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Equitatus Legis
vs.
FACTS:
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was
entered in Japan; hence, applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases
arising from the contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial
court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific
performance and damages. Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such
cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
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The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws
should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there are three phases and each
next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:
2. Choice of Law Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes
cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must automatically apply.
The court must determine which substantive law when applied to the
merits will be fair to both parties.
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTCs taking
cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which
was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then
he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari.
The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial
court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his
motion for reconsideration.
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THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD. petitioners,
vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
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Although MHC owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs
of the Palace Hotel. MHC and MHIL are separate entities. Further, MHIL and the
Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are
not residents of the Philippines.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that
the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
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vs.
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC
referred to as "Representative Agreement".
One year into the second term of the parties' Representative Agreement,
ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly
violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements.
On January 31, 1991, the complaint in Civil Case No. 91-294, was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134.
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From the foregoing order, petitioners elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals on a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The respondent appellate court dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based
on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on
the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse
to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the
court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that
the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court's
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present
forum not being the "most convenient" as a ground for the suit's dismissal,
deserves scant consideration.
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vs.
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with and was
granted by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount
of Singapore dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable
monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility.
In 1982, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, all of whom were
directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee
in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly
and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK
under the aforestated overdraft facility.
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over
all disputes arising under this guarantee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis
the Guarantee stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
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HELD:
YES
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been
filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much
less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary
trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.
In the case of Neville Y. Lamisl Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the
stipulation was [i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of
Davao City. We held: Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the
venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing
of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4,
Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement
which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the
parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby
stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has
jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject
to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling
sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and
foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the
permission of the latters authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the
State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making
its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before
them.
In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by
law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case
by applying the principle of forum non conveniens.
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Petition granted.
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vs.
FACTS:
1488, Inc. executed a warranty deed with vendors lien by which a parcel
of land in Harris County Texas, USA was sold to Petitioner ATHONA for
US$2,807,209.02 in order to assume Ducats obligation to AYALA and PHILSEC
for the payment of his loan, secured by shares of stock.
ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance and the entire amount
became due and demandable. Private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners
PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance
of US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of
stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a
complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment"
against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The complaint
reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil
Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private
respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more
than its true value of US$800,000.00. Petitioners claimed that, as a result of
private respondents' fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and
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AYALA were induced to enter into the Agreement and to purchase the Houston
property. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against the real and personal properties of private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the
grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-avis Civil Action No. H-86-440 filed by 1488,
Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners
PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat's motion to dismiss, stating that "the
evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the
forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international
law of forum non conveniens." The trial court also held itself without jurisdiction
over 1488, Inc. and Daic because they were nonresidents and the action was not
an action in rem or quasi in rem, so that extraterritorial service of summons was
ineffective. The trial court subsequently lifted the writ of attachment it had earlier
issued against the shares of stocks of 1488, Inc. and Daic.
A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic's motion to
dismiss. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic
on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court
erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens and in
ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the defendants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Would the civil action filed be barred by the judgment of the U.S court?
2. Would the dismissal of the civil action be justified on the ground of forum
non conveniens?
3. Does the trial court have jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic.
RULINGS:
1. No. The foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata
without giving them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in
Rule 39, sec. 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." In the
case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res
judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The
proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the
appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S.
court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper
determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court
were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that
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might be rendered would constitute res judicata. As the trial court stated
in its disputed order dated March 9, 1988.
2. No. The trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case is unjustified
under the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is
limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec. 1, which does not include
forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of
the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances" require the court's desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely
on the basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in connection
with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs
(PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura
Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt
which was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court
arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party
in the U.S. case.
3. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold
that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because
this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial
service. Rule 14, 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of
summons on a nonresident defendant may be effected out of the
Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, "the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines." 18 It is not disputed
that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had
been attached prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial
court dated April 20, 1987.
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K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO and FU HING OIL CO., LTD.,
petitioners,
vs.
FACTS:
The complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court, alleged that
Crestamonte, as bareboat charterer and operator of the MV Estella, appointed
N.S. Shipping Corporation ("NSS"), a Japanese corporation, as its general agent
in Japan. The appointment was formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in turn
appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai supplied the MV
Estella with supplies and servicesuntil it incurred barged expenses for the total
sum of US$ 152, 412.56 but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to
pay the amounts due.
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K.K. Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella. The complaint-in-
intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
The trial court allowed the intervention of Fu Hing and K.K. Shell
respectively. Writs of preliminary attachment were issued upon posting of the
appropriate bonds and thereafter discharged. Atlantic and the MV Estella moved
to dismiss the complaints-in- intervention filed by Fu Hing and K.K. Shell.
Atlantic and the M/V Estella filed a petition in the Court of Appeals against
the trial court judge, Kumagai, NSS and Keihin, which sought the annulment of
the orders of the trial court. Among others, the omnibus order denied the motion
to reconsider the order allowing Fu Hing's intervention and granted K.K. Shell's
motion to intervene. Again Fu Hing and K.K. Shell intervened.
The Court of Appeals annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it
to cease and desist from proceeding with the case.
According to the Court of Appeals, Fu Hing and K.K. Shell were not
suppliers but sub-agents of NSS, hence they were bound by the Agency
Agreement between Crestamonte and NSS, particularly, the choice of forum
clause, which provides:
12.0-That this Agreement shall be governed by the Laws of Japan. Any matters, disputes,
and/or differences arising between the parties hereto concerned regarding this Agreement shall
be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the District Courts of Japan.
Thus, concluded the Court of Appeals, the trial court should have
disallowed their motions to intervene. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
Fu Hing and K.K. Shell but this was denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
RULING:
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Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, as the exact nature of the relationship of the parties is still to be
established. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who is in the best
position, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit. It was clearly reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals to annul the trial court's orders, insofar as K.K. Shell is
concerned, and order the trial court to cease and desist from proceeding.
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vs.
FACTS:
There are two parties in this case which sought the estate of Marcos. One
is the Class Plaintiffs and the other is the Republic of the Philippines (RP).
There was an earlier case (Credit Suisse Case) wherein the Swiss Asset
of Marcos estate had been frozen by the Swiss Government at the request of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Class plaintiffs obtained injunction from USDC of
Hawaii to hold the assets for the benefit of the class Plaintiffs. The US CA issued
a writ of mandamus and held that the injunction violated the act of state doctrine,
which preclude American courts from declaring invalid a foreign sovereigns
official act, that is, the freeze order of the Swiss government.
The USDC of Hawaii then made a ruling that the Philippine SC had
violated due process by any standard and the latters judgment was entitled to
no deference. It ordered reinstatement of an earlier settlement agreement in the
District Court wherein the RP refused to approve and consent to it.
The District Court then issued an Order to Show Cause against the
Philippine National Bank, which was not a party to the litigation in the district
court, requiring the Bank to show why it should not be held in contempt for
violating the courts injunction against transfer of assets by the estate.
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The Philippine National Bank then filed the present petition for mandamus
in the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to restrain the District Court from
enforcing its Order to Show Cause and from pursuing discovery against the
Bank officer.
The Bank asserted that it had transferred nearly all of the funds in issue to
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the judgment of the Philippine
Supreme Court. It contended that the entire proceeding against it for its transfer
of funds to the Republic of the Philippines violated the act of state doctrine.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the USDC of Hawaii violated the act of state doctrine?
2. Whether or not the act of state doctrine do not apply to judicial
decisions?
3. Whether or not the act of state doctrine was inapplicable because the
judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court did not concern matters
within its own territory?
HELD:
3. The USCA held that, generally, the act of state doctrine applies to
official acts of foreign sovereigns performed within their own
territory. The act of the Philippine Supreme Court was not wholly
external, however. Its judgment, which the district court declared
invalid, was issued in the Philippines and much of its force upon the
Philippine National Bank arose from the fact that the Bank is a
Philippine corporation.
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Because the RPs interest in the enforcement of its laws does not end at
its borders, the fact that the escrow funds were deposited in Singapore does not
preclude the application of the act of state doctrine.
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vs.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States
executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid, his distributable estate
should be divided among his heirs, viz: to his first wife - $240,000.00, to his three
(3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis Php 40,000.00 each and the remainder shall go to all his surviving seven
(7) children by his first and second wives.
The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid the
entire bequest therein.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executors final account, report and administration and project of partition.
Subsequently, their respective motions for reconsiderations were denied. Hence,
they appealed to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
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1. In determining the intrinsic validity of the will, what law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law?
HELD:
The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January
31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of
one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that
the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas
law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
Article 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing
from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
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The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
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vs.
FACTS:
It was only Mr. Zalamea that was allowed to board the flight for it turned
out that he was holding the full fare ticket of his daughter. Unfortunately, Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter were not allowed to board the airplane. Upon their
arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach
of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 145. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision dated
January 9, 1989.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines.
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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YES.
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it
did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed
tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing
overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the
same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex
loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.
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vs.
FACTS:
Starting October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declaration
secured in Australia.
Rederick answered that Grace knew of his prior marriage as far back as
1993 and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989, thus he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.
Five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia. He prayed in his Answer for the dismissal of the
complaint for no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The trial court held that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
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vs.
FACTS:
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to
dismiss. In its reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya
acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary
submission to the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay
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Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all
objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
ISSUES:
1. Would the Malaysian court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over
Philippine National Construction Corporation, notwithstanding that (a)
the foreign court had served summons on Philippine National
Construction Corporation at its Malaysia office, and (b) Philippine
National Construction Corporation itself appeared by counsel in the
case before that court?
RULING:
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the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the
validity of the money judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would
render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign
judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first
establish its validity.
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vs.
FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left
among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a
corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins
estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator,
refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced
to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet
Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins shares.
Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are
not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust
Company of New York.
ISSUES:
2. Is it right to declare or consider the certificates lost when they are in the
possession of the domiciliary administrator?
HELD:
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It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require
that ancillary administrator's right certificates be respected is equally
beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full
allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its
shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune
from lawful court orders.
3. No, such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion
to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary
administrator did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover,
there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is
concerned, it is immaterial who is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates. Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to
impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a
contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court
decree, the latter is to be followed.
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It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require
that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the
33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For
appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to
the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot
therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
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vs.
FACTS:
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport,
Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was
issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: Check-in-
required. They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the
flight was overbooked. The Court of Appeals ruled that private respondents
failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the
denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA,
relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on over-sales of the USA.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place
where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and
validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the
rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the
place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents
and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the
United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It
is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did not change
the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in
Manila.
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vs.
FACTS:
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also filed its Motion for Reconsideration in addition to the Notice of Appeal filed
earlier.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the foreign law should govern or the contract of the
parties.
RULING:
NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour
Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of
the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
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Anent to the second issue, as general rule, a foreign procedural law will
not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by
the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.
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claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants
worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia
under different terms and condition of employment.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of
the claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of
the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus,
each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the
other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the
interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have
abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise
settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain
cannot be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
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FACTS:
The case was an action at law, brought on December 18, 1885, in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by
Gustave Bertin Guyot, a Frenchman, as the official liquidator of the firm of
Charles Fortin & Co., against Henry Hilton and William Libbey, citizens of the
United States and of the State of New York and trading as co-partners in the
cities of New York and Paris and elsewhere under the firm name of A. T. Stewart
& Co.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judgment of a foreign nations court entitled to full credit
and has a conclusive effect when sued to other nation.
HELD:
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a
treaty or a statute of this country. But when, as is the case here, there is no
written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of
ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do
so in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought before
them. In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial
decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and
usages of civilized nations.
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of
one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by
legislative act, or by judicial decree shall be allowed to operate within the
dominion of another nation depends upon the comity of nations.
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"All the effect which foreign laws can have in the territory of a state
depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of that state. The express
consent of a state to the application of foreign laws within its territory is given by
acts passed by its legislative authority, or by treaties concluded with other states.
Its tacit consent is manifested by the decisions of its judicial and administrative
authorities, as well as by the writings of its publicists. There is no obligation
recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists to regard foreign laws;
but their application is admitted only from considerations of utility and the mutual
convenience of states, ex commitate, obreciprocamutilitatem."
The court stated that comity was reciprocal. Since France did not
recognize final judgments of the U.S., and would try such judgments anew,
judgements given by France would be given the same treatment.Therefore, the
comity of the United States did not require the court to give conclusive effect to
the judgments of the courts of France.
A foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued
upon another nation, but is a prima facie evidence only of the claim.
Comity was not afforded to foreign judgments when the country did not
reciprocate comity.
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JOHNSTON
vs.
COMPAGNIEGENERALETRANSATLANTIQUE
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the New York Court of Appeal were bound to apply the
reciprocity requirement following the decision the Hilton case
HELD:
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LOUCKS et al.
vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
One states penal laws are not enforceable in any other state. Whether a
statute is penal depends on the type of liability it creates. Where the penalty is
awarded to the state or a member of the public is suing in the interest of the
whole community to right a public wrong, the statute and/or recovery is penal.
While this statute is penal in the sense that damages are awarded on the basis of
the defendants conduct rather than the plaintiffs measure of damages, the right
to recover is private and therefore the statute is not penal in the international
sense. The public policy of New York is not violated by the enforcement of the
right, as New York recognizes the right of survivors to recover for wrongful death.
The fact that the Massachusetts Statute is different in the way it is enforced does
not make the Massachusetts Statute wrong. The forum may refuse to enforce a
right based on a foreign statute only where enforcement would violate an express
strong public policy of the forum. That is not the case here and since the Statute
is not penal in the international sense, there is no bar to its being enforced in
New York. Judgment reversed and order of the Special Term affirmed.
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GODARD
vs.
GRAY
FACTS:
All parties in France seem to have taken the word for granted in the
charter party which is to be understood in their natural meaning,
ISSUE:
HELD:
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virtue of any statute, but upon a principle very well stated by Parke, B., in
Williams v. Jones (13 M. & W. 628; 14 L.J. Exch. 145):
"Where a Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from
one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay the sum, on which an action of debt to
enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and
colonial Courts are supported and enforced."
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign
judgment?
HELD:
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Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US
Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment.
PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the
agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI
insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within
this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts
not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that
which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against
whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a
meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to
the very existence of the cause of action such as fraud in obtaining the consent
to a contract is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate
against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.
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vs.
FACTS:
Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a
countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court
of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child.
Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both
parties. Both parents were re-strained from taking Querubina out of California
without the permission of the Court.
Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she
had then married the man she was living with and had a stable home, the Court
granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the part of the father
and he was also ordered to pay for the support of the child $30 each month on
the first day thereof.
In the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the
Respondent stated that he had brought his daughter to the Philippines because
he wanted to prevent her knowing about the misconduct and infidelity committed
by the mother. The appeal said that her daughter wanted to be bred in an
environment of high morals.
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ISSUE:
RULING:
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vs.
FACTS:
In the first instance, petitioners contended that the U.S. District Court
never acquired jurisdiction over their persons as they had not been served with
summoned and a copy of the complaint. In the second instance, petitioners
contend that such jurisdictional infirmity effectively prevented the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City from taking cognizance of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-39927 and from enforcing the U.S. District Court's Default Judgment against
them. Petitioners contended, finally, that assuming the validity of the disputed
Default Judgment, the same may be enforced only against petitioner PISC the 9
petitioners not having been impleaded originally in the case filed in New York,
U.S.A.
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ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
The evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S. District Court had
validly acquired jurisdiction over PISC under the procedural law applicable in that
forum i.e., the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of the Summons
and Complaint which were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed with
the SC, were stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983, PISC Manila." indicating that
service thereof had been made upon and acknowledged by the PISC office in
Manila on, 18 January 1983 That foreign judgment-which had become final and
executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom and perfected by petitioner
PISC-is thus "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." The SC note, further that there has
been in this case no showing by petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered
by the U.S. District Court was vitiated by "want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In other words, the Default Judgment
imposing upon petitioner PISC a liability of U.S. $94,456.28 in favor of
respondent Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this jurisdiction.
The existence of liability on the part of petitioner PISC having been duly
established in the U.S. case, it was not improper for respondent Interpool, in
seeking enforcement in this jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such
liability, to have included the other 9 petitioners herein (i.e., George Lim, Marcos
Bautista, Carlos Laude, Tan Sing Lim, Antonio Liu Lao, Ong Teh Philippine
Consortium Construction Corporation, Pacific Mills, Inc. and Universal Steel
Smelting Co., Inc.) as defendants in civil case, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. The record shows that said 9 petitioners had executed continuing
guarantees" to secure performance by petitioner PISC of its contractual
obligations. As guarantors, they had held themselves out as liable. "Whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative," to respondent Interpool under their
separate "continuing guarantees" executed in the Philippines. The New York
award of U.S. $94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a breach by PISC of its
own obligations under those Agreements. The SC considered the 9 other
petitioners as persons against whom [a] right to relief in respect to or arising out
of the same transaction or series of transactions [has been] alleged to exist" and,
consequently, properly impleaded as defendants. There was, in other words, no
need at all, in order that case would prosper, for respondent Interpool to have
first impleaded the 9 other petitioners in the New York case and obtained
judgment against all 10 petitioners.
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vs.
FACTS:
On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch,
entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit
the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff
under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo,
Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages.
After the two attempts of service at its Office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd
floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture by the
36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan, the judge of the Tokyo
District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at
the head office of the defendant in Manila.
On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels
upon the defendants head office in Manila and defendant received from Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons on August 28, 1980. Despite receipt
of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the
Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiffs complaint and on [January 29,
1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August
28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed. Defendant not having appealed
the judgment, the same became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20,
1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54. Defendant filed its answer averring that
the judgment of the Japanese Court: (1) the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is
contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of
law.
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In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with
the latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait wherein it was held that the
process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired
over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the
state. To support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated:
ISSUE:
Would the Japanese court have jurisdiction over C.F. Sharp & Company
Inc.?
HELD:
YES.
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court,
SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. It is settled
that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lexfori or the internal law of the
forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP. As to what this law is, it is a question of fact, not of law. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is
invalid. But, it did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is
a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1)
on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
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Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons
together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila.
Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department)
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in
Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the
Corporation Code. Hence, SHARPs contention that such manner of service is
not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.
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vs.
FACTS:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their
favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly
$1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the
subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money
allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such,
the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. In dismissing the
complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the
computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
ISSUES:
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HELD:
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vs.
FACTS:
Teban Caoile, with his three brothers, arrived at the port of Manila on June
7, 1961. He applied for admission as a Philippine citizen under his
documentation issued for that purpose by the Philippine Consulate General at
Hongkong.
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The case was submitted for decision on the basis of a stipulation of facts
and on the testimonies of Antonio Caoile and Immigration Commissioner Vivo.
Antonio Caoile, the supposed father of Teban Caoile, declared that he is a
Filipino citizen. He categorically affirmed "that he does not know Teban Caoile",
that "it was only in the hearing of the case that he saw Teban Caoile" and that he
(Antonio) was married only about five years prior to 1964.
On March 24, 1964 the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus. It found that Teban Caoile was legally detained. Juan
Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he renewed his motion for
Caoile's release on bail which had been denied by the trial court. The
Commissioner of Immigration opposed the motion. The Court of Appeals allowed
Caoile's release upon his posting bail in the sum of P5,000.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
The first Board of Commissioners did not meet collectively to discuss and
deliberate on the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Its action was set aside
by Memorandum Order No. 9 of the Secretary of Justice. Individual action by the
members of the Board of Commissioners renders nugatory the purpose of its
constitution as a board. The later Board of Commissioners, headed by the
appellant, acted on the hypothesis that the documentation supporting Teban
Caoile's alleged Philippine citizenship was fraudulent and manufactured. That
conclusion was confirmed by the testimony of Antonio Caoile, who, at risk of
being indicted for perjury, denied any paternal relationship to Teban Caoile. His
testimony implied that a monstrous deception was practiced upon the
immigration authorities. The foundation of Teban Caoile's assertion of Philippine
citizenship is his representation that he is Antonio Caoile's son. That foundation
collapsed when Antonio Caoile revealed that he could not have been the father of
Teban Caoile. His revelation belied Teban Caoile's documentation of Philippine
citizenship and unmasked it as an imposition. "When a party resorts to falsehood
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vs.
FACTS:
A verified petition was filed on April 28, 1965 by the petitioner Chua Tan
Chuan thru counsel Atty. Peregrino M. Andres for the purpose of changing the
nationality of his son Jacob Chua from Chinese to Filipino as could be found in
the birth certificate of Jacob Chua.
The petitioner in this case is a resident of Sta. Ana, Davao City, Philippines
and is a Chinese citizen, while the minor Jacob Chua is under the custody and
support of the petitioner as according to the decision of this Honorable Court ...;
that according to the birth certificate of the minor prepared by the attending
physician, he was born at the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital on October 24,
1965.
The lower court, the Honorable Vicente P. Bullecer presiding, rendered its
decision ordering the correction of the birth certificate of the minor Jacob Chua
by changing his nationality from Chinese to Filipino.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
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vs.
FACTS:
The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the herein
private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed
with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet a Petition for the
change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. For this purpose, she also
sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's
name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name
recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the
litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was
assisted in the case by her mother.
The suit was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 642. The
petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is
Helen Chan and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is
actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner also
asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously
written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns
these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names.
The petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic
priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian
given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that since
her childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as
Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.
In a Decision dated July 24, 1969, the trial court, with respondent Judge
Feliciano Belmonte presiding therein, ruled in favor of the petitioner. The
petitioner was allowed to change her name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. The
court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents as prayed for in the
Petition in the registry of birth. The Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad Benguet
was ordered to implement the corresponding corrections. On behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General elevated the case
to this Court by way of the instant Petition.
ISSUES:
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Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in
the civil registry be joined in the same proceeding?
HELD:
No.
The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name other father
in her birth certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown to have been
registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is no justification for allowing
the petitioner to use the surname Pao. The corrections sought by the petitioner
involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections
should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in character
than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial court. Aside from
the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil
registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary
proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under
Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change
in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner. A clerical error must
be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of being corrected
by reference to the record alone. The petitioner seeks more than just the
correction of a clerical error.
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petitioner Anita Po and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were
before such Decision.
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MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to
take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching
Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration
to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except
for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-
in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Should Lau Yuen Yeung by ipso facto be Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen?
HELD:
Yes.
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This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute
for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to
have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may
not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or
enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage
or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case.
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DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change of
her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such
privileges were obtained through misinterpretation, since never did the petitioner
disclose his marriage to Banez to the immigration authorities. Had they known,
immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who
claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from
the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Also, marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to
depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an
alien.
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vs.
FACT:
The Motion was opposed by the Solicitor General on the ground that it
was "filed only in June 1970 or more than nine (9) years from the rendition of the
decision in December 20, 1960 granting the petition for naturalization and it is not
shown that the delay was excusable, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned his
petition."
On August 26, 1970, the Court issued an Order which reads as follows:
"The decision in this case dated December 20, 1960, admitting petitioner
Tan Ching to Philippine citizenship as a naturalized Filipino was promulgated on
January 6, 1961.
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The Court Finding that petitioner Tan Ching has complied with all the
requirements provided for in Republic Act No. 530, the Court hereby confirms the
decision in this case dated December 20, 1960 and promulgated on January 6,
1961 and orders its registration in the civil registry of Catanauan, Quezon. After
petitioner shall have taken his oath of allegiance in the form and substance
prescribed by law, let the corresponding certificate if naturalization be issued to
him, after which let him be under the duties and enjoy and be entitled to all the
rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing the petitioner to take the
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen despite the fact that he has not complied
with all the requirements provided for in Republic Act No. 530 and does not
possess all the qualifications required by law for admission to Philippine
citizenship?
HELD:
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vs.
FACTS:
On April 24, 1995, the COMELEC Second Division declared Imelda not
qualified to run and struck off the amended and the original COCs. The
COMELEC in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on
in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there
and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to
have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days,
as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
HELD:
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2.) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon
her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new
domicile after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after
her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This choice was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her
letters to the PCGG Chairman.
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vs.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
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vs.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance admitted to probate the last will and testament
of C.O Bohanan. The lower court finds, according to the evidence of the
proponents that the testator C.O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada. It provides in his last will and
testament that out of the total estate (after deducting the administration
expenses) of P211, 639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90, 819.67
and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother
and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6, 000
each, or a total of P12, 000.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator,
Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The will has not given her
any share in the estate left by the testator. The court below refused to recognize
the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife of the testator and his children are entitled to their
legitime?
RULINGS:
As to his wife, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena
C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to
him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married
Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife
exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C.
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Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left
by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward
and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only,
and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by
the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator
died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are
to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the
law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.
vs.
FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens
of California and domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was
no ante-nuptial marriage contract between the parties and during the existence of
their marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal
property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died intestate in Palo, Alto
California and that in accordance with the law of California, the community
property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife
previous to that of the husband belongs absolutely to the surviving husband
without administration.
Thereupon, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring
the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the
petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.
The court reaffirmed the order of September 22, 1930 and entered the
order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the owner of
a descendible interest in the Philippine lands?
RULING:
Yes.
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Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested
in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in
question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted
that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property
of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine
Islands, vested of a descendible interest, a title equal to that of her husband, in
the Philippine lands from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this
proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the
successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by
section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the
death of Mrs. Gibbs.
Petition dismissed.
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vs.
FACTS:
Silva started to frequent the house of the Doctoleros, and soon professed
love for Esther. Having been made to believe that he was single, she accepted
his marriage proposal, and the two were married on January 14, 1945 by one
Father Cote on the occasion of a house blessing. No documents of marriage
were prepared nor executed, allegedly because there were no available printed
forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived together as husband and wife.
From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino Silva, Jr., was born.
On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of Ising, for
which reason, he was transferred to Leyte, and later to the United States, he
divorced Precilla Isabel and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriage with
plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.
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Except for the statement that a marriage actually took place between
Saturnino Silva and Esther Peralta, the evidence on record fully supports the
foregoing findings of fact the lower court. No evidence was offered, other than
the testimonies of the defendant herself and her counsel, Atty. Juan Quijano, to
prove any such alleged marriage, although there is convincing proof that the
defendant and Saturnino Silva, for a time, actually lived together as common-law
husband and wife. But the witness' asseverations regarding the marriage, taken
by themselves and considered with other circumstances appearing on the record,
reveal too much uncertainty and incoherence as to be convincing.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes.
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FACTS:
Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish
citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on November, 1936, whom she bore
a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had
lived from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband,
on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from the conjugal
abode carrying the child along with him and never returned, about whose
whereabouts she made inquiries from among her husband's friends and
countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, where,
according, however, to information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived
from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found; that
all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain;
and that, because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during
which she has not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes
that he is dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and
that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive and later on
appear, be preserved. Upon the foregoing evidence the trial court dismissed the
petition on the ground that it is not for the settlement of the estate of the
absentee, and because the rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a
person unheard from in seven years is dead, does not create a right upon which
a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The petitioner has
appealed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw,
because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage
and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the
petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits
the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had
been unheard from in seven years had been established. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The
latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally
the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
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vs.
FACTS:
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for the review of the award.
ISSUE:
Would the provisions of Article 391 of the old Civil Code on presumptive
death apply on this case?
HELD:
No.
The Supreme Court however, ruled that, in the case of Madrigal Shipping
Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario, et. al. G.R. No. L-13130, 10-31-1959, it
approves of the explanation of the respondent Commissioner therein that Article
391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of
persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case wherein the
vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there
is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a
vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection
with an aeroplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being the
object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. In the instant case, none of
the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of petitioner's vessel is not
unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been definitely
destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that when
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petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had
not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not
apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact
of death. In the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., supra, we said:
Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might
probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again,
though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may be
drawn. (Brownlee, et al., vs. Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident Association, 29
Fed [2nd] 71).
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vs.
FACTS:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were
joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In
February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and
acquired real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza
Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with him
in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month
and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they
"resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by
virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside
in such place as the said lady pleases." In the same document, the husband
undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support,
payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. The
husband complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he
ceased to make further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but
the husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the
same year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce
proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery
committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she
named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom
he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce;
that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the
defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be
therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been
determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the
amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant
be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish
dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date
of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held
itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the
plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed
that the communal property be divided between the parties, with costs against
the defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was
to be effected by commissioners according to law.
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Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal,
the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with.
These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the
partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both
parties appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the case and partition of
property as decided by the court should be affirmed.
HELD:
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th
of September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments
appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in
this instance.
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within
the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish
subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in
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Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion
of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical
courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code,
could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal
statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial
courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. It is a
question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court.
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although
Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile
herein.
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vs.
________________________________________
vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
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The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:
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vs.
FACTS:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel filed before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of the latters previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Having been allegedly force to enter into a
marital union, she contends that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise
alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law. There is no
need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable.
Therefore, such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to
her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is
no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
It is also worth noting that Castro failed to offer any other witness
regarding the celebration of her marriage. This is because of its peculiar
circumstance of being a secret marriage. Cardenas did not appear during the
annulment trial, so he is considered to be in default.
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vs.
FACTS:
The municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed
an administrative case against the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law for solemnizing the weeding of Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife and for performing the marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Somaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Article 41 of the Family Code Provides that For the purpose of contracting
the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
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the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that
the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as
well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Now, the law specifically
provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as
a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
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vs.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972, established residence in the Philippines and begot two
children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Petitioner remarried
to Theodore Van Dornalso in Nevada.
The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which a divorce dissolves
the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioners husband who is entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
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over the alleged conjugal property. Alice Reyes Van Dorn should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Petition granted.
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vs.
FACTS:
Crasus alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997.
She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and
was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of
her present nationality shall govern her status.
ISSUES:
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RULING:
1. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which
she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
2. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar. According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines:
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia;
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law. The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
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"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife
and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." Whether the will is
intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
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vs.
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva
at the United Church of Christ of the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married an American citizen.
Cipriano thereafter file with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was file.
The court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Thereafter, it filed petition to the Supreme Court raising a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
Thus, taking into consideration this legislative intent and applying this rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
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and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import leads to mischievous results or contravenes the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
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In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez,
Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
FACTS:
Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition
seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and
Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz Vasquez. He claims that
they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage and he desires to
adopt them to promote their best interest and well-being. Since the hearing of
the petition, petitioner Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria
Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz
Vasquez. He claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of
marriage and he desires to adopt them to promote their best interest and well-
being.
Since at the hearing of the petition petitioner acknowledged that they are
his natural children, the Solicitor General opposed the petition on the plea that he
could not legally adopt them for the reason that Article 338 of the new Civil Code
which allows a natural child to be adopted by his natural father refers only to a
child who has not been acknowledged as natural child.
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their
marriage was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12,
1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he
and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the minors he is
now seeking to adopt. He claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as
soon as he is granted Philippine citizenship for which he has already applied and
in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that no one of his relatives
abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his
former wife and acknowledged said minors as his natural children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged
natural children of the father or mother?
HELD:
Yes.
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Article 338 of the new Civil Code evidently intends to allow adoption of a
natural child whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow
adoption only to unrecognized children, then said article would be of no useful
purpose because such children could have been validly adopted even without it.
This is so because a natural child not recognized has no right whatever and
being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may be adopted under
Article 337. The same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural
child because, his filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot
be made under the general principles governing adoption. There is therefore
need of an express provision allowing the adoption of an acknowledged natural
child as an exception to the rule and that is what is contemplated in Article 338.
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In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS
SANTOS-YIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YIGO, petitioners-
appellees,
vs.
FACTS:
On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yigo and his wife for the adoption of a minor named
MarcialEleuterioResaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor
have given their consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by
them on March 20, 1950, and that since then petitioners have reared and cared
for the minor as if he were their own. It is likewise alleged that petitioners are
financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.
By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor
General who, in due time, filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners
have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such
they are disqualified to adopt under the provisions of the new Civil Code.
The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two
legitimate children of their own, yet said children were born after the agreement
for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of the minor. The court
found that said agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into
effect and while the petition may not be granted under this new Code, it may be
sanctioned under the old because it contains no provision which prohibits
adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the parties. From this decision,
the Solicitor General took the present appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Has the lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of
the provisions of paragraph 1, article 335 of the new Civil Code?
2. Has the lower court erred in giving Exhibit "A", the agreement to adopt,
a binding effect?
RULING:
While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law
applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court which does not prohibit
persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the
proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of
paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The reason is
simple. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil
Procedure (sections 765-772, inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of
the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. (Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one
case, said chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure "appears to be a complete
enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the
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expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to
have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code.
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vs.
FACTS:
On February 21, 1990 Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen of America and
his Wife, Evelyn A Clause, Filipino at birth who later became a natural citizen of
the United States petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala. On June 20, 1990 the
judge decree said Filipino minor be their child by adoption. Republic of the
Philippines, the petitioner here, appealed that the lower court erred in granting
the petition for adoption for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under the
Philippine Law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. The spouses are disqualified to adopt the Filipino child Solomon.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz:
An alien, except:
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly the later.
Alvin Clause is not qualified being a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. On the other hand Evelyn Clouse may seem to be qualified on
Article 184, however adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone for the Family
Code requires that the husband and wife must jointly adopt as stated on Article
185.
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vs.
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife,
Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon
and respondent Irma Lazatin. One month after Marianos death, his widow,
Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box which
either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margaritas
death, Respondent Nora, opened the safety deposit box and removed its
contents.
Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened
this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the
probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that
submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the
opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that
she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will
therein.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara
filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child,
on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the
deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, that petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr.
Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on August
19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his
wife Margarita de Asis.
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discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the
question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
"As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is concerned and his Petition to
establish his status as an adopted child, the Court has ruled that he has failed to
establish such status. The Court denies any motion for reconsideration unless
based on some documentary proof."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Renato has established his status as an adopted child and
is allowed to intervene in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate?
RULING:
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and
jurisprudence.
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vs.
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six
years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old.
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
an order setting the petition for hearing and subsequently granted the petition for
adoption.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's decision which
granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles?
HELD:
No.
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In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree
of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the
petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several
commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the
adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn
written consent of the children of the adopters.
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vs.
FACTS:
The petitioners in the adoption proceeding are husband and wife married
on June 2, 1962. The minor sought to be adopted was born on February 16,
1960 and the natural child of petitioner wife who has been living with them ever
since the marriage of petitioners. Petitioner husband is a Danish subject, who
has been granted permanent residence in the Philippines and has treated the
minor as his son, and the latter calls him "Daddy." Although the possibility exists
that petitioners may yet have their own children, the adoption at this time, before
any such children are begotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future
domestic relations.
The court a quo (Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) denied
the application for adoption of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks
because the same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship
and the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter. It stated that, an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a
citizen of the alien's country. As petitioner husband in this case is a Danish
subject, it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph
Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that of his natural
mother.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for
the approval of the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by
the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no
support in the law. The judgment appealed from would operate to impose a
further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force
(Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a)
non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has
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broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two cases,
alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a
person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
Petition granted.
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vs.
FACTS:
Maria Garnier Garreau (Maria), then aged 85, filed an application for
adoption of Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida (Josefina), aged 55, a
Filipino citizen, at the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain, where both were
residing at that time.
On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the application for
adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes
final, to execute the corresponding adoption document "con arreglo al articulo
177 del Codigo Civil." The adoption document became necessary for the reason
that under Article 177 of the Civil Code of Spain, "[a]probada definitivamente la
adopcion por el Juez, se otorgara escritura, expresando en ella las condiciones
con que se haya hecho, y se inscribira en el Registro Civil correspondiente."
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. However, the registrar refused to
register that document upon the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can
only be had through judicial proceeding. And since the notarial document of
adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.
ISSUE:
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RULING:
At any rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State
and adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of
our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign
adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is
entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to
be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by
the laws of this country.
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vs.
FACTS:
100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testators lifetime and for
payment of his debts and family expenses;
On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale of the
southern half of the above mentioned 259-hectare lot in favor of Ernesto, who
was also appointed as executor without bond. He also expressly recognized
Ernesto as the owner of the northern half.
The whole lot had been previously registered by Victorino and Ernesto,
but in view of the sale, the decree for the whole tract was issued exclusively in
the name of Ernesto. A certificate of title was issued to this effect on October 12,
1933.
Upon Victorinos death on September 27, 1933, his will was not filed for
probate. About four years later, Rosario, claiming to be Victorinos recognized
natural child and assuming that he died intestate, brought a suit against Ernesto
to recover her legitime.
The case reached the Court of Appeals and was decided in favor of
Rosario but upon certiorari, the Supreme Court modified the judgment.
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On December 9, 1946, Judge Sotero Rodas denied the motion but upon
reconsideration, Judge Maalac of the same court, on June 23, 1947,
reconsidered and set aside the previous resolution and ordered the petition
dismissed.
An amended petition for the probate of the will in toto and another petition
to reconsider the previous order were subsequently denied. Rosario and Atty.
Quinto thereupon brought the case on appeal. The Court of Appeals decided in
favor of Rosario and Quinto.
Ernesto filed a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No.
The provision of Article 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedents will to the competent
court has always been deemed by our law as more of a duty than a right. The
neglect of such an obligation carries with it a corresponding penalty. It is
inconsistent with that policy for the court to refuse admission of wills to probate,
without inquiry into their validity. The authority given to testators to dispose freely
of a portion of their estate would be imperfectly safeguarded, unless adequate
measures were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of the deceased
would be carried out. Because the decedent may no longer act to have his
testamentary dispositions duly executed, the state authority must take over the
opposite vigilance and supervision, so that free testamentary disposition does not
remain a delusion and a dream.
Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will
with no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition
of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide
the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of
the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away
with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the
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probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will, may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be
done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may
have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate
among themselves to the exclusion of others.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to
the wills authenticity and due execution, none of the heirs may sue for the
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court; first, because the law expressly provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a
proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
designed to effectuate the testators right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law. This is for the protection of the rights of the heirs and
legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the
publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action
for revindicacion or partition.
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vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan, respondent.
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New
York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship this means that in the
event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall
be presumed to have predeceased his wife. Later, the entire family perished in a
fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses will,
filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and
that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could
present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already
issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of
the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in
the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court,
and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifth requirement above
as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and
substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed
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over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.
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vs.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is a corporation that operates a gas plant in the City of Manila
and furnishes gas service to the people of the metropolis and surrounding
municipalities by virtue of a franchise granted to it by the Philippine Government.
Associated with the plaintiff are the Islands Gas and Electric Company domiciled
in New York, United States, and the General Finance Company domiciled in
Zurich, Switzerland. Neither of these last mentioned corporations resides in the
Philippines.
For the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, dividends in the sum of P1,
348,847.50 were paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric Company in
the capacity of stockholders upon which withholding income taxes were paid to
the defendant totaling P40, 460.03. For the same years interest on bonds in the
sum of P411,600 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric
Company upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant
totaling P12,348. Finally for the stated time period, interest on other
indebtedness in the sum of P131, 644, 90 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands
Gas and Electric Company and the General Finance Company respectively upon
which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totaling P3,949.34.
ISSUES:
1. Did the trial court err in holding that the dividends paid by the plaintiff
corporation were subject to income tax in the hands of its stockholders?
2. Did the trial court err in not holding the interest on bonds and other
indebtedness of the plaintiff corporation, paid by it outside of the Philippine
Islands to corporations not residing therein, were not, on the part of the
recipients thereof, income from Philippine sources, and hence not subject
to Philippine income tax.
HELD:
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The grantee shall annually on the fifth day of January of each year
pay to the City of Manila and the municipalities in the Province of
Rizal in which gas is sold, two and one half per centum of the gross
receipts within said city and municipalities, respectively, during the
preceding year. Said payment shall be in lieu of all taxes, Insular,
provincial and municipal, except taxes on the real estate, buildings,
plant, machinery, and other personal property belonging to the
grantee.
For that reason, the decision of the trial court is sustain and
to overrule appellant's first assigned error.
2. The appellant contends that, as the Islands Gas and Electric Company
and the General Finance Company are domiciled in the United States and
Switzerland respectively, and as the interest on the bonds and other
indebtedness earned by said corporations has been paid in their
respective domiciles, this is not income from Philippine sources within the
meaning of the Philippine Income Tax Law.
The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within
its jurisdiction without violating the due process clause of the constitution.
The taxing power of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits, but
within such it may tax persons, property, income, or business. If an interest
in property is taxed, the situs of either the property or interest must be
found within the state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must
have a domicile within the state or the property or business out of which
the income issues must be situated within the state so that the income
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Pushing to one side that portion of Act No. 3761 which permits
taxation of interest on bonds and other indebtedness paid without the
Philippine Islands, the question is if the income was derived from sources
within the Philippine Islands.
Judgment affirmed.
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INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
NO.
It has been held that "the playing of music in dines and dance
establishment which was paid for by the public in purchases of food and drink
constitute performance for profit within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has been
explained that while it is possible in such establishments for the patrons to
purchase their food and drinks and at the same time dance to the music of the
orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the purpose of
inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for the entertainment
in the purchase of food and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of business
for profit, and it is public; and the music is performed for profit.
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applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same is correct. The Supreme
Court has ruled that pursuant to Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative
Order No. 3(as amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled 'Rules of Practice
in the Philippines Patent Office relating to the Registration of Copyright Claims
promulgated pursuant to Republic Act165, provides among other things that an
intellectual creation should be copyrighted thirty (30)days after its publication, if
made in Manila, or within the (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which
renders such creation public property."
Indeed, if the general public has made use of the object sought to be
copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to the copyright application, the law deems
the object to have been donated to the public domain and the same can no
longer be copyrighted. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the musical
compositions in question had long become public property, and are therefore
beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
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vs.
vs.
FACTS:
The subject property in this case, the Roppongi is one of the four
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine Government under the reparation
agreement entered into with the former. The properties and capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese Government for the national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their loses in life
and property and their suffering during world war II.
The Roppongi property consists of the land and building for chancery of
the Philippine embassy. As intended, it became the site of Philippine Embassy
until it was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major
repairs. Due to the failure of the government to provide the necessary funds, the
Roppongi has remained undeveloped since that time.
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The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying
that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of
Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is
used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and
devolution of the title to a property. The respondents add that even assuming for
the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has
ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial
property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic
purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and
because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert
it to private use has been manifested by overt acts.
ISSUES:
2. Was there a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the
real property is situated there) and Philippine law?
RULINGS:
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2. No. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when:
(1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such
that the capacity to take and transfer immovable, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See
Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues
are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of
the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the
State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
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vs.
FACTS:
This is an action to recover a debt due upon a contract executed July 27,
1903, whereby plaintiff transferred to the defendant the abaca and copra
business carried on by him at various places in the Island of Catanduanes, with
all the property and right pertaining to the said business, or the sum of 134,636
pesos and 12 cents, payable in Mexican currency or its equivalent in local
currency. Defendant paid at the time of the execution of the contract, on account
of the purchase price, the sum of P33,659 pesos and 3 cents, promising to pay
the balance on three instalments P33,659 pesos and 3 cents each, with interest
at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from the date of the contract. The first
instalment became due July 27, 1904. It was for the recovery of this first
instalment that their action was brought to the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject of the action. The court overruled the demurrer and
defendant refused to and did not, as a matter of fact, answer plaintiffs complaint.
Judgment having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 33,659
pesos and 3 cents, Mexican currency, equal to 30,052 pesos and 70 centavos,
Philippine currency, an interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from
July 27, 1903 and costs, the defendant duly excepted.
ISSUES:
HELD:
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province where the plaintiff resides or in that where the defendant may
reside, at the election of the plaintiff. The residence in such case should
be that which the parties had at the time of the commencement of the
action and not prior thereto.
The law does not authorize litigant-parties to submit themselves, by
express stipulation, to the jurisdiction of a particular court, to the exclusion
of the court duly vested with such jurisdiction. An express agreement
tending to deprive a court of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void
and of no legal effect.
2. Due to his failure to deny, dispute or controvert the facts of the complaint,
particularly regarding the value of the Mexican currency in Philippine peso,
the defendant has also admitted to the same. Therefore, it shall not be
necessary for the court to hear evidence upon this point. The proof
required by section 3 of Act No. 1045 is only necessary when the parties
disagree as to the actual value of either currency.
3. The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that
which he shall have demanded in his complaint. (Sec. 126, Code of Civil
Procedure).
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vs
FACTS:
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties.
xxxxxxxxx
6. TERMINATION
xxxxxxxxx
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This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of
Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to
consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
In its position paper, the PIA, without any evidence, claimed that both
private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of
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bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of personal effects; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by
customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA
further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated
pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.
A favorable decision was granted for the respondents. The order stated
that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after
rendering more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the
period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on
regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out
without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private
respondents to reinstatement with full back wages.
ISSUE:
Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?
HELD:
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with
public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations
cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to
govern their relationship. The contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it
was also performed here, at least partially.Private respondents are Philippine
citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is
licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence is residing in
the Philippines. Lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All of the above
contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as the proper
forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Petition denied.
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vs.
FACTS:
In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, The Defendant Frank entered into a
contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a
salary as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition
thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in travelling from city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
The Defendant entered upon the performance of his contract and was
paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Defendant left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make
a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No.
80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging that:
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No.
224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract; and that (2) he was a
minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible
under the law. The lower court rendered a judgment against Defendant and in
favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of $265.90.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No.
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It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the
time and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full
capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters
bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.
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vs.
FACTS:
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident
was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police
put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and
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Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and
allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a
few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed
to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the
case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to
appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court
on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one
hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane
was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her
to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary
of Mr. YahyaSaddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at
the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same
court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision,
translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to
286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together
with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention
of Islamic tradition.
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The trial court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion
to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia. On February 20, 1995, SAUDIA
filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary
Restraining Order dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge
from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant
Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October
13, 1995.
ISSUES:
1. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided
for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
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xxxxxxxxx
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(a) xxxxxxxxx
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it
best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance
of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she
no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons
of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with
the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
2. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we
find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should
have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal
issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which
could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable
petitioner's insistence that "since private respondent instituted this suit,
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she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on
the matter." As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no obligation to
plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause
of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she
never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly
held by the respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the
petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia,
then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the
law of Saudi Arabia is".
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Did the US district court lack subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350?
HELD:
Yes.
The district court does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction of the case
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien or a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
The Alien Tort Statute was enacted as part of the First Judiciary Act of
1789 but has seldom been invoked. The debates that led to the Acts passage
contain no reference to the Alien Tort Statute, and there is no direct evidence of
what the First Congress intended it to accomplish. The statute has, however, be
comprehensively analyzed by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
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There is no doubt, as the district court found, that causing Trajano's death
was wrongful, and is a tort. Nor, in view of Marcos-Manotoc's default, is there
any dispute that Trajano's death was caused by torture. And, as we have recently
held, "it would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture
violate customary international law." Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699
We believe, therefore, that Trajano's suit as an alien for the tort of wrongful
death, committed by military intelligence officials through torture prohibited by the
law of nations, is within the jurisdictional grant of Sec. 1350.
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters?
HELD:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters
thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The
Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes
such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel
in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
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about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public
order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute.
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vs.
FACT:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and
internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to
inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The
defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium
in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium he
ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly
constitutes corpus delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that
it came from Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in
Manila and Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over
foreign vessels stationed in its port.
HELD:
Yes.
The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel
in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present
case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
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vs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
Da Costa and Gorcey cannot deny that they are partners of the
partnership Stasikinocey, because in all their transactions with the National City
Bank they represented themselves as such. McDonald cannot disclaim
knowledge of the partnership Stasikinocey because he dealt with said entity in
purchasing two of the vehicles in question through Gorcey and Da Costa. The
sale of the vehicles to MacDonald being void, the sale to Gonzales is also void
since a buyer cannot have a better right than the seller. As was held in Behn
Meyer & Co. vs. Rosatzin, where a partnership not duly organized has been
recognized as such in its dealings with certain persons, it shall be considered as
partnership by estoppel and the persons dealing with it are estopped from
denying its partnership existence. If the law recognizes a defectively organized
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partnership as de facto as far as third persons are concerned, for purposes of its
de facto existence it should have such attribute of a partnership as domicile.
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The claim arose from a series of agreements concluded between the two
parties, principally the contract dated March 28, 1977, under which Granger
licensed MSI to manufacture and sell its products in the Philippines and extended
to the latter certain loans, equipment and parts; the contract dated May 17, 1979,
for the sale by Granger of its Model 7100/7200 Multiplex Equipment to MSI and
the Supplemental and Amendatory Agreement concluded in December 1979.
The law invoked by the defendants was Section 133 of the Corporation
Code reading as follows:
The trial court, after considering the evidence of the parties in light of their
respective memoranda, sustained the defendants and granted the motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the respondent court
prompting the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In this petition, Granger seeks the reversal of the respondent court on the
ground that MSI has failed to prove its affirmative allegation that Granger was
transacting business in the Philippines. It insists that it has dealt only with MSI
and not the general public and contends that dealing with the public itself is an
indispensable ingredient of transacting business. It also argues that its
agreements with MSI covered only one isolated transaction for which it did not
have to secure a license to be able to file its complaint.
ISSUE:
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RULING:
...the phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service
contracts, opening offices whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing
representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year
stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplates to that extent the performance
of acts or works, or the exercise of some of these functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization.
With the examination of the terms and conditions of the contracts and
agreements entered into between petitioner and private respondents, it indicates
that they established within our country a continuous business, and not merely
one of a temporary character. Such agreements did not constitute only one
isolated transaction, as the petitioner contends, but a succession of acts
signifying the intent of Granger to extend its operations in the Philippines.
In any event, it is now settled that even one single transaction may be
construed as transacting business in the Philippines under certain
circumstances, as we observed in Far East International Import and Export
Corporation v. Nankai Kogyo Co., Ltd., thus:
The rule stated in the preceding section that the doing of a single act does
not constitute business within the meaning of statutes prescribing the conditions
to be complied with by foreign corporations must be qualified to this extent, that a
single act may bring the corporation within the purview of the statute where it is
an act of the ordinary business of the corporation. In such a case, the single act
or transaction is not merely incidental or casual, but is of such character as
distinctly to indicate a purpose on the part of the foreign corporation to do other
business in the state, and to make the state a base of operations for the conduct
of a part of the corporations' ordinary business. (17 Fletchers Cyc. of
Corporations, sec. 8470, pp. 572, 573, and authorities cited therein.)
The petitioner stresses that whoever makes affirmative averments has the
obligation to prove such averments and points out that the private respondent
has not established its allegation that the petitioner is doing business in the
Philippines. On the other hand, it is also the rule that the factual findings of the
lower court are binding on this Court in the absence of any of those exceptional
circumstances we have enumerated in many cases that warrant a different
conclusion. Having assailed the finding of the respondent court that the petitioner
is doing business in the Philippines, the petitioner had the burden of showing that
such finding fell under the exception rather than the rule and so should be
reviewed and reversed. The petitioner has not done this.
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vs.
FACTS:
Eastern Isles Import corporation and Eastern Isles, Inc., are corporations
organized under and are existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, all of the
capital stock of which are owned by American citizen, except, in Eastern Isles
Import, one share of the capital stock was owned by Antonia Sevilla and another
share was owned by Edmund Schwisinger and in Eastern Isles Inc., one share
was owned by F. Capistrano, who had a current account deposit with the
Philippine Trust Company amounting P51,410.00 and P34,827.74 respectively.
In its answer, the defendant Philippine trust Company invoked the order of
the Japanese Military Administration by virtue of which it transferred the current
deposit accounts in question to the Bank of Taiwan. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered a decision upholding the contention of the defendant
and accordingly dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Is the Philippine Trust Company correct in refusing not to pay the check
amounting to Php 51, 410.91 and Php 34, 827.74?
RULING:
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effect is to make such act binding on said company. At any rate, the defendant
corporation has not impugned its validity.
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vs.
FACTS:
In 1972, Anchor Supply Co. (ASC), through Tan Boon Bee, entered into a
contract of sale with Graphic Publishing Inc. (GPI) whereby ASC shall deliver
paper products to GPI. GPI paid a down payment but defaulted in paying the rest
despite demand from ASC. ASC sued GPI and ASC won. To satisfy the
indebtedness, the trial court, presided by Judge Hilarion Jarencio, ordered that
one of the printing machines of GPI be auctioned. But before the auction can be
had, Philippine American Drug Company (PADCO) notified the sheriff that
PADCO is the actual owner of said printing machine. Notwithstanding, the sheriff
still went on with the auction sale where Tan Boon Bee was the highest bidder.
Later, PADCO filed with the same court a motion to nullify the sale on
execution. The trial court ruled in favor of PADCO and it nullified said auction
sale. Tan Boon Bee assailed the order of the trial court. Tan Boon Bee averred
that PADCO holds 50% of GPI; that the board of directors of PADCO and GPI is
the same; that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced based on the
premises. PADCO on the other hand asserts ownership over the said printing
machine; that it is merely leasing it to GPI.
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when
he refused to pierce the PADCOs corporate identity.
HELD:
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However, the fact that petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court
during the initial hearing of the case but nevertheless actively participated in the
trial, bars it from questioning now the court's jurisdiction. A party who voluntarily
participated in the trial, like the herein petitioner, cannot later on raise the issue of
the court's lack of jurisdiction.
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LEVITON INDUSTRIES, NENA DE LA CRUZ LIM, DOMINGO GO, and LIM KIAT
vs.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes.
We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had
failed to allege the essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before
Philippine courts. Private respondents action is squarely founded on Section 21-
A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, which we quote:
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Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that facts showing the capacity of a party
to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party, must be averred
In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action
under the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law which, as pointed out,
explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution
thereof. It is therefore incumbent upon private respondent to comply with these
requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such be the case. It may be that
private respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on
pleadings require that the necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with
such right be affirmatively pleaded. And the reason therefor, as enunciated in
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., et al. versus Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. is that
these are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of appellants alone, and it
would be unfair to impose upon appellees the burden of asserting and proving
the contrary. It is enough that foreign corporations are allowed by law to seek
redress in our courts under certain conditions: the interpretation of the law should
not go so far as to include, in effect, an inference that those conditions had been
met from the mere fact that the party sued is a foreign corporation.
It was indeed in the light of this and other considerations that this Court
has seen fit to amend the former rule by requiring in the revised rules (Section 4,
Rule 8) that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be
averred.
Digested Cases
Conflict of Laws
161