Republic of the Philippines Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages
SUPREME COURT amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983
SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA,
petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO
P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI,
respondents.
Amado G. Olis for petitioners.
Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.
ESCOLIN., J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the
classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay
Law. This law requires the compulsory process of arbitration at the
Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court,
Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing
as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal
courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial
courts, but also by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial
courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit its coverage
only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982,
respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of
First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P.
Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma.
R-22154.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants
are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss,
citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior
availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process
required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the
Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had
been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private
respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied in an order dated October 3, 1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal
Courts in the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of P.D.
No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or
arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, shall
be elevated for nullification of the award or for
execution of the same, and considering that from the
provision of Section 14 of the same law, the pre-
condition to the filing of a complaint as provided for in
Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the
considered opinion of this Court that the provision of
Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable
by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12
of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration
filed by the defendants, of the order of September 2.
1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby
denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].
From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a
resolution dated December 2, 1982, We required respondents to file
an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their
answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.
We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508
reads as follows:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of
complaint. No complaint, petition, action for
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed
or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat
and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the
following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under
detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be
barred by the Statute of Limitations
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.
The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30
days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the
law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of
disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or
municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with
respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at
the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon
the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority
over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section
2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to
which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with
the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law
does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compelling the
disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the
barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the
animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members
of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage
indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged
dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed
by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases
exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this
objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what
would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages,
as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his
case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the
mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the
law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and
not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much
more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such
half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of
the time-honored tradition of amicably settling disputes
among family and barangay level without judicial
resources would promote the speedy administration of
justice and implement the constitutional mandate to
preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen
the family as a basic social institution;
WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the
courts of justice contributes heavily and unjustifiably to
the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a
deterioration in the quality of justice;
WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such
docket congestion and thereby enhance the quality of
justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable
to formally organize and institutionalize a system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the
Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, ...
," its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and
comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the
optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives
would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is
exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to
cases cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have
provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which
involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the Barangay where the real property or and
part thereof is situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction
over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except
forcible entry and detainer cases, has always been vested in the
courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4
and 14, 5 of the law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the
forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration
award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be
construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. As
heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by
respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the
settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These
sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction
to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon,
regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute.
But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis
that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies
exclusively to said inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No.
22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of
which is quoted as follows:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST
INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL
COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT
 SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the
Minister of Local Government and Community
Development that all the barangays within your
respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in
implementation of the barangay system of settlement
of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings
in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.
Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the
late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent
modified.
This Circular takes effect immediately.
It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive
"to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has
been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but
also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal
courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations,
now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said
circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of
Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of
which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of
cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all
government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication
of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made
by all government officials and offices concerned of the system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare
that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D.
1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory
not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the
metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by
the regional trial courts as well.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent
judge denying petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside.
Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further proceedings
in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, CJ Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-
Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ concur.
Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., reserves his vote.
De Castro, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.: concurring:
I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu for the collection of P49,400 from the Morata
spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is covered by the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The impression
that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts does not seem
to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or
among persons actually residing in the same barangay or to those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city
or municipality (Sec. 3).
Cases between or among those persons should undergo the
conciliation process, whatever may be the amount involved or the
nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the
following cases:
 (a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities unless such barangays
adjoin each other;
(b) Where the dispute involves real property located in
different cities or municipalities;
(c) Where one party is the government or any sub-
division or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
(e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable
by imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine
exceeding two hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus,
physical injuries requiring medical attendance for not
exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light threats,
unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters
for settlement;
(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party,
for example, littering, gambling, jaywalking, public
scandal, vagrancy and prostitution; and,
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government and Community
Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan
Pambarangay Rules).
The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in
section 6 of the law.
Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9,
1979 has enjoined all Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit
Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian
Courts, city courts, municipal courts and their clerks of court to desist
from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases
falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon their
receipt of the certification of the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within their respective
jurisdictions have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law applies to the cases in Regional Trial Courts or
Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a complaint for damages
in the sum of P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority of the
Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Opinion No.
81, Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series
of 198 1).
The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court
contemplates situations for the enforcement or nullification of
settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or
municipal court will have no occasion to intervene.
Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and
should receive commensurate remuneration for their work is another
question.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.: concurring:
I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu for the collection of P49,400 from the Morata
spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is covered by the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The impression
that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts does not seem
to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or
among persons actually residing in the same barangay or to those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city
or municipality (Sec. 3).
Cases between or among those persons should undergo the
conciliation process, whatever may be the amount involved or the
nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the
following cases:
(a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities unless such barangays
adjoin each other;
(b) Where the dispute involves real property located in
different cities or municipalities;
(c) Where one party is the government or any sub-
division or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
(e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable
by imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine
exceeding two hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus,
physical injuries requiring medical attendance for not
exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light threats,
unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters
for settlement;
(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party,
for example, littering, gambling, jaywalking, public
scandal, vagrancy and prostitution; and,
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government and Community
Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan
Pambarangay Rules).
The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in
section 6 of the law.
Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9,
1979 has enjoined all Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit
Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian
Courts, city courts, municipal courts and their clerks of court to desist
from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases
falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon their
receipt of the certification of the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within their respective
jurisdictions have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law applies to the cases in Regional Trial Courts or
Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a complaint for damages
in the sum of P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority of the
Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Opinion No.
81, Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series
of 198 1).
The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court
contemplates situations for the enforcement or nullification of
settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or
municipal court will have no occasion to intervene.
Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and
should receive commensurate remuneration for their work is another
question.
Footnotes
1 Promulgated June 11, 1978.
2 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Gimenez, I
SCRA 267.
3 SECTION 11. Effect of amicable settlement and
arbitration toward the amicable settlement and
arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10)
days after the date thereof unless repudiation of the
settlement has been made or a petition for nullification
 of the award has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court.
4 SECTION 12. Execution.The amicable settlement or
arbitration award may be enforced by execution within
one (1) year from the date of settlement. After the lapse
of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action
in the appropriate city/municipal court.
5 SECTION 14. Transmittal of settlement and
arbitration award to court.- The Secretary of the Lupon
shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to
the local city or municipal court within five (5) days from
the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day
period for repudiating the settlement and shall furnish
copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement
and the Barangay Captain.
6 Dated November 9, 1979.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167261 March 2, 2007
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner,
vs.
CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES
and FLORENTINA MANACNES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78019, dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set aside the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, and reinstated the Resolution3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province dismissing herein petitioners
action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award and Damages.
The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4 for recovery of
possession of real property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada
filed by herein petitioner before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain
Province on 9 November 1994, against the spouses Leoncio and Florentina
Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein respondent.
On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through
their respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon
(Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings
before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon
for resolution.6
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February
1995 due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement
for Arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8
March 1995, the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were
forwarded to the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding
the matter for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an
Arbitration Award thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the records of
the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties
concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as
provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be
returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration
Award on 10 May 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon
payment to the spouses Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00 for the
improvements on the land. Aggrieved, Leoncios widow,7 Florentina
Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her repudiation was rejected
by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished with copies of the
Arbitration Award.
On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for
Execution of the Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes
filed a Motion with the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the
original case for recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider
her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.
Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes
notwithstanding the latters failure to appear before the court despite notice.
The MCTC denied Florentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration
Award elucidating that since the movant failed to take any action within the
10-day reglementary period provided for under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final and executory.
Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an
Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the
Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong
Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001,
herein petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of
the Arbitration Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the
Manacnes spouses.8 The heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the
Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement
for Arbitration not having been personally signed by the spouses Manacnes,
and the Arbitration Award having been written in English a language not
understood by the parties.
In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for
Enforcement of Arbitration Award in this wise:
x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa concerned?
The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the
lupon concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a
hornbook rule that a null and void act could always be questioned at any time
as the action or defense based upon it is imprescriptible.
The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse
the pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:
"Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in
writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman
or the pangkat. x x x"
The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code
which provides:
"Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers."
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in
conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory.
Likewise, the execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done
personally by the parties themselves so that they themselves are mandated to
sign the agreement.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who
signed the agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another
person. Thus, it is very clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and
415 of RA 7160 are violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who
signed the agreement per instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation?
The answer must still be in the negative. As provided for by the cited
provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to an assistance, it shall be
done only when the party concerned is a minor or incompetent. Here, there is
no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were incompetent. Perhaps very old
but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides is assistance, not
signing of agreements or settlements.
Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in
favor of their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the
agreement to arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the
personal appearance of the parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the
appearance of representatives.
In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the
questioned agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the
mandatory provisions of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof
as it was not the respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.
The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced
effective? Much to be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a
consequence. Considering that the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as
earlier declared, it follows that the arbitration award which emanated from it
is also inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration Award by itself, granting
arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is valid, will readily show that it
does not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:
"Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in writing
in a language or dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the
dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be
written in the language known to them."
Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:
"Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by
mediation, conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or
dialect known to the parties. x x x"
It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the
scenic and serene community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the
Kankanaey language. Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been written
in the Kankanaey language. However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it
is written in English language which the parties do not speak and therefore a
further violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is
hereby dismissed.9
Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she
filed an Appeal before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution
of the MCTC and remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings.
According to the RTC:
As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on
page 51 of the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat
Chairman of the Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was
signed by the respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative
of the Appellee in the instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the
signatures of her aforesaid predecessors-in-interest therein were not
personally affixed by the latter or are falsified-which in effect is an attack on
the validity of the document on the ground that the consent of the defendants
spouses Manacnis is vitiated by fraud. Indulging the Appellee Heirs of
Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of the matter, the fact
still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said original
defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in
question in accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5)
days from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418,
RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated,
such failure is deemed a waiver on the part of the defendants spouses
Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on the ground that their
consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules).
Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now deceased original
defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo under the
equitable principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time in
the present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10,
1995, written in English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and
found on page 4 of the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on
the ground that the English language is not known by the defendants spouses
Manacnis who are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that the document should
have been written in Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413
(b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP Rules). On this score, the
court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of the self-serving mere
say-so of the representative of the Appellee that her predecessors did not
speak or understand English. As a matter of judicial notice, American
Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada, Mountain Province as early
as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place by turns, co-mingling with the
indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating them, and converting
most to the Christian faith, among other things, until the former left about
twenty years ago. By constant association with the white folks, the natives
too old to go to school somehow learned the Kings English by ear and can
effectively speak and communicate in that language. Any which way, even
granting arguendo that the defendants spouses Manacnis were the exceptions
and indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the Arbitration
award in issue on such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of
the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days
from May 10, 1995, the date of the document. Thus, upon the expiration
thereof, the Arbitration Award acquired the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA 7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP
Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No.
07) and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.
In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for
Arbitration and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not
have in the first place been given due course by the court a quo. In which
case, it would not have in the logical flow of things declared both documents
"inefficacious"; without which pronouncements, said court would not have
dismissed the case at bar.
Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the
Resolution appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. 10
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition
before the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9
February 2005, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision, to
wit:
After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would
show that the spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise
with respondent Pang-et. Thus, We are at a loss as to the basis of the
Arbitration Award sought to be enforced by respondent Pang-ets subsequent
action before the MCTC.
There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended
and the same remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to
Arbitrate which was allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed upon by
their respective counsels during the pre-trial conference. In the meeting
before the Lupon, it would seem that the agreement to arbitrate was not
signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly, when the pangkat
chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their thumbmarks in
the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should instead go to
court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a certificate to file
action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to "render
an arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late
Beket Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed property.
While Pang-et offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the
spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their
right to the subject property. Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued
an Arbitration award which favored respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same
was again remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not
entering into any compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear
in both the minutes of the Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9
April 1995. With the foregoing, We find it evident that the spouses Manacnes
never intended to submit the case for arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no
showing that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in
accordance with Rule V of the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after
constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI, thereof the Punong Barangay and the
Pangkat must proceed to hear the case. However, according to the minutes of
the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995, the pangkat Chairman and
another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.
Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or
the Pangkat Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed
to the settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of
the two hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor
voluntarily agreed to anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period
to repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor
necessary since the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were
never freely nor voluntarily entered into by one of the parties to the dispute.
In short, there is no agreement validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an
action or defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We
cannot but agree with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null
and void. Similarly, the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the
agreement is also void.
WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, the MCTC Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for
enforcement of Arbitration Award is REINSTATED.11
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
Pang-et filed the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court
overlooked material facts that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed
Decision. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact
that the original parties, as represented by their respective counsels in Civil
Case No. 83, mutually agreed to submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon
ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner insists that the parties
must be bound by the initial agreement by their counsels during pre-trial to
an amicable settlement as any representation made by the lawyers are
deemed made with the conformity of their clients. Furthermore, petitioner
maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an
amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first
instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC
ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for
arbitration.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress
that, during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the
spouses Manacnes declined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were
adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must
continue. As reflected in the Minutes12 of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26
February 1995, the legality of the signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter
of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement for Arbitration on
behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the spouses
Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve
the issue, the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they
wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify their
intention in the Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated earlier,
the Manacnes spouses did not want to sign such agreement and instead
insisted that the case go to court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February
1995 due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said
Certification are the following: 1) that there was personal confrontation
between the parties before the Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and
2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the personal
confrontation before the Pangkat failed likewise because respondents do not
want to submit this case for arbitration and insist that said case will go to
court.13 Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the records of the
case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an arbitration award, explaining
that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed
that an "Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the
above-entitled case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award
as mandated by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a
finding that the case may now be brought to the court. This is violative of the
KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned by the court.14
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation
proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties. 15 Through this
mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without
enduring the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are
not compelled to settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings
before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in
the courts16 in the event that no true compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of
the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the
Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission
by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively
resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further remanded
the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration
proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes
refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case
for arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the
part of the parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award
is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of
the proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses
the principle of voluntary acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable
settlement.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there
be a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a
case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication. 18 In other words, the only
necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the authority of the
Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been
personal confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to
conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be
emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by
during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to the Agreement for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they
sign the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have signified their never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for arbitration by
consent to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the the Pangkat.
Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed
because the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
insisted that the case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby
with the proceedings in the case for recovery of possession which it AFFIRMED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain
suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the Province, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83
case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa. for Recovery of Possession of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of
the same with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective
counsels agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter SO ORDERED.
into an amicable settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties
respective counsels was the remand of the case to the Lupon ng THIRD DIVISION
Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings and not the actual amicable
settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may only be compelled to
appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary confrontation,
but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the
Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented G.R. No. 157830
appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they
by REYMEL R. SAGARIO,
had already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the
case for conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is
already their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to Petitioner,
the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual Present:
confrontation between the parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement
was reached due to the spouses Manacnes refusal to sign the Agreement for
Arbitration.
PANGANIBAN, Chairman,
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,*
Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will -versus-
not bind the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang CORONA,
Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration
award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the CARPIO MORALES, and
arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract,
parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by GARCIA, JJ.
said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon
and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it.19 In view of the
fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to settle the MARILOU M. PASCUAL,
issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the
spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the
 Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 17, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------
-------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas
dismissing, on motion of herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the
complaint filed against her by her brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual,
represented by his attorney-in-fact Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-
compliance with the conciliation provision-pre condition to filing of
complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code).
Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed
Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated
April 10, 2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale
of Registered Land (Dec. No. 639; Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of
1994) and/or Reconveyance at the appropriate court;
2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;
3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other
mode of payment/and/or dispute resolution;
4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be
necessary relative to the above acts.
x x x[1]
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela
RTC at Roxas a complaint entitled Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M.
Pascual and Register of Deeds, Defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. Br.
23-713-02, for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of
Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance
with Damages.[2]
To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a
Motion to Dismiss[3] on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with
the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,[4] she
contending that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the
barangay court before the case was filed in court.
By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,[5] Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC
at Roxas granted respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-
fact shall be deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from
the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of Attorney. Being a
real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring
this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court provides that Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted
or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and
shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.

. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised

Katarungang Pambarangay provides under Section 409 All disputes
involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the xxx
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is
situated. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A.
7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is
involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore
property is located, regardless of the residence of the parties. bring the necessary complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and
Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not residents of the appear in person as if he is the owner of the land.[9] (Emphasis
same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the and underscoring supplied)
plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira,
Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute (sic) Dante Pascual by virtue of
said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should
have brought the dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where
the property is located. In the case of Royales vs. Intermediate Hence, the present petition questioning the palpable legal errors of the RTC.
Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470, Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) party in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have
no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citing
Agbayani v. Belen.[10]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[7] of the above-said order was denied
by Order of March 24, 2003:[8] Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of
the Local Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of
the same Code the latter of which provides that [a]ll disputes involving real
xxx
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property is located, hence, the use of the word shall makes it mandatory together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
for the bringing of the dispute before the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of
hers, respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or
of the lupon, for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of instrumentality thereof;
Civil Procedure which provides:

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be relates to the performance of his official functions;
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
Rules. An agent acting in his own name for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal, (d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different

being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest. cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

Respondents submissions do not lie.

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of

The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read: different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; and

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine
in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice.
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time
before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in
the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the lupon of said barangay .
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election
of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for
study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings
before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed
waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay
in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted
to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative
whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis supplied)
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,[11] this Court held that where the
parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining
barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the
lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508
(Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have
no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual
residents of the same city or municipality, except where the
barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
(Underscoring supplied)
In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,[12] this Court, noting that the
Tavora ruling, reiterated in other cases including the 1996 case of
Agbayani[13] cited by petitioner, was decided under the provisions of P.D.
No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which were, except for some
modifications, echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local Government Code
which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that the Tavora ruling remained.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as
applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by
respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as defined
in Section 2 of Rule 3[14] of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of
the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by
respondent.
In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not CARPIO MORALES and
an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent GARCIA, JJ.
resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:
referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
Respondent. November 22,
2005
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.
x----------------------------------------x

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003

Order, as well as the March 24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the RESOLUTION
first, of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela at Roxas is SET
ASIDE. Said court is accordingly directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-
713-02 to its docket and take appropriate action thereon with dispatch. GARCIA, J.:

SO ORDERED.
In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of
Republic of the Philippines the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija
Supreme Court
Manila Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with
THIRD DIVISION
willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296 Professional Responsibility.
Complainant,
Present:

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that

PANGANIBAN, J., complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a
Chairman
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have
CORONA, the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a
letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay
captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the
barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted
on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special
Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the
latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants
objection to respondents appearance elicited the response
that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer
inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to
complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely
coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as
an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with
supporting documentation, tending to prove that respondent
had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the
Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of
as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her
complaint: [2]
5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an
ocular inspection of the subject matter of the
complaint. A heated argument took place
because Lorencito Inos said that [complainants
brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in
the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . .
returned to the barangay hall to have the
incident recorded in the barangay blotter....
attached as Annex A
6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo
Inos appeared before the hearing also with the
assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes
of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent]
averred that the minutes is partial in favor of
the complainant because only her statements
were recorded for which reason, marginal
insertions were made to include what
[respondent] wanted to be put on record. She
also signed as saksi in the minutes .
7. xxx In a letter (answer to the
"sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay dated
December 22, 2002, she signed representing
herself as Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a
copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . .
(Words in bracket added.)
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C.
Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed the
respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice,
her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be
considered as in default.[3]
 The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its
to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:
respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July
15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an
answer in due time.[4] RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it
is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with modification,
Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong and considering respondent's actuations was in
Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio violation of Section 415 which expressly
prohibits the presence and representation by
Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty.
conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.
premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a
lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she
argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as
an attorney-in-fact.
Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject
Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner

Maala stated that the charge of complainant has been
established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that
basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from Section 415. Appearance of Parties in
the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person
On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission without the assistance of the counsel or
on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next
of kin who are not lawyers.
 benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her
Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment
since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the
personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies
counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal
to all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11]
appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first
the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to
hand and direct information about the facts and issues,[8]
filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the
the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents
conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the
are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of
lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the
goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their
punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the
conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the
unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could
disputes between the two parties.
sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the
participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their
analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP
of expedite settlement of the case.
Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that
respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section
415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless,
barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable
on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What
of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly
Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who ignored complainants protestation against her continued
thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her
Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby
FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for
willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of
impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B.
POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY.
RICARDO REYES, Respondents.
Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner.
Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER;
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT
BAR. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions
for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from
demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA
116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand
was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in
court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month
had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the
prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the
procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the
conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat
should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9)
months-ample time indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper
court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as
private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred
by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay
Lupon.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED.
Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay
Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An
"individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group
or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural
persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a
corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL
TO BARANGAY LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. In Civil Case No. R-239l5,
plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or
defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-
23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a
juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being
coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the
Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment
suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building
bearing the deceaseds name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said
building has been leased and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo
at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days
of the month.
On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator
of the estate and a resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter
demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from
March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As
petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September 16, 1982 an
ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and assigned to the
sala of respondent judge.
On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing,
among others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the
parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner
contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for
failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court,
as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay
Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That
from the acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the
docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil division of this
court could be considered as meeting the requirement or precondition for
were it not so, the Clerk of Court would not have accepted the filing of the
case especially that there is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the
President of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain
exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order
dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).
Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court
through this petition for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum,
private respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay
conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4,
section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court
where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as
applying to the case at bar.
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article
1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and
detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from demand to vacate the
premises. 2
In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the
complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between
these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least
eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147
of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3
the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay
Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private
respondent nine (9) months ample time indeed within which to bring
his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it
cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe,
that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course
his action to the Barangay Lupon.
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the
Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances
where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL
JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS
OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS
AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular
reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local
Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your
respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement
of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints,
petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library

While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, FIRST DIVISION
1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil
Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. [G.R. No. 132264. October 8, 1998]
Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the
operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto ABRAHAM GEGARE, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
presumption of regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his (Former Special Twelfth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome by the BR. 217, QUEZON CITY, and SPS. MELENCIO and SOTERA C.
disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action LAVARES, respondents.
from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4
RESOLUTION
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a)
of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only QUISUMBING, J.:
where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single
human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the following
the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of resolutions issued by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation UDK No. 9819, to wit:
sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party
who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is
true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of
an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest
in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since
the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the
complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay
Lupon for arbitration.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is

ordered to try and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De

Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino J., concurs in the result.

1) Resolution dated July 17, 1997 which declared that petitioners
appeal may be declared abandoned and dismissed for his failure to
pay the required docket fee, pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50, of the
Rules of Court;i[1]
2)Resolution dated September 24, 1997, denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration with motion for extension of time to file brief;ii[2]
3)Resolution dated October 16, 1997 which noted petitioners motion
for clarification and/or final disposition of his appeal;iii[3]
4)Entry of Judgment dated November 6, 1997 declaring the
Resolution of July 17, 1997 final and executory.iv[4]

The antecedents to this suit are as follows:

In November, 1990, plaintiffs (now private respondents) Melencio and
Sotera C. Lavares filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.v[5] They alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms
and conditions of his lease contract by refusing to pay the monthly
rentals on private respondents property. Demands to vacate the
premises were unheeded by petitioner, prompting private respondents
to file the suit.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court in private
respondents favor ordering petitioner to turn over the possession of
the leased premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use
thereof as well as attorneys fees.vi[6]
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner filed a notice of appeal on
October 3, 1996,vii[7] stating that he was appealing to the Court of
Appeals.
On April 25, 1997, petitioners counsel received a notice from the Clerk
of Court of the Court of Appeals informing him that docketing fees for
petitioners appeal must be paid within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the notice, with a warning that failure to do so will be deemed as
abandonment of the appeal and result in its dismissal.viii[8] Petitioner
failed to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period and as a
consequence, private respondents moved for the dismissal of
petitioners appeal for failure to pay docket fees.ix[9] On July 17, 1997,
respondent Court of Appeals issued the first of the assailed
resolutions, as follows:

Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division, the

appeal may be declared abandoned and dismissed for
appellants failure to pay the required docket fee, pursuant to
Section 1(d), Rule 50, of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners counsel moved for reconsideration on the ground of

excusable negligence in failing to pay the docket fees. Allegedly, the
lawyer originally handling the case resigned from the law firm and
inadvertently failed to turn over the records of the case and to inform
the remaining lawyer about the pendency of petitioners appeal as well
as the need to pay the docket fees. Additionally, counsel prayed for an
extension of time to file appellants brief. Petitioners counsel paid the
corresponding docket fees and thereafter filed the appellants brief on
September 8, 1997.

On September 24, 1997, respondent Court of Appeals issued another

resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration with
accompanying motion for extension to file his brief.
On October 16, 1997, petitioners counsel filed a motion seeking
clarification and/or final disposition of the appeal but respondent Court
of Appeals merely noted the same as it was in the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading.x[10]
On November 6, 1997, the Resolution dated July 17, 1997 became
final and executory and entry of judgment was accordingly made on
December 16, 1997.xi[11] Hence, the instant petition.

It is petitioners contention now that respondent Court of Appeals

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing his appeal for failing to pay docket fees and
thus gave premium to the technical requirements, rather than
resolving the case on substantial merits.

Petitioner also maintains that Entry of Judgment could not have been
made by the Court of Appeals in the absence of any categorical
declaration that his appeal has indeed been abandoned and
dismissed. The contention is anchored on the apparent permissive
tenor of respondent Court of Appeals resolution dated July 17, 1997
which declared that x x x, the appeal may be declared abandoned and
dismissed for appellants failure to pay the required docket fee x x x.
[Italics supplied.]

After careful consideration of the petition, the comments of private

respondents, and the manifestation in lieu of reply by petitioner, we
find the foregoing contentions of petitioner bereft of merit. On the
contrary, respondent Court of Appeals was very explicit when it denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration with motion for extension to file
brief, in its Resolution dated September 24, 1997, in this wise:
 Considering the explanations submitted in appellants motion
for reconsideration with motion for extension of time to file
his brief, and appellees Opposition thereto, appellants
motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.xii[12]
No other conclusion could be deduced from the aforecited
pronouncement, in our view, except that petitioners prayer to be
allowed to pay the docket fees, file his brief, and proceed with his
appeal was being denied by respondent appellate court, categorically.
The appeal had obviously been dismissed already as of July 17, 1997
and this dismissal was confirmed by the September 24, 1997
resolution. Thus, respondent court merely noted petitioners
subsequent motion for clarification and/or final disposition of his
appeal considering that the same is a prohibited pleading under Sec.
3, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. No
doubt respondent Court of Appeals acted justifiably in merely noting
said motion.
Also without merit, in our view, is petitioners plea for a liberal
treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the
technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has
consistently been held that payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in
Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections,xiii[13] such payment is an
essential requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over
a case:
The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v.
Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135
[1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of
Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The requirement of an appeal
fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure.
It is an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no
appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the
law.
Thus, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.An appeal may
be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or
on that of the appellee, on the following grounds.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful
fees as provided in Section 5 of Rule 40 and Section 4 of
Rule 41;
xxx xxx x x x.
As previously discussed, we took notice of the fact that petitioner's
appeal with respondent court was considered abandoned and
dismissed per Resolution dated July 17, 1997, and the subsequent
move to reconsider denied on September 24, 1997. These resolution
have become final and executory on November 6, 1997 and Entry of
Judgment was made on December 16, 1997. Thus, filing a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cannot be
used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, the exception of
which is not applicable in this particular case.xiv[14]
Given the circumstances in this case, and considering precedents as
well as prevailing rules, we find petitioners claim that respondent
appellate court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
resolutions, could not prosper. The resultant dismissal of his appeal is
well justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
i
ii
iii
iv
vFIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004]

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Resolutions[2] dated 2 July 1998
and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[3] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite (RTC), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribianas (Edwin) motion to dismiss
the petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent Lourdes Tribiana (Lourdes).

Antecedent Facts

Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union only on
28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that
Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned
out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss
Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made
before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.

On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts
at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from
their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.

On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and
his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate court also denied Edwins motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action attached by
Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise but failed.

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not required in petitions for habeas corpus.

The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition for habeas corpus that the parties exerted prior
efforts to reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petitions dismissal under Section
1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family
Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable condition precedent. Article 151 provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Edwins arguments do not persuade us.

It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to compromise
proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached
a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the
Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were
unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite the existence of the
Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.

Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A dismissal
under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given
that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is
not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[5] It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a
compromise have been made at all.

In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.[6] Such
defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a
motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.[7] Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right
without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading.[8] A motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading.[9] More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition precedent is not
a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that
in cases where the defect consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court
should order the amendment of the complaint.[10] Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies between the parties.[11]

Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the
paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities
should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.[12] This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only
one year and four months when taken away from the mother.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional ground the exception in Section
412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) on barangay conciliation, which states:

(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to court in the following instances:

xxx

2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;

xxx.

Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding in two
instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention. The second instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such
custody. The most common case falling under the second instance involves children who are taken away from a
parent by another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under this category.

The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings
where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties to go
directly to court without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty
warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.[13] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions on the
additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation
requirement.

The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial of his motion to dismiss merely states a
blanket allegation of grave abuse of discretion. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not a
proper subject of a petition for certiorari.[14] Even in the face of an error of judgment on the part of a judge
denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure.
[15] The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose as
affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary
circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort to a petition for certiorari is
proper.[16]

The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on technicalities. This is precisely what
has happened in this case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint of the slightest abuse of discretion by the
RTC or the Court of Appeals. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency of filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse. More importantly, any matter
involving the custody of a child of tender age deserves immediate resolution to protect the childs welfare.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending before it. This
decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
vi
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SECOND DIVISION

ESTELA L. BERBA, G.R. No. 160032

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE Promulgated:

HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,
Respondents. November 11, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)

in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case
No. 170639.

Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of a parcel of land located at

No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house

was constructed on the lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in

1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration, the lessees continued leasing the house on

a month-to-month basis.

By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees failed to pay the rentals due,

and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00. Berba then filed a complaint for eviction and collection

of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo

executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:

Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na nasasakop ng
Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking
tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng
buwan bilang hulog sa aking pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang P81,818.00
na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng buo ang
aking pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o
pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa
aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking upa sa aking
tinitirahan.[3]

By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1, 2001, the total arrearages of

the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2, 2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote the lessees, demanding

payment of the said amount and to vacate the house within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue them. [5]

The lessees ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a complaint[6] against Josephine Pablo and the

Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that,
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of

plaintiff ordering defendant (sic)

a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of
Manila;
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand One Hundred
Fifteen and 63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in
arrears to the present;
c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and
63/100 Pesos (P4,562.63) per month representing monthly rent on the
premises for the year 2001 until finality of the judgment;
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of
attorneys fees;
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos;
f) to pay costs of suit.

Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the premises.[7]

Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that no

conciliation or settlement had been reached.

In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying rentals because of

financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain if the plaintiff was the owner of the property. By

way of special and affirmative defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she

failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon.[8]

During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite earnest efforts, no

amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as whether or not the plaintiff had a valid cause of

action for unlawful detainer against the defendants.[9]

In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her and Pablo, which appeared

to have been approved by Punong Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales of Barangay 873, as well as other members

of the Lupon,[10] duly approved by the Pangkat. She also appended a Statement of Account indicating that the

defendants back rentals amounted to P135,115.63.[11]

In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through the Lupon ng

Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence, Berbas complaint was premature. They also averred

that the increase in the rental rates imposed by the plaintiff was unjustified and illegal.

In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a Certificate to File

Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, while the defendants were

residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana, Manila.

On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants and
all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana,
Manila and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount
of P135,115.63 representing monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for
the succeeding months until finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced amount
of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff, the RTC issued an order for the

execution of the decision pending appeal.[13] The defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order,[14] but
before the court could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the property to

Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]

In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berbas action in the MTC was

premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon. They also claimed that Berba

unlawfully increased the rentals for the house.[16] Berba, on the other hand, averred that there was no need of a

prior referral to the Lupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited Section 408(f) of the Local

Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in Malate, 8 kilometers away from Barangay 873

in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and the Palanca heirs resided.[17]

On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting aside the appealed decision.

The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is
also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court
a quo pending appeal is also set aside.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who reside in the same

city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the

Lupon.[19] The court cited the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]

Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration[22] of the decision, which the RTC denied in its Order[23] dated

October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, where she averred:
 a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral to the Barangay Court by
the respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and

b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with respect to referring her
complaint before the Barangay Court.[24]

Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that Section 408 of the Local

Government Code should be construed liberally together with Section 412. She further averred that she had

complied substantially with the requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings before the Lupon

resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply with the agreement, all

chances of amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were

estopped from claiming that she failed to comply with the Local Government Codes requirement of prior referral

of their dispute to the Lupon.

After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the RTC

decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision, which proved futile.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO

CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160)
WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY
DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE COURT.[26]

The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and whose only source of

income are the rentals generated from the property, which she also uses to pay her medical expenses. She avers

that the continued denial of her right to the fruits of the subject property is highly unjust and contrary to the spirit
behind the enactment of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.[27]

The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of the CA, she would have to

go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous, process of going back to square one; that is, referring the

dispute to the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be rendered useless considering that respondents had

already been validly and effectively ejected from the leased premises. She would then have to go through the

rungs of the judicial ladder a second time to vindicate her trampled rights. She further claims that the CAs

affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a legal anomaly. She points out that the very

purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes between members of the same or adjacent barangays

to the end that their disputes will not reach the doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted

process as suggested by the RTC ruling and affirmed by the CA.[28]

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was estopped from relying on

the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because the

respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca were not parties thereto. The respondents maintained that the petitioner must

bear the blame for her failure to comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she insisted that there was no

need for prior referral of the dispute to the Lupon, claiming that she resided in a barangay other than where the

respondents resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and

respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents aver, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioners

action for unlawful detainer because it was filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999

when the petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the action should be one

for recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).

 On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file

their respective memoranda.[29] The parties complied.

The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of the RTC reversing the

decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice.

The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement on June 5, 1999, which

was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such

agreement of the parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court declared in

Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong barangay,

within six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an

action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government Code:

We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the settlement to
the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and
to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement
which is not repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Lupon
through the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so
enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the
proper city or municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended,
which reads:

SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be

enforced by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in
the proper city or municipal court. (Italics supplied).

Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the enforcement
of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement
of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of
the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the
party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon
during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement
and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation
under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of
 Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of
law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement
by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with
the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison detre of the law is to afford the parties during the
six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before
the Lupon.[31]

In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of repaying the back rentals

of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement

against her and move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before the Lupon

for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for

the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner filed an action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful

detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those already due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement

was executed. The action of the petitioner against respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5,

1999.

The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June 5, 1999 Agreement with

respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the complaint as against such respondent, the MTC rendered

judgment against her and ordered her eviction from the leased premises.

The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca was

premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by the petitioner as parties-respondents before the

Lupon. The petitioner filed her complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said

respondent heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it. Section 412 of the

Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of complaints in court, to wit:

SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint,

petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there
has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that
 no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has
been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.

Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound to

submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree
to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
 (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under
this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement.

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code, such

complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.[32]

The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals[33] is misplaced. In that

case, there was a confrontation by the parties before the Barangay Chairman and no agreement was reached.

Although no pangkat was formed, the Court held in that instance that there was substantial compliance with the

law. In any event, the issue in that case was whether the failure to specifically allege that there was no

compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. Moreover, no such

confrontation before the Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful detainer suit against Josephine Pablo

before the MTC.[34]

In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the City of Manila,

albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent heirs was thus a matter

within the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer and the collection of

back rentals should have been first filed before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an

opportunity to settle the case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint against the respondent Heirs

of Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature. The execution of the June

5, 1999 Agreement between petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial

compliance to the requirements of the Local Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation

proceedings.
 Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of the case, it is not

without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which would require the petitioner to start again from

the beginning. The facts of the present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the petition under

these circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local Government Code and to wiping it off

the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure are

concerned. This Court has no authority to do that.[35]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

xiv