CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Introduction The Fundamental Powers of the State
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights.
Similarities of the three inherent powers of the State:
The fundamental powers of the State:
1. Police power the power of the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare
2. Power of Eminent Domain enables the State to
forcibly acquire property, upon payment of just
compensation, for some intended public use
3. Taxation enables the State to demand from the
members of the society their proportionate share or
contribution in the maintenance of the government
Differences between the three inherent powers of the State:
Nature of the Constitution
Constitution the written instrument enacted by direct action of
the people by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established, limited and defined, and by which
those powers are distributed among the several departments
for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic
Essential parts of the written constitution:
1. Constitution of liberty consists of a series of
prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and
political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations
on the powers of government as a means of securing
the enjoyment of those rights
2. Constitution of government consists of a series of
provisions outlining the organization of the
government, enumerating its powers, laying down
certain rules relative to its administration, and defining
the electorate
3. Constitution of sovereignty consists of the
provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in
accordance with which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be brought about
The Constitution should be interpreted in such a way as to
give effect to the intendment of the framers.
The Constitution must change with the changing times lest
it impede the progress of the people with antiquated rules
grown ineffective in a modern age.
In case of doubt, the constitution should be considered
self-executing rather than non-self-executing; mandatory
rather than directory; and prospective rather retrospective.
Self-executing provision a rule that by itself is directly or
indirectly applicable without need of statutory implementation
Non-self-executing one that remains dormant unless it is
activated by legislative implementations
The fundamental powers of the state are inherent and do
not need to expressly conferred by constitutional provision
on the State.
1. They are inherent in the State and may be exercised
by it without need of express constitutional grant.
2. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The
State cannot continue or be effective unless it is able
to exercise them.
3. They are methods by which the State interferes with
private rights.
4. They all presuppose an equivalent compensation for
the private rights interfered with.
5. They are exercised primarily by the legislature.
1. The police power regulates both liberty and property.
The power of eminent domain and the power of
taxation affect only property rights.
2. The police power and the power of taxation may be
exercised only by the government. The power of
eminent domain may be exercised by some private
entities.
3. The property taken in the exercise of the police power
is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose. The property taken under the power
of eminent domain and the power of taxation is
intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore
wholesome.
4. The compensation of the person subjected to the
police power is the intangible altruistic feeling that he
has contributed to the general welfare. The
compensation involved in the other powers is more
concrete, to wit, a full and fair equivalent of the
property expropriated or protection and public
improvements for the taxes paid.
The Police Power
The police power may not be bargained away through the
medium of a contract or even a treaty. The impairment
clause must yield to the police power whenever the
contract deals with a subject affecting the public welfare.
The police power may sometimes use the taxing power as
an implement for the attainment of a legitimate police
objective.
Like taxation, the power of eminent domain could be used
as an implement of the police power. (Association of Small
Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343)
The police power is lodged primarily in the national
legislature. Its exercise lies in the discretion of the
legislative department. The ascertainment of facts upon
which the police power is to be based is likewise a
legislative prerogative.
Tests of the police power:
1. The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and
The first requisite simply means that the subject of the
measure is within the scope of the police power, that is,
that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects
the public welfare.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may be reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public
service.
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The means employed for the accomplishment of the police
objective must pass the test of reasonableness and,
specifically, conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill
of Rights for the protection of private rights.
Eminent Domain
Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. (Section 9, Article III, 1987
Constitution)
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether
directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in
that case is that the authority must be strictly construed.
The power of eminent domain is lodged primarily in the
national legislature, but its exercise may be validly
delegated to other governmental entities and, in fact, even
to private corporations, like the so-called quasi-public
corporations serving essential public needs or operating
public utilities.
Under existing laws, the following may exercise the power of
expropriation:
1. The Congress;
2. The President of the Philippines;
3. The various local legislative bodies;
4. Certain public corporations, like the Land Authority
and the NHA;
5. Quasi-public corporations like the Philippine National
Railways, the PLDT Co. and the Meralco.
Destruction from necessity cannot require the conversion
of the property taken to public use, nor is there any need
for the payment of just compensation.
Questions of necessity or wisdom are essentially political
when decided by the national legislature and are usually
not subject to judicial review.
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity
for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement of public use, and it may select the exact
location of the improvement for public use, and it may
select the exact location of the improvement. In such a
case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all
questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and
the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for those of the representative of the people.
(City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349)
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation (by the legislature) to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity (the delegate) is exercising the right in a particular
case under the conditions imposed by the general
authority is a question which the courts have the power to
inquire into. (City of Manila v. Chinese Community, supra)
Property already devoted to public use is still subject to
expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national
legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the
delegate. A mere general authority may not suffice.
Compensation is required if the property is a patrimonial
property, that is, property acquired by the municipality with
its private funds in its corporate or private capacity.
However, if it is any other property such a public buildings
or legua comunal held by the municipality for the State in
trust for the inhabitants, the State is free to dispose of it at
will. (From lawphilreviewer)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may only declare a
municipal resolution invalid if it is ultra vires. (Moday v.
CA, 268 SCRA 586) This rule is especially important in
expropriations made by LGUs because they expropriate
through a municipal ordinance. A municipal ordinance for
expropriation is ultra vires if it not for public use and no
just compensation.
Services are considered embraced in the concepts of
property subject to taking under the power of eminent
domain. (Republic of the Philippines v. PLDT, 26 SCRA
620)
Essential requisites of eminent domain:
1. Taking by competent authority;
2. Observance of due process of law;
3. Taking for public use;
4. Payment of just compensation.
Taking imports a physical dispossession of the owner, as
when he is ousted from his land or relieved of his watch or his
car and is thus deprived of all beneficial use and enjoyment of
his property; in law, the term has a broader connotation as to
include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material
impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the
ordinary uses for which the property was intended
Examples:
1. Where farmland is permanently inundated because of
the construction of a dam nearby, the owner who is
prevented from planting on the land is entitled to
compensation although he remains in possession of
the property.
 2. If government planes fly over private property at such
low altitude as to practically touch the tops of the
trees thereon, there would be such an intrusion into
the superjacent rights of the owner as to entitle him to
payment of just compensation although again there is
no divestiture of title. (U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256)
3. The imposition of an easement over a 3-meter strip of
the plaintiffs property could not be legally done
without payment to it of just compensation. (Ayala de
Roxas v. City of Manila, 9 Phil. 215)
4. A municipal ordinance prohibiting construction of any
building that would destroy the view of the plaza from
the highway was considered a taking under the power
of eminent domain that could not be allowed without
payment of just compensation to the owner affected.
(People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443)
Not every taking is compensable, as it may be justified
under the exercise of police power aimed at improving the
general welfare. (This rule is valid as long as the prejudice
suffered by the individual property owner is shared in
common with the rest of the community. If he suffers more
than his aliquot part of the damages, that is, a special
injury over and above that sustained by the rest of the
community, he will be entitled to payment of the
corresponding compensation.)
Requisites of taking in eminent domain:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
4. The property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The expropriator may enter into a private property even if
the case for expropriation is still pending, provided that the
expropriator has given prior notice and has deposited an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for tax purposes.
Mere notice of the intention to expropriate a particular
property does not bind its owner and inhibit him from
disposing of it or otherwise dealing with it. Such notice will
not justify immediate taking. (People v. Fajardo, supra)
The owner does not need to file the usual claim for
recovery of just compensation with the COA if the
government takes over his property and devotes it to
public use without benefit of expropriation.
Public use any use directly available to the general public as
a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or
accommodation; or while not directly available to the public,
redound to their indirect advantage or benefit
Just compensation a full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from the private owner by the expropriator
Owner as applied in eminent domain cases, refers to all
those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in
possession under an executory contract
Where the entire property is not expropriated, there should
be added to the basic value of the owners consequential
damages after deducting therefrom the consequential
benefits arising from the expropriation.
Consequential damages consist of injuries directly caused on
the residue of the private property taken by reason of the
expropriation
Consequential benefits, like consequential damages, must
be direct and particular and not merely shared with the
rest of the properties in the area, as when there is a
general appreciation of land values because of the public
use to which the condemned properties are devoted.
The property taken should be assessed at the time of the
taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings. (Republic v. Castellvi, 58
SRCA 336) BUT if the value increased independently of
what the expropriator did, then the value is that of the
latter filing of the case.
Where the entry precedes the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the assessment should be made as of the
time of entry.
The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the time
of the taking until just compensation is actually paid to
him. (Urtula v. Republic, 22 SCRA 477) Interest must be
claimed, however, or are deemed waived.
Taxes paid by the owner from the time of the taking until
the transfer of title, during which he did not enjoy any
beneficial use of the property, are reimbursable by the
expropriator. (City of Manila v. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215)
While the non-payment of compensation does not entitle
the private landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay the compensation within five
years from the finality of the judgement in the
expropriation proceedings, the owner concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property.
(Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA 265)
Title to the property shall not be transferred until after
actual payment of just compensation is made to the
owner. (Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550)
Airtime is not a property of radio and television
broadcasting companies. (Telecom v. COMELEC, 289
SCRA 337) Thus, compulsory allocation of airtime in favor
of the government for free is not taking of private property
without just compensation.
If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the
condition that when the purpose is ended, it shall return to
the former owner, then the former owner reacquires the
property. If the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a
fee simple title, then the land becomes the absolute
property of the State. The public use may be abandoned
without impairment of the right of title or reversion to the
former owner. (Heirs v. Moreno, 413 SCRA 502)
Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain
1. To determine the adequacy of the compensation
 2. To determine the necessity of the taking
3. To determine the public use character of the taking.
However, if the expropriation is pursuant to a specific
law passed by Congress, the courts cannot question
the public use character of the taking.
Notice and hearing is always afforded to owner of the
property to be taken so that the owner can
Taxation
Taxes the enforced proportional contributions from persons
and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for
the support of government and for all public needs
Taxation the method by which tax contributions are exacted
The power to tax does not include the power to destroy as
long as the Court sits. (Justice Holmes)
The power to tax may include the power to destroy if it is
used validly as an implement of the police power in
discouraging and in effect ultimately prohibiting certain
things or enterprises inimical to the public welfare
Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and
charges, subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. (Article X, Section 5)
Uniformity in taxation persons or things belonging to the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate
Equality in taxation the tax shall be strictly proportional to the
relative value of the property
Equitable taxation taxes should be apportioned among
people according to their capacity to pay
There is double taxation when additional taxes are laid on
the same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction during the
same taxing period and for the same purpose.
The Bill of Rights
The provisions in the Bill of Rights are generally self-
executing.
The provisions of the Bill of Rights can only be invoked
against the State and not against private individuals.
Due Process of Law
Section 1, Article III. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law...
Artificial persons like corporations and partnerships are
also covered by the protection of due process but only
insofar as their property are concerned. (Smith, Bell & Co.
v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136)
Deprive to take away forcibly, to prevent from possessing,
enjoying or using something
Deprivation per se is not necessarily unconstitutional.
What is prohibited is deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
One cannot have a vested right to a public office, as this is
not regarded as property. If created by statute, it may be
abolished by the legislature at any time, even if the term of
the incumbent therein has not yet expired.
Where the salary has already been earned, it cannot be
reduce or withdrawn by a retroactive law as the salary has
already accrued as a property right. (Mississippi v.
Miller,276 U.S. 174)
Mere privileges, such as a license to operate a cockpit or
a liquor store are not property rights and are therefore
revocable at will.
One does not have a vested property right in the
continued operation of a law, which may be repealed or
amended at will by the legislature, or in the maintenance
of a judicial doctrine, which may be modified or reversed in
the discretion of the Supreme Court.
Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
or property (see test of police power)
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process (procedural) and
neither of these elements can be eliminated without
running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. (Vinta
Maritime Co. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 656)
Requirements of procedural due process in judicial
proceedings:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it;
The judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. (Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA
194)
Competent court one vested with jurisdiction over a case as
conferred upon it by law
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant and over the property
which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
In action in personam, such as a complaint for recovery of
a loan, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired by the
court by his voluntary appearance or through service of
summons upon him.
In actions in rem or quasi in rem, such as land registration
proceedings or the foreclosure of a real estate mortage,
the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power it
may exercise over the property.

3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard;
A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void ab
initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. (David v.
Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707)
The law does not require another notice and hearing for a
review of the decision of the board of special inquiry on
the basis of evidence previously presented. (Caoile v.
Vivo, 125 SCRA 87)
Due process is not violated where a person is not heard
because he has chose, for whatever reason, not to be
heard. If he opts to be silent where he has a right to
speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was
unduly silenced. (Stronghold Insurance Co. v. CA, 205
SCRA 605)
Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always
and in all situations, requires trial-type proceedings.
(Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316)
Some exceptions to the requirements of notice and hearing:
1. Cancellation of the passport of a person sought for
the commission of a crime;
2. The preventive suspension of a civil servant facing
administrative charges;
3. The distraint of properties for tax delinquency;
4. The padlocking of restaurants found to be insanitary
or of theatres showing obscene movies;
5. The abatement of nuisances per se.
4. Judgement must be rendered upon lawful
hearing.
Requisites of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;
7. The board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceedings can know the various
issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily
include the right to cross-examine. An administrative
proceeding conducted to investigate students participation
in a hazing act need not be clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding. (AdMU v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644)
When an administrative body issues an order which
applies to all (quasi-legislative, as distinguished from
quasi-judicial), there is no need for notice and hearing.
Due process is required in deportation and extradition
cases.
Due process is required in summary dismissal. There
must be notice and hearing.
Due process need not be observed in the following cases:
1. Abatement of nuisance per se
2. Preventive suspension
3. Provisional increase
4. Contempt
Equal Protection
Section 1, Article III. x x x, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed
Substantive equality is not enough. It is also required that
the law be enforce and applied equally. (Example: Even if
the law be fair on its face, it will still violate equal
protection if it is administered with an evil eye and an
uneven hand so as to unjustly benefit some and prejudice
others.)
A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.
(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56)
The equal protection clause is available to all persons,
natural as well as juridical. Artificial persons, however, are
entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned. (Smith, Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136)
Classification the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars
While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged
to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens. (Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 270)
Requisites of classification:
1. It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and
component cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. (Ceniza v.
COMELEC, 96 SCRA 763)
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skills, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries. (International School
Alliance of Educators v. Quisimbing, 333 SCRA 13)
2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

The classification, even if based on substantial
distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the
purpose of the law.
o Example: The law cannot provide for a lower
passing average for women in the bar
examinations on the basis of classification of
physical strength. Physical strength, although a
substantial distinction between men and women,
is not the test for admission to the legal
profession.
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
The classification must be enforced not only for the
present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues exist.
4. It must apply equally to all members of the class.
It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as
this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally.
The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him.
Searches and Seizures
Section 2, Article III. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or
warrant of arrest:
1. It must be based upon probable cause;
Probable cause referring to such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves
are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act
in pursuance thereof; consists of a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to
be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense; the
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify
a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for
prosecuting defendant in the manner complained of, the
concurrence of facts and circumstances reasonable warranting
the belief; such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
The warrant must refer to only one specific offense. (Rule
126, Section 3, Rules of Court)
2. The probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge;
This power is derived by the judge directly from the self-
executing provisions of Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution and therefore may not be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature.
The issuance of a warrant is not a ministerial function of
the judge who had the right to determine for himself the
existence of probable cause. While he could rely on the
findings of the prosecutor, he is nevertheless not bound
thereby. (Placer v. Villanueve, 126 SCRA 463)
The judge may either do the following to personally determine
probable cause:
1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents* submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant; or
2. If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
*The judge should not rely on the recommendations alone of
the prosecutor but must independently arrive at his own
conclusions based not only on the bare report of the
prosecutor but also on other relevant documents.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause.
Difference between the determination of the existence of
probable cause by the prosecutor and by the judge:
The prosecutor determines whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty and should be
held for trial. On the other hand, the judge determines
whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant.
Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative
authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final
finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or
an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of
investigation or prosecution. (Board of Commissioners v.
De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853) Karon, ang issuance of
warrant is strictly judicial.
The requirement of probable cause is, strictly speaking,
not applicable in deportation proceedings, which are not
criminal in nature.
3. The determination must be made after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
(Applies to search warrants; also to warrants of arrest
if the judge is not satisfied with the report of the
prosecutor and the supporting documents.)
 In issuing warrants of arrest, there is no need to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses if the judge,
after evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor, is satisfied of the existence of
probable cause.
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Rule 126, Rules of
Court)
The judge, before issuing the search warrant, must
personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witness he may produce on facts personally known to
them, and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted. (Section 5, Rule
126, Rules of Court)
The evidence offered by the complainant and his
witnesses should be based on their own personal
knowledge and not on mere information or belief. Hearsay
is not allowed.
4. It must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
While a John Doe warrant is generally held invalid, it will
satisfy the constitutional requirement if there is some
descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify
the accused. (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended.
Where by the nature of the articles to be seized their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given.
Properties subject to search and seizure:
1. Property subject of the offense;
2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense; and
3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The return of stolen goods, even if illegally seized, may
not be ordered by the court. (People v. Marcos, 117 SCRA
999)
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (in flagrante
delicto)
An offense is committed in the presence or in the view of
an officer within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant when an officer sees the offense
although at a distance, or hears the disturbance or
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene of the crime. (People v. Evaristo, 261 SCRA 431)
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and (Hot pursuit) [What is important here is to
determine whether the arresting officer has personal
knowledge.]
See People v. Briones, 202 SCRA 708. In this case, the
eyewitness went to the police to report a crime committed by
the accused. The peace officers arrested the accused without
a warrant based on the eyewitness information. The SC held
that the warrantless arrest was not valid because the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the accused has committed the crime. It was the
eyewitness who had such personal knowledge.
In the case of People v. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772, it was held
by the SC that the there was a valid warrantless arrest. Upon
the investigation of the police officer, it was found out that the
accused was the perpetrator of the crime based on the
information given by a witness. The police officer arrested the
accused without a warrant of arrest. This case differs from the
Briones case in that in this case, there was an investigation
conducted by the arresting officer. The information gathered by
the arresting officer at his investigation becomes within his
personal knowledge.
The information derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the crime upon which the police acted
does not constitute personal knowledge of the arresting
police. (Go v. CA, 206 SCRA 138)
The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be
released because of such defect. (Sanchez v. Demetriou,
227 SCRA 627)
The accused, invalidly arrested without a warrant, is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court if
he raises objections on grounds other than the ground that
the court had not acquired jurisdiction because of the
invalid warrantless arrest. (Sanchez v. Demetriou, supra)
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Additional instances of valid warrantless arrest:
1. If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued,
any person may immediately pursue or retake him
without a warrant at any time and in any place within
the Philippines. (Section 13, Rule 113)
2. For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the
bondsmen may arrest him or upon written authority
 endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking,
cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any
other person of suitable age and discretion. (Section
23, Rule 114)
3. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without permission of the
court where the case is pending. (Section 23, Rule
114)
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he
raises them before entering his plea. (Sec. 26, Rule 114,
Rules of Court)
An accused is stopped from question the legality of his
arrest where he never raised it before entering his plea.
(People v. Salvatierra, 276 SCRA 55)
Instances of valid warrantless search and seizure:
1. Search incident to a lawful arrest
When an arrest is effected by virtue of a valid warrant, or
under any of the circumstances of a valid warrantless
arrest, a search may be made as an incident to such valid
arrest. The individual may be frisked for concealed
weapons that may be used against the arresting officer
and all unlawful articles found in his person or within his
immediate control may be seized. (Adams v. Williams, 47
U.S. 143)
A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may be
made only within the permissible area of search, or the
place within the immediate control of the person being
arrested.
It is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings. Where a search
first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
Requisites:
2. Stop and frisk Where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behaviour, he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own and others safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. (Terry Search)
In the case of Posadas v. CA, 180 SCRA 283, the accused
Posadas, carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously, was
approached by two policemen who identified themselves
as such. Posadas suddenly attempted to leave. Thus, the
policemen caught him. And when searched, Posadas was
found out carrying firearms and ammunitions. The SC held
that the warrantless search made by the policemen was
valid because when Posadas attempted to flee when the
police officers were merely introducing themselves, it gave
probable cause for the policemen to believe that Posadas
was hiding something illegal.
In People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174, the facts were
similar with the case of Posadas except that it happened
at noon and the accused Mengote did not attempt to flee
when policemen introduced themselves and searched
him. The SC held that the warrantless search was invalid
because the policemen has no probable cause to search
Mengote.
3. Search of moving vehicle
GENERAL RULE: Inspection in checkpoints of moving
vehicles is limited to a visual or ocular inspection.
(Valmonte v. De Villa)
EXCEPTION: Extensive search may be valid if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. Example: When the police officers
have information that a passenger riding as certain vehicle
was carrying something illegal. (People v. Malmstedt, 198
SCRA 401 and People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 53) The
ruling in Malmstedt and Bagista was not however applied
in the case of People v. Aminudi, 163 SCRA 402, where
the police received information that Aminudin carrying
marijuana was on a certain vessel from Mindanao. The SC
said that the warrantless search was not valid because the
police officer still have time to secure the necessary
search warrant.
EXCEPTION: When there is consent to search the
vehicle.
4. Evidence in plain view
1. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area;
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and
3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.
The plain view doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the plain view.
5. Customs searches
Searches, seizures and arrests may be made even
without warrants for purposes of enforcing customs and
tariff laws.
o REASON: The vessel can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
 must be sought before the warrant could be Restrictions on freedom of expression:
secured.
1. Previous restraint or censorship;
6. Consented search
Previous restraint or censorship on freedom of expression
Requisites: bears a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity.
(Osmea v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447) It is incumbent
1. The right exist; for the Government to show that the restraint or
2. That the person involved had knowledge, either actual censorship has passed the clear-and-present danger test
or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (or the dangerous tendency test or the balancing of
3. The said person had actual intention to relinquish the interest test). [Applies only to content-based restrictions]
right;
4. The consent must be voluntary.
Two ways of restrictions (concerns laws/regulations):
Silence is not equivalent to consent. (People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1) a) Content-neutral regulations

Where the permission to enter a residence was given to
search for rebels, it is illegal to search the rooms therein
for firearms without a search warrant. (Veroy v. Layague,
210 SCRA 97)
7. Exigent searches or searches during emergency
circumstances
8. Searches pursuant to airport security procedures
9. Searches pursuant to jail safety procedures
10. Search by private persons
Content-neutral regulations on freedom of expression are
concerned with the time, place and manner of the exercise
of such freedom, and not with the content of the speech.
Clear and present danger is not needed to justify content-
neutral regulations. Substantial governmental interest is
sufficient to support them. (Osmea v. COMELEC, supra)
The restriction on freedom of expression in content-neutral
regulations is only incidental. (Osmea, supra)

Section 3, Article III. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
The court order herein must be issued upon compliance
with the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a
warrant, and shall only be effective for only sixty (60) days.
b) Content-based restrictions
Content-based restrictions on freedom of expression
restrict such freedom based on the content of the speech.
Censorship conditions the exercise of freedom of
expression upon the prior approval of the government.
Only those ideas acceptable to it are allowed to be
disseminated; all others are restricted or suppressed.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. (Exclusionary rule; Fruit of the poisonous Distinctions between content-neutral and content-based:
tree)

Where the accused did not raise the issue of admissibility

CONTENT-NEUTRAL
of the evidence against him on the ground that it had been
illegally seized, such omission constituted a waiver of the
Content-neutral regulations
protection granted by this section, and the illegally seized
only restricts freedom of
evidence could then be admitted against him. (People v.
expression incidentally, thus,
Exala)
they are presumed a valid
The accused should raise the objection before the exercise of police power.
prosecution rests during trial.
Since they are presumed
valid, the burden of showing
that they are not is upon
those who challenge the
Freedom of Expression regulation/law.
CONTENT-BASED
Content-based restrictions
are abridgements on freedom
expression, thus, there is a
presumption of constitutional
invalidity against them.
Since they are presumed
constitutionally invalid, the
burden of showing that they
are valid is upon the
Government.

Section 4, Article III. No law shall be passed abridging the They are concerned with the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the time, place, and manner of
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the exercising the freedom.
government for redress of grievances.
Substantial governmental
Freedom of expression is available only insofar as it is interest is sufficient to justify
exercised for the discussion of matters affecting the public content-neutral regulations.
interest.
2. Subsequent punishment.
Freedom of expression is a preferred right.
They are concerned with the
content and substance of the
speech.
Clear and present danger
must be shown to justify
content-based restrictions.
 Freedom of speech includes freedom after the speech.
It has been held that freedom of expression does not
cover ideas offensive to public order or decency or the
reputation of person which are all entitled to protection by
the State.
Three major criteria for determining the liability of the
individual for ideas expressed by him:
1. The clear and present danger rule
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the State has the right to
prevent. (Schenck v. United State, 249 U.S. 97)
The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear
and present but also traceable to the ideas expressed.
Clear a causal connection with the danger of the substantive
evil arising from the utterance questioned
Present refers to the time element
The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished.
In Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the Supreme Court held
that the respondent Mayors refusal to allow the Nacionalista
Party to hold a meeting at Plaza Miranda is violative of the
freedom of expression. The Mayors refusal was grounded on
the fear of disorder that could be caused by the speeches that
will be delivered during the meeting. The Supreme Court, in
rejecting the argument, said that the fear of disorder is not that
serious and imminent as to justify the curtailment of
expression.
In Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731, the facts are similar to
the Primicias case, but occurred in 1970, at the height of
student unrest and activism. The Supreme Court sustained the
Mayors refusal to allow the meeting to be held at Plaza
Miranda because the fear of disorder at that time is serious
and imminent. The Sunken Garden was suggested, a less
sensitive area in the city.
In Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, the Supreme Court
held that the denial by the respondent Mayor to issue a permit
to rally was invalid because there was no showing of the
probability of a clear and present danger that might arise as a
result of the rally.
2. The dangerous tendency doctrine
If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the State has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used
be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks
to prevent. (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152)
3. The balancing of interest test
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect,
conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the
courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests
demands the greater protection under the particular
circumstances presented. (American Communications
Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 282) -_O_-
The official acts, and now even the private life of, a public
servant (includes public figures and persons involved in a
public issue) are legitimate subjects of public comment.
The people have a right to scrutinize and commend or
condemn the conduct of their chosen representatives in
the government. And as long as their comments are made
in good faith and with justifiable ends, they are insulated
from prosecution or damage suits for defamation even if
such views are found to be inaccurate or erroneous.
In prosecution for libellous comments against a public
official, it is upon the public official concerned to prove that
the false defamatory statement was made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
disregard of whether it was false or not. (Vasquez v. CA,
314 SCRA 460)
The right to invade a persons privacy to disseminate
public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how public
a figure he or she may be. (Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. De
Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476)
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice
in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts.
This rule is otherwise after the case is ended. (People v.
Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265) This rule simply prohibits criticisms
on pending litigations so as not to interfere with the
administration of justice.
Criticisms must always be couched in respectful language.
(People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64) Critics may be cited for
contempt in violation with this rule.
Tests of obscenity:
1. Whether the average, applying contemporary
community standards, would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable law;
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Rules regarding the right peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government
The permit for an assembly to be held in a public place is
required for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself.
 The power of the local officials with regards to lawful
assemblies is only one of regulation and not prohibition.
(Primicias v. Fugoso, supra) Meaning mag designate lang
sila ug other place or time.
Another place may be designated by the licensing
authorities upon clear and convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a clear and present danger
that will bring about the substantive evils that such
authorities has a right to prevent.
If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law. (Sec. 6[e], B.P. Blg. 880)
A permit for the holding of a public assembly shall not be
necessary where the meeting is to be held:
1. In a private place;
2. In the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution;
3. In a freedom park. (Public Assemnly Act, B.P. Blg.
880)
Where a permit is required, the written application therefor
shall be filed with the mayors office at least five days
before the scheduled meeting and shall be acted upon
within two days. Otherwise, the permit shall be deemed
granted.
The question, if rights of free speech and peaceful
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices
under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not
as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech
which the Constitution protects. (De Jonge v. Oregon, 229
U.S. 353) The Test of a Lawful Assembly
Rights to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, like any other
liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as
not to prejudice the public welfare. (De la Cruz v. CA, 305
SCRA 303) If they exercise their right beyond the
reasonable limits, they may be penalized, not because
they exercised such right but because of the manner they
exercised such right. (Bangalisan v. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
Property rights are inferior to the rights of free expression
and of assembly. (PBM Employees v. Phil. Blooming Mills
Co., 51 SCRA 189)
Freedom of Religion
Religion any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc.,
often involving a code of ethics and philosophy
Religion embraces matters of faith and dogma, as well as
doubt, agnosticism and atheism.
Section 5, Article III. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...
The doctrine of the separation of Church and State cuts
both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is
likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.
The establishment clause is not violated if:
1. The statute has a secular legislative purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.
Freedom of religion includes freedom from religion; the
right to worship includes the right not to worship.
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared as unconstitutional the recitation by the student in
public schools in New York of a prayer. It held that the State
aligned itself with the worshiper as against the atheist and
violated its obligation to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality
in religious matters.
Section 29 (2), Article VI. No public money or property shall
be appropriated, applied, paid or employed directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of
any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Any benefit indirectly enjoyed by a religious institution, as
long as such benefit was only incidental to a legitimate
secular objective, would not violate the prohibition.
(Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201)
In Garces v. Estenzo (105 SCRA 510), the Supreme Court
ruled that the purchase of a religious image by a barangay
council with private funds raised from voluntary
contributions did not violate the Constitution.
Section 29 (2) does not inhibit the use of public property
for religious purposes when the religious character of such
use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is
available indiscriminately to the public in general.
Payment of public funds is prohibited to ecclesiastics only
as such, which means that they may be paid from public
funds if they serve the government in a non-ecclesiastical
capacity.
Section 3 (3), Article XIV. At the option expressed in writing by
the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught
to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools
within the regular class hours by instructors designated or
approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the
children or wards belong, without additional cost to the
Government.
Section 28 (3), Article VI. Charitable institutions, churches
and personage and convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
(The taxes covered by the constitutional exemption are real
estate taxes or ad valorem taxes imposed on the property
itself.) [As distinguished from excise taxes] (Lladoc v. CIR, 14
SCRA 292) _-o-_
Intramural disputes regarding religious dogma and other
matters of faith are outside the jurisdiction of the secular
authorities.
Where the dispute involves the property rights of the
religious group, or the relations of the members where
property rights are involved, the civil courts may assume
jurisdiction. Example is in the case of Fonacier v. CA, 96
Phil. 417, where the SC applied the pertinent laws and the
internal rules of the Philippine Independent Church to
determine who between the two persons is the head of the
church and thus has the right to control its properties.
Where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining
to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right
and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decision out of
which the civil right has arisen as it finds them, and
accepting those decisions as matters adjudicated by
another jurisdiction. (Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila, 51
Phil. 420)
x x x The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Aspects of the right to religious profession and worship:
1. Freedom to believe
This freedom is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought.
2. Freedom to act on ones belief
Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State.
The constitutional provision on religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It
gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religion, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma. (W. Va.
Board of education v. Barnette, 219 U.S. 624)
Examples:
1. One has full freedom to believe in Satan, but he may
not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as
this would be murder.
2. One has freedom to believe in the Biblical command
to go forth and multiply, but he is not allowed to
contract plural marriages in violation of the laws
against bigamy.
As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right
does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State
to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.
Any restraint in the freedom to act in ones belief can be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on
the ground that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. (American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101
Phil. 386)
The freedom to act in ones belief is not subject to the
requirement of licensing or registration or fee. A person
has the right to exercise such privilege without permission
or fee.
In American Bible Society, supra, the Supreme Court held that
the ordinance requiring petitioner to obtain a license and pay
the corresponding fee for being engaged in the sale of
merchandise unconstitutional. The SC said that petitioner was
not engaged in the sale of merchandise but was in the exercise
of his freedom to religion. Such privilege is not subject to
license and fees.
In Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630, the registration
fee of P1,000 was upheld by the Supreme Court because such
fee was not imposed on the exercise of a privilege but only for
the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration.
Liberty of Abode and Travel
Section 6, Article III. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety or public health, as may
be provided by law.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may
advance to a prospective employee, has absolutely no
power to curtail the freedom of said employee. The fact
that power to control said freedom may be an effective
means of avoiding monetary loss to the agency is no
reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right.
(Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851)
It is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center
should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression
that certain citizens desirous of exercising their
constitutional right to travel could be subjected to
inconvenience or annoyance. (Salonga v. Hermoso, 97
SCRA 121)
An order of a court to a person released on bail to remain
to be a resident in a certain area constitutes a lawful order
as contemplated by the provision in the Constitution. (Yap
v. CA, 358 SCRA 564)
Provisions of law limiting enjoyment of liberty should be
strictly construed against the government and in favor of
the individual.
The power of the court to restrict the right to travel of an
accused released on bail is inherent on their power to
administer justice.
 The right to travel refers to the right to move from one
place to another. (Mirasol v. DPWH, 490 SCRA 318)
Access to Information
Section 7, Article III. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Except perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the
examination is unlawful or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers
to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the persons seeking access to the records.
(Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14)
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit.
Distinctions between the discretion to refuse outright the
disclosure of or access to a particular information and the
authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to
be afforded:
1. The refusal may only be made by the Legislature by
law; while regulation pertains to the government
agency charged with the custody of public records.
2. While the manner of examining public records may be
subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of
said agencies.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress,
the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. The
extraordinary character of the exemption indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure. (Senate v. Exec. Sec., 488
SCRA 1)
Matters covered by the executive privilege:
1. Military secrets and diplomatic secrets
2. Internal deliberations
3. Identities of crime informers
Some of the recognized restrictions on freedom of information:
1. National security matters and intelligence information;
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions;
3. Criminal matters; and
4. Other confidential information.
Cases on R.A. No. 9262 and child abuse are prohibited
from public knowledge.
Orders and decisions of the courts are matters of public
concern and the public has a right to be informed.
However, when it comes to pleadings and other
documents filed by the parties to a case, the purpose for
which they are sought is to be considered. (Hilado v.
Reyes, 296 SCRA 282)
Remedies:
1. Mandamus
2. Administrative case
Right of Association
Section 8, Article III. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 2 (5), Article IX-B. The right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees.
Members of the civil service may not declare a strike to
enforce their economic demands. (Alliance of Government
Workers v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA
1)
Laborers who are inhibited from joining labor unions
because of their religious beliefs have the right not to
associate in spite of any closed-shop agreement with the
management. The right to associate includes the right not
to associate. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,
59 SCRA 54)
GENERAL RULE: The right to associate includes the right
not to associate. EXCEPTION: Closed-shop agreement
A closed-shop agreement is a valid form of union security
and a provision therefor in a collective bargaining
agreement is not considered a restriction of the right of
association. (Villar v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 444)
REASON for the validity of a closed-shop agreement: The
purpose of the self-organization of the workers could be
thwarted if every worker were to choose to go his own
separate way instead of joining his co-employees in
planning collective action and presenting a united front
when they sit down to bargain with their employees.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate
(and not to associate). (In re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554)
Section 8 only guarantees the right to associate. It does
not guarantee registration as a group.
The Impairment Clause
Section 10, Article III. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
Contract refers to any lawful agreement on property or
property rights, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible
What contracts include:
1. Executed or executor contracts;
2. Contract between private persons only, natural or
artificial;
3. Contracts between private persons and the
government or its agencies;
4. Franchises or charters granted to private persons or
entities.
The contracts herein do not include licenses, as these
involve grants of privileges only that are essentially
revocable.
License merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful and not a contract with the government
A public office is not a property right and therefore cannot
be the subject of a contract between the incumbent and
the government. The office itself, if created by statute, may
be modified or even abolished or any of its incidents may
be changed, as by reduction of the term or the salary. The
exception already noted is where the salary has already
been earned, in which case it will be deemed a vested
property right that cannot be withdrawn or reduced by
retroactive legislation. (Mississippi v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174)
Law includes statutes enacted by the national legislature,
executive orders and administrative regulations promulgated
under a valid delegation of power, and municipal ordinances
passed by the local legislative bodies
Obligation the law or duty which binds the parties to perform
their undertaking or agreement according to the terms of the
contract and the intent of the parties
Impairment anything that diminishes the efficacy of the
contract; the obligation is reduced or increased, the period of
payment is shortened or lengthened, conditions are added or
removed, remedies to enforce right are completely withdrawn
In the case of remedies for the enforcement of rights of the
parties, there will be impairment only if all of them are
withdrawn, with the result that either of the parties will be
unable to enforce his rights under the original agreement.
There will be no impairment, in other words, as long as a
substantial and efficacious remedy remains. And this rule
holds true even if the remedy retained is the most difficult
to employ and it is the easier ones that are withdrawn.
(Manila Trading Co. v. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461)
An obligation may be impaired by law if the law is in the
proper exercise of police power. The obligation, however,
is not considered impaired within the meaning of the
impairment clause.
The legislature cannot bargain away the police power
through the medium of a contract.
Free Access to Courts
Section 11, Article III. Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus
Writ of habeas corpus a writ directed to the person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his
caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and receive
whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
his behalf
The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is
to inquire into the legality of ones detention. (Ilagan v.
Enrile, 139 SCRA 349) can also apply when there is
undue restraint
Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present
a denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedoms originally valid has, in the
light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the
person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still
avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. (Moncupa v.
Enrile, 141 SCRA 223)
When the writ of habeas corpus is available:
1. Arbitrary detention;
2. Moral restraint, as where a housemaid is prevented
from leaving her employ because of the influence of
the person detaining her;
3. When conviction was made by a court without
jurisdiction;
4. Where the sentence has become invalid;
5. When a person is sentenced to a longer penalty than
that subsequently meted out to another person
convicted of the same offense;
6. In case of unlawful denial of bail;
7. When there is denial of the right to a speedy trial.
Section 15, Article III. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when public safety requires it.
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not suspend the writ itself, but only its privilege. This
means that when the court receives an application for the
writ, and it finds the petition in proper form, it will issue the
writ as a matter of course, i.e., the court will issue an order
commanding the production before the court of the person
allegedly detained, at a time and place stated in the order,
and requiring the true cause of his detention to be shown
to the court. If the return to the writ shows that the person
in custody was apprehended and detained in areas where
the privilege of the writ has been suspended or for crimes
mentioned in the executive proclamation, the court will
suspend further proceedings in the action. (Ex Parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 131)
Section 18, Article VII. x x x In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law...
xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Speedy Disposition of Cases
Section 16, Article III. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
Involuntary Servitude
Section 18, Article III. (1) No person shall be detained
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.
Involuntary servitude the condition of one who is compelled
by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against his will, to
labor for another, whether he is paid or not
Slavery that civil relation in which one man has absolute
power over the life, fortune and liberty of another
Peonage a condition of enforced servitude by which the
servitor is restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in
liquidation of some debt or obligation, real or pretended,
against his will
Exceptions to the prohibition on involuntary servitude:
1. All citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal military or civil
service. (Sec. 4, Article II)
2. A person who enlists in the service of a merchant
vessel may be compelled to remain in such service
until the end of the voyage for which he contracted.
3. In pursuit of persons who have violated the law, such
as brigands, the authorities might command all the
male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. (U.S.
v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245)
4. Striking workers in industries affected with public
interest may be required to return to work pending
settlement of the labor dispute. (Kaisahan ng
Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45
O.G. 147)
5. Unemancipated minors come under the patria
potestas and so are obliged to obey their parents so
long as they are under parental power, and to observe
respect and reverence toward them always.
In Caunca v. Salazar, supra, the Supreme Court released on
habeas corpus a housemaid who was being detained and
required to render domestic services in payment for the money
advanced for her transportation from the province.
Non-Imprisonment for Debt
Section 20, Article III. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Debt refers to any civil obligation arising from contract,
expressed or implied
But although the debtor cannot be imprisoned for his
failure to pay his debt, he can be validly punished in a
criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. In
such a case, the act for which he is penalized is the
deception he employed in securing the debt, not his
default in paying it.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes.
Since tax is not a debt but arises from the obligation of the
person to contribute his share in the maintenance of the
government, failure to pay the same can be validly
punished with imprisonment. Exception: Poll tax
Poll tax a specific fixed sum levied upon every person
belonging to a certain class without regard to his property or
occupation
 Ex Post Facto Laws
Section 22, Article III. No ex post facto law or bill of
attainder shall be enacted.
Ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the
offense;
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
Characteristics of an ex post facto law:
1. Refers to criminal matters;
2. Retroactive in its application;
3. Prejudices the accused.
A law providing for the suspension pende lite of any public
officer or employee accused of offenses involving
fraudulent use of public funds or property, including those
charged earlier, is not ex post facto even if applied
retroactively because the suspension was not punitive but
merely preventive. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA
383)
Bill of attainder a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat
for a judicial determination of guilt
Rights of the Accused
Section 12, Article III. (1) Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Custodial investigation the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who carry out the process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statement;
this includes the practice of issuing an invitation to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability
of the inviting officer for any violation of law
Mere inquiry on the commission of a crime by law
enforcement authorities does not automatically trigger the
application of the right to counsel. It is only after the
investigation ceased to be a general inquiry and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating
statements.
In People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135, the accused upon his
arrest in Quezon City was interrogated by the police while
being transported back to Manila, where his formal
investigation was conducted at the police station. The
Supreme Court held that his custodial investigation started in
Quezon City. His right to counsel has began from the time
when he was interrogated in Quezon City.
A barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying the right to counsel. Thus,
a suspects uncounselled statement before the barangay
chairman is admissible. (People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374) dili
ni extrajudicial confession
Any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(Sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)
The right to counsel may be waived but to insure that the
waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the waiver must be in
writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused.
(People v. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601) In custodial
investigation only, not in trial.
Requisites for the validity of an extrajudicial confession in
custodial investigation:
1. It must be voluntary;
2. It shall be in writing and signed by the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation;
3. It must be signed in the presence of his counsel or in
the latters absence, upon a valid waiver;
4. In the event of a valid waiver, it must be signed in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel chosen by him.
When things were seized from an accused during arrest,
the signing of the receipt for the things seized by the
accused must be with the presence of a counsel.
Tactical interrogation is included in Section 12.
Section 12 does not apply in cases where the accused
signed the marked money used during a buy-bust
operation without counsel. The signed marked money is
admissible in court even if it was signed without counsel.
Confession made to a TV reporter is admissible in court.
(People v. Taboga, 376 SCRA 505)
Counsel is not necessary in administrative investigations.
Statements in a counter-affidavit are admissible even if
executed without counsel.
 Res gestae statements are admissible even without
counsel.
The rights under Section 12 apply only to custodial
investigation or questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. (Sebastian v. Gachitorena, 343 SCRA 463)
There is a presumption that the rights in Section 12 are
not afforded to the accused. The prosecution has the
burden of proof.
There is a presumption that the waiver is invalid.
Prosecution has the burden to prove otherwise.
(2) No torture, force, violence threat or intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(There is a presumption that these acts are not done by law
enforcers.)
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right to counsel is not available during a police line-up
as this is not considered part of the custodial investigation.
(De la Torre v. CA, 294 SCRA 196)
A re-enactment of the crime in the absence of counsel is
inadmissible evidence against the accused. (People v.
Suarez, 267 SCRA 119)
While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute,
the accuseds option to hire one of his choice is limited.
Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible
dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the
equally important rights of the State and the offended
party to speedy and adequate justice. (People v. Serzo,
274 SCRA 553)
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
Section 13, Article III. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law...
Section 1. Bail defined. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may
be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash
deposit, or recognizance. (Rule 114, Rules of Court)
The purpose of bail is to combine the administration of
criminal justice with the convenience of a person accused
but not yet proven guilty and to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the State of the burden of keeping him,
pending trial.
The right to bail is a constitutional right. It is personal in
nature and is therefore, waivable. (Paderanga c. CA, 247
SCRA 741)
The right to bail is not suspended by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Section 13, Article
III, 198 Constitution)
The right to bail has traditionally not been recognized and
it is not available in the military. (Commendador v. De
Villa, 200 SCRA 80)
By its definition, bail requires that a person must first be in
the custody of the law or deprived of his liberty before it
can be availed of. (Manigbas v. Luna, 98 Phil. 466)
Bail cannot be denied simply because the person detained
has not yet been formally charged in court but is still under
investigation for the commission of an offense. if one who
has already been indicted is entitled to bail, there is no
reason why another who has not yet been charged
against whom prima facie case has not yet been
established should be denied a similar right. (Teehankee
v. Rovira, 42 O.G. 717)
In custody of the law may mean (1) physical or actual
custody, or (2) constructive custody. (Pederanga v. CA,
247 SCRA 41)
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no
reason why it should not be granted in extradition cases if
petitioner is not a flight risk. (Government of Hong Kong v.
Olalia, April 19, 2007)
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception. (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court)
x x x The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. All
kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon
approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in
force at all stages of the case until promulgation
of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally
filed in or appealed to it;
(The accused have to apply for another bail after promulgation
of the judgement of the RTC. If granted, the accused may
continue his provisional liberty under the same bail provided
the bondsman consents. [par. 2, Sec. 5])
 (b) The accused shall appear before the proper
court whenever required by the court of these
Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial
without justification and despite due notice shall
be deemed a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed
in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to
the court for execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address
of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the
conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size)
taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left
and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the
bail. (2a)
Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or
bail. No person under detention by legal process shall
be released or transferred except upon order of the court
or when he is admitted to bail. (3a)
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons
in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as
prescribed by law or this Rule
(a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and
(b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
(c) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Where bail is a matter of right, the existence of a high
probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon
the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond
that would assure his presence when wanted. (San Miguel
v. Judge Maceda, April 4, 2007)
The remedy of the petitioner from the order of the trial
court denying a petition for bail is to file a petition for
certiorari if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the said order. (People v. Gomez, 325 SCRA 61)
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary.
Where to file bail after conviction by the RTC:
1. Appellate Court; or
2. RTC despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
the following conditions concur:
a. The original record of the case has not been
transmitted to the appellate court; and
b. The decision of the RTC convicting the
accused has not changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial
court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may
be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any
party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court
after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a)
A finding that none of the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3, Section 5 of Rule 114 is present does not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will
simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach. (Leviste v. CA, March 17, 2010)
Section 6. Capital offense defined. A capital offense is
an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and of the application for admission to bail,
may be punished with death. (6a)
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)
 The general rule is that a hearing upon notice is
mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion.
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the
hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is
in custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at
the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify. (8a)
Duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the courts to
exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the evidence guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail
bond.
In the hearing for a petition for bail by an accused charged
with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the presentation of mitigating
circumstance will be considered unless the prosecution
objects. And if such presentation of mitigating
circumstance makes the maximum penalty for the offense
less than reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a matter of
right. (Bravo v. Borja, 134 SCRA 466)
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. The judge who
issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not
limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the
trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is
on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a) __--o--__
Section 14, Article III. (1) No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(See comments in Section 1, Article III)
The holding of a preliminary investigation is not required
by the Constitution. It is not a fundamental right and is not
among those rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. The
right thereto is of a statutory character and may be
invoked only when specifically created by statute.
(Marinas v. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423) However, since it has
been established by statute, it becomes a component of
due process in criminal justice. Denial of this right, in the
absence of a valid waiver, will violate due process. (Bunye
v. Sandiganbayan, 205)
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment. (Go v. CA, 206
SCRA 138) WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO PRELIMNARY
INVESTIGATION
How to invoke the right? By filing a Motion to Conduct a
Preliminary Investigation.
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. (Civil Code of the Philippines)
Due process is denied where a person is impleaded for
violation of a law, administrative regulation or municipal
ordinance not previously published as he would not know
what acts he must do or avoid to prevent prosecution.
Where appeal is permitted by the Constitution or by
statute, denial thereof will also militate against due
process. (Reyes v. CA, 80 SCRA 143)
Section 14, Article III. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, . . .
Section 1 (a). To be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 115, Rules of Court)
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v.
Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59)
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by
itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790)
The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged
by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused, but
by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt.
(People v. Mirantes, 209 SCRA 179)
 It is generally conceded that the legislature has the power
to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima
facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift
the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a
rational connection between the facts proved and the
ultimate fact presumed. (Hizon v. CA, 265 SCRA 517)
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require that the
guilt of the accused must be shown with absolute
certainty. The rule merely requires moral certainty. (People
v. Malilay, 63 SCRA 420, citing U.S. v. Lasada)
In establishing the guilt of the accused, jurisprudence
requires that the prosecution must rest on its own merits
and must not rely on the weakness of the defenses.
Equipoise rule where the evidence of the parties in a criminal
case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favour of the accused
x x x and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel . . .
Section 1 (c). To be present and defend in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however,
waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set
forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by
the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the
accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he
had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be
present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes,
he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on
all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.
(Rule 115, Rules of Court)
Two rights here:
1. To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgement;
2. To defend in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
the judgement.
Instances when the accused may not be allowed to waive his
presence in court:
1. During arraignment because he is required to
personally enter his plea;
2. At the promulgation of judgement;
3. During trial for purposes of identification;
4. Any other instances when the court so requires with
due notice.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has
the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The
court need not wait for the time until the accused who
escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to
present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses
against him. (Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1)
The right of the accused to counsel in criminal
proceedings has never been considered subject to waiver.
(Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 429)
The requisites of trial in absentia:
1. The accused has already been arraigned;
2. He has been duly notified of the trial;
3. His failure to appear is unjustified.
Trial in absentia does not abrogate the provisions of the
Rules of Court regarding forfeiture of the bail bond if the
accused fails to appear at his trial. (People v. Prieto, 84
SCRA 198)
Section 1 (d). To testify as a witness in his own behalf but
subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct
examination*. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice
him. (Rule 115, Rules of Court)
*American rule is used; only matters covered by the direct
examination as distinguished from Section 6, Rule 132 on the
Rules on Evidence where the English rule is used wherein
cross-examination not only on matters covered by the direct
examination but also those connected therewith are allowed.
When an accused is silent when he should speak, in
circumstances where an innocent person so situated
would have spoken, on being accused of a crime, his
silence and omission are admissible evidence against him.
(People v. Delmendo, 296 SCRA 371)
x x x to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him . . .
The defendant is denied the right to be informed of the
charge against him, and to due process as well, where the
statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that is
not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine
therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and,
hence, should be avoided. (The void-for-vagueness rule)
Section 1 (b). To be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. (Rule 115, Rules of Court)
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation is not waivable because public interest is
involved, the public having an interest in seeing to it that
no person is unlawfully deprived of his life or liberty. (U.S.
v. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207)
The variance in the identities of the check described in the
information and the check allegedly issued and admitted in
evidence violates the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(Dico v. CA, 452 SCRA 441)
Section 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or
information shall:
1. state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, [Not an essential element of a complaint or
information because, at most, that is a mere
conclusion of the fiscal. Note: When the facts
 appearing in the complaint or information are so
stated that they are capable of two or more
interpretations, then the designation of the offense in
the caption controls. (U.S. v. Ticzon, 25 Phil. 67)]
2. aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and
3. specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
(Rule 110, Rules of Court)
The real question is not did he commit a crime given in
the law some technical and specific name?, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in
the manner therein? (Matrido v. People, G.R. No.
179061)
It is axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime
charged are determined not by the designation of the
specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the information.
Controlling in an information should not be the title of the
complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being, by and large, mere conclusions of law by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. (People v. Quemeggen,
G.R. No. 178205)
The failure to designate the offense by the statute or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act or
erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate
the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. (Malto v. People, G.R. No.
164733)
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (9a)
BAR 2001 (Rule 110, Rules of Court)
A generic aggravating circumstance, if not alleged in the
information or complaint even proven at the trial, cannot
be appreciated against the accused. (Sombilon v. People,
2009)
A qualifying aggravating circumstance to be such must be
alleged in the information. If it is not alleged but proven at
the trial, it is a generic aggravating circumstance only.
While, under the new rules, an aggravating circumstance
that is not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated
in determining the criminal liability of the accused, the
rules do not prevent its appreciation for the purpose of
determining civil liability. (People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163)
Qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by
descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter,
properly qualify an offense. (People v. Aquino, 2002) [mu-
apply pud sa aggravating]
It is not the use of the words qualifying or qualified by
that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the
essential element raising the crime to a higher category.
(People v. Rosas, G.R. No. 177825)
x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial . . . (same
as Section 1 [h], Rule 115, Rules of Court)
The right to speedy disposition of cases is considered
violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept
of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible.
(Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236) Due regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding
each case.
Factors to be considered in the determination of whether or not
the right to a speedy trial has been violated:
1. The length of delay;
2. The reasons for such delay;
3. The assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and
4. The prejudice caused by the delay.
Remedies of an accused whose right to a speedy trial is being
violated:
1. Oppose the postponement and insist on trial;
2. Mandamus, if the court grants the postponement
every time the prosecution asks for it over the
objection of the accused;
3. If the accused is restrained of his liberty, his remedy is
habeas corpus.
If the court denies the postponement asked by the
prosecution and directs the prosecution to proceed and
cannot do so because he does not have the evidence,
accused should move for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of failure to prosecute or insufficiency of evidence.
If the motion for dismissal is granted, such dismissal is
equivalent to an acquittal and there is no way for that case
to be brought back because it will amount to double
jeopardy.
The purpose of the right to a public trial is for the public to
see that the accused is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned and for keeping his triers keenly alive to a
sense of responsibility and to the importance of their
function.
x x x to meet the witness face to face . . .
Section 1(f). To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial*.
Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of
a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence
be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to
testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Requisites:
 1. The testimony is given by a witness who is
deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify;
2. The testimony is given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. The other case involves the same parties and
subject matter;
4. The adverse party had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.
*In trial only. Not in advance because it might endanger the
witnesses if the accused were to know the prosecution
witnesses in advance.
Exceptions to this right:
1. Second paragraph of [f];
2. When there is a separate civil action filed against the
accused by the offended party and he made a
reservation;
3. The exceptions to the Hearsay Rule.
x x x and to have compulsory process issued to secure
the attendance of witnesses and production of other
evidence in his behalf. (Same as Section 1 (g), Rule 115,
Rules of Court)
The right to compulsory process must be invoked during
the trial. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver that cannot
be rectified or undone on appeal. (U.S. v. Garcia, 10 Phil.
384)
Section 17, Article III. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
The right is available not only in criminal prosecutions but
also in all other government proceedings, including civil
actions and administrative or legislative investigations.
The right may not be invoked where the question asked
relates to a past criminal liability for which the witness can
no longer be prosecuted.
The witness may not refuse to answer where he has been
previously granted immunity under a validly enacted
statute.
Section 1 (e). To be exempt from being compelled to be a
witness against himself. (Rule 115, Rules of Court)
The right against self incrimination prescribes an option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions, and not a
prohibition of inquiry. (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215)
The right against self-incrimination does not give a witness
the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and
answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate
him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty. (People v. Ayson,
supra)
The preceding rule applies only to a witness who is not the
accused. The accused may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.
On this instance, it is assumed that the purpose of his
interrogation is to incriminate him.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take
the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality,
the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the
People would be to incriminate him. (Chavez v. CA, 24
SCRA 663)
This privilege applies only to natural person. (U.S. v.
White, 322 U.S. 694)
The privilege against self-incrimination applies only to
evidence that is communicative in essence. (Herrera v.
Alba, 460 SCRA 197)
The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is against
not all compulsion but testimonial compulsion only. (4
Wigmore, Sec. 2263)
Force re-enactments come within the ban against self-
incrimination. (People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092)
The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving
of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of
evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the
divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a
right to hold secret. (Beltran v. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil.
570) Does not cover mechanical acts. Mechanical act
does not require concentration and intelligence
The prohibition applies to the compulsion for the
production of documents, papers and chattels that may be
used as evidence against the witness, except where the
State has a right to inspect the same, such as the books of
accounts of corporations, under the police power.
(Wigmore)
The right against self-incrimination is waivable by the
accused taking the stand and testifying as a witness or by
freely answering the incriminating question put to him.
(U.S. v. Grant, 18 Phil. 122)
The privilege also protects the accused against any
attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting in connection with his prosecution for
falsification. (Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570)
SITUATION: Prosecution presented as evidence a letter
allegedly written by the accused. The accused denied that it
was his handwriting. Because of such denial, the accused
cannot anymore refuse to give a specimen of his handwriting
on the ground of violation of the right against self-incrimination
because he is deemed to have waived such right when he
testified that the handwriting in the letter presented was not his.
[Dapat wala juy maski denial kung incriminating.]
Section 19, Article III. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduce to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 21, Article III. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
jeopardy. When an accused has been:
1. convicted or
2. acquitted, or
3. the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution:
1. for the offense charged, or
2. for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or
3. for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
Requisites that must be present in order to properly raise
the defense of double jeopardy:
1. The first jeopardy must have been attached prior
to the second;
a. The former complaint or information is valid,
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
i. It charges an offense; and
ii. It is filed by a person or officer
legally authorized to do so
b. It was filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction;
c. The accused had been arraigned under said
complaint or information and had pleaded to
the same.
2. The first jeopardy must be validly terminated; and
a. When the accused had been previously
convicted;
b. When the accused had been previously
acquitted; or
c. When the case against him had been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that of the first. The accused cannot
anymore be charged of:
a. The same offense charged in the former
complaint or information;
b. The attempted or frustrated stage of the
offense charged in the former complaint or
information; or
c. Any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes
the offense charged in the former complaint or information
under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening
facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became
known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of
Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or
serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited
with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
(Rule 117, Rules of Court)
When does jeopardy NOT attach:
1) If information does not charge any offense
2) If, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents evidence
of complete self-defense, and the court thereafter acquits
him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused.
3) If the information for an offense cognizable by the RTC
is filed with the MTC.
4) If a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is
dismissed.
Section 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. (Rule 117, Rules of Court)
The grant of the demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal. Thus, double jeopardy can arise.
Where the accused is acquitted without giving the
prosecution its day in court, this denial of due process may
be validly appealed.
x x x If an act is punished by a law and an ordinace,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Distinctions between the first sentence and the second
sentence in Section 21, Article III:
1. What the first sentence prohibits is double jeopardy
for the same offense; what the second sentence
prohibits is double jeopardy for the same act punished
by an ordinance and a law.
2. There is no double jeopardy in the first sentence so
long as the second offense charged is different even if
it arises from the same act; there is double jeopardy
in the second sentence even if the offenses are
distinct provided they arise from the same act
punished by a law and an ordinance.