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G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013


JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma
Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO
BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of
Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934
and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking
spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any
motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the
Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S.
Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin
Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal
is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents
herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan
and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey
Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile
by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner,
Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00
were not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against
respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto
Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-
Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on
May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of
Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia
denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the
placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to
remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto
Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against
respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery,
specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these
cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes
fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands.
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who
has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for
violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in
Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of action
and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly
dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate
No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of
the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation
(Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to
Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state
facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the
right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months
after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already
extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order11to argue among other
points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2,
2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The
Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is
that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF
PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch
7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the
private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt
the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before
this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the
old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can
only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases
"shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The
offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in court as
required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for
violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-
month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to
judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was
not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and
ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the
respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the
filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City
Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the
respondents and upheld the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005
Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled
the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because
respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that
the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of
two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also,
respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted
no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also,
respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the
case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private
complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution
dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which
the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the
preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified
petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of
the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the
law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation
omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance
003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions
effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in
this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent
of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An independent component
city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are
chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act
or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime
charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present
case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information
was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine
of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court,
whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court,
this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes
is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However,
the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of
Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the
original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the
offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus,
respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and
filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime charged was
committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in
which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election
Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the
domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period
of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the
complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the
violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution
Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed.
Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information within the two-month
period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the
private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the
necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.

2.
G.R. NO. 152662 JUNE 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

PEREZ, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936,
entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand
Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial
Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC
of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No.
127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the
amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-
complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa
Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were
raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.

On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the
MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received
by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the
same was filed with the court a quoconsidering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is
hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the
petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed
to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the
private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had
elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until
the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.

xxx

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper
court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326,
as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[9]

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. [10] It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant
Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence
superseding the aforesaid ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, [13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with
the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure
to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of
service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases
relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [15] Respondent pointed out that the
crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326,
as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws,
as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such
offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the
12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that
attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition
was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22
cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened
by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. [17] when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals
Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no
more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, [22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially
those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of
presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of
the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of
Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil
case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22
against the respondent.
3.
G.R. Nos. 135554-56 June 21, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO DELA CRUZ y CARIZZA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision dated August 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R and 15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty of two (2) counts of
rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.
On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant in the RTC of Baguio City. The informations
alleged:
Criminal Case No. 15163-R -
That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his
daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 11 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 15164-R -
That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, have
carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 16 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 7610
(The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information stated:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter
either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15368-R.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the three cases. When arraigned, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges. Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jeannie Ann dela Cruz; Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation-Cordillera Administrative Region (NBI-CAR); Mrs. Jean dela Cruz, mother of complainant and spouse
of accused-appellant; and SPO2 Melchor Ong of the Baguio City Police.
The prosecution established that accused-appellant married Jean dela Cruz in civil rites on 14 April 1977 and again in Catholic rites on
27 December 1978. They begot four children, namely: Jeanie Ann (the private complainant), Divine Grace, Daniel Jay and Gerard
Nio.4
Accused-appellant, a teacher, worked at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. He transferred to the Don
Bosco Elementary School in Baguio City sometime in 1986 and taught there until the following year. In 1987, he worked at the Saint
Louis Center in Baguio City until his dismissal therefrom in 1993. Accused-appellant again taught at the Don Bosco Technical Institute
in Tarlac from 1993 until his arrest in August 1997.5 While working there, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac on
weekdays and went home every 15 days or every payday. They would go home to Baguio City, where the rest of their family stayed, on
Friday evening and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.6
Jeannie Ann dela Cruz ("Jeannie Ann") testified that she was born to accused-appellant and Jean Aqui-dela Cruz on April 18, 1979 in
Tarlac, Tarlac. Not long after her birth, her family transferred to the house of her maternal grandmother in No. 2 Sumulong Street,
Baguio City. Her family lived in an extension of her grandmothers house which had a basement, a second floor and an attic. The
second floor had four rooms and a stairs leading to the attic, which served as a stockroom. Jeannie Anns parents and her two brothers,
Daniel and Nio, stayed in the basement while she and her sister, Divine stayed in the second floor.7
Jeannie Ann revealed that accused-appellant started molesting her when she was seven years old. While he helped do her homework
at night, accused-appellant would on occasion make her hold his penis and masturbate him. There were also instances when he would
put his penis inside her mouth and withdraw the same when a white liquid came out.8 Accused-appellant warned Jeannie Ann not to tell
her mother what he was doing to her and told her that it was a normal thing between father and daughter. He further warned Jeannie
Ann that her mother might kill them should she learn about the things that they did. Jeannie Ann believed accused-appellant and did not
tell anyone about the sexual acts he performed on her. As she was growing up, accused-appellant continued to engage in the
aforementioned sexual activities with her, and continuously threatened to hurt her, her siblings or her mother if she did not give in to his
desires. Jeannie Ann still refrained from complaining because she was convinced by the accused-appellant that the sexual activities
which he performed on her were proper.9She recounted before the trial court three particular occasions when accused-appellant
molested her.
Jeannie Ann said that sometime in September 1990, she was sexually abused by accused-appellant in their house in No. 37 Leonard
Wood Road, Baguio City. She was only 11 years old then. According to Jeannie Ann, their family had moved to said house when her
grandmothers house in Sumulong St. was destroyed in the July 16, 1990 earthquake that hit Baguio City.10 They occupied the
basement of the house in Leonard Wood Road. The basement had two bedrooms, a comfort room and a living room. Nobody stayed in
the second floor thereof but during the day they stayed in the main house.11 Sometime that month, Jeannie Ann, her three year-old
brother Nio and accused-appellant were left in the house while her mother and her sister Divine went to market. She was in the living
room with Nio when her father undressed her. Her father removed his pants and she was made to lie down on a cushion. Her father
played with her genitalia and rubbed his penis against her private part until a white liquid came out of his penis. Jeannie Ann said that
after said incident, she felt pain in her vagina whenever she would urinate (mahapdi). She did not resist because she thought that what
her father was doing to her was a normal act.12
Jeannie Ann narrated that accused-appellant again abused her one night in July 1995 when she was 16 years old. She was watching
television with her siblings in the living room. At that time, their mother was attending a meeting in church. Accused-appellant called her
three times but she refused to respond to his call as she was watching television. Exasperated, accused-appellant pulled her inside one
of the bedrooms and asked her to lie down on the bed saying, "This is only for a while." Accused-appellant then undressed her,
removed his pants and underwear, inserted his finger inside her vagina, mashed her breasts and licked her vagina. Accused-appellant
proceeded to rub his penis against her vagina and thereafter inserted his penis therein and kept it there until his semen started to come
out. Accused-appellant placed his penis on Jeannie Anns stomach where he made his semen flow. While all this was happening,
Jeannie Ann could only cry, as she was afraid of accused-appellant, because he threatened her that he would kill her or her mother and
siblings.13
The third incident recounted by Jeannie Ann occurred in their house in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City on August 2, 1997. She was
then 18 years old. When she came home at around 10:30 in the morning after her classes at Saint Louis University, she saw accused-
appellant at the door. He told her to proceed to the attic shortly. She ignored him and went directly to her room and started cleaning the
same. While she was cleaning the outer portion of her room, she saw accused-appellant go up the attic. While he was there, he
repeatedly called her and asked her to go there. When Jeannie Ann remembered that her mother had earlier instructed her to clean the
attic, she went up when she was done cleaning her room.14
Accused-appellant lay on the bed in the attic as Jeannie Ann swept the floor. When she was done, accused-appellant asked her to join
him on the bed. He went near her and again asked her to sit on the bed when she refused to heed his call. Accused-appellant
whispered to her that he was running out of time. He talked in whispers so that the other people in the house at that time would not be
able to hear what he said. Sensing that accused-appellant would again molest her, Jeannie Ann became nervous and started to cry. He
told her to stop crying and to relax, as what he was about to do would only take a while. Accused-appellant then lifted Jeannie Anns t-
shirt and brassier, mashed her breasts with his left hand and inserted his right hand inside her pants. Jeannie Ann resisted, but
accused-appellant proceeded to insert a finger of his right hand inside her vagina. While he performed the aforementioned acts on his
daughter, accused-appellant told her, "I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only one who will do this to you." 15
Accused-appellant only stopped what he was doing when he heard Aileen, a boarder in their house, calling Jeannie Ann. He
immediately fixed her clothes and hair, then moved away from her. Accused-appellant instructed Jeannie Ann not to go down and to
keep quiet about the incident. When accused-appellant noticed that Aileen had left because Jeannie Ann did not respond to her,
accused-appellant embraced Jeannie Ann and said: "Please cooperate with me and trust me. I have given you my life. Promise that I
will be the only one who will touch you." Accused-appellant began touching her again. He inserted his fingers inside her vagina. As he
touched her, he said, "Please cooperate with me and trust me. This is for your own good and for the good of our family. If you will not
follow me, you might regret it. I want you to have a bright future. And after you finish, I can already die and you will no longer have any
problem."16 Although Aileen, Divine, Nio and Rogel, another boarder in their house were also there at the time of the incident, Jeannie
Ann did not have the courage to call for help because she was very much afraid of accused-appellant, and she saw anger in his eyes.17
When accused-appellant was done with her, Jeannie Ann insisted on going down. She cried as she returned to her room to fix herself.
Thereafter, she went out of the house to deal with what had just happened to her. While walking outside toward the bridge, she saw a
white L-300 van belonging to the police. She flagged down the vehicle and narrated to the two police officers riding therein, SPO2
Bravo and SPO2 Ong, what accused-appellant had just done to her. The policemen accompanied her back to their house where they
met accused-appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person who had raped her. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with the
policemen to the Baguio City Police Station.18
When they arrived at the Baguio City Police Station, Jeannie Ann narrated her experience to the police officer stationed at the Womens
Desk. In her statement, Jeannie Ann described what accused-appellant did to her on August 2, 1997.19
Jeannie Ann also denied accused-appellants claim that she had sexual relations with her boyfriend Charles, and that she accused her
father of rape to get back at him for causing her breakup with Charles.20
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the NBI-CAR medico-legal officer who conducted a physical examination of Jeannie Ann on August 8, 1997,
testified that he found two old healed lacerations at 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions on Jeannie Anns hymen. He said that the
lacerations could have been inflicted more than three months prior to the date of the examination and considering the proximity of their
location, could have been inflicted at the same time. A hard rigid instrument like an erect male organ, a rigid wood or a finger could
have caused these lacerations. Dr. Bandonill also opined that the positions of the lacerations did not rule out the possibility that the
victim had sexual intercourse less than three months prior to his examination of her, since intercourse would not create further
lacerations when done in the same position. He likewise noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the vaginal rugosities were slightly
flattened and smoothed. The victim's hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.4 cm. in diameter with ease. Dr. Bandonill said it was possible
that penetration happened several times. He further testified that the frequent insertion of a finger or other rigid object, with a diameter
of more than an inch, could cause the lacerations as well as the lax condition of vaginal walls.21
Jean dela Cruz ("Mrs. dela Cruz"), Jeannie Anns mother and wife of accused-appellant, testified that she learned that accused-
appellant had sexually abused their daughter Jeannie Ann on August 2, 1997 when she arrived at home after her marketing chores.
She was told by her daughter Divine that accused-appellant was picked up by the police. Mrs. dela Cruz followed accused-appellant to
the police station and found Jeanie Ann crying while the latter was reporting what had happened to her at the Women's Desk. Upon
seeing her daughter, Mrs. dela Cruz hugged her and they cried together.22
Mrs. dela Cruz further stated that she was shocked upon hearing Jeannie Anns statement before the police that accused-appellant had
been performing oral sex on their daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter was seven years old, as it was the first time that she learned
about it. In her anger, she rushed to the other room where the accused-appellant was being questioned and slapped him, kicked him
and scratched his face. She said accused-appellant denied all the accusations against him. When accused-appellant was already
incarcerated, Mrs. dela Cruz received several letters23 from him asking for forgiveness from her and from Jeannie Ann.24 She also
informed the trial court that after accused-appellants incarceration, she went to Tarlac to get her husband's things since he usually
stayed there on weekdays while he taught at Don Bosco.25 She discovered several love letters by a certain Emily addressed to
accused-appellant,26 Emilys photograph27 and accused-appellants draft love letters to Emily, dated March 21, 1995,28 September 4,
1995,29 and March 7, 1996.30 Mrs. dela Cruz also found a letter from a certain Maureen telling accused-appellant that he had a chance
of winning her heart,31 and a photograph of Maureen.32 She said that the tenor of the letters indicated that accused-appellant was
having relations with other women.33 Mrs. dela Cruz also denied accused-appellants claims that she had a paramour and that she
helped Jeannie Ann file the complaints against him because she (Mrs. dela Cruz) wanted to get back at him for being unfaithful to her.34
SPO2 Melchor Ong, the police officer assigned to the Baguio City Mobile Group, also testified that on August 2, 1997, between 11:30
a.m. and 12:00 noon, while he and his companion inside an L-300 van of the Baguio City police were passing along Sumulong St.,
Baguio City, they saw Jeannie Ann walking towards them. The latter stopped them and tearfully reported to them that her father had just
sexually molested her. They accompanied Jeannie Ann to her house and there the latter pointed to accused-appellant as the person
who mashed her breasts and inserted his finger inside her vagina. SPO2 Ong and his companion approached accused-appellant,
introduced themselves as policemen and invited him to the police station. He said that accused-appellant readily agreed to go with
them to the police station.35
The defense presented as witnesses the accused-appellant, Camilo Estepa, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City,
Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute, and Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco in Trancoville,
Baguio City.
Accused-appellant testified that he was a teacher at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. In 1987, he
transferred to Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City and worked there for a year. From 1988 to 1993, he taught also in Saint Louis
School Center. In 1994, he went back to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac and had taught there until his incarceration
in August 1997.36 On weekdays, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac, Tarlac and they would go home to their family in
Baguio City every 15th and 30th of each month to give his salary to his wife. When these dates fell on a weekday, they would go home
to Baguio City the following Friday and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.37
He denied all the accusations hurled against him by his daughter Jeannie Ann.38 According to him, he tried to provide for the needs of
his family, especially his wife whom he loved very much. He maintained that even when he was already in jail, he asked his mother and
his sister to support his daughter's education.
He admitted to having gone home to Baguio City in the evening of August 1, 1997, which he recalled was a Friday. That night, his wife
asked him to clean the attic the following day as there was a dead rat therein.39
The following day, August 2, 1997, accused-appellant removed the decomposing body of the rat from the attic as requested by his wife.
He called his daughter Jeannie Ann who was cleaning her room on the second floor of the house to come to the attic and help him. It
took a while before Jeannie Ann heeded his call. When she finally went up, she merely swept one third of the floor area of the attic,
away from where the dead rat was. When she was done sweeping the floor, accused-appellant asked her to come near him, as he
wanted to apologize for having scolded her earlier and to remind her that she should not have ignored him when he commanded her to
go up the attic, or to at least tell him that she could not obey his command immediately. While he was talking to her, they heard
someone calling her name. Jeannie Ann told accused-appellant that that person was her classmate. She then went down while
accused-appellant stayed on to fix the things in the attic. Not long afterwards, his daughter Divine informed him that they had some
visitors downstairs. On his way down from the attic, he looked out of the window and saw Jeannie Ann walking beyond the bridge.40
Accused-appellant went down to meet the visitors who were looking for Rogel, one of their boarders. After leading these visitors to
Rogel, two policemen arrived in their house with Jeannie Ann. Accused-appellant identified the policemen as SPO2 Leonardo Cruz
Bravo and SPO2 Melchor Ong. The former asked for accused-appellants name and thereafter invited him to the police station. He
freely went with them, without asking the purpose of the invitation.41
At the station, SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed accused-appellant. The interview was reduced to writing and he was asked to
sign the same. He did not read the document, as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time. At first, accused-appellant
refused to sign the document without the presence of his counsel. SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo, however, told him that his refusal to
sign the document may be interpreted as a sign of resistance on his part. Accused-appellant thereafter decided to sign the document.42
Accused-appellant admitted that he transferred to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac because he was dismissed from
the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City. He acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a student named Freda Miguel filed a
case43 against him because accused-appellant allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in the Science Laboratory Room of the school, and that
he signed an amicable settlement of the complaint. However, he denied the truth of that complaint against him and said that the filing
thereof was not the cause of his dismissal from Saint Louis Center.44
He also admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen addressed to him were his but insisted that they were only his friends, and
that Emilys reference to him as her boyfriend in one of her letters45 was only a joke.
Accused-appellant claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann conspired to file the cases against him because they had resentments against
him. He said Jeannie Ann blamed him for having caused her breakup with her boyfriend Charles. His wife, on the other hand, wanted
him out of her life because she had a paramour. According to him, his wife admitted to him that she had an illicit relationship with a man
named Alfredo dela Cruz, a namesake of his brother. His wife had a second relationship with a person named Alfredo Aquino against
whom he filed a case before the barangay.46
Camilo Estepa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, told the trial court that sometime in 1993, accused-appellant
filed a case for malicious mischief against a certain Alfredo or Federico Aquino, a boarder in the house of Mrs. Aqui, the mother of Mrs.
dela Cruz. Accused-appellant alleged that Aquino was courting his wife. However, the case was settled amicably when Aquino agreed
to leave the boarding house of Mrs. Aqui.47
Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1994 to 1998, testified that he had known accused-
appellant since 1994 and was not aware of any untoward incident involving the latter. He said that accused-appellant and his son
Daniel would go home to his family in Baguio City every weekend and returned to Tarlac either on Sunday evening or Monday morning.
He would come to school on time and attended the flag ceremony regularly. Fr. Veloso said that none of the lady teachers ever
complained about accused-appellant.48
Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary School in Trancoville, Baguio City, testified that accused-appellant was a
very competent teacher in Science and had a very good relationship with the other teachers. He said he regretted that accused-
appellant left his teaching job at the Don Bosco Elementary School after only one year.49
On August 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Rape (committed in September 1990) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under paragraph No.
3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (Statutory Rape) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the offended party, Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of incest rape (committed in July 1995) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under Section 11 of
Republic Act 7659 (Heinous Crime Law) which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of Death to be implemented in accordance with law; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann
dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
3. In Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code instead of violation
of RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him, applying the indeterminate sentence
law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to two (2)
years four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela
Cruz the sum of P5,000 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Law.
SO ORDERED.50
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jeannie Ann and in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. He alleges that Jeannie Anns testimony was
fabricated and inconsistent.51
Accused-appellant points out that Jeannie Ann failed to immediately notify the authorities, or at least her mother, of her harrowing
experience. Notwithstanding the fact that he was often away from their home because he stayed in Tarlac where he worked on
weekdays, and Jeannie Ann was with her mother in Baguio City, it took her eleven years to disclose the sexual abuses which accused-
appellant allegedly committed against her.52 Moreover, he claims that considering Jeannie Anns tender age at the time he allegedly
raped her, she must have suffered great pain and should have complained about it to her mother or told the latter what accused-
appellant had been doing to her. Accused-appellant argues that the delay in the reporting of the sexual acts he performed on his
daughter is not normal and is indicative of the untruthfulness of complainants charges.53
The Court finds that the trial court did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his daughter
Jeannie Ann in September 1990 and July 1995.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined the crime of Rape prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997), and which is the applicable law for the rape incidents of September 1990 and July 1995, states:
When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
In reviewing the cases at bar, the Court observed the following guidelines it had previously formulated for the review of rape cases: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is difficult to prove, and even more difficult for the accused to disprove; (2) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.54
In rape cases, the issue invariably boils down to the credibility of the victims testimony. The trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
the victims statements is accorded great weight because it has the unique opportunity of hearing the witnesses testify and observing
their deportment and manner of testifying. The trial court judge is indisputably in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the
complainants testimony. Thus, unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.55
The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a woman who states under oath that she has been raped meets the test
of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and who remains consistent, is a credible witness.56
In the cases at bar, the trial court found Jeannie Anns testimony to be "natural, coherent and touching as she recounted her harrowing
experience in the hands of her father,"57 as follows:
xxx
q Now, sometime in the month of July, 1995, Madame Witness, do you remember if there was anything unusual which
took place again in your house at Sumulong St., Baguio City?
a There was, sir.
q What was that incident?
[a] On that night I was watching TV with my brothers and sisters. While I was watching TV my father was calling me but I
did not heed his call because I said I was watching TV. So, three times he called me and I know that he was already angry.
Then he went near me and pulled me into the other room. And in that other room, he did bad things that I cannot imagine.
q Now, you said that you and your brothers and sisters were watching TV on that night of July, 1995. Where was your
mother at that time?
a She was not in the house at that time because she attended a meeting in our church.
COURT: (to witness)
q That is why we already excluded the public. Dont let the Court speculate. Will you tell us straight. What did your father
actually do which you said (sic) he did things which you cannot imagine?
a When we were in the room he let me sit on the bed. And he asked me to lie down. And he said, "This is only for a
while". And after that he put down my pants and my underwear. Then he undressed, lowered his pants and removed his brief.
Then he started touching my vabina (sic).
COURT:
Continue from there. Make it of record that at this point the witness is crying.
PROS. CENTENO:
q Now after your father had removed your pants and your underwear as you said, and he also removed his pants and his
brief and started holding your vagina, what else happened?
a He fingered my vagina and also mashed mybreasts (sic). And with his tongue he licked my vagina. After that he used
his penis and rubbed it into my vagina. And he played with my vagina.
q What did you do when your father was doing that to you?
a I was just crying, sir.
q Did you not fight back?
a No sir, because I was afraid of my father.
q Why are you afraid of your father?
a Because when I was still young, one time he told me that either I will be killed or our family will be killed.
q On what occasion was that when your father old (sic) you that it is either you or the family that will be killed?
a I cannot remember, sir. But that was when I was still young.
q Now, aside from rubbing his penis to your vagina, what else did your father do?
a When he was rubbing his penis against my vagina there was a white liquid that came out. And when that white liquid
came out he placed his penis on my stomach where the white liquid was placed.
COURT: (to witness)
q Will you tell us what you mean by his rubbing his penis to your vagina? What was being done actually?
a I felt that half of the head of his penis was inside my vagina. That is what I felt. (At this point the witness again broke
into tears)
COURT:
Continue.
PROS. CENTENO:
q Now, when you felt that as you said half of the penis of your father was inside your vagina, what did you do?
a None, sir.
q Why did you not do anything?
a Because I didnt know what to do, sir.
q Did you not try to fight your father?
a No, sir, because I am really afraid of my father. Because when he gets mad at my mother, my brothers and sisters
would be involved.
q Now, before July 1995, Madame Witness, particularly in September of 1990, several months after the earthquake of
July 16, 1990, will you tell us where you were residing?
a We were residing then at No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, sir.
q How old were you?
a I was 11 years old.
xxx
q When you were staying at Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City, together with your father, your mother, your sister and
your brothers in September of 1990, do you remember if there was any unusual incident which happened to you?
a Yes, sir.
q What was that incident?
a I was with my father and brother Nio at the sala. And at the sala he undressed me and did the same. He removed his
pants. Then he took a cushion from the sala and asked me to lie down. And there he played with my vagina. Then he rubbed
his penis against my vagina. Nio was still a baby at that time.
q Where was your mother at that time?
a My mother was not in the house at that time. What I know is that she went to the market.
q How about you sister Divine?
a She was with my mother, sir.
COURT: (to witness)
q Again, in this incident will you describe actually to us the motions that took place with the rubbing of his penis into your
vagina?
a It is like this, sir. For example this is my vagina (witness showing her left hand, palms up) and this is his penis (witness
demonstrating with her right forefinger), he made a push and pull movement on my vagina.
PROS. CENTENO:
q What did you feel while your father was doing that to you which you term as "rubbing his penis into your vagina"?
a I felt pain, sir.
PROS. CENTENO:
May we put the word "mahapdi" which was the term used by the witness, in the record.
(to witness)
q How long did your father rub his penis into your vagina?
a It was for quite a long time until a white liquid came out.
q Did you not fight back when your father did that to you?
a No, sir.
q Why did you not fight back?
a Because I thought that what he was doing to me was a normal act.
xxx58
The trial court judge saw "from the face of the victim the anguish and the pain and the shame and the embarrassment as she broke
down and cried several times in the course of her testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable acts of her father."59
Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination of her private parts and endure the humiliation of
a public trial where she would be forced to recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not really been raped. This is
especially true in cases of incestuous rape, as in these cases where Jeannie Ann accused her own father of abusing her, since
reverence and respect for ones parents and other elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children.60
The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the victim where the delay can be attributed to the
pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral ascendancy over the
victim. It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for sometime the assault on her virtue because of the rapists threat on her life, or
on the life of the other members of her family.61
In the cases at bar, Jeannie Ann repeatedly explained that accused-appellant threatened to hurt her, her mother or her siblings if she
did not give in to his desires.62 Her fear of what accused-appellant would do to her, her mother and siblings if she revealed his evil
deeds was what compelled her to suffer in silence for a long time. In People v. Nicolas,63 the Court stated:
The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in
virtually all cases that have reached this Court. It is through this fear that the perpetrator hopes to create a climax of extreme
psychological terror which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated acts of rape over
a period of time. The relationship of the victim and the perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person
normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim.64
On the other hand, the trial court found accused-appellant to be evasive in his narration of his story. All that he offered in his defense
were his bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. A mere denial constitutes negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.65
Accused-appellant's assertion that his daughter made up the charges against him to get back at him for causing her breakup with her
boyfriend Charles is likewise unbelievable. It is not likely that a complainant in a rape case would fabricate a story of defloration against
her own father and put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well, unless it was the plain truth and her motive was purely to
obtain justice.66 Neither does the Court believe accused-appellant's claim that his wife urged their daughter to file rape charges against
him because she (his wife) wanted to get him out of the way of her extra-marital relationship. It is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject them to embarrassment and even stigma.67 No mother would have the
courage to expose an ignominious act of her husband that could lead to a breakup of the family unless she was prompted by a desire
to obtain justice for her daughter.68
The trial court committed no error in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape he committed in
September 1990, since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law).69
However, the Court finds that the lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him for the rape committed in July
1995. R.A. No. 7659, which was already in force at that time, requires that the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender must concur for the death penalty to be imposable. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 provides:
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
xxx
The Court has previously explained that the circumstances of minority and relationship are considered as special qualifying
circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus warrant the imposition of the death penalty. These
circumstances must be alleged in the information and established during trial for the court to be able to impose the death penalty.70 It
was, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfactorily prove both circumstances of minority and relationship.
In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the father-daughter relationship was alleged in the information and proven in the course of the trial.
However, Jeannie Anns minority, although likewise alleged in the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that was offered to
establish her age was her bare testimony that she was born on April 18, 1979. The prosecution failed to present her birth certificate, or
in lieu thereof, other documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate, school records which would have aided the court in
verifying her claim that she was a minor when she was raped by accused-appellant in July 1995.
In the absence of adequate proof of Jeannie Anns minority, the penalty imposable for the offense in Criminal Case No. 15164-R is
reclusion perpetua.71
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the information in Criminal
Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness."72
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite which among
the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.73 Moreover, it does not state the acts
and omissions constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of
criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter
[Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts.74 The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is
therefore void for being violative of the accused-appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.75
Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this Court regarding the defects of the information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its ruling in Suy Sui vs.
People,76 because the information is a patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and of the basic principles of due process. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case
open for review, and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as might be found in the appealed decision, whether
these errors are assigned or not.
It is likewise necessary to increase the award of damages by the trial court. The lower court in its decision ordered accused-appellant to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) only in each of the cases, representing moral damages.
It failed to award the prescribed amounts for civil indemnity, the award of which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.77 This
civil liability ex delicto is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.78 It is not to be confused with moral damages, which
is awarded upon a showing that the victim endured physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.79Under prevailing jurisprudence, when the penalty imposed on the
accused is reclusion perpetua, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) should be awarded as civil indemnity to the rape
victim.80 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for each
count of rape is proper.
In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages are automatically granted to the victim in rape cases without need of proof for it is
assumed that the private complainant has sustained mental, physical and psychological suffering.81The Court affirms the award by the
trial court of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, since said amounts
are in accord with its current rulings.82
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6 in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R is
hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the
victim the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is declared null and void for being violative of the accused-appellant's constitutionally-
guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case against him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

4.
G.R. No. 123070 April 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
CASIANO BUNTAG alias "CIANO" and DIEGO BONGO, appellants.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:


This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 7729, convicting the
appellants Casiano Buntag alias "Ciano" and Diego Bongo of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, and directing
them to jointly indemnify the heirs of the victim Berno Georg Otte the sum of P50,000 as moral damages.
The Indictment
The appellants were charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1992, in the municipality of Panglao, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery by the suddenness and unexpectedness of the acts, the victim
who was unarmed being then unaware thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the use of a bladed instrument one Berno Georg Otte (a German national), hitting and injuring the latter on his chest,
thereby causing his immediate death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount to be proved during
the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 248 in relation to Art. 14 all of the Revised Penal Code as amended. 2
The Case for the Prosecution
Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,3 a German national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona Ville Beach Resort located in
Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal Bonga,4 assigned Otte to Room No. 95 and gave the latter his room key.
On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resorts restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the disco which was about to unfold
that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo Chapel.6
At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of the tables.7 She noticed that he had some
companions whom she failed to recognize.8
Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno "Ninoy" Guigue were also at the disco. At around 2:00 a.m. of February 9, 1992,
Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a night and walked home, with their respective bicycles at their sides.9 At the crossing to the
Alona Beach, they saw a man lying on the road but did not recognize him. They walked past the prostrate man. When they were about
twenty-five meters10 away from the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates.1111 Suddenly,
Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the
house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo.1212 In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino Bongo then accompanied
Mihangos and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos and Guigue retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no
longer there.
At around 5:30 a.m. of February 9, 1992, the police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call about a man, believed to
be dead, lying at the side of the crossroad near the Alona Beach.1313 PO1 Yolando E. Hormachuelos, together with PO1 Mauro
Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie Ragusta,1414 proceeded to the crime scene. They were accompanied by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed that the man died due to a stab wound.1515 The policemen found a hunting knife about one meter away
from the body.1616 Constancio Geoivencal took pictures of the cadaver. Hormachuelos took custody of the knife.1717
In the course of their investigation, the policemen learned that Mihangos and Guigue had seen the dead body by the road.
Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their houses and brought them to the road where the body of Otte was found.
Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the body at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well as their encounter with Bongo and
Buntag.
At about 1:00 p.m. that day, Hormachuelos took appellant Bongo to the police station and investigated him without the assistance of
counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Ottes key to Room No. 9 and hid it near their house. He then drew a sketch showing the place
where he hid the key, at the back of their house. Bongo also admitted that he was with appellant Casiano Buntag. The policemen went
to Bongos house and recovered the key to Ottes room as indicated by Bongo in his sketch.
At 2:00 p.m., Guigue arrived at the police station and gave his statement to Hormachuelos.1818 At 3:00 p.m., Mihangos gave his
statement to SPO1 Proculo Bonao.1919 Hormachuelos then took custody of Casiano Buntag and brought him to the police station
where he was asked about his involvement in the killing of Otte without the assistance of counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep
silent. When apprised that Diego Bongo had implicated him, Buntag, this time with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora,
gave a statement on February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He stated that at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was walking back
home from the disco place where he caught up with Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife
at Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box Otte but he refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte three
times on the face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also stated that he then ran back home, but
Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal the incident to anybody or else he would be implicated.20 Buntag subscribed and
swore to the truth of his statement on February 21, 1992 before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
In the meantime, Municipal Health Officer Dr. Julita Lood-Cogo performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Otte and submitted her Post-
Mortem Report which contained the following findings:
Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib, approx. 2 cms. x 1 cm. in size, with a depth of approx. 12 cms.,
directed upwards and medially, with a complete fracture of the 4th rib, right, involving a portion of the right lung and base of the
heart.
Cause of death:
CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO STAB WOUND, ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT.21
On March 7, 1992, a criminal complaint for murder was filed against appellants Bongo and Buntag with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Attached to the records was Buntags sworn statement dated February 21, 1992. Only appellant Bongo submitted his counter-affidavit
on February 27, 1992, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Antonio Sarce,22 where he confirmed (a) Buntags account in his sworn
statement before Judge Sarce that they were with Otte at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992 at the crossing towards Alona Beach Resort,
and (b) that he was armed with a hunting knife. He further stated therein that while at the crossing, Buntag and Otte, who were both
drunk, had an altercation and that he tried to pacify them but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongos) hunting knife from his waist
and stabbed Otte with it.23
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a resolution finding probable cause against the appellants for murder and
issued warrants for their arrest. The court found Buntags sworn statement and Bongos counter-affidavit self-serving.
On June 4, 1992, the day of the appellants arraignment in the Regional Trial Court, appellant Buntag, through counsel, Atty. Nerio G.
Zamora, filed a "Motion to Discharge (him) to be a Witness for the Prosecution," alleging inter alia:
1) That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused whose discharge is requested;
2) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused, as can be shown by the affidavit of said accused in relation to the affidavits or sworn statements of Ponciano
Horcerada, Isidro Mihangos, Benigno Guigue, Alfredo Guioguio, and PO1 Yolando [E.] Hormachuelos;
3) That the testimony of herein accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
4) That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
5) That the said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude;
6) That herein accused-movant hereby expresses his consent to be a witness for the government.24
However, the prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that both accused were equally guilty. On June 8, 1992, the court issued
an Order denying the motion, and the appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, entered pleas of not guilty.25
During the trial, the prosecution presented Judge Antonio G. Sarce who testified that he conducted the preliminary examination of the
case and identified both Buntags sworn statement and Bongos counter-affidavit as subscribed and sworn to before him (Judge Sarce)
in his chambers.
After presenting all its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence the hunting knife,26 the key to room no. 9 of the beach resort,27 the
sworn statement of Buntag,28 and Bongos counter-affidavit29 to prove that both appellants conspired to kill the victim and that they in
fact killed the victim, and as part of the testimony of Judge Sarce. Both appellants objected to the admission of the said sworn
statements and counter-affidavit solely on the ground that the statements executed by one accused was hearsay as to the other
accused.30 By way of rejoinder, the prosecution alleged as follows:
1. That exhibits A, B, C, D, E and all its submarkings are all relevant, pertinent and material evidence against the accused in
the above-entitled case, therefore, admissible in evidence;
2. That exhibits F and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter alios acta rule because they are
principally offered against accused Casiano Buntag, the affiant. The sworn statement of Casiano Buntag is offered mainly as
admission of said accused Casiano Buntag;
3. That exhibits G and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter alios acta rule because they are
principally offered against accused Diego Bongo, the affiant. The counter-affidavit of Diego Bongo is offered mainly as
admission of said accused Diego Bongo.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to admit in evidence all the prosecutions exhibits formally
offered, for the purpose for which they are being offered.31
The court admitted the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution. The appellants opted not to adduce any evidence on their
behalf. Instead, they filed, without leave of court, a "Motion to Acquit." On June 7, 1993, the court issued an Order denying the motion.
On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment finding both the appellants guilty of the crime charged. The decretal portion of
the decision of the trial court reads:
FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Court renders judgment finding the two (2) accused Casiano Buntag, alias Ciano,
and Diego Bongo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, an act committed contrary to the provisions of
Article 248, in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and does hereby sentences each one of them to
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accusatory penalties imposed by law.
There being no evidence disclosed as to the civil liability, this Court, therefore, limits in providing that the accused shall pay
jointly the heirs of the deceased Berno Georg Otte the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), by way of moral
damages, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The trial court relied, inter alia, on the sworn statement of Buntag dated February 21, 199233 and the counter-affidavit of Bongo34 in
convicting them of the crime charged. Both the appellants appealed the decision.
Although the appellants enumerated separate issues in their briefs, the same may be synthesized into three issues, namely: (a)
whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the victim Otte and that they, in fact, killed
him; (b) whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not the appellants are liable for moral damages to the
heirs of the victim. Appellant Bongos contention that he was deprived of his right to due process on his claim that the transcripts of the
respective testimonies of Dr. Julita Cogo, SPO1 Bonao and resort manager Bonga were not transmitted to this Court is belied by the
records. In a Resolution dated September 11, 2000, the Court declared that, based on the records, the transcripts of stenographic notes
in this case were already complete.35
The appellants contend that the prosecution failed to adduce direct or circumstantial evidence to prove that they conspired to kill the
victim, and that they, in fact, killed him. They argue that although the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence consisting of the
extrajudicial sworn statement of appellant Buntag and the counter-affidavit of appellant Bongo, such evidence is utterly insufficient to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, according to the appellants, the admissions made by appellant Buntag in his sworn statement are binding on him only.
Being prejudicial to appellant Bongo, such admissions are not inadmissible against the latter unless repeated in open court by appellant
Buntag, thus, affording appellant Bongo the right to cross-examination. Likewise, the admissions of appellant Bongo in his sworn
statement are inadmissible against appellant Buntag, unless the former repeated his admissions during the trial, affording the latter an
opportunity to cross-examine the said appellant. The appellants further aver that since they opted not to testify on their respective
statements, there was no opportunity for cross-examination. Consequently, the admissions made by one appellant in his sworn
statement are hearsay evidence against the other appellant, and vice versa. In fine, the appellants contend that the trial court should
have acquitted them of the crime charged.
We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that they conspired to kill Otte and that they, in fact,
stabbed and killed the victim. However, we find and so hold, after an incisive review of the records, that the prosecution adduced
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime.36 Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when
the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.37 It is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.38
The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites are established: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.39
In People v. Delim,40 we held, thus:
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and
the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one
conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.41
In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial court relied not only on the counter-affidavit of appellant Bongo42 and
appellant Buntags sworn statement,43 but also on the other evidence on record, namely, the knife used in killing the victim,44 the key to
Ottes room,45 and the collective testimonies of the other witnesses of the prosecution.
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against the said accused but is
inadmissible against the other accused.46 The same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the
conspiracy has ceased. However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other
accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible against both
accused.47 The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the trial is transposed into judicial admissions.
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied,
which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound,
against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged.48 It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is
insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.49 A confession, on the other hand, is an
acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.50
In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his sworn statement, and not a confession. So did
appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit. Such admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the Municipal Trial Court in the course of its
preliminary investigation, are high quality evidence.51 MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce testified on the said sworn statement and counter-
affidavit and was cross-examined.52 Moreover, some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant are identical with some
of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa. This corroborates and confirms their veracity. Such admissions,
made without collusion, are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
other appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his participation in the commission of the crime and as corroborative
evidence against him.53 The Court rejects the appellants contention that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on
the latters admissions against the other. Through their common counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their
respective statements by the prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity to cross-examine Judge
Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of their statements.54
In this case, the prosecution adduced the following circumstantial evidence which constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellants, indeed, conspired to kill and did kill the victim:
1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement,55 that, at about 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was in the company of
appellant Bongo and the victim Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach, and that appellant Bongo was armed with a hunting knife.
Appellant Buntag identified the victim through the latters picture, as well as the hunting knife used in the killing.56 Appellant Bongo, in
his counter-affidavit, confirmed the truth of appellant Buntags admissions and also admitted that on the said date, time and place, he
was with appellant Buntag and the victim, and that he was armed with a hunting knife which was tucked on his waist.
2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements that on the said occasion, Otte died from a stab wound caused by a hunting
knife.
3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that he took the key to the victims room and hid it near their house where the
policemen found it.
4. While both appellants were within the periphery of the situs criminis, Mihangos and Guigue sauntered by with their bicycles at their
sides. Suddenly, the appellants jointly and simultaneously lunged at them, causing Mihangos and Guigue to believe that their lives were
in peril, impelling them to run for their lives and seek sanctuary in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By the time Mihangos
and Guigue returned to the situs criminis to retrieve their bicycles, the appellants had already left.
5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that after the victim was stabbed, he and appellant Bongo fled from the situs
criminis. This was corroborated by the testimony of Mihangos. The presence of both appellants at the situs criminis and their flight from
the scene are strong indicia of their participation in the commission of the crime and their complicity therein.57 Appellant Bongo opted
not to testify or adduce evidence to controvert the testimony of Mihangos and the admissions of the appellant prejudicial to him.
6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used to kill the victim was left at the scene of the crime where the policemen
recovered it shortly thereafter.
7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn statements that the victim was stabbed once with a hunting knife. These
admissions were corroborated by Dr. Julita Cogos finding that the victim was stabbed once on the anterior chest area.58 The doctor
testified that the stab wound could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon.59
8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the hospital for immediate medical attendance and operation.
9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the assailant in their respective statements, neither of them reported the stabbing to
the police authorities and claimed that the other killed the victim.
10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to deny any involvement in the killing of the victim. The evidence of the prosecution,
thus, stands unrebutted.
The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of their respective statements as basis for their acquittal of the crime charged. In
the case of appellant Buntag, he avers in his sworn statement that he was ordered by appellant Bongo to box the victim and when he
refused, appellant Bongo himself boxed and stabbed the victim with the hunting knife. When appellant Buntag fled from the scene and
went back home, appellant Bongo followed and warned him not to divulge the incident so that he would not be implicated. For his part,
appellant Bongo turned the tables on appellant Buntag and claimed in his counter-affidavit that the latter snatched the hunting knife
from his waist and stabbed the victim in the heat of their altercation. The stabbing was so sudden, he insists, that he was unable to stop
appellant Buntag from stabbing the victim.
We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for the following reasons:
First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that appellant Bongo boxed the victim, the necropsy report of Dr. Cogo failed to show
that the victims body sustained hematoma, bruises or contusions. The findings of the doctor must prevail as against the bare
statements of the appellants.
Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn statement that before he and appellant Bongo could leave the situs criminis after the
victim was stabbed, Mihangos and Guigue arrived. The appellants lunged jointly and simultaneously at the two teenagers which so
terrified the latter that they fled for their lives. If, as appellant Buntag claims, he had nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim, he
should have sought the help of the teenagers, brought the victim to the hospital and reported to the police authorities that it was
appellant Bongo who stabbed the victim. Appellant Buntag failed to do so. Neither did appellant Bongo seek the help of the two
teenagers and report the stabbing to the police authorities. Both appellants unexplained omission is another indication of their
conspiracy and complicity in the crime charged.
Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the victim and hid it near their house where the policemen found it. The appellant
has not explained why he had the key to the victims room and hid it near their house. He owned the hunting knife used in stabbing the
victim. He knew or should have known that sooner or later, the policemen would trace the knife to him; and yet, appellant Bongo failed
to report the incident to the police authorities and surrender the knife to them.
Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing and pointed to appellant Buntag as the assailant only after the latter had
executed his own sworn statement pointing to appellant Bongo as the victims assailant. We are convinced that appellant Bongos
denial of any involvement in the killing is but a belated afterthought to escape criminal liability for the victims death.
The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced each of
them to reclusion perpetua. We note, however, that the trial court, in its amended decision, made no finding on any attendant
circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder. It bears stressing that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, any qualifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of a crime must be alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution, conformably to
the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against him.
In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. The prosecution was burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.60 Treachery cannot be based
on speculations and surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed means, method or manner of execution affording
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and, (b) the means, method or manner of execution was deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender. In this case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.
On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn statement, claimed that before the victim was stabbed, appellant Bongo and the
victim had an altercation; appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, stated that it was appellant Buntag and the victim who had an
altercation before the victim was killed. There is no evidence that the appellants deliberately or consciously adopted a method or means
of execution to insure the death of the victim.
In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide, punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal in its full range, which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance
attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be in its medium period.
The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the victim, although the prosecution failed to present any heir of the victim as
witness. The trial court, likewise, failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim. The decision of the trial court shall,
thus, be modified accordingly.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 7729
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Casiano Buntag alias "Ciano" and Diego Bongo are found guilty, as principals, of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, each of the
appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The award of moral damages is deleted.
The said appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Berno Georg Otte, P50,000 as civil indemnity,
conformably to current jurisprudence.61 Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

5.
G.R. No. 140406 April 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO DESUYO alias "TONY," accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger sister Aisalyn one late night in September 1996 when she was awakened
by someone caressing her breasts. She opened her eyes and saw her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, crouching before her. He was
naked except for his underpants to cover his private parts. Instinctively, she begged her father not to touch her, reminding him that she
was his daughter. But he paid no heed; instead, he removed her underwear while threatening to kill her should she make any noise. He
mounted her, forced his penis into her vagina and gyrated his hips against hers. She wept as she continued to beg him to desist from
his fiendish assault on her virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did not tell her mother about the incident; instead, she kept the ignominy and pain
to herself.
Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town and she did not want to give her any trouble. Neither did she inform her
relatives who lived nearby. She feared for her life as her father had threatened to kill her should she speak to anyone about what he
had done to her.
The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost everyday from September 1996 to August 1997. His assaults on
her virtue were always followed by threats on her that she would be killed should she report these to her mother. The sexual abuses of
her father were so often that Maricel lost count.
On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already accustomed to, she would be roused from her sleep by her father
fondling her private parts. Again, he undressed her and unleashed his lechery on her. It was meant to be the last. In her young and
impressionable mind, Maricel vowed that it would not happen to her again.
On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to relate her ordeal to a police officer who lived nearby. She bravely narrated to
Police Officer Tito Ganggalang and his wife Riza her sordid tale which was actually a confirmation of what was already circulating
around their neighborhood. She admitted that her father had been sexually abusing her for close to a year already. Emboldened by the
encouragement she received from sympathetic neighbors, she next confided to Luisa Galit, Maricel's maternal aunt, who could only
commiserate with her.1wphi1.nt
Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who upon examination found Maricel to have several old hymenal lacerations in
her vaginal area. Thereafter, they repaired to the municipal hall where Maricel instituted a complaint against her father, accused Antonio
Desuyo, for having repeatedly raped her.
In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal trial court judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness
from his daughter and promised to leave her alone should she withdraw the charge she filed against him. Maricel vehemently refused
as her father grovelled for forgiveness.1 As a consequence, an Information was filed against the accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony"
for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter Maricel.
Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations. According to her, ever since her mother worked in a faraway town, her father
was dauntless and unrelenting in sexually abusing her night after night within the confines of their home. She felt pain and cried
everytime her father would forcibly insert his penis into her vagina; however she kept her ordeal to herself as she was afraid of him.
After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive that she might get pregnant. Her father however was unperturbed and
simply dismissed her fears by telling her not to worry. A year after the first forced coition, Maricel decided to end her tribulation by
unburdening her grief to neighbors who readily sympathized with her. She felt relieved after seeing her father locked up behind bars. 2
The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed however that he raised singlehandedly his two (2) daughters Maricel and
Aisalyn as his wife was serving another household in a distant town. According to him, despite his guidance, Maricel turned out to be a
wayward daughter who entertained suitors at an early age. Once, his daughter Aisalyn confided to him that Maricel was corresponding
with a boy from another barrio. He immediately searched through her bag and found a letter intended for a certain Jerry. Incensed by
his daughter's behavior he mauled her expecting that she would atone for her mistakes. However, instead of mending her ways, Maricel
ran away from home and instituted this unfounded charge for rape against him. He presented in evidence Maricel's supposed letter to
Jerry as well as a letter from his wife pledging her love and support. He averred that Maricel was being inveigled by his sister-in-law
Luisa and the latter's boyfriend Boy into tormenting him for reasons which he could not fathom.3
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the accused. Solely on account of Maricel's testimony, the court a quo found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty
of death, and to indemnify the offended party P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.4
Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for "multiple rape" essentially on two (2) grounds, namely, that the
Information is defective and that the court a quo erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death despite the failure of the prosecution
to establish the age of Maricel with certainty.5
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against him is deficient since by merely stating that the sexual assaults were
repeated "within the month of September 1996 up to August 18, 1997,"6 it failed to state the exact dates when the alleged rapes were
committed. Quoting heavily from the early case of US v. Diacho,7accused asserts that unless he is informed of the precise "day, or
about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived of the opportunity to defend himself."8
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense
with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars. The records show that the accused never asked for a bill of particulars in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when the alleged crime was committed or for the quashal of the
Information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form10deprives him of the right to object to evidence
which could lawfully be introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
accused with a definite crime.11 It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections to matters of form
or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. At any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the
commission of rape is not an essential element thereof and need not be stated in the information.12 The Court has sustained the
following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient for purposes of complying with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994,"13 "sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent
thereto,"14 "on or about and sometime in the year 1988,"15"sometime in the year 1987"16 and "before and until October 15, 1994."17 In
any event, a review of the evidence presented by the prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the accused for the rape of his
daughter.1wphi1.nt
For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely preposterous, that Maricel, a guileless barrio lass, would concoct a story of rape
against her very own father, taking into mind the societal humiliation and personal devastation which such a charge entails. More so, no
serious motive, apart from the beatings which she supposedly suffered in the hands of the accused, was offered to satisfactorily explain
why Maricel would come out and undergo legal scrutiny of the unfortunate encounters with her father. Thus, if her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and consistent manner. Although Maricel
expounded only on the first and last instances of rape, failing thus to give an accurate account of the other sexual violations, her
testimony in its entirety was forthright, clear and free from any contradictions.
Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as her relatives about her ordeal is consistent with reason. It must be
remembered that Maricel depended on the accused for existence and protection as her mother lived far. As to her total obedience to
her father and the stoic silence she kept about her sufferings, these were all brought about by her genuine fear of a man who on
account of his moral ascendancy needed no weapon to instill such terror in her.18 Maricel was convinced of a potential yet real danger
posed by a beast masquerading as the family's paladin.
Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before the trial court that he wrote his parents-in-law sometime in March 1998 to
ask for their forgiveness. Antonio likewise acknowledged when cross-examined that he begged for Maricel's mercy before the municipal
trial judge in the course of the preliminary examination. No compelling reason was offered by the defense to explain Antonio's
incriminating declarations. Verily, these are judicial admissions which no man in his right mind would make unless they were true.
The court a quo convicted the accused of "multiple rape" without stating the counts of rape involved. The records however show that
the prosecution established beyond doubt that accused was guilty of two (2) counts of rape. Although Maricel insists that she had been
raped almost everyday from September 1996 to August 1997 she was only able to relate with clarity two (2) of the rapes, the first forced
coition sometime in September 1996, and the last on 14 August 1997. She positively narrated in detail the surrounding circumstances
of the sexual assaults committed against her on those two (2) occasions. Indeed, her recollection of these two (2) rapes was very vivid,
leaving no doubt about its credibility and truthfulness.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two (2) counts of rape has been conclusively established; however, the
death penalty was erroneously imposed. Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659, death shall be imposed if "the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent x x x of the victim."
In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with rape alleges that Maricel is the fourteen (14)-year old daughter of the
accused. However, it is significant to note that other than the testimony of Maricel, no independent proof was presented to show that
she was a minor and that she was the daughter of the accused. Although Maricel's relationship with the accused was not contested, nor
her age refuted, proof of age and relationship is critical considering the gravity of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused.19
It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation to the accused when properly alleged in the information and proved
beyond reasonable doubt during trial elevate the crime of simple rape to qualified rape and warrant the imposition of the extreme
penalty of death. As such, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for the penalty of death to be upheld. In fine, the minority of the
victim as well as her relationship with the accused must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself; contrarily, the
failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish the victim's age and relationship with the accused is fatal and consequently bars
conviction for qualified rape.20
Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the award
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be modified and adjusted to P50,000.00 since the penalty is likewise lowered to reclusion
perpetua. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, accused Antonio Desuyo should also be ordered to pay Maricel Desuyo P50,000.00
as moral damages even if there was no proof presented as basis therefor since the anguish and pain that complaining witness endured
are plainly evident.21
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San Jose, Southern Leyte, finding accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony"
guilty of "multiple rape" in its qualified form and ordering him to pay complaining witness Maricel Peru Desuyo P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, is MODIFIED. The accused is instead found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape and, accordingly, sentences him
to reclusion perpetua for each count. In addition to paying Maricel Peru Desuyo civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, instead
of P75,000.00, for each count of rape, accused is further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 also for each
count. Costs de oficio.

6.
G.R. No. 124036 October 23, 2001
FIDELINO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, GUMACA, QUEZON, BRANCH 62, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal by certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 22, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 13358. The decision
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, finding petitioner
Fidelino Garcia with his co-accused Leopoldo Garcia and Wilfredo Garcia guilty of homicide.
In an Information dated December 13, 1983, Fidelino Garcia, Leopoldo Garcia, and Wilfredo Garcia were charged with murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of July 1983, at Barangay II, in Poblacion, Municipality of Mulanay, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife, a piece of wood and a
broken bottle with intent to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit with said piece of wood and stab with the said knife and broken bottle one Paulino
Rodolfo y Olgena, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
"Wound lacerated mid parietal area 4cm with linear fracture of underlying skull;
Wound lacerated 3 cm mid frontal area;
Wound lacerated T shape right frontal cm;
Abrasion right nasolridge;
Contusion with laceration nose;
Multiple contusion chest right #3 6cm deep non-penetrating;
Wound lacerated left temporal 1 cm;
Wound stab left arm medial aspect 1 cm."
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.1
Petitioner and Wilfredo Garcia are brothers, while their co-accused in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, Leopoldo, is their first-degree cousin.2
Earlier, a separate charge sheet docketed as Criminal Case No. 2165-G had been filed against petitioner Fidelino Garcia, charging him
with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. On March 8, 1984, he was arraigned in said case and entered a plea of not
guilty.
In 1985, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2307-G were separately arraigned. All pleaded not guilty to the charge. As Criminal Cases
Nos. 2165-G and 2307-G arose from the same incident, a joint trial ensued.
The facts, as established by the prosecution before the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:
At around 2:30 P.M., July 30, 1983, P/Cpl. Francisco Rollera was on his way to mail a letter. He was waiting at the crossing near the
police outpost in the town proper of Mulanay, Quezon, when he saw petitioner, Wilfredo and Leopoldo, ganging up on Paulino Rodolfo y
Olgena.3 While Leopoldo held the victim, petitioner hit him with an empty bottle. Wilfredo then stabbed the victim once with a stainless
steel fan knife (balisong). The knife got stuck in Paulinos body. Paulino succeeded in wrestling free from Leopoldos grasp and pulling
out the knife from his body. He used the knife to stab petitioner in the stomach.
Rollera tried to stop the fight. He pulled out his service pistol and fired three successive warning shots, calling upon the combatants to
stop their fight, but to no avail. Still holding Wilfredos knife, the wounded Paulino beat a hasty retreat to the store of one Manuel
Roberto. Wilfredo pursued him. Inside the store, Paulino stabbed Wilfredo twice in the neck and stomach. Unable to stop the affray,
Rollera then asked the other people around to summon other policemen.
Paulino went back to the street. Seeing that Wilfredo was about to hit him with a piece of wood, Rollera stepped in and wrestled the
stick away from Wilfredo. The latter, however, managed to get hold of an empty bottle. Before Rollera could react, petitioner
approached him, holding a broken bottle. Rollera moved back and Fidelino chased him around a parked vehicle.
At this point, two other policemen arrived and pacified the antagonists. A third responding policeman grabbed and caught petitioner
chasing Rollera around the parked vehicle.
Paulino Rodolfo subsequently died. The medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Mario A. Cuento of the Bondoc Peninsula District
Hospital at Catanauan, Quezon, revealed that the cause of death was "cerebral hemorrhage."4
Predictably, the defense gave a slightly different version of the incident. Wilfredo testified that between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. of July 30,
1983, he was on his way to the tricycle parking space in Nanadiego St., Mulanay, Quezon, with his two co-accused following a short
distance behind him. He met P/Cpl. Rollera and Paulino, both of whom appeared to be intoxicated. Paulino put an arm around
Wilfredos shoulder and invited him to have a drink. The latter removed Paulinos arm and refused, explaining that he had to go to the
barrio. Wilfredo was about to leave, when Paulino suddenly collared him and poked a balisong at his throat. Wilfredo stepped back, but
Paulino nonetheless succeeded in stabbing him in the neck, chest, and stomach. He did not know what transpired next as he lost
consciousness as a result of his wounds, regaining it only next morning when he found himself at the Quezon Memorial Hospital where
he was confined for four (4) days.
Although petitioner and he were closely following Wilfredo, Leopoldo claimed that he did not actually see how Paulino attacked
Wilfredo. What he heard were the voices of persons heatedly arguing. When he advanced to investigate, he saw Wilfredo already
wounded. Leopoldo ran towards the municipal hall to get police assistance. On his way, he met police officers Pobeda and Roadilla and
he told them what happened. They then proceeded to the scene of the incident where Leopoldo allegedly saw Rollera chasing a
wounded Fidelino around a parked vehicle. Pobeda and Roadilla then pacified Rollera and petitioner. Because Leopoldo and petitioner
were both wounded, the peace officers brought them to the Catanauan Hospital. Leopoldo claimed that he never saw the victim at the
scene.
On February 14, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision and disposed of the two cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, on ground of reasonable doubt, accused Fidelino Garcia is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged under Criminal Case No. 2165-G for Direct Assault Upon An Agent of a Person in Authority.
In Criminal Case No. 2307-G, the judgment of conviction is hereby entered. Accused FIDELINO, WILFREDO and
LEOPOLDO, all surnamed GARCIA are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, and this Court
hereby sentences them, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Furthermore, all the accused are solidarily liable and are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena,
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) plus the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as actual
damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.5
The accused seasonably filed their respective notices of appeal to the appellate court.6 The Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated May
17, 1994 ordered Wilfredo Garcias appeal deemed "abandoned and ordered dismissed for failure to furnish the Court (with) his
forwarding address."7 On September 3, 1994, the resolution dismissing Wilfredos appeal became final and executory. The Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 13358, thus resolved only the appeals interposed by Leopoldo and Fidelino Garcia.
On February 22, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the lower courts decision finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,
thus:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indeterminate sentence should be from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Although the three accused were represented by one counsel before the trial court, said counsel filed an appellants brief only for
accused Leopoldo Garcia. Before us now is the separate appeal of petitioner Fidelino Garcia filed by a court appointed counsel de
oficio from the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG).9 In his brief, petitioner Fidelino Garcia assigns the following as errors committed
by the appellate court:
First Assigned Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR CONSPIRACY WHEN IT WAS NEVER
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION NOR PROVEN DURING TRIAL.
Second Assigned Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONERS CONVICTION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE
REGARDING THE FACT, MANNER AND CAUSE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS DEATH.
Third Assigned Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION AND FINDING NO
ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
Fourth Assigned Error
PETITIONER SHOULD BE ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH HIS CULPABILITY AS A PRINCIPAL,
CO-CONSPIRATOR OR ACCOMPLICE.10
In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1) Whether the appellate court erred in convicting petitioner as a conspirator in the killing of
Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena; and (2) Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that an accused cannot be convicted of any offense not alleged in the information, as he has the
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. He points out that the Information in
Criminal Case No. 2307-G did not allege that he conspired, confederated, mutually helped, and/or acted in concert and with consent in
committing the offense charged. He submits that an allegation of conspiracy cannot be presumed or implied in an information. In finding
him to be a conspirator in the killing of the victim, appellant claims that his rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him; to a fair trial; to due process of law; and to equal protection of law were violated by respondent appellate court.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that it is not essential that the allegation of "conspiracy" be expressly
stated in the indictment. It is enough that the narration in the Information shows that the accused acted in concert in the commission of
the crime.
On this point, we are not in agreement with the OSG.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.11 The right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him is explicit in Sec. 1(b) Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 12 To ensure that
the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with
reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.
One such particular circumstance is conspiracy where two or more persons are charged in an information. Conspiracy denotes an
intentional participation in a criminal transaction, with a view to the furtherance of a common design and purpose. It imputes criminal
liability to an accused for the acts of another or others, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation. In a conspiracy, the
act of one becomes the act of all and the particular act of an accused becomes of secondary relevance. Thus, it is essential that an
accused must know from the information whether he is criminally accountable not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-
accused as well.13 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient if: (1) it follows the words of the statute creating the offense and reasonably
informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit;14 or (2) following the statute, contains a
sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy;15 or (3) alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated
crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them.16
In the present case, the appellate court held that an allegation of conspiracy is implied in, or may be inferred from, the statement that
"the said accused, armed with a knife, a piece of wood and a broken bottle, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of their superior
strength and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, hit with said piece of wood and stab with the
said knife and broken bottle one Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena." But we agree with appellant that here the information does not satisfy the
requirement that the conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate language."17 The words "conspired," "confederated," or the phrase
"acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment.18 The language used by the
prosecution in charging the three accused contains no reference to conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the
information. Absence of a particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting
conspiracy in Criminal Case No. 2307-G renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his co-
accused. An accused must be furnished with a description of the charge against him to enable him to make a proper defense and, later,
to avail himself properly of either a conviction or acquittal for his protection against further prosecution for the same cause.19 In our view,
petitioner Fidelino Garcia cannot be convicted as a conspirator in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo, for the simple reason that the
information against the accused contained no clear and definite allegation of conspiracy.
It follows that in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, petitioner can only be held responsible for an act as could be proved to have been
committed by him personally. Stated otherwise, his criminal accountability, if any, should be determined on an individual rather than on
a collective basis. Responsibility for acts done by his co-accused could not be heaped on the shoulders of appellant unless it be shown
that he participated directly and personally in the commission of those acts.
Thus, anent the second issue, we find merit in petitioners argument that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for homicide. There appears no proof to show the connection between the acts he allegedly committed and the lethal injuries
sustained by the victim. Petitioner points out that the only act he allegedly did was that of hitting the victim with an empty bottle while
the latter was being held down by Leopoldo Garcia and stabbed by Wilfredo Garcia. He submits that there is no showing whatsoever
that his blow caused any injury to the victim, much less caused his death. He stresses that the medico-legal certificate prepared by one
Dr. Mario Cuento, marked as the prosecutions Exhibit "B" cannot even be found in the record, nor did the doctor take the witness stand
to identify it. The medical certificate in effect has no probative value.
The OSG counters that while Exhibit "B" cannot be found in the records, nonetheless, the fact stands that the number and nature of the
victims injuries are enumerated in the Information, which the petitioner failed to rebut or object to during the trial. Moreover, petitioner
did not object when Exhibit "B" was offered in evidence by the prosecutor before the trial court to prove the victims injuries causing his
death.
In general, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.20 The
rule, however, does not apply in the present case. For one, the judge who penned the trial courts judgment was not the same one who
heard the prosecution witnesses testify.21 For another, our review of the records indicates that both the trial court and the appellate court
have overlooked some material facts and circumstances of weight which could materially affect the result of this case.
First, the Court of Appeals heavily relied on the testimony of prosecution eyewitness, P/Cpl. Francisco Rollera. However, we find his
testimony riddled with inconsistencies, particularly the exact role played by petitioner in the affray leading to Paulino Rodolfos death.
On direct examination, Cpl. Rollera averred that petitioner struck the victim with a bottle while his co-accused were ganging up on the
latter, thus:
Q Now, you stated a while ago that the accused in this case ganged up on the deceased Rodolfo Olgena. Will you
please tell before this Honorable Court how the accused ganged up on him?
A While Leopoldo Garcia was holding Rodolfo Olgena, Rodolfo Olgena was hit by a bottle by Fidelino Garcia and
Wilfredo Garcia stabbed him on the lower groin with a stainless [f]an knife, sir. (Stress supplied)22
The cross-examination of Rollera, however, reveals a contradictory version in that apparently, petitioner Fidelino Garcia was not the
aggressor but the victim of stabbing by the deceased Paulino Rodolfo. Thus, Cpl. Rollera testified on cross:
Q According to you, the three were ganging up on Rodolfo Olgena until Wilfredo Garcia stabbed him. As the three were
ganging up on Rodolfo Olgena, where were Fedelino Garcia and Leopoldo Garcia when Rodolfo Olgena was stabbed by
Wilfredo?
A Leopoldo was holding Olgena while Fedelino was approaching Olgena when Wilfredo stabbed Olgena, sir. When
Rodolfo Olgena was stabbed by Wilfredo, as regards Fedelino, he was then also approaching Rodolfo Olgena and that was
the reason why he was also stabbed by Olgena. Because when Fedelino approached Rodolfo Olgena, the latter had pulled
the knife, so that when Olgena pulled out the knife, he was able to stab Fedelino, sir.
ATTY. CERILLA:
Let us straighten this out. Correct me if I am wrong. This, according to you, took place.
Q Rodolfo Olgena while being held by Leopoldo Garcia was stabbed by Wilfredo Garcia, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q The weapon which was used by Wilfredo Garcia got stuck in that portion of the body of Rodolfo Olgena that was hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Rodolfo Olgena was able to pull out that knife and while Fedelino Garcia was approaching he stabbed the latter?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, are you telling us that although Rodolfo Olgena was being held by Leopoldo Garcia he was still able to pull the
knife from his thigh and then used it in stabbing Fedelino Garcia?
A Rodolfo Olgena was able to get loose from the hold of Leopoldo that was why when Fedelino approached Olgena the
latter who had pulled out the knife from his body was able to stab Fedelino, sir. (Stress supplied).23
That petitioner Fidelino Garcia was stabbed by Paulino Rodolfo is perfectly clear to us. What is doubtful is whether he had an active,
direct and personal role in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo. On cross-examination, it appears petitioner was still approaching the deceased
when the latter was stabbed by co-accused Wilfredo Garcia. Cpl. Rollera stated under direct examination that Fidelino had hit Rodolfo
with a bottle. But Cpl. Rollera did not say where and when petitioner struck the victim with a bottle, or if the blow was hard or not.
Further, the prosecutions evidence does not establish any direct link between the petitioners act with the bottle and any injury suffered
by the deceased, much less the mortal wound which caused his death. If we are to believe Cpl. Rolleras account, petitioner was merely
approaching the victim, who was then trying to get loose from Leopoldos hold and ward off Wilfredos attack. It appears unclear to us,
however, whether petitioner succeeded to hit the victim, Rodolfo, with a bottle. As it turned out, it was petitioner who was stabbed by
Rodolfo, using Wilfredos balisong, with the result that petitioner was hospitalized.
Second, the Court of Appeals likewise heavily relied upon Exhibit "B" to establish the injuries suffered by Paulino Rodolfo. As stated
earlier, Exhibit "B" is nowhere in the records.24 The only mention we find of it is in the transcript of stenographic notes of November 19,
1987.
FISCAL ENCOMIENDA:
We will now be resting our case.
COURT:
Go ahead.
FISCAL ENCOMIENDA:
But before we do so, we would like to prove the existence of the medico legal certificate although it has been
admitted by the defense counsel and likewise the fact of death. We would like to request the same to be marked as
Exhibit "B" in both cases and the findings therein as stated as Exhibit "B-1" and the signature of Dr. Mario Cuento as
Exhibit "B-2." We are offering, Your Honor, Exhibit "A" and "A-1" the affidavit of Francisco Llorera [should read
Rollera] as part of his testimony. And we are likewise offering Exhibits "B", "B-1", and "B-2" to show the fact of death
and the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim.
COURT:
Is that all? Any objection to the annexes of the exhibits?
ATTY. CERILLA:
No objection, Your Honor, except to the affidavit of the policeman.
COURT:
The Court will admit all these exhibits in evidence.25
Notwithstanding its absence from the records, the Court of Appeals held that said Exhibit "B" "sufficiently indicates the nature, number,
location, and extent of the injuries sustained by the victim. The cause of death stated therein is purportedly cerebral
hemorrhage."26 The appellate court likewise held that "These were deemed admitted by the accused-appellants for their failure to make
a timely objection at the time the offer was made."27 We find nothing in the record, however, to support the prosecutions sweeping
statement that the "existence of the medico-legal certificate had been admitted by defense counsel and likewise the fact of death." In
fact, per the transcript quoted above, Atty. Cerillas response has a reservation, "except to the affidavit of the policeman," when asked
about the annexes of the exhibits. But we shall not belabor this point, for the decision of the trial court is barren of any reference to
admissions or stipulations. On record now, the medico-legal report is missing. And we find that the prosecutions evidence nowhere
shows that petitioner by his own act killed the victim or contributed directly to his death.
To conclude, there is a dearth of evidence as to the specific role played by petitioner Fidelino Garcia in the commission of the crime
charged. Petitioner enjoys the presumption of innocence, which can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere
conjectures, no matter how strong, can never substitute for this required quantum of proof.28 Failing to meet the needed quantum of
proof, petitioners conviction as principal in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 22, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No.
13358, which had affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Branch 62, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to convict petitioner Fidelino Garcia beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.

7.
G.R. No. 126899 August 2, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICITO BARBOSA Y TURALLO, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On January 30, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Cases Nos. IR-3448, 3449, 3450 and 3451, found
accused-appellant Felicito Barbosa y Turallo guilty of four counts of rape, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count.
The conviction of the appellant stemmed from four separate informations all dated September 15, 1993, which read as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3450
That during the year 1988 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa who
was then eleven (11) years old, on nine (9) separate occasions, against her will and by means of violence and intimidation, to
the damage and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as maybe proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3448
That in or about November 1992 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant in such amount as may be proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3449
That on or about February 6, 1993 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
said accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant in such amount as may be proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3451
That on or about May 8, 1993 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in such
amount as may be proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. Thereafter, the four cases were jointly heard. Subsequently, the
trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FELICITO BARBOSA y TURALLO
1. In Criminal Case No. IR-3450, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information and despite the presence
of one (1) aggravating circumstance, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. IR-3448, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information, and despite the presence
of one (1) aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. IR-3449, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information and despite the presence
of one (1) aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4. In Criminal Case No. IR-3451, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information and despite the presence
of one (1) aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In all the aforesaid cases, to reimburse Juana Malate of the sum of P11,200.00 as attorney's fee and litigation expenses, and
to pay the cost of suit.
The accused, FELICITO BARBOSA y TURALLO shall serve the foregoing four (4) prison terms successively or one after the
other, subject to the provisions of the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of Article 70, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The accused shall be credited with the period of preventive imprisonment that he may have undergone during the pendency of
these cases in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.5
The facts in this case as presented by the prosecution are summarized by the trial court as follows:
. . . [P]rivate offended party, Analiza C. Barbosa, was born on February 6, 1978. Her father is Julio Abad and her mother is
Juliana C. Barbosa. Her parents were not married, so that she was registered in the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as Analiza
Cornelio. When she was already five (5) years old, her mother, Juliana Cornelio married the accused, Felicito Barbosa. She
continued using the surname Cornelio until she reached Grade 2. Then her mother instructed her to use the surname
Barbosa, instead of Cornelio. Since then she has been using the said surname "Barbosa" and she calls her stepfather, Felicito
Barbosa "Papa". Sometime in 1988 (she cannot remember the month) her mother went to Manila twice. The second time she
went to Manila, her mother stayed there for a month. It was already March 1988 when she returned. She, together with her
half sister Analyn who was then only one (1) year old, having been born on January 19, 1987, was left with her stepfather, the
herein accused. They stayed at the house of the parents of her stepfather situated at La Purisima, Iriga City, because the latter
were also in Manila at that time. The three of them, (Analiza, Analyn and Felicito Barbosa) slept only in one room and on one
bed. On the third night after her mother left for Manila and they were already sleeping, she woke up and noticed that her short
pants was already removed. Her stepfather was standing beside the bed where she was sleeping. He was holding a
"Batangas knife" which was closed and which was poked at her side. When she saw these things she cried but the accused
told her not to make any noise and not to tell her mother or he will kill her and he will not send her to school anymore. She
then stopped crying as she was afraid of what the accused has said. The accused then told her to remove her panty which she
did. The accused removed his shorts, reached for an oil from the kitchen which was adjacent to the bedroom and after
applying oil into her vagina, the accused laid on top of her and inserted his organ into her organ. Analiza tried to push the
accused because she did not like what the accused was doing as she felt pain. The accused, however, was too heavy for her
and she did not succeed in dislodging him from his position on top of her. The accused stayed on top of her for about two (2)
minutes. He then went to the sala, on her part, she put on her panty and short pants and kept on crying until she fell asleep.
She further testified that during that period of one (1) month, the accused repeatedly abused her almost every night.
When her mother returned, Analiza Barbosa did not tell her about the abuses committed by her stepfather because her
stepfather repeatedly warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise, he will kill her. But in the middle of 1990 Analiza ran away
and stayed with her classmate, Quennie Sanglay. After one (1) week her mother and stepfather went to the house of Sanglay
to fetch her. She refused to go with them. The following day her mother and grandmother went back to fetch her. Her
grandmother asked her why she refused to go with her mother and stepfather. In answer, she told her grandmother of the
abuses she suffered from her stepfather. Her mother and grandmother brought her to San Nicolas, Iriga City, where she
stayed with her aunt Evelyn Cornelio. After one week she was brought to Manila to stay with her natural father, Julio Abad. She
stayed there up to October 1992 and then she returned to Iriga City as her stepmother kept on scolding her. In Iriga City she
again stayed in the house of her aunt Evelyn Cornelio at San Nicolas, Iriga City. After one week her mother got her again. Her
mother told her that her stepfather will no longer abuse her. However, as soon as she was again with her mother and
stepfather at their residence at La Purisima, Iriga City the evidence show that, in more or less the same pattern and
circumstances and while her mother was out of town or just outside their house, her stepfather continued abusing her.
In November 1992, Analiza's mother again went to Manila. She stayed there for about two (2) weeks. She returned before the
Barangay Fiesta of La Purisima on December 7. Her half sister, Analyn, was with her mother. On the third night after her
mother left, Analiza was watching television at the sala of their house at La Purisima, Iriga City at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening and she fell asleep. When she woke up she noticed that her shorts and panty were already removed. Her stepfather,
the herein accused, was standing beside her. She asked him why he removed her shorts and panty. He answered that he will
repeat what he had done to her before, and further told her to lie down and not to make any noise otherwise he would kill her.
She told him that she will not lie down for she did not want to be repeatedly abused. The accused then got a knife from the
kitchen and showed it to her. She then laid down and the accused placed himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her
vagina. He stayed on top of her for about three minutes. Then the accused left.
February 6, 1993 was the 15th birthday of Analiza. The previous month, January 1993, her mother together with Analyn, again
went to Manila to fetch Aljon, nephew of her stepfather. Upon her suggestion, her mother invited Jonah Ocine, a girl of seven
years old, cousin of Analiza, to sleep in their house with her while her mother was away. Jonah, however, stayed only for three
days and she left. And so, Analiza found herself alone again, with her stepfather, in their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. On
that day, February 6, 1993, while Analiza was sleeping in the only bedroom in their house, at around midnight she noticed that
her panty and shorts were already removed and her stepfather was standing beside the bed where she was sleeping. He was
holding a knife which he poked at her waist. He told her that he will do again what he did to her before. He told her again not to
tell her mother, otherwise, he would kill her. He then removed his short pants and laid on top of her, Analiza tried to push him
but he told her if she will not stop pushing him, he will kill her. He inserted his penis into the vagina of Analiza. Then he left and
went to the sala.
On May 8, 1993, complainant was at their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of that day she
was lying down on the sofa at the sala of their house. She was alone. Her mother was at the house of her mother-in-law,
helping in preparing "ibos" (suman in Filipino) to be placed in the refrigerator and cooked the following day. These "ibos" will be
served during the baptism of the nephew of her stepfather on the fiesta of San Nicolas, on May 10, 1993. Analyn was with her
mother. The accused then arrived. He told her to remove her shorts and panty as he again will do to her what he did before.
After some hesitation, Analiza obeyed as she was afraid since appellant was again holding the "balisong" which the accused
used to poke at her side during the previous times he abused her. The accused then laid on top of her on that sofa. He
inserted his organ into the organ of Analiza. He stayed on top of her for about two (2) minutes and then left her, but he stayed
in the house.
On May 10, 1993, complainant went to the house of her grandmother, Juana Malate to attend the Barangay fiesta of San
Nicolas. After the fiesta she refused to go back to La Purisima, with her mother and stepfather. She told her grandmother and
her other relatives that the accused continues to abuse her . . . .6
On May 12, 1993, accompanied by her aunt Evelyn Cornelio, complainant went to the Iriga City Police headquarters where she
revealed to the police officers the abuses committed by her stepfather against her. She lodged complaints of four counts of rape against
appellant. Then she was taken by the police to the City Health Office.
Dr. Tita Lalaine Rito, a city government physician, examined complainant. Dr. Rito later testified that she found old hymenal lacerations
at 10:00 and 6:00 o'clock positions on the hymen of complainant which appear to be months or even years back, and that complainant
was no longer a virgin.7
On October 5, 1993, appellant was apprehended and detained in the city jail.8
As summarized by the trial court, appellant's defense consisted of the following versions of denial and alibi:
In Criminal Case No. IR-3450, the accused presented his wife, Juliana C. Barbosa. She testified that the complainant, Analiza
lied when she said that she was raped by the accused in 1988 while she (Juliana) was in Manila, because she did not go to
Manila the whole year of 1988. She was all the time in their house in La Purisima, Iriga City. When accused testified, he
denied that he raped Analiza in 1988 and corroborated his wife's testimony that she did not go to Manila in 1988.
In Criminal Case No. IR-3448, accused has similar defense. He and his wife testified that the testimony of Analiza that she
was raped by the accused in November 1992 at their residence in La Purisima, Iriga City, while Juliana Barbosa, her mother,
was in Manila, was a lie, because Juliana Barbosa did not leave for Manila in November 1992. She was always in their house
at La Purisima, Iriga City. Moreover, the accused further argued in his memorandum that this rape (in November 1992) could
not have happened because at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when the crime took place, people were still up and around. The
house where it happened is very near several houses. It was by a pathway leading to the river. Analyn was just downstairs and
Analiza's friend, Benelyn, just went to the house of the father of his stepfather. She may return at any time. And yet, Analiza
did not cry out.
xxx
In Criminal Case No. IR-3449, the defense of the accused is to the effect that he could not have raped Analiza on February 6,
1993, at their house in La Purisima, Iriga City, as she claimed in her testimony, because he went to Manila on February 1,
1993 and stayed there until February 16, 1993. His alibi was corroborated by his wife and his mother, Bibiana Barbosa.
In Criminal Case No. IR-3451, the defense put up was that the accused could not have raped Analiza on May 8, 1993 at about
8:00 o'clock in the evening because Analiza was at the church attending El Shaddai prayer meeting. She was there from 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. The accused was in the town of Bula, Camarines Sur, delivering
candies. [H]e left about 8:00 o'clock in the morning and returned to Iriga City at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. He was with his
wife, Juliana, his cousin, Clemens [Turallo] and Judith Ibarreta. This alibi of the accused was provided by Joan Turallo, niece
of the accused Juliana C. Barbosa, wife of the accused Clemens Turallo, cousin of the accused and Bibiana Barbosa, mother
of the accused.9
After trial, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on his innocence, appellant promptly filed his notice of appeal before us.
In his brief, appellant faults the trial court in:
I
. . . BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF APPELLANT IN ALL FOUR (4) CASES ON THE BASIS OF ITS
OBSERVATION ON THE MANNER AND DEMEANOR OF THE COMPLAINANT WHILE TESTIFYING;
II
. . . NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY THE WITNESSES;
III
. . . RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION RATHER THAN ON WEIGHING THE
EVIDENCES DURING THE TRIAL IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT.10
At the heart of these assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. It is doctrinally settled that such issue is to be
resolved primarily by the trial court because it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.
After trial, the court a quo gave full faith and credence to the testimony of the complainant because it found her testimony positive,
straightforward, natural and sincere. It ruled that her testimony met the test of credibility.11 In contrast, appellant failed to overcome the
overwhelming force of complainant's evidence against him. We shall now consider the alleged errors of the trial court cited by appellant
and his arguments raised in support of his appeal.
In Criminal Case No. 3450, appellant seeks to discredit complainant's testimony by citing her inability to recall the date when the sexual
assaults were committed. He insists that complainant could not have been threatened by a closed Batangas knife. According to
complainant, she was raped by appellant on the third night after her mother left for Manila in 1988. She recalled that her mother stayed
there for about a month and returned only in March 1988.
But even if appellant could not recall the exact dates of the rape, it appears that complainant was below twelve years old when she was
ravished in 1988 because she was born on February 6, 1978. Thus appellant would still be liable for statutory rape. Sexual congress of
a victim below twelve years is rape, as provided for in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree
of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation. (As amended by
Sec. 11, R.A. 7659.)
Failure to recall the exact date of the crime is not an indication of false testimony. Moreover, the precise date when the victim was raped
is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed an information is sufficient. The allegations that rapes were committed "before and until
October 15, 1994", "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter", "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior
and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.12
Although evidence with respect to the employment of force or intimidation upon complainant is mere surplusage in a charge of statutory
rape, the prosecution still established its case against appellant by proving that the sexual assaults against complainant were
committed with the use of force and intimidation, alluding to appellant's use of a closed Batangas knife, and stressing that intimidation
must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and
fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
something dreadful would happen to her. Even the use of a weapon is not necessary. Its use serves only to increase the penalty.13
Furthermore, the stepfather of the victim enjoyed moral and physical ascendancy over complainant sufficient to cow her into submission
to his bestial desires.14 Appellant's moral influence over the complainant substitutes for violence and intimidation.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 3450 charges appellant with nine counts of rape. This was objected to by appellant
because the information charges more than one offense violating the proscription against duplicity of offenses in Section 13, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, a complaint or information must charge but one offense except when the
law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. The aim of the rule is to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the
charge to enable him to prepare his defense. The State should not heap upon defendant two or more charges which may confuse him
in his defense. The trial court is correct in convicting appellant for only one count of rape under this particular information.
In Criminal Case No. 3448, appellant avers that he could not have raped complainant at around 6:00 P.M. sometime in November 1992
because his wife as always was at home after 5:00 P.M. and Analyn, complainant's younger sister, as always played downstairs.
Moreover, Benelyn, complainant's friend, was just nearby and people were then still awake. He insists that his wife did not leave for
Manila in November 1992, contrary to complainant's claim.
In a number of cases, the Court has observed that fear of discovery or the likely appearance of other people does not necessarily deter
the commission of rape. It is not impossible to commit rape inside a house where there are several occupants and even in the same
room where other members of the family are sleeping. Lust does not respect either time or place.15 Appellant's assertion that his wife
did not leave for Manila in November 1992 is immaterial.
In Criminal Case No. 3449, appellant contends that the identification of the perpetrator is uncertain because of the poor light. He also
claims the defense of alibi, in that he alleges he was in Manila for medical treatment so he could not have committed the crime.
It is undisputed that complainant not only knew appellant personally; both she and appellant lived in the same house. At the time of this
offense, only the two of them were home. Also, there was a vigil light in the altar which provided sufficient illumination in the room to
enable complainant to recognize her aggressor. A man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual
act,16 there is no doubt complainant had identified appellant positively.
Concerning appellant's alibi, it cannot prevail over the positive identification and unequivocal declaration of complainant that appellant
was the author of the crime. What makes appellant's alibi weak is the fact that it is corroborated only by his wife and mother. These
testimonies of close kin are suspect and cannot prevail over that of the complaining witness.17
In Criminal Case No. 3451, appellant asserts that complainant was in fact attending the El Shaddai prayer meeting when the alleged
rape happened at about 8:00 P.M. As complainant explained during her cross-examination, she did not know what time they left the
prayer meeting. But she declared that when she arrived home it was not yet 9:00 P.M. Complainant might have failed to note the exact
time of her itinerary but these are minor details whose exactitude the victim could not be expected to remember. Her inability to
remember these details even tend to buttress complainant's credibility that her testimony was not contrived.18
Appellant points out that while complainant's rape allegedly took place between 8:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. of that day in their residence,
yet she admitted attending the prayer meeting at around 8:00 P.M. Appellant seeks to discredit complainant's testimony because of an
obvious contradiction: she could not have been raped at home while attending the prayer meeting at the same time elsewhere.
Appellant's assertion can not stand scrutiny. Appellant admitted that he returned home at about 5:00 P.M. while complainant arrived
home before 9:00 P.M. Complainant states she was raped between 8:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. Clearly, it was not impossible for the
offense to have taken place in the indicated time frame, before 9 o'clock that evening. Further, considering the proximity of their
residence and the venue of prayer meeting, according to complainant's testimony, it could have taken just a few minutes for her to get
home from the meeting.
Appellant surmises that complainant filed the cases against him to spite her mother who banged her head on a wall. According to him,
her grandmother, her auntie and she herself concocted said cases. In brief, appellant attributes the rape charges to family feud,
resentment or vengeance. But, this attribution need not sway the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of complainant who
remained steadfast throughout her testimony despite her minority, as in this case.19 Nothing on record shows plausibly that complainant
has any improper motive to frame-up appellant.
That complainant did not cry for help while being raped is not too difficult to comprehend. Complainant explained that her "uncles" are
not her blood relations but relatives of appellant. She feared that they might also do what appellant had done to her. Further, she was
cowed into submission by appellant's continuous threat that he would kill her, and that she would not be allowed to attend school
anymore.
With regard to appellant's claim that it was rather unusual for him to have sexual congress with complainant without foreplay like kissing
or caressing her, hence the charges could not be true, suffice it to say that it is too trivial a matter to merit further discussion.
More substantially, appellant argues that if indeed complainant was raped continuously from 1988 until 1993, she should have not kept
her silence until she was fifteen years old, since she had all the available remedies for redress as well as relatives who could help her.
But as observed by the Court on numerous occasions, delay in reporting rape cases may be justified if there are strong reasons like
death threats against the victim. Worth stressing, complainant was a girl of tender age who was completely under the moral
ascendancy and control of appellant. Fear alone of what appellant would do if she exposed his evil deeds was reason enough for her to
suffer in silence for a long time. Then too her mother's apathy after she told her about the abuses committed by appellant was another
reason explaining delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities. That she did not file charges promptly against appellant could
not diminish her credibility,20 given her tender age, the moral ascendancy of appellant, and the continuous threat on her life.
Appellant claims there was no tenacious resistance shown on complainant's part. Physical resistance, however, need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace
because of fear for life and personal safety.21
Finally, appellant points out that the medical certificate, Exhibit "C", does not clearly show that complainant was raped. It is settled that
a medical report is not even necessary in a prosecution for rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper.22 In this case, the examining physician found old lacerations on complainant's hymen which appear to have been caused
months or even years back. While hymenal lacerations may also be caused by other factors such as extraneous physical activities, no
evidence was adduced by the defense to support this possibility. But note the complainant testified that appellant succeeded in inserting
his genital into her organ during the times she was raped. Hence, the hymenal lacerations bolster complainant's assertion that appellant
raped her on several occasions.
Under the penal law then prevailing, whenever the crime of rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as the knife
used by appellant,23 the penalty should be reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. In this case,
considering that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
We note that the trial court awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to complainant in each case. This however is
inadequate. In addition, complainant must also be awarded the amount of P50,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.24
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case Nos. IR-3450, IR-3448, IR-3449 and IR-3451 convicting appellant
FELICITO BARBOSA of four counts of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each case is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that appellant shall also pay to the victim for each count of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, in
addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages, P11,200.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.

8.
[G.R. Nos. 132625-31. December 18, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL SANDOVAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For ravishing his two (2) minor step-daughters, Noel Sandoval was charged in seven (7) separate Informations with seven (7)
counts of Rape, five of which were committed against Teresa Micu, then thirteen (13) years old, and two counts of statutory rape
committed against Victoria Rhea Micu, then only eleven (11) years old as evidenced by her Birth Certificate. [1] The Informations were
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan, Pangasinan, Branch 42, and allege as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 97-01815-D
That on or about May 5, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01816-D
That on or about May 9, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01817-D
That on or about April 24, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01818-D
That on or about April 18, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01819-D
That on or about May 5, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01820-D
That sometime in April 2, 1997 in the evening thereof, at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the stepfather, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse in their conjugal house with
VICTORIA RHEA F. MICU, who is under twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7659.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01821-D
That sometime in April 5, 1997 in the evening thereof, at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the stepfather, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse in their conjugal house with
VICTORIA RHEA F. MICU, who is under twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7659.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 23, 1997 for the first five (5) counts of rape, wherein he pleaded NOT GUILTY. The following
day, the Public Prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the five (5) criminal complaints to allege the relationship of the victim and
the accused. On July 31, 1997, accused-appellant was scheduled to be arraigned for the other two (2) counts of rape but he failed to
appear because of lack of notice on the Provincial Warden. At this point, the Public Prosecutor called the attention of the Court to the
Amended Informations he filed in the first five (5) cases, to which accused-appellant has already been arraigned and has pleaded not
guilty on July 23, 1997. Counsel for the defense objected on the ground that the amendment would prejudice the right of accused-
appellant.
The court a quo ruled that since there was no evidence yet presented, the matter of amendment should be brought at the proper time
after the prosecution has presented its evidence.Thus, the resolution of the Motion to Amend Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-
01815-D, 97-01816-D, 97-01817-D, 97-01818-D and 97-01819-D was held in abeyance. Meanwhile, on August 7, 1997, accused-
appellant was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the two (2) counts of statutory rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-01820-D and 97-
01821-D. Thereafter, a joint trial of all the seven (7) cases was conducted. The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, including the
two (2) complainants while on the other hand, the defense presented three (3) witnesses including the accused-appellant.
On January 9, 1998, the court a quo rendered its decision,[2] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused NOEL SANDOVAL is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of the
crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-01815-D, 97-01816-D, 97-01817-D, 97-01819-D, 97-01820-D and 97-01821-D and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the mandatory penalty of DEATH for each act of rape. In addition, he is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each case or a total of P300,000.00. Also for each count of rape, he is further ordered to pay P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages as example for the public good or a total of P30,000.00. He is however acquitted in Criminal Case No. 97-01818-D for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the penalty imposed, the records were elevated to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court.
Accused-appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:
I
The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Rape on the person of Teresa Micu and imposing the death
penalty upon him notwithstanding the fact that, at the time of the alleged commission, he was not yet married to the victims mother.
II
The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Rape over Rhea Micu, considering her lack of credibility which
finds support in the medical findings of the physician who examined her.
III
The court a quo erred in awarding damages to the complainants notwithstanding that the latter never testified to establish the same and
the only basis of such on record is the testimony of their aunt, Perlita Fernandez, who is not their legal guardian.
After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the case at bar, this Court finds that the trial court did not err in convicting accused-
appellant of the crime of rape on the person of Teresa Micu. During her testimony, she clearly and convincingly established before the
court a quo the facts and circumstances that transpired during the several occasions when accused-appellant raped her.[3]
The rule has always been that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, factual findings of the trial court should be highly
respected. The trial judge is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having had the opportunity to
personally hear them, observe their deportment and manner of testifying and detect if they were telling the truth. [4] We find no reason to
depart from this rule in this particular case. It should be remembered also that courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl
who is a victim of sexual assault because, ordinarily, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify
on the details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice.[5]
However, we cannot agree with the trial courts imposition of the death penalty on accused-appellant for the rape of Teresa
Micu. The pertinent law in effect at the time of commission of the crimes in this case, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659, provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
xxxxxxxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x. (Underscoring ours)
The above-quoted provision states, inter alia, that where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. This is one of the seven (7)
modes enumerated in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which are considered special circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of
rape. In the subsequent cases of People v. Ilao[6] and People v. Medina,[7] it was ruled that the seven new attendant circumstances in
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and not merely aggravating circumstances, since said
qualifying circumstances are punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death. A qualifying
circumstance increases it to a higher penalty while an aggravating circumstance affects only the period of the penalty but does not
increase it to a higher degree. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying
aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information.
A reading of the Information for the rape of Teresa Micu filed against accused-appellant reveals that he was merely charged with
the crime of simple rape. The fact that accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of the victims parent is not alleged in the
Information. What was stated therein was only the minority of the victim. As we have emphasized, the elements of minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender must be both alleged. [8] As such, the special qualifying circumstance stated in Section 11 of RA
7659 was not properly pleaded in the Information. Thus, the penalty of death prescribed in RA 7659 can not be imposed on accused-
appellant. Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial
of due process if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant
circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned.[9]
The amendment sought by the prosecution of the five informations, in order to allege the relationship of accused-appellant to the
victim, were clearly substantial in character as they had the effect of changing the crime charged, thereby exposing accused-appellant
to a higher penalty. Such amendment can no longer be done after accused-appellant has pleaded to the Information for simple rape on
July 23, 1997,[10] without violating his constitutional rights. Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, provides:
The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at anytime before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done, without
prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x.
In sum, the failure of the prosecution to allege the relationship of the accused to the victim has effectively removed the crime from
the ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribes the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. [11] In the recent cases of People v. Calayca,[12] People v. Tabion[13] and People v.
Acala,[14] where the prosecution failed to allege the fact of minority of the victim in the Informations, we reduced the penalty imposed
from death to reclusion perpetua.
Anent the second assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to discredit Rhea Micu, the second victim, by invoking the findings
of the examining physician, Dr. Luisa Cayabyab, to the effect that she could not tell whether force attended the laceration of Rheas
organ and that even the tip of her finger could not reach the said complainants cervix when she attempted to check the same.
[15]
According to accused-appellant, this shows that the victim had never experienced sexual intercourse.
Appellants claim is without merit.
A circumspect scrutiny of Dr. Cayabyabs testimonial declarations discloses that they were not conclusive. As a matter of fact, the
medical examination, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove nor disprove the fact of rape. On the contrary, her testimony even tended
to clarify the apparent conflict pointed out by accused-appellant, viz:
Q Likewise one of your findings is that her vagina admits one finger, in this finding of yours, it does not show any force or can be
interpreted that there was no force of inserting something on the vagina of the patient, is that right?
A I cannot say directly that there was no force because the vagina is so elastic like a rubber, sir.
Q And so you can conclude that there was really no force?
A I cannot say that there was no force because as I have said the vaginal canal is so elastic, sir.
COURT
Q There may be force or no force?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Proceed,
ATTY. TAMINAYA
Q When you stated in your findings, admits one finger, could you tell this Court that there was no penis yet or any object that was
inserted?
A As I have said, the vaginal canal is so elastic so I cannot say if there was or there was no object that was inserted, sir.
COURT
Q Was there something introduced into the vagina or inserted inside?
A Maybe yes, maybe no, sir.
Q I think that the hymen can tell you that something was inserted into the vagina because of the laceration?
A It is possible, sir.
Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA
Q In this case, there was no showing that the hymen was lacerated?
A There was healed laceration, sir.
COURT
Q But whether or not the laceration was caused by force or no force, you could not tell?
A Yes, Your Honor.[16]
In the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants private part is not necessary. Neither is the rupture of the
hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the entrance or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum
is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the victims genitalia and not the full penetration of the
complainants private part consummates the crime.[17] More importantly, it has been ruled in People v. San Juan[18] that in crimes against
chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime, as her
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof.
As found by the court a quo, Rheas testimonies were overwhelmingly straightforward, logical and convincing as to be worthy of
belief and impervious to a mere denial by accused-appellant Noel Sandoval, to wit:
Q Sometime in the evening of April 2, 1997, do you remember where you were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was in Brgy. Casibong, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, sir.
Q Where in Brgy. Casibong were you staying?
A In the house of my step-father, sir.
Q Your step-father, you are referring to the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q While you were in the house of your step-father in the evening of April 2, 1997, where were you in relation to that house?
A I was inside the house, sir.
Q What were you doing at that precise time?
A I was tending the small child to sleep, sir.
Q What is the name of that small child?
A John, sir.
Q While you were tending the small child by the name of John, what happened next after that?
A While tending, I was able to sleep, sir.
Q Were you awakened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you awakened, could you explain to the Honorable Court?
A I was awaken because somebody went on top of me, sir.
Q When somebody went on top of you, who was that person?
A Noel Sandoval, sir.
Q When Noel Sandoval went on top of you, what happened next after that?
A He removed my shortpant and my pantie, sir.
Q After Noel Salvador removed your shortpant and pantie, what did Noel Sandoval do, if he did anything?
A After he removed my shortpant and my pantie, Noel Sandoval also removed his pants and brief and thereafter, he inserted his
penis into my vagina, sir.
Q After Noel Sandoval inserted his penis to your vagina, what did Noel Sandoval do, if he did anything?
A He kissed me, sir.
Q What part of your body did Noel Sandoval kiss you?
A My neck, sir.
Q What else?
A Only my neck, sir.
Q On April 5, 1997, do you remember where you were?
A I was also in the house of my step-father, sir.
Q What were you doing in that precise time of the day?
A I was already asleep then, sir.
Q Were you awakened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why? Could you explain before the Honorable Court why you were awakened on the evening of April 5, 1997?
A I was awakened because I felt pain, sir.
Q Why did you feel pain.
A I felt pain inside my vagina, sir.
Q Why? Can you explain before the Honorable Court why you felt pain in your vagina?
A Because my step-father inserted his penis inside my vagina, sir.
Q What part of the house of your step-father did he insert his penis?
A Inside the house, sir.[19]
It is a well-settled rule that an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the
mouth of a credible witness.[20]
We agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Noel Sandoval is
guilty of the rape of Rhea Micu. However, as in the other four cases, the death penalty can not be imposed on him. The prosecution
failed to prove that accused-appellant was legally married to the victims mother, in order to substantiate the allegation in the Amended
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01820-D and 01821-D that the accused-appellant is the stepfather of the victim. In People v.
Brigildo,[21] a stepdaughter was defined as the daughter of ones spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses
by a previous marriage. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was the stepdaughter of the
accused-appellant to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Corollarily, the prosecution must establish that accused-appellant is
legally married to the victims mother. In order that the qualifying circumstances under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which raises the penalty
of rape to death, can be appreciated, the circumstances must be both alleged and proved. Accordingly, the proper penalty for the two
counts of rape against Rhea Micu is reclusion perpetua.
Finally, we affirm the trial courts award of moral and exemplary damages to the complainants notwithstanding that the latter never
testified to establish the same.
The award of moral damages for rape is proper as it is provided in Article 2219 (3) of the Civil Code. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, accused-appellant should be made to pay P50,000.00, especially considering that the offended parties were of tender
age at the time of the crime. [22] In People v. Prades,[23] it was ruled that the award of moral damages to the victim is proper even if there
was no proof presented during the trial as basis therefor. The fact that the complainant suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by
the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility.[24]
On the other hand, exemplary damages may also be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. [25]Accused-appellant being the stepfather of the victims, relationship should be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition to moral and exemplary damages, civil indemnity must also be awarded to the victims since it is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape. [26] The recent judicial prescription is that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape if the death penalty is not imposed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan, Pangasinan, Branch 42, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Noel Sandoval is found guilty of four (4) counts of simple rape committed against Teresa Micu
and two (2) counts of simple rape committed against Victoria Rhea Micu, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for each of the six (6) counts.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 for each of the six (6) counts of rape, or a total of P300,000.00, as moral
damages; P10,000.00 for each of the six (6) counts of rape, or a total of P60,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 for each
of the six (6) counts of rape, or a total of P300,000.00, as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

9.
[G.R. No. 134730. September 18, 2000]
FELIPE GARCIA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In two separate Informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, petitioner Felipe Garcia, Jr. was charged with
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 91-93374 and with murder in Criminal Case 91-93375 committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 91-93374:
That on or about November 3, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with two others
who[se] true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one REYNALDO
BERNARDO Y DEL ROSARIO @ BOY PANCHANG, by then and there shooting the latter with a revolver, hitting him on the neck,
thereby inflicting upon the said REYNALDO D. BERNARDO @ BOY PANCHANG physical injuries which was necessarily fatal and
mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said
REYNALDO D. BERNARDO @ BOY PANCHANG which prevented his death.
Contrary to Law.[1]
xxx
Criminal Case No. 91-93375
That on or about November 3, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with two
others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery attack, assault and use personal force upon one FERNANDO B. LEAO Y
BERNARDO @ BAGGING, by then and there shooting the latter with a revolver, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting upon the said
FERNANDO B. LEAO @ BAGGING gunshot wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to Law.
x x x[2]
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Upon arraignment on 24 May 1991, the petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of Not Guilty to both charges.[3]
Trial on the merits then ensued. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court summarized the events that led to the killing of
Fernando Leao and the near fatal injuries sustained by Reynaldo Bernardo as follows:
On November 3, 1990, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Arnold Corpuz and Fernando Leao, a 15-year old student, and their
friends, were conversing along Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila. Fernando Leao was on the side of the street. Momentarily, a
pedicab, with Renato Garcia (Reneng Palayok), on board, passed by and, in the process, the right wheel of the pedicab ran over the
right foot of Fernando Leao. The pedicab failed to stop and continued on its way. Incensed, Fernando Leao ran after the
pedicab. Arnold Corpuz followed suit, at a distance of about three (3) meters away from thepedicab. When Fernando Leao was about
abreast with the pedicab, he uttered invectives but Renato Garcia retaliated and hurled invectives, too, at Fernando Leao,
saying 'Putang ina ninyo.' Fernando Leao was then ahead of the pedicab when he looked back and saw, to his consternation, Renato
Garcia placing his right hand on the right side of his waistline and about to pull out his gun. Afraid for his life, Fernando Leao sped away
from the pedicab, turned to an alley and ran to Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, direct to the house of his uncle, Reynaldo
Bernardo, at No. 1281 Mataas na Lupa, Paco, Manila (Exhibit 'E-1'). The pedicab slowed down a bit and then turned towards F.
Muoz Street, Paco, Manila. Arnold Corpuz followed Fernando Leao to the alley and, when he saw him again, Fernando Leao was
conversing with his uncle, Reynaldo Bernardo, by the gate of the latter's house (Exhibit 'E-1'). Fernando Leao reported to his uncle that
Renato Garcia earlier uttered invectives at him and even tried to pull out his gun from the back portion of his waistline. Reynaldo
Bernardo decided to have the incident reported to Police Station No. 5 of the Western Police District. Reynaldo Bernardo changed
clothes, put on his shoes and, with Fernando Leao and Arnold Corpuz, proceeded to the house of his mother, Esperanza del Rosario
Bernardo (Exhibits 'E-2' and 'O-2') to borrow the latter's jeep, parked near the basketball court, along Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco,
Manila, which they will use in going to the police station. The house of Reynaldo Bernardo was about twenty (20) meters away from the
house of his mother.
The three (3) then turned left along Mataas na Lupa Street, towards the direction of the house of Esperanza del Rosario
Bernardo. However, before they could reach her house, they had to pass by the intersection of F. Muoz Street and Mataas na Lupa
Street, Paco, Manila. The intersection was about twenty-five (25) meters away from the house of the Accused and Renato Garcia and
about fifty (50) meters away from the house of Gerardo Lugos, which was near the South Superhighway already.
When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leao and Arnold Corpuz were near the corner of F. Muoz and Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco,
Manila, Reynaldo Bernardo saw the head of Gerardo Lugos who was peeping on the side corner of the vacant store, at the said corner
of the street. However, Reynaldo Bernardo gave no significance to the incident, there being no feud or misunderstanding between him
and Gerardo Lugos. When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leao and Arnold Corpuz continued on their walk, Fernando Leao and
Reynaldo Bernardo were walking side by side, Fernando Leao on the right side of his uncle, while Arnold Corpuz was three (3) meters
behind the two (2) but tried to overtake them. When the three (3) passed by the first corner of F. Muoz Street, Paco, Manila and Mataas
na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, Arnold Corpuz saw three (3) male persons, about seven (7) to ten (10) meters away on their left side,
walking along F. Muoz Street, Paco, Manila, going towards their direction, but did not as yet recognize them at the time. However, when
the three (3) male persons were near the portion of the street near the store, which was lighted by the lights emanating from the
Meralco post (Exhibit 'E'), Arnold Corpuz recognized the three (3) male persons. The first was Renato (Reneng Palayok) Garcia, who
was then holding a .38 caliber revolver, with his two (2) hands raised on the level of his abreast, aimed at them.Behind Renato Garcia,
towards his right side, was his younger brother, the Accused and behind the Accused, to his right side, was Jerry Lugos. The Accused
and Jerry Lugos were armed with handguns, also aimed at Reynaldo Bernardo. When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leao and Arnold
Corpuz were about two (2) to three (3) meters from the intersection of F. Muoz and Mataas na Lupa Streets, Paco, Manila, Reynaldo
Bernardo turned, looked towards his left, and saw Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos, all armed and their guns aimed at
him. Reynaldo Bernardo then started to sprint toward where Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos were but barely had
Reynaldo Bernardo taken off when Renato Garcia fired his gun, once, at Reynaldo Bernardo and hit the latter on the left side of his
neck (Exhibit 'B').Renato Garcia was then only about two (2) meters way from Reynaldo Bernardo. When Renato Garcia fired at
Reynaldo Bernardo, the Accused and Jerry Lugos looked around as if acting as lookouts.Reynaldo Bernardo placed his left palm on the
left side of his neck which was hit, fell, at first, on a kneeling position and then, on the ground, face down (Exhibits 'E-3' and
'O'). Instinctively, after Reynaldo Bernardo was hit, he flung and swung his hand inward, outward and sideward and, in the process, hit
Arnold Corpuz who was then about to give succor to Reynaldo Bernardo. Arnold Corpuz then fell on the ground, on a sitting
position. Arnold Corpuz then stood up and then fell again on a kneeling position (Exhibit 'E-4'). In the meantime, too, Fernando Leao
rushed to his uncle and tried to lift him (Exhibit 'E-5'). Fernando Leao was then on a kneeling position. In the meantime, too, Renato
Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos continued walking towards where Reynaldo Bernardo was sprawled and Fernando Leao beside
him and Arnold Corpus in front of Fernando Leao. The body of Reynaldo Bernardo was between them. Three (3) successive shots then
ensued. Arnold Corpuz then decided to lie down on the ground, face down, his face on the feet of Reynaldo Bernardo, to avoid being
hit with his two (2) hands under his breast. Arnold Corpuz then raised his head a little and noticed that the front portion of the head of
Fernando Leao was bulging and Fernando Leao falling down. It turned out that Fernando Leao was felled (sic) by a gunshot wound at
the back of his head. In the process, Arnold Corpuz saw Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos behind Fernando Leao, still
holding their guns. Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos then fled from the scene together. Arnold Corpuz also fled from the
scene towards the house of Esperanza del Rosario Bernardo to plead for help. On the way, Arnold Corpuz met Dominador Bernardo,
Jr., the brother of Reynaldo Bernardo who came from the basketball court. Dominador Bernardo, Jr. inquired why Arnold Corpuz was
running and Arnold Corpuzz (sic) replied, thus: Tinamaan si Kuya Boy at Ferdie.' (pp. 214-216, id.)[4]
The victims were taken to the Medical Center Manila at about 12:00 midnight. Subsequently, Leao was transferred to the
Orthopedic Hospital, where he died in the morning of November 4, 1990.[5]
Dr. Marcial Cenido performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Leao and prepared a report with the following Post Mortem Findings:
EXTERNAL INJURIES AND EXTENSIONS INTERNALLY:
1. Gunshot wound, thru and thru with the following points of entry and exit:
Point of Entry - right occipital region, head, 58.5 inches from the heel, 3 cm. from the posterior midline, measuring 0.5 cm. x 0.3
cm. and with the contusion collar measures 1 cm. x 0.7 cm. and
Point of Exit - right forehead, 5 cm. from the anterior midline, 58 inches from the heel, and measures 1.3 cm. x 0.5 cm.
Course: Forwards, very slightly upwards and very slightly towards the lateral penetrating the cranial cavity and lacerating the right
occipital, parietal and frontal lobes of the brain.
2. Hematoma, below the right eyebrow.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Laceration of the right occipital, parietal and frontal lobes of the brains and subrachnoid hemorrhage, and generalized
pallor of the internal organs and tissues; and
2. Recovered from the stomach about a glassful of dark liquid with some rice and vegetables and without alcoholic odor.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Gunshot wound, right occipital region, head.[6]
On the other hand, Dr. Pedro P. Solis, Medico-Legal Officer of the Medical Center Manila, performed an operation on and gave
medical treatment to Reynaldo Bernardo. The report he prepared showed the following findings:
Abrasion, 3 cm. x 2 cm. scalp, frontal region, left side; 3 cm. 3.5 cm x 1cm. lateral aspect, frontal region, left side. Wound, gunshot,
circular in shape, 0.9 cm. in diameter, lateral aspect, neck left side, indise anterior triangle, directed medially, downwards and slightly
backwards, penetrating soft tissues of the neck, involving external jugular vein, then making wound exist at right paravertebral area that
the level of T3-T-4 and 3 cm. below the highest point of the shoulder.[7]
Based on the above established facts, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion reading as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the following cases to wit:
1. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr., Criminal Case No. 91-93374, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and hereby sentences said Accused to an indeterminate penalty of
from Four (4) Years and Two (2) months of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor, as Maximum, and to pay to Reynaldo Bernardo the amount of P115,631.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;
2. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr. Criminal Case No. 91-93375, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Homicide" and hereby metes on him an indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal
as maximum, and to pay to the heirs of Fernando Leao the amount of P10,040.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 by way of
indemnity.[8]
Petitioner elevated his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which on 21 May 1998, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
[9]
Hence, the present case, petitioner raising the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN EVALUATING EVIDENCE DIRECTED AGAINST SUSPECTS GERRY LUGOS AND
RENATO GARCIA - INFERENTIALLY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT FELIPE GARCIA, JR., UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONSPIRACY SO-CALLED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHED IN
THE TRIAL AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS CO-CONSPIRATOR THEREOF, AND,
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY AS CO-PRINCIPAL IN HOMICIDE
AND FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE GROUNDED ON CONSPIRACY WITH THIRD PERSONS (GERRY LUGOS AND RENATO
GARCIA) WHO ARE MERE SUSPECTS AND STRANGERS IN THE TWO CASES AS THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED THEREIN
NOR CHARGED AS JOHN AND RICARDO DOES IN EITHER OR BOTH INFORMATIONS." [10]
Petitioner asserts that since he alone was named in the information, "it would seem by implication from the narration in the
information that it was being made to appear that the accused was in fact the gunman who acted in conspiracy with unknown
persons. The evidence later presented proved otherwise and it turned out that it was Renato Garcia alone who shot and wounded
Reynaldo Bernardo and shot and killed Fernando Leao. It was not, therefore, in keeping with the evidence on record proper to convict
the accused based merely on the theory that there was conspiracy when no sufficient evidence to support such fact exist."[11]
Contrary to petitioners argument, there is no irregularity in the information to warrant a reversal of the conviction. All material facts
and essential elements of the crimes, for which petitioner is charged, were alleged therein. Conspiracy was alleged in the
information. Thus, it is not necessary to allege with exactitude the specific act of the accused, as it is a well-settled doctrine that in
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.[12]
Neither is the fact that the two others allegedly in conspiracy with the petitioner were not named with particularity, nor tried and
convicted, of any moment. An information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot
pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information.[13]
This Court does not doubt the guilt of the petitioner. The findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate magistrate in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. Absent any
showing that trial courts calibration of the credibility was flawed, we are bound by its assessment.[14]
An examination of the records will reveal that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the accused. Reynaldo Bernardo,
who sustained injuries from a gunshot wound, narrated the incident as follows:
FISCAL PERALTA:
Where were you when this Fernando Leao told you that a gun was poked on (sic) him?
WITNESS:
I was in our house, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Can you still recall that (sic) time it was when this Fernando Leao told you that a gun was poked on (sic) him?
WITNESS:
I think about 11:30 oclock, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And did you come to know as to what time or that date was that poking incident took place.
WITNESS:
On November 3, 1990, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
At what time was it, if you know?
WITNESS:
I was told at about 11:30 o'clock, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
You said that at around 11:40 o'clock in the evening at the corner of Mataas na Lupa and F. Muoz street, you were with two (2) men,
can you recall of any unusual incident that happened at that corner?
WITNESS:
We were shot sir. "Pinagbabaril kami."
FISCAL PERALTA:
Who shot you if you can still recall?
WITNESS:
Reneng Palayok and his two (2) other companions by the name of Peping Palayok and Jerry Lugos, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
How far were you in relation to the place where these men shot you?
WITNESS:
About seven (7) meters away, sir, it is very near.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Can you still recall the relative positions of these men whom you said shot you and your position at the time that (sic) shots were
fired?
ATTY. UY:
I object to the question, Your Honor, on the ground that the same is very leading.
FISCAL PERALTA:
I will reform, Your Honor. You said that you were about more or less seven (7) meters away from the men. Now, my question to you
is, were you hit?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And where were you hit?
WITNESS:
At my (sic) left side of my neck, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And at the time that you were hit on the neck, where were these three (3) men at that time?
WITNESS:
They were on my left side, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And what were these three (3) men actually doing at the time that they shot you?
WITNESS:
They were armed with guns, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Have you known this Rene Palayok even before November 3, 1990?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, since we were young.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What about this Peping Palayok, have you known also this Peping Palayok?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, I have known him also since we were young.
FISCAL PERALTA:
How about this Jerry Lugos?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, he is my childhood mate.
xxx
COURT:
Granted.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Now, Mr. Witness, after you were hit on the left side of your neck, what happened next?
WITNESS:
I fell down, sir, face down.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And when you fell down, face down, can you still recall what happened next?
WITNESS:
After that, sir, I heard shots.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Now, if you see again that Peping Palayok whom you said was one of those who shot you, will you still be able to recognize him?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Will you please look inside the Court and point to him?
WITNESS:
That person, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person who, when asked, stated his name as Felipe Garcia, Jr.[15]
One of Bernardos companion, prosecution witness Arnold Corpuz, testified in this wise:
FISCAL PERALTA:
Could you please tell to this Honorable Court why you were not able to reach the house of Reynaldo Bernardo?
WITNESS:
Because there were three (3) male persons who were waiting nakaabang for us, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Why did you say that these three (3) men were waiting or nakaabang for you?
WITNESS:
Because while we were walking, they were already there holding guns, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Do you know these persons who were holding guns?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And who were these persons whom you said were waiting for you and holding guns?
WITNESS:
Reneng Palayok, Peping and Jerry Lugos, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What is again the full name of this Rene(ng) Palayok, if you know?
WITNESS:
Renato Garcia, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What about this Peping?
WITNESS:
Felipe Garcia, sir.[16]
In the face of petitioner's positive identification, petitioners defense of alibi cannot hold water. No jurisprudence in criminal cases is
more settled than the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, and the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused
has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime.[17]
The factual findings of the trial court that petitioner participated in the perpetration of the crime, such being supported by evidence
on record, will not be disturbed by this Court. However, we are of the persuasion that the prosecution failed to prove with positive and
competent evidence the fact that the act of the petitioner was direct or actually necessary to the commission of the crime.
The existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18] The mere fact that the petitioner had prior knowledge of the criminal design of
the principal perpetrator and aided the latter in consummating the crime does not automatically make him a co-conspirator. Both
knowledge of and participation in the criminal act are also inherent elements of an accomplice. [19] In his commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code, Chief Justice Ramon Aquino explains:
The guilt of an accomplice should be predicated on an act that was done in furtherance of the commission of the crime by the
principal. The accomplice must have known that the principal intended to commit a particular crime. In other words, he should have
community purpose with the principal. xxx[20]
In the case of People vs. Tamayo,[21] citing the Supreme Court of Spain, this Court made the following exposition on the
characteristics of an accomplice:
xxx It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
In cases of doubt as to whether persons acted as principals or accomplices, the doubt must be resolved in their favor and they
should be held guilty as accomplices.[22] Such principle was applied by this Court in the case of People v. Clemente:
In the case of appellants, Carlos and Pascual Clemente, while they joined their brother in the pursuit of the fleeing Matnog, and in the
attack on him as he fell, yet the prosecution eyewitness was unable to assert positively that the two managed to hit the fallen
man. There being no showing of conspiracy, and the extent of their participation in the homicide being uncertain, they should be given
the benefit of the doubt, and consequently they are declared to be mere accomplices in the crime.[23]
After a circumspect examination of the evidence, we find that other than a showing that petitioner assisted Renato Garcia in the
slaying of Fernando Leao and the infliction of injuries upon Reynaldo Bernardo, the prosecution failed to present other evidence which
would positively establish the existence of conspiracy. Thus, this Court is of the belief that petitioner-accused should only be held liable
as an accomplice. This seems to be the more reasonable and safer course.
Even if we were to agree with the trial court that conspiracy existed between accused-petitioner and two other malefactors, in
particular Renato Garcia, who was positively identified as the gunman, still this Court is of the conviction that the petitioner should only
be held liable as an accomplice. petitioners participation was hardly indispensable. As the trial court pointed out, the petitioner merely
acted as a lookout. The testimony of Arnold Corpuz is telling:
FISCAL PERALTA:
And what happened after you saw these three (3) men waiting for you armed with guns?
WITNESS:
They fired a gun once and Kuya Boy was hit, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What part of the body of Boy was hit?
WITNESS:
Here, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the left portion of his neck.
COURT:
I cannot understand that. You said that they fired once. How many fired?
WITNESS:
Only one, Your Honor.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Who was that person who fired the gun?
WITNESS:
Mang Rey or Rey Palayok, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And you said that there were three (3) of them. What did these Peping and Jerry Lugos do when Rene Palayok fired a gun that hit
your Kuya Boy?
WITNESS:
They were behind Mang Rene, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
You said that they were behind Rene Palayok. What did they do afterwards after Rene fired a gun that hit your Kuya Boy?
ATTY. UY:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
They were looking around holding their guns as if they were acting as look outs, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
After your Kuya Boy was hit on the neck, what happened next?
WITNESS:
I saw Fernando went (sic) near his uncle so that he could lift his uncle, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Was he able to lift his uncle Reynaldo Bernardo?
WITNESS:
Not anymore, sir, because there were continuous firing of guns about three (3) times.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What happened to Fernando Leao when there was a continuous firing for at least three (3) times?
ATTY. UY:
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
He was hit on the back of his head, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the right back portion of his head just behind his right ear.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And do you know who shot this Fernando Leao?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir. It was Mang Rene.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What did the companions of Rene Palayok do when Rene Palayok shot Fernando Leao?
ATTY. UY:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
They were acting as aide and they were following Rene Palayok, sir.[24]
As can be seen from the above testimony, petitioner's participation was hardly indispensable. In the case of People v. Nierra,
[25]
this Court made the following ruling:
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty
as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals. However, since their
participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of
liability may be applied to them.
In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an
accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character.
WHEREFORE, the herein questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
MODIFIED to wit:
1. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr., Criminal Case No. 91-93374, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as an ACCOMPLICE in the crime of Frustrated Homicide and hereby sentences said Accused
to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to Four (4) years and One (1) Day
of Prision Correcional, as Maximum;
2. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr. Criminal Case No. 91-93375, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as an ACCOMPLICE in the crime of "Homicide and hereby metes on him an indeterminate
penalty of Two (2) Years of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as
Maximum.
No pronouncement as to cost.

10.
G.R. No. 131806 October 20, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO CABIGTING y SARMIENTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal filed by accused Liberato Cabigting y Sarmiento from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan Branch
19, Malolos convicting him of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Sheryl M. de Ocampo in the sum of fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages, and to pay costs of
suit.1
On April 23, 1996, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, with the assistance of her mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos, a
criminal complaint alleging, to wit:
"That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Norzagaray, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation and with lewd designs have carnal knowledge of one Sheryl M. de Ocampo, against her will and without her
consent.
"Contrary to law."2
At the arraignment on February 25, 1997, accused Liberato S. Cabigting pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.3Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Sheryl M. de Ocampo, eleven years old at the time of the incident, was a Grade 4 student of accused Liberato S. Cabigting in Tigbe
Elementary School, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
In the morning of November 23, 1995, Sheryl, together with her classmates, Janet C. Gojo Cruz and Zemonette 4C. Valenzuela went to
the house of their teacher, accused Liberato Cabigting, to clean his house. Upon their arrival, the three children saw accused Cabigting
outside his house. They approached him and asked what they were supposed to do. He instructed Janet and Zemonette to clean the
front yard of the house while Sheryl would clean inside.
When Sheryl entered the house, accused Cabigting asked her to go inside a room. Sheryl proceeded to a room on the ground floor.
The room was about 3 to 4 meters in length and 2 meters in width. Accused Cabigting followed Sheryl and closed the door and the
window of the room. He took off her sando, t-shirt, panty, and skirt. Sheryl did not move. Then, accused Cabigting took off his polo shirt,
shorts and brief. He told her to kiss and hug him. She refused. He kissed and hugged her. Then, he pushed her to a bed, spread her
thighs and went on top of her. She tried to kick him but he continued to stay on top of her. Accused Cabigting held her two hands with
his two hands. Later, he held his penis and inserted it into her sex organ. She felt pain in her sex organ.5
Suddenly, Janet and Zemonette knocked on the door. Accused Cabigting got off Sheryl and dressed quickly. Sheryl also put on her
clothes. Accused Cabigting opened the door and led Sheryl out of the room. They all went to school. Sheryl attended morning and
afternoon classes. She did not reveal to her friends what had occurred that morning.6
Sheryl claimed that she found bloodstain on her panty after the incident.7 She felt pain for about three days.
On November 27, 1995, five days after the incident, Sheryl refused to go to school. Antonia de Ocampo, Sheryl's mother, wrote the
accused Cabigting to inform him that Sheryl had LBM and would not be able to attend classes that day. Sheryl, accompanied by her
sister, Victoria de Ocampo went to Dr. San Pedro at Sapang Palay Emergency Hospital for treatment of the LBM. The doctor, after
examination, advised Sheryl to go to the National Bureau of Investigation to report the rape incident.8
The following day, Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas, Jr., medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a medico genital
examination of Sheryl and issued an official report, stating his conclusions as follows:
"1) No evident sign of extra-genital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
"2) Hymen intact and its orifice wall (2.0 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult
Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury."9
Dr. Vargas testified in court that "there was no destruction on the hymen" and that there was "no laceration".10However, he did not
discount the possibility that there could have been inter-labial insertion even if there was no full penetration of the organ of the
male.11 He noted that the examination took place five days after the reported incident and that a contusion in the vaginal canal heals
after four days.12
Accused Liberato S. Cabigting13 denies ever asking Sheryl and her two classmates, Janet and Zemonette, to clean his house in the
morning of November 23, 1995. He admits, however, that his pupils normally come to his house, which is 100 yards from the school, to
watch television, to fetch him or to bring his things to school.
Accused Cabigting alleged that at 7:00 in the morning of November 23, 1995, he left his house to walk to school with his daughter, who
was also going to school. Ten minutes later, he reached the school. He signed the attendance logbook at the office of the Head Teacher
and then prepared his lesson for the day's classes. Later, he proceeded to the playground to attend flag ceremony with his class,
consisting of fifty students. Afterwards, he returned to the classroom for morning classes. Sheryl and the two other girls were present in
school at that time. Lunch break came at 11:45, then classes resumed at 1:00 in the afternoon. Sheryl and her two classmates also
attended the afternoon classes. Classes ended at 4:30 or 4:45 in the afternoon.
Accused Cabigting avers that he has been a teacher for 23 years in Malolos, Bulacan, and in Bayabas, Norzagaray, Bulacan and that
he has never been charged with any offense. He does not know of any reason why his student, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, would testify
falsely and impute such a crime against him.
Teresita Lo, head teacher of Tigbe Elementary School, testified that accused Cabigting signed in the attendance logbook at 7:15 in the
morning of November 23, 1995.14
Janette C. Gojo Cruz and Zemonette C. Valenzuela testified that they went to the house of accused Cabigting at around 7:00 in the
morning of November 23, 1995.15 Janet stated that while she was cleaning the front yard of the house with Zemonette, accused
Cabigting was cleaning the pigpen.16
Michael Bayumbong, another student of accused Cabigting, testified that he, together with Jonjon Hernandez and Ronald Hernandez,
accompanied Sheryl, Janet and Zemonette to the house of accused Cabigting on November 23, 1995, at around 7:00 in the morning.
The three boys stayed in the backyard near the pigpen of the house to pick up dried leaves and plastics. Thereafter, they left for school,
leaving Sheryl, Janet and Zemonette behind.17
On October 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision,18 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, this Court finds accused LIBERATO S. CABIGTING guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the victim,
Sheryl de Ocampo, in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED.
"Malolos, Bulacan, 3 October 1997.
"RENATO C. FRANCISCO
Presiding Judge"19
Hence, this appeal.20
Accused-appellant Cabigting questions the credibility of Sheryl M. de Ocampo, citing inconsistencies in her statements and lack of
evidence to support her assertions.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is settled doctrine that evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court is accorded great respect by this Court because the trial
court is in the advantageous position of personally observing the demeanor of witnesses. Absent any showing that certain facts of
substance and significance have been plainly overlooked or that the trial court's findings are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached
by the trial court must be respected.21
Accused-appellant contends that Sheryl was inconsistent regarding the actual time when the rape took place. According to Sheryl, she
went to the house of accused-appellant Cabigting at around 8:00 in the morning of November 23, 1995. However, her classmates
testified that they went there at around 7:00 in the morning.
The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape and it has no bearing on its commission.22 The
important thing is, it was established that Sheryl went to the house of accused-appellant on the date reported and this allegation was
corroborated by the classmates of Sheryl who went there with her.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim does not necessarily render such testimony incredible. In fact, minor inconsistencies
strengthen the credibility of the witness and the testimony, because of a showing that such charges are not fabricated. What is decisive
in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive identification of the accused as the malefactor.23
Accused-appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the occurrence of carnal
knowledge of the victim. Medical findings were inconclusive as to the finding of rape. No sign of violence or any form of injury was
detected on the body of the victim.
However, it is undisputed that the victim underwent medical examination five days after the incident, by which time, any form of slight
contusion in the vaginal canal may have healed already. The absence of any external sign or physical injury does not necessarily
negate the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element of that crime.24 Lack of lacerated wounds does not negate
sexual intercourse.25 Even the slightest touching of the female genitalia, or mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge.26
Moreover, when a woman, in this case a girl barely in her teens, says she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to
show that she has been raped, provided her testimony is credible.27 It is highly inconceivable that a young girl of eleven years would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial,
if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.28
Accused-appellant contends that any incident occurring within the house would have been noticed by the classmates of the victim, who
were just outside the house at that time.
The fact that Sheryl's friends were outside the house and she was inside the house does not remove the possibility for the rape to
occur. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a
house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, for lust is no
respecter of time and place.29
At least four children, excluding Sheryl M. de Ocampo, confirmed that accused-appellant was at home that morning of November 23,
1993. Mere denial cannot overcome such positive testimony.1wphi1
Although accused-appellant presented the head teacher in charge of the attendance logbook to declare that she saw accused-
appellant signing in the logbook at 7:15 that morning, said witness could not account for the time of accused-appellant afterwards.
With the positive testimony of the victim, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, accused-appellant is liable for rape under Article 335 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code, in effect at the time the crime was committed, for the carnal knowledge of a girl under twelve years of age.
Regarding the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, the Court notes that the trial court awarded moral damages in favor of the
victim and failed to award civil indemnity. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than
the fact of the commission of the offense and is separate and distinct from moral damages.30 Hence, in addition to the fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) awarded as moral damages, accused-appellant must be sentenced to pay an additional amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
The award for exemplary damages is deleted as no aggravating circumstance has been proved to have attended the commission of the
crime.31 Exemplary damages, under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, may be imposed only when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.32
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, convicting Liberato
Cabigting y Sarmiento of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with the modification that he shall indemnify the victim, Sheryl
M. de Ocampo, in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity, not as exemplary damages, and fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, and costs.
SO ORDERED.

11.
G.R. No. 148144 April 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO CADAMPOG, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 7823-96, finding the
appellant Florencio Cadampog guilty of rape committed against complainant Prudencia Lasara,2 and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as actual damages.
The Information filed against the appellant reads:
That on or about the 14th day of January 1996, in the afternoon, at Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag,
Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused prompted by
lewd design entered the house of Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA LAZARA and accused remove also his pants and have sexual intercourse with
the latter against her will, to the damage and prejudice of PRUDENCIA LAZARA in such amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659.3
Upon arraignment on April 10, 1996, the appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Trial
thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution5
The spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara were farmers who lived in Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag,
Bukidnon. Felipe was 41, while Prudencia was 33. They had four children, namely, seven-year-old Jimmymar, six-year-old Jaypee, five-
year-old Gemma and one-year-old Jovilyn.6
At about 12:30 p.m. on January 14, 1996, a Sunday, Felipe with his brother-in-law Paul, and his friends Berting and Dodoy, went to the
neighboring Barangay Dagumbaan to attend the festivities, as it was the eve of the fiesta.7 Prudencia was left alone in the house with
her young children.
At around 2:30 p.m. of the same day, Prudencia heard the voice of a man asking her two children, who were then playing downstairs,
where she was. The children replied that their mother was upstairs. Momentarily, she heard footsteps going up the house. Suddenly,
the person, who turned out to be the appellant Florencio Cadampog, their neighbor and her husbands friend, rushed towards her.8 The
appellant immediately grabbed her by the arm and hooked his other arm around her neck. She maneuvered to back away but the
appellant started kissing her. She wanted to shout, but relented when she noticed that the appellant had a sheathed bolo dangling at
his waist. Nevertheless, she struggled and vigorously resisted his advances, to no avail. The appellant pushed her against a wall,
stripped her of her panties, causing her to be thrown off-balance. Prudencia fell on a bench, astride and supinely flat on her back. The
appellant then unzipped his trousers, pulled out his erect penis and inserted it into her vagina. He then made push-and-pull
movements. Prudencia continued resisting the bestial assault on her. The appellant retaliated and scratched her face and
neck.9 Prudencia managed to push the appellant away, causing him to withdraw his penis and ejaculate outside.10 The appellants lust
deflated when his semen splattered all over Prudencias upper thigh.11 The appellant dressed himself and warned Prudencia to keep
the incident to herself, otherwise, he would kill her.12 The appellant then left.
Prudencia immediately proceeded to the barangay secretary and the barangay captain, Mrs. Raguro. She reported the incident to
them. The barangay captain told Prudencia that there would be a settlement at 2:00 p.m, but the latter did not agree. She then returned
home.13 Back home, she hid her husbands bolo in a safe place, and thereafter, patiently waited for her husband to return.14
When Felipe arrived home at around 11:00 p.m., Prudencia told him that the appellant had raped her.15 Felipe was so enraged that his
initial reaction was to look for and kill the appellant, but he relented when he realized that he had no right to take the law into his own
hands.16
The following morning, January 15, 1996, Prudencia reported the incident to the police17 and gave a sworn statement. Dr. Venus
Tagarda of the Maramag District Hospital examined her and issued a Medical Certificate with the following findings:
PROGNOSIS/FINDINGS - Linear abrasions left zygomatic
- Multiple linear abrasion to upper part of anterior chest and neck
OPERATION PERFORMED - Introitus-multiparous
REMARKS - Sperm identification: Vagina smear done -
negative for spermatozoa
slide I, slide II18
Dr. Tagarda testified that there were no traces of semen found in the offended partys vagina due to the intervening period from the date
of the rape and the physical examination. The linear abrasion located at the complainants left cheekbone, and the multiple abrasions
on her chest and neck could have been caused by sharp objects such as fingernails or other sharp instruments.19
The Case for the Appellant20
The accused denied the charge. He interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he lived with his wife, Liza, and their four children
in Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon. They resided in a house built on a farmland owned by Constancio
Paragoso, roughly 500 meters from where the spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara lived.21 On January 14, 1996, the accused, along
with his wife and eldest daughter, Lady Rose, were at the farmlands grassland all day long, cutting cogon grasses to be used for
Paragosos house roofing. They started working from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. without let up, except for a short lunch break. He
chopped firewood upon returning to the house.22 The following day, at around 11:00 p.m., lawmen came to his house and arrested him.
He was brought to the municipal jail and there he learned of the charge for the first time.23
The appellant claimed that the charge was merely Prudencias concoction because he refused to be a witness against a certain Romeo
Alinas, against whom Prudencia had contemplated filing a criminal charge for rape.24 The appellant recalled having a meeting with the
spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara at their place days before January 14, 1994, where Prudencia asked him to testify in her behalf.
For his refusal to do so, he ended up in jail.25
The appellants wife, Liza, corroborated his story, claiming that her husband was with her and their daughter, Lady Rose, cutting cogon
grasses in Paragosos farmland the whole day of January 14, 1996. Her husband never left the place.26 Liza recalled that after the
alleged rape, she went to Prudencia, they being close friends, and requested her to withdraw the case. Prudencia however, refused to
agree unless given P80,000.27
Constancio Paragoso, a septuagenarian farmer, also corroborated the appellants alibi. He testified that he hired the accused and his
wife to cut cogon grasses for the roofing of his house and paid them P1.00 per bundle. He claimed to be with them. He also vouched
for the appellant, claiming that the latter was present at the cogonal area during the whole day of January 14, 1996.28
On January 12, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of rape. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this court, for the foregoing reasons, finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple
rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and pursuant thereto is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua together will all the accessory penalties included thereunder and to pay the offended party the
sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00.
By virtue of this conviction and pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 114 of [the] 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure the accused shall
continue to be under detention even if the accused should appeal this decision to the proper appellate court. However, the
accused shall be entitled to the full credit for the period he is detained pursuant to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and
subject to the restriction and limitation therein imposed.
SO ORDERED.29
The accused, now the appellant, contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE COMMITTED THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHEN THE INFORMATION WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE. 30
The appellant asserts that the Information against him does not charge him of rape because it does not allege one of its elements, i.e,
force or intimidation. He argues that the Information is void. Even if the prosecution was able to prove that he forced Prudencia to have
sexual intercourse with him, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged; otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of
the charge against him and to prepare for his defense.31
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the Information is not defective; neither is it void. It argues that although
the Information does not specifically allege that the appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the victim with the use of
force, threats or intimidation; nonetheless, it alleges that the appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the victim after first
wrestling with her and against her will, viz:
Appellant argues that the information is defective since it failed to allege that [the] appellant raped the victim with the use of
force and/or intimidation (Appellants Brief, p. 4).
Appellants claim is bereft of merit.
Contrary to [the] appellants claim, a perusal of the information shows that force was alleged therein.
As stated in the information "the above-named accused prompted by lewd design entered the house of Prudencia Lazara and once
inside, did then and there, unlawfully and criminally wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA LAZARA and, accused remove also
his pants and have sexual intercourse with the latter against her will."
An information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. [Sta. Rita vs. CA, 247 SCRA 484 (1995)].
In the case at bar, the failure of the information to state that [the] appellant raped Prudencia "through force and intimidation" was not a
fatal omission nor did it make the information defective since the word "wrestle" was used in lieu of the word "force".
"Force" is defined as power, violence, or constraint exerted upon or against a person. It is used to show that an unlawful or wrongful
action is meant (Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing Co., Minnesota, 1979, page 644).
"Wrestle," on the other hand, is to engage in a violent or determined purposive struggle to overcome an opposing force (Webster[s]
Third New International Dictionary, Massachusetts, 1993, page 2640).
In the case at bar, although the word "force" was not used in the information, the prosecution used the word "wrestle" instead. Thus, it is
respectfully submitted that the word "wrestle" synonymously connotes the use of force in the commission of the offense.
Moreover, the use of the phrase "against her will" in the information also implies that the rape was committed with force. 32
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure re-enacted Section 6, Rule 110 of the old Rules, thus:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of Information - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)
The Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
What is required is that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. Thus, Rule 110, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
In the case at bar, the appellant is charged with rape through force, threats or intimidation under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent.33 We have reviewed the
Information34 and found that it contains all the elements of rape defined in Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The Information against the appellant is quoted, viz:
INFORMATION
That on or about the 14th day of January 1996, in the afternoon, at Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag,
Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused prompted by
lewd design entered the house of Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA LAZARA and accused remove also his pants and have sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will, to the damage and prejudice of PRUDENCIA LAZARA in such amount as may be
allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659.35
Although the Information does not allege that the appellant used force, threat or intimidation in having sexual intercourse with the
victim, it alleges that the appellant "criminally wrestled" with the private complainant and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her against her will. The import of such allegations is that the appellant used physical force and intimidation in having carnal
knowledge of her. To wrestle is to contend by grappling with and striving to trip or throw down an opponent; or to combat or overcome
an opposing tendency or force, or an antagonistic person or group; or to engage in or as if in a violent or determined purposive
struggle. It applies to a struggling for mastery by the use, mainly or solely of dexterous holds with the hands, arms or legs. 36
The appellants submission that the Information does not sufficiently charge him of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code or that the Information is defective is but an afterthought. The appellant never filed a motion to quash the Information or a
motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 10 of the Rules of Court before his arraignment. He was arraigned, assisted by
counsel, and after the Information was read and explained to him in a language or dialect known to him, he entered a plea of not guilty.
There was no complaint from the appellant, before he entered his plea, that the Information was defective and that he did not
understand the charge against him. The appellant is, thus, deemed to have waived whatever objections as to form or substance in the
Information.37 As the Court ruled in People v. Flores:38
If the complaint against the accused-appellant was afflicted by the vice of vagueness, his remedy is to file a motion for bill of
particulars. The record reveals that [the] accused-appellant did not ask for a bill of particulars in accordance with section 10,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The failure to move for specifications or the quashal of the information on any of the grounds
provided for in the Rules of Court deprives [the] accused of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced
and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite
crime. It is too late in the day for [the] accused-appellant to raise this issue now because objections as to matters of form and
substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.39
Although the appellant failed to raise, as an issue, the matter of whether the prosecution was able to prove his guilt for the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt, we reviewed the records to ascertain whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove the crime charged to avert a miscarriage of justice. It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct any errors as may be found
in the appealed judgement, whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of errors.40 We are convinced that, indeed, the
prosecution discharged its burden.
The private complainant vividly recounted before the trial court how the appellant bestially ravished her. She positively identified the
appellant as the rouge who raped her on January 14, 1996.41 She testified as follows:
...
PROS. CHING:
Q And then what did he do when he was inside your house together with your infant baby (sic)?
A He immediately held me and embraced me.
Q And then when he embraced you what was your position?
A He kept on kissing me.42
...
Q Then after the accused held your right arm and encircled his right arm on the (sic) neck, what then did he do to you? or what
did he do with (sic) your face?
A He kept on kissing my face.43
...
Q Were you able to successfully resist?
A I kept on moving backward so that my face could not touch his face.
Q Then because you were trying to avoid his advances on kissing you, what then immediately happened to you? What
position did you have because of the attack?
A I was able to lean on the wall and bench.44
...
Q In that position, what then did he do to you?
A He removed my panty.45
...
Q Now, when he removed your panty, did you not resist?
A I was afraid to resist because he was carrying with him a bolo. He had a bolo.
Q Where was the bolo at that precise time?
A On the side of his body.
Q Did it have a scabbard?
A Yes.
Q And you mean the bolo was strung around the waist of the accused Florencio Cadampog?
A Yes.
Q Then you said your panty was removed, what then did the accused do next?
A He unzipped the zipper of his pants and he pulled out his penis.
Q When he pulled out his penis, what did you notice? You are a married woman, you should know. Was it erect or not?
A Yes, it was erect.
Q And then after he opened his zipper and pulled out his erect penis, what then did he do next?
A He inserted his penis to my vagina.46
COURT:
...
Q Did you resist his advances?
A I resisted, that is why he scratched my face.47
...
PROS. CHING:
Q You said that he scratched your face. Did you suffer any injury on your face?
A Yes.
Q What part of your body was scratched?
A Here.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the left side of her face, the neck and the chest.48
...
PROS. CHING:
Q In that position, when he inserted his penis into your vagina, did you not resist him?
A I kept on resisting.
Q But he was able to penetrate your vagina?
A Yes.
Q And when his penis was already inserted into your vagina, what then did he do?
A He made a push and pull movement of his buttocks. He made a pumping motion of his buttocks.
COURT:
Q How about you, what was your reaction when he kept on pumping?
A I was afraid.
Q Did you come to like it?
A No, Sir.
PROS. CHING:
Q Now, when he had that pumping motion at that time, the accused had sexual intercourse with you, what then did you do?
A I suddenly pushed him away.
Q And what happened after you pushed him away?
A He was pushed away from me.
Q And what happened to his penis when you pushed him?
A It was withdrawn from my vagina.
Q When it was withdrawn from your vagina, what happened next?
A He had an ejaculation.
Q How do you know that he had an ejaculation when the penis was pulled out from your vagina?
A Because it spurted towards my upper thigh.
Q Then when the penis was pulled out and the accused had an ejaculation and spurted spermatozoa (sic) in your thigh, what
did he do next?
A He then left our own house.49
The linear abrasion on Prudencias left cheekbone, and the multiple abrasions on her chest and neck were eloquent testimonies of the
force employed by the appellant. In rape case, the physical evidence showing use of force speaks louder than words.50 It bears
stressing that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, sufficient basis exist to warrant a conclusion
that the essential requisite of carnal knowledge has thereby been established.51
It has been held that the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance as tending to
establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.52 Thus, further strengthening this Courts conviction that the appellant is guilty of
raping Prudencia is the fact that she wasted no time in reporting her ordeal to the authorities. As we have held in the case of People v.
Grefiel:53
[D]espite the outrage and shame, she lost no time in reporting the incident to the barangay captain. In less than twelve (12)
hours from the commission of the crime, she narrated the sordid details of her horrifying and harrowing experience in a
statement given to the police authorities, submitted to a medical examination and signed a criminal complaint for forcible
abduction with rape against the accused-appellant. Not only did these acts demonstrate courage of the highest order, they
also enhance the complainant's credibility. It has been repeatedly said by this Court that when a woman admits that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed; if her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof ...54
Thus, the veracity of Prudencias testimony cannot be doubted. In People v. Jaca,55 we said:
The credibility of the victim is further strengthened by the spontaneity of her act immediately after the incident. We note her
courage in reporting the rape, unmindful of what the incident could do on her reputation in their barrio. We fully concur with the
opinion of the lower court, viz:
"The fact that, the offended party, after the beastly attack, immediately left her house to report the molestation against
her honor, is a clear manifestation that she was indeed raped. ...
Her immediate response (reporting the incident) carries the stamp of truth. This is a natural reaction of a virtuous woman who
had just undergone sexual molestation against her will."56
The appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of the private complainant is absurd. The appellant alleged that he was charged with
rape because of his refusal to testify in Prudencias behalf against a certain Romeo Alinas, who is Prudencias alleged real rapist. This
reason posited by the appellant is too chimerical. Prudencia does not need the appellant, much less his testimony. She could have
charged Romeo Alinas of rape with dispatch if he, not the appellant, was the culprit. She did not do so.
Anent the appellants assertion that Prudencia demanded P80,000 from his wife in consideration of Prudencias desistance from
charging him with rape, the latter offered no evidence to prove his allegation other than the bare claim of his wife, Liza. Besides, the
evidence shows that it was Liza who approached Prudencia, not the other way around.
The Court does not see how Prudencia, a married woman, and mother of four children, could demean her womanhood, risk public
censure, and expose herself to the rigors, embarrassments and headaches of a public trial, if her motive was other than to secure
justice. As aptly pointed out in People v. Dagami57
[A] married woman with a husband and three daughters would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused
unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case why a mother of four would concoct a story of defloration, allow
the examination of her private parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were other than to
fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her. Pertinently, it stands to reason that Visitacion would not
bring herself, her family and her husband to embarrassment, to public scrutiny and being the talk of the community unless
what she had testified that she was raped is true. It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime,
the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.58
It bears stressing that when it comes to the issue of credibility, the trial court judge is in the best position to rule on the matter,
considering that he has the vantage point of observing first hand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses. In the absence of
proof that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the case, as in the
case at bar, its appreciation of the credibility of witnesses will not be altered on review.
The appellants defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration, in view of Prudencias positive identification of the appellant
as the one who defiled her, coupled with Dr. Tagardes testimony and medical findings.
The appellants denial of the charge against him is futile, in light of Prudencias positive testimony that he raped her on January 14,
1996. Denial is inherently a weak defense. It cannot prevail over positive identification, unless buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability.59
The appellants defense of alibi must also fail. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by the victim.60 Prudencia has positively identified the appellant as the one responsible for the
assault on her chastity.61 His alibi cannot, thus, exculpate him from liability.
In addition to the positive identification made by Prudencia, the appellants alibi placed him within the periphery of the locus criminis. In
order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the offense was committed;
it must, likewise, be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.62 In People v. Bracamonte,63 we said
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is a
plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good
defense. But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would
have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission,
the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of
no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.64
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 765965 reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The trial court is mandated to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua regardless of any attendant generic aggravating circumstance
as provided for in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, generic aggravating circumstances may be appreciated as basis for an award of exemplary damages, in line with
prevailing case law.66 In this case, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant because the appellant raped the victim in her
house.67 Hence, the victim is entitled to an award of exemplary damages.
While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, it failed to award civil indemnity to the victim. The
award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000 to a rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of rape.68 Civil indemnity is distinct from
and must not be denominated as moral damages, which are based on different jural foundations.69 The victim is entitled to P25,000 as
exemplary damages.70
The trial courts award of P10,000 as actual damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To seek recovery of actual damages, it
is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party.71 The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts.72
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 9, convicting appellant
Florencio Cadampog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant is directed to pay the victim Prudencia Lasara the amount of P50,000 as
civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and, P25,000 as exemplary damages. The award of P10,000 as actual damages is deleted
for lack of proof thereof.

12.
[G.R. No. 142740. August 6, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated January 3, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
42,631-99. Appellant ROBERTO TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Appellant was charged in an information[2] containing the following allegations:
The undersigned, at the instance of the offended party HAPPYLEN ORTEGA Y RIOS, whose affidavit hereto attached and form part of
this Information accuses the above-named accused of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE, under Art. 335, Par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to R.A. 7610 and R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313 it being a heinous offense, committed as follows:
That on or about February 18, 1999, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the complainant HAPPYLEN ORTEGA Y RIOS, who is six (6) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by counsel on arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented five
witnesses, namely private complainant Happylen Ortega, her mother Lady Lewin Ortega, security guard George Amigable, Ms.
Benaranda V. Orosco, and Dr. Samuel Cruz.
Complainant HAPPYLEN[3] ORTEGA testified[4] that on February 18, 1999, while on her way to the house of an Uncle George, she
noticed appellant Roberto Tampos staring at her. She knew Tampos and even knew where he lived. [5] Appellant suddenly pulled her by
the right wrist and, using his two hands, lifted and carried her. Appellant brought her to an unlighted area at the back of Almendras Gym
where a junked ambulance[6] was parked. Appellant then forced complainant to lie on the plywood flooring and proceeded to remove her
short pants. She was not wearing any panty at that time. Appellant then removed his own short pants and brief. It was then that she
was raped.[7] While placing himself on top of Happylen, appellants erect penis was placed in her vagina. Complainant illustrated this by
thrusting her right forefinger towards a circle formed by the fingers of her other hand.[8]
According to Happylen, appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. He warned her not to tell her parents about
what he did, otherwise, appellant would kill her.[9]Appellant then stood up to urinate and it was then that the guard on duty at the
Almendras gym apprehended him. At first, Happylen did not tell her mother about what happened but eventually had to since her Auntie
Betty and two of the latters children saw her and they had already related the incident to her mother. Her mother accompanied her to
the police where she executed an affidavit detailing what had happened. They also went to the doctor where Happylen submitted
herself to a medical examination.
During cross-examination, complainant testified that appellants penis did not penetrate her organ. [10] On re-direct, however, she
said that there was actual contact of the penis and her vagina. [11] When asked to point to the part of her body that was touched by the
penis, complainant pointed to a part a little above the vagina.
On query by the court, however, Happylen clarified that appellants organ did not pass her vagina but only its lower portion. She
stated that it was not on the middle but on the lower portion or on the lower tip of the vagina. [12]
GEORGE AMIGABLE[13] was the security guard on duty at the Almendras Gym when the incident occurred. He testified that on
February 18, 1999, at past 7:00 p.m., while he was roving around the compound of Almendras Gym, two women reported to him that a
child was being raped in the junked ambulance. He rushed to said place and found appellant and complainant both standing up. The
witness saw appellant putting his shirt on.[14] He then asked the appellant and the child their names which they promptly gave him. The
girl appeared to be normal but then she cried when she told him that appellant had raped her. [15] He held appellant at once, to prevent
him from running away. The other security guard on duty assisted him. He turned over custody of appellant to PO3 Romeo Autor, [16] a
policeman living nearby. Thereafter, the girls parents arrived.
Complainants mother, LADY LEWIN[17] ORTEGA[18] testified that her daughter was only six years and nine months at the time of
the incident. She presented Happylens Birth Certificate, [19] indicating that the child was born on July 4, 1992. Mrs. Ortega knew
appellant because he had been a neighbor for three months. [20] The children in the area were likewise familiar with appellant since he
used to hang out in the vicinity of the chapel where the children usually played.[21]
A witness told Mrs. Ortega about the rape. Later on, Happylen also told her about it. [22] The child was crying while relating to her
what she suffered at the hands of appellant. [23] Mrs. Ortega then assisted her daughter in filing a complaint with the police and
accompanied her to the doctor for physical examination.
BENARANDA[24] V. OROSCO[25] also testified for the prosecution. On the date and time in question, she was asked by one
Beatriz[26] Danuco to accompany the latter to the Almendras Gym. Betty said her son Marvin told her there was a little girl at the gym
and a man was doing something bad to her.[27] Upon reaching the back of the gym, and from a distance of about 4-5 meters, they saw
appellant Roberto Tampos. The witness demonstrated how appellant was bending up and down. [28] She did not actually see the child at
that time because it was dark. [29]Thereafter, a security guard arrived and she went home. When she returned to the gym, appellant was
already being held by the security guard and surrounded by many people. It was only then that she saw Happylen.
Dr. SAMUEL CRUZ[30] testified that he conducted the physical/medical examination of complainant on February 19, 1999 or a day
after the incident. His findings were reduced to writing as follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping. Fourchette, tense. Vestibule, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, thick, tall, intact.
Hymenal orifice, annular, 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and rugosities, cant be reached by examining finger.
CONCLUSIONS:
1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2.) Hymen, intact and its orifice, small as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized male organ in erection without causing
hymenal injury.
REMARKS: Semenology: Positive for Spermatozoa[31]
According to Dr. Cruz, his findings indicated that no male organ had penetrated the childs vagina, otherwise, hymenal lacerations
would have been present.[32] However, he stated that this would not negate the possibility of partial penetration or of contact between
the penis and the vagina. Further, Dr. Cruz testified that he took a sample from the opening of the vagina by dabbing a cotton swab
therein. Upon laboratory examination[33] of the sample conducted by a medical technologist, it was found to be positive for spermatozoa.
The lone testimony of the appellant was presented in his defense.
ROBERTO TAMPOS[34] testified that he did not know complainants name, but he recognized her only by face. He admitted that he
was with complainant at around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of February 18, 1999. [35] He saw her playing on the road leading to the back of
Almendras Gym at around 6:00 p.m., while he was on his way to the house of his foreman. [36] He said he was a bit drunk at the time.
[37]
He brought her to the back of Almendras Gym, made her sit on a plywood near the junk vehicle and gave her P1.00.[38] People were
passing by at the time. He placed the girl on his lap and in the process touched her side. He admitted that he intended to touch the girl
and then masturbate, which was what actually happened. He slipped his penis out at the side of his brief and shorts. Appellant denied
removing Happylens shorts but said he only lowered them. [39] He then saw the girls vagina but denied that he ever touched it. He did
not place himself on top of the girl when he masturbated. He only knelt beside her while Happylen lay on the plywood. He touched the
girls thigh but not her private parts. As he was ejaculating, he actually touched Happylens hips. He directed his semen above the hips
of the girl.[40] Nothing more happened after that. He then left the girl behind and went home. However, he was immediately apprehended
by the security guard of Almendras Gym, brought to the guards office, and taken to the barangay captain.
After trial, the RTC rendered its assailed decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged, accused ROBERTO TAMPOS is sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to Lady Lewin Ortega, another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity together
with all accessory penalties as provided for by law. (PP vs. Romeo Ambray y Luterio GR 127177 promulgated on February 25, 1999;
PP vs. Melanio Bolatete y Melon GR 127570 promulgated on February 25, 1999).
SO ORDERED.[41]
Aggrieved, appellant interposed the present appeal, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE NOTWITHSTANDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHILD HERSELF THAT THE ACCUSED PENIS (sic) DID
NOT GO INSIDE HER VAGINA BUT MERELY ON HER NAVEL, ABOVE HER VAGINA AND THE LOWER PORTION OF
HER VAGINA.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT
HE MERELY MASTURBATED AND THIS FACT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE MEDICAL FINDINGS ON THE PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE GIRL RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT AS WELL AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION. [42]
More specifically, the issues are: (1) whether appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant; and (2) whether the penalty
imposed on appellant is appropriate.
Appellant is charged of STATUTORY RAPE under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The two elements of
statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. [43] Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code is now in Article 266-A, par. 1-d, in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. 8353. Statutory rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under par. d, when the offended party is under 12 years of age.
In this case, the victims age is undisputed. She is below 12 years old. Her Birth Certificate shows that she was born on July 4,
1992. Thus, on February 18, 1999, Happylen was exactly six (6) years, seven (7) months and fourteen (14) days old. Her mother
confirmed this in open court. Hence, the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to prove carnal knowledge between appellant and
Happylen beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant submits that, assuming arguendo that Happylens testimony were true, he could not be convicted of rape but only acts of
lasciviousness. He insists that there was no penetration of the vagina. He points out that the medical findings show that the hymen was
intact and, had there been penetration, hymenal lacerations would have been present. Appellant contends that the acts described do
not constitute carnal knowledge as the essential element of rape. He sticks to his claim that he merely masturbated. He adds that he
only held on to the hips of complainant at that time, without touching her private parts.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General argues for the affirmation of the trial courts judgment finding appellant guilty of
rape. However, the OSG recommends that the penalty of death be imposed on appellant instead of reclusion perpetua only.
Considering the evidence on record, we are one with the trial court in giving credence to the testimonies of the complainant and
the other prosecution witnesses. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect on appeal, for it
had the opportunity to closely observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. [44] The trial court found that the
complainant acted without malice in reporting the alleged abuses of accused on her person. In contrast, according to the trial court,
appellants unsubstantiated and self-serving denial could not hold up against the positive declaration and frank manner by which the
victim recounted her ordeal.[45] A careful scrutiny of the records leads us to the same conclusion, that the prosecution witnesses and
their testimonies are logical and more credible than that of the defense. We have no hesitation in rejecting the testimony of the
appellant for being less than candid and truthful.
Instructive is complainants testimony, which we find worth excerpting, to detail what appellant did to her:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
xxx
Q: Now, Hapilyn Ortega, tell the court, how did he rape you?
A: He placed his organ to me. (witness demonstrating her right forefinger thrusting it towards the circle of her other finger as
if penetrating inside).
Q: What was the position of the accused when he inserted his penis to your private part?
A: His penis erected.
Q: Precisely, was he on top of you at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Going back to the testimony, that his penis (sic) the accused inserted his penis to your vagina, in the course of sexual
contact made to you by the accused, what did you feel if any, coming from the penis of the accused?
A: I cried.
Q: The question is what did you observe if any, coming from the penis of the accused?
A: None.
xxx
CROSS EXAMINATION
Q: You testified that earlier, that you were raped by the accused by placing his organ to your organ, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was the penis of the accused able to penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, when he (sic) accused removed your shortpants, what did the accused do with his penis?
A: He let it out.
Q: Did he hold his penis? Did he push and pull it with his hands?
A: No.
xxx
RE-DIRECT
Q: Hapilyn Ortega, you said the organ of the accused did not penetrate your organ, do you mean to say that there was an
actual contact of the penis in your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
RE-CROSS
Q: Can you point out to this court, what portion is that which was touched by the penis of the accused?
A: (witness pointing to her vagina).
xxx
COURT:
Q: Hapilyn Ortega, you testified before, you are pointing in your finger like this, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are referring to the one of your finger like this, as the organ of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the one you are forming in your finger a ring symbolizes your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when the accused raped you, is it that his organ passes to your vagina?
A: No.
Q: Where is that part in your vagina here in your circle that the penis of the accused was pointed?
A: To the lower portion.
Q: It did not go inside here?
A: Yes, not on the middle but on the lower portion.
Q: Where in this vagina where the penis of accused penetrated?
A: Lower portion.
Q: Only on the lower tip of the vagina?
A: Yes sir.[46]
From the foregoing, we resolve the crucial issue: Did the acts described above constitute the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge in a case of rape?
In People v. Lerio,[47] we stated:
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured (6 WORDS AND PHRASES 273 citing Walker v. State,
273 S.W. 2d 707, 711, 197 Tenn. 452). The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the mans penis merely enters the labia
or lips of the female organ (People vs. Cabebe, G.R. No. 125910, May 21, 1998) or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of
the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act. (People v. De la Pea, 233 SCRA 573 cited in People v.
Castromero, 280 SCRA 421.)
Appellants counsel, in his brief, admits that the foregoing testimony of Happylen clearly demonstrated that appellants penis,
indeed, touched the victims vagina.[48] However, he contends that, much like the case of People v. Campuhan,[49] the touching was
merely an epidermal contact or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina or the mons pubis. To
bolster defense counsels claim that there was no penetration, he cites the result of the medical examination that shows no extragenital
injury and no hymenal lacerations.
Complainant herself testified that there was no penetration of her organ. However, she indicated at least two areas where the
penis of the appellant touched her vagina: (1) the one she pointed to above her vagina; and (2) the lower portion or lower tip of the
vagina. But even if we consider only the second spot, the lower portion or tip of her vagina, which she categorically indicated during
counsels examination and upon inquiry by the court, in our view, sexual contact has been indubitably established. That appellants penis
only touched the lower tip of the victims vagina without any resulting external genital injury or laceration of the hymen would not
preclude a finding of rape.
In several cases, we have held that rupture of the hymen or vaginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be consummated.
[50]
An intact hymen does not negate a finding that the victim was raped. To commit the crime of rape the rupture of the hymen is not
indispensable.[51]
Significantly, in a number of cases[52] we held that where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its
conclusion that the rape was nevertheless committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of
discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia majora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer
visible.[53]
Thus, contrary to appellants assertion, we are convinced that appellants penis came in contact with complainants vagina in a way
much more intense than mere epidermal contact or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis which the defense wants us to accept. The
victim felt pain in her sexual organ; [54] the doctor found both the labia majora and minora to be gaping.[55]These, in our view, are
external indicia of carnal knowledge.
As we stated in People v. Ayo:[56]
While it may be granted that penetration may not have been accomplished as the girls hymen was shown to have remained intact and
the orifice too small to preclude full penetration, jurisprudence recognizes that slight penetration of the labia by the male organ still
constitutes rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. Absence of hymenal
laceration does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. Mere touching, no matter how slight, of the labia
or lips of the female organ by the male genital, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is sufficient to consummate rape.
The presence of appellants spermatozoa in her genitalia, established by medical evidence, adds to the credibility of the
prosecutions stance that carnal knowledge did take place.
Jurisprudence requires that, to be considered consummated rape, an erect penis capable of penetration [57] must have touched, at
the very least, the area of the labia of the pudendum. In the present case, Happylen testified that contact was made on the lower tip of
her vagina. A six-year- old girl might have difficulty pinpointing which part of her vagina was actually touched. But Happylen had no
such difficulty. Clearly, there was sexual contact, for spermatozoa was found present in her vagina. The trial court is convinced as we
are that the lower tip of her vagina testified to by complainant as the point touched by appellants organ is the vaginal opening or the
area between the labia through which the semen (spermatozoa) traveled and therein found the following day when the gynecological
examination was performed.
Now, as to the imposable penalty in this case. The OSG contends that the trial court erred in imposing on appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The OSG argues that the offense committed is the heinous offense of child-rape, where the victim is less than
seven years old. Hence, the OSG recommends that the penalty should be death.
At the outset, we find that the appellant is being charged of STATUTORY RAPE as defined in Art. 335, Paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. This provision reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.[58]
The phrase under twelve years of age makes the offense STATUTORY RAPE as well understood in our jurisdiction. It is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty, under Art. 266-B, RPC, now. In our view, the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him would be violated if, as the OSG argues, we should convict him on the basis of a
provision of law, R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which imposes death. True, the information mentions confusedly Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7610, R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313, it being a heinous offense. Note that the information does not
mention R.A. 8353. The visible emphasis of the present charge, clearly, is on STATUTORY RAPE, which the Prosecutor spelled in
capital letters.
The Information first and foremost refers to the crime of rape defined in Paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
now Article 266-A, where the woman is under twelve years of age, which is statutory rape. It is this specific provision of the Code,
favorable in this context to the appellant that we should apply. To convict an accused of a higher or more serious offense than that
specifically charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an outright violation of his basic rights. [59] It is well
settled that an accused may only be convicted of a crime charged against him in the information or those necessarily included therein.
[60]
The information herein charging STATUTORY RAPE could not be validly converted to a charge of CHILD-RAPE. The latter charge
constitutes a greater offense punishable by death, quite distinct from statutory rape. Having been specifically arraigned on the charge of
STATUTORY RAPE, appellant could not after trial be held to answer for child-rape. To do so would raise infractions of due process and
other guarantees in favor of appellant, particularly his right to be informed, and not misinformed, of the offense charged.
Moreover, the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. [61] The OSGs prayer to increase
appellants culpability to a capital offense cannot, in our view, be granted now without also fracturing our present Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. For now, in Rule 110 made effective on December 1, 2000, [62] we find strict requirements for the State Prosecutor
to observe faithfully, thus:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The prosecution must avoid ambiguity, vagueness or uncertainty as to what offense is being charged. The allegation in the
information states that the appellant is being charged with the crime of STATUTORY RAPE, under Art. 335, Par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code. Mention of its relation to R.A. 7610, R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313 it being a heinous offense... need not confuse us. It should not now
appear that alternative offenses are charged, which could void the information. To forestall that eventuality, the charge should be read
as referring to statutory rape and no other kind. Given that charge, we agree with the trial courts imposition of reclusion perpetua as the
appropriate penalty on appellant. Prudence counsels us to avoid pronouncing a sentence of death where law and the evidence do not
clearly and indubitably call for it.
As to damages, civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000 are also properly awarded in favor of
private complainant, on the ground that victims of rape suffer psychological and moral injuries sufficient to justify the award, without
necessity of further proof.[63]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, is AFFIRMED. Appellant ROBERTO
TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN is declared GUILTY of statutory rape, and he is sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all its accessory
penalties. The appellant is likewise ordered to pay private complainant, Happylen Ortega, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages, together with the costs.
SO ORDERED.

13.
[G.R. No. 127128. August 15, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROEL MENDIGURIN Y CANLAS, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellant Roel Mendigurin challenges the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 74, convicting
him of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay P30,000 as moral damages.
The information under which appellant was charged states, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1992, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, have sexual intercourse with ELENA
SEBASTIAN and successfully did so by employing force, threat and intimidation on her person.
Contrary to law.[2]
In his arraignment on March 1, 1993, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty[3] and trial thereafter ensued.
Appellants conviction was principally based on the testimonies of complainant Elena Sebastian, her nephew Mark Figueroa who
allegedly witnessed the incident, and Dr. Louella Nario of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Also testifying for the prosecution
on peripheral matters were the elder sister of complainant, Edna Figueroa, and Dr. Remedios Puentespina.
Complainant Elena Sebastian, who was 19 years old on the date of the alleged rape, is a native of Pampanga. After her
elementary education, she moved in with her elder sister Edna Figueroa to the latters residence in 217 Gov. Pascual, Sipac, Navotas,
Metro Manila. Edna Figueroa is married to Salvador Figueroa, who happens to be the brother of Daisy Mendigurin, wife of appellant
herein. Appellants house is adjacent to the Figueroas. In fact the two houses are separated only by a concrete wall.
In her testimony,[4] complainant narrated that on June 15, 1992, she woke up at 5:00 a.m. to prepare breakfast for her brother-in-
law and his two children, who were then sleeping upstairs. As she unlocked the kitchen door leading outside to throw out water from the
rice pot, appellant suddenly pushed the door and barged in. To her surprise, appellant locked the door, and embraced and kissed her.
Startled by appellants sudden attack, she fell unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her abdomen and
noticed blood in her private part. At that moment, she saw appellant putting on his shorts with a smirk on his face. He threatened her
not to report the incident to anyone, or else he would kill her sister. He then left and complainant was unable to do anything but weep.
She went to the bathroom with a knife and attempted to commit suicide. Her fear, however, prevented her from doing so.
Complainant kept the incident to herself until September 26, 1992, when she was rushed to the hospital for slashing her wrist. It
was then that she divulged to her relatives the ordeal she suffered at the hands of appellant. On October 22, 1992, she filed a complaint
against appellant before the police authorities of Navotas, where she gave a written statement [5] relating the June 15, 1992 incident.
She was thereafter brought to the NBI for physical examination.
She further testified that due to her heart ailment, it was usual for her to lose consciousness whenever she felt frightened, as in
the past when her elder sister scolded her. On cross-examination, she said that at the time of the assault, she was unable to cry for
help to her relatives upstairs because she was so surprised. She also stated that it took her a long time to report the matter to the
authorities because of appellants threat to her and her fear that everybody would know about it.
To buttress complainants testimony, the prosecution also presented the testimony [6] of Mark Figueroa (Mark), complainants
nephew who also happens to be the godchild of appellant. He was then eleven years old at the time of the incident. He declared that at
around 5:30 a.m. of June 15, 1992, while descending the stairs, he saw appellant bare-buttocked on top of complainant on the kitchen
floor. Appellant immediately stood up, approached him and told him not to tell anybody what he just witnessed. At that instance, Mark
also saw complainant get up to dress up. Out of fear, he ran back upstairs and thereafter kept silent about the incident. It was only after
complainants confinement in the hospital that he volunteered to take the witness stand because he pitied his aunt. On cross-
examination, he recounted that before going down the stairs, he heard a soft outcry and an angry voice, which prompted him to go
down. He added that his aunt, upon getting up, went into the bathroom where he heard her crying.
Dr. Louella Nario, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who examined complainant, confirmed in her testimony[7] her findings as stated in
Living Case Report No. MG-92-858[8] which showed a healed deep laceration in complainants hymen. She further opined that the
laceration could have been effected three to four months before October 4, 1992, the date of the examination.
The prosecution also presented testimonial evidence to support complainants claim that it was common for her to lose
consciousness whenever she feels afraid. Edna Figueroa testified[9] that sometime in 1991, complainant fell unconscious when she
scolded the latter. In corroboration, Dr. Remedios Puentespina testified[10] on the medical history of complainant, who had consulted
her on three occasions since 1991. She stated that complainants frequent complaint since the first consultation was the latters
tendency to lose consciousness whenever she felt emotional stress. She testified, however, that based on the results of the
examinations previously conducted on complainant, she found nothing wrong with the latters heart.
Appellant Roel Mendigurin and his wife, Daisy Mendigurin, testified for the defense.
Roel Mendigurin took the witness stand and admitted engaging in sexual intercourse with complainant on June 15, 1992. He,
however, denied the rape charge and interposed the defense that he and complainant were lovers. In his testimony,[11] he stated that his
work as a batilyo[12] required him to leave the house before 7:00 p.m., and come home at past 3:00 a.m.He testified that from March
until sometime in September, 1992, he secretly maintained a sexual affair with complainant, who lived just next door. He recalled that
his first sexual intercourse with complainant was in the afternoon of March 1992 in the room of complainants elder sister. He testified
that it was on this occasion that he discovered that complainant was no longer a virgin. They had their sexual escapades usually in the
mornings, either in his house or in complainants house, whenever his wife was at work.
He narrated a different version of the incident. He stated that in the early morning of June 15, 1992, he arrived home from work
and was allowed entry by complainant into her sisters house. He walked into the kitchen, where they voluntarily engaged in sex.
Complainants nephew, Mark Figueroa, later came down from upstairs and saw them in the act of intercourse. At this instance, appellant
and complainant stood up. He went to the door, while complainant approached her nephew. He, thereafter, went home. He said that
contrary to complainants claim, she never lost consciousness while they were having sex. He also denied threatening Mark, asserting
instead that it was complainant who talked to the child.
To bolster his defense, he further testified that even after the date of the alleged rape, he and complainant continued with their
illicit sexual affair. In fact he recounted that on June 28, 1992, they again engaged in sex in the house of complainants parents in Apalit,
Pampanga, where appellant stayed overnight on the occasion of the town fiesta. He alleged that complainants shame for having been
caught by her nephew, who later spread the word about their sexual relations, must have moved her to accuse him of rape.
Daisy Mendigurin also testified[13] in defense of her husband, appellant herein. As a fish vendor, her usual routine was to leave
for work at 9:00 p.m., and to come home at 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. Most of the time, she was also away in the afternoon to sell more fish in
the market. Whenever she arrives home from work, she would often see her husband and complainant talking and teasing each other,
which caused her to suspect that they were having an affair. However, because she treated complainant as her sister, she kept silent
and waited for proof to confirm her suspicion. Eventually, in September, as complainant was rushed to the hospital for having slashed
her wrist, her husband talked to her and admitted the affair. As a natural reaction, she got mad and lost control of herself in rage.
In rebuttal, the prosecution recalled complainant to the witness stand, and also presented a new witness, complainants father,
Federico Sebastian.
Complainant Elena Sebastian in her testimony[14] on rebuttal denied appellants claim that she and appellant had an affair and that
what occurred on June 15, 1992 was consensual. She admitted that on June 28, 1992, appellant did stay overnight in her parents
house in Pampanga, but denied that they had any sexual contact. She clarified that although they both slept on the same floor of the
house, they were about ten feet apart from each other, in different rooms. At the time, she did not have the strength to report the rape
incident to her family because she was afraid of appellants threat.
Federico Sebastian testified[15] that on the night of June 28, 1992, while his daughter, his grandchildren and appellant were
asleep on the second floor of their house in Pampanga, he went up to check on them and noticed nothing unusual.
The trial court lent credence to the prosecutions version of the incident. Observing that complainant appeared to be the Maria
Clara type, it rejected appellants claim that the sexual intercourse that occurred on June 15, 1992 was out of an illicit affair. It concluded
that the medico-legal finding that the hymenal laceration of the complainant was about four months old strongly negated appellants
claim that they had had sexual contact as early as March of 1992. It further found that appellants act of sudden entry into the house and
pushing the victim to the door sufficed to be considered as an employment of force, threat, and intimidation to consummate the rape. [16]
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleges the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ELENA
SEBASTIAN.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
III
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED WAS INDEED GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE ALLEGATION FOUND IN THE INFORMATION THAT RAPE WAS
COMMITTED BY MEANS OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH IS NOT FOUND ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION.[17]
It is constitutionally mandated that the accused be accorded the presumption of innocence. The burden of proof rests on the State
to establish every circumstance which proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [18] This exacting standard of proof acquires more
relevance in rape charges which are easy to make but hard to prove and harder still to defend by the party accused who may be
innocent.[19] Thus, we have exhorted courts to keep in mind settled principles in the decision-making process: (1) to accuse a man of
rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult although the accused may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and that only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.[20]
On the other hand, it is the general rule that factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which could alter the result of the case. [21]
In the present case, however, a careful review of the evidence compels us to take exception to the aforesaid rule.
We have repeatedly stressed that the resolution of a rape case often hinges on the credibility of the victim. If her testimony does
not meet the test of credibility, the acquittal of the accused is inevitable.[22]
After thoroughly examining complainants testimony, along with the other evidence at hand, we find glaring inconsistencies therein
which constrain us to entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant. As principal evidence, the prosecution proffered the
testimony of complainant, who attested that she was raped while she was unconscious and that the only thing she could remember
upon regaining consciousness was seeing appellant putting on his shorts. Of equal significance is Mark Figueroas testimony, which the
prosecution presented as an eyewitness account of the incident, and which, upon a closer scrutiny, fails to corroborate complainants
testimony. Marks narration of what he saw that fateful morning of June 15, 1992 belies complainants claim that she was unconscious:
Q. You testified that sometime on June 15, 1992 between the hours of 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., when you woke up and while
descending the stairs you saw your uncle, who happens to be your godfather, on top of your Ate Lena is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Now, before you descended the stairs did you hear any outcry from downstairs coming from your Ate Lena?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You mean to say you heard your Ate Lena making a loud outcry?
A. Little bit soft, sir.
Q. But why did you descend from your upper house?
A. Because it[]s as if I heard something, sir.
Q. You heard murmur?
A. No sir.
Q. You heard what, what more did you hear?
A. I heard an angry voice, sir.
Q. Do you hear the words being uttered by someone whom you heard?
A. None sir.
Q. When you saw your uncle atop your Ate Lena, did you hear any outcry from your Ate Lena?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Was the cry loud?
A. No sir.
Q. And you testified that immediately your Ninong stood up[,] is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What if any did your Ate Lena do after your Ninong stood up?
A. She dressed up, sir.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
When you saw your godfather, the accused herein, on top of your Ate Lena, will you please tell the Honorable Court
whether at that time your Ate Lena was moving?
A. Yes sir.[24]
It is worth noting that Mark is related to both appellant and complainant. Considering this and the fact that he was only eleven years old
at the time he witnessed the incident, we give full weight to his testimony.
Moreover, we cannot help but notice that complainants testimony and affidavit failed to mention the presence of Mark during the
incident. When asked, she even denied knowledge as to when her nephew woke up that morning. [25] In comparison, except as to who
approached and talked to the child, appellants account on this point conforms with Marks testimony.[26]
In addition, complainants claim that she has a heart ailment which caused her to faint under extreme emotional condition was
unsupported by any medical finding. The prosecution only presented the testimony of Dr. Puentespina, who stated that the results of
the two examinations conducted on complainant both proved negative for any heart disorder. She testified that she only prescribed
medicines to calm her, as she observed complainant to be frequently emotional each time she consulted her.[27]
Complainants failure promptly to report her agonizing experience to the authorities, or at the very least to her family, despite all the
opportunities to do so, also seriously affects the veracity of her narration. [28] She stated that it took her four months before divulging the
incident because she feared appellants threat to kill her elder sister.[29] However, she admitted that she had many relatives living in the
same neighborhood where she resided.[30] She also admitted that just a week after the date of the alleged rape, she spent one week in
her familys home in Pampanga, away from the watchful eyes of appellant. [31] Considering that appellant was many kilometers away in
Manila and the protection afforded by her household, her life cannot be said to have been in danger then. Furthermore, she kept silent
and did not protest when appellant slept overnight in their house on the same floor where she slept, while her parents slept downstairs.
[32]

In view of the foregoing, we find the prosecutions evidence insufficient to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
And even assuming, for arguments sake, that the evidence at hand suffices to prove the alleged rape, still, conviction of appellant
under the information filed herein cannot stand.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, the governing law in this case, provides that the crime of rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The information herein specifically alleged that appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the complainant by employing
force, threat, and intimidation, thus invoking paragraph 1 of Article 355. It was also on this ground that appellant was convicted by the
trial court. After painstakingly searching through the records, however, we find no evidence of force, threat, or intimidation used by
appellant to consummate the alleged rape. On the contrary, what we found were complainants admissions that no such means
attended the sexual act:
Q. Now, it states here, that the accused did, then and there will fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, have
sexual intercourse with Elena Sebastian and [successfully] did so by employing force, threat and intimidation with you,
my question to you Miss Sebastian [is], what kind of force was made to you by the accused?
A. None, Sir, he only pushed the door.
Q. And what kind of threat [or] intimidation [was] perpetrated or done to you by the accused?
A. After he raped me, [he] told me that he would kill me if I complain to anybody.
Q. But that threat or intimidation happened, according to you, after you have been abused by the accused?
A. Yes, Sir.[33]
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You also testified on rebuttal that what happened to you on June 15, 1992 was no[t] voluntary but by means of force and
intimidation, my question is, how were you forced and intimidated by the accused?
A. He told me that if I tell what happened to anybody, he will kill my sister, sir.
Q. Is it not a fact that [those] utterances, according to you, [were] made by the accused after you woke up and found yourself
to have been molested by the accused in this case?
A. Yes sir.
Q. So the intimidation happened after you found and discovered yourself to have been abused by the accused in this case?
A. Yes sir.[34]
As clearly shown from the foregoing, complainant herself attested that no force was employed on her by appellant. The threat and
intimidation, on the other hand, were claimed to have been used by appellant only after consummating the sexual act. This is not what
is contemplated by Article 355 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. To convict under this mode, the accused must have used force or
intimidation to compel complainant into having sexual relations with him.[35]
As the prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charge of rape through force, threat and intimidation, we are
duty-bound to uphold appellants innocence. It is an elementary rule in criminal procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.[36] If the prosecution in this case sought to convict appellant by
proving that complainant was violated while in a state of unconsciousness, as provided under the 2 nd paragraph of Article 355, the
information should have stated so. We find, however, that the element of unconsciousness was not alleged much less specified in the
information, which charged appellant for rape under the first circumstance. Hence, it cannot be made the basis of conviction without
violating appellants right to due process, in particular to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. [37] We have ruled that
this right is accorded by the Constitution so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him.
Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded.[38]
The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the praesumptio hominis that no young Filipina would cry rape if it were not true.
However, its decision totally disregarded the paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven
otherwise.[39] Where the evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one consistent with the accused's innocence and the other indicative of
his guilt, that which favors the accused should be properly considered.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 12501-MN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant Roel
Mendigurin y Canlas is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED forthwith from confinement,
unless held for another cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is further ordered to report to us, within five days from notice,
his compliance with this decision.
Cost de oficio.

14.
G.R. No. 137366 November 27, 2003
People of the Philippines, appellee,
vs.
Romeo Mole y Santos, appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, finding appellant Romeo Mole y Santos guilty of the
crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accusatory portion of the Information2 charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
EMERITA REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent.
On motion of the prosecution, the accusatory portion was later amended to read:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
EMERITA REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent, while dizzy or otherwise unconscious. (Emphasis supplied.)
Culled from the documentary and the testimonial evidence for the prosecution consisting of the testimonies of the following witnesses,
to wit: private complainant Emerita Reyes (Emerita); Aurea Villena, the Medico-Legal Officer from the National Bureau of Investigation;
SPO4 Lilia R. Hogar, the police investigator; and Wildredo Reyes, the husband of Emerita, are the following:
On April 11, 1997, the then 34-year old Emerita, her husband Wilfredo and their three children consulted appellant, Romeo Mole, an
albularyo (quack doctor), in the latters house, they having been experiencing itchiness all over their bodies. Appellant, diagnosing the
Reyeses to be victims of kulam (witchcraft), asked for and was given P935.00 for the purchase of 17 black candles which he needed to
insulate them from the spell. Appellant asked them to return the next day for treatment.3
As advised, the Reyeses returned to appellants house the next day, April 12, 1997. On appellants instructions, the Reyeses removed
their clothes upon which appellant massaged their bodies one at a time with cotton dipped in oil.4
After the "treatment," the Reyeses repaired home, accompanied by appellant who brought with him two black candles. Upon reaching
the Reyeses house, appellant lit the candles and placed one at the main door and another near the door of the kitchen. He then invited
Emeritas husband Wilfredo to drink gin while waiting for the candles to burn out. After three shots, Wilfredo became dizzy and passed
out. Appellant thereupon brought Wilfredo to the only bedroom of the house and blew something on his (Wilfredos) chest.5
At about 11:00 p.m., appellant left the Reyeses residence after asking for and receiving the amount of P350.00 representing payment
for his services.6
Emerita then went to sleep. At about 12:00 midnight, however, she heard someone knock at the main door. Clad in a duster, she
opened the door and saw appellant who was looking for her youngest son, he saying that "the sorcerer will take and kill him" and to
save him (the son), appellant needed P2,500.00. Panicky and crying, Emerita immediately gave the said amount to appellant who
thereafter went to the bedroom and sprinkled a pungent liquid on Wilfredo and their three children. Appellant also sprinkled the same
liquid on Emerita, blew something on her chest and, while looking at her eyes, mumbled as if in prayer at which point Emerita instantly
felt weak and dizzy.7
Appellant then dragged Emerita to the kitchen, laid her on the floor and removed her underwear. She felt appellant, who was naked
from the waist down, lie on top of her. While she wanted to resist she was too weak and dizzy and eventually lost consciousness.8
Before losing consciousness, however, Emerita felt something heavy on her breast as appellant lay on top of her.9
When Emerita regained consciousness, appellant had left and her entire body, including her vagina, was aching. She was later to
declare in the course of her testimony in court, when asked why her vagina was aching, that appellant "raped" her.10
The next morning, or on April 13, 1997, Emerita, without the knowledge of her husband, reported her experience to the police.11 Her
husband, however, was informed by a neighbor that Emerita went to the police station, prompting him to follow her. On arrival at the
police station, he was unable to talk to his wife, and it was only on her return home at around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. of that day that Emerita
related to him the incidents that occurred the night before, albeit he could not remember if Emerita ever mentioned to him that she
became unconscious, because there have been a lot of things which then occupied his mind.12
On April 14, 1997, Emerita was physically examined by Dr. Aurea Villena who found multiple lacerations on her hymen which are
secondary to child birth13 and noted the following:
1. No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Hymen, reduced to myrtiformis.14
At the witness stand, the doctor disclosed that the seminology examination conducted on Emerita yielded negative result, and that
there was no medical basis to conclude that she had been subjected to sexual abuse.15
From the Final Investigation Report16 of SPO4 Lilia Hogar to whom the case was referred for investigation, the following datum appears:
xxx
07. Suspect ROMEO MOLE when apprised of his constitutional rights admitted raping EMERITA and also told the same admission to
the PRESS people who interviewed him.
xxx
SPO4 Hogars testimony in court was dispensed with after the prosecution stipulated that appellant was investigated and "gave the
statement to her."17
Appellant on the other hand denied the accusation. He claims that it was his wife Adoracion Mole, not him, who treated Emerita; that
both Emerita and Wilfredo were awake when he returned to their house on the night of April 13, 1997; that he merely fell asleep on the
Reyeses sofa in the living room; and that when he awoke at around 8:00 the following morning, Wilfredo even offered him breakfast
which he turned down as it was already late. He, however, admitted that there is no reason why Emerita would file a complaint for rape
against him.18
Appellants testimony was corroborated by his wife Adoracion Mole.19
Giving weight to the testimony of Emerita and relying on Romeos verbal admission to SPO4 Hogar of having raped the victim, as
reflected in the aforementioned datum in the Final Investigation Report, the trial court convicted appellant of rape by the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Romeo Mole y Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Accordingly, accused
Romeo Mole y Santos is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to INDEMNIFY private complainant Emerita Reyes y
Tamayo in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.20
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court:
1. . . . In deciding the case by mere confusion or supposition, and in failing to consider certain unrebutted substantial matters
of facts tending to show the non-occurrence or at least a doubtful occurrence of rape.
2. . . . In failing to apply the rule that in case of doubt, the same must be resolved in favor of the accused.21
In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.22
And the credibility of the private complainant is of vital importance for, in view of the peculiar nature of rape, conviction or acquittal rests
entirely upon her.23 It has thus become doctrine that the accused may be convicted even solely on the basis of the victims testimony
provided that the testimony is clear, credible, convincing, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points.24
Although the findings of trial courts are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal,25 inconsistencies in the testimony of Emerita
put serious doubts on her claim of rape, compelling this Court to reverse appellants conviction.
Thus, on direct examination, she related that appellant, who was naked from waist down, lay on top of her after removing her
underwear, whereupon she lost consciousness; and that after she regained consciousness, her entire body, including her vagina, was
aching. She thus concluded that she was raped:
Q You mean Madam Witness that after your panty was removed and accused was able to l[ay] you down [o]n the floor you lost
consciousness and you dont remember anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q Prior [to] you[r] los[s of] consciousness, what was the accused doing [to] you that you could remember?
A I just felt that there was something heavy on my breast, sir.
xxx
Q What was the condition of your body when you regained consciousness?
A I felt pain all over my body, sir.
Q What particular portion of your body was aching or suffering from pain?
A My whole body and also my vagina, sir.
Q Do you know of any reason why your vagina is aching?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A He raped me, sir.26 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, Emerita gave the following account:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q You testified Madam Witness on direct examinatio[n] that the last time you were conscious that you felt that the accused was on top
of you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.1wphi1
Q You also testified that you lost consciousness and that when you regained consciousnes[s] the accused ha[d] left already, am I right,
Madam Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, my question, Madam Witness, when did you lose your consciousness?
A When he was halfway [with] what he was doing to me, Sir.
Q Are you referring to the . . .[m]ashing of your breast and kissing of your lips, Madam Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
xxx
Q Miss Witness, can you possibly tell the Honorabl[e] Court if there was actual penetration of the sexual organ of the accused to you?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q Why do you know that there was [f]ull penetratio[n] Madam Witness?
A Because Your Honor, when I regained consciousnes[s] and he already left the house, I felt that my vagina was somewhat forced and
it was very painful, Sir.
xxx
Q Why do you know that he was able to have sexual intercourse with you?
WITNESS
A Because my organ was wet, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
When, also on during cross-examination, she was questioned by the trial court, she gave the following statement:
COURT
Q What was that thing that he did which you felt the accused was doing to you?
WITNESS
A I felt that he put his sexual organ on top of my body, Sir.
COURT
Q On top of your body?
[Q] Where did the accused plac[e] his sexual organ, Madam Witness?
[WITNESS]
[A] On my vagina, Sir.28 (Underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony of Emerita prompted the defense to propound the following question which elicited the following answer:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q Madam Witness, you made several inconsistent statements during your direct examination that you lost consciousness and that you
learned that you were raped after you regained consciousness. Likewise, when asked by this Honorable Court when you came to know
that you were raped, you also said that you learned that you were raped because when you woke up, your sexual organ was painful
and when you were finally asked when for the first time you c[a]me to know that you were raped, you changed your testimony that you
felt that the accused inserted his sex organ into your vagina, which is which now, Madam Witness?
A I lost consciousness after he was finished having sexual intercourse with me, Sir.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When asked to clarify her statements, Emerita did not give categorical answers:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q When the accus[ed] was holding your breast and kissing your lips, in the middle of that, you lost consciousness, Madam Witness?
A I felt what he was doing to me but because my body was very weak, I tried to move my head around so he could not kiss me, Sir.30
xxx
COURT
Q When [did] you know that your organ was wet?
WITNESS
A When he was gone already, Sir.
COURT
Q In other words, you only came to know tha[t] there was sexual intercourse after the accused has already left the premises[,] is that
correct?
WITNESS
A No, Your Honor, because when he dragged me, I already felt weak and dizzy but I felt all those things that he did to
me.31 (Underscoring supplied)
Emeritas vacillating account of the incident failed to stand the test of consistency. This Court is thus put on guard as to the veracity of
her claim. For while minor inconsistencies do not detract from the actual fact of rape,32 those in Emeritas testimony may not be
considered minor for they relate to the fact of commission of the offense charged.
A woman raped in a state of unconsciousness would not be able to narrate her defloration during that state, and her violation may be
proved indirectly by other evidence.33 Whereas, a woman fully conscious at the time of rape need only testify in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remain consistent in her testimony to convict the accused.34
While this Court has held in numerous rape cases that no person would subject herself to a rape trial given the attendant
embarrassment of a medical examination and the stigma of a sexual assault unless the accusation be true,35 it is gathered from those
cases that the victim was able to clearly and categorically impute the crime on the offender.
In the case at bar, save for Emeritas inconsistent testimonies as noted above, there is no other evidence showing that appellant did
have carnal knowledge with her.
The testimony of Wilfredo merely dwelt on events that occurred before and after the alleged rape, while the result of the medical
examination showed no physical manifestations of sexual intercourse. While Dr. Villena did not rule out the possibility of sexual
intercourse, her testimony could hardly be characterized as consistent and unwavering, having first ruled out the possibility of sexual
intercourse, only to later retract upon being scrutinized by the trial court.36
As for the trial courts reliance on the investigative report-Exhibit "E" of SPO4 Lilia Hogar in this wise:
Incidentally, the defense did not interpose any objection to the admission of Exhibit "E", the Investigation report. SPO4 Lilia Hogar, the
Investigator-on-Case, stated in the said report that ROMEO, when interviewed by the media people admitted raping EMERITA, 37
the same report showing that appellant admitted having raped Emerita is inadmissible in evidence. The admission was not in writing
and there is no showing that appellant was assisted by a competent and independent counsel of his choice when he made such
statement in accordance with Section 2 (d)38 of Republic Act 743839 in relation to Section 12 (1) Article III of the Constitution.40
The failure of the prosecution to establish appellant Moles guilt for rape notwithstanding, this Court finds him liable for the lesser crime
of acts of lasciviousness. The records clearly show that appellant lay on top of the victim, mashed her breasts and kissed her lips, acts
from which appellants lewd design was evident. Although the information filed was for the crime of rape, appellant can be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.41
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged in the information or proven during trial, the penalty of prision
correccional42 shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant must suffer the penalty of Six
(6) Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the July 15, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Romeo Mole y
Santos is CONVICTED of the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6)
Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs
of suit.

15.
[G.R. No. 124342. December 8, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN LADRILLO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.[1] The prosecution must demonstrate the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. Only when the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction exists that the liberty, or even the life, of an accused may
be declared forfeit. Correlatively, the judge must examine with extreme caution the evidence for the state to determine its sufficiency. If
the evidence fails to live up to the moral conviction of guilt the verdict must be one of acquittal, for in favor of the accused stands the
constitutional presumption of innocence; so it must be in this prosecution for rape.
Jane Vasquez, the eight (8) year old complaining witness, could not state the month and year she was supposedly abused by her
cousin Edwin Ladrillo. She could narrate however that one afternoon she went to the house of accused-appellant in Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City, which was only five (5) meters away from where she lived. There he asked her to pick lice off his head; she
complied. But later, he told her to lie down in bed as he stripped himself naked. He removed her panty and placed himself on top of
her. Then he inserted his penis into her vagina. He covered her mouth with his hand to prevent her from shouting as he started gyrating
his buttocks. He succeeded in raping her four (4) times on the same day as every time his penis softened up after each intercourse he
would make it hard again and insert it back into her vagina. After successively satisfying his lust accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo would
threaten to "send her to the police" if she would report the incident to anyone.[2]
Sometime in 1994 Salvacion Ladrillo Vasquez, mother of Jane, noticed that Jane had difficulty urinating and kept pressing her
abdomen and holding her private part. As she writhed in discomfort she approached her mother and said, "Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa
akin na yung uten ni Kuya Edwin ipinasok sa kiki ko (Ma, you wont believe that Kuya Edwin inserted his penis into my vagina).
[3]
Perturbed by her daughters revelation, Salvacion immediately brought her to their church, the Iglesia ni Kristo, where she was
advised to report to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). At the NBI Salvacion was referred to the Puerto Princesa Provincial
Hospital so that Jane could be physically examined.
Dr. Danny O. Aquino, the examining physician, reported in his medico-legal certificate that Jane had a "non-intact hymen." [4] He
later testified that a "non-intact hymen" could mean either of two (2) things: it could be congenital, i.e., the victim was born without a
fully developed hymen,[5] or it could be caused by a trauma, as when a male organ penetrated the private organ of the victim.[6]
On 3 February 1995 Jane Vasquez with the assistance of her mother Salvacion Ladrillo Vasquez filed a criminal complaint against
accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo.
The defense is anchored on alibi and denial. Accused-appellant claims that in 1992, the year he allegedly raped Jane as stated in
the Information, he was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, and did not even know Jane or her mother at that time. That it was
only in 1993, according to him, that he moved to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. To corroborate his testimony, the defense presented as
witnesses, Wilfredo Rojas and Teodoro Aguilar, both of whom were neighbors of accused-appellant in Liberty, Puerto Princesa
City. They testified that in 1992 accused-appellant was still their neighbor in Liberty and it was only in 1993 when accused-appellant
and his family moved to Abanico.[7]
Edito Ladrillo, accused-appellants father, testified that his family lived in Abanico for the first time only in 1993; that when he and
his sister Salvacion, mother of Jane, had a quarrel, he forbade his son Edwin from attending church services with Salvacion at
the Iglesia ni Kristo, which caused his sister to be all the more angry with him; and, the instant criminal case was a means employed by
his sister to exact revenge on him for their past disagreements.[8]
The trial court found accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo guilty as charged, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to
indemnify Jane Vasquez the amount of P100,000.00, and to pay the costs.[9] Thus, the court rationalized -
The crux of accuseds defense is that he was not in the place of the alleged rape in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City when this allegedly
happened. He denied committing the crime of rape against the young girl, Jane Vasquez. After having carefully examined and
calibrated the evidence on record, the Court is convinced more than ever that the accused Edwin Ladrillo indeed repeatedly raped or
sexually abused Jane Vasquez, a girl who was then only five (5) years old. This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the
testimony of Jane Vasquez given the straightforward clarity and simplicity with which it was made. It is highly improbable that a young,
8-year old girl would falsely testify that her own cousin, the accused herein, raped her. She told her mother: Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa
akin na ang utin ni Kuya Edwin ay ipinasok sa kiki ko. Jane also described that after the intercourse and as the penis of the accused
softened, the latter would make it hard again and then inserted it again into her vagina and this was made four (4) times. Janes
testimony has all the characteristics of truth and is entitled to great weight and credence. The Court cannot believe that the very young
victim is capable of fabricating her story of defloration.
Accused-appellant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in: (a) not giving credence to his defense that at the supposed
time of the commission of the offense he was not yet residing in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and did not know the complainant nor
her family; (b) finding him guilty of rape considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (c) not
finding that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish with particularity the date of commission of the offense; (d) giving great weight
and credence to the testimony of the complainant; and, (e) failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of minority in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, assuming for the sake of argument that indeed the crime of rape was committed.[10]
A careful study of the records sustains accused-appellants plea that the verdict should have been one of acquittal.
Preliminarily, the crime was alleged in the Information to have been committed "on or about the year 1992" thus -
That on or about the year 1992 at Abanico Road, Brgy. San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City x x x x the said accused, with the use of force
and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned five (5) years of
age, minor, against her will and without her consent.
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court which requires that the
time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More
importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.[11]The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the
criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months of 1992 but includes the years prior and
subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure
of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the
date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for
his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of residence in
the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
In United States v. Dichao,[12] decided by this Court as early as 1914, which may be applied by analogy in the instant case, the
Information alleged that the rape was committed "on or about and during the interval between October 1910 and August 1912. This
Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on a demurrer filed by the accused, holding that -
In the case before us the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed is so indefinite and uncertain that it
does not give the accused the information required by law. To allege in an information that the accused committed rape on a certain girl
between October 1910 and August 1912, is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare for his defense, and that
indefiniteness is not cured by setting out the date when a child was born as a result of such crime. Section 7 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose is to permit the allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near to
the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and when that has been done any date may be proved which
does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It does not authorize the total omission of a date or such an indefinite
allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing.
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that militates heavily against its being accorded the
full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of
conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate,
they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.
First, complainant had absolutely no recollection of the precise date she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant. In her
testimony regarding the time of the commission of the offense she declared -
Q: This sexual assault that you described when your Kuya Edwin placed himself on top of you and had inserted his penis on (sic)
your private part, when if you could remember, was (sic) this happened, that (sic) month?
A: I forgot, your Honor.
Q: Even the year you cannot remember?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: But is there any incident that you can recall that may draw to a conclusion that this happened in 1992 or thereafter?
A: None, your Honor.
Q: About the transfer of Edwin from Abanico to Wescom Road?
A: I dont know, your Honor (underscoring supplied).[13]
In People v. Clemente Ulpindo[14] we rejected the complaining witness testimony as inherently improbable for her failure to testify
on the date of the supposed rape which according to her she could not remember, and acquitted the accused. We held in part -
While it may be conceded that a rape victim cannot be expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience, and while
Reginas answer that accused-appellant went on top of her, and that she continuously shouted and cried for five (5) minutes may have
really meant that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her for five (5) minutes despite her shouts and cries, what renders
Reginas story inherently improbable is that she could not remember the month or year when the alleged rape occurred, and yet, she
readily recalled the incident when she was whipped by accused-appellant with a belt that hit her vagina after she was caught stealing
mangoes.
Certainly, time is not an essential ingredient or element of the crime of rape. However, it assumes importance in the instant case
since it creates serious doubt on the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The
Information states that the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992," and complainant testified during the trial that she was
sexually abused by accused-appellant in the latters house in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City.[15] It appears however from the records that
in 1992 accused-appellant was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, a town different from Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and
had never been to Abanico at any time in 1992 nor was he familiar with the complainant and her family. He only moved to Abanico,
Puerto Princesa City, in 1993.[16] It was therefore impossible for accused-appellant to have committed the crime of rape in 1992 at his
house in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, on the basis of the prosecution evidence, as he was not yet residing in Abanico at that time and
neither did his family have a home there. The materiality of the date cannot therefore be cursorily ignored since the accuracy and
truthfulness of complainants narration of events leading to the rape practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.
The ruling of the trial court to the effect that it was not physically impossible to be in Abanico from Liberty when the crime charged
against him was committed, is manifestly incongruous as it is inapplicable. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that Liberty and
Abanico were not far from each other, both being within the city limits of Puerto Princesa, and could be negotiated by tricycle in less
than thirty (30) minutes.[17] But whether or not it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to travel all the way to Abanico from
Liberty to commit the crime is irrelevant under the circumstances as narrated by complainant. Truly, it strains the imagination how the
crime could have been perpetrated in 1992 at the Ladrillo residence in Abanico when, to repeat, accused-appellant did not move to that
place and take up residence there until 1993.
To complicate matters, we are even at a loss as to how the prosecution came up with 1992 as the year of the commission of the
offense. It was never adequately explained nor the factual basis thereofestablished. The prosecutor himself admitted in court that he
could not provide the specific date for the commission of the crime -
COURT: Wait a minute. (To witness) How many times did your Kuya Edwin placed (sic) himself on top of you and inserted (sic) his
penis to (sic) your private organ?
A: Four (4) times, your Honor.
COURT: You demonstrate that with your fingers.
A: Like this, your Honor (witness raised her four (4) fingers).
COURT: Fiscal, did you charge the accused four (4) times?
PROS. FERNANDEZ: No, your Honor because we cannot provide the dates (underscoring supplied).[18]
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992
manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a
conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.
Second, neither did the testimony of Dr. Danny O. Aquino, the medico-legal officer, help complainant's cause in any way. In his
medico-legal certificate, Dr. Aquino concluded on examination that complaining witness' hymen was not intact. When asked by the trial
court what he meant by "non-intact hymen," Dr. Aquino explained that it could be congenital, i.e., natural for a child to be born with a
"non-intact hymen."[19] However, he said, he could not distinguish whether complainants "non-intact hymen" was congenital or the result
of a trauma.[20] When asked further by the public prosecutor whether he noticed any healed wound or laceration in the hymen, Dr.
Aquino categorically answered: "I was not able to recognize (healed wound), sir," and "I was not able to appreciate healed laceration,
sir."[21] The answers of Dr. Aquino to subsequent questions propounded by the prosecutor were very uncertain and inconclusive. To
questions like, "Is she a virgin or not?" and "So you are now saying that Jane Vasquez was actually raped?" the answers of Dr. Aquino
were, "I cannot tell for sure, your Honor." "That is a big probability," and, "Very likely."
It is clear from the foregoing that the prosecution likewise failed to establish the medical basis for the alleged rape. The failure of
Dr. Aquino to make an unequivocal finding that complainant was raped and that no healed wound or laceration was found on her
hymen seriously affects the veracity of the allegations of the prosecution.
Third, from her testimony, complainant would have this Court believe that while she was being raped accused-appellant was
holding her hand, covering her mouth and gripping his penis all at the same time. Complainants narration is obviously untruthful. It
defies the ordinary experience of man. The rule is elementary that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself.
And fourth, complainant reported the alleged rape to her mother only in 1994 or two (2) years after its occurrence. It hardly
conforms to human experience that a child like complainant could actually keep to herself such a traumatic experience for a very long
time. Perhaps it would have been different if she were a little older and already capable of exercising discretion, for then, concealment
of the rape committed against her would have been more readily explained by the fact, as in this case, that she was probably trying to
avoid the embarrassment and disrepute to herself and her family. Children, on the other hand, are naturally more spontaneous and
candid, and usually lack the same discretion and sensibility of older victims of the same offense. Thus, the fact that complainant, who
was only five (5) years old when the supposed rape happened, concealed her defilement to her mother for two (2) years seriously
impairs her credibility and the authenticity of her story.
We are not unmindful of the fact that a child of tender years, like complaining witness herein, could be so timid and ignorant that
she could not narrate her ordeal accurately. But the mind cannot rest easy if this case is resolved against accused-appellant on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution which, as already discussed, is characterized by glaring inconsistencies, missing links and
loose ends that refuse to tie up. The rule that this Court should refrain from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses, does not apply where, as in the instant case, the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance or value which if
considered would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on misapprehension of facts.
Denial and alibi may be weak but courts should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused
may really have no other defenses but denial and alibi which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor,
especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak.
Let it be made clear, however, that this opinion does not necessarily signify acceptance of accused-appellants version of the
incident. If complainant was indeed sexually abused, this view should not be considered a condonation of what was done, as it was
indeed reprehensible. This only indicates that reasonable doubt has been created as to accused-appellants guilt. Consequently, under
the prevailing judicial norm, accused-appellant is entitled to acquittal. To reiterate, there is in his favor the constitutional presumption of
innocence, which has not been sufficiently dented.
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: sympathy for the victim and admiration for
her in publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been
sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape
victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on
the law.[22]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of RTC-Br. 47, Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, is REVERSED. Accused-appellant
EDWIN LADRILLO is ACQUITTED of rape based on insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. Consequently, his immediate
release from confinement is ORDERED unless he is otherwise detained for any other lawful or valid cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

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