CASE 21
MARIANO RIOSA vs. CLARO VERZOSA and CIRIACO BULAN
G.R. No. L-7726
November 6, 1913
Facts: Plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendants, the purpose of which was to secure an
injunction against the defendants to prevent them from
harvesting and destroying the growing hemp upon a
certain parcel of land and to require the defendants to
deposit the hemp already harvested with the deputy
sheriff of the pueblo of Malinao. Upon the presentation
of said petition, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno
granted a temporary injunction in conformity with the
prayer of the petition. The defendants were duly served
with a summons and a copy of the petition. The
defendants failed to appear and answer the complaint
within the time prescribed by law and the rules of the
court. By reason of the failure of the defendants to
appeal, the plaintiff presented a motion asking that a
judgment by default be rendered against them, which
motion was granted. Later, the honourable judge,
granted a permanent injunction against the defendants,
restraining them from cultivating or harvesting the crops
upon the said land or from doing anything thereon
which would tend to injure its value, and also found that
the defendants had caused damages to the plaintiff in
the sum of P300. It appears from the record that the
attorney for the defendants was present in court during
the trial of the cause, but by reason of the fact that the
defendants had presented no answer, no defense
whatever was made during the trial of the cause. The
court held that If the defendant had redeemed the land
or should redeem the land in the time allowed by law, a
motion then for relief from the judgment will be
considered. At this juncture, by reason of the ruling of
Judge Moir upon the motion to dismiss, it becomes
important to examine the particular facts, in order to
fully understand Judge Moir's conclusions.
In December 1909, a judgment was rendered against
Claro Verzosa, for the sum of P320.87. Upon said
judgment an execution was issued and was levied upon
the land described in the complaint. The said land was
sold at public auction, under said execution, and was
purchased by the plaintiff also held a mortgage upon
said land which was due on the 1st day of January, 1910.
It will be remembered that the present action was
commenced on the 25th of January, 1910. The record
does not clearly disclose what action the plaintiff had
taken to protect his interest in the land under his
mortgage. The present action was brought to protect
the plaintiff's interest in the land, by virtue of his
1
purchase of the same under said execution on the 1st of
December, 1909. It will be remembered that the law
permits the owner of land which has been sold under an
execution to redeem the same within a period of twelve
months.
Issue: What interest has the purchaser of the land sold
under execution in the same during said twelve months?
What right has he to interfere with the owner in the
management and control of such land? Is he entitled to
the rents and profits during the twelve months? Can he
eject the owner from the possession of the same?
Ruling: We believe that the weight of authority is to the
effect that the purchaser of lands sold at public auction
under a writ of execution only has an inchoate right in
the property, subject to be defeated and terminated
within a period of twelve months from the date of sale,
by a redemption on the part of the owner. In the present
case the property was in the possession of the owner,
and the inchoate right of the purchaser was subject to
be defeated at any moment during the period of
redemption. The owner was entitled to remain in the
possession of the land sold for the statutory term of
twelve months, and she might at any time defeat the
inchoate right obtained by the purchaser by proper
redemption within that period.
Under the law it would seem to be difficult to fully
understand the right of the plaintiff to interfere in the
manner in which he has attempted to interfere with the
owner of the land before the expiration of the twelve
months within which the owner had a right to redeem
the land.
That the defendants were in possession of the land at
the time it was sold at public sale under execution on
the 1st of December, 1909, and continued in the
possession of said land. 2. The plaintiff, by virtue of the
purchase under the execution sale, acquired no right,
except a mere inchoate right in the land, until after the
expiration of the period within which the defendants
had right to redeem 3. The defendants redeemed the
land in accordance with the provisions of law within the
legal period. It must follow, therefore, that the plaintiff
was not entitled to the remedy prayed for in his petition
and is, therefore, not entitled to damages resulting from
the use and occupation by the defendants. We find no
reason in the record for reversing or modifying the
conclusions of the lower court. The judgment of the
lower court is, therefore, hereby affirmed with the costs
of this instance.
CASE 22
VELASCO v. ROSENBERG
G.R. No. 9921
October 26, 1915
FACTS: The present action was commenced in the CFI
of Manila to recover from the defendant corporation the
possession of a certain parcel of land, together with the
buildings thereon and the sum of P500 for each and
every month from the 1st of July, 1912, until the same is
delivered to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also petitioned for
the appointment of a receiver to take charge and
conserve the property in litigation during pendency of
the action, which receiver was appointed and took
possession of the property.
Defendant denied that plaintiff is entitled to the
possession of the property in question. Defendant also
alleged that receiver not only took possession of
property, but other property as well and that the
plaintiff, through the receiver, fraudulently used the
name of defendant (Rosenberg) and solicits business
from the public by the use of such name. Thus,
defendant claims damage from the appointment of the
receiver, together with other damages.
Upon presentation of the issue for trial and after
hearing evidence, the judge found that the plaintiff
occupied the property in question, through its receiver,
and used the trade name of the defendant, that the
latter was damaged in the sum of P500.
ISSUES: 1. The right of the purchaser at an execution sale
to the rents and profits of the property sold when the
execution debtor is in possession of the same at the time
of the sale, during the period of redemption, or for a
period of one year thereafter; and
2. The right of the defendant to recover of the plaintiff
damages resulting from continuance of the business sold
under the execution, by a receiver duly appointed by the
court
2
HELD: 1. An analogous case decided by the SC, it held,
insofar as the right of the purchaser is concerned to
collect rent for the property during the period of
redemption when the execution debtor is in possession
of the property, "that, inasmuch as, under the law, the
rents received by the purchaser during the period
allowed for redemption must be applied on account of
the redemption price, the judgment debtor in
possession of such property should not be required to
pay rent, inasmuch as he would thereby simply be
paying rent to himself.
Hence, a judgment debtor in possession of real
property sold under execution cannot be required to pay
rent to the purchaser for such property during the
period of redemption.
2. With reference to the damage caused by the
receiver in continuing the business, it may be said that
inasmuch as the receiver did continue to run the
business and inasmuch as he was an officer of the court,
appointed thereby for the purpose of conserving the
property we have a right to assume that he was
authorized so to do. The question of damages arising
from his running the business should have been settled
in his final accounting to the court. If in such final
accounting the receiver had not properly reported the
same or accounted therefor, an objection might
properly have then been made to the accounting of the
receiver and he held responsible therefor in case of loss
through negligence or by bad administration of the
property given into his care. There is nothing in the
record which shows that the property had not been
properly accounted for.
Digest by: E.C.
CASE 23 Issue:

Sarmiento vs Agana What are the rights of the parties if an accession is made
GR# L-57288 with respect to Immovable property?
April 30, 1984
Held:

Facts:
While ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's
mother had told him the couple could build a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms., being Lot D
of a subdivision in Paranaque (the LAND, for short).
In 1967, ERNESTO did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. It was
probably assumed that the wife's mother was the owner
of the LAND and that, eventually, it would somehow be
transferred to the spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been
titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who,
on September 7 , 1974, sold the same to petitioner
SARMIENTO.
On January 6, 1975, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and
wife to vacate and, on April 21, 1975, filed an Ejectment
suit against them.
In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court,
SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in
her favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00. On
the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of
the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00. The figures were not questioned by
SARMIENTO.
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, OR to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The provision for the exercise by petitioner SARMIENTO
of either the option to indemnify private respondents in
the amount of P40,000.00, or the option to allow private
respondents to purchase the LAND at P25,000.00, in our
opinion, was a correct decision.

Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Digest by: KRH
Instance of Pasay. It ruled SARMIENTO was required,
within 60 days, to exercise the option to reimburse
ERNESTO and wife the sum of 40,000.00 as the value of
the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the option to allow them to
purchase the LAND for P25,000.00. SARMIENTO did not
exercise any of the two options within the indicated
period, and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the
sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the purchase price
for the LAND.

3
CASE 24
BULACANAG vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO May 30,
1983
G.R. No. L-34199
FACTS
Charvet and Stohner entered into a lease contract
whereby the former is the lessor and the latter is the
lessee.
Later on, Stohner constructed a house in the property.
Much later on, Mrs. Charvet sold the subject property to
Mr. Bulacanag.
When Stohner's failed to pay the rents, Balucanag, thru
counsel, wrote Stohner a letter demanding that he
vacate the premises. However, Stohner proposed that
Bulacanag should reimbursed him the value of the house
first before he do so.
As no agreement was reached, Balucanag instituted an
ejectment suit against Stohner.
ISSUE
Cant Mr. Stohner be ejected until he is reimbursed of
the value of the improvements?
RULING
City Court Ruling:
The City Court of Manila ruled in favor of Bulacanag
ordering Stohner to pay back rentals and to
subsequently vacate the premises.
CFI Ruling:
On appeal, CFI reversed the ruling of the City Court
holding that Stohner was a builder in good faith because
he had constructed the residential house with the
consent of the original lessor, Mrs. Charvet, and also
because the latter, after the expiration of the lease
contract, neither sought Stohner's ejectment from the
premises, nor the removal of his house therefrom.
Invoking Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
Respondent judge concluded that Stohner, being a
builder in good faith, cannot be ejected until he is
reimbursed of the value of the improvements.
4
SC Ruling:
However, the Supreme Court tends to disagree.
According to the Supreme Court, Article 448 of the Civil
Code, relied upon by respondent judge, applies only to a
case where one builds on land in the belief that he is the
owner thereof and it does not apply where one's only
interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental
contract.
It cannot apply to a lessee because, as such lessee, he
knows that he is not the owner of the leased premises.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 1678 of
the Civil Code.
This article gives the lessor the option to appropriate the
useful improvements by paying one-half of their value.
However, the lessee cannot compel the lessor to
appropriate the improvements and make
reimbursement for the lessee's right under the law is to
remove the improvements even if the leased premises
may suffer damage thereby to the extent that he shall
not cause any more damage upon the property than is
necessary.
OTHER THINGS
In a separate opinion
Article 1678 of the Civil Code concerning improvements
made by the lessee on the leased premises applies only
in the absence of stipulation on the matter.
In the instant case theres such a stipulation, to wit;
IV. The lessee may erect such buildings upon and make
such improvements to the leased land as he shag see fit.
All such buildings and improvements shall remain the
property of the lessee and he may remove them at any
nine, it being agreed, however, that should he not
remove the said buildings and improvements within a
period of two months after the expiration of this
Agreement, the Lessor may remove the said buildings
and improvements or cause them to be removed at the
expense of the Lessee.
The above-quoted stipulation has the force of law
between the parties (Art. 1159, Civil Code) and
supersedes Art. 1678 of the Civil Code.
Digested by: Pungos. R.
CASE 26
PNB v. DE JESUS
GR# 149295
September 23, 2003
FACTS: In 1995, respondent Generoso filed a complaint
against petitioner before the RTC of Occidental Mindoro
for recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, over the questioned property.
In his complaint, respondent stated that he had
acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro and that on 26 March 1993, he had
caused a verification survey of the property and
discovered that the northern portion of the lot was
being encroached upon by a building of
petitioner. Despite two letters of demand sent by
respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the
area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it
acquired the lot and the building sometime in 198
1from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, theencroachment
already was in existence and toremedy the situation,
Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which
then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00
per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have
accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when,
without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor
Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development
Bank of the Philippines. He also contends that he is a
builder in good faith.
The trial court decided the case in favor of
respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner of the
disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and
ordering petitioner to surrender possession of the
property to respondent and to cause, at its expense, the
removal of any improvement thereon.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a builder in good faith and
whether or not Art. 448 should be applied in favor of
petitioner
HELD: A builder in good faith is one who, not being the
owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself
to be its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or
mode of acquisition.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of
the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
5
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such a case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.
A builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating
the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The
choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around. Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him is preclusive. He cannot, for
instance, compel the owner of the building to instead
remove it from the land. In order, however, that the
builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his
corresponding right to demand that a choice be made
by the landowner, he should be able to prove good
faith on his part.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and
it encompasses an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to
seek an unconscionable advantage. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Petitioner was not in good faith. Evidently,
petitioner was quite aware prior to its acquisition of
the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the
building sold to it stood on the land not covered by
the land conveyed to it.
The building, constructed on the land by
Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property
transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code
refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed
by two or more parties, one of whom has built some
works and not to a case where the owner of the land
is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for,
elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the
builder of works on his own land, the issue of good
faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to
invoke the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Digest by: E.C
CASE 27
Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs Lagrosa
GR# 193517
January 15, 2014
Facts:
Lagrosa represented by Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Lourdes
Mojica, filed a complaint against Sps. Sarili alleging that
he is owner of a land in Caloocan City covered by TCT
No. 55979.
Respondent claimed that he is a resident of California,
USA, and that during his vacation in the Philippines, he
discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject
property was issued by the RD in the name of Victorino
married to Isabel Amparo (Isabel), i.e., TCT No. 262218,
by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale9 dated
February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale)
purportedly executed by him and his wife, Amelia U.
Lagrosa (Amelia).
In their answer, Sps. Sarili maintained that they are
innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the
subject property from Ramon B. Rodriguez (Ramon),
who possessed and presented a Special Power of
Attorney(subject SPA) to sell/dispose of the same, and,
in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 20, 1992 conveying the said property in their
favour.
Sarili built a house on the disputed land.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sps. Sarili are builders in good faith
entitled to reimbursement
Held:
The strength of the buyers inquiry on the sellers
capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof
of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists
of a special power of attorney but there appears to be
flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of
the document will not do; the buyer must show that his
6
investigation went beyond the document and into the
circumstances of its execution.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Sps. Sarili
purchased the subject property from Ramos on the
strength of the latters ostensible authority to sell under
the subject SPA. The said document, however, readily
indicates flaws in its notarial acknowledgment since the
respondents community tax certificate (CTC) number
was not indicated thereon.
Despite this irregularity, however, Sps. Sarili failed to
show that they conducted an investigation beyond the
subject SPA and into the circumstances of its execution
as required by prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, Sps. Sarili
cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he
may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower
the proper rent.
As for Sps. Sarili, they knew or at the very least, should
have known from the very beginning that they were
dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to
sell the subject property considering the palpable
irregularity in the subject SPAs acknowledgment. Yet,
relying solely on said document and without any further
investigation on Ramoss capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still
chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a
house thereon. Based on the foregoing it cannot be
seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually aware of
a flaw or defect in their title or mode of acquisition and
have consequently built the house on the subject
property in bad faith under legal contemplation. The
case is therefore remanded to the court a quo for the
proper application of the above-cited Civil Code
provisions.
Digest by: KRH
CASE 28
BALLATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125683
March 2, 1999
FACTS
This is a case of encroachment.
Winston Go constructed a house in their property but
the concrete fence and side pathway of his house
encroached on the property Edden Ballatan.
Upon investigation Edden Ballatan found out that the
area of her lot was actually less than that described in
her Title. Upon further investigation, this is what they
find out.
ISSUE
Who is to blame, and what is the remedy?
RULING
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
the third-party complaint against AIA.. The claim that the
discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was
not proved.
The appellate court, however, found that it was the
erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered
these discrepancies. And it was this survey that
respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his
house on his father's land. He built his house in the
belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his
father's land. In short, respondents Go had no
knowledge that they encroached petitioners' lot. They
are deemed builders in good faith until the time
petitioner Ballatan informed them of their
encroachment on her property.
7
There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that
respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built
his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on
respondents Go's adjoining land. Good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the
part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. 2
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith.
Their rights must, therefore, be determined in
accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil
Code on property. (Article 448 of the Civil Code, to be
precise.)
Application of Art. 448 of the NCC with respect to
Ballatans and the Gos:
Petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to
purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on
their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion.
If buying the improvement is impractical as it may
render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell
to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which
their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or
unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land
and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners.
Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than the
portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value
of the land is much more than the Go's improvement,
the respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do
not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to
court to fix the same.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their
option, respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly
rent up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the
lease or until the court fixes such terms.
Application of Art. 448 of the NCC with respect to Gos
and the Yaos:
Art. 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply
to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their
land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the
improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37)
square meters of respondents Go's land.
Digested by: Pungos. R.
CASE 29
Communities Cagayan Inc. Vs. Spouses Arsenio and
Angeles Nanol
G.R. NO. 176791
Nov. 14, 2012
Facts: Respondent Spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol
entered into a contract to sell with petitioner
Communities Cagayan Inc. wherein the latter agreed to
sell the House And lot of lot 17 and 19 at block 16 for
368,00php. Respondent-spouses, however, did not avail
of petitioners in house Financing due to its high interest
rates. Petitioner use the property as collateral for the
loan. To facilitate the loan, a simulated sale over the
property was executed by petitioner in favor of
respondent-spouses. Unfortunately, the bank collapsed
and closed before it could release the loan. Thus, on
November 30, 1997, respondent-spouses entered into
another Contract to Sell with petitioner over the same
property for the same price of P368,000.00. This time,
respondent-spouses availed of petitioners in-house
financing thus, undertaking to pay the loan over four
years, from 1997 to 2001. On September 10, 2003,
petitioner sent respondent-spouses a notarized Notice
of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell due
to the latters failure to pay the monthly amortizations.
Petitioner filed for complaint of cancellation of title and
recovery of possession, reconveyance and damages in
the RTC. It ruled that the sale is void and the transfer of
title to respondent is cancelled. Instead of appealing,
Petitioner opted to file the instant petition directly with
this Court on a pure question of law .
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to
respondent-spouses all the monthly installments
paid.
2. Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse
respondent-spouses the value of the new house
minus the cost of the original house.
Ruling: 1) Considering that this case stemmed from a
Contract to Sell executed by the petitioner and the
respondent-spouses, we agree with petitioner that the
Maceda Law, which governs sales of real estate on
installment, should be applied. (b) If the contract is
canceled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value of the payments on the property
equivalent to fifty percent of the total payments made,
and, after five years of installments, an additional five
per cent every year but not to exceed ninety per cent of
the total payments made: Provided, That the actual
cancellation of the contract shall take place after thirty
8
days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract
by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash
surrender value to the buyer. In this connection, we
deem it necessary to point out that, under the Maceda
Law, the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes
place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the
notarized notice of cancellation, and upon full payment
of the cash surrender value to the buyer. In other
words, before a contract to sell can be validly and
effectively cancelled, the seller has (1) to send a
notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to
refund the cash surrender value.
2) In Tuatis, we ruled that the seller (the owner of the
land) has two options under Article 448: (1) he may
appropriate the improvements for himself after
reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the
necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and
548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the
buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of
the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay
reasonable rent. In conformity with the foregoing
pronouncement, we hold that petitioner, as landowner,
has two options. It may appropriate the new house by
reimbursing respondent Angeles the current market
value thereof minus the cost of the old house. Under
this option, respondent Angeles would have a right of
retention which negates the obligation to pay rent. In
the alternative, petitioner may sell the lots to
respondent Angeles at a price equivalent to the current
fair value thereof. However, if the value of the lots is
considerably more than the value of the improvement,
respondent Angeles cannot be compelled to purchase
the lots. She can only be obliged to pay petitioner
reasonable rent. In view of the foregoing disquisition
and in accordance with Depra v. and Technogas
Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we find it necessary to remand this case to the
court of origin for the purpose of determining matters
necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in
relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
Digested by: WJLB
CASE 30
VDA DE ROXAS v. OUR LADYS FOUNDATION
GR# 182378
March 6, 2013
FACTS: On September 1, 1988, Salve Dealca Latosa
filed before the RTC a complaint for the recovery of
ownership of a portion of her residential land located
at Our Ladys Village, Bibincahan, Sorgsogon.
According to her, Roxas, represented by petitioner
herein, encroached on a quarter of her property by
arbitrarily extending his concrete fence beyond the
correct limits.
In his answer, Roxas imputed the blame to
respondent Our Ladys Foundation, Inc. then filed a
Third-Party complaint against respondent and
claimed that he only occupied the adjoining portion
to get the equivalent area of what he lost when OFLI
trimmed his property for the subdivision road.
After considering the evidence of all the
parties, the trial court held that Latosa had
established her claim of encroachment by a
preponderance of evidence. It found that Roxas
occupied a total of 112 square meters of Latosas
lots, and that, in turn, OLFI trimmed his property by
92 square meters. Thus, Roxas was ordered to return
and surrender the portion of 116 sq. meters which
lawfully belongs to plaintiff and to demolish whatever
structure constructed thereon.
OFLI was ordered to reimburse Roxas the
value of the 92 sq. meters plus interest to be
reckoned from the time it was paid to the third-party
defendant.
encroached upon petitioner herein has the option
to require respondent builder to pay the price of the
land.
Although these provisions of the Civil Code
do not explicitly state the reckoning period for valuing
the property, jurisprudence states that in the event
that the seller elects to sell the lot, the price must be
fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment.
Jurisprudence states that the present or
current fair value of the land is to be reckoned at the
time that the landowner elected the choice, and not
at the time that the property was purchased. In
another case, the Court reckoned the valuation of the
property at the time that the real owner of the land
asked the builder to vacate the property encroached
upon.
The CA incorrectly pegged the reimbursable
amount at the old market value of the subject
property 40 per square meter as reflected in the
Deed of Absolute Sale between the parties. The RTC
properly considered in its 2 December 2004 Order
the value of the lot at 1,800 per square meter, the
current fair price.
Digest by: E.C.

ISSUE: Whether the valuation of the amount OFLI

should reimburse Roxas reflect the current value of
the property or the original amount of the lot

HELD: Both the trial and the appellate courts differed

in interpreting the amount of reimbursement payable
by respondent (OFLI) to petitioner (Roxas). The RTC
pegged the reimbursable amount at 1,800 per
square meter to reflect the current value of the
property, while the CA maintained the original
amount of the lot at 40 per square meter.
To settle the contention, this Court resorts to
the provisions of the Civil Code governing
encroachment on property. Under Article 448
pertaining to encroachments in good faith, as well as
Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad faith,
the owner of the land

9
CASE 31
Parilla vs Pilar
GR# 167680
November 30, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner-spouses Samuel and Chinita Parilla and their
co-petitioner-son Deodato Parilla, as dealers of Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell), have been
in possession of a parcel of land (the property) located at
the poblacion of Bantay, Ilocos Sur which was leased to
it by respondent Dr. Prospero Pilar under a 10-year
Lease Agreement entered into in 1990.
When the lease contract between Pilipinas Shell and
respondent expired in 2000, petitioners remained in
possession of the property on which they built
improvements consisting of a billiard hall and a
restaurant, maintained a sari-sari store managed by
Leonardo Dagdag, Josefina Dagdag and Edwin Pugal, and
allowed Flor Pelayo, Freddie Bringas and Edwin Pugal to
use a portion thereof as parking lot.
Pilar thru Marivic Padre filed a complaint for ejectment
in the MTC. MTC ruled in favour of the respondent
ordering Parilla et al to vacate the premises and at the
same time it ordered Pilar to reimburse petitioners the
sum of 2 million which represented the value of the
improvements introduced in the property.
Pilar appealed to RTC but RTC affirmed the MTC. Pilar
went to CA. CA set aside the ruling of the RTC. Hence,
this present petition by Parilla.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 448 governing the right of
accession in relation to Article 546 pertaining to effects
of possession is applicable in this case
Held:
The law on lease under the New Civil Code has specific
rules concerning useful improvements introduced by a
lessee on the property leased, it is erroneous on the part
of petitioners to urge this Court to apply Article 448, in
10
relation to Article 546, regarding their claim for
reimbursement and to invoke the right of retention
before reimbursement is made.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically
declare that Article 448 covers only cases in which the
builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be
owners of the land or, at least, have a claim of title
thereto, but not when the interest is merely that of a
holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A
tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he
has no pretension to be owner.
ART 1678 not ART 448 applies
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease
shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He
shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than
is necessary
Under Article 1678, it is the lessor who is given the
option, upon termination of the lease contract, either to
appropriate the useful improvements by paying one-half
of their value at that time, or to allow the lessee to
remove the improvements. This option solely belongs to
the lessor as the law is explicit that [s]hould the lessor
refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal
thing may suffer damage thereby. It appears that the
lessor has opted not to reimburse.
Digest by: KRH
CASE 32
CHILDREN MACASAET vs. PARENTS MACASAET
G.R. Nos. 154391-92
September 30, 2004
FACTS
Two lots, The Parents, and the Children Parents :
Vicente and Rosario Children : Spouses Ismael(son) and
Teresita.
The present case involves a dispute between parents
and children. The children were invited by the parents to
occupy the latters two lots, out of parental love and a
desire to foster family solidarity. Unfortunately, an
unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of
pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises.
Parents contentions:
According to the parents, there was a lease agreement
entered into by both parties. But despite of repeated
demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental.
Childrens contentions:
There was no lease agreement. They claimed that
respondents had invited them to construct their
residence and business on the subject lots in order that
they could all live near one other and help in resolving
the problems of the family.
They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot
the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance
in favor of their children. Thus, they contended that one
of the lots had been allotted to Ismael (the son) as
advance inheritance.
And the other lot was allegedly given to petitioners as
payment for construction materials used in the
renovation of respondents house.
ISSUE
Which provisions of the law should be applied with
respect to the improvements therein? (this is the main
issue)
RULING
MTCC Ruling:
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that the
children had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal
lease agreement, but by tolerance of their parents.
The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had
been allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground
11
that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it
disbelieved petitioners allegation that the other parcel
had been given as payment for construction materials.
RTC Ruling:
RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the RTC
allowed respondents to appropriate the building and
other improvements introduced by petitioners, after
payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in
relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
CA Ruling:
The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaring that
Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA
opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, Ismael
and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half
of the value of the improvements made.
SC Ruling:
The CA applied the provisions on lease, because it found
their possession by mere tolerance and not by virtue of a
lease agreement.
However, there was no tolerance, nor was there a lease
agreement. But there was an agreement regarding
possession of the lots, to wit;
We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the
finding of possession by mere tolerance. Petitioners
were able to establish that respondents had invited
them to occupy the subject lots in order that they could
all live near one other and help in resolving family
problems. By occupying those lots, petitioners
demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence,
there was a meeting of minds, and an agreement
regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose between
the parties.
Since there was no lease agreement, Article 1678 does
not apply. On the other hand, when a person builds in
good faith on the land of another, the applicable
provision is Article 448.
Good faith is identified by the belief that the land is
owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to
build, plant, or sow thereon. (Kung kabaw ka dili imo ang
property, di ni ma apply)
However, in some special cases, this Court has used
Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited
definition (Del Campo Case). This article was also applied
to cases wherein a builder had constructed
improvements with the consent of the owner, or when
the builders were found to be in good faith despite their
reliance on the consent of another whom they had
mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.
(Sarmiento Case). The Court ruled that the law deemed
the builder to be in good faith.

Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies

to the present factual milieu. The established facts of
this case show that respondents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact,
because the children occupied the lots upon their
invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of
the construction of the improvements introduced
thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been
in good faith when they built the structures on those
lots.

The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier. In

that case, this Court deemed the son to be in good faith
for building the improvement (the house) with the
knowledge and consent of his father, to whom belonged
the land upon which it was built. Thus, Article 448 was
applied.

Digested by: Pungos. R.

12
CASE 33
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA
G.R. No. 134329
January 19, 2000
Facts: One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely,
Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and
Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included
a parcel of land of residential and coconut land located
at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It
is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which
is the subject of the instant controversy. During the
lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada,
obtained permission(take note mau ni tubag sa number 2
ruling) from him to build a houseon the northern portion
of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son,
Pastor, continued living in the house together with his
eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor's children, has been living in that house since
1960. Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada
entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For
this purpose, they executed a private document which
they, however, never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte(take note ani nga wala na
register). On June 14, 1978, Juanita(anak ni ananias)
Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his
father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to
sell the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano.
Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was
the buyer.Thereafter, private respondent demanded
that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said
area. They went through a series of meetings with the
barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable
settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end,
failed. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. From the
foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the
Regional Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a
judgment of reversal. Petitioners filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of
the Regional Trial Court. On May 20, 1998, respondent
13
Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said
petition.
Issue:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-
OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF
JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM THEIR
UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE
BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH
Ruling:
1. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in
1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered
private document. No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and be registered in
order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule
74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition
be put in a public document and registered, has
for its purpose the protection of creditors and
the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when
no creditors are involved. Without creditors to
take into consideration, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by the rules from
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is essential for
the partition to be valid.(tubag sa take note sa
facts)
2 . Petitioners are estopped from impugning the
extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto
Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they
had been occupying the subject property since 1960
without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the
liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.25 Their
admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them
insofar as the character of their possession of the
subject property is concerned. Considering that
petitioners were in possession of the subject property by
sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them.Thus, they cannot be considered
possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled
that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil
Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof.

Digested by: WJLB

14
CASE 34
IGNACIO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
GR# L-12958
May 30, 1960
FACTS:
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a
parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged he
acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel
of land owned by the Ignacio. His application is
opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano
Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the
public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the
application holding that said land formed part of the
public domain.
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to
him by the law of accretion, having been formed by
gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he
cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land subject of the dispute can
be acquired by right of accretion of Ignacio.
HELD:
No. Article 457 is not applicable. The article cited is
clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or
deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in
the present case was caused by action of the Manila
Bay. Manila bay is not a river. A bay is a part of the
sea, being a mere indentation of the same. A bay is
an opening into the land where the water is shut in
on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea;
an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or
curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.
The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in
inapplicable in the present case because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this
refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be
part of the sea.
Digest by: E.C.
15
CASE 35
De Buyser vs Director of Lands
GR# L-22763
March 18, 1983
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant is the registered owner of Lot No.
4217 of the Surigao Cadastre, which borders the Surigao
Strait. Contiguous to said lot is a parcel of land which
was formed by accretion from the sea, the subject-
matter of this controversy. Defendants Ignacio Tandayag
and his wife Candida Tandayag have been occupying this
foreshore land under a Revocable Permit issued by the
Director of Lands.
Claiming ownership of the said land, plaintiff filed an
action against the spouses Tandayag in the Court of First
Instance of Surigao to recover possession of this land as
well as rents in arrears for a period of six years.
In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff
invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August
3, 1866 which provides:
Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain, when
they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of the estate adjacent
thereto and as an increment thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not De Buyser can validly claim ownership of
such land formed by accretion from the sea
Held:
Plaintiff's reliance on the above article is quite
misplaced. The true construction of the cited provision is
that the State shall grant these lands to the adjoining
owners only when they are no longer needed for the
purposes mentioned therein. In the case at bar, the trial
court found that plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that
the land in question is no longer needed by the
government, or that the essential conditions for such
grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
exists.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the approval by the
Director of Lands of the defendants' Revocable Permit
Application is tantamount to an implied declaration on
the part of the Director of Lands of the fact that the
disputed lot is no longer needed for public use. We fail
to see such implication.
The Director of Lands wrote a letter approving the
Revocable Permit Application. It did not declare the land
as no longer needed for public use. It says
land applied for by you is/may be needed by the
Government for future public improvements (Boulevard
and seawall protection purposes) you may be allowed to
continue with your temporary occupation and
provisional use of the premises under a revocable permit
renewable every year in the meantime that the land is
not actually needed by the Government for the purposes
aforestated
NOTE: Requisites of Alluvion
-Accretion and Alluvial Deposits must be caused by the
action of the sea
-It is no longer washed by the waters of the sea
-The Government must declare that it is no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
services
Digest by: KRH
16
CASE 36
GRANDE vs. CA and CALALUNG
G.R. No. L-17652
June 30, 1962
FACTS
The land involved in this action was formed by the
gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action
of the Cagayan River sometime from 1931 until the
present action was filed in 1958.
Petitioners claim:
Grande and family alleged that were registered owners
of a lot adjoining the property in question and that they
were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents
entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Respondents claim:
Calalung and family countered that they were in
possession of the disputed property as early as 1933 or
1944 and that they now acquired the property via
prescription.
ISSUE
Who has a better right on the disputed land?
RULING
CFI Ruling:
The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs,
on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this
instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,
consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of
Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land
in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and,
second, the adverse possession of the defendant began
only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the
10-year period required for prescription before the
present action was instituted.
CA Ruling:
CA held in favor of defendant stating;
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by
the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of
the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a
natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility
of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be
productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the
title, and the technical description of the land given
therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied
upon by the trial court We are convinced, upon
consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were
really in possession since 1934, immediately after the
process of alluvium started, and that the plaintiffs woke
up to their rights only when they received their copy of
the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.
therefore, never became registered property, and hence
is not entitled or subject to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under
the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that
provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when
the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in
force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in
1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is
hereby affirmed.
Digested by: Pungos. R.

SC Ruling:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just

as an unregistered land purchased by the registered
owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension,
become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece
of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership
over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river
is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral
Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures
have been provided. The fact remain, however, that
petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial up
to the time they instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment,

17
CASE 37
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS) vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO,
AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA TANCINCO
IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO
G.R. No. L-61647
Oct. 12, 1984
Facts: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena
Tancinco Reyes, Marina Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709
situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. On
June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond property. On April 5, 1974, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of
the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the
application for registration. On March 6, 1975, the
private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the
application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan
Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court. On March 7,
1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application
and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2
covered by Plan Psu-131892. On June 26, 1976, the
lower court rendered a decision granting the application
on the finding that the lands in question are accretions
to the private respondents' fishponds covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. Only Lot 1 and 2
where granted. The petitioner submits that there is no
accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil
Code because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further down
the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there
is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial
and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river.
Issue: WON there is actual accretion on the subject Lots.
Ruling: The court agrees with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.
18
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of
three requisites before an accretion covered by this
particular provision is said to have taken place. They are
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be made through the effects of the current of the
water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs.
Virginia Acua to the effect that:
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land,
namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already
dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of
the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that
from the boundaries of the lots, for
about two (2) arms length the land was
still dry up to the edge of the river; that
sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1
& 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this
was done sometime in 1951; that the
new lots were then converted into
fishpond, and water in this fishpond was
two (2) meters deep on the side of the
Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing
evidence establishes the fact of accretion without
human intervention because the transfer of the dike
occurred after the accretion was complete. The
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect
of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused
by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive
work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made gradually through the effects of the
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree
with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is
preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of
land came into being because of the effects of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue river.
Digested by: WJLB
CASE 38
REPUBLIC v. ARCADIO IVAN SANTOS
GR# 160453
November 12, 2012
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner
of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying
up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs
to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner,
unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
FACTS: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of
more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan applied
on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B
(the property) in the RTC.
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his
application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr.
as his co-applicant because of the latters co-
ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had
been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous
and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Paraque (the City) opposed the
application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program;
that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank; and that assuming that
the property was not covered by the legal easement,
title to the property could not be registered in favor
of the applicants for the reason that the property was
an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted
from accretion.
On May 10, 2000, the RTC granted the
application for registration. The Republic, through the
OSG, appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that
"(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong theaccretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the currents of the waters.
In rulings for the respondents, the CA upheld
the RTC which pronounced that on the basis of the
evidence presented by the applicants, the court finds
that the respondents are the owners of the land
subject of the application which was previously a part
of the river which became an orchard after it dried up
and considering the lot which adjoins the same
property is owned by the applicant which was
obtained by the latter from his mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents could claim the
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription (section
14(1) of PD 1529).
19
HELD: No. The CA grossly erred in applying Article
457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the currents of the waters."
Respondents as the applicants for land
registration carried the burden of proof to establish
the merits of their application by a preponderance of
evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of
greater weight, or more convincing than that offered
in opposition to it. They would be held entitled to
claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they
established that, indeed, the property was an
accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of
soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual
and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Accordingly, respondents should establish the
concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant
the grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden
of proof.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the
dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the
river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the
effects of the current. In accretion, the water level
did not recede and was more or less maintained.
Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no
legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of
Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the
provision only to accretion, we should apply the
provision as its clear and categorical language tells us
to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of
the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application.
Digest by: E.C.
CASE 39
Bagaipo vs Court of Appeals
GR# 116290
December 8, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of
Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural land
situated in Ma-a, Davao City. In the southeast portion of
the said land was the Davao River.
Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered
parcel of land located across and opposite the southeast
portion of petitioners lot facing the Davao River.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery
of Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against Lozano. She sought the
recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters
which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River
traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a
result of a change in course of the said river, her
property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots
415-A, 415-B and 415-C.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by
Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled property.
He asserted that the Davao River did not change its
course and that the reduction in Bagaipos domain was
caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the
Davao River.
Is Article 461 applicable in this case?
Held:
Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner
cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned
riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbeds
former location cannot even be pinpointed with
particularity since the movement of the Davao River
took place gradually over an unspecified period of time,
up to the present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian
owner when the following requisites are present:
1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water; and
3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent
to the bank of the river.
These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of
respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change
in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred
through avulsion, the presumption is that the change
was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
Digest by: KRH

On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular

inspection. It concluded that the applicable law is Article
457 To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters of the New Civil
Code and not Art. 461 The reduction in the land area of
plaintiff was caused by erosion and not by a change in
course of the Davao River. Conformably then, the trial
court dismissed the complaint.

Bagaipo appealed to the CA. It affirmed the RTC.

Issue:
20
CASE 40
SPOUSES BAES vs. CA
G.R. No. 108065
July 6, 1993
FACTS
The government dug a canal on a private parcel of land
(Lot 2958) to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes and was
subdivided into Lot 2958-A, Lot 2958-B, and Lot 2958-C.
In exchange for Lot 2958-B which was totally occupied
by the canal, the government gave Baes Lot 3271-A with
exactly the same area.
Meanwhile, lot 2958-A was further subdivided to Lot 1-A
and Lot 1-B.
In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that
Lot 1-B grew bigger since it now covered Lot 3611 of the
Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of the Tripa
de Gallina creek.
Hence, the government filed for the cancelation of the
TCT of Lot 1-B.
The claims:
The petitioners claim that they became the owners of
the old bed (which was eventually filled up by soil
excavated from Lot 2958-B) by virtue of Article 461.
The government rejects this claim and avers that the
petitioners had already been fully compensated for it
when they agreed to exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot
3271-A belonging to the government.
The law:
Article 461 of the Civil Code states:
River beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to
the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course
in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of
the land adjoining the old bed shall have the right to
acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which
21
value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by
the new bed.
ISSUE
Under the said provision of the law, Do the Baes have
rights to the disputed portion of land considering that
the change in this particular case is man-made and not
natural as referred by the said law?
RULING
The petitioners rely heavily on Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino's
interpretation of this Article, to wit:
This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course
of a stream. If the change of the course is due to works
constructed by concessioners authorized by the
government, the concession may grant the abandoned
river bed to the concessioners. If there is no such grant,
then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed will belong to
the owners of the land covered by the waters, as
provided in this article, without prejudice to a superior
right of third persons with sufficient title.
We agree.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes,
there is all the more reason to compensate him when
the change in the course of the river is effected through
artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land
covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act
on the part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was
therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their
loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already
been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A
in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the
Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970.
This was a fair exchange because the two lots were of
the same area and value and the agreement was freely
entered into by the parties. The petitioners cannot now
claim additional compensation because, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General,
. . . to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the
dried-up portion of the creek would be a clear case of
double compensation and unjust enrichment at the
expense of the state.
Digested by: Pungos. R.
CASE 41
MARIO C. RONQUILLO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL
ROSARIO and FLORENCIA DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-43346
March 20, 1991
Facts: It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a
registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
34,Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc,
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
34797 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The other
plaintiffs Florencia and Amparo del Rosario were
daughters of said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot
is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied
by the defendant since 1945 which is the subject matter
of the present action.
Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot
including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero
Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga.
Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was occupied by Isabel
Roldan with the tolerance and consent of the plaintiff on
condition that the former will make improvements on
the adjoining dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub. In
the early part of 1945 defendant occupied the eastern
portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion
of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled
lot. After a relocation survey of the land in question
sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was
occupying a portion of their land and thus demanded
defendant to vacate said land when the latter refused to
pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However,
despite said demand defendant refused to vacate. On
December 26, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of the Rosarios. Upon motion of Ronquillo,
respondent court modified its decision by setting aside
the first portion of the trial court's decision ordering
Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios that portion
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797
occupied by the former, based on the former's
representation that he had already vacated the same
prior to the commencement of this case. However,
22
respondent court upheld its declaration that the Del
Rosarios are the rightful owners of the dried-up river
bed. Hence, this petition.
On May 17, 1976, this Court issued a
resolution 7 requiring the Solicitor General to comment
on the petition in behalf of the Director of Lands as an
indispensable party in representation of the Republic of
the Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded,
was subsequently considered impleaded as such in our
resolution of September 10, 1976. In his Motion to
Admit Comment, 9 the Solicitor General manifested that
pursuant to a request made by this office with the
Bureau of Lands to conduct an investigation, the Chief of
the Legal Division of the Bureau sent a communication
informing him that the records of his office "do not show
that Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del
Rosario or Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land
application covering parcels of land situated at Estero
Calubcub Manila as verified by our Records DivisionIn a
letter dated June 29, 1979. Florencia del Rosario
manifested to this Court that Rosendo, Amparo and
Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only
one still alive among the private respondents in this
case.
In a resolution dated January 20, 1988, the Court
required petitioner Ronquillo to implead one Benjamin
Diaz pursuant to the former's manifestation that the
land adjacent to the dried up river bed has already been
sold to the latter, and the Solicitor General was also
required to inquire into the status of the investigation
being conducted by the Bureau of LandsOn April 3,
1989, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
for Certiorari, this time impleading the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which
subsequently bought the property adjacent to the dried-
up river bed from Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated
January 10, 1990, the Court ordered that DBP be
impleaded as a party respondent
Issue: Whether the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub
being claimed by herein petitioner was caused by a
natural change in the course of the waters; and,
corollary thereto, is the issue of the applicability of
Article 370 of the old Civil Code.
Ruling: Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the
trial court that there was a natural change in the course
of Estero Calubcub declared that:
The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil
Code is not applicable to the instant case because said
Estero Calubcub did not actually change its course but
simply dried up, hence, the land in dispute is a land of
public domain and subject to the disposition of the
Director of Land(s). The contention of defendant is
without merit. As mentioned earlier, said estero as
shown by the relocation plan did not disappear but
merely changed its course by a more southeasternly
direction. As such, "the abandoned river bed belongs to
the plaintiffs-appellees and said land is private and not
public in nature. Hence, further, it is not subject to a
Homestead Application by the appellant". Even
assuming for the sake of argument that said estero did
not change its course but merely dried up or
disappeared, said dried-up estero would still belong to
the riparian owner. A careful perusal of the evidence
presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal
that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was
caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping of
garbage therein by the people of the surrounding
neighborhood. Under the circumstances, a review of the
findings of fact of respondent court thus becomes
imperative. The foregoing facts and circumstances
remove the instant case from the applicability of Article
370 of the old Civil Code which provides:
Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are
abandoned because of a natural change in the
course of the waters, belong to the owners of
the riparian lands throughout the respective
length of each. If the abandoned bed divided
tenements belonging to different owners the
new dividing line shall be equidistant from one
and the other.
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for
interpretation.Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals
or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our
earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention
of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the
case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be
entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by
private ownership.
Digested by: WJLB
23
CASE 42
SIARY VALLEY ESTATES, INC. v. LUCASAN
97 Phil 987
1955
FACTS: Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200
heads of cattle that were driven from its lands to that
of Lucasans. Lucasan however argued that although
there was commixtion of cattle, Siari already
retrieved its animals. The CFI of Zamboanga decided
in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucasan was in bad faith thus should
lose his share in the commixtion
HELD: YES. Although there was no actual evidence
that all 823 missing animals were taken by Lucasan or
his men, on 2 occasions however, his men drove
away 30 heads of cattle. It is not erroneous to believe
that the others must have also been driven away
applying by analogy the principle that one who stole a
part of the stolen money must have taken also the
larger sum lost by the offended party.
Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that
if the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith,
the one responsible for it will lose his share thus
since Lucasan is in bad faith, he should lose his share
in the commixtion.
The SC ordered Lucasan to deliver the 321
heads that had been entrusted to his care to Siari;
pay damages for the 400 heads he sold since 1946;
ordered to allow Siari to round up all the buffaloes
that may be found on its cattle ranch.
Digest by: E.C.
Note: this is a one and a half full text case so this digest
is deemed proper.
-JM (PROOFREAD)