ARTICLE III THE BILL OF RIGHTS

a. PBM Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195,
June 5, 1973

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

SECTION 1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW

a. Ichong vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

b. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994

FACTS: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI) filed a petition for election among
supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS). Petitioner
PHILPHOS submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter, welcoming the creation of a
supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking
to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. It
provided for necessary requisites to be followed and exempt the superintendents and
professional/technical employees from the PMPI supervisory union. Then, Mediator-Arbiter
Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election. PMPI filed an
amended petition which includes the superintendents and professional/technical employees from
the PMPI supervisory union which was granted by the Mediator-Arbiter. Petitioner appealed the
order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment but the appeal was dismissed. Petitioner filed
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before respondent
Mediator-Arbiter.

RULING: No, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this case, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of due process. Petitioner agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties. Petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
Moreover, petitioner could have, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of
the other party. But it did not; instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-
Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
Secretary of Labor.

c. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

d. Alonte vs. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

e. Aniag vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994

FACTS: Commission on Election (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, which
promulgate rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other
deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of reaction
forces during election period. Petitioner Congressman Fransico B. Aniag, Jr. assails the
Resolution No. 2327 which provides for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in
gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing
spot checkpoints. Because there was a Gun Ban, Mr. Serapio P. Taccad requested the return of
the two firearms issued to him by the House of the Representatives. Ernesto Arellano, Mr.
Taccads driver, was instructed to pick up the firearms from the petitioners house and to return
them to Congress. On his way to Batasan Complex the Philippine National Police (PNP) were
conducting a check point and Arellano was apprehended and detained because when PNP
searched the car and found the firearms inside a bag in the trunk of the car. COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 92-0829 against the petitioner and Arellano for violating B.P. Blg. 881 also
known as the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was given due process.

RULING: No. The requirement of due process the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. Due process guarantees the
observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it
the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. In this case, Petitioner was merely
invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latters explanation.
Petitioner was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written
explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not the petitioner himself.
Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet
the accusation against him as he was not appraised that he was himself a respondent when he
appeared before the City Prosecutor. His filling of motion for reconsideration with COMELEC
was his vigorous insistence on his right and not as a waiver of his claim to separate preliminary
investigation for himself. Petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 was set aside for it being violative of the Constitution.

f. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818,

December 18, 1989

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

g. Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

h. Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner University refused to admit Students who are guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of
the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
The initiation rites of a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School caused the death of one of
the neophytes, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, and serious physical injuries inflicted on Bienvenido
Marquez. Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee submitted a report regarding
the investigation on the death of Lennie Villa. Students received a copy of the written notice that
requires them to submit their written statements within 24-hours which they failed to do so.
Students were placed in preventive suspension. They requested copies of the charges and
pertinent documents or affidavits. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Students have to file their written answers to the
formal charge otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their
defences. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. Petitioner Bernas wrote Dean del Castillo that he prefer the Board to leave the decision
to the Administration so that the case will also be on the University level. The Board found
respondent students guilty and found that they acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to
participate in the physical hazing. The Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Petitioner del Castillo let the President of the University to decide about the
expulsion of the respondent students. Petitioner Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on
all respondent students. But the Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the
penalty because neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. the court ordered petitioners
to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students
were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases
of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issues of the instant case.
the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza concluded its investigation and it
imposed the penalty of dismissal on respondent students Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza and
directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled
that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the charges against
them.

RULING: It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was
arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to
disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated.

The minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic

institutions:

"(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case."
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. Dean of the Ateneo
Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit within twenty-four hours their
written statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. Some of the students were able to
submit their written statements and the others failed to do so the latter were granted an extension.
Petitioners notices/letters clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to
adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before
the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog
and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

The opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
order, they were denied procedural due process but for disciplinary cases involving students need
not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted
to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of
a judicial proceeding. It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge filed before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a
criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character.

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the
same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education
Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, such right is subject, as all rights
are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.

The Court affirms petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent students.
This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools.

i. Mortel vs. Kerr, G.R. No. 156296, November 12, 2012

FACTS: Respondent Salvador E. Kerr instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against
Dennis Q. Mortel. On the fifth setting of pre-trial, Mortel and Atty. Leonuel N. Mas were not
around when the case was called. On motion of Kerr's counsel, the RTC declared Mortel as in
default and allowed Kerr to present evidence ex parte. Despite of a notice of appearance the RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Kerr ordering Mortel to pay Kerr. The RTC denied the verified
petition for relief from judgment on the ground that the petition for relief had been filed beyond
the reglementary period of 60 days based on a reckoning of the start of the period when Atty.
Mas received the notice and copy of the Order. Mortel prays that the Rules of Court be liberally
interpreted in his favor to allow his petition for review on certioraridespite the various lapses of
his counsels resulting in the loss of his opportunity to assail the resolutions of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Mortel's counsels was so gross and palpable as to
deprive him of his property without due process of law.

RULING: Yes, Mortel did not have his day in court, because he was unable to submit his
evidence to controvert the claim of Kerr about his contractual default after the RTC declared
Mortel as in default due to his counsel's failure to appear at the fifth setting of the pre-trial. Yet,
he explained that he was only late because he arrived in court a few minutes after the case had
been called. His explanation appears plausible, considering that he had unfailingly appeared in
court in the four previous settings of the pre-trial. In view of the fact that it was his first time not
to be present when the case was called at the fifth setting of the pre-trial, the RTC could have
allowed a second or a third call instead of immediately granting his adverse party's motion to
declare him as in default.

In the negligence of Atty. Mas, his non-appearance despite notice and his subsequent inaction for
his client's cause manifested his indifference and lack of professionalism, and is difficult to
comprehend considering that he was the primary cause why Mortel was declared as in default by
the RTC. The reason for the RTC's disregard of and long-delayed action upon a matter as
essential to the client and to the administration of justice in the case as the substitution of counsel
is not easy to appreciate, especially because the RTC tendered no good reason for it. Atty.
Tumulak's moves in behalf of Mortel, no matter how well intentioned, were contrary to the
pertinent rules of procedure and worked against the client's interest.

The negligence and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable that
they denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They thereby
prevented him from presenting his side, which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on
account of his defense being plausible and seemingly meritorious. A court may suspend its own
rules or except a case from them in order to serve the ends of justice; or, it may altogether
disregard the rules in a proper case. To cling to the general rule of having the ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client is only to condone rather than to
rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his cause
to his counsel.

The court re-opens the civil case for the reception of evidence for the petitioner as the defendant.

j. Valentino vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize
the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801. Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.)
and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC
in Cebu City. he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted
on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp; that he had been
infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet
an important client on that day. The car was impounded for three days, and paid for a fine of
P1,400.00 for the release of his car.

Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo
Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the
Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages. He had left his car was outside the gate of his house to
for the anay exterminator to unload his materials and equipment from the front of the residence
while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, his car was clamped the front wheel
of his car. The unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover to criminal charges.

RTC rendered its decision declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void. The taking or
deprivation of one's life, liberty or property must be done upon and with observance of the "due
process" clause of the Constitution and the non-observance or violation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process.

RULING:

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance
No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy. The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in
avowedly aiming to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of
Cebu at all times" (Section 1).

In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
elements of fairness and reasonableness. The release could be ordered by any of such officials
even without the payment of the stipulated fine. The immobilization of a vehicle by clamping
pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time
of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. The clamping would happen only to
prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. The towing
away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to
prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and
thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived
of his property.
The prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the
guaranty of due process. The clamping of the petitioners' vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No.
1664 is one of the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing.

k. Sanguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio vs. Jadewell, G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

l. Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140, January 21, 2015

FACTS: The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada a copy of the complaint
against him a criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080. Eighteen of Sen.
Estrada's co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits. Sen. Estrada filed
his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings. The Ombudsman issued the assailed Order that
Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada] to be furnished all the
filings of the respondents. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his
correspondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed for the issuance of a new
resolution dismissing the charges against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Sen. Estrada was not denied due process of law.

RULING: Yes. There was also no violation of Sen. Estrada's right to due process because there is
no rule which mandates that a respondent such as Sen. Estrada be furnished with copies of the
submissions of his co-respondents. The Ombudsman's denial in its Order of Sen. Estrada's
Request did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. There is no law or rule which requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
Sen. Estrada fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due
process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents . Neither Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada's claim.

In Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is a respondent's right to
examine only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant" while in the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a
copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to
submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. In Section 4 (b), Rule II of the
Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
not the affidavits of the co-respondents. A respondent's "access to evidence on record" in Section
4 (c), Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting
documents of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4 (a) of the same Rule II.

Sen. Estradas case involves the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case and Rule II on
the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
applies. Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial
where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence."

SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

a. People vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

b. People vs. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

FACTS: The accused, Cayat, appealed for he was prosecuted for violation of Sections 2 and 3 of
the Act No. 1639. Cayat pleaded not guilty but admitted all the facts in the information for the
reasons adduced in his demurrer. He was found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to pay
a fifty pesos fine or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Legislature passed
Act No. 1639 to secure the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their
rapid and steady march to civilization and culture.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Act No. 1639 is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws.

RULING: No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.
First, the classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is based upon the degree of civilization and culture. This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in
the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have
reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established. Second, the prohibition is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes
have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government
to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, it is intended to apply for all times as long as
those conditions exist. The Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Finally, that
the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may
be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

c. Ichong vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

d. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS: The Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition wanting the ordinance declared null and void. The respondent Judge Francisco Arca
rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void. The
Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and was signed by the
petitioner Mayor Antonio Villegas of Manila. Section 1 of said ordinance states that the aliens
should first secure an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
fifty pesos before being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or
business except those employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in
the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders
or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Penalty for
violations would be by an imprisonment or fine or both upon conviction. Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas filed a petition alleging errors committed by respondent Judge in the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge further committed a serious and patent error of law in
ruling that Ordinance No. 6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
constitution.
RULING: No. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the
City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The trial court did not commit the errors
assigned.

e. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

f. Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc., vs. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958,
June 30, 1988

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

g. Himangan vs. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

h. Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:
 i. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7,
2010

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

j. Almonte vs. Vazquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING:

k. Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February
17, 1968

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc ., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United
States of America and other foreign countries.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer,
Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being
an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. Also alleged
that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax.

Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in
view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils
the power to impose an export tax. Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, gave
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just
and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
RULING: The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these
are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions
but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for
it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class
as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected.

l. Ysaruegi vs. PAL, G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING: