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Romario Harris

1) The probability-weighted average of the utility of a person, corresponding to all possible


realizations of a random choice of nature or mixed strategies of the players.
a. Perfect information
b. External Uncertainty
c. Expected Payoff
d. Payoff

2) An extensive-form game summarizes:


a. Players, alternative strategies, order of moves, and payoffs
b. Players, arrangements, situations, and payoffs
c. Players, arrangements, order of moves, and payoffs
d. Players, stages of the game, order of moves, and payoff

3) In game theory, a strategy:


a. Is made up of a series of countermoves.
b. Is a decision rule that identifies a players moves
c. Constitutes a multi-stage game.
d. Must be strictly dominant.
e. Must have a Nash equilibrium.

4) A structured and simplified version or reality used to explain real-world behavior.


a. Economic Model
b. Game Theory
c. Dominant strategy
d. Strategic interaction

5) Extensive form game is used to model


a. Credit contracts
b. Contract laws
c. Debit contracts
d. Debt contract

6) Subsequence nodes are shown as


a. Open circles
b. Open squares
c. Filled in circles
d. Filled in squares

7) A Nash equilibrium:
a. Results in a payoff for a player that is no lower than any other payoff, regardless of the
strategy adopted by the other players
b. Results in the largest payoff for both players
c. Occurs when each player adopts a strategy that it believes is the best response to the other
players strategy
d. Results in the best of the worst possible payoffs

8) The organizational tool, a table with numbers that summarizes who the players are, the
actions available to each player, the payoffs available to each player for each action that he or she
might choose given the action chosen by their rival.
a. Mutual independence
b. Economic Model
c. Pure Coordination
d. Payoff Matrix

9) A focal-point equilibrium:
a. May be a possible solution to a game involving multiple Nash equilibrium.
b. Cannot exist in the presence of multiple Nash equilibriums.
c. Results when two players follow a secure strategy.
d. Applies only to multistage games.

10) Incomplete situations where one person knows more than another
a. Imperfect information
b. Screening
c. Incomplete information
d. Asymmetric information

11) An example of a simultaneous-move game is:


A. Chess.
B. Checkers.
C. Rock-scissors- paper.
D. Mah Jongg.

12) Our solution to the game must take into account the incentives of
a. The parties
b. Every possible decision point
c. Just the decision points
d. Both a and b

13) Branches leading away from the node represents the


a. Possible points
b. Possible payoffs
c. Actions that are not available to the player
d. Actions that are available to the player

14) The structure of the extensive form game and the idea of a subgame perfection gives us a
way to distinguish ________ threats from ones that ________.
a. Non-credible, are
b. Credible, are not
c. Credible, are
d. Non-credible, are not
15) A solution to a multistage game may be arrived at through:
a. Deductive reasoning
b. Inductive reasoning
c. Backward iteration
d. Simple method

1. C
2. D
3. B
4. A
5. D
6. C
7. C
8. D
9. A
10. D
11. C
12. D
13. D
14. B
15. C