TRANSPO DIGESTS | ASS 6 |1

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. IAC and Development Insurance & having failed to discharge the burden of proving that it had exercised the
Surety Corp. extraordinary diligence required by law, Eastern Shipping Lines cannot
G.R. No. L-69044 May 29, 1987 escape liability for the loss of the cargo
As it was at fault, it cannot seek the protective mantle of Sec. 4(2) of
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. The Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which provides: Neither the carrier nor the
Co., and Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from x x x (b)
G.R. No. 71478 May 29, 1987 Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
Melencio-Herrera, J. there was actual fault of the carrier shown by lack of diligence in that when
the smoke was noticed, the fire was already big; that the fire must have
FACTS: started 24 hours before the same was noticed; and that after the cargoes
were stored in the hatches, no regular inspection was made as to their
(G.R. No. L-69044): a vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, condition during the voyage.
Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan for transportation to Manila, 5000 pieces of 3. See Art. 1749.
calorized lance pipes in 28 packages consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills G.R. No. 69044: no stipulation in the Bills of Lading limiting the carriers
Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc.; liability for the loss or destruction of the goods; no declaration of a higher
both sets of goods were insured with Development Insurance and Surety
value of the goods; Hence, Eastern Shipping Lines liability should not exceed
Corp.
(G.R. No. 71478): the same vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment US $500 per package (as provided in 4(5) of the COGSA), or its peso
fabrics and accessories, in 2 containers, consigned to Mariveles Apparel equivalent, at the time of payment of the value of the goods lost, but in no
Corporation, and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman case more than the amount of damage actually sustained.
Enterprises and General Merchandise
the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo

ISSUES: 1. which law should govern the Civil Code provisions on Common
carriers or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act?; 2. who has the burden of proof
to show negligence of the carrier? 3. what is the extent of the carriers
liability?

HELD: 1. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported
governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. As the cargoes were transported from Japan to the Philippines,
the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code.
However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations
of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is
suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
2. Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention
in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law. The burden is upon Eastern
Shipping Lines to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence
required by law.
Note: fire not considered a natural disaster or calamity within the
contemplation of Art. 1734 for it arises almost invariably from some act of Bacarro vs. Castano
man or by human means; it does not fall within the category of an act of God (GR L-34597, 5 November 1982)
unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity
 TRANSPO DIGESTS | ASS 6 |2

FACTS:
Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner Montefalcon who
thereafter drove it at around 40 kilometers per hour. While approaching
Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo truck coming from behind,
blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep, without
changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both
vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20 meters. Thereafter as
the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former lane
and instead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards
the right until it fell into a ditch pinning down and crushing Castanos right
leg in the process.
Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and
Felario Montefalcon. Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by
the overtaking cargo truck. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered
Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay Castano. It was affirmed by the CA
upon appeal.
ISSUES:
Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code
which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner
Montefalcon.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary
diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new
Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a
common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured,
or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed
to be at fault.
3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon
respondent court in not freeing petitioners from any liability, since the
accident was due to a fortuitous event. But, We repeat that the alleged
fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo
truck, was something which could have been avoided considering the
narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two
vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the
occurrence of the mishap.

1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the part of the

jeepney driver.
2. Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the jeepney driver.
3. Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event.

HELD:

1.) Yes. X x x. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his
speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers
per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was running side by
side for about twenty (20) meters and at which time he even shouted to the
driver of the truck.

Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck
was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there
would have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at
the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as
the road was getting narrower the truck would be to close to the jeep and
would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened
his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck because the
two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time. DANGWA TRANSPORTATION VS CA

2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of
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Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation) observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755 circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is
right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
FACTS: EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as
May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa) Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious
The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when condition = patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
Pedro alighted Hospital was in Bunk 56
Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later
when it suddenly accelerated forward called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and deliver a
Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of refrigerator
the vehicle In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings.
Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to
their respective destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital
where he expired
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa
for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the co. and the
supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of
the public at large
RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his
negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P
10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages,
actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver
Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to
bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the
effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is attempting to board
the same
Premature acceleration of the bus in this case =
breach of duty
Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection
pertaining to such a contractual relation
Duty extends to boarding and alighting
GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals (17 SCRA 739)
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and
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Post under case digests, Civil Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger

near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still
Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor
exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of
children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at theirdestination, plaintiffs
Court, although incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court
and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded
allows the plaintiffs to allege causes ofaction in the alternative, be
spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a
they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming
piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter
arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
Raquel. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for
petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art.
the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father
2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs can be
had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed.
passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the

increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.

Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA,

holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus

P400. La Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no

longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage terminated.

Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases

the moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle.

Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who

was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier,

still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rules that the

relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the

passenger alights from the carriers premises, to be determined from the

LRT vs. NAVIDAD
circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
driver, althoughstopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he

started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got
into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell
onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train
driver, (Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent
Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly
and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and
instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable
as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it
with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed
between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets
and the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being
hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA
also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory
damages.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common
carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176
of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil
Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use
utmost diligence in carrying passengers with due regard for all
circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of the trip
but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to
be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
TRANSPO DIGESTS | ASS 6 |5
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b)
on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if
the common carriers employees through theexercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or
injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to
force majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for
a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the
employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable
on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach How
then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same
act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine,
a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said
to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was
deleted/\.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILA
C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and
PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989)

FACTS:
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila.
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over
the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.
The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1)
hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was
being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said
vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in
the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the
crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He
was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days
thereafter.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending
that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control
of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the exclusive stevedoring
contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel
of Aboitiz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.
HELD:
Yes.
x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was
the negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the
arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct,
immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
TRANSPO DIGESTS | ASS 6 |6
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will not
ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination,
safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see
after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12 The carrier-passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported
has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in
the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it
did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the
carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on
the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier,
the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and
therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking
into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited
case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger
therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval
of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary
factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify
the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there
exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business
as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to
disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger
bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can
load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as
compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship
passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark
from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily
get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily,
petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes,
that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the
 TRANSPO DIGESTS | ASS 6 |7

contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant

petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a
passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring
its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable
time to claim their baggage.

PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)

FACTS:

A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine

Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved
to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek.
 TRANSPO DIGESTS | ASS 6 |8

The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases involve
actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the
heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the
accident was a fortuitous event.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto
the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil
Code)

HELD:

Yes.

While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the
carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier
from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the
passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment;
hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the
defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering
knuckle did not measure up to the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person as far as human care and foresight can provide and therefore the
knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the
carrier from responsibility.