FUENTES v ROCA Further, Atty.

Plagatas defective notarization of the affidavit of consent

did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be

Charges upon and obligations of CPG (FC 121-122) on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate
Without Consent Rosario s consent. She personally signed the affidavit in the presence of
PONENTE: Abad, J. Atty. Plagata.
(1) CA reversed RTC decision on appeal. It found sufficient evidence of
DOCTRINE: In contrast to Art 173 CC, FC 124 does not provide a period forgery, taking in consideration that the couple have been living separately
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale for 30 years. Futher, the property relations between the couple was
of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses
governed by CC, under which an action for annulment of sale on the
written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the
marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action
RULING FORMAT: RTC- Dismissed petition. CA- Reversed decision, that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the sale.
ordered reconveyance and reimbursement. SC- Affirmed CAs decision. However, the sale was merely voidable. The Fuentes spouses, who acted
in good faith, are entitled to reimbursement of what they paid and for the
FACTS: improvements made.
(1) On October 11, 1982, Sabina Tarroza sold a parcel of land to her (2) Unsatisfied, Fuentes spouses appealed.
son, Tarciano, under a deed of absolute sale. However, Tarciano
did not have the title transferred to his name. ISSUE:
(2) 6 years later, in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. They arranged to meet at

1. WON Rosarios signature giving consent to the sale was forged. (YES)
the office of Atty. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the 2. WON the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
documents of sale. The signed agreement expressly stated that spouses already prescribed. (NO)
sale was to take effect in 6 months. 3. WON only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
(3) Agreement required Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a DP of action to annul that sale. (NO)
P60k for the transfer of lot title; within 6 months, Tarciano was to
clear the lot and secure the consent of his estranged wife, HELD:
Rosario, to the sale. After which, an additional P140-160k was to
be paid. (1) This is a key issue for if the signature was genuine, the fact that she gave
(4) Atty. Plagata allegedly went to see Rosario in Manila, had her her consent to her husbands sale of conjugal land would render other
sign an affidavit of consent, and notarized the document. After all issues academic. SC agrees with the observations of the CA regarding the
the conditions were met, a new title was issued in the name of the

obvious variance in Rosarios signature strokes. Moreover, the couple
spouses, who immediately constructed a building on the lot. lived separately for 30 years. The falsified jurat Atty. Plagata executed,
(5) On January 1990, Tarciano passed away, followed by Rosario 9 taken together with the marks of forgery, is sufficient evidence that no
months later. consent was obtained. Notwithstanding Fuentes spouses good faith, the
(6) 8 years later, in 1997, the children of the Tarciano and Roasario sale is still void without authentic consent.
filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the (2) When the couple married, the CC put in place the system of CPG:
land. They claimed that the signature of Rosario in the affidavit a. Art 165 CC Made Tarciano the sole administrator of the CP
was forged as she did not give her consent. b. Art 166 CC Prohibited him from selling commonly owned real
(7) RTC dismissed the case ruling that the action had already property without his wifes consent; making sale voidable.
prescribed (4 years, pursuant to Art 1391 of the CC.) In this case, c. Art 173 CC Gave Rosario the right to have sale annulled during
Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the marriage within 10 yrs from the date of the sale. Incase she
the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the

fails, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of marriage,
new title was issued. They only filed for action almost 9 years only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.
after the title was issued.
 However, FC 105 provides that the FC shall also apply to already
existing CPGs without prejudice to vested rights. Consequently,
when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot, the law that governed the
disposal was already the FC.

In contrast with Art 173 CC, FC 124 does not provide a period
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail the sale. It

only provides that without the other spouses written consent or
court order allowing the sale, the sale would be void. And under
the provisions of the CC, a void contract cannot be validated by
ratification or prescription.
In the present case, the Rocas right to file action against the
Fuentes spouses cannot prescribe. Even assuming that the CC
applies, Art 173 CC provides that wife may bring action for
annulment within 10 years. Consequently, the action filed by the
heirs fell within the 10 year prescriptive period.

(3) The sale in this case is void ab initio. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale.
When the two died, ownership passed to the heirs. As lawful
owners, the Rocas had the right to exclude any person from its

enjoyment and disposal.

However, to be fair, Fuentes spouses is entitled to recover the
P200k paid, with legal interest, chargeable to the estate. Further,
as possessor in good faith, the spouses are under no obligation to
pay for their stay on the property. Moreover, they are entitled to
indemnity for the improvements made on the property, or paying

the increase in value which property may have acquired by reason
of such improvements, with a right of retention until
reimbursement is made.







PEOPLE v LAGRIMAS Life imprisonment of the husband, in the absence of a judicial separation
of property decreed in accordance with Art 191, cannot be a cause of

Charges upon and obligations of CPG (FC 121-122) liquidation. Moreover, the fines and indemnities sought to be charged are
Personal Debts (FC 122, RPC 108) not debts or obligations contracted for the benefit, of the CPG. The RTC
PONENTE: Fernando, J. concluded that the law is clear on the matter; the indemnities in the present
case may only be charged against the exclusive properties o the accused or
DOCTRINE: Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife his share in the partnership assets after liquidation.
"may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities (1) Hence, the appeal by the offended party.
enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound

should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient." ISSUE
WON RTC erred in quashing and annulling the writs of attachment and execution.
RULING FORMAT: RTC- Granted motion to quash writ. SC- (YES)
Remanded case to RTC for reception of evidence.
HELD
FACTS: (1) The CC provides that fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband
(8) On February 1960, an information was filed against the accused, or wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
Froilan Lagrimas, for the murder of Pelagio Cagro. Thereater, responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse
appellants as such heirs, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
of preliminary attachment on the property of the accused; such insufficient; x x x."
was granted.
- It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability
(9) After trial, RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnification to existing. The law speaks of "partnership assets." Thus, the termination
the heirs in a total sum of P16,000. The judgment became final in of the CPG is not contemplated as a prerequisite. Furthermore, the
1962. article provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the partnership

(10) A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was issued upon such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
motion of the appellants and levy was made on 11 parcels of above-mentioned."
land, which were declared under the name of the accused. The - However, the terms cannot be accepted outright. If the appealed order
sale at public auction was scheduled in on January 1965, but on were to be upheld, he would be in effect exempt therefrom, the heirs
December 1964, the wife of the accused, Mercedes, filed a of the offended party being made to suffer still further. In doing
motion to quash the writ of attachment and execution alleging justice to the heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice is committed
that the property levied belonged to the CPG; therefore, could not
against the family of the offender; such as they are made to bear
be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity of the husband. burdens of an extremely onerous character. It is a condition that the
(11) RTC Ruling: 1st judge granted motion and declared writ null and responsibilities under Art 161 covering primarily the maintenance of
void; 2nd judge sustained legality of writs; 3rd judge revived the the family and the education of the children are first satisfied.
original order declaring writ null and void. -
(12) Ratio of the RTC Decision: Only debts contracted by husband or (2) The heirs of the deceased seek the opportunity to present evidence as to
wife before the marriage, and those fines and indemnities how the CPG could be made to respond. In Lacson v Diaz, the Court
imposed upon them, may be enforced against partnership assets ruled that it is incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or the
after the charges enumerated in Art 161 have been covered. So creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are obtaining." The
long as the obligations in Art 161 have not been paid, the assets proof required should not be the most the exacting kind, ordinary
of the partnership cannot be made to answer for the indemnities. credibility is enough; the husband or wife representing the CPG may be
Further, before the obligations in Art 161 can be paid, the CPG
tempted to magnify the obligation in order to defeat the offended partys
must first be liquidated; liquidation can only occur under the right of recovery.
causes under Art 175one of which is death. However, in this
case, both spouses are still living.
PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITE

Charges upon and obligations of CPG (FC 121-122) FC 256 does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into ACP
Personal Debts (FC 122, RPC 108)
relation all CPG that existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements. The FC provides in Art 76 that marriage
PONENTE: Abad, J. settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Clearly,
therefore, CPG between Efren and Melecia cannot be modified except
DOCTRINE:
before the celebration of that marriage. None of the circumstances
provided for by Art 132 exists to warrant post-marriage modifications of

such settlements. Further, under the CPG, the husband and wife place only
RULING FORMAT: RTC- Denied motion to quash; MR Denied. CA- the fruits of their separate property and incomes from work or industry in
Affirmed RTC Decision. SC- Affirmed CA Decision, with modification. common fund. They continue to enjoy rights of ownership over their
separate properties. To automatically change the marriage settlements into
FACTS: ACP would impair their acquired or vested rights to such properties.
(1) Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and 8 others were accused of
murder. It is clear that Efren and Melecia were married when the CC was still
(2) On July 9, 1997, RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting operative. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that
Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence, but Melecia they were married under the regime of CPG.
was convicted and sentenced to death. In addition, she was
ordered to pay civil indemnity to each of the heirs of the victims.
(2) The FC contains provisions governing the CPG that supersede CC
The decision became final and executory on October 2001.
provisions. Consequently, the Court must refer to the FC provisions in
(3) On March 12, 2002, upon motion for executive by the heirs of the deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may
deceased, the RTC issued a writ levying the real properties be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
case.
(4) On April 3, 2002, petitioner Eren and his wife Melecia filed a
motion to quash writ of execution, claiming that the levied
Efren did not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of property of her own. Therefore, pursuant to FC 122, the civil indemnity
Melecia. RTC denied the motion. that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
(5) Upon appeal, CA dismissed petition for failure to sufficiently against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in FC
show that RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing orders.
121 have been covered.
ISSUE:
Contrary to Efrens contention, FC 121 allows payment of the criminal
WON the CA erred in holding that the CPG of Efren and Melecia can be indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities
the murder case.
may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No prior
HELD: liquidation of those assets is required.
(1) The RTC and CA erred in applying the reasoning that Efren and
Melecias property regime was admittedly conjugal under the This is not altogether unfair since FC 122 states that at the time of
CC, however since the transitory provision of the FC gave its liquidation of the partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for
provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
impaired, therefore the property regime between the couple
changed to ACP when the FC took effect.
GUIANG v CA (7) On March 11, 1990, Gilda returned home. She found her children staying
with different households and her husband was nowhere to be found.

Ownership, administration and enjoyment (8) Guiang spouses filed a complaint of trespassing against Gilda before the
Joint Administration (FC 124) Barangay authorities for staying in the house sold by Judie. The parties
signed an amicable settlement, providing that Gilda and the children
PONENTE: Panganiban, J. voluntarily leave the house where they are presently boarding without any
charge.
DOCTRINE: In this instance, private respondents consent to the contract (9) Believing she had received the shorter end of the bargain, Gilda went to
of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This
the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not
being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 having been made, she stayed put in her house and lot.
of the Family Code. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or (10) Guiang spouses filed a motion for execution of the amicable settlement.
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal The proceedings of such before the MTC are still pending.
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. (11) RTC, affirmed by the CA, ruled that any alienation or encumbrance by

These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance the husband of the conjugal property without the consent of his wife is null
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the and void as provided under FC 124. It also rejected petitioners contention
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition that the amicable settlement ratified said sale, citing Art. 1409 CC which
or encumbrance shall be void. expressly bars ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly
those prohibited or declared void by law.
RULING FORMAT: RTC- Granted petition declaring Deed of Sale null
ISSUE
and void. CA- Affirmed Decision. SC- Affirmed Decision.
1. WON Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed. (NO)
FACTS: 2. WON the CA erred in not declaring the said Deed as a voidable contract
(1) Judie and Gilda Corpuz were civilly wed on December 24, 1968. which was validly ratified through execution of the amicable settlement.
The couple have 3 childrenJunie, Harriet, Jodie or Joji. (NO)

(2) On February 14, 1983, the couple bought a lot in South Cotabato
from Manuel Callejo, in a conditional deed of sale; the HELD
consideration of which was payable in installment. (1) In this instance, private respondents consent to the contract of sale of their
(3) On April 22, 1988, the couple sold of the portion to petitioners conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This being the case, said
Antonio and Luzviminda Guing. The latter have since then contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
occupied the portion and built their house thereon. Thus, they which was correctly applied by the two lower courts:

became neighbors of the Corpuzes.
(4) Gilda left for Manila sometime in June 1989. Her plans to go ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
abroad fell through, so she stayed for some time in Manila. After partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
his wifes departure, Judie seldom went home to the conjugal disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
dwelling. He stayed at his work place, a resto-hotel cooperative. recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
(5) Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father availed of within five years from the date of the contract
intended to sell the remaining portion of the lot, including their implementing such decision.
house. She wrote to her mother, who objected to the sale. He
gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang expecting Guiang to advise In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
her father. Despite the objection, the sale still pushed through. participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
(6) On March 5, 1990, to cure whatever defect in the title, spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
Luzviminda executed another agreement over the disputed lot,

not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
with the widow of the original registered owner from whom Judie have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
and Gilda originally bought the lot from, signing as vendor. spouse.
 In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Comparing FC 124 to the equivalent provisions of the CC, the

RTC correctly ruled that the disposition or encumbrance is void.
Under the CC, it is merely voidable and wife may bring an action
to annul alienation or encumbracnce within 10 years. The 10 year
prescriptive period was not carried over to the the FC; therefore,
any alienation or encumbrance made after Aug 3, 1988 without
the consent of the wife is null and void.

Furthermore, the fraud and intimidation were perpetrated in the

execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement.
To constitute a valid contract under the CC, there must be cause,
object, and considerationconsent is absent here. In any event,
its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale.
It was entered into without the wifes consent, which under the
FC is void.

(2) Since the amicable settlement was executed as a direct offshoot

of the deed of sale, it is likewise void; pursuant to Art. 1422 CC.
A void contract cannot be ratified. Neither can the amicable
settlement be considered a continuing offer to sell property or an
acceptance of such offer. No stretch of imagination can the Court
interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned under FC
124.