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DACOYCOY V. CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991) on the ground of improper venue (SC Resolution 15 October
FACTS Jesus Dacoycoy filed before RTC of Antipolo, Rizal a
complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman
praying for annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of
riceland located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of
the produce, and damages. Before summons could be
served on de Guzman, RTC judge ordered counsel for
petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter
of venue. After said conference, RTC dismissed the complaint
due to improper venue. RTC found that petitioners action is
a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the deeds
of sale but also recovery of ownership of the riceland which
was outside of the RTCs territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner
appealed to IAC which affirmed RTCs order of dismissal.
Petitioner faults the IAC in affirming RTC finding that the
venue was improperly laid when de Guzman has not even
answered the complaint nor waived the venue.
HELD Petition granted. The court can not motu proprio
dismiss the case on ground of improper venue. Objections to
venue may be waived by the parties. Improper venue does
not necessarily divest the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the controversy.
Even granting that the action of petitioner is a real action,
respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction over the
case, it being a RTC vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein.
de Leon: This does not apply in summary procedure cases
where the court may motu propio dismiss the complaint even
1991, Sec. 4).
FORTUNE MOTORS V. CA, 178 SCRA 564
(1989)
FACTS Metrobank extended various loans to Fortune which
was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune
building and lot in Makati. For failure of Fortune to pay the
loans, Metrobank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. After notice were served, posted and published,
the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction to
Metrobank as the highest bidder.
3days after the expiration of the 1yr redemption period,
Fortune filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale alleging that the foreclosure was premature
because its obligation to Metrobank was not yet due,
publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was
no public auction, and the price for which the property was
sold was shockingly low.
Before summons could be served, Metrobank filed a MtD the
complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was
improperly laid in Manila for the subject real property is
situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul the
foreclosure sale should be filed in Makati RTC.
MtD was opposed by Fortune alleging that its action is a
personal action and that the issue is the validity of the
extrajudicial proceedings so that it may have a new 1yr
redemption period.

Manila RTC issued an order reserving the resolution of
Metrobanks MtD until after the trial on the merits as the
grounds relied upon by the defendant were not clear and
indubitable. Metrobank filed a MfR but was denied by Manila
RTC. Metrobank appealed to CA. CA granted and dismissed
the annulment case without prejudice to its being filed in the
proper venue.
HELD An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure
sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of
real property. Both are actions that affect title and seek
recovery of the real property sold. It is therefore a real action
which should be commenced and tried in the province where
the property or part thereof lies. Petition denied.
decision affirmed.
CLAVECILLA RADIO V. ANTILLON, 19
SCRA 379 (1967)
FACTS New Cagayan Grocery Bacolod Branch sent a
message (REURTEL WASHED NOT AVAILABLE REFINED
TWENTY FIFTY IF AGREEABLE SHALL SHIP LATER REPLY) to
New Cagayan Grocery CDO Branch thru Clavecilla Radio
Bacolod. Clavecilla Radio Cagayan received the message.
However, in delivering the same to New Cagayan Grocery
CDO, the word NOT between the word WASHED and
AVAILABLE was omitted, thus changing entirely the
contents and purport of the message and causing the
addressee to suffer damages.
New Cagayan filed a complaint against Clavecilla in the MTC.
After service of summons, Clavecilla filed MtD the complaint
on the grounds that it states no cause of action and the
venue is improperly laid. New Cagayan interposed
opposition to which Clavecilla filed its rejoinder. Thereafter,
MTC judge Antillon denied MtD for lack of merit.
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Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition and prelim injunction
with the CFI praying that judge Antillon be enjoined from
further proceeding with the case on the ground of improper
venue. Respondents filed MtD the petition but was opposed
by Clavecilla. CFI held that Clavecilla may be sued in Manila
where it has its principal office or in CDO where it was served
with summons thru the branch manager. In other word, CFI
upheld the authority of MTC to take cognizance of the case.
In appealing, Clavecilla contends that the suit against it
should be filed in Manila where it holds its principal office.
HELD The residence of the corporation is the place where its
CA principal office is established. Branch offices are not
residences where it may be sued. The phrase where he
(defendant) may be found as to venue of actions applies
only to non-residents. It does not apply to defendants
residing in the Philippines.
YOUNG AUTO V. CA, 223 SCRA 670
(1993)
Facts: Young Auto (YASCO) sold its shares of stock in
Consolidated Mktg & Devt Corp (CMDC) to Roxas. Purchase
price 8M, dp 4M check bal 4M in pd checks 1M each. After
execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of the
four markets of CMDC. However YASCO held on to stock
certificates as security pending full payment. First 4M was
honored but the four 1M checks were dishonored. Roxas sold
one of the markets to a 3 rd party. Out of the proceeds, YASCO
rcvd 600k leaving a bal of 3.4M
YASCO filed a complaint against Roxas in Cebu RTC praying
that Roxas be ordered to pay the bal or that full control of the
3 markets be turned over to YASCO. Roxas filed MtD, ground:
improper venue. RTC dismissed MTD.

Roxas appealed to CA. CA ordered dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of improper venue. YASCO appealed to SC.
The Articles of Incorporation of Young Auto Motors stated that
its principal office was in Cebu. In its transactions with Roxas,
Young Auto stated in its letterhead that its principal office
was in Manila. Young Auto sued Roxas in Cebu based on such
transactions. Roxas files MTD on the ground of improper
venue.
Held: A corporation is a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation. Hence, Cebu was a valid venue for Youngs
action.
Escolin: If it was Roxas who filed the case against Young in
Pasay City based on the address in the letterhead, Young
would be estopped from objecting on the ground of improper
venue.
Dr. Antonio Lizares vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag (QC- CFI Judge)
and Flaviano Cacnio
Facts: Flaviano Cacnio alleged that he brought from petitioner Lizares on
installment Lot 4, Block 1 of the Sinkang Subdivision in Bacolod City.
Cacnio received a letter of demand from Lizares representing arrears in the
payment of installment plus regular and overdue interest. Cacnio then sent
a check drawn by one Antonio Bernardo in favor of Lizares. But according
to Cacnio, Lizares refused the check and returned it. Cacnio instituted a
civil case in the CFI of Quezon City, praying for compensatory damages
plus attorneys fees.
Petitioner Lizares moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the venue
is improperly laid, for the action affects title to or possession of real
property locates in Bacolod City which was the subject matter of the
contract. This was denied by the respondent court upon the ground that
the action was in personam.
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Issue: Whether or not the venue was properly laid
Held: Negative. Although the immediate remedy sought by Cacnio is to
compel petitioner to accept payment made by the former, it is obvious that
this relief is merely the first step to establish Cacnios title to the property.
Moreover, Cacnios complaint is a means resorted to by him in order that
he could retain the possession of said property. In short, venue in the main
case was improperly laid and the CFI of QC should have properly granted
the motion to dismiss.
LIZARES V. CALAUAG, 4 SCRA 746 (1962)
FACTS: Flaviano Cacnio bought from Dr. Antonio Lizares on
installment a parcel of land located in Sinkang Subd Bacolod
City. Cacnio made a downpayment p of Php1,206 bal
Php10,858 to be paid in 10yearly installments.
Cacnio received a letter from Lizares demanding payment of
arrears in installment payments, interests, and taxes. Cacnio
sent a check to pay the amount due but Lizares returned the
check and refused the tender of payment. Cacnio instituted
a civil case in the Rizal CFI praying that Lizares be ordered
to accept the payment being made by him.
Petitioner MtD the complaint due to improper venue for the
action affects the title or possession of real property located
in Bacolod. CFI denied MtD holding that it was a personal
action. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA denied petition.
HELD: An action praying that defendant be ordered "to
accept the payment being made" by plaintiff for the lot which
the latter contracted to buy on installment basis from the
former, to pay plaintiff compensatory damages and
attorney's fees and to enjoin defendant and his agents from
repossessing the lot in question, is one that affects title to
land, and "shall be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies," because,
although the immediate remedy is to compel the defendant

to accept the tender of payment allegedly made, it is obvious
that this relief is merely the first step to establish plaintiff's
title to real property.
Escolin: In the Bar exams of 1978, Wigberto Taada was the
Bar examiner. There was a question using the facts of
Lizares. The consensus was the case should be filed in the
place where the property was located. Taada cited the
Hernandez case in ruling that the case should be filed in the
residence of the plaintiff. Eventually, both where considered
correct.
de Leon: So where should we side now?
ESUERTE V. CA, 193 SCRA 541 (1991)
FACTS: An action for damages was filed by private
respondent Beverly Tan against herein petitioners Patria
Esuerte and Herminia Jayme with Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. Private respondent as plaintiff in the Civil Case is a
legal resident of Cebu City. Her parents live there. However,
at the time of her filing of the complaint against petitioners,
she was a temporary resident of Bacolod City. She was then
employed with the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial
Hospital, Bacolod City, as resident physician. Moreover, the
acts complained of were committed in Bacolod City. The
private respondents were all residents of Bacolod City at the
time of the bringing of the action. Though Tan's employment
was only temporary there was no showing when this
employment will end.
Issue: WON the case filed in Cebu will prosper.
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Held: No.For purposes of venue of personal actions, the
venue is to be determined where the plaintiff or the
defendant is actually located. It is actual residence, not legal
domicile, which is relevant.
de Leon: The meaning of residence in determining venue of
personal actions is the same as residence in determinng
venue of estate proceedings.
CAPATI V. OCAMPO, 113 SCRA 794 (1982)
Facts: Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor,
Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. He
entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Jesus
Ocampo, a resident of Naga City where he undertook to
construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the
said Feati building in accordance with the specifications
indicated therein. Defendant further bound himself to
complete said construction on or before June 5, 1967. To
emphasize this time frame Ocampo affixed his signature
below the following stipulation in bold letters: TIME IS
ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE 67.
At the back of the contract which reads:
14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract
may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Naga.
Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question
only on June 20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of
consequential damages.
Ocampo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid.

Capati (plaintiff) filed an opposition to the motion, claiming
that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court of First
Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both
contracting parties.
CFI of Pampanga decided that it is an improper venue.
Held: Stipulation as to venue which uses the word may is
permissive and does not limit the venue of the action only to
the venue stipulated.
UNIMASTERS V. CA, 267 SCRA (1997)
Stipulation as to venue which uses the word shall is
permissive and does not limit the venue of the action only to
the venue stipulated.
Escolin: They should have used the words solely,
exclusively, or only. Shall is not enough to confer been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and
exclusive venue with a court.
DIAZ V. ADIONG, 219 SCRA 631 (1993)
Facts:
Filing of answer waives MTD on ground of improper venue.
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Escolin: the rules now allow raising the issue of improper
venue as an affirmative defense in the answer even if there
was failure to raise it in a motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec. 6).
ENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC
OFFICIAL. From the provision of Article 360, third
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same
time a public official can only institute an action arising from
libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and
the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and
first published.
IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A MOTION TO DISMISS
PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. Unless and until the
defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to
a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have
purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be
considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience
the rules on venue had been devised.