Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
A SYSTEM APPROACH
AK Subramanian
MODELLING RADAR-ECCM
A SYSTEM APPROACH
AK Subramanian
AK Subramanian
Series Editors
Editor-in-Chief Editors
Dr Mohinder Singh Dr JP Singh, A Saravanan
Coordinator
Ashok Kumar
Cataloguing in Publication
Subramanian, A.K.
Modelling radar-ECCM: a system approach.
DRDO monograph series.
Includes index and bibliography.
ISBN 81-86514-12-0
1. Radar 2. ECCM I. Title (Series)
623.623
Preface xi
Acknowledgement xiii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Importance of ECM 1
1.2 Background 2
1.3 Basic Considerations 2
1.3.1 Jamming Interference 3
1.4 ECM-ECCM Matrix Dynamics 4
1.4.1 ECCM EfficacyThe Difficulty 5
1.4.2 Survival 5
1.4.3 Judging Efficacy of an ECCM Element 6
1.5 Assessment of the State-of-the-Art 6
CHAPTER 2
MODERN RADAR DESIGN & ITS DEPLOYMENT
ENVIRONMENT 9
2.1 Introduction 9
2.2 Radar Performance 10
2.2.1 Two Representative Radar Models 10
2.2.1.1 Low Flying Detection Model 10
2.2.1.2 Land Clutter Model for Radar Design 11
2.3 Command, Control, Communication & Intelligence 13
2.4 ECCM Modelling 14
2.4.1 Radar Systems 14
2.4.2 Communication Systems 15
2.5 Mathematical Analysis 15
2.6 Simulation 15
2.7 The EW Flywheel 16
Reference
(viii)
CHAPTER 3
ECCM EVALUATIONSOME MODELS 19
3.1 Introduction 19
3.2 ECCM Improvement Factor 19
3.3 Functional Models 20
3.4 Response to Specific ECM 21
3.5 Deployment Models 22
3.6 Weapon System Efficacy 22
3.7 Game Theory Model 22
3.7.1 Case Study 1 23
3.7.2 Case Study 2 23
References
CHAPTER 4
MODELLING FOR ELECTRONIC CONFLICT:
THE BURNTHROUGH EQUATION MODEL 27
4.1 Background 27
4.2.1 Burnthrough Range 29
4.2.2 Escort Jammer 29
4.2.3 On-board Jammer 30
4.2.4 Repeater Jammer 30
4.3 Comments on the Burnthrough Range Equation 31
4.4 A Relook at the Burnthrough Range Relationship 32
4.4.1 Dynamic Radar Range Equation 33
4.5 Search Radar Modelling for ECCM 34
4.5.1 Functions of Radar Variables 34
4.5.2 Antenna Function 36
4.5.3 Jammer Function 37
4.6 Low Flying Target Detection Model 38
References
CHAPTER 5
LOW PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT SEARCH
RADAR MODEL 39
5.1 Radar Detection & LPI 39
5.1.1 Detection 40
(ix)
CHAPTER 6
ECCM IN MULTIFUNCTION RADAR 49
6.1 Introduction 49
6.2 MFR ECCM: The RF Chain 50
6.3 MFR Antenna ECCM 50
6.4 MFR Transmitter ECCM 53
6.5 MFR Receiver ECCM 54
6.6 Resistance to Anti Radiation Missile 54
6.7 ECCM Evaluation 55
6.8 Comment 56
References
CHAPTER 7
RADAR ECCM MODEL THROUGH PETRI NETS 59
7.1 Conflicts 59
7.2 Petri Net 59
7.3 Extended & Timed Petri Nets 60
7.4 ECCM Modelling Through Petri Nets 60
7.5 Concluding Remarks 67
References
CHAPTER 8
GAME THEORY MODEL APPROACH TO RADAR ECCM
EVALUATION 69
8.1 Applications to ECCM Evaluation 70
8.2 Point-Defence Surface Radar 76
(x)
8.3 Conclusion 79
References
CHAPTER 9
KNOWLEDGE-BASED INFERENCE FOR RADAR ECCM 83
9.1 ECCM Decisions 83
9.2 Acquisition of ECCM Knowledge Base 86
9.3 Knowledge-based Classification 86
9.3.1 Handcrafting 88
9.4 Knowledge-based Simulation & Evaluation 90
References
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION 93
Index 95
PREFACE
Bangalore AK Subramanian
Date: Dec 6, 2003
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AK Subramanian
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
-9
Tactical Electronic
Intelligence Counter
Countermeasures
Figure1.1. Electr
Figure1.1. onic war
Electronic far
warfar e
fare
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
1.2 BACKGROUND
Considering its effective usage since World War II, it is not
surprising that the art of Electronic Warfare has gone through a
sea change over the last century. The real assessment of ones
might as well as weakness in this area, is unfortunately proved
only during a major conflict. Modern examples have all been well
documented: those of the conflicts in Lebanon, Golan Heights,
Falklands, and the latest in the Gulf region. Whichever be the
theatre of war in future, it is amply clear that the initial strike
would be on the vital electronic defences of a country, be it the
missile complex, communication network, major air-defence
installation or the central and field headquarters.
The concept of a countrys boundary, guarded by its natural
geographical features, stays only as an historical fact these days.
Thanks to the modern technology, weapon development and
delivery systems, no nation needs to invade another territory to
start a war. Physical occupation may come later, but the initial
threat and thrust can be delivered from a safe distance. It is
presumed that the United States of America covertly supported
bombing of Iraqi Nuclear Facility by Israeli fighter planes. American
Warships positioned in the Mediterranean, guided the Israeli
fighters as well as provided facilities for the mid-air refuelling of its
aircraft. The Falkland War and the Gulf War had strong support of
satellite surveillance.
Further, even when delineated, the boundaries of a country
have a way of expanding due to economic and political reasons.
The USSR, when it existed, had its own ring of satellite countries
and the Warsaw Pact to protect its air space and the seas.
Americas reach was even wider and farther from its own country.
In India, due to the exploration of natural resources from the sea,
the naval complement of our defence effort extends our concern on
air-defence, even farther from the existing land boundaries. All in
all, the subject of air-defence rules the world as a modern dynamic
entity, precariously balanced and vulnerable to changes.
2
Introduction
MULTIFUNCTION
RADAR WITH
ADAPTIVE
CAPABILITIES
Figur
Figuree 1.2. Multifunctional radar capability
3
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
EW
RADAR COMMUNICATION
Figur
Figuree 1.3. Some basic dif fer
differ ences between radar and communication
ferences
network under electr onic war
electronic far
warfar e.
fare.
4
Introduction
1.4.2 Survival
The survival of a military electronic complex is dependent
on the diverse elements in the system. The electronic sensor or
communication is one of the limbs, albeit an important one. In a
defence scenario, every element is finally tied down to a weapon
and ultimately, the total effectiveness is measured in the manner
in which this system either performs/survives or perishes. Such a
terminal evaluation, as mentioned earlier, is unfortunately
possible, only upon major encounters.
Even such evaluations are not easily tractable, given the
inevitable shroud of secrecy in the EW matters. This is more so, in
5
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
7
CHAPTER 2
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Modern radar system design looks into two major phases,
the benign as well as the hostile environment. To the former, falls
the usual classification of clutter, terrain, screening, radar
horizon, mode of propagation and interference, EMC, etc. The
resultant modification to the radar performance has been studied
and well documented over the last century of radar development
in the world.
However, a radar system under Electronic Countermeasure
(ECM) and other means of hostile electronic interference operate
altogether in a different dimension. Firstly, the situation is dynamic.
The sources and the nature of interference are many. The solutions
for survival are also varied, depending on the effectiveness one seeks
to achieve. Secondly, there is no clear understanding of what was
achieved under what circumstances, and how long such a
performance can be maintained by the radar system designer. Much
of the problem in this field is due to the inevitable secrecy that
shrouds the EW world.
2/
5 min = . ( ) (2.1)
( 4)
Pt G t 4 H t H r 4H t H r
R max = 8 = 8 Ro (2.2)
S min Const .
10
Modern Radar Design & its Deployment Environment
BURNTHROUGH RANGE
8
DATA 1
DATA 2
DATA 3
7 S Vs RANGE
5
S/J
S/J Vs RANGE
4
3
J Vs RANGE
0
0.6 0.8 1
RANGE
Figure 2.1. Behaviour of S/J ratio as a function of range
11
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
12
Modern Radar Design & its Deployment Environment
EW NETTED DATA
THREAT SENSORS FUSION
NETTED
THREAT
SENSORS
PROCESSING
NETTED
SENSORS
BATTLE
COUNTER MANAGEMENT
ACTION
13
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
14
Modern Radar Design & its Deployment Environment
2.6 SIMULATION
Digital computer simulation combined with hardwarein-
the-loop system, is the most effective way of combining the
analytical and the practical elements of an EW scenario. In such a
hybrid combination, the solution of a given problem can be found
on a real-time basis. However, there are a number of inexact
parameters in the process.
The immunity of the system under different jamming
threats are estimated on a statistical basis. These give an
expectation value on the performance of the system under
evaluation. The success of such an analysis depends, to a great
extent, on the capability of modelling the ECM and the victim
systems through the following steps.
15
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
16
Modern Radar Design & its Deployment Environment
DECISION
DECODING
ENEMY
ECM
ENEMY
ESM FRIENDLY
ESM
DECISION
RADAR
DECODING AND
ECCM
REFERENCE
1. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
Artech House, 1979.
17
CHAPTER 3
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of ECCM evaluation in a radar system was
initially proposed by Johnston1, who introduced the term ECCM
Improvement Factor (EIF). This measures the efficacy of a particular
use of ECCM (Electronic Counter Countermeasures) in a radar
system against an encountered ECM (Electronic Countermeasures).
It is a factor to be used in the evaluation, in a manner analogous to
the concept of improvement factor in an MTI processor. Although
the EIF has been introduced about three decades back, it has not
found an all-round application so far in the literatures on radar
ECCM. This is the only accepted evaluation method presently
available which is professionally recognised as a standard by the
IEEE body since 1977. Some generalised models for radar ECCM
evaluation are proposed here.
20
ECCM EvaluationSome Models
21
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
22
ECCM EvaluationSome Models
23
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
B
No Reaction
C
Value
to Reaction
Attacker
Fake Real
Attack
Value
to Reaction
Attacker
A
Decoy/ Real
Attack
Deception Target
24
ECCM EvaluationSome Models
minimum pay-off that will be the outcome of this strategy for the
attacker.
Figure 3.2 similarly indicates the situation when the
previous example is translated to show the effect of a decoy or a
deception jammer against a weapon system. The weapon is
assumed to be guided by its electronic sensors. The reasoning is
similar to that of Fig. 3.1 provided by Axelrod9.
The simple model of Fig. 3.1 can be further refined when a
warning system is added to the environment. Such a system
enhances the capability of survival. Of course, the information
available to the warning device may be incomplete or partially
correct in a situation of conflict, but its very presence is considered
significant to the decision making. Depending on the discriminatory
value attached to the warning device, the pay-off to the defender is
improved as shown below (Fig 3.3).
The basis used by Axelrod for his model coincides with the
usual radar concepts of detection and false alarm probability, with
normal distribution. In this context, the case of the ESM receiver
is realised as a warning system to aid the ECCM response.
Borrowing on the above model, the response of a weapon system
with ESM warning can be viewed with similar results in Fig. 3.3.
Concept like Constant False Alarm Receiver (CFAR) can also be
utilised to describe the strategy for ensuring an assured pay-off
under deception. It is necessary to point out that the concepts of
game theory applied both by Nilson7 and Axelrod9 have been
accepted by radar engineers and as such these concepts form
attractive modelling possibilities.
B
No Reaction
C
Pay-off
to Reaction
Attacker
D
Reaction with Warning Device
Decoy Real
Figure 3.3. Pay-off in the presence of a warning device
25
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
REFERENCES
1. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
Artech House, 1979, Chapter 9.2, pp. 499-501.
2. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
Artech House, USA, 1979.
3. Military electronics/countermeasures, 1980, 3 & 12.
4. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
IEEE Trans. Aerospace Elect. Syst., 1978, 14(1), 109-17.
5. Subramanian, A.K. ECCM improvement factor considerations
in a multi-function radar. In Proceedings of the International
Radar Symposium, IRSI-83, India, 1983. pp. 587-92.
6. Loomis, R. Threats and techniques. Electronic Progress, 1975,
17(3), 17-25.
7. Nilson, N.J. An application of the theory of games to radar
reception problems. In IRE Convention Record, Pt.4, 1959.
pp. 130-40.
8. Gager, C.H. The impact of waveform bandwidth upon
tactical radar design. In Proceedings of Radar-82, UK.
pp. 278-82.
9. Axelrod, R. Coping with deception: Applied game theory. In
Proceedings of the Conference at the Institute for Advanced
Studies, Vienna, 1978. pp. 390-405.
26
CHAPTER 4
4.1 BACKGROUND
The burnthrough equation is a significant parameter in the
discussion of the Radar-ECM scenario. The radar detection
depends on the R 4 relationship whereas the jammer coverage
range is determined by the R 2 dependence. The difference is due
to the physical fact that the radar has a two-way transmission
path for its detection capability; it is easily perceived at the same
time that the jammer needs only to radiate its signal and reach its
victim on a one-way transmission path. If one considers a target
carrying its own on-board Self-Protection Jammer (SPJ), the
following equations would indicate the ranges where the jammer is
dominant over the radar and the juncture when it becomes
vulnerable to its skin detection by radar in spite of its EW suite.
The signal power S received by a radar receiver is given by
1 P t G t (1 , 1 ) t ( 1 , 1 ) Ar (1 , 1 )
S= 2 (4.1)
(4) (Rt )4 L t L r
2
Ar (2 , 2)Br P j G j (2 , 2) 1
J = 1 R (4.2)
4 Lr Bj Lj j
where,
Radar Parameters
Pt = Peak power of radar transmitter
Gt (1,1) = Transmitting antenna gain in the direction of the
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
4
J = 4 P j G j ( 2 , 2 ) B r Ar (2 , 2 ) (R t ) Lt
S t (1, 1) 2 (4.3)
P t G t (1, 1) B j Ar (1, 1) (R j ) L j
28
Modelling for Electronic Conflict:The Burnthrough Equation Model
4 P G ( , )B ( R )2 L
J j j r t
= P G ( , )B L (4.4)
S t ( , ) t t j j
2
4
P Gt (1, 1) B j Ar (1, 1) (R j ) L j
Rt = t t (4.5)
4 P j G j (2, 2) B r Ar (2 , 2) L t (S/J )
29
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
the receiver antenna apertures for the signals are not equal, i.e.,
Ar (1, 1) Ar (2, 2). The above equation remains
unaltered in this case.
For the on-axis stand-off or escort jammer, the following
holds good:
Rt Rj but Ar (1, 1) = Ar (2, 2). Equation 4.5 simplifies to
G ( , ) B j
Rt4 = t P t t 1 1
( ) 2
Rj Lj
4 P j G j (2 , 2 ) Br L (S/J ) (4.6)
t
For both the conditions, the Eqns. 4.5 and 4.6 can be used
to estimate the maximum range of detection (by skin reflection) of
the target by the radar. This provides the performance index
known as the mutual screening range.
2 (1, 1) P G (1, 1) Lj
R = t 4 t t ( , ) (S/J ) (4.7)
P j G j 2 2 L t
(ii) Condition: R t = R j = R and B j = B r but A r ( 1 , 1 ) A r ( 2, 2 ).
(Jammers repeater action is seen through the sidelobes of
the radar beam)
G (1, 1) A (1, 1) L j
2 (1, 1) P
R = t 4 t t
(
r
, 2 ) Ar (2 , 2 ) Lt (S/J ) (4.8)
P j G
j 2
(iii) Condition: The jammer collects the radar power through its
antenna and re-radiates with its own gain and sends it back
30
Modelling for Electronic Conflict:The Burnthrough Equation Model
P G ( , ) (G ) ( 2 ) (G ) (G )
J = t t 1 1 j1 x j2 1 A
2 L
4 R 2 L 4 L ( 4 R )
r
t j
(4.9)
and the signal due to the targets echo is
1 P G ( , ) ( , )A
S = t t 1 1 t 1 1
( 4 )2 4
(R ) L t L r
and thus, the ratio J/S is given by
2
J = (G j1)( )(Gx )(G j 2) 1 = System gain of jammer (G )
S (4) L j t L j t (4.10)
31
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
A ( , ) R j
2
4 t (1 ,1 ) E t G t (1 ,1 ) Lj
r 1 1
(Rt ) =
4 Lt E j G j ( 2 , 2 ) Ar ( 2 , 2 ) S /J
(4.11)
It is preferable to substitute energy term instead of power
in the equation. This will enable the definition of different types of
radar waveforms, with diverse spectral density distributions.
Hence, it is most suitable to address the situations under radar
ECCM.
Secondly, the energy term Et = Pav to (where, Pav is the
average power of the radar and to the duration of antenna dwell
on the target), is a more meaningful term than Pt. For the
rectangular shaped radar pulse, Et = (Pt ) [Pulse length ()]. The
jammer output energy is readily represented as Ej , jammer power
32
Modelling for Electronic Conflict:The Burnthrough Equation Model
per unit bandwidth (W/Hz). The S/N power ratio associated with
the radar detection can be similarly modified to Es/No , where, Es
is the signal energy and No is the noise energy (i.e., noise power per
unit bandwidth).
These changes have already been introduced in the
literature2 but have not been uniformly applied as standard
parameters in the radar range equations.
One important point to analyse in the burnthrough
equation is to find ways and means to keep it flexible and
comprehensive enough to cater for the requirements of the radar
ECCM community. Thus, efforts must be made to treat the
parameters of the range equation as functions of a number of
variables, which are valuable from the ECCM front. This will
ideally suit the dynamic behaviour of the ECM vs ECCM conflict.
The resultant effect on the system performance can then be
visualised through representative modelling and computation, all
of which can now be carried out by a modern desktop computer.
33
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
( Pav ) (t o )
[
E t (change in energy) = Pav t o ]
Pav
+
t o
34
Modelling for Electronic Conflict:The Burnthrough Equation Model
( Pt ) ( ) ( f r )
= Pav + +
Pt f r
( t o ) = b t s
s
35
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
[G( ,)] = constant and [G( ,) ] = constant
G (, ) = G1 (, ) + G2 (, ) + G3 (, ) + G4 (, ) (4.13)
36
Modelling for Electronic Conflict:The Burnthrough Equation Model
d g g
dG
{Gg } =G
dG
+ g = g G
dG
= 0. This form of the
Re
Rr
= ( 4 ) Rr GeGre Br (S / N )r
GrGr Be (S / N )e (4.14)
where, the subscripts r and e stand for the radar and Elint
systems, respectively. It can also be observed that all the radar
parameters are from the equation governing Rss (Eqn. 4.4). In fact,
Johnston has suggested that the range Rr should actually
correspond to the burnthrough range. It is then noticed that the
robustness factor is reduced by the jammer activity:
37
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
1
Range at low altitude 4 H t H a
=[ ] [Range in free space ]2
Range in free space
REFERENCES
1. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
Artech House, 1979. pp. 493-97.
2. Skolnik, M.I. Radar handbook. pp. 1-6.
3. Gutsche, S.L. et al. Radar ECCM. Artech Book House, 1979.
pp. 531-46.
4. Subramanian, A.K. ECCM improvement factor consider-
ations in a multifunction radar. Proceedings of international
radar symposium. IRSI-83, India, 1983. pp. 587-92.
5. Rudge, A.W. et al. Radar ECCM. Artech Book House, 1979.
pp. 195-204.
6. Hsiao, J.K. Phased array sidelobe level gain, beamwidth, and
error tolerance. Proceedings of radar conference, Paris, 1984.
pp. 304-08.
7. Nilsson, N.J. An application of the theory of games to radar
reception problems. IRE convention record, Part 4, 1959.
pp. 130-40.
8. Shenoy, R.P. Evolution of radarAn Indian point of view.
Proceedings of radar conference. Paris, 1984. pp. 5-9.
9. Maksimov, M.V. Radar anti-jamming techniques. Artech
Book House, 1979. pp. 17-18.
38
CHAPTER 5
5.1.1 Detection
The performance of a surveillance radar is specified in terms
of positively detecting a target or a group of targets in a given time-
frame by searching a given volume of space. For discussion on LPI
aspects and volumetric coverage, the radar range equation is
modified1 as
Power-aperture product of the radar =
4
( 4 ) R n (SNR )
PA = (5.1)
T N
where
P = Peak power of the radar transmitter
A = Effective antenna aperture of the transmit beam
R = Range of radar
= Solid angle of the radar's volumetric coverage
n = Noise power of radar receiver/Hz
SNR = Receiver Signal-Noise Power ratio required for a given
detection criteria
= Target cross-section
T = Time taken for a single scan of the antenna
= Duty ratio
N = Number of receivers assuming that the radar
transmits in a fan beam coverage; while on receive
mode, it has multiple, independent receive beams in
the elevation to define the elevation plane better
N = 1, if transmit and receive beams are the same.
40
Low Probability of Intercept Search Radar Model
Smin = n i SNR i (G i )(B 1i ) (2B 2i )1 (5.3)
where
ni = Interceptor receiver noise power/Hz,
SNRi= Threshold signal-to-noise ratio at the interceptor
receiver
Gi = Receive antenna gain
B1i = Pre-detection receiver bandwidth
B2i = Post-detection receiver bandwidth
= A factor varying between 0 (when two bandwidths are
comparable) and 0.5 (when B1i > B2i ).
To acquire the intended radar signal from a long range, the
interceptor has only a few choices in improving its receiver
sensitivity, increasing Gi , and reducing B1i and B2i. All of these do
have practical constraints. The gain of the antenna has to be
reckoned by the demand for wide frequency range coverage. The
wide-open receiver front-end bandwidth B1i is necessarily kept
higher to improve the probability of intercept (PoI). Hence, a finer
beam of the receiver antenna, coupled with reduced pre-detection
bandwidth will mean a fall in the PoI for the interceptor. The
reduction of B2i will lead to lower measurement bandwidth (target
characteristics and resolution). There is scope for compromise
here, without seriously impairing the main goal of achieving the
desired PoI at the best possible range.
41
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
J = Sj N Ar i Br (5.4)
where
J = Jammer power coupled to the radar
Sj = Jammer radiated power/Hz (spectral radiance)
N = Number of independent receivers on radar
Ar i = Effective receive aperture of the radar antenna
presented in the jammer direction
Br = Bandwidth of radar receiver.
5.3.2 Conflicts
In terms of conflict between detection and LPI functions for
the radar, it is seen that though the multichannel receivers (N) are
helpful for detection, these do couple jammer power to the same
degree as the number of channels provided. It is also observed that
the radar transmit antenna should have a better gain than that of
the receive mode, to maintain LPI characteristics, though in terms
of detection criterion, the reverse holds well.
42
Low Probability of Intercept Search Radar Model
5.4 LPIECCM
The LPI radar, by its inherent design requirement, tries to
reduce the time available for interception and/or make the
recognition of its signature a low-probability event. In this sphere,
the elements of design are traceable to the same basic philosophy
that governs the ECCM capability of the candidate radar system.
The essential difference though, is in the stage of implementation
during operation. The process of interception is a silent function
that precedes the eventual ECM thrust on the radar. The LPI
concept is to attract less attention (interception) from a hostile
electronic snooper, and thus, its function can be considered as a
defensive measure. The role of ECCM is to offer a counter (offensive)
response in the presence of a threat. Both measures aid in the
survival of the radar system under the EW environment.
In this context, Johnston3 has defined a new set of radar
design measures under the name counter ESM (CESM). Referring
to Fig. 5.1, it can be seen that the solution caters to the dual needs
of a LPI radar system.
43
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
CESM
44
Low Probability of Intercept Search Radar Model
1 1
PGr Radar B 2 2
= B [BT0] (5.8)
PGe Elint rf
Letting B = Brf , the above ratio becomes equal to [BT0]0.5, the
square root of the time bandwidth product of the radar system,
with T0 indicating the coherent processing time. Hence The ratio
now simplifies to
(S/N )e PGr BN e 1
= [BT ]2 (5.9)
(S/N )r PGe BN r
0
4 Bj
Radar R r Pt G t
Jammer : 2 = 4 S /N L
P G (5.10)
R r j j
j
From the above, it becomes clear that the radar's ECCM feature
should force the Jammer bandwidth to be spread out for proper
ECM thrust. This is not a welcome solution for an on-board jammer
with restricted power elements and space. He further shows the
relative merits of different waveforms (with high and low PRF) when
used in the radar transmitter for providing ECCM capability.
Thus, there is clearly a value-added performance index
measurable here. This is both in terms of the quiet range (obtained
through LPI) and the range against jammer (obtained through
application of ECCM). These form a common design solution for the
radar designers.
45
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
46
Low Probability of Intercept Search Radar Model
REFERENCES
1. Skolnik, M.I. Introduction to radar systems. McGraw Hill,
1981.
2. Schleher, D.C. Introduction to electronic warfare. Artech
House, 1986.
3. Johnston, S.L. CESMA new category of radar ECCM. IEEE
Trans. Aerospace Elect. Syst., 1995, 31(2).
4. Wiley, R.G. Electronic intelligence. In The interception of
radar signals. Artech House, 1985.
5. Gager, C.H. The impact of waveform bandwidth upon tactical
radar design. Proceedings of radar, UK, 1982. pp. 278-82.
6. Fleskes, M. Proceedings of radar, UK, 1982. pp. 12-14.
7. Stone, L.D. Theory of optimal search. Academic Press, 1975.
8. Dobbie, J.M. SIAM Jour. Appl. Maths, 1975, 28(1), 72-86.
9. Billetter, D.R. Microwave Journal, 1986, 29(1), 147-57.
10. Cohen, M.N. et al. Proceeding of MSAT-1983. USA.
pp. 483-94.
47
CHAPTER 6
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Multifunction radar (MFR) design has become necessary
and popular in the present-day environment of air defence for
providing multiple target engagement capability. Such a radar
often combines several functions like search, track, illumination,
guidance, etc., which were handled a few decades back by
separate radars, each having a unique role. Reliability and cost-
effectiveness are added constraints to its operation. The design of
a MFR system is complex as it has to cater for diverse needs;
providing an effective ECCM suite adds another difficult
dimension.
The MFR system is characterised by building many
adaptive designs into it. This starts from the antenna end and
continues through the RF/IF chain, signal processor, data
processor, computer, and finally the display.
In terms of the ECCM modelling for this type of radar,
the following parameters are analysed. These represent typical
modern MFR operating in several countries, deployed usually in
missile air defence complex:
Phased array antenna with programmable scan/coverage
and sidelobe cancelling system
Large RF dynamic range receiver with high image rejection
IF system
Digital signal processing with programmable filters
Self-contained illumination and guidance system for missiles
Digital computer system (central as well as distributed) to
cater for various programming controls and processing needs
of the radar
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
50
ECCM in Multifunction Radar
51
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
52
ECCM in Multifunction Radar
53
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
54
ECCM in Multifunction Radar
55
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
6.8 COMMENT
With the diverse roles assigned to the MFR, a large ECM-
ECCM matrix 22 is present when dealing with the ECCM
assessment. Performance figures like EIF will undergo variations
under different modes of operation of the radar with the attendant
ECCM features. This will be typical in a MFR. Thus, the evaluation
of EIF with the entire weapon system performance against ECM
seems to be a formidable task in such a radar system. At the same
time, with the kind of prohibitive cost structure associated with
the phased array system, it is necessary to have practical and
engineering guidelines when one is faced with the ECCM
implementation in a MFR. Following are some of the
considerations to seek an appropriate answer:
In the case of a highly priced radar system, like the MFR
model discussed here, performance and reliability have normally
to be balanced against acquisition cost and ease of maintenance.
A method known as structured redundancy is usually resorted
to in keeping the above considerations in an engineering balance23-24.
This principle utilises optimum redundancy at modest cost to
achieve greater prospects of mission accomplishment.
One could draw a parallel from this for the present ECCM
consideration. A structured ECCM possibly? If the word can be
coined and methods implemented, it would imply that
(a) Advantage could be taken by concentrating on those
hardware of the MFR system which are used in more than
56
ECCM in Multifunction Radar
REFERENCES
1. Skolnik, M.I. The phased array in military radar applications.
Military Technology, 83(3), 62-72.
2. Stark, L. Microwave theory of phased array antennasA
review. Proc. of IEEE, 1974, 12, 1661-1701.
3. Knittel, O. Phased array antennaAn overview. In Radar
Technology. Chapter 21, Artech House, 1978. pp. 289-301.
4. Forrest, J.R. Phased arrays. Current technology and future
prospects. Proceedings of the 11th European Microwave
Conference, 1981. pp. 81-90.
5. Mailloux, R.J. Phased array theory and technology. Proc. of
IEEE, 1982, 3, 246-91.
6. Fulvio, Ananasso. Null steering uses digital weighting. MSN,
1981, 7, 78-94.
7. Patton, W.T. Low-sidelobe antennas for tactical radars. IEEE
International Radar Conference, 1980. pp. 243-47.
8. Hsiao, J.K. On performance degradation of a low sidelobe
phased array due to correlated and un-correlated errors.
Proceedings of Radar-82. pp. 355-59.
57
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
58
CHAPTER 7
7.1 CONFLICTS
Major criterion in the ECCM response is the ability to resolve
conflict situations. A few examples can be readily cited: Radar with
wideband frequency agility is a compromise solution when its MTI
performance is considered. Wideband antenna can only be
optimised in relation to its narrow band counterparts superior
antenna gain, efficiency and sidelobe performance figures. Faster
scanning rates and beam agility have to compete with the goals set
for high anti-clutter rejection. Thus, any modelling for ECCM
should have the impact of conflicts shown in the analysis process.
Petri nets possess the inherent advantage of illustrating such
conflicts in their directed graphs.
Platform Platform
Self-screening Stand-off
Jammer Jammer
(SSJ) (SOJ)
60
Radar ECCM Model Through Petri Nets
(c)
Normal Frequency
Adaptive Agility
Resources
Platform:
SSJ Platform
with a Wideband Jammer t3
t4
t2 Friendly
Enemy t5 ESM
ESM P4 P3
P2
t1
Inhibit
Frequency
P5 Agility
TOJ
P1
Adaptive Beam
Scan
& LPI
Figure 7.3. ECM and radar ECCM shown in Petri net connectivity
61
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
62
Radar ECCM Model Through Petri Nets
RX ONLY
P2 P1 P3 P2 P2 P3
ADAPTIVE
PROCESSING
P4 P5 SLB/SIC P6 TOJ P7
FREQUENCY
AGILITY CONFLICT
INHIBIT
63
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
AUXILIARY MISSILE
HOMING
T4 A4 A1
TARGET RX
HOMING
T ECM
T HEAD
R
A R
N A
S N
P S
O P
O A2 A3
N T3
D T1 N T2
E D
R E
COMMAND R HOMING TOJ
MODE MODE MODE
64
Radar ECCM Model Through Petri Nets
65
Modelling Radar-ECCM: A System Approach
the missile guidance weaves between homing and TOJ mode. The
first instance the guidance switches on to TOJ, T3 (min) = T2, which
is less than its maximum available duration n4. It is easily seen that
the upper time limit for both homing and TOJ modes will be n4 for
mission accomplishment. However, under severe ECM conditions,
a time cushion is necessary so that the missile still has enough
moments to patch up with the ground station to resume its flight on
fallback command guidance mode. Hence, under the ECM
influence, time stamps T2 and T3 have to work with an upper time
ceiling, say n5, which is less than n4. Transition A4 represents the
auxiliary phase, where the command guidance from ground is
invoked. The time stamps T4 for this junctions works between the
limits n 5 and n4, as can easily be verified.
A further comment that can be made is on the nature of
firing of the transitions. While transitions, A1 and A2 are necessarily
enabled and fired during T1 and T2, respectively, it is not always
mandatory for A3 or A4 to act. In the normal ECM-free environment,
transitions A3 or A4 does not have a part to play, but if these do act,
these need to be fired during time stamps T 3 and T4 allotted to them.
Such transitions, which are not necessarily forced to fire but are
anyway given the choice to act only during specified time intervals,
are known under weak-time semantic4.
The Petri net representation is advanced to another level of
abstraction (Fig. 7.6), to indicate major system-level response under
ECM-ECCM interaction. Transitions with suitable weights for firing
conditions are introduced along with inhibitor arcs and conflict
situations.
The radars ECCM responses under five categories are
depicted. In this example, an attempt has been made to show the
dynamic nature of the response, usual in these conflicts. If the ECM
platform is on active mode, the radar acts in the listening mode.
The signature analysis through its ESM serves to help the ECM
platform to switch to passive mode. This, in turn, forces the radar
to actively transmit again, but now being aware of the presence of
ECM, it tries to effectively use its response from the ECCM suite. A
further level of abstraction can consider the time factor, if the radar
is employed in a multifunction role, wherein multiple threats and
the related radar responses are to be analysed. It becomes
mandatory when common resources are to be managed. It is to be
pointed out again that the nature and the duration of resource tie-
ups are conveniently modelled in timed Petri nets with time
stamped inhibitor arcs.
66
Radar ECCM Model Through Petri Nets
F1 F2 P2
ESM
RADAR NORMAL RADAR
TX RX
RESPONSE
RESOURCES
RADAR (v)
1 PASSIVE F1
1 2
P1
1 F2
2 2
1 P2 1
ACTIVE 1 2 4 (iv)
(i)
RADAR RESPONSE
2 UNDER WIDEBAND
ADAPTIVE
RADAR RESOURCES JAMMING
RESPONSE
ADAPTIVE RADAR
RESPONSE
2 2
2 (iii)
TOJ MODE
NORMAL RX (ii)
FUNCTION
Figure 7.6. ECCM Petri net of a radar system with weight shown for
transitions.
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The utility of Petri nets in the modelling of radar ECCM has
been discussed. Further abstraction can take into account the
statistical nature of the decision process in the selection of ECCM
against a given ECM threat. Side by side, it is necessary to develop
functional relationships to establish ECCM improvement factor
(EIF) to denote system performance and evaluation. Much work
needs to be done, especially on the EIF, whose proper
representation will require the total efficacy of the system, including
the associated weapons5. Petri nets show the potential for
contributing to these developments in the radar ECCM sphere.
REFERENCES
1. Peterson, J.L. Computing Surveys, 1977, 9(3), 223-52.
2. Agerwala, T. Computer, 1979, 12(12), 85-94.
3. Murata, T. Proc. of IEEE, 1989, 77(4), 541-80.
4. Ghezzi, et al., Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop
on Software Specification and Design, 1989. pp. 60-67.
5. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
Artech House, USA. 1979.
67
CHAPTER 8
DECISION MAKER II
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 C
DECISION
MAKER I
S2
70
Game Theory Model Approach to Radar ECCM Evaluation
0 1 1
NO SPECIAL
FEATURES
RADAR
DECISION 1 0 0
MAKER
1 0 1
J-STROBE
PROCESSOR
0 1 0
1 1 0
PULSE
DOPPLER
0 0 1
options at the design stage, the enemy, likewise, does not change
during his mission.
71
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
72
Game Theory Model Approach to Radar ECCM Evaluation
CHAFF DETECTOR -2 -2 -2
73
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
REACTING 1 0
NOT
REACTING 0 1
74
Game Theory Model Approach to Radar ECCM Evaluation
C REACTION
PAYOFF NO REACTION
TO
ATTACKER
D
M
REAL TARGET DECOY
PROBABILITY
Figure 8.5. Guided missile optimisation
right (The pure strategies of Fig. 8.4). The payoff to the attacker is
shown on the vertical axis; the reverse of this scale will be the payoff
to the radar by the zero-sum postulate. Point B in the figure shows
a high payoff to the attacker if the radar reacts to the decoy.
Similarly, point C in the figure is a high payoff if the radar does not
react to the real target. Points A and D represent the low payoff of
being shot at, or no reaction to the decoy. Now, pure strategies are
not viable to the attacker, for if he only uses decoys, he will never
penetrate! and if he never fakes, the radar will always visualise that
it is shooting at a real target. So, the practical case is a probabilistic
mixture of the two, represented by the horizontal axis of Fig. 8.5. By
making the judicious probability mix, the attacker will achieve a
better payoff than he would have achieved under the pure strategies
at points A or D. The point M corresponds to the maximum of the
minimum payoff curve, shown dotted in the figure.
In passing, it may be noted that Fig. 8.5 also illustrates the
most important theorem of game theory: In the two-person zero-
sum M *N matrix game under mixed strategies, the min-max is equal
to the max-min: Player 1 has the gain-floor precisely equal to player
2 loss-ceiling. This particular payoff is known as the value of the
game. The pair of optimum strategies applied in this case are known
as solution to the gain.
75
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
C
REACTION
PAYOFF E NO REACTION
TO
ATTACKER
A F
PROBABILITY
76
Game Theory Model Approach to Radar ECCM Evaluation
RADAR MULTIFUNCTION
SEARCH/TRACK/DESIGNATE/GUIDE
DOMAIN SPECTRAL/TEMPORAL
SPATIAL
77
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
ECCM
SOJ SSJ STEALTH DECOY REPEATER ARM CHAFF (ROW
RADAR ECCM MINIMUM)
HIGH ERP/
BURNTHROUGH
10 10 15 2 -10 -20 5 (-20)
EFFECTIVE
SIDELOBES
20 4 -20 2 10 10 2 (-20)
TRACK ON
JAMMING (TOJ) 5 5 -5 -5 5 5 -5 (-5)
COMPLEX
WAVEFORM 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 (5)
PROCESSING
78
Game Theory Model Approach to Radar ECCM Evaluation
threats assumed: For example, the poor marking of the low sidelobe
technique is due solely to the inclusion of a stealth threat. A balance
must be attained between choosing a wide enough threat spectrum
to lead to a fairly robust solution, and yet not misinterpreting the
matrix maxmin. For the ECM designer, the minmax rating of chaff
and decoy points to their promise for attacking this point-defence
radar.
8.3 CONCLUSION
The evaluation of the efficacy of candidate ECCM features in
a military radar should be an important part of the design process.
79
Wide band Swept Long Short Spot Sidelobe Mainlobe Range Velocity Angle Row
noise frequency pulse pulse frequency repeater repeater gate gate gate minima
jammer jammer jammer jammer jammer stealer stealer stealer
Frequency 3 10 10 5 10 5 5 3 3 3 (3)
agility
Waveform 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 (3)
coding/pulse
compression
Variable 3 2 5 5 2 3 3 3 3 3 (3)
transmitter
pulse parameters
Pulse 5 2 2 2 10 5 5 5 5 5 (5)
Doppler
MTD 4 2 2 2 8 4 4 4 4 4 (4)
80
Monopulse 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 10 (4)
lobe-on-
receive
Jittered 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 -3 (3)
PRF/Doppler
range rate check
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
FTC/IAGC 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 (2)
Channelised 4 5 4 2 10 4 4 4 4 4 (4)
limiter
Dicke-fix 6 5 2 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 (3)
REFERENCES
1. Nilsson, N.J. An application of the theory of games to radar
reception problems. In IRE Convention Record, Part 4. 1959,
pp. 130-40.
2. Rodinov, V.V. A game theory approach to detection of radar
signals in the presence of unknown interference. Radio Engg.
Elec. Phys., 1982, 27(9), 74-80.
3. Friedman, B. Noise and clutter rejection in radar as a problem
in non-cooperative game theory. In Proceedings of International
Symposium on Noise and Clutter Rejection
in Radar and Imaging Sensors, Tokyo, October 1984.
pp. 327-32.
4. Subramanian, A.K. ECCM evaluationSome models. In
Proceedings of International Symposium on Radar, Paris,
May 1984. pp. 523-27.
5. Von Neumann, J. & Marganstern, O. Theory of games and
economic behaviour. Princeton University Press, 1944 (Later
Wiley, 1964).
6. Owen, G. Game theory, Ed. 2. Academic Press, 1982.
81
CHAPTER 9
ECM/ECCM
LIBRARY
OPERATOR
ESM DISPLAY
INTERFACE
84
Knowledge-based Inference for Radar ECCM
ESM SORTER
HARDWARE
FRIENDLY
ESM INPUT U
S
E
R KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECCM DECISION SUPERVISORY
DOMAIN
EXPERTISE B CONTROL
U
S
SIMULATION TRAINING/
DIAGNOSTIC HARDWARE
DYNAMIC
INPUT
RADAR
FUNCTION
85
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
MULTISENSOR FUSION C3 I
ESM INPUT
REFERENCE EW
DECISION
SIGNATURE LIBRARY DECISIONS
SUPPORT
INFERENCE
MODEL
WEAPON
FEEDBACK
SYSTEMS
86
Knowledge-based Inference for Radar ECCM
Deployment (field/environment)
Total weapon system efficacy
A further broad classification, as detailed by Schleher8,
would be to review the ECCM deployment under spatial, spectral,
and temporal planes:
87
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
9.3.1 Handcrafting
A review of the radar ECM-ECCM matrix, such as the one
published2, can help a Knowledge Engineer to go through the
handcrafting exercise for the representation of a knowledge base to
be used by an expert during problem solving. The limitation of this
method is soon perceived when representing the proper and
effective ECCM response against an environment of multiple ECM
threats; also when there are multiple choices of ECCM available for
deployment against a particular, validated threat. In both the cases,
further knowledge representation would require logical induction
and optimisation methods.
Example: Keeping the general concept as outlined above,
one such ECCM decision mechanism is examined here:
The following tree structure illustrates the decision process
for selecting the appropriate ECCM response, given a set of threats
and their decoding capabilities at a radar site. To get the example
working within bounds, a system-level ECCM decision is kept as
the goal, with limited ECCM inventory at the disposal of the decision
maker.
Referring to the Fig. 9.4, the following sequencing of events
and inference could be easily mapped:
(a) The sensors friendly ESM system identifies the threat and
determines its direction
(b) With the input from the radar and other associated sensors,
the range and the type of platform, from which the threat is
perceived, are determined
(c) The decision regarding the nature of the electronic threat
comes from the ESM signal decoder
(d) The ECCM response is then determined from the available
ECCM suite
The above inference procedure (a case of handcrafting), is
not always the best but can provide an initial estimate to the
inferencing procedure. Often, the rule-based system is inadequate
to handle dynamically varying parameters. Further, the hostile
intention inherent in the ECM-ECCM process belies such
streamlined approach. Hence, the decision mechanism becomes
one out of many possible choices.
The decision criterion under such a situation is to optimise
the basic time frame required to search and resolve. A rule-based
88
Range Data
Angle Of ECCM Radar/Other
Arrival Data Signal Decoding Sensor Input
AND
AND
Decode ECM
Decode:Wide Band/
Threat:
Narrow Band/Swept
SSJ/SOJ/Escort
Frequency
Chaff
AND
AND AND
89
SOJ
Platform
Wide Band ECM Wide Band ECM
SSJ/Escort SOJ Platform
Knowledge-based Inference for Radar ECCM
ECCM
MTD
SIGNAL ACQUISITION/
ANGLE OF ARRIVAL/ LIBRARY FUNCTION/ RADAR, ECCM STATUS
FREQUENCY KNOWLEDGE-BASED AND
MEASUREMENT/SCAN ESM/ECM ANALYSIS OPERATOR INPUT
TYPE DETERMINATION AND INFERENCE
ETC.,
USER INTRANET
SUPERVISORY CONTROL
SIMULATION,
ESM SORTER KNOWLEDGE- TRAINING RADAR
HARDWARE BASED ECCM AND FUNCTION
DECISION DIAGNOSTIC MONITOR
HARDWARE
USER INTRANET
90
Knowledge-based Inference for Radar ECCM
REFERENCES
1. Gaudry, E. ITT Electri. Commu., 1986, 60(2), 168-73.
2. Johnston, S.L. Radar electronic counter countermeasures.
Artech House, USA, 1979.
3. Proceedings of the International Conference on Radar, India
(1983), Paris (1984), Washington (1985), China (1986).
4. Li, Nengjing. Proc. of IEEE, 1984, 131(4), 417-23.
5. Johnston, S.L. Record of the CIE International Conference on
Radar, 1986. pp. 149-54.
6. Johnston, S.L. Correspondence, Pt. F, Proc. of IEEE, 1985,
132(3), 198201.
7. Subramanian, A.K. ECCM evaluationsome models In
Proceedings of Radar-84, Paris, 1984. pp. 523-27.
8. Schleher, Curtis D. Introduction to electronic warfare. Artech
House, 1986. USA.
91
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
pod 12 H
specific response 21
threat 5 Handcrafting 88
ECM-ECCM Human intelligence 85
matrix 15, 20 Hybrid simulation 59
library functions 84 I
ED. see ECCM: designer
EIF 6, 19, 56, 67. see also Instantaneous bandwidth 51
ECCM improvement factor Intercept receiver 41
Electronic Interceptor 42
battlefield receiver bandwidth 43
management 13 Interface
beamwidth broadening 50 radar
intelligence 37, 39 interceptor 42
support measure 14 Intra-pulse coding 39
warfare 2 IPAR 47. see Radar: intra-
Electronic countermeasure 9 pulse polarisation agile
ELINT 39, 44. see also J
Electronic intelligence
Encrypted data communication Jammer
50 escort 29
Equations function 37
burnthrough 27 on-board 30
range 31 power 42
dynamic radar range 33 repeater 30
Escort jammer 29 self-protection 27
self-screening 62
ESM 14. see Electronic:
stand-off 62, 76
support measure
Jamming 3
counter 43
interference 3
decoding 85
sidelobe 20
receiver 25 Judging
Event-driven simulation 59 efficacy 6
EW 9 see also Electronic:
warfare L
flywheel 16 LC. see Lifecycle cost
threat 13 Lifecycle cost 57
F Linear chirp 12
Low flying detection model 10
False alarm 3 Low flying target 38
probability 3, 20 Low probability intercept 39
Frequency Low sidelobe performance 52
agility 39 LPI. see Low probability
range of operations 51 intercept
Functional models 20 modulation scheme 43
LPI-ECCM 43, 47
G
M
Game theory 12, 69
model 22 Main-lobe 36
Gulf War 2 Matrix 69
96
Index
dynamics 4 P
ECM-ECCM 20, 56
Payoff 24, 69, 74
Max-min 75
PB. see Pre-brief mode
strategy 73
Petri net 59
MEMs see Micro- Petri nets
electromechanical sensors extended 60
MFR. see Radar: multi function timed 60
antenna ECCM 50 Phased array 35
ECCM 50 antenna 49
Micro-electromechanical Polarisation control 50
sensors 7 Pre-brief mode 55
Min-max 75 Probability
strategy 74 mix 75
theorem 15 of detection 3, 20
Missiles of false alarm 3, 20
of intercept 41
anti radiation 32
Propagation 10
resistance 54
Pure strategy 69
patriot 22
Mixed strategies 24, 74 Q
Mode
Quiet range 45
look-down 10
track-on jammer 62 R
Model
Radar
detection 10
design
land clutter 11 land clutter model 11
Models detection 39
burnthrough equation 27 dynamic range equation 33
deployment 22 ECCM 83
functional 20 evaluation 93
game theory 22 intra-pulse polarisation agile
low flying target detection 38 47
MFR 22 jammer scenario 29
radar LPI 35
LPI-ECCM 44 modelling 34
Modulation 33 models 10
MTI 19, 21 multifunction 21, 49
performance 5, 10
improvement factor 21
point-defence surface 76
Multi-target attack 76
surveillance 40
Multifunctional radar 3
variables 34
Multiple beam generation 50 functions of 34
Multisensor deployment 85 Ranges
Mutual screening range 30 burnthrough 29
O Real-time problems 60
Receiver
Optimum aperture 42
redundancy 56 intercept 41
strategies 75 Receivers
Ordinal measure 71 ESM 25
97
Modelling Radar-ECCM A System Approach
98