ELECTION LAW CASE DIGESTS
the freedom of expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on
1. Badoy v. COMELEC (35 SCRA 285) G.R. No. L-32546 October 17, 1970,
G.R. No. L-32551 October 17, 1970
Facts: In these two cases, petitioner Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. avers that he is a
candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the lone district of North
Cotabato; and pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132, he prays in L-32546 that Sec.
12(F) of the law be declared unconstitutional as the same denies:.(1) individuals, who
are not candidates, their freedom of speech and of the press; and (2) candidates the
right to speak and write, discuss and debate in favor of their candidacies or against
the candidacies of others.
Petitioner in G.R. No. L-32551 prays. (1) that Sec. 12(F) of R.A. No. 6132 be so
construed as to allow the printing and publication of comments and articles for or
against a candidate, which are not-paid, without mentioning the names of all the other
candidates with equal prominence (emphasis supplied); and (2) that Comelec
Resolution No. RR-724 be declared unconstitutional in so far as it prohibits the
printing and publication of such comments and articles, which are not paid, unless the
names of all the candidates are mentioned with equal prominence. (emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. L-32546, petitioner insists on his challenge that Sec. 12(F) of R.A. No.
6132 is unconstitutional, because it unduly abridges the freedom of expression of an
individual, whether candidate or not.
Under the challenged paragraph F of Sec. 12, the moneyed candidate or individual
who can afford to pay for advertisements, comments or articles in favor of his
candidacy or against the candidacy of another or which mention his name and the
fact of his candidacy, is required to mention all the other candidates in the same
district with equal prominence to exempt him from the penal sanction of the law. The
evident purpose of this limitation, on the freedom of the candidate or his sympathizer
to spend his own money for his candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the
candidacy of his opponents, is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the
election. Neither it is true that the mere mention of the poor opponent in the same
advertisement or paid article does not by itself alone engender per feet equality of
chances; at least the chance of the poor candidate for victory is improved because
thereby his name will be exposed to the reading public in the same article as that of
the wealthy candidate. The same is true with respect to the candidate who can afford
to pay only for an advertisement or comment or article in his favor, and is without
funds for the additional space needed to accommodate the names of the other
candidates.
ISSUE: whether Sec. 12(F) of R.A. No. 6132 is unconstitutional, because it unduly
abridges the freedom of expression of an individual, whether candidate or not.
HELD: Considering the foregoing limitation in paragraph F, Sec. 12 in the light of the
other provisions of R.A. No. 6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality
of chances among the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on
the individual's liberty of expression.
The questioned ban on Sec. 12(F) is even less restrictive than the prohibitions in R.A.
4880.
No. 4880 limiting the period of election campaign to the election of delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. Sec. 12(F) does not limit the period of campaign. And as a
matter of fact, under par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) any individual, whether a member of a political
party or organized group or not, can campaign for or against any candidate as long as
he does so as an individual and not as a member of such party or organized group.
If the aforementioned limitations in R.A. 4880 were deemed valid restrictions on the
due process clause, freedom of expression, freedom of association, right to equal
protection of the laws and freedom of peaceful assembly, a fortiori the less narrow or
less restrictive inhibition embodied in Sec. 12(F) of R.A. 6132 should survive the
constitutional test.
Hence, consistent with our opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs.
Comelec and Gonzales vs. Comelec,4 this slight limitation of the freedom of
expression of the individual, whether candidate or not, as expressed in par. F of Sec.
12, is only one of the many devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and
present danger of the perversion or prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the
denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Under the guarantee of free expression, the candidate who pays for a comment or an
article has the duty not only to inform the electorate about his qualifications and
proposals for constitutional reforms, but also to inform truthfully the public who his
opponents are, so that the public or particularly the electorate can determine the truth
and merit of his claims vis-a-vis those of the other candidates. Otherwise, the
candidate will be guilty of gross and unpardonable deceit on the people. This duty on
the part of the candidate was underscored by John Milton in his stirring rhetorical
denunciation of the suppression of truth as he appealed for "the liberty to know to
utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties"5 (emphasis
supplied). The same duty was stressed by Mr. Justice Murphy speaking for the
American Supreme Court in Thornhill vs. Alabama6 when he delineated the contours
as well as facets of the freedom of expression as "the freedom to publish publicly
and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of
subsequent punishment" (emphasis supplied).
Once adopted, the Constitution and the statutes are not to imprison forever in their
cast the sovereign people, even though these organizations no longer serve the
people nor their welfare
WHEREFORE, the prayers of the petitions in those two cases are hereby denied and
paragraph F of Section 12, R.A. No. 6132 is declared valid and constitutional.
 2. Pablito Sanidad v. COMELEC (181 SACRA 529)
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all
comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the
ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which
was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226
dated December 27, 1989.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who
claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day
before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite
issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.
Petitioner believes that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes
a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further
imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a
penal provision, as follows:
Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or
Activities. Except to the extent that the same may not be
applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and offenses
defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code ('Sections
261, 262, 263 and Article' XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be aplicable to the plebiscite
governed by this Resolution.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression
and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to
supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in
Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the
Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through
the Comelec space and airtime. This is provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional.
HELD: Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167.
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to
the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment
of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or
other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise
holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising
space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is acandidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd
par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator
who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other
candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was
assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of
the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of
the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an
election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a
plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a
plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167
does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the
Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is
still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason
was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of
regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no
justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to
be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better
served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened
by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein
issued is hereby made permanent.
3. National Press Club v. COMELEC (207 SCRA 1) G.R. No. 102653 March
5, 1992
FACTS: In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question
raised by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2)
individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial
office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that
their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is
being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that
the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.
HELD: The limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon
the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office
constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and
that ofSanidad v. Commission on Elections. 5 In Sanidad, the Court declared
unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as
follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut
off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their
qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and
television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal information
and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any intervention
and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal
operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which
the individual candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated
Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a]
repressive government" dictating what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters,
editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens. There is
here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in
context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to for a other
than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass
media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and
Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent
candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of
equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates
with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11
(b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into
operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal
opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry
about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial
disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation
except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common
maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich candidate
is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to spend his
funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True
enough Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of
the Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on complete and perfect
equalityinter se without regard to their financial affluence or lack thereof. But a
regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which does not
completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone
constitutionally infirm. The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in
governmental regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory
measure under challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally
sanctioned objective. That the supervision or regulation of communication and
information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality is made clear by the
Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right
to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive
or unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media
reporting of and commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the
candidates themselves. All other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for
political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all,
designed to benefit the candidates themselves.
Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic
media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free
speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless
electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad
nauseam.
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated
with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to
inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational
and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the
non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general
listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects
is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through
modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their
revenues from the marketing of "packaged" candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998.
4. TELEBAP (TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.) and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,
Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner,
GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout
the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in
excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the period of election.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not section 92 takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
HELD: we have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use
of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
(1) Radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using them or franchise, the exercise of which
may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service, such as providing print space or air time to Comelec. Section 92 of
B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 7252 granting GMA Network,
Inc. a franchise and does not constitute denial of due process and that B.P. Blg. 881,
92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a
duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.
An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise of lawmaking, amend a statute of
Congress. Therefore 2 of Resolution No. 2983-A of the Comelec providing for
payment of just compensation is invalid.
(2) B.P. Blg. 881, 92 does not single out radio and television stations in providing
free air time. There are important differences in the characteristics of the broadcast
media and the print media, which justify their differential treatment for free speech
purposes.
The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with
the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good
so requires."
(3) What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the
Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their
franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale
or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of
supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition.
The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of
charge is not new. It goes back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388). This
provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code (P.D.
No. 1296). Substantially the same provision is now embodied in 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was
brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but
even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of
the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters which is paramount. Radio and television broadcasting companies,
which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service.
As held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., which upheld the right of a party
personally attacked to reply, "licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of
designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them."
Consequently, "a license permits broadcasting, but the license has no constitutional
right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the
exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others
and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views
and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves." As radio and television broadcast stations do
not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they
provide air time to the COMELEC.
[G.R. No. L-23637. December 24, 1965.]
5. MARCELINO G. COLLADO vs. JUAN A. ALONZO
UNLAWFUL EXPENDITURES; PROMISE TO DONATE SALARY FOR THE
EDUCATION OF INDIGENT BUT DESERVING STUDENTS. A promise made by a
candidate for election that he will, if elected, donate his salary for the education of
indigent but deserving students, is not prohibited by Section 49 of the Election Law.
Facts: Collado ran as candidate for mayor of the town of Ballesteros, Cagayan, in the
November 1963 election. His opponent, Juan A. Alonzo, won. In due time, he
commenced this action to disqualify Alonzo, contending that, (a) Alonzo's certificate of
candidacy had been filed beyond the statutory period; and (b)Alonzo had incurred
or made excessive expenditures, contrary to the Election Law, because in his
campaign speeches, Alonzo had promised to donate his salary as mayor of the town,
for the education of indigent but deserving students.
Issue: Whether or not Alonzo had incurred or made excessive expenditures, contrary
to the Election Law.
Held: Contrary to petitioner's contention, we do not believe that Alonzo may be held
to have "spent in his election campaign, more than the total emoluments attached to
the office for one year." This was no expenditure during the campaign.
Neither may the donation be considered as prohibited by sec. 49 of the Election Law,
2 because it was not made to one particular person or persons to induce him or them
to vote or withhold his or their votes. It could not even be construed to have been
made to voters, because indigent "students" might not even be voters. Furthermore,
the identity of future beneficiaries was, at the time of the election, unknown. This
promise and its long-range effect can not be distinguished from the election promises
of candidates to support this or that law or public project or local improvement, which
although favorable to some, may not be classified as among the pledges which
candidates for public office are prohibited to make.
We are, of course, aware of judicial opinions to the effect that:
"Direct promises, or statements made by candidates for election, that they will, if
elected, serve for less than the regularly established salary or fees of the office
frequently have been held to be within the denunciation of not only provisions of
corrupt practices, but also constitutional, statutory, or common-law inhibitions against
bribery. The principle underlying this rule is that when candidates offer to discharge
the duties of elective offices which they seek for less than the salaries fixed by law
and which must be paid by taxation, they offer to reduce pro tanto the amount of
taxes which each individual taxpayer must pay and are thus indirectly making the
same offer of pecuniary gain as if they were offering him money directly." (Francisco,
Revised Election Code [1965 Ed.] p. 135, 136 citing 18 Am. Jur. 334.)
But the circumstances before us may be differentiated, because this respondent did
not promise to waive collection of his salary. He intended to collect it; but he
undertook to spend it in such a way as to help bright and deserving students not
necessarily voters whose identity could not be known at the time of the elections.
So, it may not be said that this or that voter had been influenced by the scholarship
offer.
WHEREFORE, seeing no reason to reverse or modify the appealed decision, we
hereby affirm it with costs against appellant.
6. PILAR V. COMELEC 245 SCRA 759
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days later, he withdrew his
certificate of candidacy. COMELEC imposed upon petitioner a fine of P10,000 for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner filed motion
for reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC. Petitioner went to COMELEC en
banc which denied the petition in its Resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD:
Petitioner should be held liable for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement
of contribution and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy 3 days after its filing. Petitioner posits
that "it is xxx clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Petitoner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of RA No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to
file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The term "every candidate" must
be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 of the COMELEC, in implementation of
the provisions of RA 7166, categorically refers to "all candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall". Such implies that
the statute is mandatory, particularly if public interest is involvedstate has
an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean and expressive of the
true will of the electorate. One way to attain such objective is to pass a
legislation regulating contributions and expenditures, and compelling the
publication of the same. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew
his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in
the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is
not all too remote.
Resolution No. 2348 also contemplates the situation where a candidate may
not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such
candidate is not excused from filing a statement.
BP Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code provides that "the filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal
or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.
ELECTION LAW DIGESTS ON ELECTION CONTEST
Marquez v. COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)
Election Contests, C. Quo Warranto
Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate
of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud
or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal
Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his
alleged flight from that country.
Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents
certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification was
filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner
instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the
COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign
court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from
justice.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) xxxx
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who
has been convicted by final judgment.
It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons
who has been convicted by final judgment.
However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the Sunga v. COMELEC (288 SCRA 76)
petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC
to resolve and proceed with the case. Election Contests, D. Distinction between Quo Warranto in Elective and
Appointive office
Held: Article 73 f the Rules Impelementing the Local Government Code
particularly Section 40 of R.A. 7160 to the extent that confines the term Facts: Petitioner was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
fugitive from justice to refer only to a person who has been convicted by Municipality of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 1995 Elections. Private respondent
final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. The Trinidad was then the incumbent Mayor, was a candidate for re-election in
term fugitives from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction the same municipality.
to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution.) NACHURA OUTLINE REVIEWER Sunga filed a complaint accusing Trinidad of violation of the Omnibus
Election Code for using threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of
Abella v. COMELEC (201 SCRA 253) coercion. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence while
Trinidad opted not to submit any evidence.
Election Contests, D. Distinction between Quo Warranto in Elective and
The election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of
Appointive office
votes while Sunga trailed second.
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to
The complaint filed by Sunga was denied by COMELEC ruling that the
intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
petitions filed shall be deemed to be the amended petition filed on May
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
11,1995 which was clearly filed after the election mandates the dismissal of
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga,
the disqualification case.
Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can hear and decide disqualification cases
against winning candidates even after the election.
The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission
granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor,
hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest Held: The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC is left with no discretion but
votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. The fact that
Leyte. Trinidad was already proclaimed and has assumed the position of mayor did
not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing
and eventually decide the disqualification case.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be
proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was
disqualified. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was
the winner of the elective office. Hence, Sunga cannot claim the right to take
originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of
the oath for the mayoral office because the Local Government Code clearly
Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact
provides that in case of disqualification of the one proclaimed for the said
remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
office, the vice-mayor shall assume office.
proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters
of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she Ramos v. COMELEC (286 SCRA 189)
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost
in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.
Election Contests, E. Execution Pending Appeal
Facts: Petitioners and private respondents were the official candidates of the
NPC Lakas-NUCD for elective municipal positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del
Sur. After the canvass of election returns, petitioners were proclaimed as the
duly elected municipal officials therein.
Private respondents seasonably filed an election protest with the RTC of
Pagadian City which ruled in their favor. Respondents thereafter filed a
Motion for Immediate Execution of Decision pending Appeal, however,
petitioner filed an Opposition to this Motion.
The trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal. COMELEC concurs with the trial courts decision, hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it concurs with the decision of the trial court.
Held: The Supreme Court held the it has explicitly recognized and given
approval to execution of judgments pending appeal in election cases filed
under existing election laws. All that was required for a valid exercise of the
discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate
execution should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order.
The rationale why such executionis allowed in election cases is to give as
much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is
initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal
would bring back the ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their
efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office.
The following constitutes good reasons, and a combination of two or more
of them will suffice to grant the execution pending appeal: (1) public interest
involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining
portion of the term of the contested office; (3) the length of time that the
election contest has been pending. In this case, all elements was present,
considering that this has been pending for a year, the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
Asmala v. COMELEC (289 SCRA 746)
Election Contests, E. Execution Pending Appeal
Facts: In the elections of May 8, 1995, eight candidates vied for the position
of Vice Mayor for the Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Basilan.
The canvass of votes by the Municipal Board of canvassers, indicated that
Hadji Husni Mohammad garnered 3,065 votes, Emmanuel Manny Alano
2,912 votes, and Halim Asmala got 2,542 votes. On the basis of the
aforesaid results of canvass of votes, Hadji Husni Mohammad was
proclaimed, and later he assumed office as Vice Mayor of Tuburan.
On May 22, 1995, Halim Asmala filed an election protest with the Regional
Trial Court of Basilan. The protest alleged that election fraud and other
irregularities tainted the election and canvass of votes. During the hearing,
the court a quo found that several ballots were written by just one hand while
other ballots were prepared by only two persons. Consequently, such ballots
were invalidated. The trial court rendered its decision crediting Halim
Asmala, the herein petitioner, with 2,130 votes, Emmanuel Alano with 1,920
votes and Hadji Husni Mohammad with 1,729 votes, and adjudging petitioner
the duly elected Vice Mayor of Tuburan, Province of Basilan. After the
promulgation of the aforementioned decision, private respondent Hadji Husni
Mohammed filed his Notice of Appeal with the same Regional Trial Court.
On the following day, the petitioner presented a Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal. Thereto, private respondent interposed his opposition, theorizing
that his perfected appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to resolve the
Motion foe Execution Pending Appeal.
Issue: Whether or not filing of notice of appeal divests a trial court of its
jurisdiction over a case.
Held: The mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion for
execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for
perfecting an appeal, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is
of no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve
the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because
the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the records to
be elevated on appeal. Filing by one party of an appeal on the same day the
judgment was rendered does not deprive the other party of the right to avail
himself of the entire period of five days within which to appeal, if he so
desires including motions for execution pending appeal. An appeal is
perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party it is not
perfected on the date the notice of appeal was filed.
Zacate v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 144678, March 1, 2001)
Election Contests, E. Execution Pending Appeal
Facts: Petitioner Javier E. Zacate and private respondent Thelma C. Baldado
were candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern
Samar, in the May, 1998 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers,
proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected mayor having garnered
2,958 votes as against the 2,719 votes of petitioner, private respondent
winning by 239 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional
Trial Court of Borongan, Samar. The trial court declared petitioner as the
duly elected Mayor with only one vote as his winning margin. On the same
date private respondent filed a notice of appeal. The following day, petitioner
filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal which
private respondent opposed on the ground that she had already perfected
her appeal. The trial court rendered a Supplemental Decision, correcting the
winning margin of petitioner to 2 votes instead of 1 vote and at the same time
denied the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal filed by
petitioner and ordered further the transmission of the complete records of the
protest case to the Comelec. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration to reverse denial of his motion for execution pending
appeal. After hearing, the trial court issued a Resolution reversing its
Supplemental Decision. The Resolution ruled that the trial court still had
jurisdiction over the motion for execution pending appeal, that there are good
and valid reasons for granting the same.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction of the case and whether
or not discretionary execution is proper.
Held: Discretionary execution is barred when the trial court loses jurisdiction
and this occurs when all the parties have filed their respective appeals or
when the period to appeal has lapsed for those who did not file their appeals
and when the court is no longer in possession of the records of the case.
The perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to so renders the
questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court or
body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
appeal. While petitioner timely filed motion for execution pending appeal,
petitioner belatedly filed the motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
motion for execution pending appeal rendering said denial final and
executory. While the Supplemental Decision wrongly denied petitioners
motion for execution pending appeal, the remedy left for petitioner then was
to timely seek relief from the erroneous ruling. This petitioner failed to do.
MAPPALA VS. NUEZ
[A.M. No. RTJ-94-1208. January 26, 1995.]
QUIASON, J:
FACTS:
In 1989, the Provincial prosecutor of Isabela filed 3 information
against Alejandro Angoluan (Alejandro for brevity), one which includes
violation of the Omnibus Election Code with Honorato Angoluan. All the
actions were consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
22, Cabagan, Isabela, presided by respondent Judge Nuez. Respondent
rendered judgment finding Alejandro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated murder and of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
in Violation of P.D. No. 1866. However, for violating the Omnibus Election
Code, the accused were not found guilty and was therefore acquitted.
In his letter-complaint, Jacinto Mappala alleged that respondent
committed serious misconduct for acquitting Alejandro Angoluan of Violation
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent justified the acquittal of Alejandro of violation of the
Election Law on the ground that the firearm was not taken from his person
within the precinct but was taken more than 50 meters away from the
precinct. Furthermore, he claimed that what the law considered as a crime
was the "carrying of firearms within (50) or 100 meters away from the
precinct. The firearm was not taken from the accused within the 50 or 100
meters distance from the precinct because in truth and in fact the said firearm
was surrendered by the accused two (2) days after the elections. The
mistake in the distance is merely a clerical error. But be it 50 meters or 100
meters, still the accused could not be convicted under the said provision,
specifically Section 261, Subsection (p) of Article XXII of the Omnibus
election Code"
ISSUE:
WON respondents acquittal of Alejandro for violation of Section 261 (p) of
the Omnibus Election Code is with merit.
HELD:
No. Said provision reads as follows:
"Deadly weapons. Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the
polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the
days and hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the polling place,
voting, counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in
cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer
authorized by the Commission to supervise the election is entitled to carry
firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving and enforcing the
law."
 In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant
herein inside Precinct No. 2 located at the elementary school building in
Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the March 1989 barangay. Respondent also
found that Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent,
the surrender of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one
used by Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings,
respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a
precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while he was
inside the precinct.
To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus
Election Code, it is not necessary that the deadly weapon should have been
seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100
meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon
"in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof"
during any of the specified days and hours.
COMELEC vs. NOYNAY
[G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998.]
DAVIDE, JR.:
FACTS:
The COMELEC resolved to file an information for violation of Section
261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada
Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both
public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.
Respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch
23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and
directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the
appropriate MTC on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases
since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed
six years of imprisonment. Thus, petitioner filed this civil action contending
that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 7691 in arguing that the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide election offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code, RTC have the exclusive original jurisdiction over
election offenses.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 7691 has divested RTC of jurisdiction over election offenses,
which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that by virtue of the exception provided
for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by
R.A. 7691, the exclusive original jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs,
does not cover those criminal cases which by specified provisions of law fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of RTCs and of the Sandiganbayan,
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefore. In short, even if those
expected cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6)
years, jurisdiction thereon is retained by the RTC or the Sandiganbayan as
the case may be. Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, RTCs have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote.
R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting
upon RTCs or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases therein specified. Congress never intended that R.A. No.
7691 should repeal such special provisions. It is indubitably evident from the
fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129 providing for the exception.
CORPUS VS. TANODBAYAN
[G.R. No. 62075. April 15, 1987.]
CORTES, J:
FACTS:
Private respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for
vice-mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand E.
Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election Code,
specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting centers
during the election. Thus, the COMELEC ordered the Regional Election
Director of San Fernando, La Union, to conduct a formal investigation. The
latter recommended to the COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint.
Private-respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed with the
COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. Later on, the
COMELEC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
 Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against
the same parties and on the same charges previously dismissed by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office entered its appearance
for the respondents and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The motion
was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive authority to prosecute
the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the
COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses
committed by COMELEC officials in relation to their office.
ISSUE:
WON the Tanodbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses.
HELD:
No. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to
the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections,
failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and
make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office
would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any
person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the
latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to
his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not
the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an
election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the
COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
NALDOZA vs. LAVILLES
[A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009. March 5, 1996.]
MELO, J:
FACTS:
Complainant Alberto Naldoza was the barangay chairman of
Barangay Kirayan, Tacas, Miagao, Iloilo. He ran for re-election in the May 8,
1994 elections. The spouses Flame and the spouses Piedad thereafter
accused complainant of vote-buying in winning the election. Accordingly, the
Chief of Police of Miagao filed two separate complaints against Naldoza for
vote-buying in violation of Section 21, Article XII of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881). Both cases were assigned to respondent judge's court.
Respondent examined the private complainants, adopting for the
purpose the transcript of the question-and-answer type of examination
conducted by the Chief of Police and sworn to before him by the parties.
Respondent then issued an order finding probable cause to believe
complainant Naldoza committed the crime charged. Complainant was
thereafter arrested and detained. An order was issued which made
complainant file a motion to quash the complaints against him and to lift the
warrants of arrest on the ground that the preliminary investigation was
irregularly conducted and the warrants of arrest improperly issued, thereby
denying him due process. Complainants motion was denied and respondent
referred the cases COMELEC for further proceedings.
In the meantime, complainant filed an administrative complaint
against respondent with the Commission on Human Rights, protesting the
irregularity in the conduct of preliminary investigation, the improper issuance
of the warrants of arrest, and for ignorance of law for failure to comply with
Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2695 (authorizing chiefs of police to
conduct the preliminary investigation of charges for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code).
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code
HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election
Code the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code; and the RTC
shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of the same. The MeTC or MTC, by way of
exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register
or to vote.
However, COMELEC Resolution No. 2695 which applies only to
preliminary examination by the Chief of Police or his duly authorized PNP
representative, of violations of the Omnibus Election Code and other election
laws, presupposes warrantless arrest by the arresting officer or policeman.
The record on hand discloses that a criminal complaint for vote-
buying was filed against complainant before the Chief of Police on the basis
of which formal complaint was filed before respondent. Respondent
examined the private complainant adopting for the purpose the transcript of
the question and answer type of examination earlier conducted by the Chief
of Police and sworn to by the private complainants before the former. A
warrant of arrest was issued by respondent and enforced by the police
officers, which led to the arrest and detention of complainant. Considering
that in this case, complainant was not under detention when the complaint
against him was filed before the Chief of Police, the regular court procedure
as ordained in the Rules of Court should apply and not COMELEC
Resolution No. 2695.
KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 128054. October 16, 1997.]
HERMOSISIMA, JR.:
FACTS:
The General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992 allocates a specific
amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and
activities. Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then secretary of Interior and Local
Government requested for authority to negotiate, enter into a sign
Memoranda of Agreements with accredited NGOs in order to utilize them t
implement the projects provided for the GAA. Respondent Franklin Drilon
granted the request and such authority was extended to all the regional
directors of the DILG. The then Regional Director of the DILG-NCR entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the
Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc.
(PYHSDFI).
The PYHSDFI applied with the DILG for accreditation as NGO in
order to be eligible for financial assistance. Hence, the Memorandum of
Agreement was entered by the PYHSDFI and the DILG-NCR. Under this
agreement, it was the express responsibility of the DILG to effectuate the
release and transfer to PYHSDFI of the amount of P70, 000,000.00 from the
aggregate allocation of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the
complete implementation of the foundations sports, health and cultural work
program. This was approved by the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management.
Petitioner Kilosbayan sent a letter to public respondent COMELEC
informing the latter that there is a violation of election laws, to wit: 1) that the
amount of P70M was released by the Secretary of Budget shortly before the
elections in favor of a private entity; 2) that there are usage of public funds,
money deposited in trust for an election campaign and; 3) that the prohibition
against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works
and issuance of treasury warrants are violated. They request that these
offenses b investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially without fear or favor
so that public confidence in the integrity and purity of the electoral process be
restored.
ISSUE:
WON section 261 (o), (v), and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code was
violated by respondents.
HELD:
No. The distribution of the PYHSDFI of medical kits and sports
equipment to several youth groups in Metro Manila is not considered an
electioneering activity. There is no proof that there are election propaganda
materials that will influence the vote of the youth. Furthermore, there is no
proof that PYHSDFI used its cash allocations as an accredited non-
governmental organization in order to undertake electioneering activities. The
CDF allocation is a legal disbursement of public funds; hence, PYHSDFI is
not guilty of using public funds for electioneering purposes. Moreover, there
is no proof that there is conspiracy between or among respondents to have
PYHSDFI accredited as a NGO in order to avail itself of public funds for
electioneering purposes. The only proofs shown are hearsay of newspaper
articles which cannot be justified. Hence, petition is dismissed.
PEOPLE VS. REYES
[G.R. No. 115022. August 14, 1995.]
PUNO, J:
FACTS:
Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs,
Collection District II, Bureau of Customs, Manila International Container Port
(MICP), assigned Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the
Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant
through the issuance of MICP Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92.
Ebio then filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint protesting his
transfer. He claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution
No. 2333 and Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code,
which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days
before the May 1992 synchronized national and local elections.
After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed an information
with the RTC, Branch 36, Manila charging respondent Maniego with a
violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Before the arraignment,
respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of
Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date
the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It purportedly became
punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.
 Resolution No. 2333 was published in the January 8, 1992 issues of
Malaya and the Manila Standard. Hence, it took effect on January 15, 1992,
the seventh day after its publication. It is undeniable that the transfer of
complainant Ebio on January 14, 1992 was made during the election period.
ISSUE:
WON the act of transfer ipso facto makes respondent Maniego liable for an
election offense under Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.
HELD:
No. No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly
or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. This
prohibition is reiterated in the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 261 (h) of
B.P. Blg. 881 implements this constitutional prohibition.
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer
of a government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure,
the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the
appointing authority. Without this inherent prerogative, the appointing
authority may not be able to cope with emergencies to the detriment of public
service. Clearly then, the transfer or detail of a government officer or
employee will not be penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to
promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2333 provides that the COMELEC has to pass upon the reason for the
proposed transfer or detail, viz: "Any request for authority to make or cause
any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in the civil service, including
public school teachers, shall be submitted in writing to the Commission
indicating therein the office and place to which the officer or employee is
proposed to be transferred or detailed, and stating the reason therefore."
Two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section
261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer
or employee within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the
transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in
accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, then the
Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of
Customs for Operations as Special Assistant on January 14, 1992. On this
date, January 14, 1992, the election period for the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections had already been fixed to commence January 12,
1992 until June 10, 1992. As aforestated, this election period had been
determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 2314 dated November 20,
1991 and Resolution No. 2328 dated January 2, 1992. Nonetheless, it was
only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect on January 15, 1992 that
COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its approval on
the transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the election
period. Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that Section 261
(h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable. Needless to
state, respondent Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the
approval of the COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as
on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were yet inexistent.
Romualdez v. RTC of Tacloban
Facts:
Philip Romualdez, is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his
decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte,
caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon thereafter
also served as a Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan
Election and 1986 snap Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan in Leyte where he
voted.
When the Peoples Power Revolution took place on 21-24 of
February, 1986, some relatives and associates of the deposed President,
fearing for their personal safety, fled the country. Romualdez, for one,
together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought asylum in
the United States. While abroad, he took special studies on the development
of Leyte-Samar and international business finance.
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the
Philippines to run for a congressional seat in Leyte. When Romualdez arrived
in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog.
During the registration of voters conducted by COMELEC for the
Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for 11 May 1992,
Romualdez registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog.
The Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors, who had known
Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in fact, an elected Barangay
Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to be registered.
Donato Advincula filed a petition for exclusion with the MTC of
Tolosa, Leyte. He alleged that Romualdez was a resident of U.S.A.; that he
had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the
required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence
in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog.
Romualdez contended that he has been a resident of Tolosa since the early
1980s, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical
absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to 1991. MTC dismissed
the petition but on appeal to RTC, the same reversed the MTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Romualdez has voluntarily left the country and abandoned his
residence in Tolosa, Leyte and, therefore may not register as a voter.
Held:
No. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous
with domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during
the early 1980s to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In
order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur: (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The political situation brought about by the Peoples Power Revolution must
have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a
serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their
immediate families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to
them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their
sudden departure from the country cannot be described as voluntary, or as
abandonment of residence at least in the context that these terms are used
in applying the concept of domicile by choice.
No evidence on record that Romualdez voluntarily abandoned his
residenceand established his domicile to somewhere else.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 211 SCRA
315 )
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, A. Defined
Facts:
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704,
disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for
the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest
available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional
election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election
registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties
and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name
of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets,
election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor,
Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued
Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from
the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all
Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor
Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.
Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving
the
election of the members of the Senate.
Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has
no cause
of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-
proclamation.
While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election
Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the
elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( G.R. No.
126669.
April 27, 1998 )
Casting of Votes
Facts: Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were
among
the four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga
during the
May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC)
proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor. Danilo
Manalastas and
Ernesto Punzalan filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
San
Fernando, Pampanga. After hearing the election protests, the trial court
rendered
judgment on September 23, 1996 declaring Punzalan as the duly elected
mayor.
Thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision On
December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution setting aside the
trial
courts decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as
the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Punzalan filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. Punzalan maintains that the
COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses
which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof,
invoking the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bautista v. Castro wherein it was
held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given
to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said
ballot is fatal.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are
valid.
Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid. While
Section 24 11 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as An Act
Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral
Reforms, requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the
ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may
constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in
said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified.
It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the
members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots,
should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the
will of the people.
ABELLA vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal
Party for provincial governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1,
1988. The private respondent, Adelina Larrazabal, is the wife of Emeterio V.
Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who
was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for
lack of residence, filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her
husband, the day before the election. The following day, Silvestre de la Cruz,
a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her
certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. Abella intervened in the
disqualification case and the following day filed a criminal complaint charging
the private respondent with falsification and representation of her residence
in her certificate of candidacy.
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was that respondent
Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as
she claimed but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component
city of the province of Leyte. On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal
maintained that she was a resident and a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte.
On February 14, 1991, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision
disqualifying Larrazabal as governor.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte
Held: The COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the required
residence on the evidence of record to the effect that despite protestations to
the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her residence at
Ormoc City from 1975 to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt
to purportedly change her residence one year before the election by
registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor
of the province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a
resident of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise,
the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code was proper and in
consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not present evidence
to show that she and her husband maintain separate residences, she at
Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.
EVANGELISTA vs. SANTOS
Facts: Plaintiffs are minority stockholders of the Vitali Lumber Company,
Inc., a Philippine corporation organized for the exploitation of a lumber
concession in Zamboanga, Philippines; that defendant holds more than 50
per cent of the stocks of said corporation and also is and always has been
the president, manager, and treasurer thereof; and that defendant, in such
triple capacity, through fault, neglect, and abandonment allowed its lumber
concession to lapse and its properties and assets to disappear, thus causing
the complete ruin of the corporation and total depreciation of its stocks. Their
complaint therefore prays for judgment requiring defendant: (1) to render an
account of his administration of the corporate affairs and assets: (2) to pay
plaintiffs the value of their respective participation in said assets on the basis
of the value of the stocks held by each of them; and (3) to pay the costs of
suit.
The complaint does not give plaintiffs residence, but, for purposes of venue,
alleges that defendant resides at 2112 Dewey Boulevard, corner Libertad
Street, Pasay, province of Rizal. Having been served with summons at that
place, defendant filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of improper venue and also on the ground that the complaint did not
state a cause of action in favor of plaintiffs. In support of the objection to the
venue, defendant states that he is a resident of Iloilo City and not of Pasay,
defendant also presented further affidavit to the effect that while he has a
house in Pasay, where members of his family who are studying in Manila live
and where he himself is sojourning for the purpose of attending to his
interests in Manila, yet he has his permanent residence in the City of Iloilo
where he is registered as a voter for election purposes and has been paying
his residence certificate.
Issue: Whether or not defendant is a resident of Iloilo, therefore, there was
no proper
venue when he was served with summons in Pasay.
Held: The facts in this case show that the objection to the venue is well-
founded. Where the plaintiff is a nonresident and the contract upon which suit
is brought was made in the Philippine Islands it may safely be asserted that
the convenience of the defendant would be best served by a trial in the
province where he resides. The fact that defendant was sojourning in Pasay
at the time he was served with summons does not make him a resident of
that place for purposes of venue. Residence is the permanent home, the
place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return.
Uytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines
No. L-6379, September 29, 1954, 95 Phil. 890
Concepcion, J.
FACTS: Petitioner-appellee Wilfred Uytengsu was born, of Chinese parents,
in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary
education at the Saint Theresas College in said municipality. Subsequently,
he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San Carlos College
and, still later the Siliman University all in the same locality where he
completed the secondary course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one
semester, in the Mapua Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he
went to the United States, where from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the
Lelan Stanford Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950
with the degree of Bachelor of Science. In April of the same year, he returned
to the Philippines for four months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15,
1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he
returned to the United States and took a post-graduate course, in chemical
engineering, in another education institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He
finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until
October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case originally scheduled to take
place on July 12, 1951 has to be postponed on motion of counsel for the
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted.
HELD: No. Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the
filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several months
after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit
promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time his admission to
Philippine citizenship, he has not complied with the requirements of section
7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a
judgment in his favor.
Torres vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 121031, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 583
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite, issued a
certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates
for Municipal Office. Accordingly, petitioner Atty. Rosauro I. Torres was
proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate for councilor. After two days, the
same Municipal Board of Canvassers wrote a letter requesting the
COMELEC for correction of the number of votes garnered by petitioner who
was earlier proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate for councilor. The
COMELEC was set for hearing. In his answer, petitioner alleged that the
subject matter of the letter-petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, private respondent Vicente Rafael
de Peralta argued for the annulment of proclamation of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners proclamation should be declared null and
void.
HELD: No. It may be argued that because petitioner has already been
proclaimed as winning candidate the remedy of the losing party is an election
protest over which the Regional Trial Court and not the COMELEC nor the
Municipal Board of Canvassers has original jurisdiction. However, as this
Court already ruled in Duremdes It is Duremdes further submission that his
proclamation could not be declared null and void because a pre-proclamation
controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made, the proper
recourse being an election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that
there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void,
the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidates
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare
such nullity and annul the proclamation.
Sampayan v. Daza
G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992, 213 SCRA 807
Romero, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Melanio Sampayan, Diego Turla, Jr. and Leonardo
Tiozon, residents of second Congressional District of Northern Samar filed a
petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, their
incumbent congressman. They alleged that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or
declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating
Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code). It was
claimed that he is a green card holder. In answer, respondent Daza denied
such fact and contended that although he was accorded a permanent
residency status, he had long waived his status when he returned to the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member
of the House of Representatives.
HELD: No. This case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the
manifestation filed by the petitioners that they seek to unseat respondent
from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office.
Moreover, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the
House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. Since petitioners
challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy
should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate of
candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House
Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas proclamation. Lastly, a
writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term
has already expired.
Santos v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 611
Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Edgar Santos and respondent Pedro Panulaya were both
mayoralty candidates of Misamis Oriental. After the votes were counted and
canvassed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent
Panulaya as the mayor. Petitioner then filed an election protest before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. After trial and revision of the ballots,
the trial court found out that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent
received only 2,105. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on petitioners motion,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari. The COMELEC, in pursuant of the
petition of certiorari, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which effectively
enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioners motion for execution
pending appeal. Subsequently, COMELEC dismissed petitioners petition for
certiorari after finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of execution pending appeal was lawful.
HELD: Yes. The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial
courts orders for the execution of its decision pending appeal. The grant of
execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial
court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders in a petition for
certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the
trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough.
Atienza v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 108533, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 298
Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Sia was elected mayor of Madrilejos,
Cebu obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival, petitioner Lou
Atienza. Following Sias proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
petitioner filed an election protest. In the revision ordered by the lower court,
petitioner obtained a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. The
Regional Trial Court then declared her a winner and ordering the private
respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing
petitioners expenses in the election protest. Private respondent appealed the
trial courts decision to the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued an Order
allowing petitioner to assume as mayor but reversed the judgment with
regards to the awarding of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not there should be an award of damages against the
private respondent.
HELD: No. Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a party
in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the
absence of the conditions specified under Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil
Code, or in the absence of a law expressly providing for situations allowing
for the recovery of the same. It follows, naturally, that in most election protest
cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or quasi-
contract or a tortious act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out
to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest
expenses against the losing party. This petitioner has been unable to do.
Malaluan v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 120193, March 6, 1996, 254 SCRA 397
Hermosisima, Jr. J. a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest
expenses against the losing party.
FACTS: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Jose Evangelista
were both mayoralty candidates in Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Private
respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the
duly elected Mayor. Petitioner then filed an election protest with the Regional
Trial Court. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal
mayor with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found
private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also
for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Just a day thereafter,
petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was
granted. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of Municipal
Mayor and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise
was not for long. In the assailed decision adverse to Malaluans continued
governance, COMELEC ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division
having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected
mayor of said municipality. It was also ordered that petitioner should be liable
for attorneys fees, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary
and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en mass
denominated as actual damages and default in payment by petitioner of
which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by
the petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded in favor of the private

respondent.

HELD: No. The overriding requirement for a valid and proper award of
damages is that the same in accordance with law, specifically, the provisions
of the Civil Code pertinent to damages. The monetary claim of a party in an
election case must necessarily be hinged on either a contract or a quasi-
contract or a tortuous act or omission or a crime in order to effectively
recover actual or compensatory damages, and in the absence of any or all of
these, the claimant must be able to point out a specific provision of law
authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing
party. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his
subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who
has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and
who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that
office, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally
provided for that position.

In the case at bar, the Court held that we have painstakingly gone over the
records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner that no breach of
contract or quasi-contract; or tortuous act nor crime that may make him liable
for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point out to