[G.R. No. 127245.

January 30, 2001]

REP. OF THE PHILS vs. CA, et al.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 30 2001.

G.R. No. 127245(Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.)

G.R. No. 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, et al.)

Before us are (1) two (2) motions for reconsideration of our decision dated September 2, 1999 filed by
petitioner Republic in G. R. No. 127245 and by petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. in G. R. No. 127022,
(2) private respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss dated September 15, 2000.

We shall first rule on the procedural issue. Private respondent Peltan filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the Republic's petition was filed one day late, thus the judgment appealed from has become final and
executory. We find the same to be unmeritorious since it is already too late to raise the issue at this stage
of the proceedings and we rule that justice will be best served if these cases will be decided on their merits
rather than on mere technicality.

We now consider the merits of these cases.

(1) G.R. No. 127245

In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for reconsideration on the following grounds:

I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASES;

II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RES JUDICATA MAY

BE APPLIED, THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE WHICH IS HIGHER AND
MORE COMPELLING THAN RES JUDICATA WARRANTS THE
EXEMPTION OF THIS CASE FROM THE RULE OF JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS;
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IS THAT UNLESS CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, UNCLASSIFIED
LANDS ARE NOT ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE; AND
 IV. IF THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IS NOT RECONSIDERED PETITIONER STANDS
TO LOSE VAST TRACK (SIC) OF PRIME LAND NOW VALUED AT
ABOUT P27,892,900,000.00.

Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court in Margolles et al. vs. CA 1 230 SCRA 97.,
Peltan Development Corporation et. al. vs. CA 2 270 SCRA 83., and Goldenrod, Inc. vs. CA 3 August 10,
1994 resolution.do not constitute a bar to the present case based on the rule of res judicata, as the said
cases pertained to the superiority of conflicting titles of the parties therein whereas the present case
resolves on the validity of the judgment covering a vast parcel of land rendered at the time when the land
was still forest land; that the subject matter of the present case is the entire parcel of land covered by
OCT No. 4216 with an area of 996,175 square meters, whereas the cited Margolles case involved only a
188,254 square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. 4216. Petitioner insists that it was not a
party in the Margolles case and that its cause of action in the present case is based on the inalienability
and indisposability of the subject land and consequent lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court
over the same. Thus there is no identity of parties or of subject matter, or of cause of action that would
justify application of the rule of res judicata.

Petitioner Republic further contends that land not classified as alienable and disposable remain so and it is
the private claimant who bears the burden of showing that the Executive Department has in fact classified
the land as disposable and alienable; that under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, thus, whatever title issued before
such classification is considered null and void ab initio. It contends that during the oral argument, the
Solicitor General stated that initially it is the government which has the burden of proof to show that the
title of the Spouses Gana is invalid or not legal but the burden is shifted to private respondents once the
government has established the fact that the title was issued before the land had been declared as
alienable and disposable; that since the land covered by OCT No. 4216 was still part of the unclassified
forest land in 1927, the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court, which took cognizance of the
land registration case and all the proceedings conducted therein including but not limited to the issuance
of the published notice of initial hearing in the 1927 issue of the Official Gazette were invalid, that land
registration courts at the time the Ganas filed their application, had no power nor authority to determine
whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land subject of registration since the authority to
classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 (1903) and 2874
(1919).

Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents' reliance on Section 45 of Act No. 2874 at this final
stage of the proceedings, which only indicates that the Gana spouses instituted their application for land
registration on confirmation of imperfect title supposedly grounded on their alleged "open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" is fraught with untenable implications since OCT No.
4216 was not evidenced by any judicial record, decision or decree; thus private respondents invocation of
"private rights" is hearsay and self serving.

On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and Peltan argue that this case must be decided on
the basis of the law and jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929 covering the time when the application
for registration was filed in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) and when OCT No. 4216 was
issued; that it is not correct to say that no valid torrens title to land can be obtained by individuals and
entities in a land registration case unless the land was previously covered by an executive proclamation
declaring the land as alienable and disposable. Respondents claim that property that was already privately
owned or under private ownership at the time the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine
Islands to the United States remained private property, even if the owner had not obtained a muniment of
title to his property; thus, such person who has held the property under color of title may institute a land
registration case to have the property brought under the torrens system and have a title issue in his
name; that even assuming that a particular piece of property was not yet privately owned when the
Spanish crown ceded sovereignty, private individuals or entities who held "agricultural public land" openly,
continuously, exclusively and notoriously, in the concept of owners "for a period of ten years next
preceding the twenty-sixth day of July 1904 were conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a "government grant" and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land, 4 Section 54 (6) Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.as a qualified possessor of "agricultural public land"; that there was no requirement
under Act No. 926 that the land subject of a government grant must have been previously declared as
alienable and disposable by the Governor General. Respondents claim that it was under Act No. 2874 that
the Governor General was given for the first time the authority upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into alienable and disposable, timber and mineral, and to
transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition. 5 Section 6 Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that under Act No. 2974 just as in Act No. 926,
such power of the Governor General did not affect lands that may have already become "private property"
or have become impressed with a "private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law" 6 Section 8 Act No. 2874.and the fact that such properties were not previously covered by a
declaration by the Governor General that these lands are alienable and disposable does not affect the
validity of the titles of the owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, the Tuason
Entail, the Hacienda de Maricaban, Hacienda de Navotas, the Piedad Estate, which were issued before
World II. The ownership of these parties who owned property during the Spanish regime was not affected
by Act No. 926 or Act No. 2874, which referred only to public lands. They further contend that under the
laws and jurisprudence in force at the time the proceedings in LRC Case No. 678 (GLRO Record No. 30406)
were conducted, and insofar as the confirmation of imperfect titles is concerned, the determination of
whether land is "agricultural public land" susceptible of registration in the name of a private party, or
"forest land" which is not susceptible of private ownership, is a question of fact that the land registration
court has the power and/or jurisdiction to determine on the basis of the judicially prescribed or formulated
test i.e., whether the land is "more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes?".

We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and were duly considered in our decision and we
reiterate that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition to annul judgment in view of the
decision of this Court in the Margolles case. Petitioner's contention that it was never a party to the
Margolles case is not decisive of the issue. We have stated that absolute identity of parties is not required
but only substantial identity of parties for the application of the rule on res judicata. We agree with the
respondent Court of Appeals that although petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case, its claim in the
instant case and that of the losing parties in the Margolles case raised exactly the same argument and
relied on the same evidence to justify invalidation of OCT No. 4216, namely, that said title supposedly
covers unclassified public land (forest land) so that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in
1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject property in favor of the original applicants, the
Gana spouses. Such a shared identity of interest as shown by the identity of the relief sought by one
person in a prior case and the second person in the subsequent case, i. e., to declare the nullity of OCT
No. 4216, is sufficient to make them "privy in law" 7 Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, 184 SCRA 80;
Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 486; Santos vs. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 289; Widows and Orphans Associations v. CA,
212 SCRA 360.for purposes of the operation of the rule on res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment.

The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking annulment of the decision of the then CFI of
Rizal sitting as a land registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) was that the court
did not have jurisdiction over the case because the property subject matter thereof was "forest land" since
at the time the land registration case was filed in 1927, the Governor-General had not issued a
proclamation declaring the subject property as alienable and disposable.

Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court which rendered the
judgment in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) that became the basis for the issuance of OCT
No. 4216 seventy (70) years ago relies on the very same evidence (FAO 4-1141 [1968] implementing LC
Map No. 2623 Project No. 13-A), (namely land classification maps), that was judicially determined by this
Court as insufficient to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1929 and to overcome
the overwhelming documentary evidence adduced to support the validity of OCT No. 4216, we are
compelled to affirm the dismissal of the petition to annul the judgment which resulted in the issuance of
OCT No. 4216.

We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a presumption lies in favor of state ownership and it is
the individual who claims that the land is alienable and disposable who must present clear, positive and
absolute evidence to over the presumption of state ownership. While it may be true that an applicant for
original registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of public domain, compliance with this burden should be proven in the
original proceedings instituted by the Gana spouses in 1927, and must be legally presumed to have been
satisfied as a decree was issued in favor of the petitioners-spouses. Thus where a petition is filed to annul
the said judgment on the ground that it is fatally void, the burden of proving the nullity rests with the
petitioner.

In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 8 189 SCRA 792.this Court
emphasized "that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests
upon the petitioner, and the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment
is fatally defective." 9 In that case, the petitioner contended in the proceedings filed by the Republic in the
Court of Appeals, that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the
parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.However, petitioner's case rested solely on
land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 which maps fail to
conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that.Before this
Court, petitioner reiterated said contention and referred, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation
reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are
parts thereof.The Court held that these maps are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of
the decree's regularity.The Court held that land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance
of the decree in 1912 fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the
years prior to that, and are insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.

Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the filing of the action. 10 Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1995 edition, p. 55.Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not to recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter
that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. 11 Ibid.It bears stress that what the petitioner
sought to annul was the 1929 decision of the land registration court which became the basis for the
issuance of OCT No. 4216. The law prevailing at the time the original land registration was sought, Act No.
2874 (1919) entitled "An act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of public domain, or better
known as "the Public Land Act" pertinently provides:

"Section 6. The Governor General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into-

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes
of their government and disposition.

xxx

Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law
may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to
disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same
reasons, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.

xxx
Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement

(2) By sale
(3) By lease.
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By administrative legalization (free patent)
(b) By judicial legalization.

Section 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United States, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by way of force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title, under the provisions of this chapter."

We are inclined to agree with the respondents that it is legally doubtful if the authority
of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that
have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized
and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of section 45 (b) of Act
2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public-domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court
issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of
title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and
that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land
for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction
to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber 12 In Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered but opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had
not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the
ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the oppositors and
excluded parcel no. 1. This Court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court to register
parcel no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as follows:
'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the
government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be
established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government
as to a particular piece of property collide, if the government desires to demonstrate that the
land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof
that the land is not more valuable for agriculture than forest purposes. Great considerations, it
must be stated, should and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the
technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition
on the part of the Attorney General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant." taking into account the
proof or evidence in each particular case. 13 Ankron vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 40
Phil 10.

Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of judgment in the respondent Court of Appeals
contended that the decree in favor of the Gana spouses was issued at the time when the subject land was
still forest land, (unfortunately no copy of the 1929 decision is available) and rested its case solely on the
land classification map No. 2623 Project 13-A which failed to conclusively establish the actual classification
of the land in 1929 or earlier. Moreover, FAO No. 4-1 141 signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr, on January 3, 1968, which provides:

"1, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised

Administrative Code, (hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the
same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition
in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be
and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated
in the Municipalities of xxxxxxxx Las Pias Province of Rizal which are
designated and described as alienable or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map
LC 2623 approved on January 3, 1968."

categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights and this pronouncement necessarily includes the
issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929; "otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all
nullified." 14 Margolles vs. CA, supra.

True, prescription does not run against the State. However, probably due to bureaucratic constraints, vast
tracts of land acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the city of Manila and Quezon City were
released from classification as forestland belatedly, or long after their residential character as private
property had become a matter of judicial notice. It appears that the City of Manila was declassified as
forest land only in 1955 15 Republic vs. Alano, CA-G.R. SP No. 08376.and Quezon City only on October 24,
1989. 16 See Comment to Motion for Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as 1961, this Court stated that
an attorney-at-law "should have known that no property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as
yet not covered by torrens title". 17 Republic vs. Aricheta, 2 SCRA 469.In this case defendant claimed that
he was a possessor in good faith From petitioners-movants' own submission, 18 Reply, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp.
835-836.a part of Las Pias comprising 1200 hectares was declared as alienable and disposable on
September 3, 1928, thus:

"The map showing the area included in the 1200 hectares was destroyed during the
Second World War, and it was in view of the loss of the map indicating the 1200 hectares that
then Sec. Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the entire Las Pias as well as part of the
adjacent municipalities as alienable and disposable on January 3, 1968."

The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reiterate the earlier declaration and serves
to affirm that indeed parts of Las Pias, albeit the map indicating this area has been lost, were already
open to disposition to private claimants long before the issuance of FAO 4-1141. Since there are extant
numerous titles covering various portions of Las Pias, 19 Attached to respondents' Comment to the Motion
for Reconsideration is a list given by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of at least thirty three (33)
original OCTs to lands in Las Pinas, issued before World War II indicating that there are numerous titles
other than OCT No. 4216 which covers parcels of land in Las Pinas, most of which were issued earlier than
1929.any conflict or overlapping of titles should be litigated by the interested parties, as what happened in
the Margolles, Peltan and Goldenrod cases.

In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only seriously undermine the principle of res judicata,
an old axiom of law, "dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age" 20 Carandang vs. Venturaza, 133 SCRA
344.and a fundamental component in every jural system 21 Ibid.that prohibits relitigation of questions
already settled by final judgment of the court, in this case, the highest court. Worse, considering that
there are numerous certificates of titles now in the hands of successors-in-interest of the original awardees
of OCT No. 4216, it will imperil the rule on the indefeasibility of titles which is a basic underpinning of the
torrens system of land registration, and which was precisely instituted to quiet title to land. Again,
contrary to the submission of the petitioner that the obtention of OCT No. 4216 has caused "property
rights (to be) unsettled and destabilized, and the integrity of the torrens system compromised", the
relitigation of the question on the validity and genuineness of OCT No. 4216 would open the floodgates or
pave the way for the assertion of numerous conflicting claims to 13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and
Cavite covered by FAO-4-1141 22 This covers an appropriate area of 13, 495,22 hectares, situated in
Taytay, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros, province of Rizal, and in Bacoor and Imus,
Province of Cavite.which were already titled prior to 1968.

Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 hectares situated in six municipalities of Rizal and
two municipalities of Cavite. Pursuing the petitioner's theory that possession before January 3, 1968 could
not have ripened into ownership, the State would have to take action to cause the reversion of the
innumerable parcels of lands which were titled earlier than 1968. An attempt at this time to single out OCT
No. 4216 for cancellation and resurrect the contention that it is spurious and irregularly obtained, despite
the pronouncement of this Court positively and categorically vindicating that very same title in three
cases, betrays an unbecoming disregard for the final judgment of the highest court and does not elicit
sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the validity of OCT No. 4216 is put to rest.

One final note, our reluctance to give overriding significance to the Republic's invocation of the regalian
doctrine stems from a consideration of the salient fact that we are here dealing with land which although
allegedly to be originally of the public domain was eventually, if belatedly, released for disposition to
private claimants. Thus the parties who have sought to assert their own title in this case (by way of
intervention) and in the cases of Peltan and Goldenrod (in petitions to cancel title) are private parties who
purportedly acquired subsequent certificates of title to, or interests in, the same land. In short, the land in
question has been the subject of overlapping or conflicting claims of private parties. Had the Republic's
cause of action been one to cause reversion to the State of public land illegally titled because it cannot be
alienated at all, e.g. military reservations, public parks, or other lands devoted to public use, and for that
reason absolutely insusceptible of private ownership, the government's plea would have compelled
concurrence. As it is, petitioners Firestone, et al., the losing parties in the Margolles case, have asserted
their "legal interest in the success of the instant Government's action" (Motion for Reconsideration) to
annul the 1929 judgment of the land court on the basis of its subsequent title obtained in 1969 covering a
portion of the property earlier titled in the name of the Gana spouses.

Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and amended petition, the State does not stand to be
deprived of its patrimony, as the entire municipality of Las Pias has already been declared as alienable
and disposable and if there is any reversion to be caused in favor of the Republic, the land recovered
would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other private persons. With the classification of
the land in question as alienable and disposable in 1968, and in view of the failure of the State to institute
reversion proceedings before 1968, any action to cause the cancellation of subject title at this time should
be subjected to assiduous scrutiny in the light of the existence of numerous titles covering lands within the
coverage of FAO-4-1 141 which encompasses 13,495 hectares in Rizal and Cavite. In Vasquez vs. Giap and
Li Seng Giap and Sons 23 96 Phil. 447; See also Arsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547., this
Court upheld the title of an alien who subsequently became a naturalized Filipino before the State
commenced escheat proceedings on the ground that the "State is deemed to have waived its right to
escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its
conveyance or transfer to him". The court rationalized that "if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to
preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be thwarted by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who become naturalized citizens before the State commences
forfeiture proceedings." By parity of reasoning, even assuming that it was convincingly established that
the subject land was indeed still classified as forest land at the time of the registration proceedings in
1929, the fact that the same was eventually released or classified as alienable and disposable should stay
the hand of the Government in bringing an action to question the title issued by a court of land
registration, an action which is in rem, considering that the same basic issue was already resolved with
finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul existing torrens titles derived from OCT No. 4216 which was issued
seventy years ago, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands covered thereby to new or
subsequent applicants would betray a subservience to technicality that will not be in the public interest nor
serve our declared national land policies any useful purpose. This is a simple matter of equity and good
sense.

(2)G.R. No. 127022

In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration with the
following assigned errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS' TITLES (DERIVED FROM OCT No. A-S-47)
BEING ADVERSE TO OCT NO. 4216, WERE DECLARED "AS NULL AND
VOID" BY THE DECISION RENDERED IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES
CASE).
II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS, AS MOVANTS-INTERVENORS IN THE CASE
BELOW, "HAVE NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST
IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING IN THE PROCESS,
THAT PETITIONERS' LEGAL INTEREST THERETO IS BASICALLY
ANCHORED IN THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT
ACTION.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS' TITLES LOST IN G.R. NO. 109490
(MARGOLLES CASE), "MAY NO LONGER BE REVIVED REGARDLESS
OF THE OUTCOME OF THE MAIN PETITION OF THE PETITIONER
REPUBLIC", EVEN AS THE OBJECT OF PETITIONERS' INTERVENTION
IS TO AVOID MULTIPLICITY OF SUIT, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
IV. THIS HON. COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT
CONSOLIDATED CASE "ARE BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN THE
MARGOLLES AND PELTAN CASES".

Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al., contend that there was nothing in the three (3) cases cited in our
decision which declared petitioners' titles as null and void although petitioners' titles were, in effect, set
aside in the Margolles case on the ground of superiority of titles. They further allege that their intervention
is based on their legal interest in the success of the government's action which is of direct and material
character because <="" span="">"either gain or lose" by the direct operation and effect of the judgment.
They also contend that in the event that the government succeeds and the mother title as well as the
derivative titles of the private respondents are voided, the Margolles group had no valid cause to litigate
upon the issue of superiority of title in G. R. No. 109490 and petitioners' derivative titles become the only
title to the extent of the 188,424 square meters; that the intended revival of petitioners supposed nullified
titles in the instant proceedings, by way of intervention, is imperative in order to avoid multiplicity of suits,
otherwise, without said intervention, petitioners will have no other recourse but to commence an entirely
new action for the recovery of the subject land or possibly to institute an action to reopen the Margolles
case thereby incurring unnecessary waste of time, money and effort while, in the meantime, the voided
titles of the private respondents will have to be reverted and consolidated in the name of the Republic to
the extreme prejudice of petitioners.

We cannot sustain the above arguments which are a mere rehash of the arguments raised in their
petition , and which we have already passed upon in our decision. Moreover, Firestone Ceramics, et al.,
were the private respondents in G. R. No. 109490 (Margolles case), which filed a complaint for annulment
of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio Margolles et al. (private
respondents in present petition). What petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. sought to annul in that case
was OCT No. 4216. With the ruling of this Court upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216 the necessary
consequence of such decision would be the nullification of the titles adverse to OCT No. 4216. There is no
question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence it has been held that final
dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action. We find no reason to dwell
on the other issues raised in view of the fact that we are dismissing the principal action of petitioner
Republic.

WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. The motions for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Republic and petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are DENIED for lack of merit with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED. (Ynares-Santiago, J.-No part; Sandoval-Guitierrez J.-No part ; Puno, J. -on official leave)

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court