Admissions and Confessions in Philippine Law

3.
Admissions and Confessions
Sec. 26. Admissions of a Party
[ABON] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002
DOCTRINE: An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the
act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or any offense
necessarily included therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua.On June 11,
1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot Dennis Wong y Chua outside the Far East
Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted
to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller
machine.
Meanwhile, recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45 bullets
and an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente.
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioners car in Barrio Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9 petitioners .45
caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major
Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon City which
reads as follows:
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above he just withdrew
from the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way
out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just withdrew
(sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning
shot upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun.After a brief struggle,
my client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person and money. My client
will submit a formal statement during the proper preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my clients car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU 736) was taken by your
operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and [is] now in your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and depression and was
advised to undergo medical treatment and confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in
Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard
under your supervision pending his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without
admission of guilt on the part of my client.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-95, stating that slugs
recovered from the crime scene, on the one hand, and cartridge cases fired from petitioners
caliber .45 Mark IV pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same firearm.The
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to appear at the trial.
In order to dispense with her testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness
of the medico-legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits,which
included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as
Exhibit LL.
On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence) based on
the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission
warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond
reasonable doubt.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for
insufficiency of evidence.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground, among
others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had set in.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court nullified the Order of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 2, 1998.Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution
from establishing the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it claimed, positively
identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
HELD:
No.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its
evidence and rested its case. The trial court subsequently dismissed the case after finding that
the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against
petitioner. The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment
against petitioner, however, contested the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial court
prevented it from further identifying the genuineness and due execution of said document in the
manner that it wanted.[31]
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of a piece of
documentary evidence vis--vis the truth of its contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is
the fundamental distinction between an admission and a confession. The prosecution maintains
that the letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and argues thus: What better evidence is
there to positively identify the perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the petitioner
himself, freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?[32] According to the prosecution, this
extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest evidence of guilt.[33]
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130,
Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or
any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is charged.[34]
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such

acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.[35] Only recently in People v. Licayan,[36] the Court
distinguished confession and admission in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt

of the crime charged, while an admission is a statementby the accused, direct or implied, of
facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours) [37]
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession,
because of the unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that
admission of guilt on the part of my client. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected the prosecutions motion
to have Exhibit LL further identified in the manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the proposed
testimony of petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to testify.Aside from
covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of privileged communication, it would,
more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the
shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected
with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the latter.[39] More specifically,
said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional
advice or assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain something
in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice his client or manage the litigation.[40]
Hence, there is no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against
petitioner. The petition is GRANTED.
[ABON] People v. Lorenzo y Corsino, G.R. No. 110107, January 26, 1995
DOCTRINE: An admissible confession or admission which has been duly proved shifts to the
accused the burden of evidence to disprove, by strong evidence, that he made the admission,
or admitting it, that he is not guilty of the crime.
FACTS:
On March 30, 1992, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a policewoman, was
charged with the crime of parricide, an information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.The accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, PO1 Dolores C. Lorenzo,
armed with a bolo and a fan knife, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack and
chop one, Agapito Lorenzo, her own husband, inflicting upon him several injuries on the
different parts of his body which caused his death.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was present.
On 24 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding the appellant guilty of the
crime of parricide and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00.
Meanwhile,at the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain Isabelo Liban and SPO1
Jose Eclipse as its witnesses. The prosecution evidence tells the following story: Agapito
Lorenzo and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in Looban, Barangay 12, Balzain,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Among their neighbors are Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo
Racheta and Robert Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the Tuguegarao PNP Station was in
Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan because that was his post for the night. At about a little past
10:00 o'clock that evening, a tricycle driver went to Policeman Eclipse and reported to him a
stabbing incident in said Barangay 12;
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met PO1 Dolores
Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained
bolo and a fan knife and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store of Barangay Captain Isabelo
Liban, Policeman Eclipse saw Agapito sprawled on the ground with blood all over his body.
Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come out of his house. In the presence
and within the hearing of said barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm
surrendering because I killed my husband".
Policeman Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless body of Agapito
Lorenzo to a funeral parlor while he and Policewoman Lorenzo went to the Tuguegarao PNP
Station. Policeman Eclipse turned over Policewoman Lorenzo together with the bolo and knife
to the Desk Officer, SPO3 Urbano Aquino. Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk
Officer which was noted down in the Police Blotter.
While the defense presented the appellant herself and Romeo Racheta. It painted another
picture of the incident. It's theory is that it was not Policewoman Lorenzo but a certain Robert
Santos who killed Agapito.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found
nothing on record which showed that their impartiality had been vitiated or compromised or that
they had any motive to falsely impute upon the appellant the commission of the crime. It further
declared that when the appellant surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and
volunteered the information that she killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession
and nothing more was needed to prove her culpability. The trial court held that the confession
was admissible for it was not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The appellant was neither under police custody nor under investigation in
connection with the killing of her husband.However, the trial court rejected the story of the
defense and characterized it as "palpably a put-up scenario . . . . [A] story which runs against
the grain of ordinary reality controverts logic and assails common sense."
ISSUE: WON the appellants declaration that she killed her husband is an extrajudicial
confession.
HELD:
No.
The Court does not agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's declaration that
she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It is clear from
Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an
admission and a confession. These sections reads as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or admission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 24
Wharton 25 defines confession a s follows:

of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Underhill 26 distinguishes a confession from an admission a s follows:

A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts
which constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged
raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
While Wigmore 27 says:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the
truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it. 28
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the

appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances,
the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence,
that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing
her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court characterized her story as "palpably a
put-up scenario.
. . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails
common sense." The five reasons enumerated by it to support this conclusion are founded on or
are inferred from facts duly established by the prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on
common experience, logic, and common sense.
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant never confessed to Eclipse that she killed
her husband, she should have protested when Eclipse reported to the desk officer that she had
confessed to the killing of her husband or she should have attempted to correct the entry in the
police blotter containing this inculpatory report. The appellant demonstrated her penchant for
falsehood when, in order to refute this statement, she asserted in her brief that nothing in the
record clearly shows that she heard Eclipse making the report and that she read the entry in the
police blotter. She conveniently forgot that on cross-examination she admitted having heard
Eclipse making the report but claiming that she did not protest because she was not in her right
senses and was in a state of shock at the time.
The Court has held that the testimony of the accused is not credible where he has adopted an
attitude of indifference relative to the crime he is accused of and where he failed to inform the
police authorities and the fiscal during the investigation that it was not he but somebody else
who committed the murder.APPEALED DECISION IS AFFIRMED.
[ABON] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738 (Resolution), April 3, 2001
For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus
Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
On Evidentiary Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF

THE RULES ON EVIDENCE SPECIFICALLY, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ACTA RULE.
Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the
Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The
Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not
furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said
Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary
published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of
the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001.
The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the
Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner
even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary,
published on February 5, 2001,[4] and the third part, published on February 6, 2001.[5] It was
also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus,
petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Meanwhile, the Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized
as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be
opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na
ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too
painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name,
then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not
resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - -
- his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding
on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a
partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones
explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the
ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made.[14] To
use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo
jumbo but common sense.[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and
commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel
to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object
to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on
this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.[16]
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res
inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One
of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or
agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and
days before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the
petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang
pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you
have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.)[17] This statement of
full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of
the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would
already leave Malacanang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m.
The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na
bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)[18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.
Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the
team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his
relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always
briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for
and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the
principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by
agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said
by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the
performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with,
and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the
language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and
admissible in evidence against such principal.[20]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R.
No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.
[ABON] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002
DOCTRINE: An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the
act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or any offense
necessarily included therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua.On June 11,
1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot Dennis Wong y Chua outside the Far East
Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted
to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller
machine.
Meanwhile, recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45 bullets
and an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente.
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioners car in Barrio Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9 petitioners .45
caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major
Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon City which
reads as follows:
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above he just withdrew
from the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way
out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just withdrew
(sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning
shot upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun.After a brief struggle,
my client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person and money. My client
will submit a formal statement during the proper preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my clients car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU 736) was taken by your
operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and [is] now in your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and depression and was
advised to undergo medical treatment and confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in
Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard
under your supervision pending his confinement.
admission of guilt on the part of my client.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-95, stating that slugs
recovered from the crime scene, on the one hand, and cartridge cases fired from petitioners
caliber .45 Mark IV pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same firearm.The
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to appear at the trial.
In order to dispense with her testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness
of the medico-legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits,which
included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as
Exhibit LL.
On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence) based on
the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission
warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond
reasonable doubt.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for
insufficiency of evidence.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground, among
others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had set in.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court nullified the Order of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 2, 1998.Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution
from establishing the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it claimed, positively
identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
HELD:
No.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its
evidence and rested its case. The trial court subsequently dismissed the case after finding that
the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against
petitioner. The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment
against petitioner, however, contested the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial court
prevented it from further identifying the genuineness and due execution of said document in the
manner that it wanted.[31]
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of a piece of
documentary evidence vis--vis the truth of its contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is
the fundamental distinction between an admission and a confession. The prosecution maintains
that the letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and argues thus: What better evidence is
there to positively identify the perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the petitioner
himself, freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?[32] According to the prosecution, this
extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest evidence of guilt.[33]
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130,
Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or
any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is charged.[34]
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such

acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.[35] Only recently in People v. Licayan,[36] the Court
distinguished confession and admission in this wise:

of the crime charged, while an admission is a statementby the accused, direct or implied, of
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours) [37]
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession,
because of the unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that
admission of guilt on the part of my client. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected the prosecutions motion
to have Exhibit LL further identified in the manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the proposed
testimony of petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to testify.Aside from
covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of privileged communication, it would,
more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the
shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected
with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the latter.[39] More specifically,
said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional
advice or assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain something
in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice his client or manage the litigation.[40]
Hence, there is no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against
petitioner. The petition is GRANTED.
[ANACTA] People v. Caritativo, G.R. Nos. 145452-53, June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Larry Caritativo, was charged of the crime of murder for stabbing one Expidito "Freddie"
Mariano and Marlon Trambulo.
atalino Gonzales, Expedito Prado, Dr.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: C
Michael Jimenez and Rosalinda Mariano
(Here are two most important Testimonies related to our topic J )
Catalino Gonzales (Catalino) testified that around 3:30 a.m. on April 28, 1995, while he
was attending a dance on the occasion of the wedding of Minesa Dalida and a certain Zamora
in Sitio Bulangcog, Barangay Iriron, Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, the appellant, Larry
Caritativo, whispered to him that he was going to stab somebody. Catalino had known the
appellant for a long time because they were neighbors. Appellant's father, Peping Caritativo,
and Catalino were friends.
Catalino asked the appellant who he was going to stab. The appellant pointed to a certain
person Catalino did not know, saying that that person was the one who ran over and killed his
mother ("siya ang nakasagasa sa nanay ko"). The appellant then showed Catalino a knife
tucked in his waist. The knife was a double-bladed instrument about 8 inches long.
Catalino did not know the person singled out by the appellant. Nevertheless, he advised the
intended victim to leave the dance hall. About five minutes later, a commotion arose. People
inside the dance hall were running in different directions. Most of them ran towards the jeep
parked some ten meters away from the dance hall. Two personshad been stabbed. One was
bleeding inside the jeep while the other was sprawled on the ground, dying. One of the victims
was Freddie Mariano (the victim in this case). Catalino knew Mariano but did not know the other
victim.
At around 4:00 a.m., Catalino left the dance hall to go home. He met the appellant on the
highway, about 150 meters from the dance hall. They went home together. W hile walking, the
appellant put his arm on Catalino's shoulder and told him that he was the one who stabbed the
victims. Pointing to his stomach, the appellant said, "Dito pare, sinagad ko hanggang lumagitik
sa jeep."
ut when a vehicle passed by and its lights
Catalino did not believe the appellant at first b
focused on the appellant's white shirt, Catalino noticed blood on it. The appellant started
to run away but Catalino held his arm. Catalino told him not to run lest the people suspect him.
They then proceeded to their respective homes. Catalino's house was only one kilometer away
from the dance hall. Before they parted, the appellant told Catalino not to tell anybody about his
revelation.17
At around 7:00 a.m. of the same day (April 28, 1995), the father of the appellant, Peping
Caritativo (Peping), went to Catalino's house. Peping and Catalino were neighbors. Peping told
Catalino, "Pare, ikaw lang ang nakakaalam na nakasaksak ang aking anak." Catalino replied,
"Pare, pag nalaman ng batas 'yan delikado ka." Peping then threatened him, " Pare, ikaw lang
ang nakakaalam nito kaya delikado ka!"
The second prosecution witness was E xpedito Prado (Expedito). He testified that he had
20
known the appellant for six years. At around 3:30 a.m. on April 28, 1995, while a dance was
going on during the wedding reception of his niece, Minesa Dalida, in Sitio Bulangcog, Iriron,
Occidental Mindoro, he was seated on a chair outside a parked passenger jeep, waiting for a
ride home to Calintaan. The parked passenger jeep was about four arms length away from the
dance hall. Without noticing Expedito, the appellant entered the jeep and immediately
stabbed the two sleeping persons inside ("pag-akyat sa jeep bigla na lang sinaksak 'yung
dalawang natutulog").
When the appellant alighted, he noticed Expedito. The appellant chased him but Expedito was
able to escape. The appellant ran towards the mango tree, about 20 meters from the parked
jeep, while Expedito ran home to Poblacion, Calintaan which was about three kilometers away.
onchito Angeles, Minesa Zamora,

For its part, the defense presented four witnesses: M
Santiago Caritativo and appellant himself, Larry Caritativo.
Monchito Angeles (Monchito) testified that he arrived at the wedding party at around
7:00 p.m. on April 27, 1995. He helped in serving the food. He noticed the presence of the
appellant at around 9:00 p.m. He, his brother-in-law Herbert Montenegro, Obet Tanglaw and the
appellant held a drinking spree. After the drinking session (he could not remember the exact
time it ended), he joined the dancing in the dance hall. At around 3:30 a.m., he was dancing the
cha-cha with the appellant beside him. They suddenly heard shouting coming from where the
"Jet-Ric" passenger jeep was parked. The jeep was about 30 meters away from the dance
hall.33
People ran towards the jeep. Monchito did the same. There, he saw Freddie Mariano dead
inside the jeep and Marlon Trambulo bleeding on the ground. He helped Marlon board the jeep
with the help of Herbert Montenegro and one of Montenegros conductors.
The fourth and last defense witness was the appellant himself, Larry Caritativo
He testified that he went to the wedding party at around 7:00 p.m. on April 27, 1995. At around
3:00 a.m., he helped out in the kitchen. At 4:00 a.m., he joined the dancing at the hall. He could
not remember the names of the persons on the dance floor, except Monching (Monchito)
Angeles. Although he joined the drinking spree, he was not drunk. He did not know the victims,
Freddie Mariano and Marlon Trambulo. He was not aware of any commotion in the early
morning of April 28, 1995.
He left the dance hall at 6:00 a.m. and went home by foot. His house was two kilometers away
from the hall. He did not meet anybody on the way. He proceeded to his father's house instead
and rested there from 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. His father and mother were at home. His parents'
house was two kilometers away from his. His father told him that Freddie Mariano and Marlon
Trambulo were killed but he had no reaction to the said information. After resting, he went to the
place where the wedding was held and helped in the dismantling of the "damara." 44
He went to Manila on May 8, 1995 to look for a job. He landed a stevedoring job at Pier 2 with
the North Star Company. He worked there for two years (from May 1995 to the latter part of
1997) but lost his ID and other documents issued by North Star. He, however, had an ID of
Bantay Bayan, Manila. He was arrested on May 27, 1998 in Tondo, Manila while working as a
vendor in Divisoria at that time. From the time he left Bulangcog, he communicated with his wife
and parents through letters.
In weighing the testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court gave more credence to the
prosecution witnesses and ruled that the defense of alibi by herein appellant must fail in
the light of the following:
1. Expedito Prado could not have been mistaken in identifying the accused as the assailant of
the victim. He was seated on a chair with its back leaning at (sic) the parked passenger jeep,
more or less four (4) arms length from the place where the dancing was taking place. He saw
the accused entered (sic) the jeep and stabbed Freddie Mariano and Marlon Trambulo.
"Pag-akyat sa jeep bigla na lang sinaksak 'yung dalawang (2) natutulog." When the accused
alighted from the jeep he chased the witness but he was able to escape. (t.s.n. December 1,
1998, pages 4-6).
2. When the crime happened, the light coming from the dance hall reached the parked jeep and
you can reached (sic) the jeep within four to five seconds by running (t.s.n. March 1, 1995, page
15). The conditions for visibility were favorable, the ability of Prado as witness to recognize the
accused should be upheld.
3. The possibility of mistaken identity was also ruled out by the fact that Prado had known the
accused even before the incident (t.s.n. December 1, 1998, page 3).
4. No ill motive was imputed by accused to Prado for having testified against him, thus Prado's
testimony was no less than the untarnished truth. Prado's positive testimony that the accused
was the perpetrator of the crime remained unchallenged (t.s.n. April 23, 1999, page 24).48
The trial court also ruled that the culpability of herein appellant was further established by the
fact that he fled Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro after the commission of the crime. The trial court
did not believe his explanation that he left Calintaan to look for a job in Manila.
Finding that treachery attended the commission of the crime, the trial court convicted herein
appellant of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Catalino Gonzales of the admission of appellant Carrativo
to him of the commission of the crime, can be admitted as evidence against Carrativo.
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death.
HELD:
1. YES. We find no basis to doubt the testimony of Catalino Gonzales. Catalino testified
categorically and candidly that appellant confessed to him that he killed Freddie Mariano. And
nowhere in the records of the case did appellant ever categorically deny his admission of guilt to
Catalino Gonzales. Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
And in People vs. Maqueda,57 we ruled that:
"Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In A balle vs.
People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to
testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance." (emphasis ours)
Clearly therefore, under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the admission by the
appellant expressly acknowledging his guilt to Catalino Gonzales, a private party, can very well
be taken in evidence against him.
Moreover, the appellant failed to show any improper motive why Catalino Gonzales would testify
falsely against him. The testimony of appellant's father that the reason why Catalino testified
falsely against the appellant was because he (appellant's father) hacked Catalino's dog was
unworthy of belief, being uncorroborated and self-serving. The allegation was hollow as nothing
was offered to support it. When there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate
him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
Thus, the trial court correctly admitted in evidence the testimony of Catalino Gonzales regarding
the admission of guilt by the appellant. But appellant's admission, standing alone, is not
sufficient to convict him. Being merely an inference, appellant's admission must be supported by
some other proof which shows his culpability for the crime charged.
2. YES. In the present case, we can no longer consider treachery as an aggravating

circumstance again, this time for the purpose of imposing the death penalty, because it was
already used to qualify the killing to murder. Other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
no proof of any other aggravating circumstance was presented during the trial or alleged before
the court to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the proper penalty should only be
reclusion perpetua.
[ANACTA] Estrella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44902, April 20, 1989
FACTS:
An old woman was killed twenty-two years ago. Her killing has so far gone unpunished,
her heirs' plea for redress so far unanswered. It is time that justice is done.
The victim was Mauricia Baraceros. On January 21,1967, in Barrio San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan, she was run over by a power wagon being then driven by Rodolfo Arcalas. She
suffered injuries resulting in cerebral hemorrhage and died almost instantly.
The police conducted an investigation of the incident shortly after its occurrence in the
course of which Arcalas declared in a sworn statement that it was the power wagon he was
operating which, while backing up, had run over Mauricia Baraceros; that the wagon belonged
to the spouses Conrado Estrella and Sergia Bautista Estrella; and that he was said spouses'
driver.
A criminal case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against Rodolfo Arcalas,
but was dismissed provisionally due to the failure of the prosecution to present witnesses.
Mauricia's heirs engaged the services of counsel who, on June 27, 1967 made a written
demand on the Estrella Spouses and their driver for settlement of their claim for damages. The
demand was ignored. It appears that an offer of the Estrellas of P500.00 as settlement had
earlier been spurned by the heirs.
Two months afterwards, the heirs of Mauricia Baraceros (the private respondents herein
named) brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Estrellas and Rodolfo
Arcalas. In their complaint they alleged that Arcalas had driven the power wagon in a "wanton,
reckless and imprudent manner and without regard to the safety of life and property" and thus
caused their mother's death; that the Estrellas had "failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, defendant driver having been reckless and
careless;" and that consequently the defendants should pay P15,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The Estrellas and Arcalas, for their part, alleged in their answer that they had no
sufficient knowledge of facts and circumstances that might have caused the death of the victim,
a nonagenarian deaf and/or physically incapacitated; Arcalas had never been a careless or
reckless driver; and the defendant spouses had "always exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees, and would never allow an employee to drive if he was
reckless and careless."
In due time, and on the plaintiffs heirs' motion, the case was set for pre-trial on February 8,1968.
Now began a long series of dilatory maneuvers on the part of counsel for the Estrellas and
Arcalas.
The Estrellas' counsel moved for postponement of the pre-trial for several times. The
pre-trial was finally held on May 16, 1968. The parties tried but failed to come to an amicable
settlement. The case was set for trial on the merits on June 27, 1968. On June 27, 1968, neither
the Estrellas or Arcalas nor their counsel appeared for the trial.
he Trial Court's verdict was
On February 4, 1970, judgment was finally handed down. T
in the heirs' favor.
The Estrellas and Arcalas moved for reconsideration. The Court denied the motion. The
Estrellas and Arcalas appealed to the Court of Appeals. But it was denied.
The petitioners submit that it was error for the Appellate Court to have sanctioned the
use of Arcalas' sworn statement (Exh. B) before the police as evidence, it being hearsay in
character; to have adjudged the Estrella Spouses liable despite absence of proof of their
ownership of the vehicle and the employment relation between them and Arcalas; and to have
held that they had not been denied due process when they "were not allowed continuance to
present their defense nor to present a motion to dismiss."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn statement of Arcalas be admitted as evidence in order hold Estrella
Spouses liable.
HELD:
YES.
Arcalas' statement to the police(Exh.B),in which he declared that while he was driving a vehicle
owned by the spouses Estrella, he had "run over an old woman," constitutes competent proof it
is an extra-judicial admission, admissible pursuant to the well-known rule that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be received in evidence
against him.
It is properly receivable as proof against the declarant, it being contrary to the position taken by
him in the action. In the answer filed in behalf of the declarant, Arcalas and his co-defendants
specifically denied, for lack of "sufficient knowledge," the allegation in the complaint that "on
January 21, 1967, at about 11:00 o'clock a.m., in Barrio San Bartolome, Resales, Pangasinan,
the said motor vehicle, while being driven by defendant Arcalas, ran over one Mauricia
Baraceros resulting in the latter's untimely death." That denial is obviously inconsistent with
Arcalas' sworn written declaration that he had indeed been operating the wagon in question on
that date and time and had on that occasion "run over an old woman." It is precisely the factor of
inconsistency between that declaration and the allegations in the pleading subsequently filed by
him, concerning relevant facts, that makes the former admissible in evidence against the
declarant.
The hearsay rule has no application to the situation. The extra-judicial declaration is not
excludible on the ground of hearsay- which proscribes evidence as to which opportunity to
cross-examine is not provided to the party against whom it is adduced at the time of
presentation -since the declarant can hardly complain of not having the opportunity to
cross-examine himself at the time that his prior statement is submitted as proof against him.
The petitioners' last submittal that they should have been accorded a postponement to present
evidence in their behalf after the plaintiffs had rested, or to file a demurrer to evidence, is also
undeserving of credit. It conveniently ignores the fact that they had already delayed the
disposition of the case by many motions for cancellation of, if not indeed by failure to appear at
hearings despite notice. It conveniently ignores the fact that they were granted by the Court a
period of one month after the case had been declared submitted for decision, within which to
make one last attempt to settle the case amicably- their constant representation to the Court
being precisely that they were negotiating for such a settlement, but the month passed with
nothing at all being heard from petitioners.
[ANACTA] Cuison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88539, October 26, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of
newsprint, bond paper and scrap, with places of business at Baesa, Quezon City, and Sto.
Cristo, Binondo, Manila. Private respondent Valiant Investment Associates, on the other hand,
is a partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with business
address at Kalookan City.
From December 4, 1979 to February 15, 1980, private respondent delivered various
kinds of paper products amounting to P297,487.30 to a certain Lilian Tan of LT Trading. The
deliveries were made by respondent pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu Huy Tiac who
was then employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. It was likewise pursuant to Tiac's
instructions that the merchandise was delivered to Lilian Tan. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan paid for
the merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiu Huy
Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to private respondent as payment for the
paper products. Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, private respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the
merchandise in question, claiming that Tiu Huy Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the
manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the questioned transactions with private respondent
and Lilian Tan. Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac
and refused to pay private respondent the amount corresponding to the selling price of the
subject merchandise.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the
collection of P297,487.30 representing the price of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial
court dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the
decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence this petition.
It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiu
Huy Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. More
particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced Tiu Huy Tiac to Bernardino Villanueva, respondent's
manager, as his (petitioner's) branch manager as testified to by Bernardino Villanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner sufficient to hold
the latter liable for the disputed transaction
HELD:
YES. It is a well-established rule that one who clothes another with apparent authority as his
agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such
person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in
good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be . From the facts and the
evidence on record, there is no doubt that this rule obtains. The petition must therefore fail.
(Based on the Petitioners Testimony)

But of even greater weight than any of these testimonies, is petitioner's categorical
admission on the witness stand that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo,
Binondo, to wit:
Court:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And who was managing the store in Sto. Cristo?
A: At first it was Mr. Ang, then later Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac but I cannot remember the exact
year.
Q: So, Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac took over the management,.
A: Not that was because every afternoon, I was there, sir.
Q: But in the morning, who takes charge?
A: Tiu Huy Tiac takes charge of management and if there (sic) orders for newsprint or
bond papers they are always referred to the compound in Baesa, sir. (t.s.n., p. 16,
Session of January 20, 1981, CA decision, R ollo, p. 50, emphasis supplied).
Such admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is sufficient to

negate all the denials made by petitioner regarding the capacity of Tiu Huy Tiac to enter
into the transaction in question. F urthermore, consistent with and as an obvious indication of
the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of the Sto. Cristo branch, three (3) months after Tiu
Huy Tiac left petitioner's employ, petitioner even sent, communications to its customers notifying
them that Tiu Huy Tiac is no longer connected with petitioner's business. Such undertaking
spoke unmistakenly of Tiu Huy Tiac's valuable position as petitioner's manager than any uttered
disclaimer.
More than anything else, this act taken together with the declaration of petitioner in open
court amount to admissions under R ule 130 Section 22 of the Rules of Court, to wit :
"The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him."
For well-settled is the rule that "a man's acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if
voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. If a man's extrajudicial
admissions are admissible against him, there seems to be no reason why his admissions made
in open court, under oath, should not be accepted against him."
Moreover, petitioner's unexplained delay in disowning the transactions entered into by
Tiu Huy Tiac despite several attempts made by respondent to collect the amount from him,
proved all the more that petitioner was aware of the questioned commission was tantamount to
an admission by silence under R ule 130 Section 23 of the Rules of Court, thus: "Any act or
declaration made in the presence of and within the observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
may be given in evidence against him."
All of these point to the fact that at the time of the transaction Tiu Huy Tiac was
admittedly the manager of petitioner's store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo. Consequently, the
transaction in question as well as the concomitant obligation is valid and binding upon petitioner.
By his representations, petitioner is now estopped from disclaiming liability for the
transaction entered by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf.
More in point, we find that by the principle of estoppel, Manila Remnant is deemed to have
allowed its agent to act as though it had plenary powers. Article 1911 of the Civil Code
provides:
"Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal issolidarily liable with the agent
if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers." (Emphasis supplied)
Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party o ut of court at one time; it does not
include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any
hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and
on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of
testimony. On theother hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party
the opportunity for cross-examination.
[ANACTA] People v. Licayan y Sucano, G.R. No. 144422, February 28, 2002
FACTS:
Appellant Aldrin Licayan and Bernard Agcopra were friends from way back. On June 25,
1999, after years of absence, appellant went to Agcopra who had a machine shop in Barangay
Inobulan, Salay, Misamis Oriental, to apply for work as a grinder of engine valves. On this
occasion, they drank rum to celebrate their reunion. Romeo Bangcong, who was also Agcopras
friend, joined them later in their drinking bout. They finished drinking in Agcropas shop at 5:00
p.m.
The group continued drinking in the house of Wenny Rajal also in Barangay Inobulan,
Salay, Misamis Oriental. After consuming two bottles of Beer Grande, they bought a case of the
same drink, which they brought to the house of Romeo. When they arrived, Romeos wife
Rosalinda and his children, Rey Oriente, Raymundo and five-year old Rowena were there.
Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer anymore. He went with Romeo to the barangay
captain leaving appellant in Romeos house. When Romeo returned to his house, appellant was
embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it by saying that he missed his daughter.
Appellant kept on embracing Rowena. At 6:00 p.m., more or less, Rowena asked that
she be allowed to watch television at neighbor Dorbits house fifteen meters away. An hour
later, Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch Rowena. Thereafter, appellant also left, saying that he
would look for Agcopra. When the boy reached Dorbits house, he saw appellant there with
Rowena. Appellant told Rowena: "Day, come here because your father asked you to go home
so you can eat your supper." Appellant then held the hand of Rowena and dragged her into a
dark area. Rey Oriente, however, did not go with appellant and his sister, thinking that they were
heading for the Bangcong house.
When Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to the Dorbit house to inquire about her.
Rey Oriente told him what happened, which caused him to cry. Neighbors were alerted and
immediately formed a posse to look for the girl. While searching for Rowena, they spotted
osse
appellant when they trained a flashlight to him. Appellant ran towards the ricefield. The p
chased him, but failed to catch him when he jumped into the deep Inobulan River. When
appellant passed by a group of men who offered him a drink, his clothes were wet and his body
was muddy. He had no slippers. That same night, appellant was arrested by the police.
The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found at the swamps,
where appellant told Rogelio Dahilan, Jr., one of the searchers, she would be. Photographs
were taken of the girl. A postmortem examination of the girl revealed that she had hematomas,
lacerations, abrasions all over her body, as well as a deep incomplete hymenal laceration at the
6:00 oclock position. The cause of death was asphyxia by submersion in water. Rowena died a
painful death.
As stated earlier, after the prosecution had rested its case and formally offered its
evidence, accused-appellant escaped detention and has remained at large despite efforts to
apprehend him. Accused-appellants escape should be considered a waiver of his right to be
present at the trial and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not
prevent the court from continuing with the trial because the escapee is deemed to have received
notice.
ircumstantial evidence.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant was convicted on the basis of c
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the foregoing circumstances are insufficient to prove
his guilt. He argues that:
1.] the first three (3) circumstances do not point to accused-appellants guilt;
2.] prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano who was among those who organized the search
party, is not credible because he did not shout upon finding accused-appellant;
3.] the witnesses could not have seen accused-appellant in the darkness;
4.] the witnesses could have seen somebody else;
5.] assuming that accused-appellant was the one seen by the posse, he was not committing any
wrong by running away;
6.] the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them where Rowenas body
could be found based on accused-appellants admission is hearsay;
7.] granting that accused-appellant revealed where Rowenas lifeless body could be found, he
never admitted having raped and killed her;
8.] the admission made by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is inadmissible; 9.] the
circumstance that accused-appellant was seen with wet pants, muddy body and without slippers
lacks probative value; and 10.] there were no tell-tale signs that accused-appellant was
dragging Rowena to the swamp.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant is sufficient enough to
warrant his conviction.
HELD:
YES.
The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but
together. Like strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced
from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like weaving a tapestry of
events that will culminate in a clear picture that will reveal a convincing scenario pointing
towards the accused as the author of the crime.
The credibility of prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano cannot be impeached by the
mere fact that he failed to rouse other members of the search party when he found the
accused-appellant. Suffice it to state that different people react differently to a given
stimulus or type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
The contention that accused-appellant could not have been identified from a distance of
about twenty (20) meters in the dark is untenable, considering that illumination produced
by a flashlight or kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow the identification of persons.
Accused-appellants argument that he did not commit any wrong in running away upon
being espied by the search party likewise deserves scant consideration. Courts go by
the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as
bold as a lion."Accused-appellant has not satisfactorily explained why he fled upon being
spotted by the posse.
In People v. Templo, we held that "the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. One type of act that
can be given in evidence against him is flight. In criminal law, flight means an act of
evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. T he unexplained
flight of the accused person may as a general rule be taken as evidence having
tendency to establish his guilt." In short, flight is an indication of guilt. What
makes flight particularly damaging for accused-appellant is that he fled t wice, i.e. first,
upon being spotted by the search party and second, by scaling the perimeter fence of
the Provincial Jail while he was in the custody of the law and undergoing trial.
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by Rogelio "Jun-jun"
Dahilan, Jr. as to the location of the victims body is hearsay. A ny oral or documentary
evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was
never presented on the witness stand, because it is the opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. In the
instant case, Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accused-appellant indeed told him where
the victims body can be found. What is more, the victims body was actually recovered
at the location pointed by accused-appellant.
Accused-appellants objection to the admissibility of his statement as to where he
dumped the body of the victim, which allegedly partakes of an extra-judicial confession,
is just as tenuous. The foregoing is n ot an extra-judicial c onfession, but merely an
extra-judicial admission.
**(Confession vs Admission)**
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the
accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue, and tending, in connection with
proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less
than a confession and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, he was in fact seen grabbing and dragging the
struggling victim from the house where she was watching television by Rey Oriente, the
victims elder brother.
While accused-appellant indeed did not admit to anyone that he raped and killed
Rowena, the prevailing circumstances overwhelmingly point to his guilt. As stated earlier,
direct evidence is not always necessary to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. A witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, hut
he may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as when the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime, as in this case.
In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety are as convincing as direct
evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of the accused-appellant. In other words, the
circumstantial evidence against accused-appellant fully justifies the finding of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony committed.
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four basic guidelines must be
observed:
1) it should be acted upon with caution;
2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and
4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. The
peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from
scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put
together reveals a convincing picture pointing towards the conclusion the accused is the author
of the crime.
[ANG] People v. Zuela y Morandarte, G.R. No. 112177, January 28, 2000
FACTS: The case involved the conviction of the three accused TITO ZUELA y MORANDARTE,
MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES, and NELSON GARCIA y TEMPORAS of the crime of
robbery with homicide. In the evening of April 27, 1985 in Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
aiding each other, with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with violence and intimidation against persons, that is by shooting and stabbing one Hegino
Hernandez, Sr., Maria S. Abendao and John-John Abendao, thereby inflicting upon them
mortal injuries that caused their instantaneous death, take, rob and carry away the following
personal properties belonging to the said Maria Abendao.
Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was
committed with the testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the extrajudicial
admission given by Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the Camaligan
municipal jail. The three accused were arrested without an arrest warrant and underwent
custodial investigation without assistance of counsel. They signed a statement of confession
allegedly under duress by the police. Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual
statements before Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur on three (3) different dates. She followed the same procedure and line of
questioning, using the local dialect, in ascertaining the voluntariness of the three (3) accused's
confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his companions to leave her and the accused inside the
chamber. Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their rights and that they voluntarily
executed their statements, she had them sign their individual extrajudicial statements.
Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial and (2) that they were
tortured and forced to make a confession. In addition, Tito and Nelson claimed they were not
assisted by counsel when their confessions were taken.
Thereafter, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the three (3) accused of
robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid confession (NO)
Wheter or not Romualda Algarins testimony regarding the accuseds extrajudicia
confession may be given weight (YES)
HELD: Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson
was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants' sworn statements did not leave a void in the
prosecution's case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to
Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is
admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court stating that the "act, declaration for omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary
value to Romualda's testimony.
The defense failed to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Romualda for testifying on
accused-appellant Maximo's admission and therefore the presumption that in so testifying, she
was impelled by no other reason than to tell the truth, stands. The fact that she is related to two
of the victims did not render her testimony incredible. Relationship per se is not proof of
prejudice. She might have been mistaken as to the date when she talked with
accused-appellant Maximo while he was detained considering the more than three-year gap
between June 1985 and September to October 1988 when Romualda testified. However, it is
not necessary that the witness should be able to fix accurately the date of the conversation in
which the admission was made. What is important is that the witness is able to state the
substance of the conversation or declaration.
Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission sealed not only the latter's
fate but also that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because the
latter has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and therefore, as against him, the
confession is hearsay, is not applicable here. What is involved here is an admission, not a
confession. A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case,
of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witness
Romualda on accused-appellant Maximo's declaration. They could have questioned its veracity
by presenting evidence in support of their defenses of denial and a libi so they could put to test
Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualda's testimony, which the trial court
correctly considered as credible, stands unscathed.
[ANG] People v. Omictin y Singco, G.R. No. 188130, July 26, 2010
FACTS:
Mary Lou Omictin was engaged in illegal recruitment and was able to take 40k php from
3 unsuspecting victims (Guevara, Caponpon, and Mago) and 16k php from another (Ambrosio).
An entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the marked money, Omictin was
arrested by the accompanying NBI agents. Omictin was found guilty of violating Section 6, in
relation to Sec. 7(b), of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995. Specifically, accused-appellant was charged with and adjudged guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of Estafa.
Aggrieved, Omictin appealed to the CA, raising in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant,
the following issues:
(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa Dotenes, who issued a
check in favor of accused-appellant in behalf of Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting
testimony of Dotenes who was not presented by the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is
unsubstantiated and hearsay; and
(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt presented to show payment to
accused-appellant, rendering his testimony uncorroborated and self-serving.
CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not presented by
the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay.
HELD: No. The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all
testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay". Petitioner fails to take
into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court.
Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they
do not include a partys testimony as a witness in court. Self-serving statements are
inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and
their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a partys
testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for
cross-examination.
Even assuming that the testimonies are selfserving, Omictin admitted and established
the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of
PhP 16,000 through her testimony.
[ANG] Heirs of Clemea y Zurbano v. Heirs of Bien, G.R. No. 155508, September 11, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case before the RTC which they claim ownership over a land.
Defendants was long before been terminated as administrator to the estate of Pedro Clemea y
Conde who deliberately continued to occupy and usurp possession and use of the disputed land
and refused to relinquish possession of the same to the lawful owner thereof. But defendants
claim that they are In exclusive possession over the disputed land and his claim of ownership
was based on sale by estate of late Pedro Clemea y Conde to his predecessor-in-interest.
RTC ruled declaring petitioners absolute owners of the land and directing respondents to
respect petitioners possession but later the RTC reconsidered its decision and found that
contending parties failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and therefore the land in
question still belongs to the original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issue
relating to the two (2) parcel of land but reversed the ruling on ownership of land and proceeded
to award respondents P118,000 as compensatory damages of their deprived shares of
possession in the harvest based on the testimony of Gregorio Clemea hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals to determine award of damages
self-serving and not proper basis for such award?
RULING:
Petitioners proposition that Gregorio Clemeas testimony was self-serving and not
proper basis for the award of damages is just unworthy of the Courts consideration.
Self-serving evidence is not a weapon to devalue and discredit a partys testimony favorable to
his cause. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves it
proponents interest, the term refers only to acts or declarations made by party in his own
interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he
gives as a witness in court, also refers to the lack of opportunity for cross-examination
by the adverse party and on the consideration that it admission would open the door to
fraud and fabrication. At any rate, for all their protestations against the use of Gregorio
Clemeas testimony, petitioner never once alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony
was inaccurate or untrue. Petitioners objection is founded solely on the mere fact the he, being
a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of the case. The partys interest may to some
extent affect his credibility as witness. The court cannot subscribe to the view, implicit to
petitioners argument, that a partys testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on
account solely of his interest in the case. As held in National Development Company v.
Workmens Compensation Commission, that interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a
partys testimony, the interest of witness cannot ipso facto deprive his testimony probative force
or require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness
testimony as he finds credible the reject the rest. The award of damages stands.
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible
[ANG] People v. Magdadaro y Gerona, G.R. Nos. 89370-72, May 15, 1991
FACTS:The Complainant, Beverlinda Abrasado, is a 16-year old country girl, a Grade VI
student, daughter of Leonardo Abrasado. The latter is a tenant of accused-appellant Magdadaro
at the latter's farm at Balubal, Cagayan de Oro City. Beverlinda helps her father till the farm.
Appellant is a farmer, 54 years of age, married residing at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City.
Beverlinda was raped three times by the accused, with each time boxing her in the
stomach, and thereafter threatened the victim not to tell anyone at risk of her life and her family.
During the last rape, Leonardo Abrasado, Beverlinda's father, heard the shouts and proceeded
towards the direction where they came from. Leonardo testified that upon reaching there, he
could hardly believe his eyes when he saw Appellant, his own landlord, abusing his own
daughter. Engaged, he called "Gaw" and unsheathed his bolo. But Appellant was quick on his
feet, stood up, naked from waist down, and ran away, leaving his pants', his underwear and his
hat in his haste. The father chased Appellant but lost the latter lost in the bushes.
Appellant was found about two hours later by some members of the Bantay Bayan and
the military, approximately 300 meters away from the place of the incident, still hiding in the
bushes (Tsn., 29 September 1988, p. 18). He was "wearing his coat, but no pants, he just
wrapped himself in the lower portion of his body with a long sleeved sweater." The witness
asked him if he was Paulino Magdadaro and "why did you do it?" but the latter did not answer
(ibid., pp. 10-11). Appellant was then taken to the checkpoint of the PC detachment by Sgts.
Lustre and Viras.
When the search party arrived at the scene of the incident, they found the corn plants
toppled down, a pair of long pants, a pair of briefs, a hat and the underwear of a woman.
Beverlinda was also still there, seated, crying. The accused was convicted of three counts of
rape and sentenced with three penalties of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt.
HELD: YES. Appellant's offers to settle the case in exchange for money or land, which were all
rejected by Beverlinda's father, were correctly appreciated by the Trial Court as evidential of his
culpability. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
Discrepancies there may be in Beverlinda's testimony and her affidavit where she did not
mention that Appellant had boxed her but instead said that she had been pushed. Be it one or
the other, however, the inconsistency will not affect the crucial fact that Beverlinda had suffered
disgrace at Appellant's hands. Moreover, as we have consistently held, an affidavit, being taken
ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion,
sometimes for want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject
Civil Cases
[BERNARDO] Smith Bell and Co. (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56294,
May 20, 1991
FACTS: In the early morning of 3 May 1970at exactly 0350 hours, on the approaches to the
port of Manila near Caballo Island, a collision took place between the M/V "Don Carlos," an
inter-island vessel owned and operated by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong and
Company ("Go Thong"), and the M/S "Yotai Maru," a merchant vessel of Japanese registry. The
"Don Carlos" was then sailing south bound leaving the port of Manila for Cebu, while the "Yotai
Maru" was approaching the port of Manila, coming in from Kobe, Japan. The bow of the "Don
Carlos" rammed the portside (left side) of the "Yotai Maru" inflicting a three (3) cm. gaping hole
on her portside near Hatch No. 3, through which seawater rushed in and flooded that hatch and
her bottom tanks, damaging all the cargo stowed therein.
The consignees of the damaged cargo got paid by their insurance companies. The
insurance companies in turn, having been subrogated to the interests of the consignees of the
damaged cargo, commenced actions against private respondent Go Thong for damages
sustained by the various shipments in the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of
First Instance of Manila held that the he officers and crew of the "Don Carlos" had been
negligent that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and accordingly held
respondent Go Thong liable for damages to the plaintiff insurance companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in evidence against the person
making the offer.
HELD: NO. Private respondent Go Thong also argues that a compromise agreement entered
into between Sanyo Shipping Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of
the "Don Carlos," under which the former paid P268,000.00 to the latter, effectively settled that
the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault. This argument is wanting in both factual basis and legal
substance. True it is that by virtue of the compromise agreement, the owner of the "Yotai Maru"
paid a sum of money to the owner of the "Don Carlos." Nowhere, however, in the compromise
agreement did the owner of the "Yotai Maru " admit or concede that the "Yotai Maru" had been
at fault in the collision. The familiar rule is that "an offer of compromise is not an admission that
anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer." 11 A
compromise is an agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in order to forestall or put
an end to a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, an adjustment which everyone
of them prefers to the hope of gaining more, balanced by the danger of losing more. 12 An offer
to compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant
that he is legally liable, nor on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or
even doubtful, since the compromise is arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding further
controversy and saving the expenses of litigation. 13 It is of the very nature of an offer of
compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of mutual
concessions. 14 The above rule on compromises is anchored on public policy of the most
insistent and basic kind; that the incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration
shortened to the maximum extent feasible.
[BERNARDO] Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109172,
August 19, 1994
FACTS: Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted several financial
accommodations amounting to P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were
evidenced and secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering three
parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and inventories. Unable to settle
its obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by respondent bank, a
restructuring of the remaining indebtedness which then amounted to P1,057,500.00, as all the
previous payments made were applied to penalties and interests. To secure the re-structured
loan of P1,213,400.00, three new promissory notes were executed by Trans-Pacific. The
mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other parcels of
land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels of land were
then sold and the proceeds amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned
over to the bank and applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Subsequently, respondent
bank returned the duplicate original copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with
the word "PAID" stamped thereon. Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985,
Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00
representing accrued interest. According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously
released. Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by
respondent bank. Later, it had a change of heart and instead initiated an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati for specific performance and damages. There it prayed that the
mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and that its
obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in evidence against the person
making the offer.
HELD: Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission
that anything is due and is inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad rule. To determine the admissibility or
non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the
party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but
offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v.
Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective
admission of a borrower's loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is what petitioner did in the case before us for
review.
[BERNARDO] Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, G.R. No. 168071, December 18, 2006
FACTS: Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject premises, the Ides ORacca Building since
1959. The Ides ORacca Building, located at the corner of M. de Santos and Folgueras Streets
in Binondo, Manila, is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On 18 May 1992, Rodil
Enterprises and the Republic, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), entered into a Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the Ides ORacca Building. A
space thereof, known as Botica Divisoria was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan. In
Rodil Enterprises Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, the former alleged
that Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease. In his Answer, Luciano
Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides ORacca Building
and not of Rodil Enterprises. According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in
civil cases that an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot overlook the frank representations by Luciano
Tans counsel of the formers liability in the form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate.
The foregoing gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a fact, like
the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus, admissible. The
court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the periodic
consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from
disavowing the fact of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears. Tan
posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,36 which states, inter alia, that an offer of
compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability.
ISSUE:
HELD: The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability.
It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This
much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,37 to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances

of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party
denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and
avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party
making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the
claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII,
p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer of
settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance. In the case at bar, the MeTC
and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners admission as an exception to the
general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence of
the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the formers liability in the form
of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment
of petitioners liability on the subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC.
Indeed, the existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by
petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May
1992, the validity of which has been upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No.
129609 and G.R. No. 135537.
Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but
also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated
27 June 2000 was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of
P440,000.00, representing petitioners unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and
that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of
each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioners judicial admission in open court, as found by
the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular significance when viewed
together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that
the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the present amounted
to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the
same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not. A
judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.
[BERNARDO] Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117728, June 26,
1996
FACTS: Servicewide Specialists, Inc. (Servicewide) filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of
money with damages before the then Court of First Instance Manila, Branch V against private
respondents Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa (Tolosa spouses) and one John Doe. Servicewide
alleged that on January 15, 1981, the Tolosa spouses purchased from Amante Motor Works
one (1) Isuzu passenger-type jeepney and the spouses failed to pay the installments due on the
purchase price despite several demands. They claimed that they purchased one jeepney unit
from Binan Motor Sales Corporation (Binan Motors), not Amante Motor Works; that in January
1981, they ordered another unit from the same corporation through the proddings of its
President and General Manager, Eduardo Garcia; that Garcia informed the spouses that the
additional unit shall be "house financed" by Binan Motors; that Eduardo Tolosa noticed that the
vendor indicated in the deed of sale was not Binan Motors but Amante Motor Works; that Garcia
explained to Tolosa that he (Garcia) was to make full payment on the jeepney to Amante Motor
Works and that he (Tolosa) was to pay Garcia the monthly installments thereon; that Tolosa
never received any notice from Binan Motors about the jeepney unit he ordered. On June 10,
1982, Servicewide amended its complaint by adding Eduardo Garcia as the defendant in place
of John Doe. Servicewide alleged that the Tolosa spouses, without Servicewide's knowledge
and consent, executed and delivered to Eduardo Garcia a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage" over the jeepney sought to be recovered. Petitioner insists that there is enough
evidence to prove Garcia's liability, viz.: (1) the pleadings filed by Garcia and Binan Motors,
specifically, the "Answer" to the complaint and the "Answer to Complaint in Intervention" where
Garcia admitted selling the mortgaged vehicle to the Tolosas which also show that he sold the
same vehicle to Bartina during the effectivity of the mortgage; (2) the testimony of Lourdes
Bartina where she declared that the same mortgaged vehicle was indeed sold to her by Garcia
and Binan Motors; (3) Garcia's subsequent compromise with Bartina which proves his liability
for the obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors
can be taken as admission of Garcias liability.
HELD: NO. The compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be taken as
an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of
any liability. 39 With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an
admission of liability on the part of the parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise
settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely
admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, 40 nor is a
compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else. 41 The policy of the
law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third
parties are not in any way affected thereby.
[BULLECER] El Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. L-21911, September
15, 1924
FACTS:
INSULAR LUMBER had a lighter (a flat-bottomed barge used for transporting cargo, esp in
loading or unloading a ship) called Tatlo which was to be repaired by EL VARADERO de
Manila. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could be, secured from any
other company. When repairs were completed and EL VARADERO gave INSULAR LUMBER
the bill, the latter (INSULAR LUMBER) refused to pay because it was of the opinion that the
price was grossly exorbitant. INSULAR LUMBER, hence, offered a compromise, but they
disagreed. Hence, they went to court. In the CFI, they entered a compromise again. Ultimately,
they never settled on an agreed figure, because CFI merely adopted INSULAR LUMBERs
proposal (CFI was so impressed with their testimony). Dissatisfied, EL VARADERO appealed to
SC (no appeal to CA was mentioned).
ISSUE:
Whether the compromise must be excluded in arriving at a correct figure of liability?
HELD:
NO. The general rule is that an offer of compromise is inadmissible. Where, however, the
amount named in the offer to accept a certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived
he rule of exclusion of compromise
at as a fair estimate of value, it is relevant. T
negotiations does not apply where there is no denial expressed or implied of liability, and
the only questions discussed relate to the amount to be paid (as in this case).
SC considered 3 points which assisted them in rendering judgment: 1 st point GR: Compromise
is inadmissible. Where, however, the amount named in the offer to accept a certain sum in
settlement appears to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, it is relevant. Here, there
was no denial of liability and the only question discussed was the amount to be paid which EL
VARADERO insisted should not be less than P10,241.37, and which INSULAR LUMBER
insisted should not be more than P8,070.12. 2nd point testimony of one Mariano Yengko, a
disinterested witness and is an inspector of vessels, assessed the fair value of the repairs at
P5,134.20, but which, on cross examination, he raised to between 7K and 8K. 3rd point the
tacit understanding between the parties was that the cost of the repairs should be approximately
the same as what other companies would charge. INSULAR LUMBER admits that El Varadero
de Navotas (another branch of El Varadero) would have done the work for about P8,000.
Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the
reasonable value of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by
INSULAR LUMBER Company, was something less than P8,000. We fix the sum definitely at
P7,700.
[BULLECER]Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PAL Employees Savings & Loan Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(PESALA) is a private non-stock corporation, the principal purposes of which are "(t)o promote
and cultivate the habit of thrift and saving among its members; and to that end, to receive
moneys on deposits from said members; (t)o loan said deposits to members when in need."
With the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3779 (Savings and Loan Association Law),
PESALA submitted the necessary requirements to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) so
that PESALA will be authorized to operate as a savings and loan association to which the BSP
issued to PESALA Certificate of Authority No. C-062. Since then and until the filing of the
present case before the trial court, PAL religiously complied with its arrangement with
PESALA to carry-out the payroll deductions of the loan repayments, capital contributions, and
deposits of PESALA members. The controversy began on July 11, 1997, when PESALA
received from PAL, a Letter informing it that PAL shall implement a maximum 40% salary
deduction on all its Philippine-based employees effective August 1, 1997. The Letter stated
that, as all present Philippine-based collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) contain this
maximum 40% salary deduction provision and to prevent "zero net pay" situations, PAL was
going to strictly enforce said provision.
Foreseeing difficulties, PESALA estimated that if the 40% ceiling will be implemented, "then
only around 8% (P19,200,000.00) of the total monthly payroll of P240,000,000.00 due to
PESALA will be collected by PAL. The balance of around P48,000,000.00 will have to be
collected directly by plaintiff PESALA from its members who number around 13,000 and who
have different offices nationwide." PESALA claimed that this scenario is highly impossible as
PESALA was only ninth in the priority order of payroll deductions. In the obtaining
circumstances, PESALA's computation showed that "(t)here will remain an uncollected
amount of P38,400,000.00 monthly for which plaintiff will suffer loss of interest income of
around P3,840,000.00 monthly."
PESALA filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Damages or Declaratory Relief with a
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction before the RTC of Pasay City, and
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1026.
After a finding that the alleged CBA provision on the maximum 40% deduction was applicable
only to union dues, and as the PESALA deductions were duly authorized by the
member-employees, the RTC granted the injunctive writ prayed for by PESALA, enjoining
PAL, Blanco, and all other persons or officials acting under them from implementing the
maximum 40% limitation on salary deductions, and ordering PAL to strictly enforce the payroll
deductions in favor of PESALA until further orders from the court.
In an Order dated March 11, 1998, the RTC ordered PAL to remit to PESALA the amount of
P44,488,716.41.
Despite said assurances, PAL still failed to make good its word. On January 17, 2000,
PESALA filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against Blanco, Mr. Avelino L. Zapanta (then
PAL President), and Mr. Andrew L. Huang (then PAL Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief
Financial Officer) before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
00-0016, and consolidated with Civil Case No. 97-1026.
In the Decision dated November 6, 2002, the RTC made the writ of preliminary injunction
earlier issued as permanent, thus ordering PAL and its officials to strictly comply with and
implement the arrangement between the parties whereby PAL deducts from the salaries of
PESALA members through payroll deductions the loan repayments, capital contributions and
deposits of said members, and to remit the same to PESALA.
AL, through its then counsel Atty. Emmanuel Pena
It is also worth mentioning that P
and then Labor Affairs OIC Atty. Jose C. Blanco, acknowledged its liability to PESALA in
the amount of P44,488,716.41. In open court, during the hearing held on December 4,
1998, Atty. Pena and Atty. Blanco assured that: (1) PAL will regularly remit to PESALA the
full amount per pay period that is due to the latter; and (2) PAL will likewise pay PESALA the
balance of the previously undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 by January 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PALs admission falls under one of the exceptions to the rule of exclusion
of compromise negotiations.
HELD:
Yes. Even if viewed as an offer of compromise, which is generally inadmissible in evidence
against the offeror in civil cases, PAL's acknowledgment of its liability to PESALA in the
amount of P44,488,716.41 falls under one of the exceptions to the rule of exclusion of
compromise negotiations.
In Tan v. Rodil, 41 the Court, citing the case of V
aradero de Manila v. Insular Lumber
Co., held that if there is neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the
course of negotiations the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff, then such
offer of the defendant can be taken in evidence against him.
In the case at bar, PAL admitted the amount of P44,488,716.41 without an
expressed nor implied denial of liability. This admission, coupled with an assurance of
payment, binds PAL.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) is ordered to REMIT to PAL Employees Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) the principal amount of P44,488,716.41, with interest at
the rate of 6% per annum computed from March 11, 1998 until fully remitted, without
prejudice to the right of PAL to be reimbursed the principal amount by the concerned
PESALA members.
|||
Criminal Cases
[BULLECER]People v. De Joya y Cruz, G.R. No. 75028, November 8, 1991
FACTS:
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide. At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial,
the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed
with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age,
disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in
the dwelling of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot
be imposed against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code.The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay
damages in the amount of P550.00.
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in
convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin
Valencia a 10-year old boy: Si Paqui";
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the
deceased victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide,
between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which
appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house without the consent of the
victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according
to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from
the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she
had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the
afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding
a bicycle and doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the
four-day wake.
In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against
appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel
to settle the case amicably".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony given by the son-in-law of the deceased as to the
supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to settle the criminal charge
amicably is conclusive.
HELD:
No. We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed
attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is
concerned. We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provides that:
"SECTION 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is
not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence
against the person making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt." (Emphasis
supplied)
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a
member of the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise"
had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part
of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself
made no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably
through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe that
appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not
fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia
Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a
conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery
with homicide.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete,
aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not
necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain
Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the
instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after
considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the judgment of
conviction.
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of robbery
and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable. The decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt.
[BULLECER]People v. Mejia y Villafania, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 & 119407, July 7, 1997
FACTS:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin
attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab
wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One
of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the
middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of
the injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph
Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another
unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the
incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead three
days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at large.|||
.A. No.
Three (3) separate criminal complaints for murder, frustrated murder and violation of R
6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended) were filed against the accused. The first two
cases were assigned to the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, presided by Judge Crispin L aron,
astillo of Branch 43 of the same court.
while the third case was assigned to Judge Silverio C
At the arraignment, the four accused entered a plea of innocence in each case.
After trial, the Laron court convicted the accused of murder and frustrated murder, while the
Castillo court convicted them of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act.
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the
identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the part of the latter,
and the offer of the parents of the accused to compromise the cases.|||
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court properly applied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the ROC.
HELD:
No. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. There is no evidence
whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the
matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of Catugas that
the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical
bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.|||Catugas had ulterior motive in
implicating the appellants. He demanded P80,000.00 from the parents of the appellants in
consideration of his exculpatory testimony. But the parents could not deliver the money as they
cannot afford it. There is no evidence that any of the appellants authorized his parents to
approach Catugas or knew the matter of the payment of the P80,000.00.
The Supreme Court ruled that while the prosecution evidence has established beyond doubt the
carnapping of the passenger jeepney, it is not convinced with moral certainty that the appellants
committed the crimes charged. The nine persons happened to be passengers of the jeepney by
accident, not by design. Witness Catugas admitted that he recognized only three of the nine
persons. In the Castillo court, Catugas declared that he was stabbed by the nine persons, but
on cross-examination he candidly admitted that only one person stabbed him but he could not
remember anymore the person. He also admitted that none of the appellants participated in the
stabbing of the jeepney driver.
Decision reversed and appellants are acquitted.
|
[CANA] San Miguel Corp. v775. Kalalo, G.R. No. 185522, June 13, 2012
FACTS: As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer
products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior
to the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank
check and a check to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods
delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the actual
amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and cases
from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the actual
amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank check, and respondent would
fund her account accordingly.
In time, respondent's business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC
increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it
became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she requested
regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply.
In 2000, SMC's agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the
probable increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her of the
breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making several cash
payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed that she still
owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it provide her with a detailed
statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC to
update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had
issued to petitioner. On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo,
petitioner SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks. AHDaET
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC,
respondent's counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein Kalalo "acknowledge[d]
the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum of P816,689.00" and
"submitt[ed] a proposal by way of 'Compromise Agreement' to settle the said obligation."
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a
ouncing Checks Law.
Complaint against respondent for violating the B
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During trial,
and after the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash
payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the Statement
of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner was P71,009.
Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at the time she had
the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that she
did not know how much she actually owed petitioner.
ISSUE: whether or not the offer of compromise by the petitioner is an admission of his liability.
HELD: NO. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an
express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was thereceipt of
the statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be
considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as evidence against the
offeror: CHDAaS
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is
entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her
efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as
privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a
person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary
litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a
compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of
weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as
admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal
contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally
liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful,
since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It
is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively,
hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions. (citations omitted)
Petitioner further argues that respondent's Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt. It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
which states:
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise
is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5
December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March
2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not
made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied
admission of guilt. SHCaEA
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account
from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the
time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioner's
agents. The trial courts and the CA gave weight to her justification, and we find no cogent
reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise may not be
considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to
petitioner in the amount of P921,215.
[CANA] People v. Manuel, G.R. No. 92503, July 8, 1991
FACTS: At the early dawn of November 28, 1987, complainant Dolores Biag, a 15-year old and
single college student, along with seven (7) other persons, were hiking home to Pinaripad,
Aglipay, Quirino. They came from sitio Dalemdem, Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino where they
attended a birthday party of one of their friends.
"After their other companions were already in their respective houses, appellant Camilo Manuel,
who was behind the complainant and Benita Cabigat, suddenly grabbed complainant's hand,
twisted it at her back, covered her mouth with his hand and dragged her to a waiting shed. At
this juncture, Benita Cabigat ran away.
"At the waiting shed, appellant made his sexual advances. Initially, complainant resisted. But
appellant boxed her twice which rendered her unconscious. Thus, appellant succeeded in
ravishing and deflowering her.
"After she regained consciousness, appellant was no longer there and she was writhing in pain.
Her clothes were torn. Then she cried.
"Hearing her cries, Benita Cabigat came to her succor. Cabigat brought complainant to the
house of Cabigat's sister. When asked why complainant was crying, she did not answer.
Cabigat then accompanied her home.
"Upon reaching their house, complainant revealed everything to her parents, that her honor and
reputation could no longer be redeemed. Her mother immediately reported the incident to their
Barangay Captain who happens to be the uncle of appellant. Appellant's parents, their
daughter-in-law and brother went to complainant's house to settle amicably the case. Appellant
would marry complainant.
"Complainant, however, refused to marry appellant. On November 30, 1989, she together with
her mother and brother went to the Integrated National Police of Aglipay, Quirino and formally
filed her complaint against appellant
ISSUE: won the offer of compromise here is an admission of guilt.

HELD: YES. It pointed out that the offer of the appellant's family to simply settle the case
constitutes an implied admission of guilt, the rule being that "(i)n criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt." As it also aptly observed, the propositions or insinuations of marriage were all rejected by
complainant, which acts reinforce her credibility and resolute desire to bring to the bar of justice
the man who had ruined her life and shattered her future. In P eople vs. Manzano, we held that
the attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case with the complainant was
considered an implied admission of guilt. We have further ruled that an offer of marriage by the
accused, during the investigation of the rape case, is also an admission of guilt.
On the other hand, while appellant claims that he and the complainant were sweethearts, he
miserably failed to substantiate this allegation. He had never even actually visited the victim in
her home prior to the rape, nor could he come up with any other proof of his alleged past
romantic relations with the complainant. In P eople vs. Valdez, supra, the Court definitely found a
similar story of the appellant therein to be untrue on the ground that if the said appellant and
complainant were really sweethearts, the latter would have readily accepted the former's
proposal of marriage. Had there been love between the two, the girl would not have jeopardized
their relationship by exposing everything to her mother and to the authorities, much less by filing
a complaint for rape against him and publicly testifying therein. On the foregoing premises and
our own calibration of the evidence, we are convinced that the pretensions of appellant must be
rejected and the case of the people should be sustained.
[CANA] People v. Mangat y Palomata, G.R. No. 131618, July 6, 1999
FACTS: Thirteen-year-old Kristal F. Manasan lived with her family in Barangay Lusong, San
Agustin, Tablas Island, Romblon. On July 10, 1995, Kristal went out of their house to go to the
shore, about 2 1/2 kilometers away. To reach it, she has to pass by Saguilpit creek. Kristal failed
to return home and could not be found for three days. Alarmed, Herminio Manasan, father of
Kristal, reported the matter to their barangay council.
At four in the afternoon of July 13, 1995, SPO1 Fajutag received information from Brgy.
Kagawad Ronnie Manao of Brgy. Lusong that a decomposing body was found along Lusong
River. SPO1 Fajutag proceeded to Brgy. Lusong to verify the report. Upon reaching the place,
he saw the dead body of a girl lying on her belly. The victim was nude and the upper part of her
body was placed inside an opening of a stone hole. The panties and shorts of the victim were
also found on the riverside, along with a plastic bag containing a pitcher and a headband. The
place where the body was found was a cave-like structure on top of which was a foot-trail used
by local residents, and underneath water flowed to the lowlands. da
The body was later identified to be that of Kristal F. Manasan. Dr. Cynthia Baradon-Mayor
examined the cadaver and certified that Kristal died of multiple hemorrhage due to multiple
fracture on the head. The victim also suffered multiple hymenal and anal lacerations. Her
bladder went out of the vaginal canal and her intestines went out of the rectal vault. From all
indications, Dr. Mayor concluded that the victim was brutally raped and murdered.
Pacifico Magramo, a farmer and resident of Brgy. Lusong, was presented as prosecution
witness. He testified that at 2:30 p.m. of July 10, 1995, he was walking downhill along Saguilpit
creek in Brgy. Lusong, carrying a sack of copra which he was bringing to the shore. He chanced
upon accused Dominador Mangat pushing the naked and lifeless body of thirteen-year-old
Kristal into a rock hole. Seeing him too, accused warned him not to divulge to anyone what he
saw or he would be next. Scared, Magramo continued downhill while accused walked away
followed by his dog. He also testified that the accused was wearing a gray sando and white pair
of shorts, and was carrying a bolo in a sheath hanging on his left shoulder by a string.
Jaime Magramo and his wife traversed the same pathway at two o'clock in the afternoon of July
10, 1995. They were going downhill with Jaime carrying a sack of copra on his shoulder. While
passing along Saguilpit creek, Jaime saw the accused conversing with his father Benedicto
Mangat. Jaime though could not hear what they were talking about. On July 14, 1995, Jaime
was informed by his son who was in Grade V that the dead body of Kristal was found along
Lusong River. It was found exactly in the same spot where the accused was seen talking with
his father in the afternoon of July 10, 1995.
With the recovery of the body of Kristal on July 14, 1995, there was widespread speculation that
the accused was the culprit. On July 15, 1995, the police authorities arrested the accused.
Bothered by his conscience, Pacifico Magramo eventually came out in the open and reported to
the police what he had witnessed in the afternoon of July 10, 1995.
While at the police station, the accused and his father offered to settle the case amicably.
SPO1 Fajutag executed an affidavit.
The accused offered an alibi. He claimed that on July 10, 1995, he was working with his wife at
a farm located in the mountain of Lusong from morning until lunch time, after which they went
home to their house, located just 50 meters away, to eat lunch and rest. At 1:00 p.m., they
returned to the farm and continued their weeding until 4:30 p.m. This was corroborated by his
wife, Alice Mangat. The accused admitted, though, that he had a dog which fit the description
given by prosecution witness Pacifico Magramo. Corollarily, the accused asserted that the
prosecution witnesses have an ill-motive in testifying against him as he did not vote for their
candidate in the last May 8, 1995 elections.
ISSUE: WON the offer of the accused to settle amicably is an admission of guilt.
HELD: YES. The most damaging piece of evidence which points to the appellant's culpability is
the affidavit executed by SPO1 Fajutag to the effect that the appellant and his father, Benedicto
Mangat, offered to settle the case amicably. It is most telling for the defense not to have made
any effort whatsoever to dispute this. Said gesture can only be taken to mean an admission of
guilt. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be amicably settled or compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.|
It is true, as contended by the defense, that there is no direct evidence linking the accused to
the crime charged. There is to Our mind, however, ample circumstantial evidence which tend to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the author of the offense.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. No greater degree
of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case,
what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed
and that the accused committed the crime. In this case, not only was the accused-appellant's
presence at the crime scene established, there is also clear and convincing testimony that he
was seen pushing the body of the victim into a cave-like hole in the rock.
[CANA] Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, June 20, 2006
FACTS: At around 10:00 p.m. on March 12, 1992, Renato Concepcion, Marcelo Ringor, Marino
Servidad, Danny Singson and their supervisor, Engr. Roy Rivera left the Baguio Colleges
Foundation after overtime work. Rivera requested Marino Servidad to buy two bottles of gin and
invited his companions to the Heike Jade Restaurant where they had a drinking spree. They
ordered two bottles of beer each. After two bottles, Concepcion noticed that Rivera appeared
dizzy, so he instructed Singson to help bring Rivera home. Singson went out to hail a taxicab
along Session Road. He was followed at a distance by Ringor, Servidad, Concepcion and
Rivera. As Rivera could hardly walk, Concepcion braced Rivera's arms around him. They were
by the Jaime's Fastfood Restaurant when suddenly, Rivera lost his balance and accidentally
bumped petitioner Bricenio. Concepcion immediately apologized, "Boss, please bear with us
because our engineer is tipsy." Petitioner suddenly pulled Rivera inside the restaurant, picked a
wooden stool, and hit Rivera's head twice. As a result, Rivera fell on the floor. Ringor and
Servidad quickly ran away. CDAHIT
Singson, while waiting for a taxicab noticed the commotion inside the restaurant. He saw
Concepcion by the entrance of the restaurant hurling empty bottles into the restaurant. He
rushed to help his companions. Singson saw Rivera lying on the floor. Singson tried to get
Rivera out but petitioner's companions who were throwing empty bottles right back at them
stopped Singson. Singson also started to throw bottles at the petitioner. Concepcion was hit on
the face when he tried to get Rivera. After about fifteen minutes of bottle-throwing, two men
arrived at the scene. Thinking that these men were petitioner's companions, Singson told
Concepcion to flee. They ran but the two men, who turned out to be police officers, caught up
with them. They were arrested and brought to the Baguio City Police Station. At the police
station, Singson asked the police officers to go back and get Rivera at the Jaime's Fastfood
Restaurant. But they were later informed that Rivera had died.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on March 13, 1992, Singson, Concepcion, Servidad, petitioner and
Noe Sapguian, an employee of Jaime's Fastfood Restaurant, were questioned by the police.
Concepcion identified petitioner as the person who killed Rivera. Petitioner was arrested and
indicted for homicide.
ISSUE: won the petitioner admitted his guilt.
HELD: YES. The records show that the petitioner offered the prosecution witnesses a
compromise involving a separate case that he filed against them. In criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
Petitioner's claim that an indication of his innocence was his bringing the victim to the hospital.
We reiterate one pronouncement in People v. Loto, where we held that the accused, in helping
bring the victim to the hospital, does not by itself prove his innocence, for it could have been
motivated by feelings other than a genuine desire for the victim to recover.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. De Guzman y Sico, G.R. No. 117217, December 2, 1996

FACTS: Gilda Ambray filed a case of rape against Gener De Guzman Y Sico. Homeward bound
from her work as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray was at the gate of Meadow Wood
Subdivision, waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes.
When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she
approached him and asked him some questions. The complainant recognized the accused very
well because it was summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a
ride, to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a
different route. She got scared but managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while
stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When they reached Phase II of the
same subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the
tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then
walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind,
covered her mouth and held her neck tightly.
(rape followed) (2 attempts were made prior to the act that consummated the rape. The
accused did not succeed on the first 2 attempts because of the complainants resistance)
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that
she was raped by the accused. They then went to report the incident to the owner of the
homeowners association and NBI. Complainant also submitted to physical examinations, the
results of which affirmed that there was a sexual intercourse with force.
Then, Bebey and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion
Talub Quiocho, the accuseds kumadre, to beg for Gildas forgiveness for the accuseds sake.
The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accuseds parents, wife, children and
sister-in-law to Gildas house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them
that should not be tolerated.
ISSUE: w/n the plea of forgiveness done by the relatives of the accused amounts to an
implied admission of his guilt?
RULING: YES.
The Court said, . . . any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to
his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on
pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified
to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their
testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was
strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of
the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise, the accused dared not assign that
finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellants Brief is conspicuously silent thereon.
Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior
knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act
of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon,
to cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital
from or retribution upon (an offender). In People vs. Calimquim, we stated:
The fact that appellants mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazons father is an
indication of guilt.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. Abadies y Claveria, G.R. Nos. 139346-50, July 11, 2002
FACTS: Accused-appellant stands charged with violation of Republic Act No. 7610 or The
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
Accused JOSE ABADIES y CLAVERIA commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of his
17-year old daughter ROSALIE ABADIES Y MANUNGHAYA by kissing, mashing her breast and
touching her private parts against her will and consent.
The facts show that accused-appellant has been living for the past twenty years with his
common-law wife, Catalina Manunghaya, together with their two children, Jonathan and
complainant Rosalie. The family sleeps together in one room and usually Catalina wakes up
early in the morning to buy bread. It was during these short periods of time while Catalina was
out of the house that the abuses took place. On the dates material to these cases, complainant
was 17 years old.
Accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi. He denies having committed acts of
lasciviousness against complainant. He testified that on the dates of the alleged incidents, he
woke up between 7:00 to 7:30 a.m.; that complainant and her mother were already preparing
breakfast; and after eating breakfast, he would leave for work. He also testified on the reason
why the charges at bar were filed against him. Allegedly, on July 26, 1997, he asked
complainant what was happening to their lives as his children were aloof with him. Complainant
threatened to end her life because she felt she was to be blamed for their problems.
Accused-appellant also declared he was too strict with his children, and even inflicts physical
harm on them when they disobey him.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant asserts that the court a quo erred in finding the
prosecution's version more credible and in convicting him despite the implied pardon given by
complainant. Accused-appellant likewise contends that there exists no factual basis for the trial
court to consider his plea of forgiveness in his letter to complainant as an implied admission of
guilt.
ISSUE: w/n the plea of forgiveness may be admitted as an implied admission of guilt
RULING:
YES.
A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will readily show that accused-appellant was
indeed seeking pardon for his misdeeds. Some of the pertinent portions read as follows: "I made
this letter to ask your 'forgiveness. x x x Alam mo bang sobra-sobra na ang pagsisisi ko sa
ginawa kong iyon. x x x Parang awa mo na Ne hirap na hirap na ako at ang lahat ay buong
puso ko ng pinagsisisihan. Patawarin mo na ako anak. x x x." There is no iota of doubt that
accused-appellant was asking forgiveness for having committed the acts with which he now
stands charged. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
or those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one
would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may
be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. Under the circumstances,
accused-appellants plea of forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998

FACTS: Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years old when the dastardly
outrage befell her. She testified that she and her younger sister, Melissa, were asleep in a room
in their house and were then the only persons at home because their grandfather, who lived
with them, was in the hospital at that time.
At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight pressing down
upon her. She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She
was about to shout when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any noise or
he would kill her.
Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the sawali door of the room,
enabling complainant to see the intruder. She recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her
barriomate. It appears that he gained entry into the house through a passageway in the kitchen.
Then the accused succeeded in raping the victim.
Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant. She saw appellant hand the
first letter to her grandmother who later gave it to her. The other letter was given by appellant to

complainant through the latters sister. Aggrieved by all these circumstances, complainant
decided to disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault.
appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had completed the presentation of
its evidence. A general warrant of arrest was issued for his apprehension and it was ordered
that he be included in the list of wanted criminals. Appellant, however, has not been recaptured
up to now
ISSUE: w/n the letters sent by the accused to the victim served as an admission of his
guilt
RULING:
YES.
it is conceded that after the rape, he sent complainant two letters in which he implored her
forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so that he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed
his own fate by admitting his crime under the seal of a virtual confession in fact, if not in law.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled
through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. For this rule to apply, it is not necessary that a
complaint be first filed by the victim because all that is required is that after committing the
crime, appellant or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved
Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea
for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. The letters of
appellant containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be construed as an
implied admission of his guilt.
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters introduced in evidence by the
prosecution and that said letters contained an admission of his guilt, thus confirming his
culpability. If appellant did not forcibly rape complainant on the night of March 24, 1994,
complainant may possibly have accepted appellants offer to live with her. At the very least, she
would not have revealed her misfortune so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue. That
complainant chose to divulge the incident and subject herself to the disgrace of public scrutiny
and scandal buttresses the charge that she had been criminally ravished by appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to discredit this affirmation of guilt
derived from the contents of the letters, the authenticity of said letters is no longer open to
question. The letters thus bolster and corroborate complainants testimony on the identity and
guilty of appellant.
Another factor supporting appellants conviction is his flight. By escaping from confinement
during trial and failing to turn himself in despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court, and
despite the standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a fugitive from justice.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008

FACTS:
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking
a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise.
Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree and other thorny plants
grow. Then Larry removed his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground.
Thereafter, he removed her short pants and panty, mounted himself on top of her and inserted
his penis into her private parts and made push and pull movements. He likewise raised AAAs
sandoand mashed her breast. AAA felt pain when accused-appellant entered her and she felt
something sticky in her private part after Larry made the push and pull movements.
Victim got pregnant.
CCC (AAA's father), testified that the family of accused-appellant went to their house and
initially offered P50,000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing
his house for the wedding reception. Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
Defense however claimed that accused could never be on the crime scene since he was with
his wife while giving birth and that he never left her side.
This was corroborated by the hilot and the victims friend who testified that she never left the
victim when her shorts got hooked; that they went together to the store of Auntie Beth where
they parted.
Family of the accused also claimed that it was because the other sister of the rape victim was
supposed to marry their other son, brother of accused, but they had an altercation regarding the
bills for the wedding. So the victims family tries to falsely accuse his other son of the rape for
revenge.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on
certain points, more notably the claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to
settle the case. This, however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and CCC
who demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and
jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
The accused testified that he had not asked his parents to plead the victims family for
compromise, instead they went there on their own.
ISSUE: w/n the act of the parents of the accused to compromise on their own will
amounts to an implied admission of guilt
RULING:
NO.
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant
as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case.
Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the

party himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the
accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that
for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been
present or at least authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it has been held that where
the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such
offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.
In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to the
testimonies of Albina, on the one hand, and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they are related to
the appellant and the victim, respectively. Their testimonies relating to the offer of settlement
simply contradict each other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not consider the
alleged offer of settlement in resolving the case.
ACCUSED WAS ACQUITTED.
The friend of the victim, Joy, testified against the family of the victim and claimed that the
victims mother insist that she change her statement to further impugn the accused.
[DLC] People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 120894, October 3, 1996
FACTS:
On or about June 28, 1992, in the City of Laoag, the said accused, Moreno Bayani, by
means of force and intimidation with the point of a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against her will.
The complainant's testimony was faithfully summarized below:
In 1992, Maria Elena Nieto was a fourth-year high school student of St. Lawrence
Academy, a Catholic School of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She was then 15 years old. At that time
both her parents were abroad as overseas contract workers. On July 19, 1989, Maria Elena
together with her siblings moved to Barangay Manayon, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to live with her
paternal grandmother Rosalina B. Nieto, her uncle Eugenio Nieto and his family. There, she met
appellant. Appellant was a neighbor. He was close to her paternal uncles, Eugenio and Rudy
Nieto. Appellant often went to her grandmother's house. She was considered a relative. At
about 6:00 in the morning of June 28, 1992, appellant went to their residence. He asked her if
she could accompany him to visit a friend in Laoag City. She told appellant to ask permission
from her grandmother who consented. At 9:30 of that same morning, appellant fetched her. At
about 11:30 a.m., they reached Laoag City. They proceeded to a boarding house near the
Northern Christian College. There appellant visited a woman. After about 30 minutes, appellant
called for her and they left. Appellant brought her to a restaurant. At that time, Maria Elena did
not know the name of the restaurant. Neither did she know then that the second floor of the
restaurant was a hotel. It was her first time to be in such place. Appellant invited her for lunch
there. She declined as she was still full and suggested that they go home. Appellant, however,
called for a tricycle and told her "[w]e will first go to a friend of mine before going home. He
brought her to the "third floor of a certain building". While there, Maria Elena was made to wait
outside and "he went to talk with somebody". Upon returning, appellant told her that "it was in
the second floor where the person he wanted to talk with was". They proceeded to the second
floor. Upon reaching the door of a room at the second floor of the building, appellant took hold of
her wrist. She tried to free herself, but all the more appellant took hold of her wrist and he
"opened the door" with a key.
After opening the door, appellant pushed Maria Elena inside. She wanted to run away
but was prevented by appellant, who pulled her hair. Appellant then locked the door. Appellant
pushed her hard making her kneel down on the floor beside the bed. All that time, appellant was
holding her hair, pressing her head against the bed. Maria Elena struggled to free herself. This
prompted appellant to tighten his hold on her hair and he poked a gun against her right temple.
Appellant then told her "[y]ou remove your pants, otherwise, I will shoot you." Out of fear, she
complied with appellant's order. While Maria Elena was removing her pants, appellant removed
his pants, too. Thereafter, appellant pushed Maria Elena to the bed and forced her to lie down.
He ordered her to open her thighs and then he went on top of her. She struggled but felt weak.
Appellant successfully had sexual intercourse with her. While doing this, appellant was holding
his gun in his right hand. Thereafter, Maria Elena wanted to leave. However, appellant pointed
his gun at her and threatened to kill her if she revealed the rape incident to anybody. After a
while, appellant repeated the sexual intercourse for two more times. All the while, appellant was
uttering indecent words at her, among them, "This is something very delicious. You will be
longing for this". Appellant repeated his threat to kill her as well as members of her family, if she
related the rape incident to anybody. They left the room at about 3:00 in the afternoon. She
went home alone.
In view of the threats of appellant, Maria Elena did not immediately relate the incident to
her family. She was forced to divulge the rape committed by appellant against her, when her
family noticed her tummy was bloating. At that time, Maria Elena and Ambrosio Malapit, Jr.,
were sweethearts. The incident was reported by Ambrosio to the principal of St. Lawrence
Academy, who went to Maria Elena's house in order to verify. She related to the principal what
appellant did to her including his threats to kill her and her family. The school took the initiative
of hiding her. She stayed for 1 week in the house of a teacher. Thereafter, she was transferred
to Madre Nazarena in Laoag City, an institution run by nuns.
The rape incident was reported to the NBI. The defense presented the accused and
Bernard Javier, the information officer of the Dragon Inn. The accused not only admitted having
sexual intercourse with the complainant; he asserted, in the main, that the complainant was his
mistress and that the further acts of sexual intercourse after the said date were with her
consent. Defense witness Bernard Javier corroborated the accused's testimony as to the
couple's checking-in at the Dragon Inn and further declared that upon checking-out he noticed
that the complainant "was happy and even laughing."
The prosecution presented as rebuttal witnesses Romeo Nieto and Rosario Nieto, the
complainant's uncle and father, respectively. Romeo testified that the accused came to his
house where the complainant resided bringing gifts (powder, soap, cotton, and milk) for the
complainant and offered to amicably settle the case. In all, the accused came thrice for the
purpose.
The Court is convinced that the accused tried to amicably settle the case with the private
complainants mother as testified to by Romeo Nieto. It is inconceivable that Romeo Nieto, an
ordinary citizen could have the courage to drop the names of highly-placed and influential
officials in the province Despite the protestations of the accused and Major Alio the Court has
no doubt that the accused was present in all the three (3) occasions related by Romeo Nieto
wherein they were looking for the private complainants mother.
At any rate, his non-presence during these occasions cannot erase the fact that the
highly-placed and influential provincial officials went there on his behalf -- that was to ask for a
compromise deal. It would be absurd to assume that these highly-placed and influential officials
went to the residence of Romeo Nieto on their own without the knowledge of the accused.
Verily, the attempt of the accused to amicably settle the case is an admission of guilt of
the crime charged against him
After the parties submitted their memoranda, the trial court promulgated the decision
appealed from. It gave full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution. The accused
seasonably appealed from the decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding that the appellant offered to compromise the case
HELD:
NO. Oddly, the accused takes inconsistent positions on this matter. On one hand, he
claims that he sought forgiveness, but on the other hand, while testifying as regards a meeting
with the complainant's mother during the conduct of the trial, the accused claimed that he "did
not ask for forgiveness because what they charged against him is not true." At any rate, the
accused's attempt to split hairs between forgiveness and compromise is unavailing. While
compromise "is an agreement made between two or more parties as a settlement of matters in
dispute," the term "forgiveness" necessarily implies a consciousness of wrongdoing or guilt.
The weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of
offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth
an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensure therefrom.
As such, we adopt the pertinent portions of the lower court's ruling on this subject and
declare that no reversible error was committed in appreciating the accused's plea for
forgiveness as an implied admission of guilt, in accordance with Section 27(2), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This can only be buttressed by the persistence of the accused's intercessors in
attempting to see the complainant at least thrice.
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party/ Res inter alios acta, Part One
[DLC] People v. Raquel, G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996
FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of
their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up
and fired their guns at him. Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her
husband lifeless while a man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at
their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while 2 other men ran away.
George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the
police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at
about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel
were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the
police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident.
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. Appellants relied on alibi as their
defense.
Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986 he left Paatan, Kabacan,
Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his
sister-in-law. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3
and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied by his father
arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the
name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his
son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to
harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to
leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5,
1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them
pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested his son
Valeriano.
The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. Herein appellants filed a notice of
appeal wherein they manifested that they were appealing the decision to the CA .In view of the
penalty imposed, the CA properly forwarded the same to us.
ISSUE:
W/N trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel despite
absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime
HELD;
YES. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of
the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her
husband. Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention
of who shot Agapito Gambalan.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of
herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said
accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an
accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity
to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those
exceptions do not however apply to the present case.
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the
right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.
These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.
Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient
to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. While
admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is
probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the
weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In
fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is weak.
It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither
met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.
[DLC] Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and
killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street,
Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain
Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a
certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by
respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect
closely resembled Columna.
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against Columna and three
John Does.On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed against
them in the RTC of Manila. Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17,
2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit
wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent
Romulo Awingan (alias Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as
masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda.The
former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the
killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty.
Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a
complaint against those implicated by Columna. On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his
affidavit before the investigating prosecutor who subjected him to clarificatory questions.
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a
candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was
instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted
that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had
been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an
election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio.
However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the
elections and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited
handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated
May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited
letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the
authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and
denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was
approved by the city prosecutor. Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City
Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced to
withdraw all his statements against respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory
hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to
another detention center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the DOJ. DOJ
reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder. Accordingly, the
Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC. However, on
August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion for reconsideration and
directed the withdrawal of the Informations.This time, he declared that the extrajudicial
confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was
admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the trial prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the Informations. RTC granted the motion to withdraw the Informations.
Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The
cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna
granted the MR of petitioner. She denied the MR of the Antipordas. Consequently, respondent
Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA. The Antipordas
separately filed another certiorari case.
CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left
out of her assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully
taken into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It
also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the respondents
because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented
to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after
Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
The CA denied reconsideration, CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of
respondents Antiporda. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents
HELD:
NO. The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the m otion to
withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial
rights of the accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at
everything made available to her at that point of the cases. No less than that was expected and
required of her as a judicial officer. According to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make
an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and
counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the
public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the
public prosecutor.
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his
March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule
on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.The reason for this
rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts
of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. An exception to the r es
inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided
that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used
against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other
piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could
corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence
against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
[GUTIERREZ] FGU Insurance Corp. v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corp., G.R. No. 141910,
August 6, 2002
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty (30) units of
Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles
(Respondent Driver Eroles), from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South
Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.
While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay
Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal,
resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being
the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of
the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS.
Since the GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of
contract of carriage against GPS and Respondent Driver Eroles with the Regional Trial Court,.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Driver Eroles can be held liable even if it was not party to the contract of
carriage?
RULING:
No, Respondent Driver Eroles without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself
be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between
petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can
only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their
personality or their juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom r es inter alios acta aliis neque
nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil
action against the driver can only be based on c ulpa aquiliana, which, unlike c ulpa contractual,
would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the
defendant.
[EVIDENTE]
Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, 213163-78, 213540-41, 213542-43,
215880-94 & 213475-76, March 15, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
PDAF scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy et al., the illegal utilization and
pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Enrile for the years 2004 to 2010, in
the total amount of P172,834,500.00.16 Tersely put, petitioners were charged for the following
acts:
(a) Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, for
fraudulently processing the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements
(b) Janet Napoles, as the alleged mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Senator Enrile's PDAF
(c) the Napoles siblings, as high ranking officers of the JLN Corporation, for continuously
diverting the sums sourced from Senator Enrile's PDAF to Janet Napoles's control
(d) De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger, for assisting in the fraudulent
releases of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs and eventually remitting the funds to
Janet Napoles's control
As alleged, the systemic pillaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF commences with Janet Napoles
meeting with Senator Enrile himself or through his Chief of Staff, Reyes, or Ruby Tuason - with
the former rendering an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "kickback"
amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.
In her defense, Reyes filed her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit, contending that the letters and
documents which she purportedly signed in connection with the allocation of the PDAF of
Senator Enrile were all forged, and that none of the three (3) witnesses - Luy, Suas, and Nova
Kay B. Macalintal - who mentioned her name in their respective affidavits, directly and positively
declared that she received money from the PDAF in question. For their part, the Napoles
siblings filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit opposing their inclusion as respondents in the
complaint. They argued that the affidavits and statements of the whistleblowers contain nothing
more than mere hearsay and self-serving declarations, which are, therefore, inadmissible
evidence unworthy of credence. On the other hand, while De Asis admitted that he was an
employee of the JLN Corporation from 2006-2010 in various capacities as driver, bodyguard or
messenger; that he had no knowledge in setting up or managing the corporations which he
supposedly helped incorporate; and that he did not personally benefit from the alleged misuse
of the PDAF. Meanwhile, despite due notice, Janet Napoles failed to file her counter-affidavits to
the foregoing Complaints. Thus, the Ombudsman considered her to have waived her right to file
the same.
While preliminary investigation proceedings were ongoing before the Ombudsman, Tuason,
who was likewise charged under OMB-C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396, surfaced as an
additional witness and offered her affidavit implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam. The
Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 finding
probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of
Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen (15)
counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly, separate motions for
reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis.
Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan, charging, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of
Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238; and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the
Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0241 to 0255, which were raffled to the
Sandiganbayan's Third Division.
On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, "along with several other
related cases," the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against "all the accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause was a mere superfluity given that it was its bounden
duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence
before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution126 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of
probable cause against them, and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment.
The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the reconsideration of the judicial finding of probable
cause against them and requested that their arraignment be held in abeyance pending the
resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles siblings alleged that the Sandiganbayan acted
on their motion for reconsideration through the latter's Resolution dated November 14, 2014,
declaring that the presence of probable cause against them had already been settled in its
previous resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the petition, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the September 29, 2014 and November 14, 2014 Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against
petitioners for the charges against them.
HELD: The petitions are bereft of merit. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has
consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed.
Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is
a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be
drawn to the context of its ruling - that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial
mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based
on opinion and belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., "[p]robable
cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as s uch facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable
cause does riot require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged."
Thus, in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of
probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are
required, not absolute certainty." In this case, petitioners were charged with the crimes of
Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Napoles siblings cannot discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence,
which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the
same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should
not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the
Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise
be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long
as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying
the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the
testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under
the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he
technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case.
[EVIDENTE] Salapuddin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184681 (Resolution), February 25,
2013
FACTS: The instant petition assails the Decision and Resolution dated August 6, 2008 and
October 16, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, which
affirmed the inclusion of petitioner Gerry A. Salapuddin in the amended information for multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), -Branch 83 in Quezon City.
The present controversy started on November 13, 2007 when, shortly after the adjournment of
the day's session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of
the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. The blast led to the
death of Representative Wahab Akbar (Congressman Akbar) et al. and the inflicting of serious
injuries on other victims.
Based on the affidavits of arrested suspects Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal, Police Superintendent
Asher Dolina indorsed a letter to then Chief State Prosecutor Zuo requesting the inclusion of
Salapuddin, Congressman Hataman, Jim Hataman and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Bayan Judda in
the complaints for murder and multiple frustrated murder. After conducting preliminary
investigation, the Chief State Prosecutor approved a Resolution dated December 6, 2007 where
he: (1) found probable cause to indict Aunal, Ikram, and Kusain for multiple murder and violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1829; (2) recommended the conduct of further investigation for their
indictment for multiple frustrated murder; and (3) recommended the conduct of preliminary
investigation as to the other respondents who were not under detention.
On February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuo approved the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Investigating Panels Supplemental Resolution recommending the amendment of the
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon City RTC, Branch 83, to
include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang Hataman and
Salapuddin. Referring to Salapuddin in particular, the DOJ Investigating Panel stated the
observation that: "Salapuddins participation in the [crime] cannot be downplayed just because
he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has his hands written all over
it. The circumstances, the people and place used are all, [in] one way or another, associated
with him. It cannot be mere coincidence." On the other hand, the resolution dismissed the
charge as against Julham Kunam, Congressman Hataman, and Jim Hataman. So the DOJ
Investigating Panel found, "their participation as conspirators in the grand scheme is unstable x
x x apart from the statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman
Hataman-Salliman, no other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement
in the crime."
On March 7, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the Supplemental Resolution with
the Office of the Secretary of Justice. The Investigating Panel, Salapuddin rued, refused to give
probative weight to the incriminating statements of Ikram with respect to the Hataman brothers,
but relied on the very same statements in finding probable cause to indict him. Moreover, he
maintained that there is no evidence independent of Ikrams statements that will support the
finding of probable cause to indict him for murder and multiple frustrated murder.
On April 23, 2008, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the
Information for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the
Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel. The Secretary of Justice predicated his
modificatory action on the interplay of the following premises: the only material evidence against
Salapuddin is the statements of Ikram. However, Ikrams statements are laden with
irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that they cannot be considered worthy of
belief. What is more, the Secretary added, "there is nothing on record that will indicate that x x x
Salapuddin performed the overt acts of the offense charged." The Secretary of Justice observed
that the statements of the other accused cannot be given weight as they were obtained through
force and intimidation contrary to the Constitution and were in fact later recanted.
In a Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2008, herein respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama
Indanan questioned the Secretary of Justices Resolution before the CA, the recourse docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 103461. They argued in the main that matters relating to the admissibility of
evidence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at
the stage of determining probable cause. There is, so respondents claimed, overwhelming
evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to kill Congressman Akbar.
The appellate court, by its Decision dated August 6, 2008, set aside the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. As held, the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability
that Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime," the CA adding in this regard that "the absence (or presence) of any
conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature after a full-blown trial on the merits." And
to the CA, the recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain and their claim of torture were of
little probative value inasmuch as these were "unsupported by competent proof."
Salapuddin moved for, but was denied, reconsideration per the CAs Resolution dated October
16, 2008.
In the meantime, Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi, Pagwalang Bisa ng

Naunang Mga Salaysay at Pagpapatotoo dated October 6, 2008 with the Quezon City
RTC-Branch 83 claiming that he was forced to sign the affidavits he previously executed and
was merely forced to implicate Salapuddin and the Hataman brothers in the alleged conspiracy
by respondent Gov. Jum Akbar and several mayors from Basilan because of their political rivalry
in the province.On November 11, 2008, Ikram submitted another affidavit of recantation
supplying details of his ordeal while under custodial investigation and alleging that he was
physically and mentally tortured so that he was forced to write and sign statements regarding
the Batasan bombing that were in fact supplied by the police officers themselves.
On November 24, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before this Court, ascribing on
the appellate court the commission of grave error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions of
Jamiri, Kusain, and Aunal obtained as they were through torture and physical abuse, without the
effective assistance of a competent independent counsel of their choice, and were in fact
recanted. The appellate court also grievously erred, so Salapuddin argued, in according full
probative value to Ikrams extrajudicial confession implicating Salapuddin even if it was riddled
with serious contradictions and inconsistencies.
The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition on September 29, 2010. Hence, on
December 1, 2010, Salapuddin filed a Motion for Reconsideration106 specifically inviting
attention to the prosecutions admission no less that there is no other direct evidence linking him
to the crime charged except Ikrams testimony.107 Since, as urged, Ikram has recanted his
testimony on account of the violations of his constitutionally protected rights, there is no longer
any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal case filed against Salapuddin.
To the motion, respondents interposed an Opposition dated December 17, 2010108 stating that
Salapuddin has not provided this Court any new and substantial matter that would show the
serious error attributed to the CA; that the allegations of torture and recantation have already
been denied by the investigating prosecutors and should not sway this Court to reverse the
Decision of the appellate court; and that Salapuddins evasion from arrest is evidence of his
guilt.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Salapuddin in this criminal case.
HELD: The discrepancies in Ikrams affidavits and the variations in the statements of the other
accused do not persuade this Court to find probable cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted
primarily because of Ikrams confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to the Batasan
bombing. Instead, while We are not pre-empting the findings of the trial court with regard to
Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and Kusain, the variations and the inconsistencies contained in their
affidavits lend credence to their allegations of torture and coercion, especially as these
allegations are supported by medical reports prepared by an independent medical practitioner
who was assisted by the personnel of the Human Rights Commission.
It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and full respect of the rights of
the accused are essential in the pursuit of justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of
innocence, and all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary
investigation. It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the
commission of a felony, only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent,
consistent and material are considered. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently
establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of.
It, thus, behooves this Court to relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors, anxiety, and
expenses of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the government's
resources.
Extrajudicial confession; binding only on the confessant; exceptions. A review of the records
show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin is the confession made by
Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence competent to establish
the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime. On the contrary, as
pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on
account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Clearly thus, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or
her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The exception provided under
section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator
requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. In this
case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to
set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the
other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was
involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating
prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddins association with these persons to
conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy. The Supreme Court, however, has
previously stressed that mere association with the principals by direct participation, without
more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.
Salapuddins complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship,
if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while
in Manila. It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act,
without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.
[EVIDENTE] Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128517, September 10, 1998
Doctrine: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE; RULE ON ADMISSIONS BY THIRD PARTY; CASE AT

BAR. Declarations, that are extrajudicial are inadmissible in evidence. The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as may be allowed
by the Rules of Court. The admission of such declarations will violate the right of the petitioner
to due process, specifically his right to confront and cross-examine his co-accused. A different
rule applies with respect to testimonies given during the trial. In a number of instances, we have
held that the testimonies of particeps criminis may be admissible against the person
incriminated. But such rule is not without qualification. We always advise caution in according
probative value to the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator, as the latter is deemed a polluted
source. His or her declaration must scrutinized with care and subjected to grave suspicion. True,
such testimony, even if uncorroborated, may be sufficient to convict a co-accused, provided it is
shown to be sincere, unhesitating, straightforward and detailed that it could not have been the
result of deliberate afterthought. Otherwise, his testimony would require corroborative evidence
which, if strong and convincing, may be given its due weight and force. Being of human nature,
culprits are likely to pin the blame on others rather than on themselves. There is therefore no
guarantee that petitioner's co-accused had testified truthfully. There are no other pieces of
evidence that support their testimonies and that tend to show or establish the guilt of the
petitioner.
FACTS: The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction for cattle rustling. According to the prosecution, on the
early morning of March 18, 1991, police officers Pfc. Felizardo and Pfc. dela Cruz with Pat.
Victoriano were on foot patrol inside the town proper of Sapian, Capiz, because of rampant
cattle rustling in the area. They tried to flag down a suspected passenger jeepney owned by
Waquez, but instead of stopping, the driver stepped on the gas pedal where Pfc. dela Cruz was
almost hit. At the Ivisan Police Station, the passenger jeepney was intercepted and Lozada, the
driver, was apprehended. The jeepney was transporting one male carabao which was found out
later to be stolen. When investigated, Lozada told the police that his companions were Waquez,
Dagohoy and Santiago. Later that same morning, Veloria reported to the Sapian Police Station
that his male carabao was stolen. He identified his male carabao and showed his proof of
ownership. On the other hand, Lozada and Waquez both claimed that on the early morning of
March 18, 1991, while on board the subject jeepney, they were stopped by Santiago, who,
together with Ledonio offered P1,500.00 for them to transport a carabao to Roxas City. Santiago
however testified that at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of March 17, 1991 while he was at
Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz, Ledonio approached him and asked him if he was going to Roxas
City and requested him to tell Lozada that he (Ledonio) would load something in the latter's
jeepney. He did as requested and thereafter, he went home to Sapian and had an accounting
with his employer because he was going to Mindanao to work there. Afterwards, he went home,
packed his clothes, then played domino. Thereafter petitioner went to sleep. His wife woke him
up at about 4:00 a.m. the following morning, March 18, 1991, and thereafter rode a vehicle
going to Sitio Talaba, Sapian, Capiz, and eventually rode a bus to Iloilo City. They arrived in
Iloilo City at about 7:30 a.m., and then proceeded to Marbel, South Cotabato.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict Santiago of cattle rustling
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence is insufficient to convict petitioner Santiago
of cattle rustling. The identification of the petitioner as the malefactor was not sufficiently
established. There is no clear, convincing and corroborative evidence that shows the complicity
of the petitioner in the commission of the offense.
First, the trial court did not find the testimonies of said witnesses "frank, candid and
straightforward," or their testimonies worthy of any credit. And our own reading of the transcripts
does not lead us to conclude otherwise. In fact, the solicitor general himself submits that "the
testimonies of co-accused Lozada and Waquez are insufficient to justify petitioner's conviction."
Second, both Lozada and Waquez deny any participation in cattle rustling. In fact, they claim to
have no knowledge that the carabao was indeed stolen. Being of human nature, culprits are
likely to pin the blame on others rather than on themselves. There is therefore no guarantee
that petitioner's co-accused had testified truthfully.
Third, the identification of the petitioner as the malefactor was not sufficiently established.
Lozada did not identify the petitioner in open court, but merely mentioned his name. True,
Waquez pointed to Santiago, but the probative weight of his identification of the latter as the
culprit is attenuated by his admission that, on the night of the incident, he "could not really
determine that he is Joebert" and that he "did not recognize him."
Lastly, the testimonies of Waquez and Lozada were not corroborated. There are no other pieces
of evidence that support their testimonies and that tend to show or establish the guilt of the
petitioner. Of the four original accused, only Waquez was positively identified by Prosecution
Witness Felizardo as the one who was "hanging at the back of the jeep." Urdelas, who
apprehended Lozada, did not see anybody except the latter. Only Lozada and Waquez testified
that Santiago rented the jeep they were plying and was with them while they were transporting
the carabao.
We agree with the solicitor general's recommendation to acquit Santiago:

". . . the facts obtaining in the case engender reasonable doubt on petitioner's complicity which,
should, therefore, tilt the scale of justice in his favor. . . . 'where the people's evidence fails to
meet the quantum required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, the
accused is entitled to acquittal regardless of the weakness of his defense of denial and
uncorroborated alibi."'
For insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court is constrained to acquit
the petitioner. It is axiomatic that the accused is entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own merit; it
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
To summarize, the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to convict Santiago. First, the

testimonies of the policemen, being hearsay, are inadmissible in evidence. Second, the
declarations of Lozada and Waquez during the investigation are inadmissible under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and for being violative of petitioner's right to due process. Third,
the testimonies of Lozada and Waquez, as borne out by the stenographic notes, are not worthy
of credence. Lastly, there is no other clear, convincing and corroborative evidence that shows
the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the offense.
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent
[GUTIERREZ] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738 (Resolution), April 3, 2001
FACTS:
On February 5, President Joseph Estrada (President Estrada) filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB
0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be
filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted. Thru another counsel, President Estrada, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for
Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming President Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON allowing the Angara Diary into the evidence violates the res inter alia doctrine?
HELD:
No. Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the
rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions.
One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or
agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and
days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the
petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang
pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you
have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.) This statement of full
trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the
first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already
leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The
Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang
umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)[18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner
cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the
respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment
of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by
Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf
of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on
the principal (President Estrada). Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is
done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So,
whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and
accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to,
and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is
then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by
his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.
[GUTIERREZ] Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association, G.R. No. 134269,
134440, 144518, July 7, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to
the spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the
spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in TCT No.
149166 issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions
indicated that the property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such
installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala
Alabang Village, including the above restrictions on TCT No. 149166, to the association of
homeowners therein, the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).
In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school
(TLC), a preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In
1991, TLC was expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross,
which provided additional grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled advanced.
AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLCs
and the spouses Alfonsos violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply
with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school and from
operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed by the
ordinance.
On October 13, 1992, AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an action
for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso.
On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by TLC and the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., for being proscribed by Section 2,
Rule 19[10] of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate
Petitions for Review with this Court challenging the July 2, 1998 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
TLC and the spouses Alfonsos main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own
acts. TLC and the spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a setting
aside of said restrictions:
1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had previously
approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24 classrooms, which approval is
further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site Development Plan with the signature of
Frank Roa himself.[44]
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA, through its
president Jesus M. Taedo, authorized through a letter the construction of a new school building
extension.[45]
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly
proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development Officer Engineer Hector
S. Baltazar, who said:
Engineer Baltazar:
There was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village, in fact, was
the one who submitted this map of theirs. In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is the
developer of the Ayala Alabang Village whom we know na maayos naman ang kanilang
zoning, we just adopted what they submitted to us. Whereas, the other areas are talagang
pinag-aralan pa namin.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered institutional in
the Official Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission of the latter constitutes an intent
to have the subject property reclassified as institutional.
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its
letter dated July 24, 1991, wherein it stated:
This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C. Gonzales concerning the
proposed expansion of the school curriculum to grade school of the Learning Child
Pre-school owned by Mrs. Mary Anne Alfonso.
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe
that it is a worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no
objection to such proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
ISSUE: WON the actions of ALI in Nos. 3 and 4 bind AAVA and if so are these actions
damaging to AAVAs cause?
HELD:
Yes, ALIs statements if damaging to AAVA would be binding on the latter but the acts of
ALI are not damaging to AAVA.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot be
considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case.
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter.
The general Ayala Alabang Village Deed Restrictions, which was attached to the Deed of
Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly state that: 2. Compliance with the said
restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court
action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective
successors and assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association. A s such,
it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the
Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res inter
alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency,
may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of
a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1
concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional
which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions.
As regards the act in number 2, the statement in ALIs July 24, 1991 letter that it believes the
expansion of TLC is a worthy undertaking, it should be pointed out that ALIs purported assent
came with conditions:
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe
that it is a worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no
objection to such proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
It is true that the AAVA Board does not have the authority on its own to alter the Deed of
Restrictions for Ayala Alabang Village, and the approval of Ayala is an indispensable condition
precedent to any change in the restrictions. However, we feel that any change in the restrictions
for Ayala Alabang should be concurred to by the AAVA Board on the premise that any change
in the restrictions affects the general welfare of the community which is the primary concern of
the AAVA Board. On this same premise, we have imposed as an additional condition to our
approval of the change in restrictions, that such change should be approved by the residents of
the Village or by the residents of the particular district where the school is situated, at the option
of the Board. We feel that the concurrence of not only the AAVA Board but also of the residents
of the Village or of the affected district (as the case may be) is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances.
As previously stated, a majority of AAVAs members, on April 5, 1992, voted to ratify the
Board of Governors resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented. Therefore,
the conditions for ALIs approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions, namely the
concurrence of the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of the village, were
clearly not met.
[FULLANTE] Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines
Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014
Facts: Redmont, after inquiring with DENR, it learned that the areas where it wanted to
undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Petitioner
McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an
application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
(MGB), Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). SMMI was
issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 and EPA-IVB-44. The MPSA and EP were then transferred to
Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and assigned to petitioner McArthur.
Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and
Patricia Louise Mining & Development Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an
application for an MPSA with the MGB. Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed with the
DENR. SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned its rights and interest over the
said MPSA application to Tesoro. Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
DENR three (3) separate petitions for the denial of petitioners applications for MPSA. In their
Answers, petitioners averred that they were qualified persons under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. POA issued a Resolution disqualifying
petitioners from gaining MPSAs.
Aggrieved by the Resolution and Order of the POA, McArthur and Tesoro filed a joint Notice of
Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal with the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) while Narra
separately filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal. Redmont filed before the
(RTC) a Complaint for injunction with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Belatedly, the RTC issued an Order granting
Redmonts application for a TRO and setting the case for hearing the prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Redmont filed a Motion for Reconsideration Order of the MAB.
Subsequently, it filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
RTC issued an Order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MAB
from finally disposing of the appeals of petitioners and from resolving Redmonts Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplement Motion for Reconsideration of the MABs Resolution.
However, the MAB issued a second Order denying Redmonts Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and resolving the appeals filed by petitioners. Hence,
the petition for review filed by Redmont before the CA. CA rendered a Decision. With respect to
the applications of respondents McArthur, Tesoro and Narra for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) or conversion of their MPSA applications to FTAA, the matter for
its rejection or approval is left for determination by the Secretary of the DENR and the President
of the Republic of the Philippines.
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. CA upheld the findings of the
POA in its Resolution which considered petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra as foreign
corporations. While pending with the CA, Redmont filed with the Office of the President (OP) a
petition seeking the cancellation of petitioners FTAAs. The OP rendered a Decision, wherein it
canceled and revoked petitioners FTAAs. The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was
further denied. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the OPs Decision and
Resolution with the CA. In the CA Decision, the CA affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the
OP. Thereafter, petitioners appealed the same CA decision to this Court which is now pending
with a different division.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in the use of the exception of the res inter alios acta or the
"admission by co-partner or agent" rule and "admission by privies" by pointing out that
statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in this case since it is not a party to the case
and that it is not a "partner" of petitioners.
Held: NO.
Application of the res inter alios acta rule
Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.- The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
evidence other than such act or declaration itself. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies.- Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.
Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned Rule can be applied to a case, "the
partnership relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact must be made by evidence other
than the admission itself." Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that a partnership
relationship exists between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such partnership exists.
Partnerships vs. joint venture agreements

A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships
since it is difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the
relationships entered between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture
agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership agreements;
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or
partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI
was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships,
then the relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership
should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be
seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be
partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that
"by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator
[FULLANTE] People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011
Facts: For review is the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in Bokingo and Col guilty as
conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. An Information was filed against Michael Bokingo and Reynante
Col, charging them of the crime of murder wherein they conspired together armed with a claw
hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and maul Noli Pasion, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said
hammer, thereby inflicting upon said Noli Pasion fatal wounds on his head and body which
caused his death. During the preliminary investigation. Bokingco admitted that he conspired
with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got
"fed up" with Pasion. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not
guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged. The trial court rendered
judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, there being the two
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both
accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo
only, sentencing them to Death. The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
however lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 7659.
Issue: Whether Reynante Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator based on
Michael Bakingos admission that Col is a co-consiprator?
Held: NO. In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is
necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. As a rule, conspiracy must be
established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as
the commission of the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that appellants fled together after
killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the
commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being
attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas house and allegedly ordering her to open the
pawnshop vault.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco
was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise
inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section
28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently,
an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her
co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta
rule is an admission made by a conspirator.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or
declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously
discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence
against Col.
[FULLANTE] People v. Palijon, G.R. No. 123545, October 18, 2000
Facts: Rodelo Palijon, Carlos Decena, and Jim Mercene, both were elderly returnees
(balikbayans), recently arrived from the United States. Entered the yard of the residence in San
Pablo City of the spouses Gonzalo and Mellorequina Reyes. Entered the house and positioned
themselves near the couples bedroom door and waited for someone to open it so they could
take cash and jewelry from the bedroom. Palijon remained outside the house, as look-out.
Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. Decena then followed her to the toilet
where he kicked and boxed her. Mrs. Reyes managed to shout for help before she fainted. Mr.
Reyes rushed to assist his wife. Decena met him, with a steel-edged stool and struck him hard
several times. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on the floor. The robbers ransacked the house then
escaped.
Prosecution witness Merly Reyes Alvero, a daughter of the Reyes couple, who lived some
distance away, was roused from her sleep by a phone call from her cousin, Edith Bicomong. A
hysterical Bicomong told Alvero that the latters parents were hospitalized and in critical
condition. Alvero then proceeded to the house of her parents. An inspection of the bedroom of
the spouses Reyes revealed that cash amounting to P17,000.00 and various pieces of jewelry
belonging to her mother, worth P100,000.00 were missing.
Mr. Gonzales died from his injuries. The immediate cause of death was cardio-respiratory failure
caused by severe contusion hematoma of head.
In an Information, the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City charged Rodelo Palijon,
Jim Mercene, Carlos Decena, Myra Pria, and several John Does, with robbery and homicide.
The accused were arraigned before the RTC of San Pablo City and pleaded Not Guilty to the
offense in the charge sheet. Both parties waived pre-trial. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Counsel for accused Decena and Mercene moved that the two be allowed to withdraw their
earlier plea of Not Guilty and be re-arraigned to allow them to enter a plea of Guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide. The prosecution raised no opposition and the motion was granted. Decena
and Mercene were then re-indicted for homicide and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded Guilty
to the charge. Both were then sentenced as guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Trial then proceeded against the remaining co-accused Rodelo Palijon and Myra Pria. The
prosecutions case was propelled in the main by the testimony of Mercene, who gave evidence
against said co-accused. The trial court found the prosecutions evidence convincing. Palijon
filed his notice of appeal to this Court, while Pria moved for reconsideration of the trial courts
decision. The court denied Prias motion for reconsideration. Pria filed her notice of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Palijon on the basis of the testimonies of
his alleged conspirators?
Held: NO. In the instant case, both prosecution witness Mercene and defense witness Decena
admitted the existence of a conspiracy to rob the victims. However, their versions as to the
participation of appellant Pria differ. Mercene testified that he and his co-accused agreed to
enter and rob the house of the Reyes couple. According to Mercene it was appellant Pria who:
(1) informed them of the arrival of the Reyes spouses from abroad; (2) told them that the
balikbayans had a lot of money being; and (3) told them how to enter the house.
Decena, admits that Pria was present when they plotted the robbery, but vehemently insists that
she had no participation in its planning. Decena claims that Pria was there only to attend to their
child, and she was sleeping when he and Mercene broke into the house of the victims. To
buttress Decenas testimony, the defense presented three of his letters to Pria, written in prison,
clearing her of any knowledge or participation in the crime.
In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime scene, Pria, as a conspirator, is
as liable for robbery with homicide just as if she had participated in the actual robbing and
killing. At the instant that the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and
pursue it, each and every member of the conspiracy is criminally liable for the felony committed
by anyone of them.
Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial court erred in convicting
him on the basis of the testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could not be
taken against him under the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet as
formulated in Sections 28 and 30, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court. Palijon and Pria submit that
the prosecution failed to establish the existence of a conspiracy and, did not overcome the
presumption of innocence in their favor.
There is conspiracy to commit a crime, where at the time the malefactors of the crime, their
actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose to attain their illicit ends. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and can no longer
repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.
In ruling upon Palijons arguments, we must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but
not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A
judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded
opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only
to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible
in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for
the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter. Nor can we give credence to Palijons defense of alibi. Mercenes
identification of Palijon as one of the conspirators and participants in the crime was positive and
categorical. His alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecutions
eyewitness.
[FULLANTE] People v. Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013
Facts: Ibaez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC), and told Henessy Auron that he
was the one who bought a gun barrel at the companys gun show in SM Megamall. Henessy
arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of the
office and called Zaldy Gabao. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not
understand what he said. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, and informed him that Zaldys hands
had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived. When Henessy and the police entered the
premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that
the companys gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing
range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.
(NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the
robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees. The NBI formed an entrapment team.
Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by
Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told
Nabilgas that they were conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the
robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other persons
involved in the crime.
Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that they would
like to see the firearms being sold. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry
Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought
them inside his house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents
inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the
meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The
agents recovered four (4) firearms from Cachuelas house.
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibaez whom the asset also contacted. The NBI
agents went to Imus and there met Ibaez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car. Lino,
Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibaez where the firearms were. Ibaez
brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the
guns had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibaez when they sensed that he was already
becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibaez.
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons
responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a
handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the
appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy.
RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Excepted from the conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of reasonable
doubt.
The appellants filed an appeal with the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants
robbed WSC and killed Rex during the course of this robbery:
(1) Ibaez visited WSC two days before the robbery and asked several questions from
Henessy;
(2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53 firearms and several ammunitions worth
P1,563,300.00 had been stolen;
(3) among the firearms stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151
and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245;
(4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing range;
(5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body;
(6) Cachuela and Ibaez were caught trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli, with serial number
T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock 30, with serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate
entrapment operations; and
(7) Cachuela and Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen
firearms.
The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the
appellants argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence,
pointing out that the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that
the appellants failed to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who
conducted the entrapment operations.
Issue(1): Whether or not the out of court identification by Zaldy was admissible?
Held(1): NO. In People v. Algarme, explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the
test to determine its admissibility, as follows: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that
renders unreliable Zaldys out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the
factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict
treatment and assessment of Linos testimony.
Issue(2): Whether or not Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence?
Held(2): NO. Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the
appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or
her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of
evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired
with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must
be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by
the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
[GO] People v. Constancio y Bacungay, G.R. No. 206226, April 4, 2016
Facts:
"AAA" went to Alabang Town Center with her friends Dacanay and Golez. After parting
ways with them, "AAA" was about to board her car when she found herself confronted by Berry
then armed with a knife, who was then in the company of Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden
and alias "Burog." These five forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her to Constancio' house
where she was raped and killed.
In the course of an interview with ABS-CBN Reporter Amparo, Berry revealed that while "AAA's"
car was parked in Constancio' garage, the said car was moving and shaking with "AAA" inside.
6 This led him to suspect that something was already happening; that when the door of the car
was opened, he (Berry) saw that "AAA" was without her underwear; and that Constancio then
uttered the words, "wala na," indicating that "AAA" was already dead. 7
"AAA's" body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a tricycle driver, saw Berry,
Constancio, and their other companions, throw something over a bridge which turned out to be
"AAA's" body upon investigation by the authorities.
On the evening of March 12, 2001, Bales almost became the next victim when Berry and his
companions who were still using "AAA's" car, attempted to abduct her. Fortunately for Bales, a
barangay tanod was present at the scene and was able to foil the abduction when he shouted at
the malefactors and startled them. Nonetheless, Bales' bag was taken during this incident.
Eventually, Berry and Constancio were arrested after an informant surfaced and identified them
as "AAA's" assailants. The informant came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for
information leading to the identity of persons responsible for "AAA's" rape-slay.
During the custodial investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of his constitutional rights
and the consequences of his statements, Berry executed an extrajudicial confession which was
embodied in a Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo during an interview that
he did take part in the execution of the crime.
At the trial, however, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he
was coerced into signing the same.
For his part, Constancio contended that he was in Baguio at the time of the commission of the
crime. Both appellants denied the charges against them. These two also asserted that Berry's
extrajudicial confession was inadmissible in evidence.
RTC found Constancio and Berry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide
CA affirmed the RTC decision
Also, the CA gave credence to Berry's extrajudicial confession as contained in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay which he executed with the assistance of Atty. Suarez. Berry's extrajudicial confession
was admitted as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise tend to establish the guilt of his
co-accused and cousin, Constancio as shown by the circumstantial evidence extant in the
records
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in declaring Berry's extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence and in
considering it against his co-accused Constancio
Ruling:
On the other hand, Constancio argues that Berry's confession is inadmissible in evidence
against him under the principle of res inter alios acta found in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Our ruling in Tamargo v. Awingan 21 pertinently explains the reason for
this rule:
[O]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts
of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is
inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused since it is considered hearsay against them. 22
However, as an exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-judicial confession is
admissible against a co-accused when it is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation of said co-accused in the crime. 23
In People v. Aquino, 24 this Court held that in order that an extra-judicial confession may be
used against a co-accused of the confessant, "there must be a finding of other circumstantial
evidence which when taken together with the confession would establish the guilt of a
co-accused beyond reasonable doubt." Applying the rule to Constancio's case, the Court finds
that the prosecution was able to show circumstantial evidence to implicate him in the crime.
Significantly, Constancio was positively identified as among those who threw the body of "AAA"
over a bridge. It is significant to note that eyewitness Adarna also attests that Constancio was
riding in the very same car where "AAA" was raped and killed. This fact leaves this Court
without a doubt that Constancio is guilty of the crime charged as the same qualifies as
circumstantial evidence showing his participation in the execution of the crime.
[GO] People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004
Facts:
Accused including certain JOE, REY and PAUL, whose family names have not yet been known,
armed with firearms and handgrenade, aboard an owner-type stainless jeep and motorized
tricycle enter the Masterline Grocery pretending to be customers and once inside, poked their
guns and intimidated the owner of said grocery, MR. INCIONG CO, and his worker carried away
P81,000.00 and three (3) pieces of Chinese gold necklace and afterwhich the above-named
accused on their way out to escape with their loot, shot and hit a responding Tayug Policeman,
PO3 ERWIL V. PASTOR, mortally wounding him on his face that subsequently led to his
untimely death, and when said accused were cornered by other responding policemen, ran and
passed to an adjacent store (Good Taste Bakery) and used it as their exit and while there also
shot, hit and mortally wounded MRS. CONCHING CO, the owner of said bakery causing her
injuries.
The remaining accused (Comiling, Galingan, Mendoza, Salagubang and Clotario) pleaded not
guilty during their arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan
decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she
testified that she was present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline
Grocery was hatched.
On the basis of the evidence the prosecution has adduced, which in the Courts perception
satisfies the requisite proof beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by Section 2, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court, the Court hereby renders a judgment, as to the accused MAJ. EMILIO
COMILING, GERALDO GALINGAN and RICKY MENDOZA finding them GUILTY of the special
complex crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Naty Panimbaan a co-conspirator is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, Appellant Comiling contends that Natys testimony was inadmissible against him to prove
conspiracy because of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration
This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is
admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first
shown by other independent evidence.
According to Comiling, Natys testimony showed that she was also a conspirator, thus, the
existence of conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than Natys admission. As there was
no independent proof of conspiracy except the testimony of Naty, the latters testimony
concerning appellants participation in the conspiracy was inadmissible against him. This
contention is misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations or
admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected
has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[8] In the present case, Natys admission
implicating appellant Comiling was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence
against him
[GO] People v. Baydo y Arcamo, G.R. No. 113799, June 17, 1997
Facts:
Accused, conspiring with GEORGE NAVARRO Y PADILLA @ BOY HAPON shot Leonardo
Punongbayan, Jr. y Concepcion on the chest and left thigh with a handgun, thereby inflicting
upon the said Leonardo Punongbayan, Jr. y Concepcion gunshot wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Upon arraignment, Appellant Baydo, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
The evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of Rosito Punongbayan, nephew
and Evelyn Punongbayan, wife of the victim who saw Leonardo Punongbayan get shot.
As a defense, Bienvenido Baydo interposed the defense of alibi stating that he was resting
inside their house at Onyx Avenue about 15 to 20 meters from the crime scene when he heard
shots and went out to know what happened; he came to know that Leonardo Punongbayan was
shot and later he learned in the neighborhood that he is being accused of shooting Leonardo
Punongbayan. Out of fear, he fled to Laguna
Furthermore, George Navarro testified that he conspired with a certain Lino Saladanan to
murder Leonardo Punongbayan
RTC found appellant guilty of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as charged in the Information despite the apparent failure of the prosecution
to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Ruling:
Yes, For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence
of the crime itself, of the following elements thereof, viz.: 1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; 2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and 3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow
himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act. These, however, were not established.
True, one can deduce from the narration of George Navarro that the commission of the
offense was planned and that, until its consummation, there was an inexorable resolve to
kill Leonardo Punongbayan. It cannot be ignored, however, that Navarro was referring to
Lino Salandanan as his accomplice. Nowhere was the name of appellant mentioned as a
member of the group which planned the death of Leonardo. Although the evidence
revealed that it was really appellant who cooperated with Navarro in the killing, the
admission of Navarro regarding evident premeditation cannot be taken against appellant
in the absence of proof of conspiracy. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another except as otherwise provided in Sections 29 to
32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Besides, it does not follow that appellant was the
one referred to as Lino Salandanan just because he actually cooperated with Navarro in
the commission of the crime. No proof whatsoever was adduced by the prosecution that
appellant was ever called Lino Salandanan or known by that name.
[GO] People v. Baharan, G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011
Facts:
An RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal
towards its Alabang bus terminal via EDSA, when accused Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay,
Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky entered
the vehicle.
Bus Conductor, Elmer Andales grew suspicious that the two were up to know good. Although
they entered the bus together they sat apart.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at
designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to
alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after,
Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus
passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman
announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of
more bomb attacks.
In an exclusive interview with ABS CBN, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had
supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified
the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered
the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against
the government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light
Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He
then recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4
kilos of TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm
that Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly
placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from
Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT
taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later,
Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly
received a call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission.
According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Asali is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a
co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However,
as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to
both conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as
they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible
against the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on
the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused
implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter
Sec. 31. Admission by privies
[GO] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, represented by the OSG, filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now
estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB,
as ill-gotten wealth. The funds five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain
Swiss banks
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes
which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland,
an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the
PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court,
in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich
granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the
Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be
placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of
dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998,
granted the motion.
After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary
judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds: THE
ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF
THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING
The Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary judgment:
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed
unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration
Respondents posits the defense of lack of knowledge for lack of privity or (inability to) recall
because it happened a long time ago or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully
acquired.
In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19,
2000 decision, thus denying petitioners motion for summary judgment:
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in
the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as
to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been
established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set
aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.[12]
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in
reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to establish that the Marcoses owns the swiss
accounts.
Ruling: There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the
Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is
embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.[105]
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents judicial admission of
ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to
Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a
joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.[107]
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a privity of estate exists
between the declarant and the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession
in rights.[108] Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is
competent.[109] Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where
several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the
admission of one is competent against all.[110]
Sec. 32. Admission by silence
[JULARBAL] People v. Roa, G.R. Nos. 138195-96, July 10, 2003
FACTS:
On May 25, 1997, around 12:30 a.m., then 15-year old Ma. Nina de la Cruz (Nina) was sleeping
in her room located at the third floor of the residence of her adopting parents, Maxima and
Melencio de la Cruz, in Ilang-Ilang St., Balubaran, Valenzuela City. Sleeping in the same room
but on a separate bed was Ninas 23-year old mentally deranged brother.
Nina was awakened when appellant, who had resided with the de la Cruzes since 1976, he
being one of the workers in the family metal craft business, armed with a bladed weapon,
suddenly entered her room. Appellant then covered her mouth, held her hand and removed her
shorts and panty after which he removed his pants and brief, went on top of her and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After satisfying his carnal desire, appellant warned her not tell anyone
about what happened and left the room.
More than two months after the May 25, 1997 incident or on July 29, 1997, around 1:25 a.m.,
Nina was, like her brother with whom she shared her bedroom, sleeping. She was once again
awakened when appellant, also again armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly entered her room.
Just like the May 25, 1997 incident, appellant removed her shorts and panty, after which he too
removed his pants and brief and threatened Nina that hell kill her if she shouted. Appellant
thereafter went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. His carnal desire satisfied,
appellant left the room.
In late July 1997, Ninas mother, after confirming from Nina herself that she was pregnant,
confronted appellant about the incidents but he remained silent. Appellant was thereupon
asked to leave as he did, he proceeding to Melencio de la Cruzs fathers house at Iba, Hagonoy,
Bulacan. On physical examination on August 2, 1997, Nina was found to have at least two
lacerations on the genital area, and fifteen to sixteen weeks pregnant.
On the other hand, appellant, who was 55 when he testified on November 16, 1998, denied that
he raped Nina on May 25, 1997 or on July 29, 1997. He claimed that on May 25, 1997, around
12:30 a.m., he was at work in the glass factory of Melencio de la Cruzs niece Dory de la Cruz at
Hagonoy; that on July 29, 1997, he was back at the house of the de la Cruzes at Balubaran
after Melencio de la Cruz rehired him; and on July 2 3, 1997, h e was confronted about the
alleged rape and cursed by Maxima but [he] did not retaliate [and] just remained silent,
and on even date he left and went to the house of Melencio de la Cruzs father at Iba,
Hagonoy, Bulacan. Melencio de la Cruz, together with his bodyguard later maltreated him and
haled him into the Hagonoy jail where he was detained. He did not complain, however.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court found accused Nicanor Roa y Rabino Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of Nina, a close scrutiny of which he claims
readily exhibits inconsistencies which go to the very core of her credibility.
Appellant argues that the fact that she was already sleeping would make it impossible for [him]
to lay her down again because these circumstances do not appear to be in consonance with the
normal course of human nature; and that while Nina attributed her pregnancy to appellant, she
nevertheless admitted that she was already pregnant before May 25, 1997 when the alleged
rape subject of the first case occurred. As for Ninas attribution of her pregnancy to appellant,
albeit she admitted that she was already pregnant b efore the first rape incident, the same does
not infirm her credibility. While, given her youth, she may erred in attributing her pregnancy to
appellant on account of the May 25, 1997 incident, what matters is that she was positive in her
claim about the occurrence of the sexual assault on her, as shown in her following verbatim
testimony which the trial court did find, as does this Court, to be candid and bereft of any
indication that it was fabricated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the silence of accussed-appelant is deemed an admission of the charges
against him.
HELD:
The prosecution having by its evidence p rima facie established appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifted on him. Appellants evidence, however, is
weak and fails to controvert the positive declaration of Nina who was not shown to have any
reason to falsely charge him. His admitted silence when Ninas mother confronted and even
cursed him by his claim, betrays his guilt just as his passivity does when he was
allegedly maltreated and haled into jail by Ninas father on account of the incidents. For
an innocent man would certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and do
something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did not.
Following Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides:
SECTION 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so,
may be given in evidence against him.
he is, by his silence, deemed to have admitted the charges.
[JULARBAL] People v. Magdadaro y Gerona, G.R. Nos. 89370-72, May 15, 1991
FACTS:
The Complainant, Beverlinda Abrasado, is a 16-year old country girl, a Grade VI student,
daughter of Leonardo Abrasado. The latter is a tenant of accused-appellant Magdadaro at the
latter's farm at Balubal, Cagayan de Oro City. Beverlinda helps her father till the farm. Appellant
is a farmer, 54 years of age, married residing at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City.
Beverlinda's narration of the three (3) happenings follows:
The 10 July 1988 incident:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, when Beverlinda was gathering "guyabano" near
Appellant's house at Balubal, Cagayan de Oro City, the latter suddenly appeared, held
Beverlinda by the hand and pulled her towards the cornfield nearby. She tried her best to
extricate herself but was no match for Appellant's strength. The latter then held her hand again
and boxed her in the stomach, making her fall to the ground. She lost consciousness. When she
regained her senses, Appellant was already on top of her, taking advantage of her womanhood.
The event over, Beverlinda was ordered to go home by Appellant with the threat not to reveal
the occurrence to any one at the risk of her life and that of her family.
The 15 July 1988 incident.
On this date, while Beverlinda was fetching water from the well near Appellant's house, the
latter appeared, held her by the hand, and pulled her towards the cornfield, despite her
resistance and attempts to free herself. She was again boxed, fell to the ground, and when she
came to, Appellant was on top of her "making the push and pull movements."
As in the first incident, Beverlinda did not reveal the episode for fear of her life.
The 21 August 1988 incident.
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of this date, Beverlinda was tethering a carabao in a
grassy area adjoining Appellant's house at Balubal. From out of the bushes, Appellant appeared
and chased her. She was able to run but Appellant caught up with her and held her hand tightly.
She shouted for help. Appellant boxed her in the stomach. She lost consciousness and fell to
the, ground. Regaining her senses, she found Appellant already astride her, having carnal
knowledge of her.
Unknown to Beverlinda and Appellant, Leonardo Abrasado, Beverlinda's father, heard the
shouts and proceeded towards the direction where they came from. Leonardo testified that upon
reaching there, he could hardly believe his eyes when he saw Appellant, his own landlord,
abusing his own daughter. Engaged, he called "Gaw" and unsheathed his bolo. But Appellant
was quick on his feet, stood up, naked from waist down, and ran away, leaving his pants', his
underwear and his hat in his haste. The father chased Appellant but lost the latter lost in the
bushes.
Appellant was found about two hours later by some members of the Bantay Bayan and the
military, approximately 300 meters away from the place of the incident, still hiding in the bushes.
He was "wearing his coat, but no pants, he just wrapped himself in the lower portion of his body
with a long sleeved sweater." The witness asked him if he was Paulino Magdadaro and
"why did you do it?" but the latter did not answer. Appellant was then taken to the
checkpoint of the PC detachment by Sgts. Lustre and Viras.
When the search party arrived at the scene of the incident, they found the corn plants toppled
down, a pair of long pants, a pair of briefs, a hat and the underwear of a woman. Beverlinda was
also still there, seated, crying.
The genital examination of Beverlinda, on 22 August 1988, at the Northern Mindanao Regional
Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, disclosed "incomplete hymenal laceration at 1:00, 3:00,
7:00 and 9:00 o'clock position," "suggestive of sexual intercourse," but "negative of
spermatozoa".
Beverlinda's father declared that on his way to the City Hall on 22 August 1988 in the company
of Sgt. Romero, his wife, a Bantay Bayan, and Appellant, the latter asked for forgiveness
twice and offered to pay damages but that he refused because the matter was already before
the authorities. Again, during the investigation at the Fiscal's Office, Appellant asked for
settlement of the case but he gave the same answer.
So much for the prosecution evidence. Now, for Appellant's own account:
He states that he knows Beverlinda because she is the daughter of his tenant, Leonardo
Abrasado. He admits having had carnal knowledge of her on 10 July, 15 July and 21 August
1988 but maintains that the act was consummated upon mutual agreement.
On 10 July 1988, he had sex with Complainant at his own house, adding that she was no longer
a virgin as he was able to penetrate immediately and without obstacle. The act consummated,
Beverlinda asked him for money so she could buy a birthday dress. He replied that he had to go
home first to get the money. On 14 July 1988, he went to Beverlinda's house at Balubal,
bringing with him fish and P200.00.
The following day, 15 July 1988, Beverlinda went to his house and he handed her the money.
One thing led to another and they made love. Beverlinda invited him for her birthday but he
begged off because of another appointment in Zamboanga, but promised that he would try and
be back.
In the morning of 21 August 1988, Appellant went fishing. Later, with his two children, he went
to Balubal and gave his catch to Leonardo, his tenant. After having lunch at the latter's house,
both went out to gather fruits and cassava. An hour later, or at 2:30 P.M., they placed what they
had gathered in sacks and Appellant instructed his children to hurry so they could catch the bus
headed for home. Appellant accepted Leonardo's offer to help the children carry the sacks. After
Leonardo and the two children had left, Beverlinda went to his house. After a brief conversation,
Appellant discovered that he had not brought the house keys. Beverlinda suggested that they
go instead to the cornfield near the house and repeat what they had engaged in on two other
occasions. Upon reaching the cornfield, he took off his pants and brief. After spreading his pants
and brief on the ground, Beverlinda removed her panty. They made love afterwards. Minutes
later, Appellant heard Leonardo calling him "Gaw." U pon seeing him, he took off
immediately, leaving behind his pants and brief.
In the course of his testimony, Appellant stoutly denied having forced Beverlinda to have sex
with him; or having boxed her and rendering her unconscious to satisfy his desire; or having
threatened her and her family if ever she reported the incidents to the authorities. In a nutshell,
Appellant's version is that he and Beverlinda were sweethearts.
The Trial Court disbelieved Appellant, found him guilty in all three criminal cases.
ISSUE:
IV. In holding that a) the flight of the accused from the scene of the crime is evidence of guilt; b)
the alleged repeated request for settlement of the case by the accused is an implied admission
of guilt; and c) the failure of the accused to answer the question of Francisco Bagtong when the
accused was asked "are you the one who committed the crime?", which would have naturally
called for comment if not true, is admission of guilt;
HELD:
From the evidence before us, it is difficult to see how Appellant can profess innocence. Even if
we were to discount Beverlinda's testimony, her father's declarations point to Appellant's clear
culpability, He had heard his daughter's shouts (not knowing then that it was she) while she was
being pulled by Appellant. He had actually seen him consummating his dastardly act. Infuriated,
the father chased him with a bolo but he was fast on his feet and successfully eluded pursuit.
That immediate flight is strongly indicative of his consciousness of guilt. "The wicked
flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as the lion."
When found, still hiding behind the bushes, Appellant was still without his brief and pants, was
uncovered from the waist down, his private part exposed. He was caught literally with his pants
down. The pieces of clothing needed to cover him up were all found at the very site of the
incident. What more physical evidence is necessary? They eloquently confirm Beverlinda's
testimony that after having undressed himself Appellant had violated her on 21 August 1988.
Appellant's flight upon discovery by Beverlinda's father of his shameful act, belies
consent by Beverlinda for if that had been so, she would not have been found crying her
heart out, nor would he have fled in fear.
His silence when asked by the Barangay Captain "why he had done it?" is likewise
significant. His claim that there was no admission by silence on his part since he was not given
the opportunity to make a reply besides the fact that whoever asked the question was not
known to him, hardly deserves consideration.
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime
is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will
at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation
and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore,
particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
[JULARBAL] People v. Paragsa, G.R. No. L-44060, July 20, 1978
FACTS:
In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a little over twelve and a half (12)
years old, was alone in her parents' house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of
Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Her parents were away at the time her father was in
Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental while the rest of the family
were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th
grade student of the Bunacan Elementary School. Upon instruction of her mother, she did not
go to school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and cook their feed. Thus, she
was alone in the ground floor of their house cooking hog feed when the accused, Bienvenido
Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the door after him.
Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck, encircled her abdomen
with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her breast,
and threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter, the accused pushed
her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her panties.
The accused then placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of his
pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's thighs, picked up the hunting knife again,
placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual organ and then made
four push and pull movement until he ejaculated. In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties
were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her dress and pull her
panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not holding
the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the house
upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father,
calling from outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not
answer because she was then in the act of putting on her panties. After she had put on her
panties, she opened the gate and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to
her, but she did not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house.
She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with her under threats
and against her will. Her aunt Lita then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt
Lita what he did, he would kill her. After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the
afternoon of the same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did not
reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also
reveal the incident to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother
returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her
mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita who revealed the
matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the
incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her about it; because, according
to her, she wanted to take revenge on the accused. Three days after her return from Sagay,
Negros Occidental on July 19, 1971 Mirasol's mother brought her to the Bantayan
Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco,
who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but negative for spermatozoa
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger brother
of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her brother-in-law,
Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house of her
brother-in-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made of split
bamboos, the accused running away when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of
putting on her panties, to open the gate. Mirasol opened the gate after she had put on her
panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked Mirasol what the accused did to her, but
Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from her hiding place she saw the accused emerge
from his hiding place and run away, passing through the gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told
Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also going there.
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not talk
to him about what she saw earlier in Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her
husband.
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a
conversation with her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother filed
the corresponding complaint against the accused.
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been
committed by the trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of
credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly
denied that he did so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and
Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the
latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the
intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse.
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for the
defense, Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay.
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory
and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point
to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness
was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or
vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or
resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was
raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after
the incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through her
aunt Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon
of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of
the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971,
one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the
accused slept together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and
Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the silence of Marisol may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of
the assertion by the accused.
HELD:
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a
party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and
understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement
was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and
calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the
fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These
requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. H ence, the silence of Mirasol
on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion.
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the
testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's
vagina.
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have
been a virgin when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt
some pain as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state
that she was bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly
narrated that the accused made four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated
indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt
discovered her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt
would report the same to her parents.
[JULARBAL] Solas v. Power Telephone Supply Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 162332, August 28,
2008
FACTS:
On 16 August 1997, Herbert Solas entered into a contract of employment with Power and
Telephone /Supply Philippines, Inc., to be the Assistant Sales Manager of the company with a
monthly salary of P21,600.00, excluding bonuses and commission.
On 06 November 1998, private respondent company granted petitioner Herbert Solas and
Franklin D. Quiachon an amount of P85,418.00 each, corresponding to their sales commission
from the month of January to June of 1998. From that time up to the present, no other sales
commission was ever again given to them.
Thus, on 04 February 2000, petitioner requested for the release of his alleged commission
which had already accumulated since July of 1998. However, in an inter-office memorandum,
said request was denied, and instead, petitioner was even mandated to settle his outstanding
obligation with the company.
On 07 February 2000, petitioner likewise received another memorandum requiring him to return
the issued cellular phone, car and key to his office, which he allegedly all complied. Petitioner
averred that these were all forms of harassment including the non-payment of his salary for the
month of February 2000, and onwards. Hence, on 15 February 2000, he instituted a case for
illegal constructive dismissal, recovery of 10% sales commission on gross sales, and attorney's
fees.
In response, private respondents maintained that there was no agreement, written or oral, which
talked of the grant of 10% commission on gross sales to sales agent, nor was there a CBA on
the matter. There was even no CBA to speak of, since the company had no union, with its
employees numbering only to less than 10, all being fixed-salaried employees. The company
gave bonuses when there was an income, but these were purely on the liberality of the
company, subject to the availability of funds and profits. Besides, petitioner has actually no
client of his own from whom he could close sales, thus the claim for commission was utterly
baseless.
Private respondents maintained also that the claim of petitioner that he was constructively
dismissed, was without basis. Beginning 02 February 2000, petitioner's attendance was already
irregular. On 11 February 2000, he was on absence without leave. He was sick and had a
growing lump on his left shoulder. It was this absence without leave which prompted private
respondents to write several memoranda to petitioner, one advising him to return to work
immediately, as his continued absence was inimical to the company; the other, directing him to
explain his continued unauthorized absences within 24 hours from receipt of the memo.
Private respondents asserted further that neither the order directing petitioner to return the
company car, the issued cellular phone and keys, nor the deductions made on his salary, could
constitute as basis for his alleged constructive dismissal, all allegations being baseless and
without merit. Thus, private respondents prayed for an order directing petitioner to pay the
latter's debt with the company, and an award amounting to P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as
well as the dismissal of petitioner from employment.
The parties submitted their position papers. On 31 August 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision finding for the petitioner Herbert Solas.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC, which reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. The
NLRC ruled that that there was no constructive dismissal in this case, because petitioner never
resigned but merely filed an indefinite sick leave, even admitting during the preliminary hearings
that he was still an employee of respondents, and his principal claim was for payment of his
sales commission. Furthermore, the NLRC saw no badge of constructive dismissal in
respondents' action of applying petitioner's salary for the month of February 2000 as payment
for his debts to the company amounting to P95,000.00. It was also held that petitioner failed to
establish that there was an agreement between him and respondent employer for a 10% sales
commission, and that he failed to establish the origin and authenticity of the specific amount of
the commission being claimed by him.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but the same was denied.
From such adverse judgment, petitioner elevated his case to the CA v ia a Petition for C ertiorari.
On September 12, 2003, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the NLRC ruling,
ISSUE:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE NLRC FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
HELD:
In this case, petitioner's allegations that respondents committed acts of harassment, i .e., the
withholding of his salary for the month of February and directing him to return the company car,
cellphone and office keys, have been rebutted and sufficiently explained by private respondent
company in its Position Paper. Respondents were able to show that its acts were not intended
to harass or discriminate against petitioner.
There was valid reason for respondents' withholding of petitioner's s alary for the month of
February 2000. Petitioner does not deny that he is indebted to his employer in the amount of
aroundP95,000.00. Respondents explained that petitioner's salary for the period of February
1-15, 2000 was applied as partial payment for his debt and for withholding taxes on his income;
while for the period of February 15-28, 2000, petitioner was already on absence without leave,
hence, was not entitled to any pay.15
With regard to the company car, respondents explained that the company car was actually
issued to Franklin D. Quiachon although petitioner and another employee, Nelson Gatbunton,
may borrow the car for company operations with the consent of Quiachon as stated in an office
memorandum dated March 10, 1999. Since Nelson Gatbunton had to attend to official business
in Clark, said employee was then given use of the company car.16
The taking of the office key from petitioner was also justified, as respondents stated that the
company's office consisted only of one big room without separate or individual offices, so it was
only the main door that required a key. The key to the office door could be borrowed by any
employee from a co-employee in possession thereof in case of overtime or weekend work, but
not a single employee had the exclusive use of the key to the office. Thus, when another
employee, Myrna Dumlao, had to work overtime, she borrowed the key from petitioner on
February 4, 2000. Thereafter, on February 18, 2000, respondents moved to another unit in the
same condominium building housing its office, so it was already useless to return the key to the
door of the former office to petitioner.17
As to the cellphone, respondents maintain that said p hone remained the property of the
company, and it became company policy for its employees to pay for personal calls. When
petitioner's debts and advances accumulated, and he showed no intention of paying for them
despite receipt of bonuses, the company had to take measures to regulate the use of the
company cellphones.18
Notably, petitioner never refuted respondents' explanations for withholding his salary
and the reasons why he was required to return the company car, key and cellphone. This
constitutes admission by silence under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. - An act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such
as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do
so, may be given in evidence against him.
Verily, the only conclusion that may be reached is that respondents' explanations are
truthful and, based thereon, the NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that there was no constructive dismissal in this case.
Lastly, as to petitioner's claim for commissions, the NLRC and the CA were correct in not
sustaining the award thereof by the LA. It must be borne in mind that there is no law which
requires employers to pay commissions;19 thus, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that that
there is indeed an agreement between him and his employer for payment of the same.
The only evidence presented by petitioner to prove that he is entitled to sales commissions are
the employment certificate, stating that he is an employee of respondents receiving P21,600.00
per month as salary, exclusive of bonuses and sales commissions, and the undisputed fact that
private respondent company gave him and its other employees the amount of P85,418.00
sometime in 1998. However, the CA was correct in ruling that the employment certificate was
insufficient to prove that petitioner was indeed entitled to his claim for sales commissions, as
said document does not give the details as to the conditions for payment of the same or the
agreed percentage, if any.
Here, the NLRC and the CA found that the computations for commissions were determined and
prepared unilaterally by petitioner. Thus, it was correctly ruled that said computation, with its
uncertain origin and authenticity, is self-serving and cannot prove petitioner's claim for
commissions in the amount of P892,780.37.
[LINGAHAN] People v. Ranario, G.R. No. 25083, August 17, 1926

FACTS:
The CFI of Bohol found Fulgencio Ranario guilty of the crime of murder against Agustin
Galanida The antecedent facts are as follows:
According to the confession made by the accused Leon Caday, at about 8 oclock on the night
of October 16, 1925, while Agustin Galanida was seated on a bench, he was stabbed, through
the said wall, with a bolo in the left lumbar region, causing a wound which passed through his
body as a result of which he died in about twenty-four hours.
The only evidence there is against the accused appellant Fulgencio Ranario is that furnished by
Leon Caday in the confession. The latter confessed that he killed Agustin Ganida, claiming,
however, that he was induced to do so by Fulgencio Ranario, who promised to give him P10,
and gave him a bolo, which he returned to him after he had committed the crime.
According to Caday, Fulgencio Ranario suspected that the deceased was the cause of the
illness of his son Moises Ranario. In view of these statements, Leon Caday was taken to
Fulgencio Ranarios house, who was not there, having gone to the river. The Constabulary
lieutenant who accompanied him, sent the chief of police to find him. Before Fulgencio Ranario
reached his house he was disarmed by the chief of police who accompanied him. U pon seeing
the bolo, Leon Caday said that it was the one which Fulgencio Ranario had given him.
Fulgencio Ranario protested saying it was not so and that Leon Caday had not been in his
house.
On the night of October 16, 1926, Agustin Galanida, finding himself in a serious condition and
knowing that he was about to die, made a declaration before the justice of the peace in which
he said that he suspected that Moises Ranario was the aggressor because he was the only one
with whom he had trouble in 1925.
On October 22, 1925, Leon Caday made another confession in which he explained the manner
in which he committed the crime, again implicating Fulgencio Ranario.
Fulgencio Ranario being confined in jail with Leon Caday, asked him why he had stated that he
had ordered him to kill Agustin Galanida and censured him for his conduct. Leon Caday told him
that he would plead guilty provided he would give him P100. Fulgencio Ranario replied that he
would not give him that sum as he hadnt done anything, although at the beginning he was
inclined to, but was afraid that Leon Caday would betray him and say something else.
During the trial, Fulgencio Ranario testified as a witness in his own defense and denied
everything that Leon Caday had said against him outside of the court. He trial court found
Ranario guilty. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made by the accused implicating his co-accused
admissible and be used against the latter.
Held:
No.
Jurisprudence has already established that an extrajudicial confession made by an accused
implicating his coaccused is not admissible against him. (People v. Durante, 47 Phil., 654.) I t is
true that when Leon Caday made his confession contained in Exhibit B, in which he implicates
Fulgencio Ranario, the latter was present and said nothing, according to justice of the peace
Castor del Bando, but it does not appear that Fulgencio Ranario heard the confession of Leon
Caday nor had the opportunity to deny it.
On the other hand, however, it does appear that when Leon Caday, in the presence of the
Constabulary soldiers, was shown the bolo that Fulgencio Ranario carried and said it was the
one that had been given him by the appellant, a discussion took place between them in which
the said Fulgencio Ranario denied having given the said Leon Caday his bolo and having been
in his house. Neither is the presumption of innocence sufficiently rebutted by the fact that before
the commission of the crime Fulgencio had a dispute with the deceased on the question of
boundaries, which was amicably settled aside from the fact that Agustin Galanida did not
suspect him but his son Moises Ranario.
The guilt of the accused-appellant has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt and
that he has the right to the benefit of the doubt.
Sec. 33. Confession
[LINGAHAN] People v. De los Santos, G.R. No. L-35598, May 29, 1987
FACTS:
Appellant Leonardo de los Santos and Alfredo Lacastesantos were charged with the crime of
Murder for conspiring together and for assisting one another in assaulting Gregorio Dotado,
thereby inflicting hack wounds upon the body of the latter, which caused his death. The trial
court dismissed the case against Lacastesantos for the reason that although appellant
Leonardo de los Santos was convicted, his conviction was due to his extrajudicial confession
and that Lacastesantos was merely implicated by the appellant as one of the participants of the
crime.
The pertinent facts that gave rise to the instant prosecution are as follows:
Sometime in 1971, a certain Gregorio Dotado was found dead by his sister at the junction of a
trail leading to his house at Tairan, Isabela, Basilan City. Francisco Dotado, the father of the
deceased, reported the matter to the manager of Tairan Plantation who notified the police
authorities. There was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime. The police authorities
immediately began the investigation of the case.
Patrolman Conrado D. Francisco of the Basilan Police Department learned that prior to his
death, the victim Gregorio Dotado was courting a certain Herminia Garcia and he had a rival by
the name of Leonardo de los Santos, appellant herein. On December 6, 1971, at around 5:30
p.m., appellant was picked up for questioning by the police authorities of Basilan City. T he
following day, appellant voluntarily executed an affidavit wherein he confessed to his
participation in the killing of the deceased. . Appellant narrated in his confession that at about
7:00 p.m. on November 29, 1971, the victim was then drinking tuba at the house of Manuel
Martinez together with Sebastian Ambrosio, Romeo Martinez, Pablito Santos and Alberto
Meneng; that when the victim left the house of Martinez, he and Alfredo Lacastesantos followed
the former; that before the victim reached his house, they overtook him; whereupon appellant
hacked him with a bolo, first on the throat and when the victim fell on the ground, he again
hacked him on the forehead and realizing that the victim was already dead, they ran away.
On December 9, 1971, appellant executed an affidavit repudiating his extrajudicial confession.

The lower court, however, ruled that the extrajudicial confession of appellant was freely and
voluntarily executed and appellant was found guilty of the crime charged.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law li
In seeking the reversal of the decision rendered against him, appellant herein raised the sole
issue that:
"The lower court erred in having convicted defendant-appellant solely on the strength of Exhibit
D, the alleged confession when the same was obtained thru violence, threat and intimidation .
That in the evening of December 6, 1971, after Pat. Conrado Francisco had brought him to the
police station for questioning, two men from the Detective Department investigated him; that
when he denied any participation in the killing of the deceased, the two men boxed him, hitting
him in the left eyebrow and in the mouth and they also kicked the left side of his body while he
was in a squatting position.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Leonardo DeLos Santos extrajudicial confession is freely and voluntary
executed.
2. Whether or not the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
RULING:
1. Yes. A confession is deemed to have been made voluntarily if the accused did not
complain to the proper authorities regarding the alleged maltreatment despite the opportunity to
do so (People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348). If appellants confession as contained in Exhibit "D" was
voluntary, we have to conclude that Dotado was slain in the manner and for the reason set out
in that document. It is needless to say that no one in his right mind would convict himself without
compulsion by fabricating a highly self-damaging story and suppressing the truth which would
absolve him (People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572).chanrobles.c
a. It is significant to consider that Exhibit "D" was taken on December 7, 1971 by Pat.
Conrado Francisco while the alleged maltreatment was done in the evening of December 6,
1971.
It is unbelievable that the alleged maltreatment made by the two policemen was what induced
appellant to admit the crime the following day. Ordinarily, confessions executed through
intimidation or maltreatment are obtained during or immediately after the supposed
maltreatment. In the instant case, appellant alleges that in spite of the alleged manhandling, he
never admitted anything that evening and the two policemen desisted from further harming him.
However, when investigated the following day (December 7, 1971) by police detective Conrado
Francisco, appellant readily confessed his participation in the killing of Gregorio Dotado.
b. Another factor that militates against the claim of appellant of involuntariness in the
execution of Exhibit "D" is the fact that the confession is replete with details that only the
confessant could have known. The post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased
conducted by Sanitary Inspector Hilario Guerrero showed that the wounds sustained by the
victim were located exactly in the places where appellant in his affidavit stated that he inflicted
them upon the victim.
Indeed, the confession at bar being complete with details that only the appellant could have
known, therefore, show that the confession was executed voluntarily (People v. Jimenez, 105
SCRA 721).
c. It is significant to note that the extrajudicial confession, Exhibit "D," was obtained and
offered in evidence before the 1973 Constitution took effect. In fact, the decision appealed from
was rendered by the trial court on May 24,1972. C onsequently, appellants extrajudicial
confession, Exhibit "D," is admissible in evidence although the requisites in Section 20 of Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person
under investigation for an offense who has not been informed of his right to remain silent and to
counsel were not observed, since that portion of the 1973 constitutional mandate should be
given prospective and not retrospective effect and no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution (Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4).
2. Yes. Furthermore, the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130). It has been held
that a confession constitutes evidence of high order and the presumption is that no sane person
would deliberately confess the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and
conscience. (U.S. v. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329).
[LINGAHAN] People v. Satorre, G.R. No. 133858, August 12, 2003
FACTS:
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with Murder for attacking
Romero Pantilgan with the use of .38 paltik revolver hitting the latter at the head which caused
his instantaneous death.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at 2:00 a.m. of May 25,
1997, her husband, Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she was
awakened by a gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she found her dead
husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997
appellants father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan.
They looked for appellant in the house of his brother, Felix Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu,
but were told that he already left. Nevertheless, appellants brothers, Margarito and Rosalio
Satorre, went to Rufinos house and surrendered the gun which was allegedly used in killing
Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay
Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu w here appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter,
appellant was detained.
Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu
testified that Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed
having killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the
latter struck him with a piece of wood. T hat same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station
with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily
narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he wrestled from his
possession.
Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of
Pantilgans death was gunshot wound.
Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from Pantilgans head
wound was fired from the gun surrendered by appellants brothers to the Carcar Police.
Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the
time of the incident. He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an
incident when he tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied
having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38
revolver and stated that he could not even remember having surrendered a firearm to
Castaares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having accompanied appellant

to Castaares house to surrender him.
Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant to Castaares
house to surrender. His other brother, Felix, also testified that he never surrendered any firearm
to anybody.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution's evidence and rendered a decision
convicting appellant of Murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of the accused is admissible in evidence despite the fact
that it was not reduced in writing and was made out of court.
2. Whether or not the alleged confession or admission is voluntary and freely made
RULING:
1. Yes There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial
confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of
the same Rule is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
or of any offense necessarily included therein. Both may be given in evidence against the
person admitting or confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an
admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission
of a crime.
Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay Captain
was a confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an
oral extrajudicial confession.
2. No. Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and
freely made. The term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord,
without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and
consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting the
will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in
evidence against him. Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its
voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face,
the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it
being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity
and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. T he problem with appraising voluntariness
occurs when the confession is an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof of
voluntariness cannot be inferred from the testimony of a witness who allegedly heard the
confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was voluntarily made. Neither
can the confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made outside the judicial
proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not only the
admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such confession was indeed made, but
more significantly whether it was made voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon the
situation and surroundings of the accused. This is the position taken by the courts, whatever the
theory of exclusion of incriminating statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want
of it must also be taken into account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of
his act.
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade.
Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may
not have realized the full import of his confession and its consequences. This is not to say that
he is not capable of making the confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his
conscience. What we are saying is that due to the aforesaid personal circumstances of
appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may not be definitively appraised and
evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a p rima facie case against the party by whom
it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved
that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be
regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when
uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written,
formal or informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or
tape. However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if
not otherwise recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This
adds weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily
made. If possible the confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read to the
defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses.
Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence.
According to Barangay Captain Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle
between him and the deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter hit him on the head with a
piece of wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the entrance
wound on the deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that the
victim was probably lying down when he was shot.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is uncorroborated.

There must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection with confession, will
show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not necessary that the supplementary evidence be
entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense
or the defendants identity or criminal agency. All facts and circumstances attending the
particular offense charged are admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession.
Nonetheless, the fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be considered
as corroborative evidence. While the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal
gun, the prosecution was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than
the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to
them. This was denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the
gun to him.
[LINGAHAN] People v. Cavite, G.R. No. 86784, November 8, 1991
Facts:
Pedro Nacional, Jr. was found lifeless in front of his house, his hands bound, wounded in
several parts of the body. The police investigation team found at the scene, and took
possession of, the rope with which Nacional had been bound; a bamboo pole and a piece of
wood (which appeared to have been used as weapons); and a telescope. Acting on leads
apparently obtained through preliminary inquiries at the scene of the crime, the police officers
brought in and investigated Eduardo Cavite y Taduran (53 years of age) and Augusto San Juan
y Cavite (25 years old).. Another suspect, Ernesto Villar y Benavente (18 years old), was
questioned, at the police station.
It appears that Eduardo Cavite and Augusto San Juan (and their families) used to occupy a
portion of land owned in common by Pedro Nacional, Jr. and his brother, Municipal Trial Court
Judge Jose Nacional. Cavite and San Juan however had to vacate the premises sometime on
January 11, 1986 on request of Judge Nacional on account of suspicions by Pedro Nacional, Jr.
that Augusto San Juan had stolen his goat and had been stoning his house.
It is noteworthy that in their affidavits, which was executed by Cavite, San Juan and Villar, all
three (3) suspects attempted to exculpate themselves. Eduardo Cavite claims that he "was just
standing near the house and . . was surprised because . . (he had) no knowledge that . . . (his
companions) intention was to kill Pedro Nacional, Jr." Augusto San Juan asserts that he and
Cavite "were only made to guide . . . (the killers and robbers to) the house of Pedro Nacional,
wherein what . . (they) did is only to watch them while they were in the course of killing the
victim . . ." And Ernesto Villar alleges that he "was just standing (at) the door of the bedroom
because . . (he) was amazed that . . (his companions) intention was to kill Pedro Nacional, Jr.,
and . . (he) was also threatened that if . . . (he) will not go with them something will happen to . .
(him), and because they are also . . (his) friends . . (he) went with them."
Trial commenced after the accused all entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. No
eyewitness was presented by the prosecution. The victims "common-law wife," Edna San Juan,
never took the witness stand.
Nevertheless, the Trial Court found that the guilt of the accused as co-conspirators in the crime
charged had been established beyond reasonable doubt by "the totality of the contents of Exh.
A, B, C, 38 together with the recovered evidence, Exh. E 39 and F, 40 (and) the flight of the
accused Pedro San Jose and Eduardo Privaldos . . " Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was an admission of guilt based on the affidavits executed.
2. Whether or not the admission that all of them are in the scene when the crime was
perpetrated is sufficient for them to be convicted as authors of the crime.
Ruling:
1. No. It is apparent that the three sworn statements are not confessions. The Rules of Court
define a confession as the "declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged." None of the three (3) affidavits contains any acknowledgment of "guilt of the
offense charged" on the part of the affiants. Not one of them acknowledged having laid a hand
on the victim or assisted in inflicting any injury on him, or having taken, or assisted in the taking
of any property for him. On the contrary, they all disclaimed any participation in the offense or
even knowledge of any intention or plan to kill or rob Pedro Nacional, Jr.
2. No. The affidavits are not sufficient to warrant the conviction of the appellants. The most that
perhaps may be said about the affidavits, as evidence against the affiants, is that they are
admissions that the latter were in fact at the scene as the crime was being perpetrated. This is
of no help to the prosecution's cause in so far as concerns implication of the affiants
themselves in the killing of Pedro Nacional, Jr. for the affidavits fasten responsibility therefor
directly and exclusively on persons other than he affiants who, as repeatedly stated, explicitly
deny any participation therein, or even prior awareness that the crime would be committed.
Worse, those affidavits are categorically rejected and repudiated by their supposed authors who
variously asserted, also under oath, that the declarations attributed to them were false and
extracted under duress.
Moreover, it is impermissible to pick the affidavits apart, lending credence only to the portions
seen as incriminatory, while disregarding as false and unacceptable those supportive of
innocence, absent, as here, any circumstance which would logically justify such
dismemberment. But this, it would appear, is what the Trial Court did; with no further
explanation than an advertence to the "totality" of the contents of said affidavits and the
recovered physical evidence it in effect hung a finding of conspiracy against appellants
Cavite, San Juan and Villar on those portions of the affidavits that would lend themselves to an
inference of such circumstance and ignored their exculpatory parts. This is manifest error
because said statements each considered in complete context, or "in totality" as it were, recount
nothing more culpable than that the affiants were unwilling, or unwitting, witnesses to a crime in
the planning and commission of which they had no conscious involvement. Such finding of
conspiracy thus lacking any clear or sufficient basis where those affiants are concerned, a
verdict of guilt against them, as to whom here is no other evidence to contradict their claim of
never having laid a hand on the victim, cannot be allowed to stand.
Accused-appellants are all acquitted.
[MACAVINTA] United States v. Corrales, G.R. No. 9230, November 10, 1914
Fact:
The appellant in this instant case was convicted for the crime of misappropriation of public
funds, and sentenced to 9 months imprisonment plus costs of trial
On or about june 6, 1913 the appellant was the clerk of court of first instance of misamis, he
received a sum of P321.88 from a chinaman named Melliza, which was the fine imposed upon
the latter, and that instead of giving Melliza the proper official receipt, the accused handed him a
copy of judgement of conviction stating fine and costs paid.
However upon audit and inspection it was later discovered that the funds were not found,
hence the accused was charged with misappropriation of funds; however a few hours later the
accused went to the house of the auditor and informed him that the amount in question is now
safe in the drawer which he kept in his personal funds.
The accused admitted the fact that he received the money from melliza but he was busy and
had no time to render a receipt for melliza, and put the money in a safe which he kept in his
personal funds, and making the proper deposit on a later date in his convenience. Which he
ultimately forgot until the auditor saw the discrepancy in the funds.
Accused states that he never used the funds kept in his personal safe and that upon audit, he
went straight to the auditors house to explain what had happened.
This court however does not agree with the accused alleged alibi and agrees with the trial judge
stating that the evidence of record conclusively establishes the falsity of the account of what
occurred as given by the accused.
The auditor testified that the accused admitted that he put the money in the safe AFTER the
inspection had been completed.
Counsel for appellant contends that such admission should be disregarded, on ground that it
was incompetent and inadmissible. Counsel for accused further contends that such admission
was not freely and voluntarily made, without compulsion or inducement and that it was not made
under oath.
Issue:
Whether or not admission is admissible when not freely given
Whether or not admission is admissible when not made under oath
Held:
The court held that the admission is admissible.
The court herein points out the difference between a confession and an admission. Confession,
is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement, stating that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
While admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statement of facts made by the accused
which do not directly involve an acknowledgement or a criminal intent to commit the offense.
As to the first issue, The reason for the rule excluding evidence as to confessions unless it is
first made to appear that they are made voluntarily does not apply in cases of admissions,
although, of course, evidence of the fact that a particular statement was made under duress
would tend very strongly to destroy its evidentiary value. It is very clear from all the evidence,
and from the circumstances under which the statement was made by the accused to the auditor,
that it was not made under duress, and we are of opinion that the trial judge properly took it
under consideration as evidence against the accused.
As to the second issue the law does NOT prescribe either confession or admissions to be
competent to be made under oath. It is the fact that they are made by the accused and against
his own interest which gives to them their evidentiary value, and provided that the fact is
established it does not matter whether they are made under oath or not.
[MACAVINTA] People v. Artellero, G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000

Facts:
On october 11, 1991, at the Far East Bank and Trust Company branch in manila, a messenger
found the lifeless body of Matias, inside the bank premises and bore a total of 32 stab wounds.
This sprung an investigation led by SPO3 Mendoza and two other officers of the western police
district. Upon investigation, they interviewed the bank janitor, Mr cawagdan, and the other
security guard Dionisio Vargas. They also found a bloodstained scissors made inside a podium
located near the main entrance of the bank. Head of security also reported that .38 cal revolvers
and five 12 gauge shotguns were missing from the guard rostrum.
Upon follow-up investigation, they learned that there was an ongoing construction on the upper
floors of the bank, and that the appellant (Artillero) and his co-accused (Rodriguez) had access
to the bank after office hours. This prompted SPO3 Jamoralin to go to the barracks of the
construction workers, wherein they saw the accused and co-accused, rodriguez, packing his
personal belongings.
When asked why he was packing, he replied that he had nothing else to do at the site. The
police however saw some reddish stains on the accused shirts and pants. Again probbed on the
reasoning behind such stain the accused explained that he had a wound on his back. Upon
inspection of his back no wound was found. Hence this prompted SPO3 Jamoralin to arrest
appellant and bring him to the police station for further interrogation together with the t-shirt and
maong pants found with the reddish stain
On october 15, 1991, accused rodriguez executed a sworn statement confessing that he and
appellant together with one Mendoza, and two other names he did not know, killed Matias.
They were then charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
Upon arraignment they entered their plea of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) SPO3 MENDOZA (2) SPO3
JAMORALIN (3) Atty Lao III (4) Carolyn Custodio the supervisor of the chemistry district of the
NBI
Custodio testified that the reddish stains on rodriguez pants and shirt were positive of type O
blood, which was also the blood type of rodriguez.
After the prosecution presented evidence, the appellant filed Demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to establish accused beyond reasonable doubt and that
testimonies presented were hearsay.
Such demurrer was however denied.
On the stand, both rodriguez and appellant Artillero admitted that they were province mates
from masbate and worked in the construction site. Rodriguez claims that he was mauled by the
policemen to make a confession while appellant was placed outside the room where rodriguez
was being interrogated and was not asked for any statement, further stating that he did not own
any maong pants.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision finding appellant and rodriguez guilty of murder,
instead of robbery with homicide.
This prompted an appeal only by Artillero and contends that the court erred in giving credence
to the extrajudicial confession of rodriguez in proving conspiracy as circumstantial evidence to
show probability of his participation.
Issue:
Whether or not extrajudicial confession made by Co-accused Rordriguez is admissible for
establishing conspiracy with appellant Artellero
Held:
The court states the four fundamental requisites for admissibility of a confession
1. Confession must be voluntary
2. Confession must be made with competent counsel
3. Confession must be express
4. Confession must be in writing
We find the second requisite lacking. The records show that both accused were detained for 4
days, and that Atty Lao from PAO was only called on the 4th day of detention when accused
was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and
appellant were arrested they were already under Custodial Investigation.
The records who that rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their arrest was informed of their
miranda rights. WORSE, they were not provided with competent and independent counsel
during the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the EJ confession.
Assuming further, that granting arguendo that the EJ confession was admissible, section 33 of
rule 130 of the ROC provides that such confession is only admissible against the
CONFESSANT. And that there is a requirement that independent evidence is required aside
from the EJ confession to prove conspiracy. In this case however no independent evidence was
presented.
Hence both appellant and rodriguez are ACQUITTED.
[MACAVINTA] People v. Urro, G.R. No. L-28405, April 27, 1972
Facts:
That on or before january 26, 1962 the four accused in the municipality of zambuanga del sur,
acting with treachery and premeditation, struck several times the victim Reconalla inflicting
mortal injuries that caused his death.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on the night of January 25, 1962, Reconalla left the
conjugal home to catch fish and thereafter did not return. After search by his wife was in vain,
she reported the disappearance to the police authorities. After search with the authorities, they
found his lifeless body along the beach near his sailboat.
Upon investigation, it was then found out by the chief of police that the 4 herein accused are the
enemies of the deceased. The chief of police investigated the four suspects (herein
defendants). They voluntarily executed their confessions and signed them and acknowledged
them to be true before the mayor.
The four confessions, were in complete harmony with one another, and stated that Urro asked
his co-defendants to meet him and that he offered the amount of P300.00 for the death of
Reconalla. Which the defendants accepted.
It was here that the three defendants went into shore on january 26, 1962 to find Reconalla
fishing. They approached him pretending to be buyers of fish, but when the latter declined their
offer, they began clubbing him to death with a piece of bamboo and paddle.
The confession was corroborated by pedro calago, who declared that while returning to the
shore, he heard the cries of a Reconalla and saw the co-defendants carrying the lifeless body of
the deceased and dumped the same into the shore.
The defense consisted mainly of denials. After weighing the evidence for the prosecution and
defense, the court believes that the crime of murder was committed by the four herein. This is
attended with the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and promise of reward without
any mitigating circumstance.
The court rendered decision against the defendants, which prompted an appeal.
On appeal, the accused-appellants assail that the lower court erred in basing their conviction on
the alleged extra judicial confessions, notwithstanding their strong and convincing evidence that
the confessions were prefabricated and take from them by force and coercion.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra judicial confession made is admissible as evidence
Held:
Two telling earmarks of prefabrication of appellants alleged confessions were presented, that
(1) it is impossible to tell from the record just who actually reduced the statements in writing
and that the (2) intrinsic evidence of diction and style unerringly shows that the confessions
are products of one mind and not of four different minds. Hence there is there is reason to
believe that the alleged confessions were prefabricated by persons other than the accused, who
were thereafter compelled to sign them.
(medjo mahaba and malabo na ung testimonies pero in short sinasabi lang that the 4
extrajudicial confessions were too good to be true, because they were all in sync hence meron
nang doubt that opens up the possibility of fabrication)
The court held that it is an established doctrine that the confession or declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against
him, where it is VOLUNTARY. Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by the force or
intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by the law, which proscribes the use of such
cruel and inhuman methods to secure confession. A coerced confession stands discredited in
the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed
Hence ACQUITTED
[MACAVINTA] People v. Bascugin y Agquiz, G.R. No. 184704, June 30, 2009
Facts:
In an information dated June 21, 1999 herein accused-appellant, Bascugin was charged with
rape with homicide.
With his the assistance of counsel de oficio, Bascugin pleaded guilty upon arraignment on
august 5, 1999.
Since this was a capital offence, the trial court asked him if his plea was voluntarily given and
whether he understood the consequences of his plea.
The prosecution presented testimonial, object, and documentary evidence, while the defense
offered no contest. The trial court then and there adjudged him guilty of the charge beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced him to death
In automatic review by the SC, the OSG and bascugin challenged the proceedings in trial court,
specially the invalid arrangement of bascugin, they contended that consultation made by the
counsel de oficio was hasty; and bascugin was not sufficiently apprised of the nature of his case
and consequences of his plea.
SC found merit and remanded the case back to court a quo for appropriate proceedings.
Bascugin was once again arraigned on may 6, 2002. And this time with assistance from counsel
de oficio, he pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution asked the court to adopt the past testimonies given in the first witness. The
defense did not object to said motion, thus, it was granted.
according to the prosecution, AAA was on board the tricycle driven by accused. De mesa, saw
bascugin going towards Balayan town proper, but did not notice if he had a passenger on board.
On the same night, liwanag, was on his way home from work via his motorcycle when he
passed bascugins tricycle parked near a waiting shed. Liwanag testified that he heard a girl
shout but he ignored the same because the area was allegedly haunted.
When AAA was reported missing, the police conducted an investigation. PO3 de castro
received information that a patient was being treated at Don Manuel Lopez Memorial District
Hospital for tongue injury. As they rushed to the hospital they found the patient to be Bascugin.
Bascugin told the police that AAA was his passenger that night and that a man and a woman
also boarded his tricycle. He was then hit behind the neck and fell unconscious, and when he
awoke, his tongue was injured and the passengers were gone.
Further investigation ensued and the police went to the scene of the crime, where they found in
a muddled portion of a sugarcane plantation the lifeless body of AAA naked with 13 stab
wounds inside a canal along national road. They also recovered a pair of maong pants and two
panties belonging to the victim.
Before prosecution can rest its case, the defense manifested that Bascugin wanted to change
his plea of not guilty to guilty, hence on sep 29, 2003 he was arraigned one more time, and
pleaded guilty to the charge.
Upon motion of the prosecution, Bascugin was placed on the wtiness stand, where he affirmed
that he understood the consequences of his voluntary plea, and admitted that AAA rode his
tricycle on june 4, 1999 and that he raped and killed her.
HOWEVER, on november 12, 20013 he moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and when
Re-arraigned again he pled not guilty.
Bacugin testified that AAA rode his tricycle and that due to heavy rain, they stopped at a waiting
shed in a barangay for a long time. He then further stated that something happened which he
could not tell but after that incident, he started the engine of his tricycle to bring AAA home but
she ran away, and that he can only remember driving her lifeless body to bagong daan and
assumed responsibility for his passenger. Thereafter, he went home and was brought to the
hospital by his father to treat his injured tongue soon after that he voluntarily went with the
investigators, and on cross-examination, admitted he raped and killed AAA.
The RTC found bascugin GUILTY.
Hence forwarded to the CA for review
In the CA, bascugin argued that his confession when he pleaded guilty should be expunged
from the records since he withdrew the said plea and substituted it with a plea of not guilty.
The CA upheld the conviction, stating that he admitted in open court that he raped and killed
AAA. this judicial admission constitutes evidence of high order, not only because it is presumed
that a deliberate confession to a crime is prohibited by truth, but also because such admission
was supported by medical findings of sexual intercourse between him and AAA.
Hence appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not confession during arraignment was admissible
Held:
The court held that the confession of Bascugins, wsa freely, intelligently, and deliberately given.
Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.
Rule 130 sec 33 states that Confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given evidence
against him.
The court stated that the presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the
commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt
constitutes evidence against him.
[SANTOS] People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
FACTS:
Muit, Pancho, Jr.,Dequillo, Romeo,Hermano, Ferraer were charged with kidnapping for ransom
with homicide and carnapping in two separate informations. All appellants pleaded not guilty
during their arraignments. In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Julaton, a relative of Ferraer,
arrived at the latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Pancho, Sr., Pancho, Jr.,
Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they
wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their visitor. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry
because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that
the money they will get would be shared equally among them. After the assailants carried their
plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting place
The prosecution presented the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which
were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare admitting that they did the crime.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997 he was
working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. He stated that on 8 December
1997, he was arrested by the CIDG at his house and allegedly tortured when he denied any
knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement without being allowed to
read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement. He denied any
participation in the crimes charged against him.
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He alleged
that the police tortured him and forced him to sign the written confession of his participation in
the crimes. He denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged against
him.
On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of
the shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his uncle
Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the crime. He
denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He
claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel
during the custodial investigation.
The RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. The RTC did not give credence to the claims of
appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through torture as these were
belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical certificates which were issued
during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements. The CA affirmed the
decision. The prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one
another in the planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants
executed extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation
in the kidnapping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr.
and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.
HELD:
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct
testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez.
During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels
and family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the
planning and execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the
victim, they should still be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of
conspiracy. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against
them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced and
tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts
which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the
knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their
lawyers when they executed their statements.
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical
examinations done on them. These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were
raised for the first time during trial.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the
prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only
against the person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where
several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense
and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that
the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the
co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the
probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise
serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known
as interlocking confessions.
Ra 7438, An Act Defining Certain Rights Of Person Arrested, Detained Or Under

Custodial Investigation As Well As The Duties Of The Arresting, Detaining And
Investigating Officers, And Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof
[SANTOS] People v. Omilig y Mancia, G.R. No. 206296, August 12, 2015
Estur, a COA Auditor, discovered in July 1993 rice stocks unaccounted for in the bodega of the
NFA. The stocks were under the account of Matas. Estur suspended accused Matas. Upon
disembarking from the Ford Fiera driven by Fajardo, was stabbed and shot in front of his rented
apartment. Upon hearing her husband shout, If you want to kill me, dont include my wife,
quickly followed by two gunshots, Vicenta hid inside their apartment. After a few minutes, she
went out of the house and saw Betonio, barely alive, slumped on the ground with a knife, with a
handle like that of an eagle and a carving like that of a dragon, still pierced through his chest.
Before Betonio was brought to the hospital, where he was later pronounced dead on arrival, he
whispered to his wife the names, Delfin and Matas.
During the investigation, accused-appellant Peaflor admitted killing Betonio and that he was
hired by accused Ondo, the brother-in-law of Matas, for the amount of P15,000.00, to kill
Betonio. At 3:00 p.m. of that same day, the police brought accused-appellant Peaflor to the
Office of the City Prosecutor to obtain his admission.
The RTC acquitted accused Matas, Omilig, and Ondo, while it convicted accused-appellant
Peaflor for the crime of murder for killing Betonio. The RTC admitted accused-appellant
Peaflors extrajudicial confessions because they were not taken under duress or intimidation
as the extrajudicial confessions were conducted at the Prosecutors Office and not in a police
station, and in the presence of his relatives.
The CA affirmed the decision. The CA ruled that accused-appellant Peaflors two extrajudicial
confessions were admissible in evidence as he was not under custodial investigation when the
said extrajudicial confessions were executed; they were conducted before an Assistant City
Prosecutor and a City Prosecutor.
In detail, accused-appellant Peaflors first extrajudicial confession was taken before Assistant
City Prosecutor Albulario, during which accused-appellant Peaflor was assisted by Atty.
Cristobal. On the other hand, his second extrajudicial confession was taken before City
Prosecutor Lagcao with Atty. Cavales assisting accused-appellant Peaflor, and while in the
presence of accused-appellant Peaflors father, mother, and other relatives. The Court of
Appeals rejected the defenses claim of inadmissibility of accused-appellant Peaflors
extrajudicial confessions, which is anchored on the sole ground that they were not made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice.
According to the Court of Appeals, the right to competent and independent counsel applies only
to a person under custodial investigation. In the case at bar, as accused-appellant Peaflor was
not under custodial investigation, but under a preliminary investigation before a public
prosecutor, during which his right to a competent and independent counsel does not apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions are admissible?
HELD:
YES.
As correctly found by the lower courts, accused-appellant Peaflor executed his extrajudicial
confession not during custodial investigation, but during the preliminary investigation. In Ladiana
v. People, the Court defined the difference between custodial investigation and preliminary
investigation: Custodial Interrogation/Investigation is the questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way; on the other hand, Preliminary Investigation is an
inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. In Ladiana, this Court has unequivocally declared that a
person undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be considered as being under custodial
investigation. The import of the distinction between custodial interrogation and preliminary
investigation relates to the inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation which is
conducted by the police authorities. Due to the interrogatory procedures employed by police
authorities, which are conducive to physical and psychological coercion, the law affords arrested
persons constitutional rights to guarantee the voluntariness of their confessions and admissions,
and to act as deterrent from coercion by police authorities. These safeguards are found in
Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution and Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438. Sans proper
safeguards, custodial investigation is a fertile means to obtain confessions and admissions in
duress. Resultingly, as pronounced in Ladiana, the claim by the accused of inadmissibility of his
extrajudicial confession is unavailing because his confessions were obtained during a
preliminary investigation. And even if accused-appellant Peaflors extrajudicial confessions
were obtained under custodial investigation, these are admissible. To be admissible, a
confession must comply with the following requirements: it must be (a) voluntary; b) made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.31 In the
case at bar, the prosecution did not present proof of the absence of any of these requirements.
[OFALSA] People v. Deniega y Macoy, G.R. No. 103499, December 29, 1995
FACTS
The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in an ill-frequented back
corner on the left side of the Mt. Carmel Church in New Manila, Quezon City. Her hands were
tied behind her back by a shoestring and pieces of her own clothing. The body bore 39 stab
wounds. There was evidence that she had been brutally assaulted, physically and sexually,
before she was murdered. Police authorities arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on information that
the victim was last seen with Daniega. Friends of Canoy volunteered the information that the
former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with Daniega. Appellant Hoyle Diaz y
Urnillo was invited by the investigators for questioning. A second sworn statement, substantially
similar and corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later extracted
from Diaz. In the said statement, Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied
that he had something to do with the victim's death. Armed with the said extra-judicial
confessions, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, charging
petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide. At trial, the confessions obtained by law
enforcement authorities during their (separate) custodial investigations formed the centerpiece
of the prosecution's case for Rape with Homicide against both accused. In their defense,
appellants, during the course of the trial, vehemently denied the claim that they had voluntarily
executed the said confessions. Appellants Daniega and Diaz went to the extent of seeking the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, and there executed a sworn statement to the
effect that their respective confessions were coerced and obtained through torture. Both testified
that they were subjected to electrocution and water treatment. They contended that they were
arrested without warrants of arrest and that the confessions obtained from them immediately
thereafter were made without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE
WON the confessions made are admissible.
HELD
The legal insufficiencies and inconsistencies in the documents in question are so glaring, even
from a cursory examination of the confessions. The statements evidencing the interrogation,
including those portions in which the appellants purportedly were informed of their constitutional
rights, were in typewritten form. However, within the body of these documents, blank spaces
were conspicuously left at strategic areas (spaces) where the accused were supposed to sign
and acknowledge that they were appraised of their rights and that they gave their statements
voluntarily. These were spaces obviously provided for the accused to fill in the blank with the
word "yes" ("opo") followed by another blank space for their respective signatures. Apart from
the defects evident on the face of the documents, there exists evidence indicating that the
actual custodial investigation was conducted at the police headquarters in the absence of
counsel, as contended by appellants. These facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the
confessions of both defendants were obtained in the absence of independent and competent
counsel as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and that the same may have been acquired
under conditions negating voluntariness, as alleged by the accused.
[OFALSA] People v. Felixminia y Camacho, G.R. No. 125333, March 20, 2002
FACTS
Rolando Felixminia was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide and the
extreme penalty of death was imposed upon him. The conviction was based on the
circumstantial evidence that Felixminia abducted the six-year old Maria Lourdes Galinato who
was later found to have been raped, killed and buried near the Macalong River in San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. In this appeal, Felixminia claimed that the trial court erred in convicting
him based purely on circumstantial evidence and in not applying the doctrine of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree."
The Court found the extra-judicial confession of the accused as invalid since he was deprived of
his right to counsel during said custodial investigation. Consequently, the exclusionary rule
applies and the extra-judicial confession should be struck down as inadmissible. However, it
bears stressing that in crimes of rape with homicide, it is seldom, if not ever, that there is an
eyewitness to the act itself. Consequently, the courts must rely on the circumstantial evidence,
which led to the obvious conclusion that accused is the perpetrator of the crime, more so when
there is corroborative evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused. Here, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in court and the findings made in the autopsy report of Dr. Ramon
Gonzales, Jr., the autopsy report of the Philippine National Police, the joint affidavit of police
officers Reyes and Rubianes, and the affidavit of witness Mangunay, showed that the
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED PURELY ON THE BASIS OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT DO NOT HOWEVER MEET THE REQUISITES
PROVIDED FOR BY LAW FOR CONVICTION BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
HELD
In the instant case, the admission made by accused-appellant was not in the form of a written
extra-judicial confession; the admission was made verbally to PO3 Roberto Reyes, a member of
the Philippine National Police stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. PO3 Reyes testified that after
accused-appellant was taken into custody, he "interviewed and interrogated" the latter and in
the course of their "conversation," accused-appellant said that he "raped, killed and buried"
Maria Lourdes. There is no doubt, therefore, that accused-appellant was taken into custody for
investigation of his possible participation in the commission of the crime. Hence, the
constitutional mantle of protection clearly covers the instant situation. While said officer testified
that he apprised the accused-appellant of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel of his
own choice, accused-appellant's alleged admission was made without the presence of a
counsel. It does not appear either that accused-appellant manifested that he could not afford the
services of a counsel nor waived his right to one in writing and in the presence of a counsel as
no such written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented in evidence. Therefore, the
Court finds the extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant invalid since he was deprived of
his right to counsel during said custodial investigation. Consequently, the exclusionary rule
applies and the extra-judicial confession should be struck down as inadmissible.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession executed by the
accused-appellant, he was properly convicted by the trial court because (a) compromising
circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with
moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged and (b) the totality of
such circumstances eliminated beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of his innocence.
The circumstances are consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused-appellant is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Moreover, Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules provides that an accused can still be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, provided that enough circumstantial evidence has been established by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting
felons free and deny proper protection to the community. Circumstantial evidence is not a
"weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence," and cases have recognized that
circumstantial evidence in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its
effect upon the Court.
[PATAWARAN] People v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 82604, December 10, 1991
FACTS: The police officers of Cebu station received a report that one Pelagio Jimenez had
been found dead below the cliff near the Balite tree. They went to the scene and found the
lifeless body of Pelagio which sustained stab wounds to the head and leg and was apparently
already rotting.
Upon further investigation, the police officers drew their suspicion to the sons of Pelagio,
Marcos and Robert. Also, there was a trail of dried blood stains from the deceaseds porch
leading to the cliff where he was found dead. It was also alleged by witnesses that the brothers
were seen by their neighbors bathing in the artesian well as if washing away blood stains and
that there were occasions where the brothers would violently box their father who had been
accused of surreptitiously selling their uncles copra, a Dr. Jimenez.
The police invited the brothers and Pelagios widow, Albina for questioning where MARCOS
CONFESSED that it was who hacked their father on the right leg and thereafter, the carried
their father and left him near the Balite tree. Lt. Bancog TOOK DOWN THE CONFESSION ON
A PIECE OF PAPER and gave it to Pat. Cavalida, who was to type up the confession and
continue the investigation.
Pat. Cavalida continued the investigation in the presence of Ex-judge Jabagat who acted as
counsel for Marcos. Cavalida typed the c onfession but was unsigned by Marcos because
Jusge Calderon, before whom the confession was supposed to be sworn and signed had earlier
left. Marcos agreed to return the next day to sign but did not return.
Subsequently, an information was filed against Albina, Marcos, Pelagio and added Wilkins,
another brother for Parricide. During arraignment, they all pled not guilty.
Marcos testimony included the following:
Marcos admitted having been investigated by Lt. Bancog on August
16. They were only two in the room. He likewise admitted that
Judge Jabagat arrived but only after his statement had been
typed by Pat. Cavalida. He admitted that Lt. Bancog wrote down
what he stated, and this handwritten statement was handed to Pat.
Cavalida . . . (He also) admitted the existence of blood near the
house and plenty of it in the bushes . . .; the existence of blood in
the plowed area . . . (and) it was he and Robert who plowed the
same. In the matter of his confession (Exh. 'B'), he claims that what
is stated there is in accordance with what his uncle, Marcos
Jimenez, wanted him to tell, that he was pressured to admit the
crime under threat of punishment."
The RTC acquitted Albina and Wilkins and were ordered to be released. However, the brothers
Marcos and Robert were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for parricide.
The RTC based the brothers conviction from the confession made by Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction based on Marcos confession is valid.
HELD: No, the RTC is reversed. Marcos and Roberto are ACQUITTED.
The Constitution explicitly declares that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect
in an offense has the right, among others, 'to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. In this case, former Judge Jabagat was evidently not of Marcos
,Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers' choice; she did not ask Marcos if he was
willing to have her represent him; she just told him: "I am here because I was summon(ed) to
assist you and I am going to assist you." This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance
contemplated by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the evidence discloses that J udge Jabagat was not present at the critical time
that interrogation of Marcos Jimenez by the police was actually taking place. She came only
after the questioning had been completed, and the handwritten record of Marcos Jimenez'
answers already typewritten- and all she did was to show the typewritten document to Marcos
and ask him if he had voluntarily given the statements therein contained.
It follows that neither the handwritten summary of Marcos Jimenez' answers made by
two investigating officers for the typewritten statement based thereon is admissible.
The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the handwritten notes from which
the former was derived. The confession was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos Jimenez
as not reflective of his own perceptions and recollection, but as containing only what his uncle,
Marcos Jimenez, had instructed him to tell the police "under threat of punishment." Hence, the
supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice is void.
Equally obvious is that any confession or admission ascribed to Marcos Jimenez in the
premises is inadmissible against his brother, his co-accused, Robert Jimenez, not only
because obtained in violation of the Constitution and therefore void, but also because of the
familiar principle of res inter alios acta. "The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another;" t he confession of an accused is admissible only
against him, but not against his co-defendants.
[PATAWARAN] People v. Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015
FACTS: SPO2 Paglicawan and SPO3 Yuzon received a radio message from the barangay
captain Torreliza that a suspicious looking boat was seen in the vicinity of the island of Looc,
Mindoro. The police officers proceeded to the island and they saw a fishing boat and a speed
boat anchored side by side with people transferring cargo from the fishing boat to the speed
boat. As the police officers boat approached, the fishing boat sped away leaving the speed boat
which seemed to be having engine problems. The police officers were not able to apprehend
the fishing boat due to the strong waves.
The officers found Chi Chan Liu and Leofe Senglao with several plastic bags containing a
crystalline substance which they immediately suspected as shabu. Unable to produce their
identification papers upon the police officers demand, they were brought to the police officers
where they repeatedly tried to bribe the officers with big, big amount of money. In the police
station and in the presence of the appellants and the municipal mayor Telebrico, they conducted
an inventory of the 45 bags. The bags were subsequently confirmed to contain shabu.
The accused were then transported to Laguna by General Acop and during the C USTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, both the accused still refused to say anything but big money, call China.
General Acop then allowed them to make a call but was unable to understand the situation
because they spoke in their native tongue. Due to this, they sought the assistance of an
interpreter. Upon arrival of the interpreter, he was tasked to inform both the accused of their
constitutional rights but they only kept repeating big money, call China.
The RTC found them GUILTY for violating the RA 7659 (Dangerous Drugs Act). On appeal the
CA AFFIRMED in toto the RTC decision.
Senglao and Liu now questions the validity of their arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not they were afforded their Constitutiolnal rights during custodial
investigation?
HELD: YES, the CA decision is AFFIRMED.
Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in an
Information on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3, 1998,
beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour period in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. But while the
law subjects such public officers who detain persons beyond the legal period to criminal liability,
it must be remembered that the proceeding taken against the detained persons for the act the
committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate. This Court is
nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police officers in this case,
such as the language barrier, the unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of
the days fell on a Sunday, as well as the disparity in the distances between the different
offices. But even assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the
Information, appellants should have taken steps to report or file charges against the officers.
Unfortunately, they cannot now rely on administrative shortcomings of police officers to get a
judgment of acquittal for these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in
appellants' possession.
Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for during
custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they provided
with one, this deserves scant consideration since the same is r elevant and material only
when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the
basis of his conviction. In this case, neither one of the appellants executed an admission or
confession. In fact, as the records clearly show, appellants barely even spoke and merely kept
repeating the phrase "call China, big money." The trial court convicted them not on the basis of
anything they said during custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants'
constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.
In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying that during
their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but were merely
represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. The facts borne by the records of the
case, however, militate against the contention of the appellants. This Court does not find a
violation of appellants' right to counsel for even in their own narration of facts, appellants stated
that when they appeared without counsel when the case was called for arraignment on January
19, 1999, the trial court gave appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It
was only when appellants again appeared for the second time without counsel on
February 23, 1999 that the court appointed a counsel from the Public Attorney's Office. It
is clear, therefore, that appellants had ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of
their own choice. They cannot now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court
for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the law.
[PATAWARAN] Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008

FACTS: Aquino, Garganta and another woman identified as Adeling went to the house of
respondent Paiste to convince the latter to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot.
Aquino and company showed Paiste a sample of the gold bar then proceeded to a pawnshop to
test its authenticity which was shown to be genuine. However, Paiste informed them that she
did not have money. Regardless, Aquino repeatedly convinced her and agreed to meet Arnold
who showed Paiste the gold bar and informed her that it was worth P60,000. Aquino and
company then repeatedly tried to convince Paiste to buy the gold bar for P50,000 to which she
agreed.
Paiste subsequently had the gold bar tested and was informed that it was fake. Paista went to
Aquinos house to inform the latter that the gold was fake. Aquino replied that she had nothing
to do with it and that they needed to see Garganta.
Paiste brought Aquino to the NBI and in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino, Aquino
promised amicably compromised with Paiste that they would locate Garganta and the document
they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta. The amicable settlement
reads:
(1) In view of the acceptance of fault by MRS. JUANITA
ASIO-AQUINO of the case/complaint filed by MRS. TERESITA
PAISTE before the NBI-National Capital Region for Swindling, Mrs. J.
Aquino agreed to pay the complainant half the amount swindled from
the latter. Said P25,000.00 offered by Mrs. J. Aquino as settlement for
the case of Estafa will be paid by her through installment scheme in
the amount of P1,000.00 per month beginning from the month of
March, 1991 until fully paid
(2) The undersigned accused/respondent hereby waives her right to

counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI
agent Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy.
Petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In the presence of B arangay

Chairperson Pablo Atayde and a police officer, respondent pointed to Garganta as the person
who sold the fake gold bar. Garganta was brought to the police station where there was a
demand against Garganta alone. Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal complaint from
which an Information against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa
Garganta and the others remained at large and only the petitioner was arraigned who pled not
guilty.
The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and Arnold in committing the
crime of estafa. The trial court likewise g
ave credence to the amicable settlement as
additional proof of petitioners guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an
implied admission of guilt. The CA AFFIRMED the RTC.
Aquinos claim that the documents cannot be given weight as she executed the documents
under threat and not freely and voluntarily which was a violation of her Constitutional rights
under the Miranda Rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amicable settlement and the waiver of the right to counsel are valid.
HELD: Yes, the amicable settlement and the waiver of the right to counsel are valid.
Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which
an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning.
Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice
of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed x x x."
Petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uys appointment during the time she
was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly
held in People v. Jerez, when "the accused never raised any objection against the lawyers
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer" the accused is deemed to have engaged
such lawyer. Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when
she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable settlement with waiver of right
to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon
cross-examination about the petitioners counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI
agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.
When petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable
settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.
The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth."15 An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial
confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their
mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy
safeguarded petitioners rights even if the custodial investigation did not push through
and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.
Even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be a dmissible since none of her constitutional rights
were violated. Petitioners allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare
allegations. Allegations are not proof.
[PATAWARAN] Mesina v. People, G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015
FACTS: Bernardo Mesina, then Local Treasurer of the Local government of Caloocan City
collected from Rosalinda Baclit the weeks collection of market fees, miscellaneous fees, real
property taxes, community tax receipts and the patubig collection all amounting to P468,394.
The cash were bundled and placed inside separate envelopes containing their respective
liquidation statements which were signed by both Mesina and Baclit.
Later that day, Baclit received several phone calls confirming the collection of the patubig
collections by Mesina. 30 minutes later, Baclit received a call informing her that the supposed
patubig collection amounting to P167,870 was not remitted. Mesina then called Baclit to inform
her that he allegedly DID NOT RECEIVE the patubig collection.
Carolo Santos, City Treasurer then summoned both Mesina and Baclit for an inquiry
relative to the missing collection. Baclit and Mesina insisted on their respective versions. The
City treasurer then ordered the Sealing of Mesinas vault pending investigation.
The following morning, Mayor Malonzo called an immediate probe on the matter. Mesina
stood fast in his denial of having received the same while Baclit positively asserted that Mesina
indeed received the collections.
The following day, the statement of collections supposedly signed by Mesina which had been
previously lost was recovered. A criminal case for Malversation was then filed Mesina.
During trial, Mesina then ADMITTED collecting the patubig collection but denied
misappropriating or embezzling the fund maintaining that the patubig collection was found
complete in his vault during the inspection. He alleged that he kept the funds in his safe
believing that he did not yet need to remit the amount because it was to be re-counted and
because his wife suffered a heart attack and was rushed to the emergency room.
RTC gave no credence to his defense and found him GUILTY of MALVERSATION. The CA
AFFIRMED the RTC.
On appeal with the Supreme Court, Mesina raises that he was not informed of his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel during the investigation. He argues that a
custodial investigation was what really transpired and insists that the failure to inform
him of his Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation conducted was equivalent to a custodial investigation.
HELD: NO, The CA is AFFIRMED.

According to People Vs. Marra, custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial
investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into a
still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused on a particular suspect who has been
taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to
elicit incriminating statements.
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not by
itself define the nature of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a
general inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing p atubig collection. By its nature, the
inquiry had to involve persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including the City
Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from different concerned offices, and even the
City Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that already focused on the
petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the missing city funds. B esides, he
was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
[PERENA] People v. Guting y Tomas, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015
FACTS:
In an Information dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93,

accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide. When arraigned on September
19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and
trial on the merits ensued.
Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at
around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling
Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his
hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing
accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from
accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.5
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-appellant
suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife.
Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi
asked who killed accused-appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po
yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and
gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police
Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado
(Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose),
accused-appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed
Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the market
with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-appellant's brother), who
was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2
Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime,
but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and saw Jose's lifeless
body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre
for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father.
Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used in stabbing
Jose. All that accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!"
PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did not request for the examination of the knife because it
was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed away by the rains at that
time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not put into writing
accused-appellant's admission that he killed his father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it
escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried away by the fast flow of
events.7
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is admissible in

evidence.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the
assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of
his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to
"custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend
to elicit an admission.
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he
stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and
voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be
true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so
in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that
point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider
accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely
standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not
yet in police custody.
[PERENA] People v. Sison, G.R. No. 70906, May 30, 1986
FACTS: Petitioner, represented by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Antique, in this special
action for certiorari, assails the Order dated March 26, 1985 issued by the respondent Judge
Luis V. Sison of Branch X, Regional Trial Court of Antique, rejecting the extrajudicial confession
of private respondent Jocelyn de Asis for having been taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV
of the Constitution.
It appears that in an amended information dated January 4, 1984, the Provincial Fiscal of
Antique, Ramon M. Salvani, Jr., charged Jocelyn de Asis, 20, single, a resident of Barangay
Agcarupi, Januiay, Iloilo, and an elementary school graduate, with subversion for having
become a member of the New People's Army (Criminal Case No. 2670). Jocelyn pleaded not
guilty to the charge.
Fiscal Recaredo P. Barte offered in evidence the aforecited extrajudicial confession (Exhibit Q)
dated May 19, 1983 of Jocelyn. This was vehemently objected to by her counsel. Respondent
judge sustained the objection on the ground that Jocelyn's waiver of her right to counsel was
made without the assistance of counsel, consonant with the ruling of this Court in the twin cases
of Morales vs. Enrile, et al., G.R. No. L-61016, Moncupa vs. Enrile, et al., G.R. No. L-61107,
April 26, 1983 (121 SCRA 538).
In her confession, which was taken at a hospital in San Jose, Antique, Jocelyn was led to admit
through a leading question that she became a member of the New People's Army on May 8,
1983. She further stated that in an encounter with the Philippine Constabulary and Civilian
Home Defense Forces a week later, or on May 17, 1983, she was wounded and her brother
David was killed.
Fiscal Barte contends that the ruling in the aforecited cases has no doctrinal value since the
said ruling was contained in an obiter dictum and was concurred in by only three Justices
instead of the required number of eight Justices.
Counsel for private respondent, in his comment, contends that the doctrine in the Morales and
Moncupa case was reiterated in the decision in People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51170 promulgated
on March 20, 1985.
The former Solicitor General, in his comment, submits that said confession is admissible.
After deliberating on the petition and comments, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition. In
the case of People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Galit (135 SCRA 465), which was decided
en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part, the Court had
occasion to put at rest all doubts regarding the ruling in the Morales vs. Enrile and Moncupa vs.
Enrile cases. The Court, in setting aside the judgment appealed from and acquitting the
accused Francisco Galit, reiterated the ruling laid down in the aforecited cases, which we quote
below:
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation, and which we reiterate:
7. At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must show the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or
any one who chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible-or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person in his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The fight to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. (People vs. Galit, s upra., p. 472)
(Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
[PERENA] Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply, G.R. No. 127553, November 28, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were employed as
drivers at N.C. Construction Supply owned by private respondents Johnny Lim (a.k.a. Lao Ching
Eng) and Anita Sy.
On June 3, 1995, the security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio Guevara, a
company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper ("pahinante"), taking out from the company premises
two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought to the Pasig
Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso named seven other employees
who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts at respondent company, among them
petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.
On June 5, 1995, petitioners received separate notices from respondent company informing
them
that they were positively identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as perpetrators of the series of
thefts committed at respondent company. They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for
investigation regarding their alleged involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an investigation
regarding petitioners' involvement in the theft. Atty. Reyes interrogated the petitioners on their
alleged participation in the series of thefts committed at respondent company. Petitioners
initially denied the charge. However, after being positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners
admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge
against them.
On July 17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal.
Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the charge against them nor were they given
an opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their admission made at the Pasig
police station regarding their involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not
voluntary but were obtained by private respondents' lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of the petitioners is admissible in evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that petitioners extrajudicial admission is admissible in evidence.
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that such admission was obtained by means of
threat or intimidation as such allegation is couched in general terms and is unsupported by
evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against
them under Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12
of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had
been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such
investigation.Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation
conducted by private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not
yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely an administrative
investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation. The questions were
propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the investigation was
conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation
as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by
petitioners during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
[PERENA] People v. Marra y Zarate, G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994
FACTS:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra
y Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder
for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992.
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified appellant as the triggerman in the
killing of Nelson Tandoc. Din recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his
friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each other in front of Lucky Hotel located at M.H.
del Pilar Street, Dagupan City, which was owned by the witness' father and of which he was the
administrator. He noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the street. The man made a
dirty sign with his finger and Din informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive act
and called them by waving his hands. Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter stopped in
front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets. They
demanded an explanation from the man but they were not given any.
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was going on. Tandoc informed
him that they were just demanding an explanation from the man. Din was surprised when
Tandoc unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing with
the two men while Din exchanged blows with the man who made the dirty finger sign. After the
fisticuffs, their three opponents ran away in a westward direction.
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they were about to enter the
place, they noticed that the men with whom they just had a fight were running towards them.
Sensing danger, they ran inside the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured the
lock of the sliding outer door. They entered a room and waited until they felt that the situation
had normalized. After ten to fifteen minutes, thinking that the men were no longer in the vicinity,
they left the room. Having decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a sudden,
Din saw Appellant, who at that time was wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with
a revolver. There was a fluorescent bulb installed at the front of the hotel which enabled Din to
identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot in the middle of the chest and he fell down. Then, Din
saw four to five men scamper away from the scene.
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase appellant and his
companions but he failed to catch up with them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the
Villaflor Hospital. The victim was taken to the emergency room but he expired an hour later.
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City Police
Station received a report about a shooting incident at the annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He
proceeded to the crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio Flores and
SPO3 Noli de Castro. Upon their arrival about five minutes later, they were informed by the wife
of Jimmy Din that the victim had been brought to the Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the
hospital where Din informed them that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc and that
the killer was, at that time, wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform.
They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the security guard of a
nearby bus company, they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident that happened
in the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some
companions, chasing two persons running towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He further added that
the man was wearing a polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular
guard might be, he pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. The man eating was not in
a security guard's uniform.
They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security guard of "Linda's
Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions, they
learned that he was Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day
to 6:00 A.M. the following day, that he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of March
7, 1992, and that the firearm issued to him was in his house. Upon their request to see the
firearm, they proceeded to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street.
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an aparador and handed it to
De Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the
barrel of the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever
having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first
denied the accusation but when informed that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in
self-defense, firing at the victim only once.
Issue: Whether or not Marras confession is admissible in evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that Marras confession is not admissible in evidence.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers a fter a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect,the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements
that the rule begins to operate.
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission.
There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could
have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they
all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered
him as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform.
[RAMOS] People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 111193, January 28, 1997
Facts:
On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita Guzman was
robbed and was killed in her own house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victims adopted
daughter, could get at once any property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the
latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez would allow the other accused to steal what they
wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing
of Estrellita.
Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement detailing what transpired from
the planning until the execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution, the trial court found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of each of the accused are binding against each other
and admissible in evidence
Ruling:
YES. If it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since
it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of a normal mind will
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by
truth and
conscience.
Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with each other
in their essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated
by other evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latter's
actual participation in the commission of the crime, are thus impressed with features of
voluntariness in their execution
The court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking confessions sufficient to
corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused's own incriminating statements. This doctrine
of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized in numerous decisions of this
Court as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the hearsay rule. Reyes' confession is
thus admissible against Lara to show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration
of the crime. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation by an accused co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against
him.
[RAMOS] People v. Buluran y Ramirez, G.R. No. 113940, February 15, 2000
Facts: The Meyer family was celebrating the birthday of their mother at their residence in Area
4, Barangay Amaparo, Capri, Novaliches, Quezon City. It appears that Dominador Meyer, Jr.,
had an altercation with a cousin. The victim, Edilberto Meyer, Sr., tried to pacify them, and
brought Dominador outside the house to cool-off. However, while the victim and Dominador,
were talking outside their residence, Reynaldo Danao approached them and warned them not to
make any trouble because the community was celebrating its fiesta. The victim denied making
any trouble and said that the matter was a family problem. Suddenly, Reynaldo boxed the victim
who also retaliated with a fistblow. The two exchanged blows and grappled with each other.
Reynaldo managed to run away but returned after about two minutes.
Now, accompanied by his barkadas or gangmates (Cielito Buluran, Leonardo Valenzuela and
Jaime Danao), Reynaldo was armed with a 12-inch stainless knife. Cielito had also a knife.
Leonardo and Jaime each carried slingshots, with sharp-pointed arrows made of five-inch nails
with abaca tails. Without warning, Reynaldo stabbed the victim at the left side of his lower back.
All the while, his three companions were pointing and brandishing their weapons at the Meyer
brothers and the other people present in order to prevent them from interfering. Cielito poked his
knife at the Meyer brothers and stood guard to prevent other people from rendering help to the
victim. Leonardo likewise held his slingshot against the Meyer brothers and prevented people
from going near the victim by pointing his loaded slingshot at them. Thereafter, the four
barkadas fled. The victim died that same night
During trial, the prosecution presented three eyewitnesses all were neighbors of the victim. The
prosecution likewise presented PO1 Roberto C. San Miguel of Station 2, Sangang Daan,
Novaliches, Quezon City, who "invited" appellant Buluran to the precinct,[6] and Chief Inspector
Florante F. Baltazar, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim.
Baltazar testified that the cause of death was the "penetrating stab wound at the posterior left
lumbar region."[7] The victims widow, Mrs. Erlinda C. Meyer, testified as to the actual damages
sustained as a result of the death of her husband.[8] All were neighbors of the victim. The
prosecution likewise presented PO1 Roberto C. San Miguel of Station 2, Sangang Daan,
Novaliches, Quezon City, who "invited" appellant Buluran to the precinct,[6] and Chief Inspector
Florante F. Baltazar, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim.
Baltazar testified that the cause of death was the "penetrating stab wound at the posterior left
lumbar region."[7] The victims widow, Mrs. Erlinda C. Meyer, testified as to the actual damages
sustained as a result of the death of her husband.[8] Hence, the present appeal.
Issues: here involve the alleged irregularity of appellants arrest; the alleged violation of their
constitutional rights during custodial investigation for lack of counsel; and the alleged invalidity
of the proceedings in the trial court sans preliminary investigation. Considering these issues,
Held:
First. Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they
never raised this issue before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[15]
Second. There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial
investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the
records[16] show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during the custodial
investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction.[17] In this case, the basis of the conviction by
the trial court was the testimonies of the three eyewitnesses, Artemio Avendao, Jacinto Castillo,
and Gloria Castillo. It is noteworthy that appellants never attempted to impeach their testimonies
during trial. Neither do they assail the credibility of said witnesses on appeal.
Third. The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did not impair the
validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.[20] While the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the
accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.[21] It appearing
that appellants only raised the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during appeal, their right
to a preliminary investigation was deemed waived when they entered their respective pleas of
not guilty.
Pursuant to the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review (including penalty, indemnity and damages),[22] we shall now consider whether
appellants were correctly found guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Unquestionably, and appellants do not allege otherwise, conspiracy attended the killing of the
victim. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence.[23] From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of
the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[24] In this
case, the presence of appellants, both armed with deadly weapons, at the locus criminis
indubitably shows their complicity in the criminal design of Reynaldo Danao to kill the victim.
However, we find that no treachery attended the killing. On numerous occasions, we have held
that where a killing was preceded by an argument or quarrel, then the qualifying circumstance of
treachery can no longer be appreciated since the victim could be said to have been forewarned
and could anticipate aggression from the assailants.[25] The previous boxing incident between
the victim and Reynaldo Danao must have already put the victim on guard for further aggression
or retaliation by Reynaldo Danao. Hence, treachery could not be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance in this case.
[RAMOS] People v. Guillermo y Garcia, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004
People v. Guillermo y Garcia, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004
Facts: For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric
Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. Apellant is
accused of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. Appellant contends that his
conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that there is no clear showing
that he was not informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by
the police investigators.
Issue: THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.

Held: Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out
that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made
to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he was only made to read
said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the
services of counsel during the custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of
no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights, appellant argues that any
evidence gathered from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the
killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by
the Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution,[43] a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.[44] In the instant case, the testimony of
SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said
constitutional guarantees.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellants confession to SPO1 Reyes at
the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For
constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do
not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits
to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section
12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an
accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellants alleged
confession to the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellants guilt in the killing of
Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to the
spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two
media reporters, Abelgas and David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the
crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution
witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the
gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court.
[RAMOS] People v. Galgarin, G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning
lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agagas who
was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled
and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the
nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino
appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the
direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he
collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical
attention.
An Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest.
Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police
forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary
custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from
the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the
Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing
Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman
Testimonies of different persons present in the crime scene were adduced pointing out Galgarin
as the accused. For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in
the slaying of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his
common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. Accused-appellant disowned the
confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the
arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution.[8]
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the
police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant. The alibi of
Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his allegation
that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by treachery. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in rejecting his alibi and admitting his videotaped confession as
evidence against him.
Held: With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as
the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leongs
identification of accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner.
Her confidence as to the attackers identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him
having a mole below his nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and
Anita to implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their
assertion. As for Clara, her naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriends assailant was not
done out of spite, but was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but
to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he
had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen
who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its
Decision[13]-
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting
ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,[14] it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary
rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental
to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases
such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession
was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents
itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery.
Doubtless,the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while
he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious
of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim,
without the slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly
qualifies the killing to murder.[15]
[TAN] Gutang v. People, G.R. No. 135406, July 11, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner along with 2 others were charged with illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs
in the RTC of Pasig City. During their arrest, several items were seized by the police in the
bedroom they were in during the arrest and their cars. These items included weed, shabu and
several paraphernalia used in the consumption and storage of the said drugs. The police issued
receipts for property seized to the accused w/c he was required to sign and they were subjected
to chemical test and thereafter used as evidence in the criminal case. Accused and company
were also subjected to drug tests.
Petitioner contends that the items seized should be inadmissible as evidence since they were
obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount to having been
derived from an uncounseled extra-judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence
for being fruits of the poisonous tree. The chemical tests done on the items should therefore be
inadmissible following this train of thought.
Absence of counsel should also render the drug test inadmissible since the same violated his
constitutional rights.
ISSUE: WON the items seized, chemical tests performed on them and the drug tests should be
considered as being fruits of the poisonous tree.
HELD:
W/ regard to the items seized, it has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the
accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without
the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration
against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in the case at
bar, mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the
signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not
admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession
which is prohibited by the Constitution.
However, as to the chemical tests performed and the drug tests, the SC held that the fact that
the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render
inadmissable the Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit
L) inasmuch as the examined materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioners
bedroom on the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or
taken from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon
were legally and validly done. Hence, the said Reports containing the results of the laboratory
examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of the prosecution, are
admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said
prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession. In other words, even without the Receipts
of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged
were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under
investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is
guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it
may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the
accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to
unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to
give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested
to undergo a drug test.
[TAN] People v. Paynor, G.R. No. 116222, September 9, 1996
FACTS:
Accused was charged by the RTC of Roxas, Isabela with the murder of Carmelita Aguinaldo
based the testimony of a single witness, Fresnaida Magaway who saw how the crime was
perpetrated.
The accused provided an alibi in his defense, asserts that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights when his clothes were seized during his custodial investigation to be later
used as evidence in his trial and contends that the court erred in convicting him on the basis of
the testimony of a single underaged witness.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of Magaway should prove that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. The contention of appellant that the expected reaction of the witness should have been to
identify him by name is an obvious non sequitur. What should be considered as a general or
common rule is that witnesses to a crime react in different ways. In the instant case, the youthful
witness was unable to immediately reveal the name of appellant to the police as she was
evidently scared or confused and, as she explained, she also failed to name appellant at that
time since her concern and thoughts were of her teacher whom she followed to the hospital.
Surely, we cannot fault the young girl for her confusion and fear, it being her first time to witness
such a crime of violence.
The important thing is that when she testified at the trial, she was firm, spontaneous and
categorical in her declaration that it was appellant whom she saw that afternoon, and that it was
he who entered the classroom of her teacher and stabbed the latter with a pointed bladed
weapon. The witness stood by her declaration, unshaken throughout the entire trial, and never
showed any hesitation in her testimony.
Another fact worth stressing is that the witness had no motive whatsoever to fabricate a serious
charge against appellant. When there is no showing that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by an improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated, and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.
As to his clothes, this constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or
to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the
proscription against testimonial compulsion.
[TAN] People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 91374, February 25, 1991
FACTS:
The accused in the case was convicted of murdering Rene Impas in the RTC of Cebu. The
accused allegedly went to the house of the deceased, kicked open his bedroom door and fired 2
rounds with a shotgun at Impas and ran away. Several witnesses saw the occurrence and
testified in court against the accused. An extrajudicial confession was also obtained by the
investigating police as was the murder weapon. A paraffin test also came back positive w/c
established that the accused had recently fired a gun.
Gamboa claims that the testimonies of the witnesses had inconsistencies and that the
confession, murder weapon and paraffin test were all obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights because of the absence of counsel.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in convicting the accused.
HELD:
No. The SC held that the appellant's claim of contradictions and inconsistencies on the part of
the prosecution witnesses puts into serious doubt their credibility, Different persons who
witnessed an incident from different angles and situations could not be expected to give uniform
details of what they saw and heard. Such minor discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be
expected because of the human differences in perception. Such contradicting statements are on
minor details, as hereinabove discussed, and rather than affect the credibility of the witnesses,
the same are badges of candor.
The paraffin test is not a violation of his right against self-incrimination as this constitutional right
extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be
examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a
gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
As to his extrajudicial confession, the SC found merit as to his contention as he was maltreated
during his interrogation.
As to the murder weapon, the Court is not persuaded that the police investigators in this case
would willingly allow themselves to be instruments to frame the appellant for so serious a crime
as murder. It appears that the three empty shells were actually recovered from the vicinity of the
scene of the crime. The ballistics examination shows that it was fired from the very shotgun of
the appellant. This evidence corroborates the theory of the prosecution, very strongly, that the
appellant was the assailant of the victim.
However, the Court did not have to take into account the inconsistencies regarding the
confession and the weapon in order to prove the accused as guilty since there was already a
multitude of evidence that corroborated this fact as provided by the prosecution.
[TAN] People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-2154, April 26, 1950
FACTS:
Accused and one Otadora were charged with the crime of murdering Leon Castro and Apolonia
Carreon. Otadora plead guilty to the charge and claimed that the accused had induced him in
committing the crime by promising money as a reward. The accused denied the same and
asked for a separate trial.
This was granted by the court and so Otadora was presented as one of the witnesses along
with several others who testified that the accused had provided Otadora with the murder
weapon and promised money in order to commit the murder.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in finding the accused guilty.
HELD:
No, of course it is founded mainly upon the declarations of Antonio Otadora that necessarily are
persuasive inasmuch as he himself admits his direct participation and his assertions are fully
corroborated by a series of circumstances competently established.
Hilaria denied connection with the assassination. And naturally the defense exerted effort to
discredit Otadora's version, by submitting the following theory:
Antonio Otadora planned a revenge upon Castro because the latter as a spy caused the death
of his father Sergio Otadora at the hands of the Japanese. He, however, found himself in the
necessity of eliminating Apolonia Carreon because the latter was a witness to his deed. On the
other hand, Antonio Otadora (and the other witnesses who are his relatives) also desire to take
revenge upon Hilaria Carreon because the latter, during the Japanese occupation, saved Leon
Castro from death at the hands of the guerrillas. The defense says that to those who had been
prejudiced by the espionage activities of Leon Castro, Hilaria Carreon appears to be just as
responsible as Leon Castro.
The theory can not be lawfully accepted. Firstly, Otadora denies that his father died at the hands
of the Japanese. Secondly, the alleged "saving" of Leon Castro was not sufficiently established.
Loreto Micabel, the superior officer of the guerrillas, who ordered the release of Leon Castro,
did not mention Hilaria as one of those who interceded for the prisoner (p. 286, stenographic
notes). Thirdly, nobody in his right senses holds Pedro criminally responsible for the crime of
Juan simply because a few days before the crime Pedro saved Juan from drowning.
[UY] People v. Omilig y Mancia, G.R. No. 206296 , August 12, 2015
Facts: An information was filed against accused Omilig for the killing of Eduard Betonio. The
same was amended imploding accused Matas and Peaflor. It was further amended imploding
Ondo. During arraignment, all plead not guilty. The prosecution presented 10 witnesses and the
defense presented 5 witnesses while Peaflor presented 3 witnesses.
Estur, COA auditor, discovered the unaccounted rice stocks in the bodega of the NFA, who
Betonio was the Provincial Manager. Betonio who was stabbed and shot in front of his rented
apartment. Before Metonio was brought to the hospital, he whispered to his wife the names
Delfin and Matas. Based on the necropsy, Betonio died of cardio-respiratory arrest hypo
polemic shock due to a gunshot and deep stab wounds. However thru the complete sketch, they
found out that it was Peaflor who was actually the killer. Peaflor admitted in killing Betonio
however he reiterated that he was hired by Ondo. Padilla was the counsel of Peaflor thru
Praquilles. However Padilla was only hired 3 days after Peaflors first extra judicial admission.
Padilla was dismissed when the 2nd extra judicial confession was made but this was conducted
by the City Prosecutor Lagcao with the assurance of Atty. Cavales as counsel de officio.
RTC admitted the extra judicial confession and charged Peaflor for the crime of murder. On
appeal, defense claimed that the extra judicial confession should be inadmissible for obtaining it
in violation of his constitutional right. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the court erred in admitting the extrajudicial confessions made by the accused?
Held: No! it was discussed in the case of Ladiana that a Custodial investigation is the
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Preliminary investigation is
an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that resident is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. Also it said that a person undergoing prelim investigation cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. Even if that those were obtained in custodial
investigation to be admissible, it must be made a.) voluntary b.) express c.) writing d.) with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel. However in the case at bar, the
prosecution did not present proof of the absence of any of these requirements. Furthermore
there is a presumption of regularity therefore it means that a confession is admissible until the
accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency. Prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove the presence of
any of the circumstance that would negate the admissibility of the submission of evidence to
convert the accused-appellant herein provided.
[UY] Ladiana v. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002
Facts: Petitioner was originally charged with murder however the anti-graft court issued an
order noting that beside the allegation of the crime committed, it was done while he was taking
advantage of his official position. Prosecution presented 5 witnesses and their testimonies:
a. Caridad M. San Juan declared that she is the wife of Francisco San Juan (victim
herein.) Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac,
Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be also a
distant relative of the decedent. Caridad received the news that her husband was shot and was
killed. The lifeless body was being examined by Gabinete. Caridad maintained that she was
aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this was what the woman
actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that he was eventually
buried at the Lumban Cemetery. Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot
wounds - one on the upper right temple and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad
stated that she was told that the wounds were the entry and the exit points. She also told the
Court that her husband was wearing short pants at the time of his death and that she found
some bruises on his knees.
b. PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda JR, declared that he is a policeman assigned at the Lumban
Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He even continued that a certain person reported to him
about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street, he was also accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a
member of the CAGFIL. Cacalda saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying face up on the road.
Cacalda did not examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2]
Percival A. Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived. He gathered news from the
people that it was Ladiana who killed the deceased and therefore started to search for him but
to be surprised that the accused had already surrendered to the authorities. On cross-
examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an investigator of the
police station. He also testified that he did not witness the incident subject matter of the case at
bar.
c. Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, he is the physician and the Municipal Health Officer in Laguna.
Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco
and that he had prepared the corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto. Javan
made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior views of the body of Francisco, and
labeled and placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The
marking Gunshot wound A is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter in diameter and
situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking Gunshot wound B is the point of exit
of Gunshot wound A, which is two (2) centimeters in diameter and found above the right
cheekbone and one (1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another
gunshot wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as Gunshot wound C and Gunshot
wound D, respectively. Gunshot wound D is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter
and located at the left cheek, three and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while
Gunshot wound C is one (1) centimeter in diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the
neck, at the level of the adams apple.
the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflictedGunshot wound A. As regards
Gunshot wound C, the assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than
twenty-four (24) inches away. Javan testified that Gunshot wound A could have been fired first
because the trajectory is on the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim could
have been both standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot wound C could have been inflicted while
the victim was already falling down. Javan then stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature.
d.SPO2 Percival A. Gabinete, The testimony of Gabinete wa subsequently dispensed

with, upon the admission of the defense that he was part of the group of policemen who
proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying
along the road.
e. Maria T. Cortez. retired assistant prosecutor. the defense counsel made an admission
as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of
accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit,
accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However,
accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking
accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused
Ladiana. Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez
testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said
counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself
as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit. The prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
Court issued a resolution for the admission of all documentary evidence. Accused however filed
for a motion for leave to file a demurrer of evidence. Court denied the motion for being improper.
Sandiganbayan ordered that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. It convicted him of the same hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the issue of self defense may be given weight as admission?
Held: Yes! The declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used
as evidence against him. The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed
raised the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his
Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and
unequivocal.
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are

utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is
hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
invoking it. It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent
evidence, and it is also doubtful. The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the lower court; in this case, the
Sandiganbayan.
By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense

enumerated in the law. Had petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have
presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a quo,
he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all. So, we do not see how
the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his Counter-Affidavit.
4. Previous Conduct as Evidence
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence/ Res inter alios acta, Part 2
[UY] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126713, July 27, 1998
Facts: Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and their children were Thelma,
Nerissa, Arnel and Gerry Cruz. Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, [his] surviving spouse and
children executed on August 22, 1977 a notarized Deed of Partial Partition by virtue of which
each one of them was given a share of several parcels of registered lands all situated in Taytay,
Rizal. The next day the same mother & children executeed MOA that provided: 1. That the
parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following registered
real properties, all situated at Taytay, Rizal, Philippines 2. Deed of Partial Partition was
executed among us before Atty. Virgilio J. Tamayo, Notary Public on and for the Province of
Rizal 3. That as a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned
and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her. However That despite the
execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their respective
shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these
presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and received
equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their
individual names by virtue of this deed of partial partition. Agreement shall continue to be valid
and enforceable. The MOA was registered and annotated. Deeds were issued in their names.
Meanwhile, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed Civil Case No. 31231 against the
spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo for a sum of money. RTC ruled in favor of
Eliseo & Virginia. Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in question. It
was sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos.
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption within the statutory period and
so the final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff conveying the lands in question to spouses
Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. The Malolos couple asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give them the
owners duplicate copy of the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she refused. The
couple moved the court to compel her to surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal
for cancellation. This was granted on September 7, 1984. But Nerissa was adamant. She did
not comply with the Order of the court and so the Malolos couple asked the court to declare said
titles as null and void. Adoracion Cruz, Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Arnel Cruz entered the
picture by filing is said lower court a motion for leave to intervene and oppose Maloloses motion.
The Cruzes alleged that they were co-owners of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the lands in
question. Said order was modify by the court. directing the surrender of the owners duplicate
copies of the titles of the lands in question to the Register of Deeds not for cancellation but for
the annotation of the rights, interest acquired by the Maloloses over said lands. Adoracion,
Thelma, Gerry and Arnel Cruz filed Civil Case No. 961-A for Partition of Real Estate against
spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos over the lands in question. As already stated in the first
paragraph of this Decision, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs from
which the defendants appealed to this court. CA reversed the judgement of the RTC hence this
petition.
Issue: WON the court violated the Res Inter Alios *Acta Rule
Held: No. Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that tends
to show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he has done
a similar as act at another time. Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the dependant
to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises
a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the issues immediately
before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical inconvenience of trying
collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to
litigants. However The rule is not without exception. While inadmissible in general, collateral
facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational
similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the
circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.[26] Evidence of similar acts may
frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds
light on the state of mind or knowledge of a persons; it provides insight into such persons motive
or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.
In the case herein, Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on the res
inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and
corroborative of evidence already received.[28] The relevancy of such transactions is readily
apparent. The nature of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots on
question since they are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by
petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should
similarly be treated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably,
the evidence in dispute manifests petitioners common purpose and design to treat all the
parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership.
[UY] Tanzo v. Drilon, G.R. No. 106671, March 30, 2000

Facts: Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and
transporting from Cali to Manila. Manuel operates MANSAL forwarders, Mario on the other hand
handles the forwarding business in the USA. Mario convinced petitioner to invest money in the
said business. Mario had allegedly represented that petitioner's money will be held in trust and
administered by both him and his brother for the exclusive use of their forwarding and
transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario promised him a return on his
investment equivalent to ten per centum for one month, at the end of which, his money plus
interest earned ned shall be returned to him. When petitioner got home to the PH, it was Manuel
who tried to convince him and in the end an investment total of US $34,000.00 which he
entrusted to his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in the U.S.A. Several checks
were issued and the same were acquired by their aunt. After the expiration of the 30 days,
petitioner demanded for his financial investment and Mario gave excuses to forestall payment of
which and instead said that there were problems encountered in the BOC. When petitioner tried
to acquired the balikbayan boxes, smuggled goods were inside the balikbayan boxes. Private
responden continued to neglect his obligation to petitioner which resulted to a complaint filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor which the latter dismissed for being lack of jurisdiction. MR was
also denied. A crime of estafa was filed against private respondent with then Sec of Justice
Drilon which the same was dismissed for lack of merit. MR was the same was also denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue: WON the evidentiary loan contract of Manuel the same with those of Liwayway & if the
res inter *alios *acta rule applies?
Held: Yes! These loan contracts may, however, be given evidentiary value in support of
Manuel's claim that the agreement with petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with
Liwayway Dee Tanzo. Under the rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
similar thing at another time, but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
As held in the case of Cruz v. CA Collateral facts may be received as evidence under
exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the
conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to
be proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based
on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person, it
provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it
reveals a mistake.
[MANIQUIS] People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 126351, February 18, 2000
FACTS: Accused was a friend of Elmer Montesclaros, grandson of complainant Filomena

Marigomen. Elmer lived in the house of Filomena. A few hours before the fire (set by accused?),
Elmer, thinking accused harboured his live-in partner, stormed the house of the accused and
burned clothes, furniture and appliances. Afternoon of the same day, accused was seen
carrying a stove and a kitchen knife going to the house of Filomena. He told one Mona that he
will burn the house of Filomena. There, accused poured kerosene on the bed and lit it but the
fire was easily put off by accused's wife. Next day, neighbour Lina, who was roused from sleep,
saw Filomenas house burning and noticed accused standing in front of the burning house. The
accused was charged with arson. RTC for convicted him. Accused bewails conviction based on
several circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Was it proper to convict accused based on circumstantial evidence of previous act?
HELD: YES. Circumstantial evidence can support conviction. Here, there were several
circumstances which support conviction: 1) he has motive; 2) his presence at the locus criminis
during the fire; 3) his nonchalance and threats subsequent to the burning and; 4) accuseds
previous conduct. Accuseds intent to commit the arson was established by his previous
attempt to set on fire a bed inside the house of Filomena which was burned later in the
night. Prosecution witness Mona xxx testified that xxx in the afternoon of the same day, she
saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do
with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house of (Filomena). Later, she
heard the sound of somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles next door. When she
peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of (Filomena) and started
pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife
rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. xxx
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it
may be received "to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like." Pp. v. Dadles: "In the early case of US v. Evangelista,
accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier
attempted to set fire to the same premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we
said that: ". . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means
amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the
accused in setting the fire which was charged in the information." xxx xxx xxx ' Where a person
is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar
acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of
the accused.'"
[MANIQUIS] People v. Magpayo, G.R. Nos. 92961-64, September 1, 1993
FACTS: Appellant was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-up and Forcible
Abduction in four separate informations allegedly.
Criminal Cases (For RAPE) and (For ROBBERY)
Ten-year old Lilibeth was given P26 by her parents for her to buy milk. On the way,
she was approached by appellant, accusing her of involvement in a theft of coffee.
Lilibeth denied but appellant told her that the thief had a tattoo on the back. Appellant
demanded that she come with him. "They proceeded to the Church and then entered
the cemetery beside the church. Upon the prodding of appellant, Lilibeth raised her
blouse to show that she had no tattoo. But appellant said: "Ano ang gusto mo,
kakantutin ka o makakauwi ka ng buhay." Lilibeth pleaded for her life. Appellant
inserted his organ into her mouth. He also i nserted his organ into hers. "After his coitus
with her, appellant took the P26.00 of Lilibeth and warned her to keep quiet. Lilibeth
went back to her mother and told her she was raped.
Criminal Case (For Robbery Hold-Up)
Jacquiline, then eight, was accosted by appellant who accused her of stealing a cart.
Appellant insisted that they go to the police station, and Jacquiline consented. Instead,
she was brought to the cemetery beside the church where she was divested of her
gold earrings and a ring with red stone, valued at P1,000.00, given by her father as a
birthday gift.
Criminal Case (For Forcible Abduction with Rape)
Then 11-year old Mara was with her younger brother Daniel in the Market upon
instruction of their mother to buy "sago". They were approached by appellant, who
asked her if she was involved in a theft of Nescafe coffee, and to which she answered
in the negative. Appellant asked her if she knew Neneng, and when she said yes,
appellant suddenly poked a sharp instrument at her neck and forced her and Daniel to
go with him. They boarded a pedicab and alighted somewhere and they walked to a
grassy portion where Daniel was told by appellant to stay at a corner, while appellant
brought Mara to another portion, about four meters away. Appellant inserted his organ
into hers. Appellant left the place.
Mara and Daniel told a mortorshop owner that they were lost. The owner asked a
jeepney driver to take them back to the market, from where they were able to get
home.
ISSUE: Was it proper to admit and consider evidence of similar acts against the accused?
HELD: YES. Appellant assails the application of r es inter alios acta (S34, R130) allegedly
because the similarity of the acts involved (i.e., molestation) was not sufficiently established.
The trial court committed no error in applying the exception to the doctrine. As a rule, evidence
is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has
committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent
to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
committed the crime charged in the complaint or information.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to establish the particular
crime, and it is usually competent to prove the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake
or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes
so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of
the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
Here, evidence was introduced in Case (Forcible Abduction with Rape) committed by appellant
against Mara on November 20, 1987, not as evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10,
1988, appellant also committed a similar act of rape (and robbery) against Lilibeth. These
offenses are separate crimes and are the subject of separate complaints and proofs though
jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only
to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.
It is to be observed that in all the cases, the modus operandi of the offender is that of
approaching young girls of not more than twelve years of age, and taking advantage of their
innocence, imputed to them the commission of a crime and brought them to an isolated place
where the offenses charged were committed. These young girls narrated in detail in a clear and
convincing manner what the offender did to them and likewise positively identified said offender
as herein accused during the investigation as well as during the trial. Thus, S34, R130 provides
that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the
like.
[MANIQUIS] People v. Dadles, G.R. Nos. 118620-21, September 1, 1997
FACTS: This case involved the alleged kidnapping of farmer Alipio Tehidor and son Dionisio,
and farmer Salvador Alipan and son Antonio, for which appellant along with several other
accused were accused charged in two separate informations. Of the several accused, only
appellant was arraigned as the other accused remained at large.
Accused et al. were allowed entry at the Tehidors residence. There, they tied the hands of
Alipio and Dionisio. Accused et al. told the wife that the captives would be freed for the firearms
of two other Tehidor sons who were CAFGU. Unable to surrender the firearms which were not in
possession of the spouses, accused et al. took the victims and since then, were not heard from.
Same night, about 30 minutes later, accused et al. showed up at the Alipans. Accused told the
wife that they will borrow Salvador and Antonio and will be returned tomorrow. They never
came back.
ISSUE: Was it error to convict accused of kidnapping the Alipans absent testimony to the effect
that the latter were coerced?
HELD: NO. As regards the Alipans, appellant points out that the testimony of wife who
witnessed the alleged kidnapping demonstrates that the victims were not deprived of their liberty
because they went with the appellant and his companions peacefully without being subjected to
threats and coercion. The court is not convinced. That the victims' hands were not tied nor guns
poked at their sides when they were taken do not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their
liberty. The circumstances that appellant et al.s previous conduct in kidnapping the
Tehidors, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive the Alipans of their liberty.
True, (res inter alios acta is the rule)." However, ( exception applies here). Thus we have held
that: "The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the
accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which
he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the
purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment. A
man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be shown to influence a jury in passing
upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the particular offense for which he is on trial. A
man may have committed many crimes and still be innocent of the crime charged in the case on
trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the minds of the jurors against
the defendant. One who commits one crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically,
one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation
between them that proof of one tends to prove the other." (Pp. v. Asinas)
In US v. Evangelista, the accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted
evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. Ruling on the
admissibility of the said evidence, we said that: "While it was not the fire charged in the
information, and does not by any means amount to direct evidence against the
accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which
was charged in the information. xxx xxx xxx 'Where a person is charged with the
commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts
committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent
of the accused.'"
Here, there is such a relation between both incidents of kidnapping charged in the two
informations that "proof of one tends to prove the other", and evidence of similar acts committed
about the same time establishes the criminal intent of the appellant to deprive Salvador and
Antonio of their liberty. First of all, both incidents happened almost simultaneously. The
kidnapping of Alipio and Dionisio occurred only some thirty (30) minutes before Salvador and
Antonio were taken from their home. The appellant and his companions were apparently well
acquainted with the Tehidors and the Alipans who readily allowed them entrance. Alipio and
Dionisio were taken by appellant's group on the pretext that they wanted to talk to Alipio.
Similarly, the appellant claims that they took Salvador and Antonio only because they wanted to
talk to the former. Alipio's wife was warned not to tell the authorities about the incident. The
same warning was given to Salvador's wife.
OSG: circumstances exist to conclude that it was the appellant's criminal intent to deprive the
victims of liberty: "First. If appellant's group merely wanted to talk to Salvador Alipan, they could
just have talked to him then and there at the house of the latter without necessarily taking him
together with his son. Second. Appellant's group could have elicited the required information
from Salvador in just a matter of hours. Hence, they should have returned Salvador and his son
the following day as promised. To this date, however, no trace of the two (2) can be found.
Third. If they did not have any ill-motive against the duo, why did they warn the family of the
victims not to report the incident to anybody or they will be killed? Clearly, this behavior betrays
the falsity of their alleged intention."
[MANIQUIS] Tanzo v. Drilon, G.R. No. 106671, March 30, 2000
FACTS: Respondents Salazars are brothers engaged in forwarding and transporting

"balikbayan" boxes from California to Metro Manila. Manuel managed the Philippine side via
MANSAL Forwarders, a business in his name. Mario handled the U.S. side as GM of M.J.S.
International, Inc.
Petitioner alleged that while in the US, Mario tried to convince him to invest. Mario represented
that petitioner's money will be held in trust and administered by both him and his brother for the
business. Mario promised him a return on his investment equivalent to 10% for one month, at
the end of which his money plus interest earned shall be returned to him. Manuel also tried to
persuade him to invest. Petitioner agreed to invest $34K which he entrusted to his aunt
Liwayway Dee Tanzo who was in the US. Thus, Tanzo issued several personal checks payable
to aunt LDT, or to Calfed, or to Cash.
Upon the expirations of the 30 day investment period, petitioner demanded accounting and/or
the return of capital plus interest earned. Manuel admitted that their shipments encountered
some problems with the Customs. When petitioner attempted to secure the release of the
"balikbayan" boxes from the Customs, he discovered that the same had actually contained
smuggled goods and were accordingly seized and forfeited.
When respondents continued to ignore petitioner's demand, the latter filed a complaint for estafa
before the Prosecutor. Prosecutor dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the offense as
it was committed not in QC. Petitioner elevated it to the Secretary of Justice. Acting SOJ
dismissed the petition. Reconsideration was also denied, saying lack of jurisdiction and lack of
evidence for estafa (apparently believing respondents evidence [consisting of loan contracts
between respondent and petitioners aunt LDT] and averment that the transaction was merely
of loan, not trust).
ISSUE: Was it proper to consider the loan contracts between LDT and respondents as evidence
of the real transaction between petitioner and respondents?
HELD: YES. Petitioner failed to present evidence other than his bare assertion that he had
invested money on the basis of a trust agreement. The checks allegedly subject of the trust
agreement did more damage than good to petitioner's proposition. None of these checks were
issued to either Mario or Manuel and were in fact payable to "LDT," "Calfed" or "Cash."
Moreover, only one of these checks was actually encashed by Mario, the rest by LDT. On the
basis of the foregoing alone, respondents could have completely denied the existence of their
liability to petitioner as neither proof in writing nor witnesses exist to substantiate petitioner's
claim of a trust agreement between himself and the respondents. On the contrary, Manuel does
not deny that Mario had indeed received money from the petitioner, albeit claiming that the
latter's liability thereunder is purely civil in nature for being rooted in a simple loan contract.
Manuel offered in evidence copies of the contracts of loan between M.J.S. International and
LDT. True, these loan contracts do not by themselves prove that his agreement with
respondents was also a loan.
However, these loan contracts may, be given evidentiary value in support of Manuel's claim that
the agreement with petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with LDT. Under the rule
of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like. [C]ollateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional
circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions
giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.
Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud
and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person, it provides
insight into such person's motive or intent, it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it reveals a
mistake. (Cruz v. CA)
The series of transactions between M.J.S. and LDT were entered into under similar
circumstances as those surrounding the contract between petitioner and Mario. Just like
the alleged trust agreement between petitioner and Mario, the loan between M.J.S. and LDT
provide that the creditor shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the latter in its
business operations. Petitioner also admits that he entrusted the checks to Liwayway Dee
Tanzo for investment in private respondents' business. This shows that private respondents
were transacting directly with LDT in the usual manner that they conduct business, that is, the
loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, respondents' modus operandi, if there ever was
one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S. was to borrow money from willing investors. It is thus
unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that respondents would all of a sudden deviate from
an established business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the petitioner.
[MELCHOR] People v. Magtuloy y Montaray, G.R. No. 105671, June 30, 1993
Facts:
Accused was charged with murder of 1 year old Arturo, Jr. before RTC Caloocan. According to
the victims mother, Betty, she, Arturo, and her live-in partner, the accused, are residents of
Caloocan and that she always leaves the child with the accused when she works, selling
siopao. On that fateful day, she quarreled with the accused when she informed the latter of her
intention to go back to the province with her son. She also averred that she does not get along
so well with the accused and quarelling between them is frequent. At midday the same morning,
the accused sought assistance from his neighbor carrying the seemingly dead child bleeding
from the mouth saying that he is to be blamed if Arturo dies. He brings the latter to the hospital
to no avail, while constantly asking Betty for forgiveness and even went on vigil during the wake.
An autopsy confirmed that the victim died due to hematoma in the chest area which may be
caused by a blunt instrument/weapon such as a punch. Accused admitted that he only slapped
the victim causing him to hit the door and fall down the stairs. Accused was arrested and pled
not-guilty during arraignment, hence trial on the merits ensued. As there is no eye-witness to the
crime, a resort to circumstantial evidence was necessary. RTC convicted the accused. At his
appeal, accused averred that prosecution has not satisfactorily proved appellants guilt by
circumstantial evidence as it was he who initially sought assistance with his neighbor and then
subsequently with the hospital and that he stood vigil during the wake.
Issue:
WON court erred in finding the accused guilty by circumstantial evidence.
Held:
No. The ff. circumstantial evidence are crucial in the determination of the guilty verdict.
1. Victim was not the son of accused.
2. He maltreats both mother and child on occasions.
3. On that fateful morning, he quarreled with the mother.
4. He was left alone on the house with the victim on the said date.
5. He constantly asks for forgiveness.
Also important to note that the expert testimony of P/Capt. Baltazar of PNP Crime Lab, stating
that a fall of 1 meter, even upon a hard pavement will not resort to a hematoma and the
suspects testimony on cross examination stating that there are no stairs in their house were
appreciated by the court.
The proven facts of the case yield the inescapable conclusion that the prosecutions evidence
albeit circumstantial, was of a sufficient quantum to establish the guilt of the accused. There is
more than one circumstance, and the combination of all is enough to produce guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
[MELCHOR] Malig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 71712, April 15, 1988

Facts:
On 10/29/1982, after public bidding, the Province of Bulacan contracted Halrey Const. for the
construction of a road for Php 963,850, to be completed in 120 days from the date of award,
10% retention fee and liquidated damages of no less than 20% of contract price in case of
failure to comply with the stipulations, with work beginning in 11/02/1982. On 11/24, Provincial
Engineer wrote Halrey Const. changing the station limits in the contract where the last 200m is
to be transferred to the start point and that there is no actual change in the length of the road.
However, petitioners say that they knew nothing of the changes, as it was not documented. On
03/07/1983, Pres. Halili of Halrey Const. informed the provincial govt that project was
completed and asked for payment, the process of which was initiated. Pres. Halili avers
(through prosecution witnesses Francisco and Gerona) that petitioner appeared in his office on
the 15th, demanding Php 20,000 for a favorable post-inspection report. They were said to also
have appeared on said office on the 21st, still demanding payment but coming home
empty-handed. On the 22nd, petitioners contended via a Contract Review Report and Contract
Review Work Sheet that only 820m of the contracted 1,020m was completed, recommending
payment of only Php 691,619 and a penalty of Php 92,770 for the delay, leaving only Php
498,849 due the complainant contractor out of a total contract price of Php 963,850. Hence
Pres. Halili filed an anti-graft case against petitioners with Sandiganbayan, which found
petitioner guilty of violating the anti-graft law. Petitioner denies knowing the witnesses and
contends that the witness testimony presented by respondent is insufficient as such is
self-serving and purely hearsay.
Issue:
WON witness testimonies by Francisco and Gerona is sufficient to convict petitioners.
Held:
Yes. According to the particulars of this case, both witnesses know of petitioner Malig by virtue
of previous construction contracts which Halrey Const. has bid on. This is evinced by the fact
that no further introductions were required when the petitioner appeared at the office of Halrey
Const. on the two above-mentioned dates, demanding Php 20,000 for a favorable
post-inspection review. While Rule 130, Sec. 35 of the Rules of Court states that evidence that
one did or omitted to a thing at one time is inadmissible to prove that he did one thing/omitted to
do one thing at another time, it may be received to prove a specific intent, knowledge, identity,
plan, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. Also, through participation on previous
construction projects, respondent knows of the petitioners habit of demanding money for favors.
Also, the post-inspection report is erroneous as it reported a delay in the project even if it was
finished on time, and that there is no shortage in the finished road as what occurred was an
authorized change of station limits, evinced by an authorization letter from the provl. engineer.
[MELCHOR] People v. Saguban, G.R. No. 96287, April 25, 1994

Facts:
An information for Rape was filed with RTC Dumaguete by Casido alleging that accused raped
her Accused pled not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the
ff.witnesses: Dra. Fuentes, Brgy. Capt. Lacpao, Atty. Icao and Casido herself. They set out to
prove that on 1pm, while bathing after washing clothes on a creek in Brgy. Alangilan, accused
jumped her and held both her hands while prodding her with a knife, compelling her to stop
screaming and enabling the accused to have carnal knowledge of her. Eventually, she was able
to extricate herself from him and escaped. She, along with her hubby then reported the matter
to Capt. Lacpao, who was unable to locate the accused as he had already left. Also,
prosecution offered the suspects previous rape conviction to prove his penchant for committing
such crimes. Defense on the other hand called the ff. witnesses: Tinaa, Sienes and accused
himself, seeking to establish that he was nowhere near the crime scene as he was plowing his
field in Brgy. Jantianon, and that he doesnt know the complainant and has never set foot in the
brgy. of the crime scene. RTC Dumaguete found accused guilty of the crime of rape against
Casido and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pay damages of Php 12,000
and costs, stating that the defense stood on an alibi which is easy to contrive and therefore
weak. Accused appealed, especially bemoaning the inclusion of his former conviction for rape
as evidence, hence the petition at bench.
Issue:
WON court erred in disregarding the defense of alibi of the accused.
WON inclusion of former conviction as evidence of a crime is proper.
Held:
1. No. For the defense of alibi to prosper, two things must concur: 1. Accused was not at the
crime scene when it was committed and 2. That it is physically impossible for the accused to be
at the crime scene at the time of the crimes commission. Witness testimonies of the
prosecution, especially of Capt. Lacpao and the victim herself belies the suspects claim that he
has never set foot in Alangilan as they have positively identified him as resident of Alangilan.
Accused himself mooted his own defense when in claiming he did not know the victim, failed to
provide a reason why the victim instituted an action against him and why the former can
positively identify him. The other defense witnesses were informed that they will testify for the
accused, but did not know that it was for rape.
2. Yes. Rule 130, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Court states that evidence that one did or omitted to a
thing at one time is inadmissible to prove that he did one thing/omitted to do one thing at
another time, it may be received to prove a specific intent, knowledge, identity, plan, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. In the case at bench, this piece of evidence was not the
sole basis of conviction, rather, it was the concurrence of established facts as well as weak alibi,
which coupled with the previous conviction formed the basis of the suspects present conviction.
RA 8505, Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998

RA 10364, Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012
Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, December 15, 2000
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer
[MELCHOR] Mclaughlin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57552, [October 10, 1986
Facts:
Petitioner and Respondent Flores entered into a contract for the conditional sale of real
property, with purchase price fixed at Php 140,000 divided as Php 26,000 upon the execution of
the deed and the balance of Php 113,000 to be paid not later than May 77. Parties also agreed
that the balance shall bear an interest of 1% per month commencing on December 76 until
payment of full purchase price. In 79, petitioner filed a complaint for the rescission of the deed
of conditional sale due to the failure of the private respondent to pay the balance due on May 31
77. Later the parties submitted a compromise agreement where the private respondent
acknowledged indebtedness to the petitioner under the deed of conditional sale in the amount of
Php 119,000 and parties agreed that said amount would be payable as follows: 1. Php 50,000
upon signing of the agreement and the 2. Balance of Php 69,000 in 2 equal installments on
June & December 80. As agreed upon, private respondent paid the Php 50,000 as well as an
escalation cost of Php 25,000. In Par. 3 of the compromise agreement, private respondent
agreed to pay Php 1,000 monthly rental from December 79 until obligation is fully paid, for the
use of the property subject matter of the deed of conditional sale, while Pars. 6 & 7 states that in
the event the defendant fails to comply with his obligation herein provided, plaintiff will be
entitled to the issuance of a writ of execution rescinding the deed of conditional sale. Defendant
hereby waives the right to appeal from the order of rescission and the writ of execution which
the court shall render in accordance to the stipulations herein provided for. In the event of
execution, all payments made by defendant will be forfeited in favor of plaintiff as liquidated
damages. In October 80, petitioner demanded payment of the remaining balance of Php
69,000, which includes the installments for both June and December 80. Private respondent
signified his intent to pay the full balance while demanding to see the Certificate of Title and tax
payment receipts. Private respondent then tendered payment, but was not accepted by
petitioner, who then filed a motion for writ of execution alleging that private respondent failed to
pay installment due on June 80 and that he has not been paying the monthly rentals. RTC
granted the motion for writ of execution, issuing the writ in November 80. RTC also granted
petitioners ex-parte motion for clarification of the order of execution rescinding the deed of
conditional sale of real property. MR was denied. Upon appeal to CA, it nullified and set aside
the orders of the RTC, hence this petition.
Issue:
WON tender of payment by respondent, which was not accepted by petitioner, made him not
liable to pay his obligations and rentals in the arrear.
Held:
No. Rule 130, Sec 35 of the Rules of Court provide that an offer in writing to pay a particular
sum of money or deliver a written instrument or specific property is, if rejected, is equivalent to
actual production and tender of the money, instrument or property, further emphasized by Art.
1256 of the New Civil Code stating that if the creditor to whom tender of payment was made
refuses without just cause to accept it, debtor shall be released from responsibility by the
consignation of the sum due, and that consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the
cases enumerated therein (refer to Art. 1256, NCC); Art. 1257 provides that in order that
consignation of the sum due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the person
interested in the fulfillment of the obligation and Art. 1258 provides that consignation shall be
made by depositing sum due at the disposal of the judicial authority and that interested parties
shall be notified thereof. Tender of payment must be distinguished from consignation. Tender is
the antecedent of consignation; a preparatory act to the consignation, from which are derived
the immediate consequences which the debtor desires. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial
while consignation is necessarily judicial, and priority of tender is attempt to make a private
settlement before proceeding with the solemnities of consignation. In this case, although private
respondent has preserved his rights as a vendee by timely tender of payment of the balance of
his obligation which was unjustly refused by petitioner, he remains liable for the payment of his
obligation because of his failure to deposit such amount with the court. Due to private
respondents failure to deposit the amount, his obligation remains unpaid along with the monthly
rentals, to which he is liable. Upon full payment of the amount of Php 76,059 and the rentals,
respondent shall be entitled to a deed of absolute sale in his favor of the real property in
contention.

Admissions and Confessions in Philippine Law

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Admissions and Confessions in Philippine Law

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3.

Admissions and Confessions

Sec. 26. Admissions of a Party

[ABON] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002

At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt

Wharton 25 defines confession a s follows:

Underhill 26 distinguishes a confession from an admission a s follows:

While Wigmore 27 says:

Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the

WHETHER OR NOT THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF

[ABON] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002

At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt

[ANACTA] People v. Caritativo, G.R. Nos. 145452-53, June 10, 2003

onchito Angeles, Minesa Zamora,

2. YES. In the present case, we can no longer consider treachery as an aggravating

(Based on the Petitioners Testimony)

Such admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is sufficient to

Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances

[BULLECER]People v. De Joya y Cruz, G.R. No. 75028, November 8, 1991

[CANA] People v. Manuel, G.R. No. 92503, July 8, 1991

ISSUE: won the offer of compromise here is an admission of guilt.

[CANA] People v. Mangat y Palomata, G.R. No. 131618, July 6, 1999

[CANA] Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, June 20, 2006

[CASTILLEJO] People v. De Guzman y Sico, G.R. No. 117217, December 2, 1996

[CASTILLEJO] People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998

[CASTILLEJO] People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008

An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the

[DLC] People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 120894, October 3, 1996

The complainant's testimony was faithfully summarized below:

[DLC] People v. Raquel, G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996

[DLC] Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

In the meantime, Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi, Pagwalang Bisa ng

Doctrine: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE; RULE ON ADMISSIONS BY THIRD PARTY; CASE AT

We agree with the solicitor general's recommendation to acquit Santiago:

To summarize, the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to convict Santiago. First, the

Partnerships vs. joint venture agreements

Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator

[FULLANTE] People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

[FULLANTE] People v. Palijon, G.R. No. 123545, October 18, 2000

[GO] People v. Constancio y Bacungay, G.R. No. 206226, April 4, 2016

[GO] People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004

[GO] People v. Baharan, G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Asali is admissible as evidence.

Sec. 31. Admission by privies

[GO] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

Sec. 32. Admission by silence

[JULARBAL] People v. Roa, G.R. Nos. 138195-96, July 10, 2003

[JULARBAL] People v. Paragsa, G.R. No. L-44060, July 20, 1978

[LINGAHAN] People v. Ranario, G.R. No. 25083, August 17, 1926

Sec. 33. Confession

On December 9, 1971, appellant executed an affidavit repudiating his extrajudicial confession.

[LINGAHAN] People v. Satorre, G.R. No. 133858, August 12, 2003

Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having accompanied appellant

Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is uncorroborated.

[LINGAHAN] People v. Cavite, G.R. No. 86784, November 8, 1991

Accused-appellants are all acquitted.