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History and Theory 44 (February 2005), 42-54 Wesleyan University 2005 ISSN: 0018-2656
ANDERS SCHINKEL
ABSTRACT
Reinhart Koselleck is an important thinker in part for his attempt to interpret the cultural
changes resulting in our modern cultural outlook in terms of the (meta)historical cate-
gories of experience and expectation. In so doing he tried to pay equal attention to the stat-
ic and the changing in history. This article argues that Kosellecks use of experience and
expectation confuses their metahistorical and historical meaning, with the result that his
account fails to do justice to the static, to continuity in history, and mischaracterizes what
is distinctive of the modern era. As well as reconfiguring the categories of experience and
expectation, this essay also introduces a third category, namely, imagination, in between
experience and expectation. This is done to render intelligible what is obscure in
Kosellecks account, and as a stimulus to a study of history that divides its attention equal-
ly between the static and the changing. In fact, it is argued that the category of imagina-
tion is pre-eminently the category of history, on the concrete historical as well as the
metahistorical level.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Reinhart Koselleck, Linguistic Change and the History of Events, Journal of Modern History
61 (December 1989), 649-666.
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Koselleck tried to interpret using only the categories of experience and expecta-
tion; I hope that in doing so a deeper understanding of them is gained.
5. Koselleck, Neuzeit, 354: Experience is present past, the events of which have been incor-
porated and can be remembered.
6. Ibid., 355.
7. Idem.
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8. Ibid., 359. that in the modern period the difference between experience and expectation
becomes increasingly larger. See also the introduction and note 4.
9. Ibid., 374: the smaller the (amount of) experience, the bigger the expectation.
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10. Ibid., 368. Koselleck cites Ludwig Bchner, Der Fortschritt in Natur und Geschichte im
Lichte der Darwinschen Theorie (Stuttgart: E. Schweizerbart, 1884), 34: when today the progress
of a century equals that of a millennium in former days, because at present almost every day brings
forth something new.
11. Progress is used in a very general sense here, without any evaluation intended.
12. Beeld may also mean statueso there was some wordplay in the phrase as well.
13. Thomas K. Ford, The Genesis of the First Hague Peace Conference, Political Science
Quarterly 51 (September 1936), 355. Czar Alexander died in 1894, and was succeeded by Nicholas
II. Fords article focuses on the question of who was/were behind the Russian appeal for a peace con-
ference presented in 1898.
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14. Zeit, Geschichte und Politik. (Time, History and Politics). Zum achtzigsten Geburtstag von
Reinhart Koselleck, ed. Jussi Kurunmki and Kari Palonen (Jyvskyl: University of Jyvskyl,
2003), 17: I believe that the categories present, past, and futurespace of experience and horizon
of expectation respectively to be assigned to the past or the futurecan be defined contentless.What
was or will be the state of affairs at a given time in the present and the future or in the past, cannot
be deduced from the structures of time.
15. Koselleck, Neuzeit, 364: the limits of the space of experience and the horizon of expecta-
tion diverged.
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ence and expectation have been related as they were for Ludwig Bchner in the
example above, the modern period does distinguish itself from the premodern by
the number of creative thinkers it producedor, one could say, that creative
thinkers produced the modern period, instead of the other way around; this is just
as sensible. Yet it is doubtful whether it makes sense to speak of expectation in
their case; when they combine their experience of the past with a creative imag-
ination, they do not simply expect the future to be different, they make it differ-
ent. But before discussing the distinctive nature and role of imagination in the
modern period it is necessary to outline the function of imagination as an inter-
mediary between expectation and experience in history.
In a sense, it is rather obvious that experience and expectation are related. What,
other than experience, could provide the rough material for ones expectations?16
I have argued that the connection between the two is essential, that it does not
make sense to say that in some period peoples expectations are so far removed
from their past experiences that the latter provide no clues for understanding the
former. It is imagination that nestles itself between experience and expectation. It
may be a small nest or it may be a large one, but experience always shapes expec-
tation through the mediation of imagination. It takes imagination to have expec-
tations at allto be able to distinguish the future from the past, and to have some
sense of what this future might be and to have an attitude toward it. This imagi-
nation can be stronger or weaker, and it can be more or less creative. In the pre-
modern period imagination, with respect to the shaping of expectations, is rela-
tively weak and relatively uncreative: the expectations of its members diverged
only minimally from their experience. The modern period, on the other hand, is
characterized by a stronger, more creative imagination in this respect. It takes
such an imagination to think that, although my father and my fathers father and
his father were all farmers, I could be something elsethat is, if such a change
is virtually without precedent. Similarly, when this is without precedent, it takes
an active imagination to picture ones childrens lives as very different from ones
own. But even when it has become normal for people to choose their own careers,
irrespective of the profession of their forefathers, the modern period will require
a more active imagination. Although a modern persons social environment will
suggest certain careers rather than others, thereby limiting the choice this person
has, he or she will still be required to imagine his life after opting for either of the
alternatives presented to him. The fact that people imagine how their life might
be and how it might be different from that of the previous generation may have
become normal, but this does not diminish the imaginative effort in itself.
Even in cases of very strong and creative imagination there will always be a
connection to some experience that makes highly divergent expectations com-
16. With regard to this section, compare Koselleck, Neuzeit, 357-358: Wer seine Erwartung
zur Gnze aus seiner Erfahrung ableiten zu knnen glaubt, der irrt. . . . Wer aber seine Erwartung
nicht auf Erfahrung grndet, der irrt ebenfalls. (Who believes he is able to deduce the whole of his
expectation from his experience, is mistaken. . . . But who does not ground his expectation in expe-
rience, is mistaken as well.)
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17. Daniel Dennetts example of a bare opportunity goes some way toward illustrating this: If I
walk by a row of trash cans, and one of them happens to contain a purse full of diamonds, then I pass
up a bare opportunity to become wealthy. It makes no difference that I had no reason to suspect there
were any jewels there for the taking, or that my normal behavior has never included checking out
trash cans for valuables. (Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room [Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,
1996], 116-117.)
18. Alan Brown, Modern Political Philosophy: Theories of the Just Society (Harmondsworth,
Eng.: Penguin Books, 1990), 115.
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of great imagination, and if they expected things to change it was mainly because
change is what they experienced. If they expected things to be better in the future,
it is because this is what they were taught and they wanted to believe it.
Koselleck quotes an Englishman from the middle of the nineteenth century:
The world moves faster and faster; and the difference will probably be consid-
erably greater. The temper of each new generation is a continual surprise.19 It
may be that the temper of each new generation is a surprise, or in other words
that the content of the future is a surprise, but it will not at all be surprising to
this man that this will be so, for it is what he experiences already. He merely
extends the line of contemporary development into the future, including the
increasing acceleration. So again, as in Bchners case, expectation arises out of
experience. This mans imagination is not strikingly activeit would have been,
had he predicted that in the near future all change would come to a halt and
things would start moving at a much slower pace. But this man merely assumed
relative continuity between past, present, and future.
This is not to deny that there isnt an important break between the premodern
and the modern period. One might describe this break in terms of the difference
between a backward-looking and a forward-looking consciousness. The back-
ward-looking consciousness is dominated by past experiences, meaning that it is
not bent on forming expectations of a future that will be very different from the
past. The forward-looking consciousness does not ignore past experiencesit
cannot shape expectations out of thin airbut it uses its experience in order to
transform it. To accomplish this, it uses imagination creatively. In general,
modernity is a more forward-looking period, and our collective experience does
not determine our expectations in the same way as five or more centuries ago.
The appearance of particular concepts of imagination and the increasing use of
these concepts is indicative of this change. Let us look at these changes before
trying to characterize the modern period.
V. CONCEPTS OF IMAGINATION
21. This etymology and those following are all from the Oxford English Dictionary.
22. The OED notes that in modern use fantasy and phantasy . . . tend to be apprehended as sep-
arate words, the predominant sense of the former being caprice, whim, fanciful invention, while
that of the latter is imagination, visionary notion.
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We might say (a bit pompously) that modernity began when imagination took
flight. Exaggerated as this may sound, there is good reason for assigning such a
central place to the changing character of imagination embodied in its changing
semantics that I have described. Historians are correct in assigning to Romanti-
cism an important role in the development of historical consciousness and of his-
tory as a science; the way philosophers of history have distinguished history
from nature, and the appearance of (the modern senses of) terms like imagina-
tion and creativity in the Romantic Era, capture crucial developments in the mod-
ern period. Two of the most influential modern philosophers of history, R. G.
Collingwood and W. Dilthey, saw events of history as distinct from events of
nature in that the former not merely had an outside, but also an inside.23 The
meaning of a historical event could not be explained or understood in terms of
causality, but had to do with the experience of those typically historical creatures:
human beings. As Collingwood put it succinctly: all history is the history of
thought. To locate the difference between historical and unhistorical creatures
in the formers mental powers is merely a modern way of putting the difference
between freedom and causality. Humans are (to a certain extent) free, thanks to
their mental powers that make it possible for them to escape the bonds of mere-
ly natural causality. In this quality lies the major condition of the possibility of
history (of the possibility not only that the future will differ from the past and the
present, but that its agents will make this difference occur on the basis of their
imagination). The freedom of humans lies in their ability to evaluate the possible
as well as the real, and to realize these possibilities by bringing novelty into the
world.24 Modern historical consciousness is a self-conscious expression of the
awareness of these capacities and an instantiation of this awareness in a particu-
lar form of being. The Romantic concepts of imagination, creativity, and genius
are the linguistic expression of and evidence for this. In the modern period imag-
ination assumes a more creative and active role in its linking of experience and
expectation, rendering the consciousness of its members more forward-looking,
and their behavior more active in seeking to make the future different from the
present.
It is not easy to give equal attention to the static and to the changing in history.
Living in a time when change, a particular kind of change at least, seems to dom-
inate, and stability appears to be something from the past, one tends to slide into
a certain discourse on history: a discourse that centers around statements that,
and explanations why, we are so different from people a few centuries ago. This
discourse of explaining modernity is itself a modern phenomenon and in a sense
23. See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History [1946] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
and W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften [1910] (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981).
24. This is not an exclusively human quality (non-human nature produces novelty as well), but it
is rather pronounced in our species.
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25. Hayden White, The Burden of History, in White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural
Criticism (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 50 (originally published in History and
Theory 5 [1966], 111-134). It is unclear to me how White is able to compare past and present, as this
presupposes an understanding of the past that is (in Whites own view) unattainable due to the sup-
posed radical difference between past and present itself. White stated elsewhere that the only possi-
ble way of choosing between different historical interpretations is to do this on moral or aesthetic
grounds, not on the ground of greater plausibility or closer approximation of truth. See Hayden
White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973).
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shape differs. And even more basic than this culturally determined normality is
a biological normality: the kind of animal species we are. White was not wrong
to insist on the importance of language in shaping our (perspective on) reality,
but Koselleck was certainly right in pointing out some prelinguistic conditions of
human history, conditions that humans share with other animals: Man, as a lin-
guistic being, simply cannot avoid transforming the metahistorical givens lin-
guistically in order to regulate and direct them, so far as he can. Nevertheless,
these elementary, natural givens remain, however much language may seek to
efface them.26 In the case at issue in this essay, this means that experience,
expectation, and imagination are transcendental categories that pick out certain
universal features of human life, and that necessarily figure in historical studies
of it. But it also means that the content of these categories can and will vary from
one historical epoch to another. Thus, in the modern period the character of expe-
rience (it typically became more forward-looking), expectation (it typically
diverged more from experience), and imagination (it typically became stronger,
more creative, and underwrote more active ways of being) all changed. In this
way the modern period is both like earlier periodsas it, too, involves the inter-
relation of experience, imagination, and expectationand unlike them, in that
the character of this interrelation changes markedly.27