepared a contract which did not express
the true intention of the parties, he was found guilty of gross
misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
In Yap-Paras v. Paras,31 where therein respondent lawyer
applied for free patents over lands owned by another person
and not in the formers physical possession, he was found guilty
of committing a falsehood in violation of the Lawyers Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors recommended a penalty of suspension to be
imposed upon respondent for five (5) years and one (1) year,
respectively. The Court, however, believes that a penalty of one
(1) year is more commensurate to respondents deceitful and
dishonest conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga is found
guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future would result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into respondents record
as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
A.C. No. 8920 September 28, 2011
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor
Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be
reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao
City. The respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with
postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City.
Background
Page22
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment2 with the
Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the respondent,
alleging that the latter violated Canons 113 and 124 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing
on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the
respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi
advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent
shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be
cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite
me!"5 Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a
fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered
the courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!"6 Judge Baculi ordered the
sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited
him for direct contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the
respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for
him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening tone,
"Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and
challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him
out of the building.7
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the
courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the
Office of the Clerk of Court.8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory
pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil
Case No. 2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After
the modified decision became final and executory, the branch
clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed
a motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution,
raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant
for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent
knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction
of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was
Judge Baculi who disrespected him.10 We quote from his
Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the
Law against him once inside the court room when he was
lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not
like that I just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral
argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just
HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public that I am A
NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said "YOU JUSTIFY YOUR
NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making it an impression to
the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT,
INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the
Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order that
the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but
what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he will have
the room to humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but
almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through
Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners
Report,11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the
mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely
reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both
parties agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of
the incident at the courtroom would be submitted for the
Commissioners review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the
transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was
observed that the respondent was calm. He politely argued his
case but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high
pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also observed
that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever
he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an
argument, the complainant stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice
Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to appear
before my court, then you better attend to your cases and do
not appear before my court if you do not want to be corrected!
(TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words "we are very sorry" [ were]
actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was saying the
quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the
following questions when the undersigned noticed that Atty.
Battung shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure?
*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because
we were asked to present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so,
if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules
on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the
complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at
each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge
that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape,
the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who
shouted first at the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present
waiting for their cases to be called. They must have observed
the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita
Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was really
Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter
cautioned him "not to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN
reads as follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court
for gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
Page23
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)
Court: The next time
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in
record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza
vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to
observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the
courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule
11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the courts. The respondents argument that Judge Baculi
provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration
since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding
judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of
a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have
done was to file an action before the Office of the Court
Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found
that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling
that the respondent had misused the judicial processes to
frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the
modification that the respondent be reprimanded.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him
inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence
of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The
respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This
behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We
note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and
acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position
even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after
initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the
courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These
actions were not only against the person, the position and the
stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose
proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought
to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their
position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to
publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court
that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.13 that it is the duty of a
lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the
institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely
disregards the latters role, stature and position in our justice
system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly
threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to
decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must
be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the
Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in
a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice
system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be
reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner
recommended a penalty of six (6) months suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for
the offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior
State Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year
for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for violating the
Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in
newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs
violations are no less serious as they were committed in the
courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where the
respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before the
litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge
Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and
offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung
is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to the respondents personal record
as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the
Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.
G.R. No. 171008 October 24, 2008
CARMELITA FUDOT, petitioner,
vs.
CATTLEYLA LAND, INC., respondent.
For resolution is the charge of indirect contempt initiated motu
proprio1 by the Court against Atty. Victor De La Serna.2
On 9 November 2007, the Court received from De La Serna a
request for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga,3
claiming that Justice Tinga received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny
Chan (Mr. Chan) in exchange for a favorable decision in the
instant case.4 He alleges:
After the usual exchange of civilities, JOHNNY CHAN curtly told
the undersigned that all negotiations for the purchase of
petitioners rights between us were off. He further stated that he
had already given out TEN MILLION PESOS to JUSTICE DANTE O.
TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in this case. Hence,
there is no more reason for him to talk to us. Justice Dante O.
Tinga is the ponente of the Decision subject to [sic] this Motion
for Reconsideration.5
Atty. De La Serna relates that sometime in 2006, he was
prevailed upon by former BIR Commissioner Tomas Toledo to
meet with Mr. Chan. In the meeting, Mr. Chan informed him that
he had already bought the interest of Cattleya Land, Inc.
(Cattleya) over a property adjacent to the property subject of
the case and that he was interested in putting up a resort/hotel
in the property. He wanted to purchase Carmelita Fudots
Page24
interest in the property as well to put an end to the litigation.
They did not reach an agreement on the purchase price.6
Another meeting was set, this time, through the intercession of
Atty. Dionisio De La Serna, former Secretary of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board, and upon the request of Mr. Chans
lawyer, Atty. Paulino Petralba (Atty. Petralba). In this meeting,
Atty. Petralba offered P4 Million. Again, no agreement was
reached on the purchase price, De La Serna narrates.7
Sometime in August 2007, Atty. Petralba sought out Atty. De La
Sernas son, Atty. Victor De La Serna, Jr., and informed him that
the Supreme Courts decision in the instant case was
forthcoming.8 This advance knowledge of the decision only
confirms the bribery bragged about by Mr. Chan, De La Serna
claims.9
In another meeting on 26 September 2007, Mr. Chan told Atty.
De La Serna that there would no more negotiations for the
purchase of Fudots rights and he had already given P10 Million
to Justice Tinga. By way of consuelo de bobo, Mr. Chan offered
De La Serna a legal retainer of P200,000.00 down and a monthly
fee of P15,000.00 to act as his lawyer in Bohol.10 A day later, or
on 27 September 2007, as De La Serna notes, in a bid to tie the
loose ends of his tale, the decision in this case was mailed at the
Central Post Office, 11 a copy of which was received by him on
10 October 2007.
Atty. De La Serna adds:
ALL WE NEED TO HAVE IS A LITTLE COMMON SENSE TO
CONCLUDE THAT INDEED, THE FAVORABLE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT WAS OBTAINED THRU BRIBERY. This is what
JOHNNY CHAN was bragging and this is what happened.12
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. De La Serna insists that the decision was contrary to the
principles enunciated by Justice Tinga in the case of Lim v.
Jorge.13 He states:
III. THE DECISION OF JUSTICE TINGA IN THE CASE REEKS OF
BRIBERY. HE HAS REPUDIATED ALL THE DOCTRINES HE HAS
SUMMARIZED AND ENUNCIATED IN LIM v. JORGE, A DECISION HE
PENNED ONLY IN 2005.
Only two years ago, in Lim v. Jorge, (G.R. No. 161861, March 11,
2005) Justice Dante Tinga made a learned treatise when he
summarized and further expounded on all the long-established
doctrines on the law and jurisprudence governing the Torrens
System of land titles in the Philippines. It was indeed a brilliant
anthology worthy of publication into a book.
In this instant Decision however, Justice Tinga has swallowed all
the noble doctrines he has enunciated so brilliantly, and instead
repudiated and contradicted everything he has said just to
accommodate JOHNNY CHAN and all his cohorts and his money.
xxx
If this is not a CLEAR CASE OF BRIBERY, then we dont know
what is.
The Decision of Justice Tinga in this case is simply a ROGUE
DECISION. It is illegal. It is immoral. And like a "mad dog, it
should be slain at sight."14 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. De La Serna also finds it surprising that the instant case
was decided less than two (2) years after it was submitted for
resolution. He compares the instant case to a criminal case
which has been pending for ten (10) years before the Court.15
He states:
Yet, in this instant case, TWO (2) YEARS is all it took for Justice
Dante Tinga to come up with a favorable Decision for JOHNNY
CHAN.
Where is equity? Where is the justice? IF THIS IS NOT BRIBERY,
THEN THE SUN RISES EVERY MORNING FROM THE WEST.
This case must have been plucked out from underneath a stack
of older cases which have been prioritized for resolution. There
could be no other explanation.
xxx
There is a difference of some 20,000 intervening cases between
Oppus and Fudot. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN THE REASON WHY
THIS INSTANT CASE WAS SELECTED AND PLUCKED OUT FROM
UNDERNEATH 20,000 OTHER CASES, AND DECIDED IN LESS
THAN TWO (2) YEARS?
Your Honors, the answer is in Your hands, but it seems quite
obvious.16 (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 February 2008, the Court issued a Resolution requiring
Atty. De La Serna to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court.17 On 27 March 2008,
De La Serna submitted his explanation, stating that he believes
in utmost good faith that all the statements he made in recent
pleadings he submitted in this case do not constitute "improper
conduct" and that his statements "were not intended to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice," as
they were made, on the contrary, "TO PREVENT THE
COMMISSION OF A GRAVE INJUSTICE.18
In a resolution dated 14 April 2008, the Court set the hearing on
the charge of indirect contempt on 18 June 2008.19 In the
hearing, Atty. De La Serna, together with his son Atty. Victor De
La Serna, Jr., Mr. Chan, Atty. Petralba and Atty. Alex Monteclar
(Atty. Monteclar) of Cattleya appeared.
Atty. De La Serna mainly reiterated his arguments during the
hearing. His son, Atty. De La Serna, Jr., corroborated his
statements. De La Serna, Jr. claimed that he heard Mr. Chan
bragging that he spent so much for the Supreme Court;
afterwards, he heard Mr. Chan mention of Justice Tingas name
and the amount of P10 Million,20 only to clarify later that he did
not hear Mr. Chan say for whom or which person the money was
spent on. 21
Mr. Chan informed the Court that he represents Ryan, Patrick
and John (RPJ) company which owns Bellevue Hotel.22 He
testified that RPJ bought a property from Cattleya which was
adjacent to the lot subject of the case.23 He admitted that he
approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling
their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in
Bohol.24 However, he denied having said to De La Serna that he
had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court.25 He
added that the hearing was the first time that he saw all the
justices.26
Mr. Chan related that during the 25 September 2007 meeting,
he offered Atty. De La Serna P4 Million and an additional
incentiveas retainer of their company.27 In his testimony:
xxx
Mr. Chan:
Well, as I said, I offered. I was trying to convince him to accept
that amicable settlement and aside from that, to be my friend,
maybe you can be our company retainer in Bohol. Thats what
we discussed about, your honor.28
Justice Carpio Morales:
So, how did the conversation or that meeting end?
Mr. Chan:
Well, we end-up, he was kind of unhappy.
Justice Carpio Morales:
Why?
Mr. Chan:
I dont know; maybe angry.
Justice Carpio Morales:
Why? What is your basis in saying that?
Mr. Chan.
Because my offer to him for the amicable settlement still stands
for Four Million.
Justice Carpio Morales: 17 September .

Page25
Did he counter[-]offer? Atty. Paulino Petralba:

Mr. Chan: After my game, I sat down, had beer, then Junior de la Serna
was walking out of another tennis court. He walked infront of our
Well, he said Ten and I said thats too much. table and I said, "O Junior, gusto daw makipagmeeting uli ng
kliyente
Justice Carpio Morales:
ko baka sakaling may favorable result," and he said "Aba, okay,
And that was it?
Ill tell my papa, my father." I said, "No, no kasi Im not going to
Mr. Chan: arrange it anymore because Im on vacation and Im going
abroad." Thats all that happened in that meeting, your Honor. I
That was it.29 did not seek him out, Your Honor. It was a chance meeting.34

For his part, Atty. Petralba clarified that the third meeting he had xxx
with Atty. De La Serna was on 4 September 2007, and not in
August as what De La Serna claimed, presenting his detailed Pursuing a vital point, Justice Carpio inquired and Atty. Petralba
diary for the purpose. 30 Thus: answered, thus:

Atty. Paulino Petralba: Justice Carpio:

The third meeting alluded to by Atty. de la Serna was not in Okay that was September 17, four days after the promulgation
August, Your Honors. It was on September 4, 2007. It is recorded of the decision. September 13 was the date the decision was
in my PDA and I do keep a diary where I list and narrate what made.
happens to my life everyday. In fact, Your Honor, I have my diary
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
herethe diary for June 2007 to December 2007, this is for last
yearand I have marked September 4, 2007 and, with your Yes, Your Honor.
indulgence, Your Honors, if I may be permitted to read even
extraneous matters because that will prove something also? Justice Carpio:

JUSTICE QUISUMBING: So if Mr. Chan really paid Ten Million to anyone here, Mr. Chan
would have known immediately that the case was decided
Yes. because he paid for it, correct?

Justice Carpio Morales: Atty. Paulino Petralba:

Yes. Logically.

Atty. Paulino Petralba: Justice Carpio:

"September 4, 2007, Tuesday, Office, 11:00 a.m.: Tennis at So he would have told you to forget about paying anything we
Makati Sports Club with my son, score 8-5, I won; Meeting with won already.
Ryan Chan, Cecil, and Atty. Vic and Junior de la Serna; He said
his price is Ten Million, I offered Four Million; Home, 9:30 p.m.; I Atty. Paulino Petralba:
did not attend my Tuesday club," Your Honor, the third meeting
was on September 4, 2007; therefore, my encounter with de la Logically, Your Honor.
Serna, Jr. could not have happened prior to that because my
Justice Carpio:
encounter with him was regarding the September 25, 2000
proposed meeting between Johnny Chan and Atty. De la Serna. So your offer to meet againyour offer on September 17 to
And may I relate, Your Honor, how that happened? 31 meet againwould be irrational because you won already had
that money been given really.
Atty. Petralba claimed that his conversation with Atty. De La
Serna, Jr. was a chance encounter in the tennis court, and that Atty. Paulino Petralba:
he did not tell Atty. De La Serna, Jr. that a decision was
forthcoming. Instead, he told him that "the client wants to have Exactly, Your Honor, and in fact the meeting on September 25
another meeting baka sakali there will be a favorable result."32 would have been an absurd meeting.
He maintained that he never intimated a bribery of a Supreme
Court Justice.33 In his testimony, Atty. Petralba stated: Justice Carpio:

Atty. Paulino Petralba: Absurd meeting because if

I will proceed. After the third meeting in September 4, 2007 Atty. Paulino Petralba:
which is by the way, Your Honors, is only nine days prior to the
promulgation of the case on September 13. Ahhhmy birthday the case was already decided
is September 13, Your Honors, and I went to the tennis court on
Justice Carpio: Yaah
September 17, 2007 to give a blow out to my tennis buddies
and I also played one game of tennis on September 17. If I may If your client really paid Ten Million, he would be the first to
be permitted, Your Honors, may I read my entries in this diary? know right away.
JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Atty. Paulino Petralba:
Go ahead. Exactly, Your Honor.
Atty. Paulino Petralba: Justice Carpio:
"September 27, 1007, Monday, lunch at office; Ordoez of tour And on September 25, he would not have agreed to a meeting
organizers came to my office; went to GBH for meeting; from anymore.
GBH returned to office, conference with another client; then
went to BF tennis court, played one game and gave birthday Atty. Paulino Petralba:
blow out inom for my group: Ernie, Glen, Roy, etc., etc; had
short chat with Junior de la Serna, 5:00 p.m." This is how it Yes, Your Honor.35
transpired, Your Honor.
Atty. Monteclar confirmed that Mr. Chan bought a land adjacent
JUSTICE QUISUMBING: to the property subject of the petition, and that Mr. Chan,
interested in buying the property of Fudot, told them that he
Page26
would try to expedite the matter and talk to De La Serna.36 He
mentioned that he and his client, Cattleya, refused to negotiate
with De La Serna because they had a sad experience with him
when he accused one of Cattleyas lawyers of making Cattleya a
milking cow. Said lawyer even filed an administrative case
against De La Serna for making baseless accusations and using
intemperate language against opposing lawyers in his pleadings
in this very case when it was still before the trial court.37 Atty.
Monteclar admitted that he was the one who informed Atty.
Petralba of the Supreme Courts decision.38 He denied any
knowledge about the attempt to bribe any of the Justices of the
Court.39
Mr. Chan and Atty. Petralba both admitted that they had never
met Justice Tinga before and it was only during the hearing on
18 June 2008 that they saw Justice Tinga in person.40 On the
other hand, Atty. Monteclar stated that he had not known Justice
Tinga personally, although he met Justice Tinga way back in
2003 in a hotel in Makati when Justice Tinga was given an honor
by the Council of Deans by the Philippine Association of Law
Schools. 41
The parties were then required to submit their respective
memoranda.42
Atty. De La Serna submitted a two-page Memorandum of Points.
He pointed out that it was Mr. Chan who sought him out using
different intermediaries and who acted as if he had advance
knowledge of the decision; moreover, it was Mr. Chan who said
that he had given P10 Million to Justice Tinga. Thus, if there was
anyone
guilty of contemptible conduct, it was Mr. Chan, and not him. De
La Serna added that anyone in his situation would have acted
similarly.43
Atty. Petralba and Mr. Chan jointly submitted their Comment44
(Memorandum) while Cattleya filed its own Memorandum.45
We find Atty. De La Serna guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting
up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies
not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders
but such conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court
and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner
to impede the due administration of justice.46 Indirect contempt
is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that
tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and
justice.47 Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice has
also been considered to constitute indirect contempt.48
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, the complainant must present panoply of evidence in
support of such an accusation.49 It will take more than the
uncorroborated and independent statements of Atty. De La
Serna to cast an aura of credibility to his accusations.
We reviewed the records of the case and find that the decision
was made in accordance with law and established jurisprudence.
The principles enunciated in Lim v. Jorge,50 now being invoked
by Atty. De La Serna, simply do not find application in this case.
His insistence that Justice Tinga repudiated and contradicted
everything he enunciated in the Lim case "just to accommodate
Mr. Chan and all his cohorts and his money" 51 is not only
groundless, it is also downright contemptuous.
In the first place, Mr. Chan, the "person most involved"52 had
categorically denied making the statement to the effect that he
gave P10 Million to Justice Tinga, or to any other justice in the
division.53
Justice Quisumbing:
You denied. You said you did not make any statement to Atty. De
la Serna concerning giving of Ten Million to Mr. Justice Tinga?
Mr. Chan:
I did not.
Justice Quisumbing:
I ask you now that you have not given anything to the other
justices in this panel?
Mr. Chan:
I did not, Your Honor.
Justice Quisumbing:
And also deny that you have told Atty. De La Serna, Sr. that you
have spent Ten Million for the Supreme Court?
Mr. Chan:
I did not spend that on you, Your Honor.54
Atty. De La Serna claims that Mr. Chan and Atty. Petralba had
advance knowledge of the Courts decision, based on the fact
that Atty. Petralba and Mr. Chan were already intimating a
favorable decision even before the decision was released. He
points out that the decision was released only on 27 September
2007, when it was
mailed at the Central Post Office, implying that if not for the fact
that Mr. Chan paid for the decision, he would not have known of
the outcome of the case even before the decision was released
on 27 September 2007.
The decision was promulgated on 13 September 2007. Decisions
of the Court are posted in its website a few days after their
promulgation. In this case, the decision was published in the
web on 19 September 2007, or before the decision was posted
in the Manila Central Post Office on 27 September 2007.
However, Mr. Chan
stated that he learned of the decision only sometime in October
of 2007, after Atty. Petralba had told him about it.55 On the
other hand, Atty. Monteclar admitted that he was the one who
called up Atty. Petralba to inform him about the outcome of the
case after he received a copy of the decision.56
Moreover, Atty. De La Sernas attribution of advance knowledge
to Mr. Chan, apart from being incongruent with the declarations
of the other personalities, does not dovetail with logic and
common sense. For one, Mr. Chan was earnest in asking for, and
pushing through with, the meeting on 25 September 2007 with
De La Serna. Had he known about the decision earlier, and more
importantly, had he really paid P10 Million for a favorable
decision, he would not have reiterated his offer or suggest any
further meeting with De La Serna for the purchase of the subject
property. The exercise would be downright irrational.57
From a related perspective, it would be plainly foolhardy for Mr.
Chan to go through all the trouble and risk of bribing a Supreme
Court Justice in the amount of P10 Million when he could have
directly acquired the property by paying off De La Serna with the
same amount which the latter had demanded in the first place.
This aspect was clearly demonstrated during the hearing, thus:
Justice Quisumbing:
From your point of view, is there any indication from your own
circle of anything spent for the Supreme Court by Mr. Chan?
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
No, Your Honor. May I add something to that, Your Honor?
Justice Quisumbing:
Yes.
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
My own observation, Your Honors. If he was willing to spend Ten
Million, why go through the difficult process of committing a
crime of bribery and not just give it to the other party?
Justice Quisumbing:
I see.
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
It would be easier, Your Honor, because once a compromise
agreement is signed, we submit it to the Court. In fact, I can
already advise my client, even if the Court has not resolved the
Page27
compromise agreement, go ahead construct because the
compromise agreement will then bind the other party. Its much
easier, Your Honor. Its much more logical.
Justice Quisumbing:
I see. But in any case, you made an offer of Four Million?
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Quisumbing:
But it was not accepted?
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
He said his price is Ten Million.
Justice Quisumbing:
And you did not agree to Ten Million?
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
Well, the client told me thats too much.58
Earlier, Justice Velasco pointed out the ludicrousness of Atty. De
La Sernas claim in the following exchange with Atty. De La
Serna himself:
Justice Velasco:
That is correct.
In your offer, the price that your client want is Ten Million Pesos?
Atty. De La Serna:
Ten Million.
Justice Velasco:
So if thats the price for the lot of petitioner Fudot and he spent
Ten Million, wouldnt it be a lot easier for him to just have paid
your client the price that she was asking for her lot in Bohol?
Atty. De la Serna:
Im not thinking for Johnny Chan, Your Honor. Im just relaying
what he told me.59
Atty. De La Sernas other basis for believing that the decision
was prompted by bribery was the time it took for this case to be
decided, which he intimated was uncommonly short. He bewails
that the case was pinpointed, then plucked out from underneath
20,000 other cases, and thereafter resolved in less than two (2)
years. He also compared the case with Oppus v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 150186; a case which he previously handled, claiming
that accused Oppus continues to languish in jail because the
Supreme Court had not resolved his appeal even after the lapse
of more than ten (10) years.60 De La Sernas plaint is baseless
and non sequitur.
Atty. De La Serna seems to be unaware that the Supreme Court
is mandated by the Constitution to decide cases within two (2)
years from the date of submission. Art. VIII, Section 15(1) of the
Constitution reads:
Section 15 (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
The instant petition was filed on 6 March 2006. Respondent was
required to file its comment thereon, which it submitted on 1
June 2006. The Court thereafter required petitioner to file her
reply, and petitioner filed one on 11 September 2006. Her reply
was noted on 13 November 2006. Thus, as of 13 November
2006, the case was deemed submitted, there being no other
pleading required by the Court. From that point on, it is but
logical to assume that a decision would be forthcoming.
As for the Oppus case, it appears from the records that De La
Serna used to be Oppuss lawyer, but he was replaced upon
Oppuss motion. Moreover, the case was already deemed closed
and terminated as of 15 October 2007, when the Court granted
Oppuss Motion to Withdraw Petition/Appeal filed on 19
September 2007. Contrary to De La Sernas claim, the case is no
longer pending as it was already been disposed of. Moreover,
the Oppus case was assigned to another ponente, not Justice
Tinga. The period during which the Oppus case was pending
cannot serve as sound basis for comparison with this case.
In addition, Atty. De La Sernas assumption that the instant case
was decided ahead of 20,000 other cases is preposterous.
Deducting the General Register Number ( G.R. No.) of the Oppus
case from the instant case would lead one to infer that 20,000
cases are still pending, which is not the case, since as pointed
out by Justice Carpio, there are no more than ten thousand
cases pending in the Supreme Court at any one time. 61
Besides, in between the G.R. No. of the Oppus case (G.R. No.
171008) and that of this case (G.R. No.150186), are thousands
of cases.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary
to his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers is to support the courts against
"unjust
criticism and clamor."62 His duty is to uphold the dignity and
the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice, as it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts
so essential to the proper administration of justice."63 As we
held in one case:
It is [the] respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold
the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the
Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. x x
x64
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a
lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and
questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to
corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable
information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it
is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that
it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay in
reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the publics trust
in, the judicial system.
The Court is perplexed by the actuations of Atty. De La Serna.
Claiming that he had been informed that a member of the Court
was involved in bribery, yet he chose to remain silent in the
meantime
and to divulge the information long after he had come to know
that he lost the case. He claims that as early as 25 September
2007, Mr. Chan told him that he had already spent P10 Million
for Justice Tinga; yet he failed to inform the Court of this matter
waited until 4 November 2007 before he divulged the alleged
bribery in his Request for Inhibition. According to him, he only
became convinced that the bribe took place after he received a
copy of the decision. Yet there was no mention of the alleged
bribery in his motion for
reconsideration dated 20 October 2007. For this, he offers the
lame pretext that adverted bribery is a mere "extraneous matter
(that) is not relevant as far as the legal issues are concerned in
this case," and because his request for inhibition dated 4
November 2007, where the matter was mentioned for the first
time, "at least does not have a deadline."65 While admitting
that he did not even verify from other sources if Mr. Chans
statement had any factual basis, De La Serna offers another
feeble explanation for his delayed reaction in that he could not
just go to the Supreme Court and request for investigation, as
he could not even pass through the guards.66 A lawyer of De La
Sernas caliber and experience would know that there is a
Page28
proper way of lodging a formal complaint for investigation,
including sending it by registered mail.
That De La Serna did not report the matter immediately to the
Court suffuses unshakeable dubiety to his claim that Mr. Chan
had uttered the statements attributed to him. That De La Serna
brought
up the issue of bribery after an unfavorable decision was issued
makes the allegation all the more a contrived afterthought, a
hastily concocted story brought to cast doubts on the integrity
not only of Justice Tinga, but also of the entire Supreme Court.
This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, Atty.
De La Serna cannot criticize the court.67 We have long
recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or any person,
for that matter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long
as they are made in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. The Court, in In re: Almacen,68 held:
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority, or that is it articulated by a lawyer. Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to
public consumption. x x x
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect
critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizen whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. x x x
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen.
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.69
Everything considered on the basis of the proofs on record,
reason and normal discernment, Atty. De La Sernas statements
bear the badges of falsehood while the common version of the
witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the
hallmarks of truth. There is more. De La Sernas declarations
were maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded the
boundaries of decency
and propriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility
of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court and
erode public confidence that should be accorded to it. As we
stated in In re: Wenceslao Laureta,70 thus:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim
that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and
rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the
duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to
destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow
such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers
and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter
of all justiciable disputes. 71
Atty. De La Serna has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism. His irresponsible and baseless
statements, his unrepentant stance and smug insistence of his
malicious and unfounded accusation against Justice Tinga have
sullied the dignity and authority of this Court. Beyond question,
therefore, De La Sernas culpability for indirect contempt
warrants the penalty of a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both under the
Rules.72
The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in
dealing with him accordingly is a means to protect and preserve
the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein
and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior and
offensive personalities.73 Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.74 The
Court will not hesitate to wield this inherent power to preserve
its honor and dignity and safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.75
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Victor De La Serna is
found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. He is hereby FINED
in the amount of P30,000.00 to be paid within ten (10) days
from
receipt of this Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a
similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. De La Sernas
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The IBP is ordered to submit with DISPATCH its Report on the
investigation in Gabriel T. Ingles v. Atty. Victor De La Serna,
docketed as A.C. No. 5763.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006
[CBD 05-1434]
JOHNNY NG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent.
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27,
2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
propensity to resort to undeserved language and disrespectful
stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is hereby REPRIMANDED with a
stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case
similar misconduct is again committed. Likewise, the counter
complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin
Michael Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by
Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor
case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is
the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision2
affirming the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),3 pertinent
portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under
Page29
consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of
respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. But we
cannot accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable
individuals, that the actual writer of the said decision is not at all
connected with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter
in maintaining that the separation pay should be only one half
month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear
enough, or is there another reason known only to them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on the
part of the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire
actually resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents
failed to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable
Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these
glaring facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One
month per year of service and all of it to the affected workers
not to some people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent
practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of
the First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to
real life.
x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division
to see for themselves the evidence before them and not merely
rely on their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they
do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty
on the part of the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking,
not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the
Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so
and with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an
illegal strike, how come their only "penalty" is removing their
tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable
Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there was
no strike. This is the only reason for the finding of "illegal strike".
Without this finding, they have no basis to remove the tent; they
have to invent that basis.
x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of
Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the
so called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to
believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the
tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide
passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and
egress of the premises, are blocked by something so thick he
cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be trusted, no
doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money
claims. Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of
money claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment.
Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name
we should call this new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But only
retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this rule and
only when the money claims involved are substantial. When
they are meager the ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips
proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their
service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from
the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged
blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible to
the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of
it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as
ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his co-
commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and
irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance
of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed
to have anything to do with the instant case any more.
Commissioner Go and Chairman Seeres, by negligence, are just
as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules prohibit the
inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Seeres should remain
in the instant case and appoint two (2) other commissioners
from another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in
the instant case.4 (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005,
respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only
intends to harass him and to influence the result of the cases
between complainant and the workers in the different fora
where they are pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC
when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on
disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it;
that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for
adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants
appearing in cases before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing
at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC
Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of
Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of
the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who are honestly and
conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a
contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger
when they get cheated in their cases by reason of corruption
and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make
their lives and the lives of their constituents miserable, with
impunity, unlike lawyers for the employers who get paid, win or
lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved.5
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union
president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras
and Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in several instances, such that while the labor case is
pending before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a
new case against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer
of Quezon City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus
splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City
Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12, Rules
12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed the disbarment
complaint against Alar, respondents Parass and Cruzs office
instigated the said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's
company did not pay income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for
non-operation due to fire and respondents consented to this act
of the employer which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that
when the case started, there were more or less 100
complainants, but due to the acts of the employer and the
respondents, the number of complainants were reduced to
almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and 19-
03.6
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,7
respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time did they file
multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or brook
interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the
reliefs sought before the CEO has nothing to do with the case
pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and
illegal structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and
unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was
requested to investigate certain nuisance structures located
outside the employer's property, which consist of shanties,
tents, banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free
ingress to and egress out of the employer's property and
present clear and present hazards; the Office of the City
Engineer found the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and
MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with the NLRC
is completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not,
did not validate or justify the construction of illegal nuisance
structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures
pursuant to its power to protect life, property and legal order; it
was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against
respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client on how to go
about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the
derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as an excuse
for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their
brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only
reason the number of complainants were reduced is because of
the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of
them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and
litigation cases; at no time were they consulted regarding the
tax concerns of their client and therefore were never privy to the
Page30
financial records of the latter; at no time did they give advice
regarding their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt
at a disbarment case against them is unwarranted, unjustified
and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by
the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of using improper and abusive language and
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of not
less than three months with a stern warning that more severe
penalty will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again
committed.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find
any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and
therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint against
them be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of
Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the
Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that
respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC,
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of
diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in
his pleadings that does not admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by
the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge
Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the
facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law
and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high
esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run
short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.10
A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic
but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.11 Submitting pleadings
containing countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly
measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its
commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not
part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial
Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v.
Gordolla,12 the Court held that respondent became unmindful of
the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a
member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose
first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice
and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics.13
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to
some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter
the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers
who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of
them as members of the Bar.14
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and
again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying
degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or
irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower
courts. Resort by an attorney in a motion for reconsideration
to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special
way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the
motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." It is in
this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio
"thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue
in the case" does not give him unbridled license in language. To
be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps
much more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust
in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of
"harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is
the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon
which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." Stability of
judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this
precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the
result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when
we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In
fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the
right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the
bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of
courts in our system of government.16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics
perception of the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed
by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to
respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the
amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz,
the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as
approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position
paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to
do so.1wphi1
At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the
Office of the City Engineer really partakes of a different cause of
action, which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The
decision was made by the city engineer. Respondents remedy
should be to question that decision, not bring it to this
Commission which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not
substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should
determine the propriety or sagacity of the city engineers action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves
of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed
the bounds of decency. In supporting the action against
Page31
respondents conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it
is the attorneys duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge
from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This
requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to
wild and groundless accusation but also to discourage other
people from so doing and to come to his defense when he is so
subjected. By the very nature of his position a judge lacks the
power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded
criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no other, who
can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing
People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag
v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957) Whether the disbarment
complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of
great import, what is more apropos would be the contents of the
complaint and whether the same is sufficient to consider
disciplinary sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the
respondent lawyers have already stated that they were not
engaged as counsels to take care of their clients tax problems,
then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any
wrongdoing has been committed by complainant Ng, he should
answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for
such acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that]
attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax
fiasco.1wphi1
Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly
diminished from about 100 claimants to less than half the
number is not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are
duty bound to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and
adversarial proceedings while a necessary part of the practice is
not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help
unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there
is no reason to prevent the same. There is nothing in the
counter-complaint which shows that the compromise agreement
and waivers executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to
hold lawyers liable for the same. Besides, a "compromise is as
often the better part of justice as prudence the part of valor and
a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the clients
champion in settlement out of court than he is the clients
champion in the battle in court." (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in
Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalos Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.)
What is therefore respondent Alar[]s beef with the execution of
these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?
All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against
Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the dismissal of the counter-
complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.17
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY
of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and
Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In
Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F.
Meads.
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor
General brought to our attention statements of record
purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the
suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On
November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set
forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary)
have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur
International. Such efforts could be accurately called
"scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated
March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page
13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare
the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.
(Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to
Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last
two lines on bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their
claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading
to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from
bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys.
Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto,
the Solicitor General points out, contain the following
statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the
applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of
the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled
that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all
bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and
excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain
fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in
effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.
10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after
judgment herein was rendered and signed by Vicente L.
Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and
Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or
any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The
motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate
Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision
dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining
of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the
son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was
given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by
the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The
motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to
be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought
about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice"
had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in
favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents"
cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has
not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the
above-entitled case.
 (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law
Page32
and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all
previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the
first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss
was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a
wholesome development of the law but only served to delay
respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not
maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion
cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no
reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the
said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided
otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to
reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard
basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable
Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding
than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two
hundred million dollars by said decision without an effort by
the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through
presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for
himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and
Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the
statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted
out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate
and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of
the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's
attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be
deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to
change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing
on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago
also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in
full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our
judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers
of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by
the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally
incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the
recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a
motion to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly totally
oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle
involved and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit
himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is
also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the
explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it
that many of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs
(f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed
his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21,
1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion
for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he
alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated
on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by
saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to
Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still
included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for
MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it
repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of
the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision
of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as
early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his
appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His
ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to
inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps
(sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial
conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he
took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were
also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of
his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those
statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis
for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had
no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is
one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally
cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and
10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said
charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as
required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants
could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of
December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion
of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or
reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor
consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14,
1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to
retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired
from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised
Meads that this case was outside his professional competence
and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise
turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and
he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that
he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or
authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection
with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the
case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers
subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on
six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31,
1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his
permission to have his name included as counsel in all of
MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was
on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969,
respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M.
Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose,
lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave
of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and
contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by
the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he
was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the
time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court Section 1,
Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
This requirement is especially significant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four months or
more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices
Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals
Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding
Page33
of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the
operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property
and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law
and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is
made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969,
requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5)
days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt
with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there
alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was
already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his
office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing
the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the
ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less
the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the
allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the
undersigned counsel together with the background of the case
involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with
the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same;
that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the
allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral
argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court,
on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said
return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why
they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be
dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969;
and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear
Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on
which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be
heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his
explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement
that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The
truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went
to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who
could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he
(Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied
Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads
with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion
and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is
as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office
with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself
prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began
to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph
when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not
Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could
recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on
the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same
time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was
reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion,
Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name
was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to
Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the
time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was
approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for
about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen
minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts
that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth
motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context
because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs"
indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a
common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations.
Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the
case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also
included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago
and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with
respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss
the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In
his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language
that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as
a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would
suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our
decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a
presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte
preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and
predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being
interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would
seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts
forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have
been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is
no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to
engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular
cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could
make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free
from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion
that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's
wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member
thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
"although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which
contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase
the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted
this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included
in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a
distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it
was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on
the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this
paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial
authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers
of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by
the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly
"incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts
of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the
explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it
that many of our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of
"unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke
of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision.
Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a
warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph
10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who
have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of
the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their
agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit
Page34
themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have
no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts
aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we
repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members
of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including
the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent.
For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops
up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this
Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is
presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is
the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much
from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to
repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer
(1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties
to the Court have become common place. Really, there could
hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical
terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that
'[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good
fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of
an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering
no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he
is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty
is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he
owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties
of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A
client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators
of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not
to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and
their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in
his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the
attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately
support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position.6
From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course
be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to
maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that
counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice
of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also
happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may
grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-
restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions
are necessary for the orderly administration of
."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not
unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language
of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71
of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice8 is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago
is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We
analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor
General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of
having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur."
He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He
describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face",
laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the
petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically
changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is
not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of
contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it
is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken
out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said
statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a]
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the
Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is
." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil.
702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder
made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The
accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer,
that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in
his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty
thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job.
Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform
him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a
palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise
of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden
deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar
and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his
assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case.
This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature.
There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to
punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent
in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties;
and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same
rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C.
Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the
name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge
and consent. Correctly did Regala insist and this is confirmed
by the other lawyers of respondents that he had not
participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled
case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as
co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt
incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record
is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation
of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He
Page35
should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt
incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act
of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation
has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of
context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who
may take part. ... only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its
entire thought should be read thus
1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to
the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed
to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and
all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court
at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration
and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not
present at the date of submission; however, only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if
the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in
writing filed with the clerk at the date of
. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not
attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a
distorted quotation came about the portion left out was
anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among
lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the
lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer
knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a
lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception
that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to
the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case
to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must
be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still
trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In
doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More
specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the
World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to
more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this
Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the
World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is
a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes
that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World
Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the
decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this
Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge
against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He
admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration
before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the
last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that
his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in
character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having
prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg
off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not
a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence
that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for
reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too
transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of
circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago
who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads
explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of
the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago,
he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads
states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for
reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in
pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself,
he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago
before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that
Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration
during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent
MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as
such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps
his client takes should be within his knowledge and
responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best
efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those
things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly
with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers,
jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be
protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency
rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause
to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of
honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor,
we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a
lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that,
if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to
decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held
in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere
to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this
invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by
bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid
of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the
requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a
lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to
the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein
was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the
merits of this case, the result would have been the same:
MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and
fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100;
and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty.
Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an
additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M.
Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to
take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may
deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of
Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of
Page36
this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-
27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts
this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the
classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying "that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the
aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the
Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did
it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious"
practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored,
his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing
why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the
Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection
therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused
the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear
itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15,
1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days
later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not
notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry
return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however,
was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966,
upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that
is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on
appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's
decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of
the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5,
1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did
not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he
filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this
Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9,
1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by
defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying
the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to
those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which
was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision
in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case
(Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue
sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary
to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in
the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We
Page37
refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the
appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28,
1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have
actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him
to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was
reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on
his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no
pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654,
Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that
this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him
to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer
was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of
the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on
November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution,
he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice
hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument
shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To
this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and
candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in
the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file
a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is
unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this
time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter
7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why
dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold,
there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out
the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to
cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you
also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth
of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming
of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest
of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members
have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our
pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and
above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our
pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards
our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of
the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution,
you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications
for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His
Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given
the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the
story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is
used to be before the war. There are those who have told me
frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not
the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties.
But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to
claim his God given right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the
further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared
by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things
that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes
are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately,
'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added only
two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the
Page38
sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal
has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence
in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members
of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he
claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let
us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for
review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against
this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and
the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given
this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only
to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth
to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest
do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full
opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry
out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution.
The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only
those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562,
566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to
the same petition different reasons may read different justices
to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the
Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in
effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If
the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The
tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact
that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the
then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack
of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question
has been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are
not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped
the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after
the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on
petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the
benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling
reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved
into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is
not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This
axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court,
nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a
thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that
the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced
the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to
exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as
1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for
a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the
adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in
Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions
in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at
least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case
the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing
Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.
Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs.
Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way
to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file
his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the
lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own
negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself
the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping
boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
Page39
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate,
he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus
appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and
scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen
the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural
for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses
what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is
why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open
to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official
actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public
property, and the press and the people have the undoubted
right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they
see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an
attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with
"imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who
assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a
case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court
are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who
vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and
fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court,
every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In
re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of
the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he
points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals
he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and
inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286).
As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman,
40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in
the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To
say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657,
665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat
Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of
courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position
to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is
concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but
as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations
and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture
into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and
the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d.
647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even
those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is
the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration
at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are
the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his
Page40
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of
a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of
relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So.
2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a
lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration
of justice demands condemnation and the application of
appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a
judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms
which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which
are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the
judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of
the administration of justice the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of
having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to
deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the
control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he
wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court
did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than
the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who
published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which
referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a
statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said
bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no
limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding
the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though
it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable
of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board,
etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197
and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In
the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer,
could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment
of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
graver character than those made by the respondent here. But,
in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who
are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the
strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts,
to the end that the public confidence in the due administration
of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E.
734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted
a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the
press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so
that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort
to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to
allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he
was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is
the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration
of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence
and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language,
and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the
courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter
written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the
bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the
court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the
courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed,
saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It
does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the
opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period
of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken
the authority of the court against whose members it was made,
bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the
administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under
the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of
that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The
acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have
reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and
honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111
Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was
suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court
an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court
from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said,
constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew
the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The
Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit
in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of
judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges
to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that
tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges
to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a
case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to
criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced
for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in
the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is
Page41
not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised,
tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts
of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by
their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney
making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this
statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds
of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted
attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives
and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of
improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747,
an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a
case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister
purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one
most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such
members does not measure up to the requirements of the law
itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and
ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for
a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to
public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech
to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary
that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client and with the courts where
justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by designedly
misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired
by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them
to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of
whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the
bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440,
the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using
in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and
wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated
brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and
the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll
of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the
erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed
in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those
pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had
been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this
paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better
right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a
widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated
intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from
its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a
statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to
read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of
the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because
of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any
good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the
spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed.
It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to
their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the
accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have
any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due
regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than
by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or
written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly
to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable
by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous
matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but
so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy,
to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold,
from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his
rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he
had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect
due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by
his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or
spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to
others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod
supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only
the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-
respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
Page42
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote
a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct
and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held
in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In
the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New
York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not
law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been
robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was
not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to
the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in
the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long
before the general public may feel that they may redress their
fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge
will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in
this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home,
while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to
the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had
been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney
was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same
principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this
case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364,
19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v.
Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36
Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a
penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed
a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two
years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an
attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his
decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in
intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and
bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to
make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from
the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive
affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-
litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of
the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring
them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute
grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent
in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the
face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those
catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the
power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting
on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such
condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may
afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel
branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths
of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and
energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so
for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the
statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the
author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment
for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his
paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which
tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there
also announced that one of the first measures he would
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have
for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court
declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to
be published in the press, the respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Page43
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices,
that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of
this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of
the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to
the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings
against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel
charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the
pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the
Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's
misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the
Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed
in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which
this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge
that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously
repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this
Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law
on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members and
some former members of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other
cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be
reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited
cases all of them involved contumacious statements made in
pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or
malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case
and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would
now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had written
finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has
terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was
the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented
with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In
re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were
conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity
of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief
Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them
may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which
tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive
hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt
where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In
the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case,
as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its
dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in
them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's
appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the
pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he
could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of
our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the
situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and
his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty
to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve
its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy
disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency
or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority
to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in
Page44
the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court,
is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To
deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the
conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to
restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable
authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to
admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is
a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and
respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is
no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of
the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission
and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney,
not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his
own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial
discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has
risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has
been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we
now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course,
purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it
may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making
the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for
his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of
his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home
his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered
by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of
justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in
the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an
explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and
reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its
members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition,
answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They
could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and
texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates
any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a
whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is
thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity
from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through
constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by
perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of
our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have
appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance.
This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings
like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act
not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court.
Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself,
not the individual members thereof as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even
lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration
of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the
legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is
but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power because public policy demands that they.,
acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the
sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may
range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32
The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable
sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice,
should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity
Page45
and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end
desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope
that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is
ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same
should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but
also because, even without the comforting support of precedent,
it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can
be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority.
The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then
be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or
how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that
he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
A.C. No. 8620 January 12, 2011
JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on
April 29, 2010, concerns respondent attorneys alleged
dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed
in behalf of the defendants in the civil action in which De Leon
intervened.
Antecedents
On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the
purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then
registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on
a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent,
respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600
square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the Registrar of Deeds of
Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No. 4674MN of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.1
De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary
intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the
respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case
No. 4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of
dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or
suspension as an attorney. The respondents sin was allegedly
committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint;
and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim
and cross-claim) despite said spouses being already deceased at
the time of filing.2
De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and
falsification as follows:
xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding (the
making and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so
participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because
they were already dead as of that time, which is punishable
under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code.
Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified
Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the
judicial proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN;
Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial
proceedings by representing dead persons therein who, he
falsely made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-
suing and cross-suing the adverse parties.
12. That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts,
complainant respectfully submits that respondent likewise
violated:
(a) His Lawyers Oath:
xxx
(b) The Code of Professional Responsibility:3
xxx
On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to
comment on De Leons administrative complaint.4
In due course, or on August 2, 2010,5 the respondent rendered
the following explanations in his comment, to wit:
1. The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent
the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and
Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;
2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries relevant to the material
allegations of the Governments complaint in Civil Case No.
4674MN, William Lim, the representative of the Lim Family,
informed him:
a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from
Georgina Flores;
b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively
managing the family business, and now co-owned the properties
by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their parents, Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu, had executed in their favor; and
c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute sale,
William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly assumed that their
parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their
names.
3. Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves were
the ones who had engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo)
consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an
extension to file responsive pleading dated February 3, 2006 the
fact that it was "the family of the defendants" that had engaged
him, and that he had then advised "the children of the
defendants" to seek the assistance as well of a licensed
geodetic surveyor and engineer;
4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his
honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then
still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he
would have most welcomed the information and would have
moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for
that reason;
5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a
falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death
certificates of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to
apprise the trial court of that fact; and
6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even dismissed
the criminal complaint for falsification brought against him (Atty.
Castelo) through the resolution dated February 11, 2010. The
same office denied the complainants motion for reconsideration
on May 17, 2010.
On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply,6
whereby he asserted that the respondents claim in his
comment that he had represented the Lim family was a
deception, because the subject of the complaint against the
respondent was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at
Page46
the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the
justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City
in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and
in denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against
members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate
recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the
prior referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts
being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case
No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits.
Ruling
We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any
falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No.
4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous
complaint.
I or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial
Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth
All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent, have
sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,7 viz:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers
Oath, providing:8
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as
officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby
enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of
any in court, and to conduct themselves according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law,
attorneys are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law
and to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by
others.9 The least they can do in that regard is to refrain from
engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which
broadly includes any act or omission contrary to law, but does
not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is
broad enough to include such element).10
To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest
value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:11
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He
should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be
at the expense of truth.
Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only
the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties,
but also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the
performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart
from their character as servants of the Law and as officers of the
Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf of their
clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of
inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory
tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in
ensuring the unhindered service to their clients causes and in
protecting the clients confidences. With the cloak of privilege,
they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally
proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal
prosecution or actions for damages.12
Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by
reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they
play in the administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege
and right to practice law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunals or offices only during good behavior.13
II
Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility
On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff
named as defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN.14 He alleged
therein that:
2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint are
ADMITTED. Moreover, it is hereby made known that defendants
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had already sold the two (2)
parcels of land, together with the building and improvements
thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (148805)
139876 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to Leonardo C.
Lim and William C. Lim, of Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza
del Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo Lim and William
Lim are their successors-in-interest and are the present lawful
owners thereof.
In order to properly and fully protect their rights, ownership and
interests, Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall hereby
represent the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as
substitute/representative parties in this action. In this manner, a
complete and expeditious resolution of the issues raised in this
case can be reached without undue delay. A photo copy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, executed by
herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in favor of
said Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as
Annex "1" hereof.
xxx
21. There is improper joinder of parties in the complaint.
Consequently, answering defendants are thus unduly compelled
to litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as to which they
have no knowledge of nor any involvement or participation in.
22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel in bringing this
suit, as it was the one who, by its governmental authority,
issued the titles to the subject property.
This action is barred by the principles of prescription and laches
for plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this suit, particularly
against defendant Flores, from whom herein answering
defendants acquired the subject property in good faith and for
value. If truly plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of action on
the subject property, it should not have waited thirty (30) years
Page47
to bring suit.
Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his complaint
in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.15 He expressly named
therein as defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but
also their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William
Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons whom the
respondent had already alleged in the answer, supra, to be the
transferees and current owners of the parcels of land.16
The following portions of De Leons complaint in intervention in
Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz:
2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, are Filipino
citizens with addresses at 504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46
C. Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where they may be
served with summons and other court processes;
3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age
and with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza
del Conde, Binondo, Manila, alleged purchasers of the property
in question from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;
4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City holds office in
Malabon City, where he may be served with summons and other
court processes. He is charged with the duty, among others, of
registering decrees of Land Registration in Malabon City under
the Land Registration Act;
xxx
7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner of a parcel of
land located in Malabon City described in TCT no. M-15183 of
the Register of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which is
attached to this Complaint as Annex "G", and copy of the
location plan of the aforementioned property is attached to this
complaint as Annex "H" and is made an integral part hereof;
8. That there are now more or less at least 40 squatters on
intervenors property, most of them employees of defendant
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William
Lim and Sally Lee who had gained access to intervenors
property and built their houses without benefit of any building
permits from the government who had made their access to
intervenors property thru a two panel metal gate more or less
10 meters wide and with an armed guard by the gate and with
permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
and/or and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee illegally entered
intervenors property thru a wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot
wall now separating intervenors property from the former
esquinita which is now part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chus and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally
Khoos and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lees
property and this illegally allowed his employees as well as their
relatives and friends thereof to illegally enter intervenors
property through the ladders defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu installed in their wall and also allowed said
employees and relatives as well as friends to build houses and
shacks without the benefit of any building permit as well as
permit to occupy said illegal buildings;
9. That the enlargement of the properties of spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu had resulted in the closure of street lot no. 3 as
described in TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
having titled the street lot no. 3 and placed a wall at its opening
on C. Arellano street, thus closing any exit or egress or entrance
to intervenors property as could be seen from Annex "H" hereof
and thus preventing intervenor from entering into his property
resulted in preventing intervenor from fully enjoying all the
beneficial benefits from his property;
10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and later
on defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are the only
people who could give permission to allow third parties to enter
intervenors property and their control over intervenors
property is enforced through his armed guard thus exercising
illegal beneficial rights over intervenors property at intervenors
loss and expense, thus depriving intervenor of legitimate
income from rents as well as legitimate access to intervenors
property and the worst is preventing the Filipino people from
enjoying the Malabon Navotas River and enjoying the right of
access to the natural fruits and products of the Malabon Navotas
River and instead it is defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee using the public
property exclusively to enrich their pockets;
xxx
13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee were confederating, working
and helping one another in their actions to inhibit intervenor
Jessie de Leon to gain access and beneficial benefit from his
property;
On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the
defendants named in De Leons complaint in intervention,
responded in an answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim,17 stating that "spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu xxx are now both deceased," to wit:
xxx
2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint are
ADMITTED, with the qualification that defendants-spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William Lim and Sally Lee Lim
are the registered and lawful owners of the subject property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-35929, issued by
the Register of Deeds for Malabon City, having long ago
acquired the same from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, who are now both deceased. Copy of the TCT No.
M-35929 is attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "1-A". The same
title has already been previously submitted to this Honorable
Court on December 13, 2006.
xxx
The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-called
clarification and submission,18 in which he again adverted to
the deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:
1. On March 19, 2009, herein movants-defendants Lim filed
before this Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the plaintiff Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the DENR;
2. The Motion for Substitution is grounded on the fact that the
two (2) parcels of land, with the improvements thereon, which
are the subject matter of the instant case, had long been sold
and transferred by the principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-intervention defendants
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to said Motion as
Annex "1" thereof.
3. Quite plainly, the original principal defendants Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject property,
have totally lost any title, claim or legal interest on the property.
It is on this factual ground that this Motion for Substitution is
based and certainly not on the wrong position of Intervenor de
Leon that the same is based on the death of defendants Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu.
4. Under the foregoing circumstances and facts, the demise of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no longer has any
significant relevance to the instant Motion. To, however, show
the fact of their death, photo copy of their respective death
certificates are attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "2" hereof.
5. The Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal
Complaint dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is
the clear, legal and imperative need to now substitute herein
movants-defendants Lim for defendants Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu in the said principal complaint.
6. Simply put, movants-defendants Lim have become the
indispensable defendants in the principal complaint of plaintiff
DENR, being now the registered and lawful owners of the subject
property and the real parties-in-interest in this case. Without
them, no final determination can be had in the Principal
Page48
complaint.
7. Significantly, the property of intervenor Jessie de Leon, which
is the subject of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically, if
not similarly, situated as that of herein movants-defendants Lim,
and likewise, may as well be a proper subject of the Principal
Complaint of plaintiff DENR.
8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself, concedes the fact that herein
movants-defendants Lim should be substituted as defendants in
the principal complaint as contained in their Manifestation dated
June 3, 2009, which has been filed in this case.
WHEREFORE, herein movants-defendants Lim most respectfully
submit their Motion for substitution of Defendants in the
Principal Complaint and pray that the same be granted.
xxx
Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the
averments in the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?
A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still
living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the
answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and
cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission,
supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already
deceased.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the
respondents pleadings might have created any impression that
the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still
cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or
falsification. For one, the respondent was acting in the interest
of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer
with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his
pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action
against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the
start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer
the actual owners of the affected properties due to the transfer
of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that
the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be
substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the
filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon
could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as a
voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other
persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual
awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in
intervention, supra, bear out in its specific allegations against
Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective spouses.
Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed
any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other
party.
III
Good faith must always motivate any complaint against a
Member of the Bar
According to Justice Cardozo,19 "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer,
however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of
ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of
tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."
A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court,
whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from
mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can
do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous
complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good
faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct.
A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is
encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of
justice.1avvphil
The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of
harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the
cudgels for his clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN,
or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject
matter of the pending action, or to accomplish some other dark
purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent from
the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint
sooner than later.
WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or
suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of
merit.
A.C. No. 7054 December 4, 2009
CONRADO QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant)
accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline
(IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the
following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by
filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),
two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC
and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final
judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2 (MeTC) and RTC3 in
the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents
clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-
well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the
complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of
the unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing
the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the
efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and
to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute
the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his
adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in
the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued
by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The
complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his
lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients
(who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.4
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that
unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation
of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment
for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the
second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic
of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of
representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762
when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of
the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro
bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the
homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila.
Page49
He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC
members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case
handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his
siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients
were the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the
respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in
filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to
protect the interests of his clients in their property. The
respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid
grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over
the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud
committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud
committed by the complainant and his family against his clients;
he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really
belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land.
The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for
annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to
contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts
of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal of the petition for annulment of
judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment
complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were
based on his observations and the notes he had taken during
the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open
court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized
appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he
immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case.
On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed
the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules
on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having
represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second
petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that
there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole
representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the
Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the
petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General
to represent his clients in the case.6
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal,
unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the
complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good
faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent
with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law
and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent
additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because
the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an
axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP
that the present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping
considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which
a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed
by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The
respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to
harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and,
indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members
of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf
of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent
meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and
protect the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and
energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the
primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and
majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is
not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients
thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and
must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in
forum-shopping.9
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the
respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the
final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer
case against his clients.10
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled
that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for
annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and
later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent
the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case
and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.11
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the respondent
was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition
for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and
attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of
which were untrue. 12
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner
disregarded the respondents explanation that he had no
intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three
of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment
of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating
Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the
representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a
majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-
forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner
likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his
misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title
since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can
institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely
signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients
and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline,
through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-
1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.13 On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced
the respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1)
year.14
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent
can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and
professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions
should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the
only one so far filed involving the respondent; another complaint
invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus
Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,
Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for
his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse
of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2)
years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the
suspension to six (6) months.16
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that
the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court
procedures and processes to shield his clients from the
execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the
unlawful detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as
Page50
CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to
question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case
be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of
petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the
ejectment case.17
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for
certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTCs and the
RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a
petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the
grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the
motion to dismiss filed.18
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for
annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in
the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these
petitions were both dismissed "for lack of legal personality on
the part of the plaintiffs" to file the petition.19
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of
judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the
respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the
same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the
complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive
relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts the
petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment,
the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the
petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents
persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final
decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful
detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts
go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical
rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already
uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the
respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a
lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in
prejudice to the winning parties in that case.20
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,21 as well as
the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed
against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same
objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes;
they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc
on orderly judicial procedure;22 and add to the congestion of
the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.23
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower
courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but
substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent
petitions involving the same property and the same parties not
only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using
different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful
detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious
with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and
declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution
of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had
become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,
intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed
with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the
RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic
fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The
extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition,
as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein),
deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available
after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners
(defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in
complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of
compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them
when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the
prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner
(defendants therein) 24
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent
alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new
trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed "that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the
RTC are null and void."25 These conflicting claims, no doubt,
involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the
petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and
unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office
colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge
when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which
was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only
the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of
public lands26 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This
second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic,
showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that
they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings;
(b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the
amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the
respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood
as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this underhanded manner, the
respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste
its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for
annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court
and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June
28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28,
2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the
aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in
open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance
of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the
defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED
AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO
THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.27[Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for
June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondents application for
temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the
adverse partys motion to dismiss.28 The records also show that
RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application
for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to
dismiss filed by the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of
the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the
transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the
Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without
stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the
Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in
the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the
Page51
Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.
[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the
falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of his
position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all
squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits,
his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28,
2002 hearing. 30
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating
the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings
with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court
to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and
his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."31 The
respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the
court makes him an indispensable participant in the
administration of justice,32 and that he is expected to act
candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.33 His duty as a lawyer
obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to
mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his
duties to his clients may be.34 In case of conflict, his duties to
his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.35
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to
observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ
only such means as are consistent with truth and honor.36 He
should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or
institute clearly groundless actions.37 The recital of what the
respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against
his clients shows that he actually committed what the above
rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for
annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted
above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and
accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and
connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate
how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The
respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases
previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the
same time, the respondents petition for annulment of judgment
also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the
unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent
believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has
been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty.
Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues." He was unfair because he imputed
wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis
therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead
and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that
the respondent twice represented parties without proper
authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment;
and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.38
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed
the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49
individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15
individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-
hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the
litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in
the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for
the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse
could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the
respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for
more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as
he so proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines
College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was
previously associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of compliance
with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed
over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper
authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint
for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the
Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the
Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed
an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a
surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he
signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his
clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the
unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may
not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from
the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without
leave of court.40 The willful unauthorized appearance by a
lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious
conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the
erring lawyer for professional misconduct.41
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University
of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and technicalities of law,
together with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on
the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for
an ulterior purpose.43 As both concepts are states of mind, they
may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more
particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose
state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in
defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion
from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he
made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took
advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread
the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the
respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the cases
that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and
RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting
conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he
filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest
belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve
his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer
judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to
determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the
same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.44 As we
explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion
Page52
in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and
justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client,
full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end
in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes,
and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind
himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and
that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best
of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the
bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.45
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the
disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the
complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We
reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who
filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only
the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own
separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the
underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with
very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is
mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as
an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of
justice an issue where the complainants personal motives
have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of
an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re:
Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not -
and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.461avvphi1
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal
motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to
file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent
committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby
failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on
members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should
be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally
recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as
previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which
shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe
and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar
the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the administration of justice which he
has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the
legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness
in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits
at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of
the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this
Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We
penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes
to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with
non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency
then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months.
We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear
that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and
since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a
finis to the respondents professional legal career for the sake of
the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM
Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and
Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the
Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable
for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath;
Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and
12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty
the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
.A.C. No. 3548 July 4, 2002
JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On September 1, 1990,1 Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint
for Disbarment2 charging Atty. Napoleon Corral with Malpractice
and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine Bar. The
complaint alleges, inter alia -
(1) That on February 12, 1990, a Decision was penned by the
Honorable Presiding Judge Gorgonio Y. Ybaez on (sic) Civil Case
No. 17473 for Ejectment.3
(2) That such decision was received by Annaliza Superio,
Secretary of Atty. Napoleon Corral, on February 23, 1990.4
(3) That on March 13, 1990, a "NOTICE OF APPEAL" was filed in
court by Atty. Napoleon Corral, a copy of which was served on
plaintiffs counsel.5
(4) That on March 14, 1990, [at] about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon
Corral came to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7,
Bacolod City and changed the date February 23, 1990 to
February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is no 29th in
February 1990, he filed a "REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS
MANIFESTATION" claiming therein that he received the Decision
not on the 29th in (sic) February 1990 but on the 28th of
February 1990.6
(5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics
as a lawyer by tampering with particularly by personally and
manually changing entries in the courts record without the
Courts prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of
a member of the Philippine Bar much more so because in so
doing he was found to have been motivated by the desire of
Page53
suppressing the truth. (6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon
Corral filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS", among other things he
stated that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the
case at issue.
In his defense, respondent claimed that the correction of the
date was done on the paper prepared by him. He also alleged
that the correction was initiated and done in the presence and
with the approval of the Clerk of Court and the other court
employees. According to respondent, the correction was made
because of typographical error he committed. He denied that
Annaliza Superio, who received the decision in his behalf, is his
secretary.
In a Resolution dated January 20, 1993, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.7 Thereafter,
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his
report on August 21, 1997 finding respondent guilty as charged
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
On October 25, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution approving and adopting the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the
IBP Boards decision. The Board, however, subsequently issued a
Resolution on March 28, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration and further pointed out that the pleading is
improper because his remedy was to file the same with this
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on May, 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging -
1. THAT THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR HEARING WHICH
HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT FROM THE
BEGINNING;
2. COMPLAINANT RIVERA COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN HE
CLAIMED THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED THE COURT RECORDS;
3. THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN BACOLOD CITY UNDER
JUDGE IBAEZ COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS.
Respondents claim that he was not afforded due process
deserves scant consideration. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 8 In fact
. . . a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled
to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against him during the hearings of the investigating
committee.9
Respondent can not feign he was denied an opportunity to be
heard in this case because as borne out by the records, hearings
had to be re-scheduled several times by the investigating
commissioner to afford him the chance to present his evidence.
The records disclose that when the case was referred to the IBP
by Resolution of the Court dated January 30, 1993,10
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued a Notice
of Hearing dated July 12, 1993 ordering complainant and
respondent to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline on August 19, 1993.
In response, complainant, who is based in Sta. Fe, Bacolod City,
sent a letter dated August 10, 1993 informing the Commission
that owing to his limited finances as a Baptist Pastor he could
not afford the expenses involved in attending the hearings and
in view thereof, he requested that the hearings be held without
his presence and that the case be decided based on the
evidence submitted. Nothing was heard from respondent,
although the records show that he was furnished a copy of the
notice.
On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant
and respondent did not appear. The investigator, however,
noted the letter of complainant dated August 10, 1993. As there
was no showing that respondent received the notice of hearing,
the investigator reset the hearing of the case for reception of
respondents evidence to September 30, 1993. Both parties,
who were duly furnished copies of the order, again did not
appear on said date. The hearing was again reset to November
8, 1993. Both parties likewise failed to appear on November 8,
1993 hearing, which was re-scheduled on January 6, 1994.
However, complainant sent a letter dated November 4, 1993
addressed to the investigator requesting that the hearings be
continued even in his absence for the reasons he stated in his
previous letter of August 10, 1993. Again nothing was heard
from respondent although he and complainant were furnished
copies by registered mail.
Neither complainant nor respondent appeared on the January 6,
1994 hearing, for which reason the investigator issued an order
re-scheduling the hearing for the last time to February 24, 1994
giving respondent "a last chance to present his evidence" with
the warning that respondents failure to do so will compel the
Commission to render a ruling based on the evidence submitted
by the complainant. The investigator, however, noted the
complainants letter of November 4, 1993 wherein the latter
manifested that he was resting his case based on the evidence
submitted by him together with the complaint.
On February 15, 1994, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that: 1.] the complaint filed is not verified; 2.] in the
hearings set by the Commission, complainant failed to appear;
3.] unless complainant appears personally, be sworn to and
questioned personally under oath, the complaint is defective; 4.]
the complaint which could be filed by anybody is a form of
harassment; 5.] in view of the repeated failure of complainant to
appear and be sworn to, the letter-complaint is merely hearsay.
On March 3, 1994, the investigator denied the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit and set for the last time the hearing on April 21,
1994 for the reception of respondents evidence.
On April 4, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Postponement
praying that the hearing be reset on the last week of July 1994.
Accompanying said motion was an "Answer To The Order Of The
Commission Dated March 3, 1994" where he averred, among
others, that: 1.] it was his right to cross-examine complainant
with respect to the allegations in the complaint; 2.] the
allegations in the complaint are not true and complainants use
of the name "Reverend" was made to deceive the Commission;
3.] what respondent actually did was to correct the date of his
pleading which was erroneously typed by his secretary and this
was done in the presence of the court employees with their
knowledge and consent; complainant made it appear that
respondent falsified the records; 4.] the correction of the date in
the pleading was done in good faith; 5.] this is not the first time
complainant filed complaints to harass people and to
misrepresent himself as a "Reverend"; 6.] in fact, complainant
was nearly stabbed to death by families whom he ejected from
their lands using donations of the church to buy the properties
in his name; 7.] respondent intended to file a complaint with the
Bible Baptist Association of America and the Philippines to
investigate complainants activities.
To accommodate respondent, the Investigating Commissioner
reset the hearing on July 28, 1994 with the warning that said
setting is intransferable and that the Commission will proceed
with its investigation on said date with or without respondents
presence. For failure of respondent to appear on said date, the
investigator issued an order considering the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
Given the foregoing factual backdrop, respondent can not now
complain that he was denied due process. On the contrary, the
Commission was lenient to a fault in accommodating his
numerous requests for continuance. Indeed, the chronology of
events shows that the prolonged silence of respondent and the
belated filing of his motion to dismiss followed by the "Answer"
to the investigators March 3, 1994 Order, were deliberately
resorted to hinder the proceedings.
The quintessence of due process is simply that a party be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side
Page54
and to adduce any evidence he may have in support of his
defense.11 Entrenched is the rule that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable
opportunity or a right to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings and opportunity to explain ones
side.12 Where opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.13
In his report, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that
the correction introduced by respondent was made not to reflect
the truth but to mislead the trial court into believing that the
notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The
Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 17473 was duly received by
a certain Annaliza Superio, the secretary of respondent, on
February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the Notice of Appeal on
March 13, 1990 which was clearly out of time. To extricate
himself from such predicament, respondent altered the date
when he allegedly received the Decision from February 23, 1990
to February 29, 1990. Realizing that there was no February 29,
1990 in the calendar, he sought to change the date again to
February 28, 1990 by means of a "reply to Plaintiffs
Manifestation".
The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that
respondents claim that the correction was made in the
presence of the Clerk of Court and other court employees was
denied by Nilda P. Tronco, the Branch Clerk of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bacolod City, who declared that the alteration was
surreptitiously made and would have been left unnoticed were it
not for the timely discovery thereof.14
The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully
supported by the evidence.1wphi1 However, the recommended
penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed of respondent.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is
not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers
but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting
the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to
remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard
of their lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.15
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.16
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended form his
office as attorney on the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit; 2.]
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3.] grossly
immoral conduct; 4.] conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; 5.] violation of the lawyers oath; 6.] willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7.]
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.
While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a
penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of the Court to
discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be
exercised because it can not be denied that respondent has
violated his solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest or deceitful conduct.17
The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01 states
in no uncertain terms that: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." More
specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that "a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper advantage in
any case or proceeding."
The Court "can not overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can
do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to his clients."18 Along the same vein, in Ong
v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,19 the Court ruled that "The ethics of the
legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of
his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity.20 Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in
such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession."21
By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice
of Appeal was timely filed, respondent committed an act of
dishonesty. Under pertinent rules,22 dishonesty constitutes
grave misconduct upon which the Court, in a recent case,23
imposed a one-year suspension on respondent therein for
inserting in the records of the case a certification of non-forum
shopping and making it appear that the same was already part
of such records at the time the complaint was filed. A one-year
suspension was similarly imposed on respondent in Reyes v.
Atty. Rolando Javier24 for deceiving his client into believing that
he filed the petition on time when in fact it was filed on a much
later date. It should be stressed that brazenly resorting to such a
legal subterfuge to mislead the court and to cover up for his
failings toward his client is not only a disgraceful indictment on
respondents moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a
lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his brethren in the Bar.
Such misconduct warrants a similar penalty for the Court can
not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair
name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Napoleon Corral is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of
respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
A.C. No. 7084 February 27, 2009
CONRADO G. FERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA ANGELICA P. DE RAMOS-VILLALON,
Respondent.
BRION, J.:
For our resolution is this administrative case filed by
complainant Conrado G. Fernandez (Fernandez) against Atty.
Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon (Atty. Villalon). The
complainant was the respondent in Civil Case No. 05-1017, in
which Carlos O. Palacios (Palacios) sought to nullify a Deed of
Donation he purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez.1 The
respondent in this administrative action, Atty. Villalon, was
Palacios counsel in the early part of the case; she withdrew
from the case after her appointment as prosecutor of Quezon
City.2
A brief summary of Civil Case No. 05-1017 is in order to put this
administrative complaint in proper context.
Palacios, in his Complaint in Civil Case No. 05-1017, alleged that
he was the owner of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 178587 located in Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati City.3
He allegedly inherited the lot from his mother. Sometime in June
2004, he became aware that his lot was being eyed by a land-
grabbing syndicate. The syndicate attempted to obtain a copy of
TCT No. 178587 by pretending to be Carlos Palacios, Jr., and by
filing a Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of Lost Owners
Duplicate Original Copy of TCT No. 178587. The petition was
docketed as LRC Case No. M-4524.4
Palacios received information that Fernandez could help him
oppose the syndicates petition. Thus, Palacios approached
Fernandez, and they eventually succeeded in causing the
withdrawal of LRC Case No. M-4524, with the assistance of a
certain Atty. Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr.. Palacios allegedly agreed to
pay Fernandez P2,000,000.00 for the services he rendered in
Page55
LRC Case No. M-4524.
On September 27, 2005, when Palacios visited the Village
Administrator of the San Lorenzo Village Association, he bumped
into Mrs. Jocelyn Lirio who expressed her interest in Palacios
San Lazaro property. She had heard it was being sold by
Fernandez. Palacios was surprised by Mrs. Lirios story, as he
had no intention of selling the property. Upon investigation, he
discovered that Fernandez had falsified a Deed of Donation that
he (Palacios) purportedly executed in Fernandez favor. This
Deed was duly registered, and on the strength of the purported
donation, TCT No. 178587 in Palacios name was cancelled, and
a new TCT (TCT No. 220869) was issued in Fernandez name.
Palacios then employed the services of respondent Atty. Villalon
to file a Complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of
Donation that became the basis for the issuance of a title in
Fernandez name.5 This complaint was subsequently amended
to implead Romeo Castro, Atty. Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr., Levy R.
De Dios, and Rosario T. Abobo.6
In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his
name was proper on account of an existing Deed of Absolute
Sale dated January 12, 2005 between him and Palacios. He also
alleged that it was Palacios who falsified a Deed of Donation by
forging their signatures and having it notarized;7 Palacios did
this in order to cheat the government by paying only the donors
tax, which was lower than the capital gains tax he would have
paid had the transaction been represented as a sale. He
additionally alleged that Palacios intended to falsify the Deed of
Donation in order to have a ground for the annulment of the
new TCT issued in favor of Fernandez and, ultimately, to recover
the property.
On March 2, 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01,8 Rule 7.03,9 Rule
10.01,10 Rule 10.02,11 and Rule 10.0312 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.13 Fernandez alleged that Atty.
Villalon, acting as Palacios counsel, deceitfully:
1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended
Complaint her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 12, 2005;
2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to deceive the
court into trying Civil Case No. 05-1071, the action for the
annulment of TCT No. 220869, despite her knowledge of the
existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale;
3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify whether
the attached Deed of Absolute Sale was properly notarized, the
respondent Villalon personally inquired before the notarial
section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City thru a
letter-request, whether a record of the deed existed in the said
office; in the letter-request, the respondent misrepresented that
there was already a pending case in the RTC of Makati before
November 9, 2005;
4. refused to receive the complainants Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim so that she could file on behalf of her client an
Amended Complaint without leave of court and without
presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale;
5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia (Heredia) to sign a false
Affidavit by telling her that it would only be for purposes of
compelling Fernandez to pay additional sums to her client;
however, Atty. Villalon used it as evidence to frame the
complainant Fernandez for her own personal gain;
6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature
examination and certification by the NBI and intentionally failed
to submit the Deed of Absolute Sale.14
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. On January 30, 2008,
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) issued a
Report and Recommendation to dismiss the case, which in part
reads:
There is no sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for
failure to mention in the Complaint and Amended Complaint the
existence of the January 12 Deed of Absolute Sale. No such duty
is imposed upon the legal counsel under any law or the Rules of
Court. This Commissioner agrees with respondents argument
that only the clients operative facts and not the other
evidentiary facts need to be included in the Complaint. It is
correct for the respondent to argue that pointing out the
existence of the January 12 Deed of Absolute Sale was a matter
of defense which the defendant in said civil case can freely point
out to the trial judge through his own pleadings.
It cannot be argued that there was suppression of evidence on
the part of the respondent as she is not the only person who had
access or possession of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. It was a
document readily available to the general public through the
Notarial Office. Moreover, it was a document which was fully
known to herein complainant as he was supposed to be a party
to the said Deed of Absolute Sale. In other words, a person
cannot possibly suppress the existence of a document which
everyone else, especially the opposing party-litigant, knows
about.
Furthermore, it is noted that while the letter to the Notarial
Office was dated November 9, it was actually received by said
office only on November 14, 2005. The civil Complaint was filed
on November 15, or on the next day. We take note that there is
no indication when the Notarial Office formally replied to the
respondents letter inquiry. Therefore, it cannot be said with
certainty that respondent acquired knowledge about the Deed of
Absolute Sale on November 14 or November 15.
We also take note that assuming the respondent had knowledge
about (sic) the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the
civil complaint was filed, her role as the legal counsel is limited
by the clients choice of cause of action. Moreover, its mere
existence as a document is not an affirmation of its validity or
due execution. In other words, the client, possibly believing in
the invalidity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, may have chosen to
refute the validity of the document at a later time when and if
its existence is raised. This is a choice within the discretion of
the party-litigant. The opposing party cannot impose it as a duty
upon the other party or his legal counsel. There is, therefore, no
sufficient factual basis to hold respondent accountable in this
charge. As it turns out, respondents client claims no
consideration was ever given for the Deed of Absolute Sale and
is consequently arguing that said Deed is void.
As for the accusation that respondent committed
misrepresentation in her November 9 letter by stating that a
case had already been filed when in truth no such case is yet
pending, we take note that assuming a misrepresentation was
committed, such act does not attain a degree of materiality or
gravity so as to attribute evil malice on the part of respondent.
The intent on the part of respondent remains the same, that is,
to obtain relevant information. We cannot attribute any evil
deception in the said letter considering the surrounding facts
especially since a civil complaint was in fact filed the very next
day the letter was sent.
As for the accusation that respondent refused or failed to
receive registered mail matters, such has not been factually
substantiated. The same goes with the accusation that
respondents failed to furnish herein complainants lawyer with a
copy of the Amended Complaint.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent did not
commit any act for which she should be disciplined or
administratively sanctioned.
It is therefore recommended that this CASE BE DISMISSED for
lack of merit.15
Before this Court, Fernandez filed a Petition for Review raising
the following issues:
1. whether Commissioner Funa committed grave abuse of
discretion in recommending the dismissal of the disbarment
case against the Respondent;
2. whether Commissioner Funa committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to resolve the matter regarding the affidavit
of Heredia, in which she retracted her affidavit in Civil Case No.
05-1017 and further said that the respondent induced her to
issue a false affidavit by telling her that the said affidavit would
only be used to compel Fernandez to pay additional sums to
Page56
Palacios.
THE COURTS RULING
We agree with the recommendation of IBP Commissioner Funa.
The charges against the respondent do not constitute sufficient
grounds for disbarment.
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthful in
all his dealings.16 However, this duty does not require that the
lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her
clients opponent. A lawyer is his or her clients advocate; while
duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to
build the case for his or her clients opponent.
The respondents former client, Palacios, approached her to file
a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. This was
the cause of action chosen by her client. Assuming arguendo
that the respondent knew of the presence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, its existence, is, indeed, a matter of defense for
Fernandez. We cannot fault the respondent for choosing not to
pursue the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The
respondent alleged that her former client, Palacios, informed her
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was void for lack of
consideration. Furthermore, unlike the Deed of Donation, the
Deed of Absolute Sale was not registered in the Registry of
Deeds and was not the basis for the transfer of title of Palacios
property to Fernandez. Under the circumstances, it was not
unreasonable for a lawyer to conclude, whether correctly or
incorrectly, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was immaterial in
achieving the ultimate goal the recovery of Palacios property.
On the second issue, the petitioner complains that
Commissioner Funa failed to consider Heredias affidavit of
retraction.17 As a rule, we view retractions with caution; they
can be bought and obtained through threats, intimidation, or
monetary consideration.18 The better rule is to examine them
closely by considering the original, the new statements and the
surrounding circumstances, based on the rules of evidence.19
The petitioner raised the retraction for the first time in his
Supplemental to (sic) Reply to Comment filed with the Office of
the Bar Confidant on November 10, 2006.20 The petitioner
attached Heredias affidavit of December 11, 2005 and her
affidavit of retraction.
In her affidavit of December 11, 2005, Heredia attested that: 1)
Palacios sought her help when a syndicate attempted to grab his
land; 2) she referred Palacios to the group of Castro, Fernandez,
and Jimenez who were then helping her with her own legal
problems; 3) she regretted having referred Palacios to this group
as she herself was later "victimized by the group; 4) they made
her sign blank papers after gaining her trust and confidence,
which signed blanks the group later filled up to make it appear
that they bought and paid for her real property; 5) she
terminated the services of this group sometime in April 2005; 6)
she only recently came to know of this groups modus operandi;
and 7) Palacios eventually became one of the groups victims.
In her affidavit of retraction, Heredia basically averred that the
statements in the affidavit of December 11, 2005 were prepared
by Villalon who asked her, in the presence of Palacios, to sign
the affidavit; that the affidavit contained lies which she rejected
outright, but Palacios and the respondent convinced her that
they would only use the affidavit to convince Fernandez to give
additional sums of money for Palacios property; that Palacios
admitted getting a motorcyle from Fernandez; that Palacios had
been paid not less than P6,000,000.00 for his property; that the
respondent and Palacios used her affidavit in the cases they
filed against Fernandez; that this violated their agreement that
the affidavit would only be used in their negotiations to get
more money for the property; that Palacios admitted to her that
he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Fernandez; that the
execution of the Deed of Donation was his idea; that Palacios
had Fernandez signature in the Deed of Donation forged and
was regretting having done so because Fernandez filed various
charges, including perjury, against him; that she executed the
affidavit of retraction in the interest of justice, to tell the truth
about the circumstances surrounding the affidavit of December
11, 2005, to clear her name, to show that she is not part of the
lies concocted by Atty. Villalon and Palacios, and to correct the
wrong that was done by the affidavit of December 11, 2005 to
the persons of Conrado Fernandez, Romeo Castro, and Atty.
Augusto Jimenez, Jr.
In the Mandatory Conference and Hearing held on July 4, 2007,
Commissioner Funa asked the respondent, through counsel,
whether she wanted to cross-examine Heredia regarding her
affidavit of retraction.21 The respondent passed up the chance
for a direct confrontation and opted to adopt her comment as
her position paper. In the position paper she submitted on
January 14, 2008, she attacked the credibility of Heredias
affidavit of retraction. She posited that Heredia contradicted
herself when she said that she rejected the pre-prepared
contents of the first affidavit outright but still signed it; that
Heredias claim that she had been hoodwinked into signing the
first affidavit because she was assured that it was a mere scrap
of paper, was unbelievable; and that Heredia failed to rebut her
earlier statement that she regretted having referred Fernandez
group to Palacios because she herself fell victim to the group.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the
complainant.22 Considering the gravity of the penalty of
disbarment or suspension as a member of the Bar, a lawyer may
only be disbarred or suspended if there is clear, convincing, and
satisfactory proof that he or she committed transgressions
defined by the rules as grounds to strip him or her of his
professional license.23
In this case, we find no clear evidence we can satisfactorily
accept showing that the respondent improperly induced Heredia
to sign the affidavit of December 11, 2005, as alleged in
Heredias affidavit of retraction.
First, the original affidavit and the retraction stand
uncorroborated by any other evidence and, in our view, stand on
the same footing. Neither affidavit provides clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof of what they allege. They cannot
therefore stand as meritorious basis for an accusation against
the respondent.
Second, the allegations in both sworn statements are so
contradictory that we can only conclude that Heredia had
grossly lied in either or even in both instruments. We find it
incredible that Heredia, as stated in her affidavit of retraction,
vehemently rejected the statements in the first affidavit, but
nevertheless agreed to sign it because it would only be used to
aid Palacios in his negotiations with Fernandez. Effectively, she
admitted in her retraction that she had lied under oath and
entered into a conspiracy to extract additional funds from
Fernandez who would not have accepted the demand if they
were falsely made. Why she did what she said she did is not at
all clear from her retraction, which itself was not convincingly
clear on why she was retracting. For this Court to accept a
retraction that raises more questions than answers, made by a
witness of doubtful credibility allegedly for the sake of truth, is
beyond the limits of what this Court can accept.
In these lights, the retraction has no particular relevance so that
the Commissioners failure to consider it would matter.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Disbarment is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 132365 July 9, 1998
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar,
and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN
MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari
with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested
Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which
are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6)
years.
The antecedents are not disputed.
Page57
In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an
information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a
public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan,
both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan
political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director
in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the
Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial
Court of Alien, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:
a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private
respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents
Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private
respondent Esbel Chua only;
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private
respondent Diosdada Amor only.
In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge
Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio
ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed
the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the
appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the
maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not
exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the
Order read as follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly
charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty
of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of
imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification
to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.)
Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded
Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city
or municipal ordinance committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof,
Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction
over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty
imposable did not exceed six (6) years.
The two motions 4 for reconsideration separately filed by the
COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC
itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the
public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, 5 the
petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that public
respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election
offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code and this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge
Juan Lavilles, Jr.," Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election offenses.
On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the
Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General informs us that it is "adopting" the instant petition on
the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent "are
clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence."
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers
that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested
in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend
him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No.
7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over
offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years
of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that
all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are
deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude
that since the election offense in question is punishable with
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by
Municipal Trial Courts.
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except
those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to
vote. 6 It reads as follows:
Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. The regional trial court
shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those
enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly
committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of
said Section, thus:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty
of an election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any
officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding
political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other
para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be
organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election
campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to
vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election
offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or
failure to vote, is "imprisonment of not less than one year but
not more than six years" and the offender shall not be subject to
probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office
and deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7691, provides as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city
or municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
Page58
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals 7 that by
virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific
provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of
the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those
excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor,
or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the
Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the
exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are
cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual
Property; 8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 9 as
amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the
plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law
that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and
determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and
must be construed as an exception to the general law on
jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No.
7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on
jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend
specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does nut have the effect of repealing laws
vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases
therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No.
7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident
from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It
is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as
other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law,
10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, 11 to be faithful to the law, and to
maintain professional competence. 12
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of
petitioner's Law Department, must also be admonished for his
utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge
Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration 13 he filed,
with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a
settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the
Supreme Court succinctly held:
A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that
pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code
and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of
the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception
exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to
register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together
with the provisions that any election offense under the code
shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6)
years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus
Election Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the
Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a
matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over
criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest
upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite
its expanded jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours)
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:
16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto
-vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same
issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial
Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:
With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent
Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and
267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the power to
conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses
punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise
jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to
vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the
provision that any election offense under the code shall be
punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years
and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus
Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the
code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over
election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on
jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as
amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by
Republic Act. No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction
over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that
the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is
neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for
reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but
ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in
volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as
falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in
volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition,
Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted
portions were findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our
own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the
memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge
Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in
Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said
cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to
faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the
discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
No costs.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA,
respondents.
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's
Page59
decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the
following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted
litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions
and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a
simple money judgment which has long become final and
executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned
or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing
courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the
petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas,
counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on
the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it
reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and
condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their
clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a
semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient
reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the
firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the
above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause
delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in
this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the
extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed
alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic
maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but
calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that
the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they
not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in
CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality
of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with
reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the
execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of
the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years
after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same
has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez
spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance
of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final
judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have
jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately
deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out
temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the
aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez,
Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an
ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she
filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil
case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which
latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the
execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31,
1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on
October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued
enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution
sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the
movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the
Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue
the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the
recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a
month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic
civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution
issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal
nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of
Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced
in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce
any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in
fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled
hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following
order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was
called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not
appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the
motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is
waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent
motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is
therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by
Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the
execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another
tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had
staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the
controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case
7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As
most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their
counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on
November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on
the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by
injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was
denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge
Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact
on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case
39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of
October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned
motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the
reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the
first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not
even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to
replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to
the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a
matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on
December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to
produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent
Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for
reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the
protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants
that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any
particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate
aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the
fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by
their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies"
projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money
judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their
own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such
that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they
interposed another until the case reached this Court for the
second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than
one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was
practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the
aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy"
when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the
validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy
made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is
not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin
the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which
action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be
established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim.
Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the
petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases
7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought
other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction
Page60
of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said
cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the
above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context.
We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of
the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases
7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the
conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We
used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted
execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy.
But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy"
in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court
of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532
and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not
have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to
restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere
with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of
the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292
did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal
action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to
continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the
fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532
when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to
recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored
on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case,
until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9,
1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez
spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the
herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary
injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil
case until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964,
with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of
the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was
because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a
quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit
or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.
A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client;
its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several
counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was
rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering
that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which
shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel"
may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we
said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the
petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407,
after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned
decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the
movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own
admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the
time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about
August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision
above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became
petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with
Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of
First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala
although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall
writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407
on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby
Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel
for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is
the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough,
antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied.
Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense
that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly
and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.