G.R. No.

83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA
FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing
to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on
several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority
to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been
harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

ISSUE: pili lang kayo sa dalawa kay kani pagkasabot nako sa ilahang ginapaglaban!

WON the checkpoint is constitutional.

WON the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?
RULING: [The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in
the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to
mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Footnote:

Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990
RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs GEN. RENATO DE VILLA
FACTS:

Guys itong case na to yung MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. Basically same facts sa
previous case. Pero on a different view sa case na to:

Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said
decision. Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the
respondents, filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply.

It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court
legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared
is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the
survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the
people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.
Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed,
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.

Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints
manned by either military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d' etat (stronger
than all previous ones) was staged only last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d'
etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but
instead accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes,
hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition
have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time high. Whether or not
effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security
measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types
of articles in illegal trade.

No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government
its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or
performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare;
and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police
power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint
is evidently one of such means it has selected.

Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to
"free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a
brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief
question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to
a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.

Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials for
warrantless search and seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution.

Ruling: Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL. SO ORDERED.

The problem we face in the resolution of this petition arises from our knowledge that law
enforcement officers use checkpoints as opportunities for mulcting oppression, and other
forms of abuse. However, to completely ban checkpoints as unconstitutional is to lose sight of
the fact that the real objective behind their use is laudable and necessary, If we say that ALL
checkpoints are unconstitutional, we are banning a law enforcement measure not because it is
per se illegal but because it is being used for evil purposes by the soldiers or police who man
it.

This is another instance where the Supreme Court is urged to solve a problem of discipline
facing the executive and the military. My reluctant concurrence with the majority opinion is
premised on the hope that our top military and police officials will devise effective measures
which would insure that checkpoints are used only where absolutely needed and that the
officers who are assigned to these checkpoints discharge their duties as professional soldiers
or peace officers in the best traditions of the military and the police. I repeat that this is a
problem of enforcement and not legality.

Under Article 111, Section 2 of the Constitution, probable cause is determined "personally by
the judge," not by a soldier or a policeman. It is not for the peace officer to decide when a
warrantless search and seizure may be made save in the exceptional instances allowed, as
where a crime is being committed or before or after its commission. I can hardly believe that
the majority is seriously offering this exception as a continuing situation to justify the regular
warrantless searches at the checkpoints.

It is easy to say that "where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not
helpless." Let us at least be realistic. This Court would be the first to dismiss the complaint if
not supported by hard evidence, which we know is not easily come by. The remedy, in my
view. is to remove the source of the evil instead of leaving it unchecked and then simply
suggesting a cure, which is not even effective. It is like inoculating a patient after exposing him
to contagion.
he problem we face in the resolution of this petition arises from our knowledge that law
enforcement officers use checkpoints as opportunities for mulcting oppression, and other
forms of abuse. However, to completely ban checkpoints as unconstitutional is to lose sight of
the fact that the real objective behind their use is laudable and necessary, If we say that ALL
checkpoints are unconstitutional, we are banning a law enforcement measure not because it is
per se illegal but because it is being used for evil purposes by the soldiers or police who man
it.

This is another instance where the Supreme Court is urged to solve a problem of discipline
facing the executive and the military. My reluctant concurrence with the majority opinion is
premised on the hope that our top military and police officials will devise effective measures
which would insure that checkpoints are used only where absolutely needed and that the
officers who are assigned to these checkpoints discharge their duties as professional soldiers
or peace officers in the best traditions of the military and the police. I repeat that this is a
problem of enforcement and not legality.

G.R. No. 156320 February 14, 2007

RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: For review before the Court is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian
City, Branch 19, dated June 5, 2000, finding Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of High Powered Firearm and Ammunition under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) in Criminal Case No. 4559-98, and of violating
Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, vis--vis COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) in Criminal Case No. 4563-
98.

On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m., in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and without any prior authority, license or permit to possess or carry the
firearm hereunder described, have in his possession and control the following firearm classified
as high powered, with its corresponding ammunitions and accessory, viz:

- one (1) cal. 45 pistol (NORINCO) bearing SN 906347;

- one (1) magazine for pistol cal. 45

- seven (7) rounds live ammunitions for cal. 45,

in gross violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294.

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of
Election Offense in violation of Sec. 261 (9)3 , BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE), vis--vis
COMELEC RESOLUTION # 1958 (GUN BAN), committed as follows:

On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the Election period which is from January 11, 1998
to June 30, 1998, in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, and
unlawfully, carry in his person a cal. .45 (NORINCO) pistol, bearing serial number 906347, and
loaded with seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions, without any prior authority from the
COMELEC in gross violation of Sec. 261 (9) of BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) in relation to
COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 2958 (GUN BAN).

The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and
he was asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police saw the firearm tucked in
his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce one, the
police confiscated the firearm. It was then found tha Abenes was not a registered nor a
licensed firearm holder. The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges. Abenes
appealed to the CA alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up,
and that his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure was violated. The CA
affirmed the trial court.

Issue: W/N the checkpoint was legally set up.

Ruling:

YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the
checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the
circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure without a
warrant (plain view)

This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule,
it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required
to answer a brief question or two.

For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC.
The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to
a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need
a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping
cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the
passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights
inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers
to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plainview of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:( a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area;( b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent;(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

G.R. No. 76005 April 23, 1993

People vs. Rodelio C. Exala

Facts: On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep driven by
accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for
routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. With Bocalan
were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member
of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms
inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by
beaming a flashlight inside. He noticed a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide
and two (2) feet long with its sides bulging. He asked what it contained. There was deadening
silence. Nobody answered. Instead, the three (3) accused, Restituto B. Bocalan, Jaime P.
Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the
bag opened. He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana, napakaraming
marijuana!" At this juncture, the three (3) remained motionless in their seats and appeared
petrified with fear. They were brought to the police station that same night for further
investigation. 2

After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain more than two (2) kilos of Indian
hemp otherwise known as marijuana. 3 Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and
Jaime P. Fernandez were accordingly charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as
amended. After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment.
A fine of P25,000.00 was also imposed. 4 The other two (2) were convicted as accomplices and
received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals. Exala did not.

Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us assailing his
conviction; hence, We deal only with him in this appeal. Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation
by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala alone. 5 Bocalan claims that while on the way to
Cavite City, he and Fernandez offered Exala a ride. Exala accepted the offer and requested
Bocalan to make a detour to Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite, where he was to pick up some
clothes. They agreed and Exala got the bag which he kept beside him all the time until their
apprehension at the checkpoint. 6

Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against
him since it was obtained through a warrantless search. 7

The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court that the
conduct of Bocalan was not only unusual but also contrary to normal human experience. 8 He
alleged that he knew Exala only by face and had no personal association with him; 9 yet, on
that eventful day of 2 November 1982, he agreed to detour to Salitran which was some fifteen
(15) to twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who owned
the bag containing the marijuana is hardly credible.

On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not know the contents of the bag as
it was already in the jeep when he boarded it. Exala asserted that it was either Bocalan or
Fernandez who owned the bag. Exala swore that Bocalan and Fernandez offered him
P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame alone, but he refused.

Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana. 11 Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require
that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in
transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law simply provides thus

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand
to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed."

Accused Bocalan appealed and questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as
evidence against him since it was seized without a valid search warrant.

ISSUE: WON the extensive search of marijuana and seized without warrant during the
checkpoint admissible in evidence against the accused?

RULING:
[The 1st Division voted 3-1 to AFFIRM the conviction of the accused. Justices Grio-Aquino and
Quiason concurred with Justice Bellosillos ponencia. Justice Cruz, by his lonesome, dissented
from the majority.]

The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the admission of the
seized marijuana because he neither raised this issue before the trial court nor objected to the
admissibility of the marijuana when it was offered in evidence.

And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalans
contention deserves scant consideration because there are instances where search and
seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be
the stop-and-search without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality
of which has already been upheld by this Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa]. Vehicles are
generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering
a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments in the commission of an offense.

According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended to do
away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal
effects and belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion
of a lawful arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful stop-and-
search at a military or police checkpoint.

The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with Operational Bakal, the main
object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the
possession of unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband
passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants were asked routine
questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of which
were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At
that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and
nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared
to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained
reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a
more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited
stuff.

[NOTE: Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in his appeal to the
Supreme Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Presbitero
Velasco Jr.]

CRUZ, J., dissenting: ( important ni sya guys, very very important)

Justice Cruz maintained the proposition in his dissent in Valmonte vs. De Villa that checkpoints
and the searches and seizures incident thereto are unconstitutional. In People vs. Exala, he
expounded on this thesis:

We cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all, the articles
seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I would rather see some criminals
go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically ignored in
the oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a
conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
420 SCRA 280 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO

Facts:
On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at
Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC
gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario),
Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were
ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which
the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a
bomb and when appellant opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The
three were then brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were
investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were
made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court
rendered them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article
IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extensive search upon the appellants and the seizure of the
alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana violated there constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.

HELD:
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or
transporting illegal drugs. Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to
mean: to carry or convey from one place to another. When accused-appellant used his vehicle
to convey the package containing marijuana to an unknown destination, his act was part of the
process of transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in the crime of transporting the
prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of transporting a prohibited drug,
like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a
special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes the offense and is sufficient to validly
charge and convict an individual committing the act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the
appellant was caught transporting marijuana, the crime being mala prohibita, accused-
appellants intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof need not be shown.[56] (Underscoring
supplied)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case
No. 35233-95 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegally transporting marijuana under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and solidarity pay a fine of
P500,000.00.

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped
and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal
effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. In light then of
Vinecario et al.s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been
flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on
the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario,
when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a
member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of
the backpack were instruments of some offense.
G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the
following resolutions of the Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December
1991 for being unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution
No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases.

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on
bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using
and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House
of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car
driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the
firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner.
Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he
was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running
for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327.
He argues that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his
bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not the extensive warrantless search on the car of the petitioner on the
basis of gathering evidences is unconstitutional.

Ruling: YES. The extensive warrantless search is valid.

I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in directing the filing of an information against the petitioner for the
violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32
of R.A. No. 7166.

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.

However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in
Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and
placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have
thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional
injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of
petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms
obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It
was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting
up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due
process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet
the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the
case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms
seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

Footnotes:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (q)
Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of
business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided,
That a motor vehicle, water or aircraft shall not be considered a residence or place of business
or extension hereof . . . . (B.P. Blg. 881).

Sec. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. During the election period, no person shall bear, carry
or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street,
park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same,
unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be
suspended during the election period . . . . (R.A. No. 7166).

Sec. 33. Security Personnel and Bodyguards. During the election period, no candidate
for public office, including incumbent public officers seeking election to any public office, shall
employ, avail himself of or engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards, whether
or not such bodyguards are regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or other law enforcement agency of the Government . . . .
(ibid.).

Sec. 35. Rules and Regulations. The Commission shall issue rules and regulations to
implement this Act. Said rules shall be published in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation (ibid.).

Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall . . . . (c) Promulgate
rules and regulations implementing the provision of this Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer, and require the payment of legal fees and
collect the same in payment of any business done in the Commission, at rates that it may
provide and fix in its rules and regulations . . . . (B.P. Blg. 881).

Art. 111, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.