Section 20 Non imprisonment for debt

Serafin vs. Lindayag

Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary
and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted
complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a
warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not
present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of
money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of
law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of
plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her
friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who
lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if
she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is
protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the
very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest
upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent
grossly failed to perform his duties properly.

Lozano vs. Martinez

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case,
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected thus appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which
the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an
element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks
have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender,
checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the
usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can
only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not
be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is
just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of
the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying
that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

Section 21 Double Jeopardy

Paulin vs. Gimenez

Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were
overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the
latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the
owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at
him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the
petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately
apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by
the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed.
Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading
and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.
(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.
Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the
accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has
deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted
upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that
shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar,
terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further
evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The
rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
People vs. Obsania
Facts : On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime,
ErlindaDollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, CiriacoDollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the
municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery against the defendant Obsania.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the
assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the
above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the
subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of
the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd
designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant
appeal. The appeal was then questioned by the defendant on the grounds of double jeopardy.
Issue : Does the appeal of the Government violated the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling : The Court answered in the negative.
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would
thereby be placed in double jeopardy.Correlatively, section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites
must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a competent
tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case was
without the express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his motion to
dismiss.The controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the
complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the right of
the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed order of
dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the merits.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the
dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such
dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at
bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the
corpus of our jurisprudence.
The order appealed from is set aside.

People vs. Pineda

FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 1971, in the municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal, Philippines, the
above-named accused, being then private individual did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a public document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, committed as follows: the
said accused on August 17, 1971, executed a document entitled "Application For Registration" for parcels of
land located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect that She is the exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-248206 and that she "does not know of
any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land or that any person has estate or
interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or expectancy", as a result of which
the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said
parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in fact the herein
accused has already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as
can be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion"
dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V. Ilano has already paid partial amount of P130,850.00 to the
herein accused.
On October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the information for falsification,
premised, among other things, on the apprehension that she is in danger of being condemned for an
identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against her for
falsification and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on the
ground of jeopardy.
HELD:
It would now appear that prior conviction or acquittal in the first case, as long as the accused had entered his
plea therein is no longer required in order that the accused may move to quash a second prosecution for the
same offense on the ground of double jeopardy."
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused."

Ivler vs. San Pedro

FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment
his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces
husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses,
whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion
the effect of this ruling.

PSB vs. Bermoy

FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents Pedrito
and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document
in the Regional Trial Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed
the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial
court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of
proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the
accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right
of the accused against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?

HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal
case:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]

On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused
does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is
based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts
to an acquittal.

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case
No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against
respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned
during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense became vested on respondent spouses.

Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or
order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for
insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into
the merits of the dismissal.

facts:
Bruno's testimony claimed that on the morning of the accident, the Alberto told Bruno that chickens were
scratching palay and corn in their plantation. He asked if he could shoot them. Bruno told son to wait as he
grabbed the gun. The gun was handed over to Alberto who was known as a sharp shooter. The father
walked 20 meters behind his son, too far away when the accident happened. When the son realized that he
had shot Dima, he carried him to his home upon his request, only to stop 50m after and then looking for the
father.
There is not the slightest ground to believe that these affidavits contained anything but the truth, especially
that part regarding Bruno's whereabouts when the defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are very intelligent,
the affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary headquarters, there is no hint
of any undue pressure brought to bear upon either of them, and, above all, they stood to gain nothing from
the statement that the accused was unaccompanied.
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The
judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years. However,
considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh
and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of
Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. the
appellant will pay the costs of both instances.
issue:
Whether or not Republic no. 4 should be implemented in full in this case.
(Wala pa ako held dito hehehe, hindi ko pa nasusulat)