ARTE MO SCRIBD

Topic: Deposit; Article 1962

Calibo v. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Abellas son Mike rented for residential purposes the house of
Petitioner Calibo.
Respondent left a tractor in his sons garage for safekeeping
Petitioner Mike had not paid rentals, electric and water bills
Mike reassured Calibo that the tractor would stand as guarantee for its
payment
Respondent wanted to take possession of his tractor but Petitioner said that
the Mike had left the tractor with him as security for the payment of Mikes
obligation to him.
Respondent issued postdated checks but Petitioner will only accept check if
Respondent executes Promissory Note to cover payment for unpaid electric
and water bills.
Petitioner instituted an action for replevin claiming ownership of the tractor
and seeking to recover possession thereof from petitioner. Likewise, he
asserts that the tractor was left with him, in the concept of an innkeeper, on
deposit and that he may validly hold on thereto until Mike Abella pays his
obligations.
TC and CA Mike could not have validly pledged the tractor because he was
not the owner. NO DEPOSIT

ISSUE: WON there was a valid deposit?

HELD: NO
In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another
with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. Petitioner
himself stated that he received the tractor not to safely keep it but as a form
of security for the payment of Mike Abellas obligations. There is no deposit
where the principal purpose for receiving the object is not safekeeping.
Consequently, petitioner had no right to refuse delivery of the tractor to its
lawful owner. On the other hand, private respondent, as owner, had every
right to seek to repossess the tractor including the institution of the instant
action for replevin.
Topic: Deposit; Article 2003
YHT Realty v. CA
FACTS:
Respondent McLoughlin would stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is here in
the Philippines and would rent a safety deposit box.
The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of 2 keys, one
of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the
possession of the management of the hotel.
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box 2
envelopes containing US Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars,
Letters, credit cards, bankbooks and a checkbook.
When he went abroad, a few dollars were missing and the jewelry he bought
was likewise missing.
Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened
the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to
his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she
had stolen McLouglins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with
the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez alsto told McLoughlin that
Tan stole the key assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep.
McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility
for the loss he suffered.
Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the
safety deposit box entitled Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box

ISSUE: Whether the hotels Undertaking is valid?

HELD: NO
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of
public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this
case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with
public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings.
The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does
not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared
forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to hold
hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not
necessary that they be actually delivered to the innkeepers or their
employees. It is enough that such effects are within the hotel or inn. With
greater reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the
missing items are taken without the guests knowledge and consent from a
safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article
2003, CC for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from
any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against
Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or
not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees.
Topic: Warehouse Receipts Law; sec. 38
PNB v. Atendido
FACTS:
Laureano Atendido obtained from PNB a loan of P3k and pledged 2000 cavans
of palay to guarantee payment which were then deposited in the warehouse
of Cheng Siong Lam & Co and to that effect the borrower endorsed in favour
of the bank the corresponding warehouse receipt.
Before the maturity of the loan, the 2000 cavans of palay disappeared for
unknown reasons in the warehouse. When the loan matured, the borrower
failed to pay obligation
Defendant claimed that the warehouse receipt covering the palay which was
given as security having been endorsed in blank in favour of the bank and the
palay having been lost or disappeared, he thereby became relieved of
liability.

ISSUE: Whether the surrender of the warehouse receipt covering 2000 cavans of
palay given as security, endorsed in blank, to PNB, has the effect of transferring
their title or ownership OR it should be considered merely as a guarantee to secure
the payment of the obligation of Defendant?

HELD:
Nature of contract is Pledge supported by the stipulations embodied in the
contract signed by Defendant when he secured the loan from PNB.
The 2000 cavans of palay covered by the warehouse receipt were given to
PNB only as a guarantee to secure the fulfilment by Defendant in his
obligation. This clearly appears in the contract wherein it is expressly stated
that said 2000 cavanes of palay were given as collateral security.
It follows that by the very nature of the transaction its ownership remains
with the pledgor subject only to foreclosure in case of non-fulfillment of the
obligation.
By this we mean that if the obligation is not paid upon maturity the most that
the pledge can do is to sell the property and apply the proceeds to the
payment of the obligation and to return the balance, if any, to the pledgor.
This is the essence of the contract, for, according to law, a pledge cannot
become the owner of, nor appropriate to himself the thing given in pledge.
If by the contract of pledge, the pledgor continues to be the owner of the
thing pledged during the pendency of the obligation, it stands to reason that
in case of loss of the property, the loss should be borne by the pledgor.
The fact that the warehouse receipt covering the palay was delivered,
endorsed in blank, to the bank does not alter the situation, the purpose of
such endorsement being merely to transfer the juridical possession of the
property to the pledge and to forestall any possible disposition thereof on the
part of the pledgor.
Where a warehouse receipt or quedan is transferred or endorsed to
a creditor only to secure the payment of a loan or debt, the
transferee or endorsee does not automatically become the owner of
the goods covered by the warehouse receipt or quedan but he
merely retains the right to keep and with the consent of the owner
to sell them so as to satisfy the obligation from the proceeds of the
sale. This is for the simple reason that the transaction involved is not a sale
but only a mortgage or pledge, and that if the property covered by the
quedans or warehouse receipts is lost without fault or negligence of the
mortgagee or pledge or the transferee or endorsee of the warehouse receipt
or quedan, then said goods are to be regarded as lost on account of the real
owner, mortgagor or pledgor.
Topic: Guaranty and Suretyship; Article 2050
De Guzman v. Santos
FACTS:
Jerry O. Toole, Antonio Abad and Anastacio Santos formed a general
mercantile partnership Philippine American Construction Company with a
capital of P14k.
P10k of which were taken by way of loan from Paulino Candelaria. The
partnership and the co-partners undertook and bound themselves to pay
jointly and severally the indebtedness.
Upon default, Paulino filed civil case against Phil-Am Construction Company
and co-partners for the recovery of loan
TC ordered all Defendants to pay jointly and severally; CA affirmed
Upon filing of complaint, Paulino obtained a writ of attachment against
Defendants. The Sheriff attached properties of 3 partners. Partnership offered
to post a bond of P10k.
Phil-Am Construction Company as principal then represented by the partner
Antonio Abad, Santiago Lucero and Meliton Carlos as guarantors executed a
bond of P10k in favour of Paulino for the lifting of the attachment.
After issuance of writ of execution, Sheriff found no property of the judgment
debtors. Paulino moved for the issuance of writ of execution against the
guarantors of Defendants.
Guarantor-Plaintiff and co-guarantor Meliton Carlos later paid the creditor and
were able to recover from Antonio Abad a sum of P3800, which they divided
equally.
It appeared that the payment made by the plaintiff to Paulino was reduced to
the sum of P3665. Plaintiff now demands from Anastacio Santos the return of
the aforesaid sum but Anastacio refused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Defendant is bound to pay Plaintiff what he had advanced to
Paulino?

HELD: YES
Article 1838 provides that any guarantor who pays for the debtor shall be
indemnified by the latter even should the guaranty have been undertaken
without the knowledge of the debtor.
IN THIS CASE: The guarantor was the deceased Santiago Lucero, now
represented by the plaintiff in her capacity as judicial administratrix, and the
debtor is the defendant-appellant. Applying the provision cited, it is obvious
that the Defendant is legally bound to pay what the Plaintiff had advanced to
the creditor upon the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the bond had
been given without his knowledge.
Any person who makes a payment for the account of another may
recover from the debtor the amount of the payment, unless it was
made against the express will of the latter. In the latter case, he can
only recover from the debtor in so far as the payment has been
beneficial to the latter.
It is evident that Defendant is bound to pay to the plaintiff what the latter had
advanced to the creditor upon the judgment, and this is more so because it
appears that although Lucero executed the bond without his knowledge,
nevertheless he did not object thereto or repudiate the same at any time.
Topic: Guaranty and Suretyship; Article 2055
Vizconde v. IAC
FACTS:
Perlas called Vizconde and asked her to sell an 8 carat diamond ring on a
commission for P85k
Vizconde later returned the ring. Afterwards, Vizconde called on Perlas and
claimed that there was a sure buyer for the ring, Pilar Pagulayan
Pagulayan gave a post-dated check; Perlas and Vizconde signed a receipt
(Exh. A)
The check was dishonoured. After 9 days, Pagulayan paid Perlas P5k against
the value of the ring and gave 3 Certificates of Title to guarantee delivery of
the balance of such value (Exh D)
Perlas filed a complaint against Pagulayan and Vizconde for estafa.
TC and CA Vizconde and Pagulayan had assumed a joint agency in favour of
Perlas for the sale of the latters ring, which rendered them criminally liable,
upon failure to return the ring or deliver its agreed value, under Art 315, par
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
SOL GEN disagreed; Vizconde cant be convicted of estafa based on the
Exhibits presented

ISSUE: Whether Vizconde was considered as agent of Perlas or mere guarantor of

obligation of Pagulayan?

HELD: Mere guarantor

Nothing in the language of the receipt, Exh A, or in the proven circumstances
attending its execution can logically be considered as evidencing the creation
of an agency between Perlas, as principal, and Vizconde as agent, for the sale
of the formers ring.
If any agency was established, it was one between Perlas and Pagulayan only,
this being the logical conclusion from the use of the singular I in said
clause, in conjunction with the fact that the part of the receipt in which the
clause appears bears only the signature of Pagulayan.
To warrant anything more than a mere conjecture that the receipt also
constituted Vizconde the agent of Perlas for the same purpose of selling the
ring, the cited clause should at least have used the plural we, or the text of
the receipt containing that clause should also have carried Vizcondes
signature.
The joint and several undertaking assumed by Vizconde in a separate writing
below the main body of the receipt, Exhibit A, merely guaranteed the civil
obligation Pagulayan to pay Perlas the value of the ring in the event of her
(Pagulayans) failure to return said article.
What is clear from Exh A is that the ring was entrusted to Pagulayan to be
sold on commission; there is no mention therein that it was simultaneously
delivered to and received by Vizconde for the same purpose or, therefore,
that Vizconde was constituted, or agreed to act as, agent jointly with
Pagulayan for the sale of the ring.
What Vizconde solely undertook was to guarantee the obligation of Pagulayan
to return the ring or deliver its value; and that guarantee created only a civil
obligation, without more, upon default of the principal.
 Upon the evidence, Vizconde was a mere guarantor, a solidary one to be
sure, of the obligation assumed by Pagulayan to complainant Perlas for the
return of the latters ring or the delivery of its value. Whatever liability was
incurred by Pagulayan for defaulting on such obligation and this is not
inquired into that of Vizconde consequent upon such default was merely
civil, not criminal.
Topic: Guaranty and Suretyship; Article 2067
Saenz v. Yap Chuan
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca a judicial administrator gave bond to guarantee his
administration of the estate of Margarita Jose
The bond was executed by Engracio, Plaintiff Saenz and two others in favour
of the government for the sum of P60k
On the same date, Engracio and 5 others executed a bond in favour of Saenz;
Yap Chuan P20k and the other 4 P5k each
TC ordered Saenz, as surety in solidum of the ex-administrator Engracio to
pay the estate the sum of P41k
Saenz paid to the administrator of the estate P8k; He filed sut against 5
sureties who executed the bond
TC acquitted Defendant from the P20k claim and ordered the other 4 to pay
P2k each.
Both parties appealed. Defendants were claiming that they are only liable for
P1k each only according to the terms of the contract. Plaintiff was claiming
that he is entitled to maximum sum of P5k for which each one had bound
himself in the contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vizmanos is entitled to P20k, a reimbursement of P5k each

from the Defendants?

HELD: NO
The bond of a debtor to protect his surety is not a sub bond nor a second
bond with respect to the original creditor. It is nothing but a substitution of
the obligation of the debtor with respect to his surety, and is necessarily
governed by the legal provisions which regulate the right of action of the
surety against the party for whom he gave the bond, that is, an action of
subrogation which lies with the surety to compel the debtor to comply with
the obligation to reimburse.
This action arising out of subrogation is the remedy for securing
reimbursement of the amount that another has paid, and cannot exceed,
except there is an express agreement to the contrary, the amount actually
paid by the surety in place of the debtor.
IN THIS CASE: The following terms of an obligation cannot be considered as
an express agreement to the contrary: x x x bind themselves as such
conjointly to reimburse or pay whatever amounts the latter (the surety) may
have to pay or shall have paid by reason of the judicial bond, inasmuch as
this manner of expressing the intention of the obligated parties does not
constitute a true disjunctive proposition, but is merely explanatory of the
obligation as if contracted by the debtor himself, the only natural and logical
interpretation.
To ask an indemnity of P20k, when the loss to be indemnified is only P8k is
contrary to law.
Vizmanos only entitled to an action against 4 Defendants for recovery of
maximum P5k. He cannot collect more than the sum which he himself was
actually compelled to pay.
---To follow---

Topic: Provisions Common to Pledge and Mortgage

Cavite Development v. Spouses Lim
Yu v. PCIB

Topic: Real Mortgage; Article 2124

Dilag v. Heirs of Ressureccion

Topic: Real Mortgage; Article 2127

Phil. Sugar Estate v. Camps

Topic: Real Mortgage; Article 2131

First Marbella v. Gatmaytan
Landrito v. CA

Topic: Antichresis; Article 2137

Peralta v. Quimpo

Topic: Chattel Mortgage; Article 2141

Superlines v. ICC