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ROAL PACCINO I.

NAZARETH

CONTRACTS LAW & ETHICS

POINTS IN BRIEFING A CASE

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

226 SCRA 572

Petitioner: Roberto Domingo

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera

Ponente: J. Romero

FACTS:

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against Roberto
Domingo. The petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following:

(a) they were married on November 29, 1976;


(b) unknown to her (Delia), he had a previous marriage with Emerina dela Paz on April
25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;

(c) she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerina sued
them for bigamy;

(d) since 1979, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in the
Philippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by
her employer;

(e) Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence;

(f) Her personal properties amounting to P350, 000.00 are under the possession of
Roberto, who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and consent;

(g) While on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage,
which is void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that
private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
properties alleged to have been acquired by their union.

RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner's motion for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If in
the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.)

2) Whether or not the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation
of Property" is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

HELD:

1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a
mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.

On the other hand, the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage.
2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.

Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA's decision is affirmed.

Hawkins v. McGee

The Facts
A doctor, Defendant McGee, operated on Plaintiff Hawkins hand and performed a skin
graft. P had sustained the hand injury nine years prior to the operation in an accident
which had no relation to D. D spoke the words, I will guarantee to make the hand a
hundred per cent perfect hand or a hundred per cent good hand. D repeatedly solicited
Ps father and P and D may even have stated that he wanted an opportunity to
experiment on skin grafting. P and his father consented to the operation. After the
operation, P was left with a hand that was arguably in worse condition than prior to the
surgery. P claimed the damage was the fault of D and P contends this was a contract
and a warranty.

Procedural History
P sued D in a N.H. court for assumpsit (breach of contract). A jury trial ensued. The jury
found that D and P had made a contract and ruled in Ps favor. The jury was also
instructed by the trial court that it could consider pain and suffering due to the operation
and positive ill effects of the operation upon Ps hand. The jury awarded $3,000 to P. D
appealed and the case was heard in N.H. Supreme Court, where damages were ruled
excessive. P was ordered to return all but $500, and he refused, so the verdict was
overturned. The finding of breach of warranty stood.

The Issue
How are damages calculated in a breach of contract? In this case, the difference
between the value to [Hawkins] of a perfect hand such as the jury found the defendant
promised him, and the value of his hand in its present condition Did the lower court
follow this rule correctly? Did the lower court properly instruct the jury regarding the
determination of whether or not a contract existed?

The Rule
Damages in a breach of contract case are either reliance or expectation, and may be
measured by determining the difference between Ps actual position and the position he
would have been in had the contract not been breached. Also, the nature of a contract is
reiterated in this case by the courts comparison of different utterances and actions on
Ds part which do not constitute a contract, and the facts surrounding his statement, I
guarantee to make the hand 100 per cent good, which the court found was a breach of
warranty. Damages could only be considered for Ds failure to improve the condition of
the hand (the position P would have been in had the contract not been breached), not
for any worsening of the condition of the hand. Rules pertaining to this matter can be
found in Restatement Sections 2 and 4.

The Holding / Disposition


The N. H. Supreme Court held that the lower courts instructions regarding damages
were incorrect, and found that the evidence presented would have justified a verdict for
an amount sufficient to cover the cost of a new operation to correct the injury to the
hand. The court found that the question of whether a contract existed was properly
submitted to the jury. Overturned and sent down for retrial.

Courts Reasoning
The N. H. Supreme Court restated the rule for damages in a contract breach. More
specifically, the measure is the difference between the value of the contract as carried
out and the value of the contract as broken, following the rules for expectation
damages. There is still debate about the allowance for pain and suffering (tort) in the
expectation damages calculated in this case, with some believing that it should not have
been allowed, or not allowed to the extent that it was. The court clearly differentiated
between what components it found to be a warranty and the opinion and predictions
which did not constitute a contract. The court applied the reasonability test of the
objective theory of contracts fairly.

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