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G.R. No.

169905 : September 7, 2011




Remigio Michael was hired by the St. Paul College (SPCQC) as a teacher in the Gen.
Education Dept. with a probationary rank in SY 1996-1997 which was renewed the
following year. His wife, Cynthia was was also hired as a part time teacher of the Mass
Comm Dept in the 2nd Sem SY 1996-1997 and her appointment was renewed for SY
1997-1998. February 1998, the spouses both wrote a letter addressed to Sr. Lilia asking
for their contract to be renewed which was indeed granted by the College Council as
evidenced by a letter sent by petitioner.

April 22,1998, a letter, whose signatures includes that of the respondents, was sent to
Sr. Bernadette. The said letter contain teachers sentiments regarding school policies.
However, April 21, 1998, a letter written by the latter was shown, reiterating the
conversation of Sr. Bernadette and Remigio regarding the non compliance of
respondent to instructional school policies. Accordingly, Sr. Bernadette wrote a letter
endorsing the termination of the spouses. Respondents submitted their comments
however they were still terminated and their letter for reconsideration denied thus the
filling of a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by both NLRC and LA
but was granted by the CA. Petitioners MR was denied hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses were illegally dismissed.



The Court finds that there was a valid and just cause for dismissal. The Labor Code
commands that before an employer may legally dismiss an employee from the service,
the requirement of substantial and procedural due process must be complied with.
Under the requirement of substantial due process, the grounds for termination of
employment must be based on just or authorized causes. Petitioner school charged
respondent Remigio Michael of non-compliance with a school policy regarding the
submission of final test questions to his program coordinator for checking or comment
which was admitted by the respondent in his letter. Respondent Remigio Michael's
spouse shared the same defenses and admissions as to the charges against her. The
plain admissions of the charges against them were the considerations taken into account
by the petitioner school in their decision not to renew the respondent spouses'
employment contracts. This is a right of the school that is mandated by law and
jurisprudence. It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its
teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. Schools cannot be
required to adopt standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition.
The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the
terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching
limitations under the Labor Code.


A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during

which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment.
The probationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to
observe the fitness of a probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether
he will become an efficient and productive employee. The word probationary, as used to
describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, not its
length. It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period
or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the
inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary period.
Therefore, the letters sent by petitioner, which were void of any specifics cannot be
considered as contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that of informal
correspondence among the said individuals. As such, petitioner school has the right not
to renew the contracts of the respondents, the old ones having been expired at the end of
their terms.

G.R. No. 131235 November 16, 1999


Dir. BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO JR. of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, Med-Arbiter TOMAS F. FALCONITIN of The National Capital
Region, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), EDUARDO J.

FACTS: Private Responednts are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union
(USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year CBA with UST. The petitioners on the
other hand, questioned before the Med-Arbiter, that the COMELEC was not constituted
in accordance with USTFUs constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been
issued to govern the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election. Med-Arbiter issued a TRO
enjoining the conduct of elections. However, a general faculty assembly was held as
scheduled. The general assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and, as
admitted by the appellants, also by non-USTFU members [who] are members in good
standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit. On this
occasion, appellants were elected as USTFUs new set of officers by
acclamation and clapping of hands.
On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering
the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001. Said CBA was ratified by a majority of the
UST faculty community.

ISSUE: WON the election of the officers in this case was valid

HELD: NO. The importance of a unions constitution and bylaws cannot be

overemphasized. They embody a covenant between a union and its members and
constitute the fundamental law governing the members rights and obligations. As such,
the unions constitution and bylaws should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to
law, good morals or public policy.

A union election is held pursuant to the unions constitution and bylaws, and the right to
vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be
distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of
determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of
collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is
to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be
represented by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case,
by which particular labor organization.

In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate

bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs
to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said election.
However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot
vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution
and bylaws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be
decided in a non-union activity.

In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the October 4, 1996
election cannot properly be called a union election, because the procedure laid down in
the USTFUs CBL for the election of officers was not followed. It could not have been a
certification election either, because representation was not the issue, and the proper
procedure for such election was not followed. The participation of non-union members
in the election aggravated its irregularity.
COMMISSION, respondents.

GRN L-63122 February 20, 1984


Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of the respondent University of

Pangasinan, an educational institution duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws
of the Philippines.

Th petitioner filed a complaint against the private respondent with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC- Dagupan City seeking: (a) the payment of Emergency Cost of
Living Allowances (ECOLA) for November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral break; (b)
salary increases from the 60% of the incremental proceeds of increased tuition fees; and
(c) payment of salaries for suspended extra loads.

The petitioners members are full-time professors, instructors, and teachers of

respondent University. The teachers in the college level teach for a normal duration of
10 months a school year, divided into 2 semesters of 5 months each, excluding the 2
months summer vacation. These teachers are paid their salaries on a regular monthly

During the semestral break (Nov. 7- Dec. 5, 1981), they were not paid their ECOLA. The
private respondent claims that the teachers are not entitled thereto because the
semestral break is not an integral part of the school year and there being no actual
services rendered by the teachers during said period, the principle of No work, no pay

During the same school year (1981-1982), the private respondent was authorized by the
Ministry of Education and Culture to collect, from its students a 15% increase of tuition
fees. Petitioners members demanded a salary increase effective the first semester of
said schoolyear to be taken from the 60% percent incremental proceeds of the said
increased tuition fees as mandated by the PD 451. Private respondent refused.







1. Yes. According to various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs Allowances of

Fulltime Employees . . . that Employees shall be paid in full the required
monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular working days if
they incur no absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay,
the amounts corresponding to the absences may be deducted from the monthly
allowance . . .; and on Leave of Absence Without Pay, that All covered
employees shall be entitled to the allowance provided herein when they are on
leave of absence with pay.

The petitioners members are full-time employees receiving their monthly salaries
irrespective of the number of working days or teaching hours in a month. However, they
find themselves in a situation where they are forced to go on leave during semestral
breaks. These semestral breaks are in the nature of work interruptions beyond the
employees control. As such, these breaks cannot be considered as absences within the
meaning of the law for which deductions may be made from monthly allowances. The
No work, no pay principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioners members
received their regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the provision of law
that it contemplates a no work situation where the employees voluntarily absent
themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, do not voluntarily absent themselves during
semestral breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For
this they cannot be faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the

The intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence, we
have the principle of No pay, no ECOLA the converse of which finds application in the
case at bar. Petitioners cannot be considered to be on leave without pay so as not to be
entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated, the petitioners were paid their wages in full for
the months of November and December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening
semestral break.

Although said to be on forced leave, professors and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened
with the task of working during a period of time supposedly available for rest and
private matters. There are papers to correct, students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and
periods within which to submit grading reports. Although they may be considered by the
respondent to be on leave, the semestal break could not be used effectively for the
teachers own purposes for the nature of a teachers job imposes upon him further duties
which must be done during the said period of time. Arduous preparation is necessary for
the delicate task of educating our children. Teaching involves not only an application of
skill and an imparting of knowledge, but a responsibility which entails self dedication
and sacrifice. It would be unfair for the private respondent to consider these teachers as
employees on leave without pay to suit its purposes and, yet, in the meantime, continue
availing of their services as they prepare for the next semester or complete all of the last
semesters requirements.

Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as hours worked. For this, the
teachers are paid regular salaries and, for this, they should be entitled to ECOLA. The
purpose of the law is to augment the income of employees to enable them to cope with
the harsh living conditions brought about by inflation; and to protect employees and
their wages against the ravages brought by these conditions

2. With regard to the second issue, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree 451, no
increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved 60% of the
proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the
faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for
institutional development, student assistance and extension services, and return
to investments: Provided, That in no case shall the return to investments exceed
twelve (12%) per centum of the incremental proceeds; . . .

Such allowances must be taken in resources of the school not derived from tuition fees.

If the school happen to have no other resources to grant allowances and benefits, either
mandated by law or secured by collective bargaining, such allowances and benefits
should be charged against the return to investments referred.

The law is clear. The 60% incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are to be
devoted entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in basic salary. The
law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over and above the
basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental
proceeds would be to reduce the increase in basic salary provided by law.

Law provides that 60% of tuition fee increase should go to wage increases and 40% to
institutional developments, student assistance, extension services, and return on
investments. Framers of the law intended this portion (return on investments) of the
increases in tuition fees to be a general fund to cover up for the universitys
miscellaneous expenses.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 181531 July 31, 2009



FACTS: A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-
file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the
following results:



In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner,

NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor
Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter to decide which among those
votes would be opened and tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they were
cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending
before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who
cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still
five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast
by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that
the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee, was counted.
Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes,
specially those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly
supervisory employees of the Hotel.

Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary employees should have
been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbontons vote was tallied. And
petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be
immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots
would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169
votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would
then become 169.

Secretary affirmed the decision of the med-arbiter. In fine, the SOLE concluded that the
certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.

ISSUES: (1) whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification
elections should be allowed to vote (2) whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the
required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.


I. On the first issue, the Court rules in the affirmative.

The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not questioned but
because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The
votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As
Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit,
whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated
in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment
relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all
employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees,
probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of
the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for
certification election. The law refers to all the employees in the
bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to
belong to the bargaining unit. (Emphasis supplied)

For purposes of this section (Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03,
series of 2003), any employee, whether employed for a definite period or
not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for
membership in any labor organization.

All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-
employed, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except
collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting

cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-
organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.

A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

II. As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining

agent, the Court rules in the negative.
It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there to
be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have
voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid
votes cast.

Prescinding from the Courts ruling that all the probationary employees votes should be
deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it
follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase from 321 to 337. Under Art.
256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the
eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337
is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.

HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was
not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate
court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the
outcome of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if such member were
all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.

It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes
cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to
determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes
has thus become material.

To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine

the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the
bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It
is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions won,
but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to
whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted

obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be
held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should
represent the rank-and-file employees.




A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the 2 highest
number of votes in a certification or consent election with 3 or more choices, where such
a certified or consent election results in none of the 3 or more choices receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all
contending unions is at least 50% of the number of votes cast.
the local union filed a petition for direct certification or certification election which
alleged among others, that forty-eight of the sixty sales personnel of the Company were
members of the local union. The Company then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that it is not supported by at least 30% of the members of the proposed
bargaining unit because of the alleged forty-eight (48) members of the local union,
thirty-one (31) had withdrawn prior to the filing of the petition.
Whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members affected the petition for
certification election

withdrawal or retraction made before the filing of the petition, the names of employees
supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite party. Logically, it
showed voluntariness in the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it becomes
apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the petition, hence
the subscription requirement has not been met.
University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja (1992)
Narvasa, C.J.:

1. The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a
petition for certification election with the BLR.
1. It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 membersmore than 33% of
the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel of four UP
campuses (Diliman, Manila, Los Baos, and Visayas).
2. UP did not object to the petition.
2. Another labor union, the All UP Workers Union (All UP) filed a motion for
1. It alleged that its membership covers both academic and non-academic
personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file employees in one
2. It assented to the holding of the certification election provided the
appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined.
3. It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and
Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel,
should not be deemed part of the organizational unit.
3. UPs General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unionsone for
the non-academic/administrative, and one for the academic personnel.
4. BLR Director Calleja: The appropriate organizational unit should embrace all the
regular rank-and-file employees.
1. No evidence to justify the grouping of non-academic personnel separate
from academic personnel.
2. The Director quoted the pertinent provisions of EO 180 and its IRRs:

Section 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit

consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise

Sec. 1, Rule IV. For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational

unit may refer to:

d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled

corporations with original charters.

1 General intent of the EO is not to fragmentize the employer unit, as can be

gleaned from the definition of the term accredited employees organization,
which refers to:

x x x a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined

in these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an
organizational unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind
the agency, such as x x x state colleges and universities.

2 She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all rank-and-file

employees, teaching and non-teaching.
1 At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term rank-and-
file. It claimed that there were some teaching and non-teaching employees
whose functions were in fact managerial and policy-determining.
2 It sought the exclusion of high-level employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 180:

SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-

making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be
eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government employees;

1 It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:

1 Those with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher;
2 Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18 or higher.
2 The University claims that these employees perform supervisory functions and
are vested with effective recommendatory powers. As to the professors, UP notes
that these academic staff are members of the University Council, a policy-making
3 ONAPUP did not oppose UPs classification. All UP remained firm in its stance to
unite all the rank-and-file employees under a single organizational unit.
4 BLR Director Calleja (Second Order): Declared that the professors are rank-and-
file employees.
1 Sec. 1, Rule I, IRRs of EO 180:

High Level Employee is one whose functions are normally considered

policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential
in nature. A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as:

1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;

2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or

3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline


1 A careful perusal of the University Code shows that the policy- making
powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely,
prescribing courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student
admission and graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of
Regents the conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over students.
2 On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition of high level
employees refers to labor-related policies like hiring, firing, discipline,
labor standards and benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.
3 MR filed by UP was denied.


Are the professors, associate professors and assistant professors high-level employees?
1 The matter was correctly resolved by respondent Director.
2 The College Academic Personnel Committee, through which the academic
personnel purportedly perform their supervisory functions, is actually tasked to:
1 Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation of policies, rules,
standards or general guidelines as formulated by the University Academic
Personnel Board;
2 Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with regard to
recruitment, selection, performance evaluation, tenure, staff development, and
promotion of the faculty and other academic personnel of the College;
3 Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available funds for
4 Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the members of the
DAPC particularly on personnel matters covered by this Order;
5 Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions made by the
Department Chairman and/or the DAPC (Department Academic Personnel
1 On the other hand, the University Academic Personnel Board performs the
following functions:
1 Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of the CAPC'S.
2 Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.
3 Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the selection,
compensation, and promotion of members of the academic staff.
4 Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on academic promotions
and on other matters affecting faculty status and welfare.
2 It is clear that the high-level employees are those who comprise the UAPB. These
would refer to the deans, assistants for academic affairs, and the chief of
personnel. They formulate rules, polices and standards respecting selection,
compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff.
3 The functions of the DAPC and UAPB are merely recommendatory.
4 Ultimately, the power to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss,
assign or discipline employees rests with the Board of Regents.
5 It is also clear that ALL academic personnel cannot be considered high-level
employees, because not all of them are members of the DAPC/UAPB. They must
be appointed or elected.
6 Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the
status of high-level employees.
1 The actions of such council are always subject to the approval of the Board
of Regents.
2 In addition, the policy-determining functions of the University Council
refer to academic matters, i.e. those governing the relationship between
the University and its students, and not the University as an employer and
the professors as employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest
results in the professors being members of the University Council and
being classified as rank-and-file employees.

Should the academic employees comprise a bargaining unit separate and distinct from
that of the non-academic employees of UP? YES.
1 Bargaining unit a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all
the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
2 Labor laws do not provide criteria for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit.
3 Sec. 12 of RA 875 merely required an appropriate bargaining unit. This was
retained in the Labor Code.
4 Thus, the Court turned to American jurisprudence for guidance.
1 Rothenberg:
1 Will of the employees (Globe doctrine);
2 Affinity and unit of employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions;
3 Prior collective bargaining history; and
4 Employment status, such as temporary, seasonal, and probationary employees.
1 10th Annual Report of the NLRB:
1 History, extent and type of organization of employees;
2 History of their collective bargaining;
3 History, extent and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same
employer, or other employers in the same industry;
4 The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the employees;
5 The desires of the employees;
6 The eligibility of the employees for membership in the union/s involved; and
7 The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the employers organization,
management and operation.
2 BASIC TEST: A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of
employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
1 Test applied: community or mutuality of interests test.
2 In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized into two general
1 Firstnon-academicjanitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists,
carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics,
plumbers; and
2 Secondacademicfull professors, associate professors, assistant
professors, instructors, research, extension and professorial staff.
3 It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common with the
University clerks and other non-academic employees as regards responsibilities
and functions, working conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests,
skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
4 On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the
work and duties as well as in the compensation and working conditions of the
academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of these two
categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining.

DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.

[G.R. No. 79526 : December 21, 1990.]

On January 28, 1985, private respondent Mainit Lumber Development Company
Workers Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines,
MALDECOWU-ULGWP (ULGWP, for short), a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment under Registry No. 2944-IP,
filed with Regional Office No. 10, Ministry of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro
City, a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative among the rank and file workers/employees of Mainit
Lumber Development Company Inc. (MALDECO), a duly organized, registered and
existing corporation engaged in the business of logging and saw-mill operations
employing approximately 136 rank and file employees/workers. The case was scheduled
for hearing two (2) times. During the first scheduled hearing on February 20, 1985, the
counsel for compulsory intervenor (now petitioner), National Association of Free Trade
Union (NAFTU) requested for postponement on the ground that he was leaving for
abroad. During the scheduled hearing of March 13, 1985, they, however, agreed to
submit simultaneously their respective position papers within twenty (20) days.

Petitioner ULGWP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper alleged,
among others: (1) that there was no certification election conducted within 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition; (2) that the petition was filed within the 60 day
freedom period, i.e. CBA expired on February 28, 1985; (3) that the petition is
supported by the signatures of 101 rank and file employees out of a total of 201
employees of the employer or more than thirty percent (30%) than that required by law

On April 11, 1985, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election. On
April 26, 1985, NAFTU appealed the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the ground that
MALDECO was composed of two (2) bargaining units, the Sawmill Division and the
Logging Division, but both the petition and decision treated these separate and distinct
units only as one

On April 28, 1986, the Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the decision. Thus, a
certification election was held on separate dates at the employers sawmill division and
logging area respectively. In said election MALDECOWU-ULGWP garnered a total vote
of 146 while NAFTU garnered a total of 2 votes

On July 26, 1986, NAFTU filed an election protest alleging massive vote buying
accompanied with grave and serious threat force and intimidation on the lives of 25
applicants as stated in a Joint Affidavit attached thereto

MALDECO filed its Manifestation on August 3, 1986, which corroborated petitioners

stand. Attached to the said Manifestation was a joint affidavit executed by thirty five
(35) of its employees/workers
On September 3, 1986, private respondent filed its position paper. On September 8,
1986 petitioner filed its opposition to private respondents position paper. On
September 24, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the election protest.

On October 10, 1986, petitioner NAFTU appealed the order of the Med-Arbiter to the
Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila which denied the appeal and the two motions for

In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the employer MALDECO was composed of two
bargaining units, the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division, in
Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte, about 80 kilometers distant from each other
and in fact, had then two separate CBAs, one for the Sawmill Division and another for
the Logging Division, both the petition and decision referred only to one bargaining
unit; that from 1979 to 1985, the Ministry of Labor and Employment recognized the
existence of two (2) separate bargaining units at MALDECO, one for its Logging
Division and another for its Sawmill Division.

Significantly, out of two hundred and one (201) employees of MALDECO, one hundred
seventy five (175) consented and supported the petition for certification election,
thereby confirming their desire for one bargaining representative

Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned
with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or
conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or
mutuality of interests. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining units
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. (Democratic
Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., et al., 103 Phil. 1103 [1958]).

Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division
and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the
other in the same way that the company needs them both. There may be difference as to
the nature of their individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Confesor, G. R. No. 114974, June 16,


The petitioner asserts that the private respondent committed ULP, i.e., interference
in the selection of the Unions negotiating panel, when Cielito Diokno, the Banks Human
Resource Manager, suggested to the Unions President Eddie L. Divinagracia that Jose P.
Umali, Jr., President of the NUBE, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. In
support of its claim, Divinagracia executed an affidavit, stating that prior to the
commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and suggested the exclusion
of Umali from the Unions negotiating panel, and that during the first meeting, Diokno
stated that the negotiation be kept a family affair.
1. whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor
practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged interference with its choice of

2. whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice
against the Bank arising from the latters surface bargaining


1. No. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an
employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization
necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.

Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or

coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the
Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse
effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective
bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243
of the Labor Code is committed.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code,
substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has
been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.[48] In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of
interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Unions
negotiating panel.
The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the
suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can
be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the
free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees,
especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the
negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be
excluded from its negotiating panel.
The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with
the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed
through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared
by the Union on June 15, 1993.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation
occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic provisions became
heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to
involve personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result,
suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with unintended
meanings.[49] Such is what appears to have happened in this case.
If at all, the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be construed as part
of the normal relations and innocent communications, which are all part of the friendly
relations between the Union and Bank.
2. The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence, committed
ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. It alleged that the
Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of reaching an
agreement, as evident in the Banks counter-proposals. It explained that of the 34
economic provisions it made, the Bank only made 6 economic
counterproposals. Further, as borne by the minutes of the meetings, the Bank, after
indicating the economic provisions it had rejected, accepted, retained or were open for
discussion, refused to make a list of items it agreed to include in the economic package.
Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without
any legal intent to reach an agreement.[50]The resolution of surface bargaining
allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether a party has
engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at
bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can
only be inferred from the totality of the challenged partys conduct both at and away
from the bargaining table.[51] It involves the question of whether an employers conduct
demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining
The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away
from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an
agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and
the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. [53] Hence, the
parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the
duty to bargain.
GR NO 91915

On Sept 6, 1984 the med-arbiter certified the Divine Word University Employees Union
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. The union
submitted its proposals on March 7, 1985. The Universitys reply requested that a
preliminary conference be held on May 28, 1985. Before the conference the VP of the
union resigned and withdrew the proposals hence the PC was cancelled.

After three years, the affiliate of the union, Associated Labor Union, requested a
conference with the University for the purposes of continuing the bargaining
negotiations. Not having heard from the university, a follow up request was sent and
warned the university from intereference. The university maintained it silence.

The union thereafter filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and
ULP, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion. Conferences were held after the
filing of the notice of strike and the parties came to an agreement.

It was found however, that the university filed for a petition for certification election one
hour before the agreement was concluded.

The union then submitted proposals which were again ignored by the university.
Marathon conciliations were held to no avail.

The Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction and directed that all striking workers to report
back to work within 24 hours.

The med-arbiter issued an order directing the conduct of the certification election. To
Which the Sec of Labor directed to hold in abeyance. The Sec of Labor dismissed the
cases of ULP filed by the union and the university.

Whether or not certification election can be held after CBA was agreed upon after 5

An employer who is requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification
election any time except upon clear showing the existence of either:
1) petition is filed within one year from the issuance of a final certification election result
2) when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
Deadlock is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or
of neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or factions. There is a deadlock
when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
opposed forces.

The records of the case shows that there was no reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining on the part of the university.

1) proposal
2) conference in case of differences
3) conciliation
4) the parties are prohibited from exercising acts which would impede or disrupt the
early settlement of the case
5) exert efforts for amicable settlement

The union after submitting proposals which were ignored by the university, remained
passive. Technically, the university has the right to file the petition for certification
election as there was no bargaining deadlock. However such right was forfeited by its