LABOR LAW 2 A2010 194
order denying the MFR seeking annulment of the certification election.
On the basis of the result of the secret ballot election, the CIR certified
the MME as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the non-
supervisory employees of the ESSO at its Pandacan Terminal unit. The
CLU and the ESSO filed separate motions to have this last order
reconsidered. These motions are pending resolution.
- The CLU filed with this Court an urgent petition praying for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the CIR from proceeding with
the enforcement of its order on the ground that the issues to be heard in
its 1st petition before this Court would become moot and academic if the
said order was enforced. The CLU moved to have the hearing
advanced. This Court issued the injunction prayed for, restraining the
CIR from enforcing its order and also from proceeding or taking any
other action in connection with the certification election case. This Court
also advanced the hearing. The CLU filed with this Court a 2nd petition
for review of the order and resolution of the CIR en banc. We gave due
course to the 2nd petition for review and resolved further to consider it
together with the 1st.
- Pending this Court's adjudication of the two cases, the MME filed with
this Court a "Motion for Preliminary Injunction", alleging that the ESSO
and the CLU had extended the term of the existing CBA; that pursuant
to its provisions, the CLU and the ESSO will commence negotiations for
a new CBA and sign the same, unless a preliminary injunction is issued
by this Court; that a new agreement will render moot and academic the
order of the CIR certifying the MME as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the employees of the ESSO unit, and may again be alleged
as a bar to the holding of a new certification election. The motion was
opposed by the CLU and the ESSO, both alleging that since the secret
ballot election was held, there has occurred a substantial change in the
composition of the rank and file employees at the ESSO unit, a good
number of them having left their employment, retired, or been
compulsorily laid off with the approval of the CIR, resulting in a change
of employee composition in the unit; that the ESSO will negotiate a new
CBA with the union that commands the majority of the present labor
force, either the CLU or the MME, as the case may be; and that if this
Court issues the restraining order, it will suspend the process of a new
CBA to the prejudice of the workers who would be denied the economic
benefits thereof. This court issued an injunction commanding the CLU
and ESSO to refrain from negotiating and concluding a new collective
bargaining agreement until after this Court shall have decided the case
on the merits.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the court may determine which of the competing unions is the
appropriate bargaining unit
HELD
1. NO
Ratio This Court in numerous cases has reaffirmed its attitude that it is
a sound and unassailable labor practice for labor and management to
conclude a new contract before the expiry date of any collective
bargaining agreement in order to avoid a hiatus in management-labor
relations.
Reasoning The passage of time has removed all meaning and validity
from the positions taken by the 2 competing unions. All the pleadings
extant in the record are dated and were filed prior to the date when the
CBA in question expired; the positions of the 2 unions have therefore
become academic. The CLU claims that it is the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent on the strength of its prior collective bargaining history;
the MME claims that it is the one that should be recognized on the basis
of the will of the employees manifested in the secret ballot election in
favor of the MME. Like the CLU, the MME claims that its majority status
should be presumed to continue up to the present time and for as long
as the question has not been finally resolved. Against the presumption
of continued majority status, however, is the rule that such
majority status does not continue forever "especially in face of an
assertion and offer of proof to the contrary", or "in view of altered
circumstances which have likely occurred in the interim", or "by a
change in the conditions which demonstrates that a shift in
sentiment actually exists among the employees, and is caused by
other factors than the employer's refusal to bargain collectively".
The burden of coming forward with proof of majority status is upon the
union asserting it. Against the claim of the MME that it represents the
Disini
will of the majority of the rank and file employees at the
Pandacan Terminal unit, is the manifestation, advanced with
vehemence, of both the CLU and the ESSO that after the secret
ballot election, the employee composition has substantially
changed because a great number of the employees and laborers
in the Pandacan Terminal unit have left their employment,
retired, or been compulsorily laid off with the approval of the CIR.
Precisely because the record is barren of evidence upon which
this Court may properly reach a definitive determination as to
which of the 2 unions should be upheld, at this time, as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent, this Court will not even begin to
attempt to resolve the problem in favor of one or the other labor
union.
Disposition Case remanded to the CIR with instructions to take
such action and issue such orders as circumstances may
warrant.
Part 8
Unfair labor practice
8.01 INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
1. DEFINITION and GENERAL CONCEPT
-212 (K); 247
ART. 212. Definitions. -(k) "Unfair labor practice" means any
unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the Code.
ART. 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for
prosecution thereof. - Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both
labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations.
Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of
the civil rights of both labor and management but are also
criminal offenses against the State which shall be subject to
prosecution and punishment as herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment of the powers vested in them by
Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all
cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor
Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and
resolution of all cases involving unfair labor practices. They
shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from
the time they are submitted for decision.
Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings
shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.
No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted
without a final judgment finding that an unfair labor practice
was committed, having been first obtained in the preceding
paragraph. During the pendency of such administrative
proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of the
criminal offense herein penalized shall be considered
interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in the
administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the
criminal case nor be considered as evidence of guilt but
merely as proof of compliance of the requirements therein set
forth. (As amended by BP Bilang 70, and later further
amended by Section 19, RA No. 6715)
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 195
DEFINITION
STERLING V SOL
7 SCRA 446
LABRADOR; February 28, 1963
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Loreta Sol was a regular Radio Monitor of Sterling Products
international. She charged herein petitioners for committing an unfair
labor practice. She was allegedly dismissed after she filed a complaint
against Sterling for underpayment and other benefits. (xmas bonus,
leaves)
- Sterling claims that Sol was an independent contractor and that she
was terminated because her services were no longer required.
- CIR ruled that Sol was an independent contractor.
- Lower court reversed and found that Sol was an employee (There was
control over the means and results) It ordered her reinstatement and
payment of back wages. It also ruled that Sterling was guilty of unfair
labor practice.
ISSUE/S
1. WON Sol was an independent contractor
2. WON Sterling was guilty of unfair labor practice
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning
- Sol was directed to listen to certain broadcasts, directing her, in the
instructions given her, when to listen and what to listen, petitioners
herein naming the stations to be listened to, the hours of broadcasts,
and the days when listening was to be done. Sol had to follow these
directions. The mere fact that while performing the duties assigned to
her she was not under the supervision of the petitioners does not render
her a contractor, because what she has to do, the hours that she has to
work and the report that she has to submit all these are according to
instructions given by the employer.
- The very act of respondent Sol in demanding vacation leave,
Christmas bonus and additional wages shows that she considered
herself an employee
2. NO.
Ratio
As respondent Sol was merely an employee and was not connected with
any labor union, the company cannot be considered as having
committed acts constituting unfair labor practice as defined in the
Industrial Peace Act, Rep. Act 875.
Reasoning
- The term unfair labor practice has been defined as any of those acts
listed in See. 4 of the Act. The respondent Sol has never been found to
commit any of the acts mentioned in paragraph (a) of Sec. 4.
Respondent Sol was not connected with any labor organization, nor has
she ever attempted to join a labor organization, or to assist, or contribute
to a labor organization. The company cannot, therefore, be considered
as having committed an unfair labor practice
Disposition Decision modified
Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global
Communications and Philcom Corporation
Carpio ; July 17, 2006
Nature Petition for Review of the decision of the CA
Facts
-Upon the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU or union) and
private respondent Philippine Global Communications, Inc. (Philcom,
Inc.) the parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July
Disini
1997. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed on October
21, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) – National Capital Region, a Notice of Strike due to
perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company.
Company suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved the
union to file for another Notice of Strike on the ground of
bargaining deadlock.
-At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the
parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed
by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency
of the proceedings. While the union and the company officers
and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers
and members staged a strike at the company premises,
barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a
stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. The
following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over
the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code.
Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order
assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or
lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the parties to
cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate
the situation, directing the striking workers to return to work
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary’s
Order and for management to resume normal operations, as well
as accept the workers back under the same terms and
conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required
to submit their respective position papers and evidence within
ten (10) days from receipt of said order. A second order was
issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees
to return to work immediately.
The union filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing, among
others, the authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Said motion was denied in an
Order dated January 7, 1998.
-The Secretary denied both motions for reconsideration of
Philcom and PEU. PEU filed with the SC a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Secretary’s Orders. SC referred the case to the CA. CA denied
petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that, contrary to PEU’s view,
the Secretary could take cognizance of an issue, even only
incidental to the labor dispute, provided the issue must be
involved in the labor dispute itself or otherwise submitted to him
for resolution.
Issues
WON the Labor Secretary could take cognizance of the case
and WON PEU is liable for the illegal strike
Held
Yes to both. The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue
on the legality of the strike. The very reason of the Secretary’s
assumption of jurisdiction was PEU’s declaration of the strike,
any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is
essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code applies. The powers granted to
the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been
characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State,
with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary
exercises these powers, he is granted “great breadth of
discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The
most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an
impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken
place. The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over
a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends
to all questions and controversies arising from such labor
dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to
enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute.
-Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’
right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the
workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 196
a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are
not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f),
which in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEU’s charge
of unfair labor practice.
-A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom
convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts
defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of
misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-
payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate
transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of
implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA
between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure.
-PEU could not have validly anchored its defiance to the return-to-work
orders on the motion for reconsideration that it had filed on the
assumption of jurisdiction order. A return-to-work order is immediately
effective and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity.
Philcom published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer a notice to striking
employees to return to work. These employees did not report back to
work but continued their mass action.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more
than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may
choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship
with their employer.
The following provision of the Labor Code governs the effects of defying
a return-to-work order:
ART. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by
the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout x x x x
Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike,
shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment,
even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.
A strike undertaken despite the Secretary’s issuance of an assumption
or certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and thus, illegal,
under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who
knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their
employment status. The union members, including union officers, who
commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order
are also deemed to have lost their employment status. Otherwise, the
workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in
the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to
discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions.
-Failure of PEU’s officers and members to comply immediately with the
return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997
cannot be condoned. Defiance of the return-to-work orders of the
Secretary constitutes a valid ground for dismissal.
The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without
legal constrictions. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, on prohibited
activities, provides:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.
The Labor Code is emphatic against the use of violence, coercion,
and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the obstruction
of free passage to and from the employer’s premises for lawful
purposes. A picketing labor union has no right to prevent employees of
another company from getting in and out of its rented premises,
otherwise, it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an
innocent by-stander. The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe
that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and
defiantly picketing Philcom’s premises to prevent the resumption of
company operations, the striking employees have forfeited their right to
be readmitted.
Disini
Section 6. Conciliation. - x x x x
During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act
which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute.
They are obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in
good faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation
meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. x x x x
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a
prohibited activity to declare a strike “during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the same strike.”
-Lamentably, PEU defiantly proceeded with their strike during the
pendency of the conciliation proceedings.
-PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance
procedure established in the CBA. PEU should have
immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in
the CBA. In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who
knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably.
The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the
consequences of their illegal acts. A strike declared on the basis
of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance
committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature
and illegal.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED; CA’s decision is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the Secretary of Labor is directed
to determine who among the Philcom Employees Union officers
participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union
members committed illegal acts or defied the return-to-work
orders.
GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION V NLRC
504 SCRA 652
CARPIO MORALES; October 17, 2006
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- Respondent Galaxie Steel Corporation (Galaxie) is a
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale
of re-bars and steel billets which are used primarily in the
construction of high-rise buildings. On account of serious
business losses which occurred in 1997 up to mid-1999 totaling
around P127M, Galaxie decided to close down its business
operations.
- Galaxie filed a written notice with DOLE informing DOLE of its
intended closure and the consequent termination of its
employees effective August 31, 1999. And it posted the notice of
closure on the corporate bulletin board.
Petitioners Galaxie Steel Workers Union and Galaxie employees
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and
money claims against Galaxie.
- The Labor Arbiter, declared valid Galaxie’s closure of business
but nevertheless ordered it to pay petitioner-employees
separation pay, pro-rata 13th month pay, and vacation and sick
leave credits.
- NLRC upheld the LA’s decision but reversed the award of pro-
rata 13th month pay and vacation and sick leave credits, the
same not being among petitioners’ causes of action as in fact
they were not even mentioned in their pleadings. It reversed too
the award for separation pay, the closure of Galaxie’s business
being due to serious business losses. Nevertheless, the NLRC
directed Galaxie to grant petitioners, by way of financial
assistance, the same amount given to the employees who had
executed quitclaims. MFR denied.
- CA upheld the NLRC decision and accordingly denied
petitioners’ petition for certiorari as it did their MFR.
- Petitioners contend that (1) CA erred in not finding that
Galaxie’s closure of business operations was motivated not by
serious business losses but by their anti-union stance (2)
Galaxie did not serve written notices of the closure of business
operations upon its employees, it having merely posted a notice
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 197
on the company bulletin board, hence, Galaxie should be liable for
backwages; and (3) CA’s upholding of the deletion by the NLRC of
separation pay is contrary to the ruling in Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank v. NLRC which held that separation pay is proper in
cases where closure or cessation of business operations is due to
serious business losses or financial reverses.
ISSUES
1 WON Galaxie is guilty of unfair labor practice in closing its business
operations shortly after petitioner union filed for certification election.
2 WON petitioners are entitled to separation pay.
3 WON the written notice posted by Galaxie on the company bulletin
board sufficiently complies with the notice requirement under A283 of
LC.
HELD
1 NO
- The Court is not a trier of facts, a rule which applies with greater force
in labor cases where the findings of fact of NLRC are accorded respect
and even finality, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence
from which an independent evaluation of the facts may be made. The
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and CA were unanimous in ruling that
Galaxie’s closure or cessation of business operations was due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, and NOT because of any
alleged anti-union position.
2 NO
- First. Galaxie’s documentary evidence shows that it had been
experiencing serious financial losses at the time it closed business
operation. It is supported by substantial evidence consisting of the
audited financial statements
- Second. (IMPT. for our purposes) Petitioners failed to present concrete
evidence supporting their claim of unfair labor practice. Unfair labor
practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to organize, and are
defined in A248 and A261 of LC. The prohibited acts relate to the
workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of CBA without
which relation the acts, no matter how unfair, are not deemed unfair
labor practices.
- In North Davao Mining Corp v. NLRC, it was held that A283 governs
the grant of separation benefits "in case of closures or cessation of
operation" of business establishments "NOT due to serious business
losses or financial reverses" Where, the closure then is due to serious
business losses, LC does not impose any obligation upon the employer
to pay separation benefits. Thus, denial of petitioners’ claim for
separation pay was proper.
3 NO
- The mere posting on the company bulletin board does not, however,
meet the requirement under A283 of "serving a written notice on the
workers." The purpose of the written notice is to inform the employees of
the specific date of termination or closure of business operations, and
must be served upon them at least one month before the date of
effectivity to give them sufficient time to make the necessary
arrangements. In order to meet the foregoing purpose, service of the
written notice must be made individually upon each and every employee
of the company. This was not met.
Dispositive CA decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION. Galaxie
Steel Corp is ORDERED to PAY each of the individual petitioners the
amount of P20K as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory
due process.
2. REQUISITE RELATIONSHIP
REQUIRED RELATIONSHIP
PHELPS DODGE CORP. V NLRB
313 U.S. 177
FRANKFURTER; April 28, 1941
NATURE Petition for review of a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals
Disini
FACTS
- The source of the controversy was a strike, begun on June 10,
1935, by the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers at Phelps Dodge's Copper Queen Mine.
- The Board concluded that the Corporation had committed
unfair labor practices in violation of 8(3) of the Act after a finding
that a number of men had been refused employment because of
their affiliations with the Union. Of these men, two, Curtis and
Daugherty, had ceased to be in the Corporation's employ before
the strike but sought employment after its close. The others,
thirty-eight in number, were strikers. To 'effectuate the policies' of
the Act, 10(c), the Board ordered the Corporation to offer Curtis
and Daugherty jobs and to make them whole for the loss of pay
resulting from the refusal to hire them, and it ordered thirty-seven
of the strikers reinstated with back pay, and the other striker
made whole for loss in wages up to the time he became
unemployable.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the order affecting the
strikers but struck down the provisions relating to Curtis and
Daugherty.
ISSUE
WON an employer may refuse to hire employees solely because
of their affiliations with a labor union
HELD
NO
- The denial of jobs to men because of union affiliations is an old
and familiar aspect of American industrial relations. An embargo
against employment of union labor was notoriously one of the
chief obstructions to collective bargaining through self-
organization. Indisputably the removal of such obstructions was
the driving force behind the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act. The prohibition against 'discrimination in regard to
hire' must be applied as a means towards the accomplishment of
the main object of the legislation. We are asked to read 'hire' as
meaning the wages paid to an employee so as to make the
statute merely forbid discrimination in one of the terms of men
who have secured employment. So to read the statute would do
violence to a spontaneous textual reading of 8(3) in that 'hire'
would serve no function because, in the sense which is urged
upon us, it is included in the prohibition against 'discrimination in
regard to ... any term or condition of employment'.
Contemporaneous legislative history, and, above all, the
background of industrial experience forbid such textual
mutilation.
- The statute does not impose an obligation on the employer to
favor union members in hiring employees. He is as free to hire
as he is to discharge employees. The statute does not touch 'the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its
employees or to discharge them'. It is directed solely against the
abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self-organization.
Disposition Decree modified, some matters were remanded to
the Board for determination.
3. CONSTRUCTION
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND
SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION V CIR
44 SCRA 509
FERNANDO : September 28, 1972
FACTS:
Caltex (claims):
- managerial personnel could neither claim nor be the
object of an unfair labor practice
- based on the case In re: Petition for Certification
Election at the Caltex, Inc., Cebu District, Altex
Supervisory and Foremen’s Union: the Court declared
certain positions in respondent company’s Cebu
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 198
District as management and excluded them from the
bargaining unit of supervisors.
ISSUE:
WON an unfair labor practice may be committed against managerial
personnel who are members of petitioner Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association
HELD:
YES
Reasoning
- The stand of the company was not a whimsical and flimsy
one. It had valid legal basis. It honestly believed that
managers, being part of management should not be included
in a union of supervisors.
- The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can
organize. What respondent Company failed to take into
account is that the right to self-organization is not merely a
statutory creation. It is fortified by our Constitution. All are free
to exercise such right unless their purpose is contrary to law.
Certainly it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an
emasculation of, the concept of law if managers as such were
precluded from organizing. Having done so and having been
duly registered, as did occur in this case, their union is entitled
to all the rights under Republic Act No. 875. Considering what
is denominated an unfair labor practice under Section 4 of
such Act and the facts set forth in our decision, there can be
only one answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor
practice could be committed by respondent Company insofar
as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is quite
obvious, in the negative.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied
3.1 ESTOPPEL
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION
(NUBE) V CONFESOR AND STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK
432 SCRA 308
CALLEJO,SR.; June 16,2004
NATURE
Petition for certiorari filed by the Standard Chartered Bank Employees
Union, seeking the nullification of the October 29, 1993 Order of then
Secretary of Labor and Employment Nieves R. Confesor and her
resolutions dated December 16, 1993 and February 10, 1994.
FACTS
- Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank, for brevity) is a foreign banking
corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard
Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union, for brevity).
- In August of 1990, the Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with a provision to renegotiate the terms
thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration of the three-year period
but within the sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the
negotiations.
- The Union and Bank exchanged proposals and counter-proposals. And
on May 18, 1993, the negotiation for economic provisions commenced.
A presentation of the basis of the Union's economic proposals was
made. The next meeting, the Bank made a similar presentation.
Towards the end of the Bank's presentation, Umali (President of the
National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the
Union was affiliated) requested the Bank to validate the Union's
"guestimates," especially the figures for the rank and file staff. In the
succeeding meetings, Umali chided the Bank for the insufficiency of its
counter-proposal on the provisions on salary increase, group
hospitalization, death assistance and dental benefits. He reminded the
Bank, how the Union got what it wanted in 1987, and stated that if need
be, the Union would go through the same route to get what it wanted.
Disini
- Upon the Bank's insistence, the parties agreed to tackle the
economic package item by item. Upon the Union's suggestion,
the Bank indicated which provisions it would accept, reject, retain
and agree to discuss. The Bank suggested that the Union
prioritize its economic proposals, considering that many of such
economic provisions remained unresolved. The Union, however,
demanded that the Bank make a revised itemized proposal.
- Diokno (Bank's Human Resource Manager and Head of
Negotiating Panel) stated that, in order for the Bank to make a
better offer, the Union should clearly identify what it wanted to be
included in the total economic package. Umali replied that it was
impossible to do so because the Bank's counter-proposal was
unacceptable. He furthered asserted that it would have been
easier to bargain if the atmosphere was the same as before,
where both panels trusted each other. Diokno requested the
Union panel to refrain from involving personalities and to instead
focus on the negotiations. He suggested that in order to break
the impasse, the Union should prioritize the items it wanted to
iron out. Divinagracia (President of Union) stated that the Bank
should make the first move and make a list of items it wanted to
be included in the economic package. Except for the provisions
on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed to
agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The
Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
- On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor
Practice (ULP) and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila
against the Union. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its
duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in good faith. It contended
that the Union demanded "sky high economic demands,"
indicative of blue-sky bargaining. Further, the Union violated its
no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the
NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an
illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Finally, the
Bank alleged that as a consequence of the illegal act, the Bank
suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate
and hire the services of the lawyer.
- Then Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) Nieves R.
Confesor, pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, issued
an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the
Bank. After the parties submitted their respective position
papers, the SOLE issued an Order on October 29, 1993, the
dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:
WHEREFORE, the Standard Chartered Bank and the
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE)
are hereby ordered to execute a collective bargaining
agreement incorporating the dispositions contained
herein. The CBA shall be retroactive to 01 April 1993
and shall remain effective for two years thereafter, or
until such time as a new CBA has superseded it. All
provisions in the expired CBA not expressly modified
or not passed upon herein are deemed retained while
all new provisions which are being demanded by either
party are deemed denied, but without prejudice to such
agreements as the parties may have arrived at in the
meantime.
The Bank's charge for unfair labor practice which it
originally filed with the NLRC but which is deemed
consolidated herein, is dismissed for lack of merit. On
the other hand, the Union's charge for unfair labor
practice is similarly dismissed.
- The SOLE dismissed the charges of ULP of both the Union and
the Bank, explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their
claims. Citing National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco
Corporation, the SOLE stated that ULP charges would prosper
only if shown to have directly prejudiced the public interest.
- Dissatisfied, the Union filed an MFR with clarification, while the
Bank filed an MFR. On December 16, 1993, the SOLE issued a
Resolution denying the motions. The Union filed a second MFR,
which was, likewise, denied on February 10, 1994.
- On March 22, 1994, the Bank and the Union signed the CBA.
Immediately thereafter, the wage increase was effected and the
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 199
signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the
employees covered by the CBA.
- On April 28, 1994, the Union filed this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S
1. WON Union was estopped, considering that it signed the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
A person, who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a
particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position,
attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to
another. (1431,CC)
Reasoning In the case, however, the approval of the CBA and the
release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived
its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. After all, the
conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE, while the
signing bonus was included in the CBA itself. Moreover, the Union twice
filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the
Bank before the SOLE.
TAKE NOTE: The petition was decided on merits and reiterated
most of the SOLE's reasoning. So although estoppel didn't apply,
the petition was dismissed.
Disposition IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the October 29, 1993
Order and December 16, 1993 and February 10, 1994 Resolutions of
then Secretary of Labor Nieves R. Confesor are AFFIRMED. The
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
HSBC v NLRC
281 SCRA 509
Regalado; November 6, 1997
FACTS:
-HSBC unilaterally implemented a Job Evaluation Program (JEP) which
lowered the salary rates of future employees of the bank.
-Union verbally objected the implementation saying this action was
violative of the existing CBA and thus is an act of unfair labor practice.
They asked for suspension of the JEP and asked that the matter be
tackled in the next CBA process.
-The bank did not heed to the request and instead said that it was under
the current CBA which states that: “Within the lifetime of this Agreement
the BANK shall conduct a job evaluation of employee positions. The
implementation timetable of the said exercise shall be furnished the
UNION by the BANK within two (2) months from the signing of this
Agreement.”
-Thus the Union engaged in concerted activities which included whistle
blowing during office hours and sending clients letters regarding the
situation.
-The Union engaged in said activities despite the fact that it had already
initiated the renegotiation of the non-representational provisions of the
CBA by submitting their proposal to the Bank, to which the latter
submitted a reply
-the Bank filed a case for ULP against the Union. It averred that such
concerted activities, despite the ongoing CBA negotiations, constitute
unfair labor practice (ULP) and a violation of the Union's duty to bargain
collectively under Articles 249 (c) and 252 of the Labor Code.
-The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action. It alleged that its united activities were actually
being waged to protest the Bank's arbitrary imposition of a job evaluation
program and its unjustifiable refusal to suspend the implementation
thereof
-labor arbiter dismissed the complaint with prejudice and ordered the
parties to continue with the collective bargaining negotiations, there
having been no showing that the Union acted with criminal intent in
refusing to comply with its duty to bargain but was motivated by the
Disini
refusal of management to suspend the implementation of its job
evaluation program, and that it is not evident that the concerted
activities caused damage to the Bank
-NLRC remanded case to determine some facts which were
needed in order that the case be resolved
ISSUE: whether or not the labor arbiter correctly ordered the
dismissal with prejudice of the complaint for unfair labor practice
on the case merely of the Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss as
well as the Opposition thereto, filed by the parties
Held: NO
-that there are several issues that must preliminarily be resolved
and which will require the presentation of evidence other than
the bare allegations in the pleadings which have been filed, in
order to ascertain the propriety or impropriety of the ULP charge
against the Union
-the labor arbiter, in finding that the Union was not motivated by
any criminal intent in resorting to said concerted activities,
merely gave a sweeping statement without bothering to explain
the factual and evidentiary bases therefor. The declaration that
there was no damage caused to the Bank by reason of such
Union activities remains unsubstantiated. Nowhere is there any
showing in the labor arbiter's order of dismissal from which it can
be fairly inferred that such a statement is supported by even a
preponderance of evidence
-. It bears emphasizing that by the very nature of an unfair labor
practice, it is not only a violation of the civil rights of both labor
and management but is also a criminal offense against the State
which is subject to prosecution and punishment. Essentially, a
complaint for unfair labor practice is no ordinary labor dispute
and therefore requires a more thorough analysis, evaluation and
appreciation of the factual and legal issues involved.
- Necessarily, a determination of the validity of the Bank's
unilateral implementation of the JEP or the Union's act of
engaging in concerted activities involves an appraisal of their
motives. It has been held that the crucial question whether or not
a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith
typically turns on the facts of the individual case. There is no per
se test of good faith in bargaining. This, the court or the quasi-
judicial agency concerned can do only after it has made a
comprehensive review of the allegations made in the pleadings
filed and the evidence presented in support thereof by the
parties, but definitely not where, as in the present case, the
accusation of unfair labor practice was negated and
subsequently discharged on a mere motion to dismiss.
DISPOSITION: REMANDED for further proceedings
3.2 LAW NOMENCLATURE and INTER-
RELATIONS of ACTS of ULP – 212(K); 248-
249
ART. 212. Definitions. –
xxx
(k) "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair
labor practice as expressly defined by the
Code.
 LABOR LAW 2 A2010 200
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful
for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an
employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one
to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union
members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their rights to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of
financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any
other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment,
except those employees who are already members of another union at
the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of
the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a
reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members
of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union
members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining
agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under
Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-
members of the recognized collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against
an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under
this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this
Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or
agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or
any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the
officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who
have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices
shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang
130, August 21, 1981).
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be
unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect
to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to
terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and
conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is
made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the
employer, provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree
to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an
exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed,
including the demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees from employers
as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any
other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the
officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or
members of labor associations or organizations who have actually
participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held
criminally liable.
Disini
HSBC EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES UNION V
NLRC AND HSBC, LTD.
281 SCRA 509
REGALADO; November 6, 1997
FACTS
- the bank issued a non-executive job evaluation program (JEP)
lowering the starting salaries of future employees, resulting from
changes made in the job grade and structures, which was
unilaterally implemented by the Bank ertroactive to January 1,
1993, announced by the Bank on Jan 18, 1993.
- The union reiterated in a letter its previous verbal objections to
the Bank’s decision, because it allegedly was in violation of the
existing CBA band thus constituted unfair labor practice.
- the Bank replied that it was in compliance with its obligation
under the CBA, referring to Art III Sec 18 thereof which provides
that “Within the lifetime of this Agreement the BANK shall
conduct a job evaluation of employee positions. The
implementation timetable of the said exercise shall be furnished
the UNION by the BANK within 2 months from signing this
Agreement.”
- This prompted the Union to undertake concerted activities to
protest the implementation of the JEP, despite the fact that it had
already initiated the renegotiation of the non-representational
provisions of the CBA by submitting their proposal to the bank.
However, the Bank was forced to declare a “Recess” to last as
long as the Union kept up with its concerted activities.
- the Bank filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a
complaint for unfair labor practice against the Union allegedly for
engaging in the contrived activities against the ongoing CBA
negotiations between the Bank and the Union to coerce the
Bank into agreeing to the demand for the suspension of the JEP.
The Bank said that such constituted unfair labor practice (ULP)
and a violation of the Union’s duty to bargain collectively under A
249 ( c ) and 252 of the LC.
- the Union filed a MtD, alleging that its united activities were in
protest of the Bank’s aribtrary imposition of a job evaluation
program
- Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint, ordered the parties to
continue with CB negotiations
- On appeal, NLRC remanded the case to the arbitration branch
of origin, because it was necessary to resolve WON the Union’s
objections to the JEP are valid, and WON the concerted
activities they conducted constitute ULP.
- Hence this petition brought by the Union
ISSUES
1. WON the Labor Arbiter correctly ordered the dismissal of
the complaint for ULP on the case merely of the Complaint,
the MtD, and an opposition filed by the parties
HELD NO. The SC agrees with the NLRC that there are several
questions that need to be threshed out before determination of
the charges made by the Bank against the Union.
Reasoning
-The need for a more than cursory disposition on the unfair labor
practice issue is made doubly exigent in view of the Bank's
allegation in its Comment that a strike has been launched by the
Union specifically to protest the implementation of the JEP.
Although the strike incident is not an issue in this case, this
supervening event bespeaks the worsening situation between
the parties that calls for a more circumspect assessment of the
actual issues herein involved.
-Necessarily, a determination of the validity of the Bank's
unilateral implementation of the JEP or the Union's act of
engaging in concerted activities involves an appraisal of their
motives. In cases of this nature, motivations are seldom
expressly avowed, and avowals are not always candid. There
must thus be a measure of reliance on the administrative
agency. It was incumbent upon the labor arbiter, in the first
instance, to weigh such expressed motives in determining the
effect of an otherwise equivocal act. The Labor Code does not
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 201
undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistake
language each incident which constitutes an unfair labor practice.
Rather, it leaves to the court the work of applying the law's general
prohibitory language in light
of infinite combinations of events which may be charged as violative of
its terms.
It has been held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met
his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of
the individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.
Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To
some degree, the question of good faith may be a question of credibility.
The effect of an employer's or a union's actions individually is not the
test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or
actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn
therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.
This, the court or the quasi-judicial agency concerned can do only after it
has made a comprehensive review of the allegations made in the
pleadings filed and the evidence presented in support thereof by the
parties, but definitely not where, as in the present case, the accusation
of unfair labor practice was negated and subsequently discharged on a
mere motion to dismiss.
Disposition the challenged disposition of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby AFFIRMED
8.02 UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE: EMPLOYER
AND LABOR ORGANIZATION ACTS
VIOLATING RIGHT OF SELF ORGANIZATION
ULP and MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES V CIR (Mariano)
109 PHIL 900
PARAS; October 31, 1960
NATURE Appeal by way of certiorari
FACTS
- Royal Interocean Lines is a foreign corporation licensed to do business
in the Philippines with head office in Hong Kong. Its branch office in
Manila employed Ermidia Mariano who had worked since January 5,
1932, until her discharge on October 23, 1953.
- Mariano and the manager of the Manila Branch (Kamerling) developed
strained relationship that led the former to lodge with the managing
director in Hong Kong a complaint against Kamerling. The latter, with the
approval of the head office in Hong Kong, dismissed Mariano. She
charged Royal Interocean and Kamerling with ULP in the CIR which
decided in her favor and ordered her reinstatement, with back pay.
Royal Interocean filed this appeal.
ISSUE
WON Royal Interocean was guilty of ULP in having dismissed Mariano
because the latter had filed charges against Kamerling not connected
with or necessarily arising from union activities
HELD
NO.
Ratio Despite the employees' right to self-organization, the employer still
retains his inherent right to discipline his employees, his normal
prerogative to hire or dismiss them. The prohibition is directed only
against the use of the right to employ or discharge as an instrument of
discrimination, interference or oppression because of one's labor or
union activities.
Reasoning The pertinent legal provision is section 4 (a), subsection 5,
of RA 875 which reads: "SEC. 4 Unfair Labor Practice, (a) It shall be
unfair labor practice for an employer: . . . (5) To dismiss, discharge, or
otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed
Disini
charges or for having given or being about to give testimony
under this Act."
- The CIR construed this as including all cases where an
employee is dismissed, discharged or otherwise prejudiced or
discriminated against by reason of the filing, by the latter with the
court or elsewhere of any charge against his employer.
- From a literal and grammatical point of view, the provision has
to be interpreted in the sense that the charges, the filing of which
is the cause of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to
his right to self- organization, in order to give rise to ULP on the
part of the employer. Under subsection 5 of section 4 (a), the
employee's (1) having filed charges or (2) having given
testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by
"under this Act" appearing after the last item. In other words, the
three acts must have reference to the employees' right to self-
organization and collective bargaining, because the element of
ULP is interference in such right. It would be redundant to repeat
"under this Act" after each enumeration connected by the
disjunctive conjunction "or".
- In this case, Mariano's dismissal has no relation to union
activities and the charges filed by her against the petitioner had
nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities.
Disposition The appealed decision is REVERSED.
GREAT PACIFIC EMPLOYEES UNION V GREAT
PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP.
303 SCRA 113
BELLOSILLO; February 11, 1999
FACTS
- Before the expiration of the CBA, the parties submitted their
respective proposals and counter-proposals for its renewal. The
series of negotiations resulted in a deadlock prompting the union
to file a notice of strike. Despite several conciliatory conferences,
the impasse could not be resolved. Thus, UNION went on strike.
- Strikers reportedly blocked all points of ingress and egress of
the company premises thus preventing GREPALIFE employees
reporting for work from entering their respective offices. These
employees and third persons doing business with the company,
including lessees of the GREPALIFE building, were allegedly
forced by the strikers to submit their cars/vehicles, bags and
other belongings to illegal search.
- GREPALIFE required all striking employees to explain in writing
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Union
president Domingo and some strikers complied. Petitioner de la
Rosa and the rest of the strikers ignored the management
directive.
- GREPALIFE found the explanation of Domingo totally
unsatisfactory and considered de la Rosa as having waived his
right to be heard. Both were notified of the termination of their
services, effective immediately. All other strikers whose
explanations were found unacceptable or who failed to submit
written explanations were likewise dismissed. Notwithstanding
their dismissal from employment, Domingo and de la Rosa
continued to lead the members of the striking union in their
concerted action against management.
- NCMB resumed conciliatory conferences between the
disputants. GREPALIFE submitted a draft Agreement, which
proposed among others that members of the Union subject of
dismissal notices shall be reinstated under the same terms and
conditions prior to their dismissal upon the submission by
Domingo and de la Rosa of their voluntary resignations to the
Company upon the signing of this agreement.
- Union and GREPALIFE executed a MOA before the NCMB
which ended their dispute.
- Domingo and de la Rosa filed a joint letter of resignation with
respondent company but emphasized therein that "(their)
resignation is submitted only because the same is demanded by
the Company, and it should not be understood as a waiver.
- Domingo and de la Rosa sue GREPALIFE for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice and damages.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 202
- The Labor Arbiter sustained the charge of illegal dismissal. NLRC
rejected the finding that Domingo and de la Rosa were illegally
dismissed. However, it agreed that respondent company failed to
comply strictly with the requirements of due process prior to termination
ISSUES
1. WON de la Rosa was illegally dismissed
2. WON he was on forced to resign by management.
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without
legal constrictions. The Labor Code is emphatic against the use of
violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and to this end
prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes. The sanction provided in par. (a) of Art.
262 thereof is so severe that "any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status."
Reasoning GREPALIFE submitted before the Labor Arbiter several
affidavits of its employees, described the incidents that transpired during
the strike, .which de la Rosa did not refute. Such affidavits by
themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
Under Sec. 7, Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
these proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of due
process, are not to be strictly governed by the technicalities of law and
procedural rules. Section 3, par. 2, of the same Rule provides that
verified position papers are to be accompanied by all supporting
documents including the affidavits of the parties' respective witnesses in
lieu of direct testimony.
2. NO
Ratio The employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment
according to his own discretion and judgment. This prerogative flaws
from the established rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of
judgment of the employer in the conduct of his business. Recall of
workers clearly falls within the ambit of management prerogative. The
employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so long as
it is done in good faith for the advancement of his interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or valid agreements. It is valid as long as it is not performed
in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of
malice or spite.
Reasoning
-While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not
every unfair act or decision constitutes ULP as defined and enumerated
under Art. 248 Of the Labor Code. All the prohibited acts instituting
unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to self-
organization. Thus, an employer may be held liable under this provision
if his conduct affects in whatever manner the right of an employee to
self-organize
- The decision of GREPALIFE to consider the top officers of the union as
unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory and constitutive of
an unlawful labor practice of employers. Discriminating involves either
encouraging membership in any labor organization or is made on
account of the employee's having given or being about to give testimony
under the Code. These have not been proved in the case at bar.
- There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are
not similarly situated. A union officer has larger and heavier
responsibilities than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to
respect the law and to exhort and guide their members to do the same;
their position mandates them to lead by example. By committing
prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa demonstrated a high
degree of imprudence and irresponsibility. This justifies his dismissal
from employment. Since the objective of the LC is to ensure a stable but
dynamic and just industrial peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor
leaders should be upheld.
- That respondent company opted to reinstate all the strikers except
Domingo and de la Rosa is an option taken in good faith for the just and
lawful protection and advancement of its interest. It was nothing less
than a sound exercise of management prerogative, an act of selt-
preservation in fact, designed to insure the maintenance of peace and
Disini
order in the company premises. The dismissal of de la Rosa who
had shown his capacity for unmitigated mischief was intended to
avoid a recurrence of the violence that attended the fateful strike.
Dispositive Petition DISMISSED.
1. INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT and
COERCION – 248 (A); 255; 277 (G) (H);
249 (A); ILO CONVENTION NO.98 ARTS
1-2
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization;
ART. 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and
workers’ participation in policy and decision-making. - The
labor organization designated or selected by the majority of
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit
shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in
such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However,
an individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-
making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their
rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form labor-management councils:
Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such
labor-management councils shall be elected by at least the
majority of all employees in said establishment. (As
amended by Section 22, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21,
1989).
ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. -(g) The Ministry shall
help promote and gradually develop, with the agreement of
labor organizations and employers, labor-management
cooperation programs at appropriate levels of the
enterprise based on the shared responsibility and mutual
respect in order to ensure industrial peace and
improvement in productivity, working conditions and the
quality of working life.
(h) In establishments where no legitimate labor
organization exists, labor-management committees may be
formed voluntarily by workers and employers for the
purpose of promoting industrial peace. The Department of
Labor and Employment shall endeavor to enlighten and
educate the workers and employers on their rights and
responsibilities through labor education with emphasis on
the policy thrusts of this Code.
 LABOR LAW 2 A2010 203
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall
be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers,
agents or representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization. However, a labor organization shall have
the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership;
ILO Convention No. 98
Article 1
1. Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of
anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment.
2. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of
acts calculated to--
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition
that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade union
membership;
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by
reason of union membership or because of participation in
union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of
the employer, within working hours.
Article 2
1. Workers' and employers' organisations shall enjoy
adequate protection against any acts of interference by each
other or each other's agents or members in their
establishment, functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the
establishment of workers' organisations under the domination
of employers or employers' organisations, or to support
workers' organisations by financial or other means, with the
object of placing such organisations under the control of
employers or employers' organisations, shall be deemed to
constitute acts of interference within the meaning of this
Article.
2. NON-UNION MEMBERSHIP or WITHDRAWAL
FROM MEMBERSHIP AS CONDITION
EMPLOYMENT- 248(B)
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or
an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall
withdraw from one to which he belongs;
3. CONTRACTING OUT TO DISCOURAGE
UNIONISM-248(C); 106
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by
union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;
Disini
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. - Whenever an
employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the former’s work, the employees of the
contractor and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code,
the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract, in the same
manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate
regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor to
protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In
so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate
distinctions between labor-only contracting and job
contracting as well as differentiations within these types of
contracting and determine who among the parties involved
shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code,
to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of
this Code.
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying
workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and
placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of such employer. In
such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered
merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible
to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter
were directly employed by him.
4. COMPANY DOMINATION UNION –
248(D)
5. DISCRIMINATION ENCOURAGE DISCOURAGE
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall
be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practice:
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor
organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or supporters;
UNIONISM- 248(E); 249 (B)
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall
be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers,
agents or representatives:
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee, including discrimination against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on
any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under
which membership or continuation of membership is made
available to other members;
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 204
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall
stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized
collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment,
except those employees who are already members of another
union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who
are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent
may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and
other fees paid by members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the
benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided,
that the individual authorization required under Article 242,
paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members
of the recognized collective bargaining agent;
6. RETALIATION TESTIMONY
AGAINST EMPLOYER – 248 (F)
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It
shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practice:
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having given or
being about to give testimony under this Code;
7. EXACTION-FEATHERBEDDING – 249(B)
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
- It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor
organization, its officers, agents or representatives:
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee, including
discrimination against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been
denied or to terminate an employee on any ground
other than the usual terms and conditions under which
membership or continuation of membership is made
available to other members;
NATURE OF ACT
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. CA [Potenciano
Galanida]
416 SCRA 65
CARPIO; NOVEMBER 18, 2003
NATURE: APPEAL
FACTS:
- Galanida was hired by Allied Bank and rose from accountant-book
keeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by
a “Notice of Personnel Action” which provides as one of the conditions of
employment the provision on petitioner’s right to transfer employees:
Disini
“REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the
bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other
departments or branches of the bank as the need arises
and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted
service to the public.”
- Galanida was promoted several times and was transferred to
several branches.
- Having been stationed in Cebu for 7 years already. Galanida
was to be transferred (pursuant to Allied’s the rotation basis) but
he manifested his refusal to be transferred to Bacolod City in a
letter citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the
anguish that would result if he is away from his family.
- He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, Allied Bank told Galanida to report to the
Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994 to which the latter
refused.
-In a letter dated 13 June 1994, Allied Bank warned and required
of Galanida to explain in writing within 3 days from receipt why
no disciplinary action should be meted against him for his
having refused to follow instructions concerning the foregoing
transfer and reassignment.
-Galanida replied that whether the bank’s penalty for his refusal
be Suspension or Dismissal, it will all the more establish and
fortify his complaint pending at NLRC. In the same letter, he
charged Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in
ordering his transfer.
-Galanida was terminated through a memo. The reasons given
for the dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s continued refusal to be
transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his
refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for
additional vacation leave. The salient portion of the Memo
reads:
- LA: Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative (as it
failed to show any business urgency that would justify the
transfer) in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches; cited Dosch v. NLRC, thus: “While it may
be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an
employer’s exclusive right and the prerogative of management,
such right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely
select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount
police power xxx for the relations between capital and labor are
not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx
And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each
other. Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal,
such (sic) as that of being away from the family.” (Underscoring
supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
- LA granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement; no
backwages.
- NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida
without just cause; characterized the transfer as a demotion
since the bank wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to
replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch. ; and
that Galanida’s termination was illegal for lack of due process.
The NLRC stated that Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing.
The NLRC declared that Allied Bank failed to send a termination
notice, as required by law for a valid termination. The Memo
merely stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of
termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.
- NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad
faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal
undermined Galanida’s right to security of tenure and equal
protection of the laws.
- CA: citing Dosch v. NLRC, held that Galanida’s refusal to
comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal and
that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or
Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion; that Allied Bank
did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there
was no hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo merely
stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there
was no such notice; denied Allied Bank’s MR.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 205
Issues:
1. WON Galanida was dismissed for just cause (& in connection
with this issue WON Galanida could validly refuse to be transferred
for his aforementioned reasons)
2. Whether Galanida’s dismissal violated the requirement of
notice and hearing
Held:
1. YES. (NO) The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful
disobedience of a lawful order of an employer. Employees may object
to, negotiate and seek redress against employers for rules or orders that
they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these rules or
orders are declared illegal or improper by competent authority, the
employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. For Galanida’s
continued refusal to obey Allied Bank’s transfer orders, we hold that the
bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282
(a) of the Labor Code. Galanida is thus not entitled to reinstatement or to
separation pay.
Reasoning:
- The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the
ambit of the employer’s prerogatives. The employer exercises the
prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to
the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in
demotion in rank or diminution of the employee’s salary, benefits and
other privileges. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden
of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and
prejudicial to the displaced employee.
- The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting
responsibilities from one branch to another is a standard practice of
Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred branches throughout the
country. Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control. It also
enables bank employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual
promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries, requires the
rotation of these personnel. The Manual directs that the “duties of
personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping records should be
rotated” and that such rotation “should be irregular, unannounced and
long enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations.”
- Galanida was well aware of Allied Bank’s policy of periodically
transferring personnel to different branches. As the Court of Appeals
found, assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was a
condition of Galanida’s employment. Galanida consented to this
condition when he signed the Notice of Personnel Action.
- The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank
discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his
transfer. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter
explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment outside Cebu
because he had been in Cebu for seven years already.
On Demotion:
- Neither was Galanida’s transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida
did not present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his
salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied Bank’s letter assured
Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and
that the transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations.
- There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of
unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate
only to violations of “the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization” and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248
of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is
no evidence that Galanida took part in forming a union, or even that a
union existed in Allied Bank.
On Validly Refusing a Transfer:
-Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC: The
acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an
illicit or underhanded purpose – i.e., to defeat an employee’s right to
self-organization, to rid himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize
an employee for union activities – cannot be upheld is self-evident and
cannot be gainsaid.
Disini
-Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana: “Certainly
the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee
opposes his employer’s decision to transfer him to another work
place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the
part of either party, it is the employee’s wishes that should be
made to prevail.”
-Dosch v. NLRC. is not applicable to the present case. Helmut
Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a promotion. We
upheld the refusal because no law compels an employee to
accept a promotion, and because the position Dosch was
supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time. This
left as the only basis for the charge of insubordination a letter
from Dosch in which the Court found “not even the slightest hint
of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.”
- Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post, as
in the Dosch case, cannot be likened to a transfer from one city
to another within the country, which is the situation in the present
case. The distance from Cebu City to Bacolod City or from Cebu
City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed the distance from Baguio
City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court
considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v. Laplana.
2. No. The memo sent to Galanida unequivocally
informed Galanida of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss
him.
Reasoning:
- The statement, “please be informed that the Bank has
terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and
considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to] as
forfeited xxx” is plainly worded and needs no interpretation.
- The Memo also discussed the findings of the Investigation
Committee that served as grounds for Galanida’s dismissal. The
Memo referred to Galanida’s “open defiance and refusal” to
transfer first to the Bacolod City branch and then to the
Tagbilaran City branch.
- The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to report for
work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation
leave.
- The Memo also refuted Galanida’s charges of discrimination
and demotion, and concluded that he had violated Article XII of
the bank’s Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.
- The Memo, although captioned “Transfer and Reassignment,”
did not preclude it from being a notice of termination. The Court
has held that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by
the title given to it but by its body and contents. Moreover, it
appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a notice of
termination.
- However, the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the
Memo stated that Allied Bank terminated Galanida’s services as
of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September
1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of the
Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the
supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice
of termination must be served on the employee. Allied Bank
could not terminate Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he
had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Bank’s
decision to dismiss him. Galanida’s dismissal could only take
effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this
reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from 1
September 1994 to 4 October 1994.
- The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied
Bank’s decision to dismiss him. Allied Bank should have
exercised more care in issuing the notice of termination.
Disposition: CA’s decision affirmed with modifications. Case is
REMANDED to the LA for the computation, within 30 days from
receipt of the Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, due to Potenciano L. Galanida for
the time his dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September 1994
until 4 October 1994.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 206
1. INTERROGATION
SCOTY’S DEPARTMENT STORE V MICALLER
99 PHIL 762
BAUTISTA; Aug 25, 1956
FACTS
- Nena Micaller was a salesgirl in Scoty's Dept Store, owned by Yu Ki
Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Micaller filed charges
of ULP against her employers as she was dismissed because of
membership in National Labor Union. Employers denied, saying they
dismissed Micaller because of misconduct & serious disrespect to
management & co-employees.
- Prior to November 1953, Micaller was earning P4.80 a day. After
every New Year, she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus; the others
were only given P60. For 3 consecutive yrs, she was the best seller,
most cooperative, most honest employee. One week before Oct 12,
1953, she organized a union among employees, which was later
affiliated w/ National Labor Union. CIR found petitioners guilty of ULP
and ordered them to pay fine of P100.
- Petitioners contend CIRs findings: (1) that Micaller was dismissed
because of membership in National Labor Union (2) that petitioners
have committed ULP and (3) that petitioners can be legally punished by
fine of P100.
- (1) & (2) involve questions of fact. CIR made an analysis of evidence
and found that petitioners have really subjected complainant & her co-
employees to a series of questioning regarding membership in union or
their union activities w/c are deemed acts constituting ULP [Sec 4, (a)
(4), RA No. 875].
- Whether CFI is justified in imposing fine not only upon Yu Ki Lam, who
was the manager, but also upon Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen
Yang, who were owners.
- Petitioners contend that Sec 25 of RA No. 875 being penal in character
should be strictly construed in favor of accused and in that sense their
guilt can only be established by clear and positive evidence and not
merely by presumptions / inferences as was done by the Industrial
Court.
- Evidence as regards ULP w/ reference to the 3 above-named
petitioners is not clear enough. The fine imposed is unjustified.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
HELD
"SEC. 25. Penalties. - Any person who violates the provisions of section
three of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of riot
less than one month nor more than one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
"Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall
be punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more
than five hundred pesos for each offense."
- The provision doesn’t specify the court that may act when violation
calls for the imposition of the penalties.
- Accdg to SC, said provision notwithstanding, that word cannot refer to
CIR for to give that meaning would be violative of safeguards
guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution.
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law" [Article III, section 1, (15), Philippine
Constitution], and that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused * *
* shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf" [Article III, section 1, (17)].
- A comparison of the jurisdiction of the CIR and of that of the Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR) created by Republic Act No. 1267
- Similar provisions on the penalty to be imposed
- When Congress intends to confer criminal jurisdiction upon an
administrative court, it expressly says so in an unmistakable
language. Congress has made its intention clear when it
Disini
amended the law by eliminating entirely criminal
jurisdiction originally conferred upon the CAR. 'This
was made manifest when Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 1409 repealing those provisions affecting the
criminal Act No. 1409 repealing those provisions
affecting the criminal jurisdiction aforementioned
(sections 7 and 10).
- Using the deliberations made on the bill eliminating the criminal
jurisdiction of CAR, which showed the same intent of Congress
to place the court on same footing as Public Service Commission
and CAR.
- In the deliberations of Congress the sponsor of the bill of the for
the amendments of the Committee to the Court of Agrarian Law
Mr. Francisco was asked on the reason for striking out the
phrase “not criminal in nature” in referring to kinds of questions
and controversies the court has jurisdiction over as well as the
sentence “Criminal proceedings should be prosecuted as in
ordinary cases.” He said that the purpose of those amendments
is to remove completely from the Agrarian Court any jurisdiction
over criminal matters. In the deliberations, it was further clarified
that the CAR will retain civil jurisdiction only.
- It is also clarified that the court will exercise quasi-judicial
functions and it will be similar in nature to the Public Service
Commission and the CIR. Mr. Cuenco said that this meant that it
is unnecessary to put the proviso the Agrarian Court has no
jurisdiction over proceedings criminal in nature. Mr. Francisco
maintained that such amendment has to be made as RA 1267,
previously gave the CAR criminal jurisdiction.
- The power to impose penalties provided for in section 25 of RA
No. 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, not in Court of Industrial
Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Decision of the industrial
court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is
illegal and should be nullified.
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v PHIL
MARINE OFFICERS GUILD
15 SCRA 174
Bengzon; October 29, 1965
Facts:
- PHILSTEAM is a domestic corporation engaged in inter-island
shipping.
- Philippine Marine Officers Guild, herein otherwise called
PMOG, is a labor union affiliated with the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), representing, and which represented in 1954,
some of PHILSTEAM's officers.
- The Cebu Seamen's Association, CSA for short, is another
labor union that represents and likewise represented in 1954
some of PHILSTEAM's officers.
- PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands with a request for
collective bargaining. PHILSTEAM received the letter embodying
the same. Subsequently, PHILSTEAM transmitted its answer to
PMOG, requiring the latter to first prove its representation of a
majority of PHILSTEAM's employees before its demands will be
considered as requested.
- PHILSTEAM, on the same date, started interrogating and
investigating its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find
out directly from them if they had joined PMOG or authorized
PMOG to represent them.
- A reply was sent by PMOG to the answer of PHILSTEAM,
insisting that PHILSTEAM consider its requests and demands
first before requiring proof of majority representation. This reply
was received by PHILSTEAM on July 6, 1954.
- PMOG thereafter filed on July 17, 1954 a notice of intention to
strike stating as reasons therefore PHILSTEAM's alleged refusal
to bargain and unspecified unfair labor practices. The
Department of Labor brought PHILSTEAM and PMOG to a
conference on July 30, 1954, without any success.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 207
- The CSA had meanwhile also transmitted its own set of demands to
PHILSTEAM.
- PHILSTEAM therein recognized CSA as representing the majority of its
employees and proceeded to consider CSA's demands.
- Subsequently, PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a CBA.
- On the same date, PMOG declared a strike against PHILSTEAM.
Although not the subject of the present appeal, it should also be
mentioned that the dispute included two other shipping companies,
namely, Compania Maritima and Madrigal Shipping, and that PMOG
simultaneously struck against all three companies.
- Around 46 officers of PHILSTEAM joined PMOG's strike; 15 of these
later returned to work, leaving 31 PHILSTEAM officers on strike. Pier 4
of the North Harbor of the Port of Manila, where PHILSTEAM vessels
docked, was among the areas picketed during the strike.
- A final conference between PHILSTEAM and PMOG on still failed to
bring the parties to an agreement.
- The President of the Philippines, certified the dispute among the
aforementioned shipping companies and their employees to the Court of
Industrial Relations, as involving national interest, pursuant to Section
10 of Republic Act 875.
- CIR issued a return-to-work order. The same, however, was not
enforced in view of an injunction issued by this Court in another case;
Rendered a decision that PHILSTEAM committed unfair labor practice in
having interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization; that PMOG has not been shown to
have committed unfair labor practice; and that the strike of PMOG
against PHILSTEAM was justified and lawfully carried out.
- PHILSTEAM filed a MFR but was denied.
On ULP:
The acts found by CIR constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice
are:
(1) the interrogation and investigation by PHILSTEAM's supervisory
officials of its captains, deck officers and engineers, to determine
whether they had authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent;
(2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the participation of
PHILSTEAM's pier superintendent in soliciting membership for a
competing union.
ISSUE: WON the strike of PMOG was lawful
HELD: Yes.
On Interrogation
- PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an investigation of
its officers as to their membership in PMOG and whether they had given
PMOG authority to represent them in collective bargaining. The reason
for this, PHILSTEAM would, however, aver, was merely to ascertain for
itself the existence of a duty to bargain collectively with PMOG, a step
allegedly justified by PMOG's refusal to furnish proof of majority
representation.
- The record discloses that such investigation was started by
PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG's reply stating a refusal to
submit proof of majority representation. Specifically, the investigation
was put under way on June 29, 1954 the same day PHILSTEAM sent
its request that PMOG submit proof of majority representation whereas,
PHILSTEAM knew of PMOG's refusal to furnish said proof only on July
6, 1954, when it received PMOG's reply letter. The CIR, therefore, aptly
concluded that PMOG's refusal to submit evidence showing it
represented a majority had nothing to do with PHILSTEAM's decision to
carry out the investigation.
- BLUE FLASH DOCTRINE: An employer is not denied the privilege
of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation, provided
the same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the
employer that no reprisals would be taken against unionists.
Nonetheless, any employer who engages in interrogation does so
with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor practice if the
circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or
interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization. (Blue Flash Express Co., Inc., 109 NLRB 591.)
- The respondent court has found that PHILSTEAM's interrogation of its
employees had in fact interfered with, restrained and coerced the
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. Such
Disini
finding being upon questions of fact, the same cannot be
reversed herein, because it is fully supported by substantial
evidence.
- The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the
company of its employees to a series of questionings
regarding their membership in the union or their union
activities, in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free
choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice
(Scoty's Department Store vs. Micaller, 52 O.G. 5119).
PHILSTEAM's aforestated interrogation squarely falls under this
rule.
On the Strike
- It is argued that PMOG staged a strike so as to compel
PHILSTEAM to bargain collectively with it notwithstanding that it
was a minority union.
a. The statement that PMOG is a minority union is not
accurate. There has been no proof as to which union, PMOG,
CSA or any other, represented the majority of PHILSTEAM
employees. For lack of showing that CSA represented the
majority it declared the PHILSTEAM-CSA collective bargaining
agreement null and void. It stated that the parties to the dispute
were welcomed to file a petition for certification election to decide
this point.
b. PMOG's strike was in retaliation to PHILSTEAM's
unfair labor practice rather than, as PHILSTEAM would picture it,
an attempt to undermine the PHILSTEAM-CSA agreement. For
said agreement was signed only on August 24, 1954 but PMOG
filed its notice of strike is early as July 17, 1954. PHILSTEAM's
unfair labor practice, consisting in its interference with the
employees, rights to self-organization started on June 29, 1954.
It was because of said unlawful act of the employer that the
union struck. The notice of strike in fact mentioned company
unfair labor practices as reason for the intended strike.
On the Reinstatement Issue
- Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUG)
vs. C.I.R., et al.: striking employees are entitled to reinstatement,
whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employer's
unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not the
consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired
others to take the place of the strikers and has promised them
continued employment
- The present strike was the consequence of PHILSTEAM's
unfair labor practice. Reinstatement of the strikers, who have not
found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, therefore
follows as a matter of right, notwithstanding that the employer
has hired others to take the place of the strikers for the purpose
of continuing the operation of the plant or the business of the
industry.
Disposition: The decision and resolution appealed from are
hereby affirmed.
2. POLLING
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 49, AFL-CIO V NLRB
353 F 2ND 852
DANAHER; NOVEMBER 4, 1965
NATURE Petition for review of an order of the NLRB
FACTS
The General Counsel’s complaint charged that Struksnes
Construction Co., Inc. of Minot, North Dakota (herein employer)
had violated section 8 (a) (1), 29 USC sec. 158 (a) (1), by
conducting an open, signed poll of its employees to determine
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 208
whether they wished the employer to bargain with the Union, and sec. 8
(a) (5), 29 USC sec. 158 (a) (5), by refusing to bargain with the Union.
Reversing the Trial Examiner, a panel of the Board, by a divided vote,
entered its Decision and Order of September 28, 1964, dismissing the
complaint. The Board found that the employer’s “purpose for conducting
the poll was xxx to ascertain whether the Union represented a current
majority”; that “there is not other evidence of animus”; and that the
“polling of the employees under the circumstances of this case did not
carry an implied threat of reprisals or in any other way interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.” The Board accordingly found that the General
Counsel “failed to establish a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) xxx.”
The Union’s motion for reconsideration or rehearing was denied by order
of March 25, 1965, reaffirming the original decision.
ISSUE
WON the employer had refused to bargain with union
HELD
NO. There had been no strike, no evidence of anti-union animus as the
Board found, no discrimination and no firing because of union activity.
There had been no substantial evidence of coercion of the employees or
of actual restraint of their exercising their section 7 rights.
But with respect to the section 8(a) (1) charge, the employer had taken
one step which we deem fateful. We are by no means satisfied with the
Board’s ad hoc acquiescence in, if not, approval of, the manner in which
the employer polled his men. The employer had called no meeting of the
men at which he might explain his purpose to ascertain whether or not
the men desired a union contract of this particular job, and assure them
of no reprisals. Struknes personally at the end of one shift presented the
statement “DO YOU WANT ME TO BARGAIN WITH AND SIGN A
CONTRACT WITH OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 49? PLEASE
SIGN YOUR NAME AND ANSWER YES OR NO.” to each of the
employees then available for his approach. His two foremen reached the
remaining employees in like manner. How each man voted was known
to the employer or his foremen, not only at the time each man signed,
but as a matter of record thereafter, just as the General Counsel’s
Exhibit 7 made manifest. The question that was asked is equivocal to be
sure, and seems not to have been directed to an ascertainment of union
affiliation of the employees or of their activities, pro or con. On the other
hand, as the Board itself has observed, “Any employer who engages in
interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor
practices if the circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or
interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act.”
The rights of the employees must be safeguarded. So it is we do not
understand how the Board could approve the tactics here utilized, the
technique employed, or the form in which ascertainment of the attitude
of the men was sought. The Board could, in the exercise of its expertise,
develop appropriate policy considerations and outline at least minimal
standards to govern the ascertainment of union status, or even in given
permissible situations, the desire of the employees respecting a contract
with the Union.
Dispositive Reversed and remanded
3. SPEECH
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSN
v INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.
37 SCRA 244
CASTRO; January 30, 1971
NATURE
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the
Court of Industrial Relations
FACTS
Disini
-The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-
NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while
still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered
into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group
(hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
-the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a
modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining
contracts which were then due to expire. The parties mutually
agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon
retroactively effective. Thereafter, negotiations were conducted
on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock
on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed
a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining."
-the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures
and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which
would justify their own proposals, taking into account the
financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to
declare a strike in protest against what they considered the
Companies' unfair labor practices.
-Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against
what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as
supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while
negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the
notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees
resigned from the Unions.
-the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular
Life Building at Plaza Moraga
-the Companies through their acting manager and president,
the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter
-The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception
of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the
aforesaid letter
-company men succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front
of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers
and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by
some picketers.
-the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent
individually to the strikers a letter
-Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed
against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were
dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts.
-However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies
required them not only to secure clearances from the City
Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee
-the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint
specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted
action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to
abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of
comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime,
and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to
work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards
readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.
ISSUE
WON the company committed unfair labor practice
HELD
YES. The companies contend that the sending of the letters
constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. SC
does not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking
employees individually — by registered special delivery mail at
that — without being coursed through the Unions which were
representing the employees in the collective bargaining. Indeed,
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 209
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective
bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his
employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement.
And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the
strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under
obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining
representative. The free speech protection under the Constitution is
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or
his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal.
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to
"bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional
movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours,"
and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-
busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to
an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union,
since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine
what the consequences of returning to work would be.
Disposition CIR Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS v.
NLRB
311 US 72
DOUGLAS; November 12, 1940
FACTS
- The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the employer,
Serrick Corporation, had engaged in unfair labor practices. The Board
found that the closed-shop contract between petitioner and the employer
was invalid because it had been 'assisted' by unfair labor practices of
the employer, because petitioner did not represent an uncoerced
majority of the toolroom employees at the time the contract was
executed, and because for this and other reasons it was not an
appropriate bargaining unit.
- Fouts, Shock, Dininger, Bolander, By-road and Baker were all
employees of the toolroom. Four of these-Fouts, Shock, Byroad and
Bolander- were old and trusted employees. Fouts was 'more or less an
assistant foreman', having certain employees under him. Shock was in
charge of the toolroom during the absence of the foreman. Dininger and
Bolander were in charge of the second and third shifts, respectively,
working at night. Prior to mid-July, 1937, they had been actively
engaged on behalf of the company union. When it became apparent at
that time that the efforts to build up that union were not successful,
Fouts, Shock, Byroad and Bolander suddenly shifted their support from
the company union to petitioner and moved into the forefront in enlisting
the support of the employees for petitioner. The general manager told
Shock that he would close the plant rather than deal with U.A.W. The
superintendent and Shock reported to toolroom employees that the
employer would not recognize the C.I.O. The superintendent let it be
known that the employer would deal with an A.F. of L. union. At the
same time the superintendent also stated to one of the employees that
some of the 'foremen don't like the C.I.O.' and added, with prophetic
vision, that there was 'going to be quite a layoff around here and these
fellows that don't like the C.I.O. are going to lay those fellows off first.'
During working hours, Byroad conducted a straw vote among the
employees and under the direction of Fouts and Shock left the plant to
seek out an organizer for petitioner. Fouts solicited among workmen in
the toolroom stating that his purpose was to 'beat' the U.A.W. For a
week preceding August 13, Shock spent much time, as did Byroad,
going 'from one bench to another soliciting' for petitioner. Baker likewise
solicited. Dininger offered an employee a 'good rating' if he would join
petitioner. Not less than a week before August 13, the personnel director
advised two employees to 'join the A.F. of L.' Byroad spent considerable
time during working hours soliciting employees, threatening loss of
employment to those who did not sign up with petitioner and
representing that he was acting in line with the desires of the toolroom
foreman, McCoy. This active solicitation for petitioner was on company
time and was made openly in the shop. Much of it was made in the
presence of the toolroom foreman, McCoy, who clearly knew what was
being done. Yet the freedom allowed solicitors for petitioner was
Disini
apparently denied solicitors for U.A.W. The plant manager
warned some of the latter to check out their time for a
conference with him on U.A.W. and questioned their right to
discuss U.A.W. matters on company property. The inference is
justified that U.A.W. solicitors were closely watched, while those
acting for petitioner were allowed more leeway.
- Five U.A.W. officials had been discharged in June, 1937,
because of their union activities. The known antagonism of the
employer to U.A.W. before petitioner's drive for membership
started made it patent that the employees were not free to
choose U.A.W. as their bargaining representative. Petitioner
started its drive for membership late in July, 1937, and its closed-
shop contract was signed August 11, 1937.4 On August 10,
1937, the U.A.W., having a clear majority of all the employees,
presented to the employer a proposed written contract for
collective bargaining. This was refused. On August 13, 1937, all
toolroom employees who refused membership in petitioner,
some 20 in number, were discharged. On August 15, 1937, the
management circulated among the employees a statement
which, as found by the Board, was a thinly veiled attack on the
U.A.W. and a firm declaration that the employer would not enter
into any agreement with it.
ISSUE
WON the employer assisted the petitioner in enrolling its
majority.
HELD
YES.
- The active opposition of the employer to U.A.W. throughout the
whole controversy has a direct bearing on the events during that
intermediate period. Known hostility to one union and clear
discrimination against it may indeed make seemingly trivial
intimations of preference for another union powerful assistance
for it. Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between
unions may have telling effect among men who know the
consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure.
The freedom of activity permitted one group and the close
surveillance given another may be more powerful support for the
former than campaign utterances.
- To be sure, it does not appear that the employer instigated the
introduction of petitioner into the plant. But the Board was wholly
justified in finding that the employer 'assisted' it in its
organizational drive. Silent approval of or acquiescence in that
drive for membership and close surveillance of the competitor;
the intimations of the employer's choice made by superiors; the
fact that the employee-solicitors had been closely identified with
the company union until their quick shift to petitioner; the rank
and position of those employee-solicitors; the ready acceptance
of petitioner's contract and the contemporaneous rejection of the
contract tendered by U.A.W.; the employer's known prejudice
against the U.A.W., were all proper elements for it to take into
consideration in weighing the evidence and drawing its
inferences. To say that the Board must disregard what preceded
and what followed the membership drive would be to require it to
shut its eyes to potent imponderables permeating this entire
record. The detection and appraisal of such imponderables are
indeed one of the essential functions of an expert administrative
agency.
Disposition Affirmed.
NLRB V VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER CO.
314 .U.S. 469
MURPHY; December 22, 1941
NATURE Certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit
FACTS
-Until the formation of the Independent Organization of
Employees (hereinafter called the Independent) in 1937, there
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 210
was no labor organization among the employees of the Virginia Electric
and Power Company (hereinafter called the Company).
-On April 26, 1937, the Company posted a bulletin throughout its
operations appealing to the employees to bargain with the
Company directly without the intervention of an "outside" union
-In response to this bulletin, several requests for increased wages and
better working conditions were received.
-The Company decided to withhold action on those requests, and
directed its employees to select representatives to attend meetings at
which Company officials would speak on the Wagner Act. These
representatives met in Norfolk and Richmond on May 24 and were
addressed by high Company officials who read identical speeches
stressing the desirability of forming a bargaining agency.
-By the substance of the speeches and the mechanics of the meetings,
the Company gave impetus to and assured the creation of an "inside"
organization
-On July 19, the Independent notified the Company that it represented a
majority of the employees, and submitted a proposed contract.
-Negotiations were begun on July 30, and the contract was formally
executed on August 5, and provided for a closed shop, a check-off, and
a wage increase.
-On November 4, the date upon which the closed shop provision
became effective, the Company discharged two employees, Staunton
and Elliott, because they refused to join the Independent.
-In March, 1938, it discharged another employee, Harrell, for his
membership and activity in an outside union.
-Upon the basis of these findings and the entire record in the case, the
Board concluded that the Company had committed unfair labor practices
within the meaning of section 8(1), (2) and (3) of the Act.
ISSUE
WON the company had committed unfair labor practices
HELD
No (no determination as it was remanded)
-The Board specifically found that the bulletin of April 26 and the
speeches of May 24 "interfered with, restrained, and coerced" the
Company's employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by § 7
of the Act.
-Neither the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the employer from
expressing its view on labor policies or problems, nor is a penalty
imposed upon it because of any utterances which it has made.
-The employer in this case is as free now as ever to take any side it may
choose on this controversial issue. But certainly conduct, though
evidenced in part by speech, may amount in connection with other
circumstances to coercion within the meaning of the Act.
-If the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his
employees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled
to the protection of the Act. And, in determining whether a course
of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted
vocally by the employer may no more be disregarded than
pressure exerted in other ways.
-For "Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between
unions may have telling effect among men who know the
consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure."
-If the Board's order here may fairly be said to be based on the totality of
the Company's activities during the period in question, we may not
consider the findings of the Board as to the coercive effect of the
bulletin and the speeches in isolation from the findings as respects
the other conduct of the Company. If the Board's ultimate
conclusion is based upon a complex of activities, such as the anti-
union background of the Company, the activities of Bishop,
Edwards' warning to the employees that they would be discharged
for "messing with the CIO," the discharge of Mann, the quick
formation of the Independent, and the part which the management
may have played in that formation, that conclusion would not be
vitiated by the fact that the Board considered what the Company
said in conjunction with what it did. The mere fact that language
merges into a course of conduct does not put that whole course
without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power.
-From the Board's decision, we are far from clear that the Board
here considered the whole complex of activities, of which the
Disini
bulletin and the speeches are but parts, in reaching its
ultimate conclusion with regard to the Independent.
-If the utterances are thus to be separated from their
background, we find it difficult to sustain a finding of coercion
with respect to them alone.
-It appears that the Board rested heavily upon findings with
regard to the bulletin and the speeches the adequacy of which
we regard as doubtful. We therefore remand the cause to the
Circuit Court of Appeals with directions to remand it to the Board
for a redetermination of the issues in the light of this opinion.
Disposition Reversed and remanded
NLRB V GISSEL PACKING CO
395 US 575
WARREN; June 16, 1969
NATURE
Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals
FACTS
- In each case (Gissel Packing Co., Heck's Inc., and General
Steel Products, Inc.), the Union waged an organizational
campaign, obtained authorization cards from a majority of
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, and then, on the
basis of the cards, demanded recognition by the employer. The
employers refused to bargain, on the ground that the cards were
inherently unreliable, and carried out vigorous antiunion
campaigns. Unions did not seek an election but instead filed
three unfair labor practice charges against the employer, for
refusing to bargain, for coercion and intimidation of employees.
- The Board's primary response was an order to bargain directed
at the employers. The Board found that all three employers had
engaged in restraint and coercion of employees - in Gissel, for
coercively interrogating employees about Union activities,
threatening them with discharge, and promising them benefits; in
Heck's, for coercively interrogating employees, threatening
reprisals, creating the appearance of surveillance, and offering
benefits for opposing the Union; and in General Steel, for
coercive interrogation and threats of reprisals, including
discharge.
- The NLRB ordered the employers to stop their unfair labor
practices, offer reinstatement and back pay to employees
discriminatorily discharged, and to bargain with the Unions on
request.
- From the time the employer first learned of the Union's drive
until the election, the company's president talked and wrote to
the employees. The NLRB stated that the communications
"reasonably tended to convey . . . the belief or impression that
selection of the Union in the forthcoming election could lead [the
Company] to close its plant, or to the transfer of the weaving
production, with the resultant loss of jobs to the wire weavers."
The NLRB set aside the election because the employer
"interfered with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in
the election," found that the Union had a valid card majority
when it demanded recognition.
ISSUE
WON certain specific statements made by an employer to his
employees constituted such an election-voiding unfair labor
practice
HELD YES
Reasoning An employer is free to communicate to his
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his
specific views about a particular union, so long as the
communications do not contain a "threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit." He may even make a prediction as to the
precise effects he believes unionization will have on his
company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 211
employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond
his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to
close the plant in case of unionization.
- NLRB correctly found that the communications were cast as a threat of
retaliatory action and not as a prediction of "demonstrable economic
consequences."
Disposition We affirm the judgment of the CA for the First Circuit in No.
585, and we reverse the judgments of the CA for the Fourth Circuit in
Nos. 573 and 691 insofar as they decline enforcement of the Board's
orders to bargain and remand those cases to that court with directions to
remand to the Board for further proceedings.
4. ESPIONAGE
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSN
v INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.
37 SCRA 244
CASTRO; January 30, 1971
NATURE
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the
Court of Industrial Relations
FACTS
-The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU,
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and
Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred
to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group
(hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
-the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified
renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were
then due to expire. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever
benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective. Thereafter,
negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were
snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which
the Unions filed a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining."
-the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and
requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify
their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the
former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against
what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
-Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what
they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices. Meanwhile,
eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without
increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on
in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the
Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
-the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building at Plaza Moraga
-the Companies through their acting manager and president, the
respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter
-The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few
unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter
-company men succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to
the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.
-the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually
to the strikers a letter
-Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the
members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's
office and by the courts.
-However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them
not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but
also to be screened by a management committee
-the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged
the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the
Disini
exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out
individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and
return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee
and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning
them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2,
1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the
members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of
participation in the strike.
ISSUE
WON the company committed unfair labor practice
HELD
YES. The lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of
Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the
interest of the respondents when, as president of the union, he
advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to
have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely
intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and
customers from entering the Companies' buildings.
Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line
had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only
when management men made incursions into and tried to break
the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra,
picketing is inherently explosive.
The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' ULP,
Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar
to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the
Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the
testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the
board of directors of the petitioner union, who became a
"turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of
Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others - another matter which
emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice.
• For under the circumstances, there is good
ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy
on the activities of the union members. This act of the
respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in
the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor
practice.
"It has been held in a great number of decisions that espionage
by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are
such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of
employees in connection with their right to organize, form and
join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice . . .
• 'Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain
and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
selforganization than such activity even where no
discharges result. The information obtained by means
of espionage is invaluable to the employer and can be
used in a variety of cases to break a union.'
• The unfair labor practice is committed whether the
espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or
detective, by officials or supervisory employees of
theemployer, or by fellow employees acting at the
request or direction of the employer, or an ex-
employee . . ."
Disposition CIR Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE
5. ECONOMIC COERCION and
INDUCEMENT
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES
ASSN v INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 212
37 SCRA 244
CASTRO; January 30, 1971
NATURE
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the
Court of Industrial Relations
FACTS
-The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU,
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and
Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred
to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group
(hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
-the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified
renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were
then due to expire. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever
benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective. Thereafter,
negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were
snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which
the Unions filed a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining."
-the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and
requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify
their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the
former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against
what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
-Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what
they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices. Meanwhile,
eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without
increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on
in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the
Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
-the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building at Plaza Moraga
-the Companies through their acting manager and president, the
respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter
-The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few
unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter
-company men succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to
the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.
-the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually
to the strikers a letter
-Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the
members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's
office and by the courts.
-However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them
not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but
also to be screened by a management committee
-the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged
the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual
letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work,
with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return
to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards
readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.
ISSUE
WON the company committed unfair labor practice
HELD
YES.
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to
"bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional
movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours,"
and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike
Disini
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice.
It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to
offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they
are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered
reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences
of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor
organizations are the following acts:
o the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal"
employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by
the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of
mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain
with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees
to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return
for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their
union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after
the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the
effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive
new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance,
profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.
"The test of whether an employer has interfered with and
coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is
whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may
reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not
necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was
in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the
employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union
conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-
organization and collective bargaining."
Disposition CIR Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE
NLRB v EXCHANGE PARTS CO.
375 US 405
HARLAN, January 13, 1964
NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS
-Exchange Parts Co.’s employees were not represented by a
union until International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO
(UNION in short) informed the company that majority of the
employees designated them as their bargaining representative in
1959. November 1959, the union petitioned the NLRB for a
representation elections, and the said elections was ordered to
be conducted on March 1960.
-However, prior to the elections and after being informed of the
union’s intent, the company did the following acts:
*announcement that their “floating holiday” for 1959 would fall on
December 26 and that there would be an additional floating
holiday for 1960;
*6 days after NLRB issued an order for the conduct of elections,
company held a dinner for the employees where the additional
“floating holiday” for 1960 was voted to fall on the employees’
birthdays and that the company VP and GM, although urging the
employees to vote, said that the union distorted some of the
facts
*14 days before the election, the company sent its employees a
letter containing a list of the benefits given by the company to the
employees, emphasizing that the employees obtained these
benefits WITHOUT A UNION and that the union would not be
able to give those benefits to the employees
-the union LOST the elections so they contested the acts of the
company to NLRB
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 213
NLRB: act of company violated 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act1
-CA: not ULP
ISSUE
WON 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits the conferral
of such benefits, without more, where the employer's purpose is to affect
the outcome of the election
HELD
YES. Reverse CA
Ratio. It was a violation of 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act
for an employer, shortly before a representation election, to confer
economic benefits on its employees for the purpose of inducing them to
vote against the union.
- Section 8 (a) (1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "interfere with" the protected right of employees to organize,
prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct
immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the
express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against
unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect.
- The absence of conditions or threats pertaining to the particular
benefits conferred would be of controlling significance only if it could be
presumed that no question of additional benefits or renegotiation of
existing benefits would arise in the future; and no such presumption is
tenable.
Disposition Reversed
6. UNION SOLICITATION and DISTRIBUTION OF
LITERATURE AND MATERIALS
LECHMERE, INC. v NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD
117 L. Ed. 2d 79
Thomas, J.; January 27, 1992
FACTS
Petitioner Lechmere, Inc., owns and operates a retail store located in a
shopping plaza in a large metropolitan area. Lechmere is also part
owner of the plaza's parking lot, which is separated from a public
highway by a 46-foot-wide grassy strip, almost all of which is public
property. In a campaign to organize Lechmere employees, nonemployee
union organizers placed handbills on the windshields of cars parked in
the employees' part of the parking lot. Lechmere denied the organizers
access to the lot, they distributed handbills and picketed from the grassy
strip. In addition, they were able to contact directly some 20% of the
employees. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with
respondent National Labor Relations Board (Board), alleging that
Lechmere had violated the NLRA by barring the organizers from its
property. An Administrative Law Judge ruled in the union's favor,
recommending that Lechmere, inter alia, be ordered to cease and desist
from barring the organizers from the parking lot. The Board affirmed,
relying on its ruling in Jean Country, that in all access cases the Board
should balance (1) the degree of impairment of the § 7 right if access is
denied, against (2) the degree of impairment of the private property right
if access is granted, taking into consideration (3) the availability of
reasonably effective alternative means of exercising the § 7 right. The
Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.
ISSUE
1 Section 8 (a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3)."
Disini
WON Lechmere committed ULP by barring nonemployee union
organizers from its property.
HELD NO.
By its plain terms, the NLRA confers rights only on employees,
not on unions or their nonemployee organizers. Thus, as a rule,
an employer cannot be compelled to allow nonemployee
organizers onto his property.
§ 7 simply does not protect nonemployee union organizers
except in the rare case where "the inaccessibility of employees
makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to
communicate with them through the usual channels." It is only
when reasonable access to employees is infeasible that it
becomes appropriate to balance § 7 and private property rights.
Pp. 535-538.
The facts in this case do not justify application of inaccessibility
exception. Because Lechmere's employees do not reside on its
property, they are presumptively not "beyond the reach" of the
union's message. Nor does the fact that they live in a large
metropolitan area render them "inaccessible." Because the union
failed to establish the existence of any "unique obstacles" that
frustrated access to Lechmere's employees, the Board erred in
concluding that Lechmere committed an unfair labor practice by
barring the nonemployee organizers from its property.
REPUBLIC AVIATION CORP. V NLRB
324 U.S. 793
REED; April 23, 1945
FACTS
- Republic Aviation Corp., a military aircraft manufacturer,
adopted a general rule which prohibited soliciting of any type (of
union membership) in their factory or offices. Despite the
warning, an EE passed out application cards to other EEs during
lunch periods for which he was discharged. 3 other EEs were
discharged for wearing union pins at the plant after being
requested to remove them, as said union was not the duly
designated representative of the EEs and wearing such pins
supposedly falsely indicated an acknowledgment by
management of their authority to represent the EEs. The
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) saw otherwise as
there was no competing labor organization in the plant and held
that the ‘no solicitation’ rule violated the National Labor Relations
Act as it interfered with and restrained employee rights in
prohibiting union activity, as did the discharge of the 3 EEs. The
Board ordered their reinstatement with backwages and the
rescission of the ‘no solicitation’ rule. Hence this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE
1. WON the ‘no solicitation’ clause resulting in the discharge of
EEs was an unfair labor practice in violation of the right to
organize
HELD
1. YES
-Petitioner argues that the application of the clause did not
violate such right since the rule was not discriminatorily applied
against union solicitation but was impartially enforced against all
solicitors. However, if a rule against solicitation is invalid as to
union solicitation on the ERs premises during the EE’s own time,
a discharge because of violation of such rule discriminates in
that it discourages membership in a labor organization.
-The gravemen of the objection to said clause is that it rests on a
policy formulated without due administrative procedure. There
must be evidence before the Board to show that the rules and
orders of employers interfered with and discouraged union
organization. Complaints of unfair labor practices based on
evidence must be place before the Board by witnesses who are
subject to cross-examination by opposing parties. An
administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on
the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 214
statutory commands have occurred may infer within the limits of the
inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be
based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the
creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts
under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an
adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is
entrusted to their administration.
- It is not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce
a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working
hours, although on company property. Such a rule must be presumed to
be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore
discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances
make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.
Disposition Decision affirmed.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105
1956
The Babcock & Wilcox Co. operated a manufacturing plant on a 100-
acre tract about one mile from a community of 21,000 people. The plant
buildings were enclosed within a fence, employee access being through
several gates.
Approximately 90% of the employees drove to work in private cars, and
the company maintained a parking lot for the employees. Only
employees and deliverymen normally used the parking lot.
The company had a rule forbidding the distribution of literature on
company property.
The Board found that the company's parking lot and the walkway leading
from it to the plant entrance were the only "safe and practicable" places
in the vicinity of the plant for distribution of union literature, and held the
company guilty of an unfair labor practice for enforcing the no-
distribution rule and thereby denying union organizers limited access to
company property.
The Board ordered the company to rescind its no-distribution rule insofar
as it related to non-employee union representatives seeking to distribute
union literature on the parking lot and walk-way area.
The CA refused enforcement of the Board's order on the ground that the
Act did not authorize the Board to impose a servitude on an employer's
property where no employee was involved.
SC affirmed on the ground that the availability of alternative channels of
communication made the intrusion on the employer's property rights
ordered by the Board unwarranted.
Guiding principle for adjusting conflicts between Sec. 7 rights and
property rights:
 "Organization rights are granted to workers by the same
authority, the National Government that preserves
property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with
as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other.
 The employer may not affirmatively interfere with
organization; the union may not always insist that the employer aid
organization.
 But when the inaccessibility of employees makes
ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to communicate
with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property
has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication
of information on the right to organize."
NLRB v. UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, ET AL
357 US 357
Frankfurter; June 30, 1958
Nature: CERTIORARI
Facts:
- No. 81: Steelworkers instituted a campaign to organize the employees
of NuTone, Inc., a manufacturer of electrical devices. In the early stages
of the campaign, supervisory personnel of the company interrogated
employees and solicited reports concerning the organizational activities
of other employees. Several employees were discharged; the Board
later found that the discharges had been the result of their organizational
Disini
activities. In June the company began to distribute, through its
supervisory personnl, literature that, although not coercive, was
clearly anti-union in tenor. In August, while continuing to
distribute such material, the company announced its intention of
enforcing its rule against employees' posting signs or distributing
literature on company property or soliciting or campaigning on
company time. The rule, according to these posted
announcements, applied to "all employees - whether they are for
or against the union." Later the same month a representation
election was held, which the Steelworkers lost.
In a proceeding before the Board commenced at the instance of
the Steelworkers, the company was charged with a number of
violations of the Act alleged to have taken place both before and
after the election, including the discriminatory application of the
no-solicitation rule. The Board found that the pre-election
interrogation and solicitation by supervisory personnel and the
discharge of employees were unfair labor practices; it also found
that the company had, in violation of the Act, assisted and
supported an employee organization formed after the election.
However, the Board dismissed the allegation that the company
had discriminatorily enforced its no-solicitation rule. The
Steelworkers sought review of this dismissal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the
Board petitioned for enforcement of its order in the same court.
The Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unfair labor
practice for the company to prohibit the distribution of
organizational literature on company property during non-
working hours while the company was itself distributing anti-
union literature; and it directed that the Board's order be modified
accordingly and enforced as modified.
- No. 289: the Textile Workers conducted an organizational
campaign at several of the plants of respondent Avondale Mills.
A number of individual employees were called before
supervisory personnel of the company, on the ground that they
had been soliciting union membership, and informed that such
solicitation was in violation of plant rules and would not be
tolerated in the future. The rule had not been promulgated in
written form, but there was evidence that it had been previously
invoked in a non-organizational context. During this same period,
both in these interviews concerning the rule and at the
employees' places of work, supervisory personnel interrogated
employees concerning their organizational views and activities
and solicited employees to withdraw their membership cards
from the union. This conduct was in many cases accompanied
by threats that the mill would close down or that various
employee benefits would be lost if the mill should become
organized. Subsequently three employees, each of whom had
been informed of the no-solicitation rule, were laid off and
eventually discharged for violating the rule.
As a result of charges filed with the Board by the Textile
Workers, a complaint was brought against the company alleging
that it had committed a number of unfair labor practices,
including the discriminatory invocation of the no-solicitation rule
and the discharge of employees for its violation. The Board
found that the interrogation, solicitation and threatening of
employees by the company's supervisory personnel were unfair
labor practices. Moreover, it found that resort to the no-
solicitation rule and discharge of the three employees for its
violation were discriminatory and therefore in violation of the Act;
it further held that, even if the rule had not been invoked
discriminatorily, the discharge of one of the employees had
resulted solely from his organizational activities apart from any
violation of the rule and was therefore an unfair labor practice.
The Board ordered the cessation of these practices and the
reinstatement of the discharged employees.
Upon the Board's petitioning for enforcement in the CA for the
Fifth Circuit, the company contested only the portions of the
Board's findings and order relating to the rule and the
discharges. The court enforced the uncontested portions of the
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 215
order but, finding insufficient evidence of discrimination in the application
of the no-solicitation rule, denied enforcement to the portion of the order
relating to the rule and to two of the discharges. As to the third
discharge, the court agreed with the Board that it was the result of
discrimination unrelated to a violation of the rule, and the court enforced
the portion of the Board's order directing the employee's reinstatement.
Issue: WON it was an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 8 (a)
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, for an employer to
enforce an otherwise valid rule forbidding employees to engage in pro-
union solicitation during working hours or to distribute literature in the
employer's plant, when the employer was engaging in anti-union
solicitation and was committing other acts which constituted unfair labor
practices.
Held: The records in these cases furnish no basis for findings that
enforcement of the no-solicitation rules constituted unfair labor practices.
(The US SC said that they do not imply that the enforcement of a valid
no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at the same time engaging in
anti-union solicitation may not constitute an unfair labor practice- there
just has to be basis for it in the findings.)
Ratio:
Employer rules prohibiting organizational solicitation are not in and of
themselves violative of the Act, for they may duly serve production,
order and discipline. (See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, Labor
Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.)
Reasoning:
- US SC: In neither of the cases before us did the party attacking the
enforcement of the no-solicitation rule contest its validity. Nor is the
claim made that an employer may not, under proper circumstances,
engage in non-coercive anti-union solicitation; indeed, his right to do so
is protected by the so-called "employer free speech" provision of 8 (c) of
the Act. Contrariwise, as both cases before us show, coercive anti-union
solicitation and other similar conduct run afoul of the Act and constitute
unfair labor practices irrespective of the bearing of such practices on
enforcement of a no-solicitation rule. The very narrow and almost
abstract question here derives from the claim that, when the employer
himself engages in anti-union solicitation that if engaged in by
employees would constitute a violation of the rule - particularly when his
solicitation is coercive or accompanied by other unfair labor practices -
his enforcement of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule against the
employees is itself an unfair labor practice.
- There is no indication in the record in either of these cases that the
employees, or the union on their behalf, requested the employer, himself
engaging in anti-union solicitation, to make an exception to the rule for
pro-union solicitation. There is evidence in both cases that the
employers had in the past made exceptions to their rules for charitable
solicitation. Notwithstanding the clear anti-union bias of both employers,
it is not for us to conclude as a matter of law - although it might well
have been open to the Board to conclude as a matter of industrial
experience - that a request for a similar qualification upon the rule for
organizational solicitation would have been rejected. Certainly the
employer is not obliged voluntarily and without any request to offer the
use of his facilities and the time of his employees for pro-union
solicitation. He may very well be wary of a charge that he is interfering
with, or contributing support to, a labor organization in violation of 8 (a)
(2) of the Act.
-No attempt was made in either of these cases to make a showing that
the no-solicitation rules truly diminished the ability of the labor
organizations involved to carry their messages to the employees. Just
as that is a vital consideration in determining the validity of a no-
solicitation rule,
Dispositive: The judgment in No. 81 is reversed, insofar as it sets aside
and requires the Board to modify its order, and the cause is remanded to
the CA for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion; in all other
respects, it is affirmed. The judgment in No. 289 is affirmed.
Disini
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN dissenting in part and
concurring in part.
(On No. 289) There is no issue in this case of balancing the
employee's rights under Section 7 with the employer's right to
promote "the legally authorized expression of his antiunion
views." The only expression of views carried on by Avondale
Mills was a series of threats against the union. Far from being
"legally authorized," this expression of views constituted an
unfair labor practice by itself. Thus we are not concerned in this
case with the possibility of curtailing legitimate employer
expression in violation of either the First Amendment or Section
8 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, it is no aid to
the company that all the activities here involved occurred on
plant property and during working hours. When a choice has
been required between an employer's rights in his premises and
the rights that Congress has protected under Section 7, this
Court has not hesitated to give effect to the congressional will.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, supra; Labor Board v.
Stowe Spinning Co.; cf. Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
supra.
In United Steelworkers, I concur in the result. The National Labor
Relations Board declined to hold that the enforcement of an
employer's no-distribution rule against a union was an unfair
labor practice even though it was coupled with an antiunion
campaign. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board on this
point, modifying the Board's order accordingly. This Court
sustains the Board. It is conceded that the enforcement of this
no-distribution rule against the union is not by itself an unfair
labor practice. The Board determined that the employer's
expressions of his antiunion views were non-coercive in nature.
This fact creates a vital distinction between this case and
Avondale Mills. Being noncoercive in nature, the employer's
expressions were protected by Section 8 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act3 and so cannot be used to show that the
contemporaneous enforcement of the no-distribution rule was an
unfair labor practice.
7. DISCRIMINATION
WISE & CO. INC. VS WISE & CO. INC.
EMPLOYEES UNION
178 SCRA 536
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
FACTS
The facts are undisputed. On April 3,1987 the management
issued a memorandum circular introducing a profit sharing
scheme for its managers and supervisors the initial distribution of
which was to take effect March 31, 1988.
On July 3,1987 the respondent union wrote petitioner through its
president asking for participation in this scheme. This was
denied by petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere strictly to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
In the meantime, talks were underway for early negotiation by
the parties of the CBA which was due to expire on April 30,
1988. The negotiation thus begun earlier than the freedom
period. On November 11, 1987 petitioner wrote respondent
union advising the latter that they were prepared to consider
including the employees covered by the CBA in the profit sharing
scheme beginning the year 1987 provided that the ongoing
negotiations were concluded prior to December 1987. However,
the collective bargaining negotiations reached a deadlock on the
issue of the scope of the bargaining unit. Conciliation efforts to
settle the dispute on 29 March 1988 were made but no
settlement was reached.
On March 30, 1988, petitioner distributed the profit sharing
benefit not only to managers and supervisors but also to all other
rank and file employees not covered by the CBA. This caused
the respondent union to file a notice of strike alleging that
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 216
petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice because the union members
were discriminated against in the grant of the profit sharing benefits.
Consequently, management refused to proceed with the CBA
negotiations unless the last notice of strike was first resolved. The union
agreed to postpone discussions on the profit sharing demand until a new
CBA was concluded. After a series of conciliation conferences, the
parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary arbitration. After
the parties submitted their position papers, a rejoinder and reply, on
March 20,1989 the voluntary arbitrator issued an award ordering
petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing
scheme to the members of respondent union. 1 Hence, this petition
wherein petitioner alleged the following grounds in support thereof
ISSUE
WON the grant by management of profit sharing benefits to its non-
union member employees is discriminatory against its workers who are
union members.
HELD:
-Under the CBA between the parties that was in force and effect from
May 1, 1985 to April 30,1988 it was agreed that the "bargaining unit"
covered by the CBA "consists of all regular or permanent employees,
below the rank of assistant supervisor, 3 Also expressly excluded from
the term "appropriate bargaining unit" are all regular rank and file
employees in the office of the president, vice-president, and the other
offices of the company � personnel office, security office, corporate
affairs office, accounting and treasurer department . 4
- It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the "bargaining
unit" and who do not derive benefits from the CBA that the profit sharing
privilege was extended by petitioner.
There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the
situation of the union employees are different and distinct from the non-
union employees. 5 Indeed, discrimination per se is not unlawful. There
can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not
similarly situated.
a) Respondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse
of discretion by the petitioner in extending the benefits of profit sharing
to the non-union employees as they are two (2) groups not similarly
situated. These non-union employees are not covered by the CBA. They
do not derive and enjoy the benefits under the CBA.
The contention of the respondent union that the grant to the non-union
employees of the profit sharing benefits was made at a time when there
was a deadlock in the CBA negotiation so that apparently the motive
thereby was to discourage such non-union employees from joining the
union is not borne by the record. Petitioner denies this accusation and
instead points out that inspite of this benefit extended to them, some
non-union workers actually joined the respondent union thereafter.
Respondent union also decries that no less than the president of the
petitioner agreed to include its members in the coverage of the 1987
profit sharing benefit provided that they would agree to an earlier
negotiation for the renewal of the CBA which expired in 1988. Be this as
it may, since there was actually a deadlock in the negotiation and it was
not resolved and consummated on the period expected, private
respondent can not now claim that petitioner has a duty to extend the
profit sharing benefit to the union members.
b) The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to
regulate, according to its discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment. This flows from the established rule that labor law does not
authorize the of the employer in the conduct of its business. 6 such
management prerogative may be availed of without fear of any liability
so long as it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employers' interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of employees under special laws or valid agreement and are
not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton
manner or out of malice or spite. 7
c) grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the
employees outside the "bargaining unit" falls under the ambit of its
managerial prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and
without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in
the CBA where the employees are classified into those who are
members of the union and those who are not. In the case of the union
members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the
CBA contract which constitute the law between the contracting parties. 8
Disini
Both the employer and the union members are bound by such
agreement.
d) However, the court serves notice that it will not
hesitate to strike down any act of the employer that tends to be
discriminatory against union members. It is only because of the
peculiar circumstances of this case showing there is no such
intention that this court ruled otherwise.
Dispositive: Petition is GRANTED.
ME-SHURN CORPORATION v. ME-SHURN
WORKERS UNION
448 SCRA 41
PANGANIBAN; January 11, 2005
NATURE
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to annul the November 29, 2002 Decision of the CA
FACTS
- The regular rank and file employees of Me-Shurn Corporation
organized Me-Shurn Workers Union-FSM, an affiliate of the
February Six Movement (FSM). Respondent union had a
pending application for registration with the BLR.
- Ten days later, petitioner corporation started placing on forced
leave all the rank and file employees who were members of the
union’s bargaining unit.
- Respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Election with
the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. The corporation filed a
comment stating that it would temporarily lay off employees and
cease operations, on account of its alleged inability to meet the
export quota required by the Board of Investment.
- While the Petition was pending, 184 union members allegedly
submitted a retraction/withdrawal thereof. The med-arbiter
dismissed the Petition. DOLE Undersecretary granted the
union’s appeal and ordered the holding of a certification election
among the rank and file employees of the corporation.
- Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner
corporation on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal lockout
and union busting).
- Chou Fang Kuen (alias Sammy Chou, the other petitioner
herein) and Raquel Lamayra (the Filipino administrative manager
of the corporation) imposed a precondition for the resumption of
operation and the rehiring of laid off workers. He allegedly
required the remaining union officers to sign an Agreement
containing a guarantee that upon their return to work, no union
or labor organization would be organized. Instead, the union
officers were to serve as mediators between labor and
management.
- The union reorganized and elected a new set of officers.
Respondent Rosalina Cruz was elected president. Thereafter, it
filed two Complaints charging petitioner corporation with unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and
deficiency in separation pay, for which they prayed for damages
and attorney’s fees.
- The corporation countered that because of economic reversals,
it was compelled to close and cease its operations to prevent
serious business losses; that under Article 283 of the Labor
Code, it had the right to do so; that in August 1998, it had paid its
342 laid off employees separation pay and benefits in the total
amount of P1,682,863.88; and that by virtue of these payments,
the cases had already become moot and academic. It also
averred that its resumption of operations in September 1998 had
been announced and posted at the Bataan Export Processing
Zone, and that some of the former employees had reapplied.
ISSUE
1. WON the dismissal of the employees of petitioner Meshurn
Corporation is for an authorized cause.
2. WON the respondents can maintain a suit against petitioners.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 217
HELD
1. NO. The reason invoked by petitioners to justify the cessation of
corporate operations was alleged business losses. Yet, other than
generally referring to the financial crisis in 1998 and to their supposed
difficulty in obtaining an export quota, interestingly, they never presented
any report on the financial operations of the corporation during the
period before its shutdown. Neither did they submit any credible
evidence to substantiate their allegation of business losses.
- Basic is the rule in termination cases that the employer bears the
burden of showing that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.
Otherwise, the dismissal is deemed unjustified. Apropos this
responsibility, petitioner corporation should have presented clear and
convincing evidence of imminent economic or business reversals as a
form of affirmative defense in the proceedings before the labor arbiter or,
under justifiable circumstances, even on appeal with the NLRC.
2. YES. The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union
were not a legitimate labor organization within the meaning of the Labor
Code. Under this Code, in an unorganized establishment, only a
legitimate union may file a petition for certification election.[34] Hence,
while it is not clear from the record whether respondent union is a
legitimate organization, we are not readily inclined to believe otherwise,
especially in the light of the pro-labor policies enshrined in the
Constitution and the Labor Code.
- Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own name in
order to challenge the unfair labor practice committed by petitioners
against it and its members. “It would be an unwarranted impairment of
the right to self-organization through formation of labor associations if
thereafter such collective entities would be barred from instituting action
in their representative capacity.”
- Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed by petitioners
against respondent union prior to the holding of the certification
election-- acts that included their immediate grant of exclusive
recognition to another union as a bargaining agent despite the pending
Petition for certification election -- the results of that election cannot be
said to constitute a repudiation by the affected employees of the union’s
right to represent them in the present case.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED.
8. RUN-AWAY SHOP
Complex Electronics Employees Association vs
NLRC (Complex Electronic Corp)
310 SCRA 403
Kapunan, J; July 19, 1999
NATURE
Petition for Review.Certiorari
FACTS
- Complex Electronics Corporation (Complex) was engaged in the
manufacture of electronic products. It was actually a subcontractor of
electronic products where its customers gave their job orders, sent their
own materials and consigned their equipment to it. The customers were
foreign-based companies with different product lines and specifications
requiring the employment of workers with specific skills for each product
line. Thus, there was the AMS Line for the Adaptive Micro System, Inc.,
the Heril Line for Heril Co., Ltd., the Lite-On Line for the Lite-On
Philippines Electronics Co., etc.
- On March 4, 1992, Complex received a facsimile message from Lite-On
Philippines Electronics Co., requiring it to lower its price by 10%.
Complex informed its Lite-On personnel that such request of lowering
their selling price by 10% was not feasible as they were already incurring
losses at the present prices of their products. Under such circumstances,
Complex regretfully informed the employees that it was left with no
alternative but to close down the operations of the Lite-On Line. The
Company promised to pay retrenched employees the equivalent of half
month salary for every year of service ( which was in accordance with the
provisions of the Labor Law under Article 283).The Union demanded one
Disini
month salary instead which the company refused.
- A notice of the closure of the Lite-on line and the
retrenchment was filed by the company with the DOLE
and the Union filed a notice of strike.
- In the evening of April 6, 1992, the machinery, equipment and
materials being used for production at Complex were pulled-out
from the company premises and transferred to the premises of
Ionics Circuit, Inc. (Ionics) at Cabuyao, Laguna. The following
day, a total closure of company operation was effected at
Complex.
- Complex averred that since the time the Union filed its notice of
strike, there was a significant decline in the quantity and quality of
the products in all of the production lines. The delivery schedules
were not met prompting the customers to lodge complaints
against them. Fearful that the machinery, equipment and
materials would be rendered inoperative and unproductive due to
the impending strike of the workers, the customers ordered their
pull-out and transfer to Ionics. Thus, Complex was compelled to
cease operations.
- The Union filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter alleging that
the pull out of the equipment from Complex was an illegal closure
and violative of Section 3 and 8, Rule Xiii, Book V of the Labor
Code and impleaded Ionics as a party defendant because the
officers and management of Complex were also holding office at
Ionics. The Arbiter ruled in favor of the Union but the NLRC
reversed the ruling and instead granted just the normal separation
pay in view of the closure of the company. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S
WON the ruling of the NLRC that Ionics was a runaway shop is
correct.
HELD
NO. A "runaway shop" is defined as an industrial plant moved by
its owners from one location to another to escape union labor
regulations or state laws, but the term is also used to describe a
plant removed to a new location in order to discriminate against
employees at the old plant because of their union
activities. It is one wherein the employer moves its business to
another location or it temporarily closes its business for anti-
union purposes. A "runaway shop" in this sense, is a relocation
motivated by anti-union animus rather than for business reasons.
In this case, however, Ionics was not set up merely for the
purpose of transferring the business of Complex. At the time the
labor dispute arose at Complex, Ionics was already existing as
an independent company. As earlier mentioned, it has been in
existence since July 5, 1984. It cannot, therefore, be said that
the temporary closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of
business to Ionics was for anti-union purposes. The Union failed
to show that the primary reason for the closure of the
establishment was due to the union activities of the employees.
The mere fact that one or more corporations are owned or
controlled by the same or single stockholder is not a sufficient
ground for disregarding separate corporate personalities.
- Ionics may be engaged in the same business as that of
Complex, but this fact alone is not enough reason to pierce the
veil of corporate fiction of the corporation. Well-settled is the rule
that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from
that of its officers and stockholders. This fiction of corporate
entity can only be disregarded in certain cases such as when it is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
or defend crime. To disregard said separate juridical personality
of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established.
- When Complex filed a notice of closure of its Lite-On Line, the
employees filed a notice of strike which greatly alarmed the
customers of Complex and this led to the pull-out of their
equipment, machinery and materials from Complex. Thus,
without the much needed equipment, Complex was unable to
continue its business. It was left with no other choice except to
shut down the entire business. The closure, therefore, was not
motivated by the union activities of the employees, but rather by
 LABOR LAW 2 A2010 218
necessity since it can no longer engage in production without the much
needed materials, equipment and machinery.
Disposition Petition is denied.
8.3 UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE:
EMPLOYER AND LABOR
ORGANIZATION ACTS
VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT TO
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1. VIOLATE DUTY TO BARGAIN – 248 (G);
249 (C); 250-253
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed
by this Code;
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It
shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its
officers, agents or representatives:
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with
the employer, provided it is the representative of the
employees;
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following
procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall
serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement
of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto
not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
notice;
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and
reply, either party may request for a conference which shall
begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of
request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon
request of either or both parties or at its own initiative and
immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The
Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the
duty of the parties to participate fully and promptly in the
conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the
parties are prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt
or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes
amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a
voluntary arbitrator. (As amended by Section 20, Republic
Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
ART. 251. Duty to bargain collectively in the absence of
collective bargaining agreements. - In the absence of an
agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a
more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be
the duty of employer and the representatives of the
employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
Disini
NLRB VS. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The
duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and
all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions
arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either
party but such duty does not compel any party to agree
to a proposal or to make any concession.
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists
a collective bargaining agreement. - When there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime.
However, either party can serve a written notice to
terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60)
days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of
both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.
418 f 2d 736
KAUFMAN; October 28, 1969
Petitions were filed to review and enforce order of National Labor
Relations Boards based on findings of unfair labor practices and
failure to bargain in good faith in violation of section 8(a) (1) and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A sec 158 (1),
(5). The Court of Appeals, Irving R. Kaufman, Circuit Judge,
held that employer (GE Co.) was guilty of unfair labor practice in
negotiation with union, where employer took a take it or leave it
approach to negotiations in general which emphasized both
powerlessness and uselessness of union to its members, and
employer conducted a communications program that pictured
employer as true defender of interests of employees, further
denigrating union, and sharply curbing employer’s ability to
change its own position.
Petition for review denied, and petition for enforcement of
Board’s order granted
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN V
ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY
OF LETRAN
00 SCRA 00
KAPUNAN; September 18, 2000
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari decision of CA
FACTS
- Letran and the labor union (AEFL) were in the process of
negotiating a new CBA. However, the negotiations were
suspended by Letran after it purportedly received information
that a new group of employees ha filed a petition for certification
election
(there are other facts involved, but only these are relevant to the
topic)
ISSUE/S
1. WON Letran is guilty of ULP by refusing to bargain with the
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 219
union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new
CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed
by another legitimate labor organization
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The filing of the petition for certification election was barred by the
existence of a valid and existing CBA. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for
certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation.
There is no doubt that petitioner is guilty of ULP by its stern refusal to
bargain in good faith with respondent union.
Reasoning Art.252, LC: The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions
of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty
does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.
- the parties have the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement. Undoubtedly, the union lived up to this requisite when it
presented its proposals for the CBA to Letran. On the other hand,
petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation.
- Letran’s utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in
its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter.
More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union,
petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the
part of Letran prompted the union to file its second notice of strike on
March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the
Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as its
excuse for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Art.250,
governing the procedure in collective bargaining2
- company's refusal to make counter-proposal to the union's proposed
CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even
bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union,
there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. Here, Letran’s
actuations show lack of sincere desire to negotiate (thus guilty of ULP).
- the claim that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the
filing of the petition for certification election the issue on majority
representation of the employees had arose is untenable. According to
petitioner, the authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the
employees was challenged when a rival union filed a petition for
certification election.
- In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining
process there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a
legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for
certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of
negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply with the
provisions of the LC and its IRR. Foremost is that a petition for
certification election must be filed during the 60-day freedom period. The
“Contract Bar Rule” under Sec.3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: “.… If a CBA has been duly
registered in accordance with Article 231, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within 60
days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.” No petition for
certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the
lapse of the 60-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a
new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal
effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in
force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.
Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. The purpose is to ensure
stability in the relationship of the workers and the company by
preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by
2 When the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic
Art.250: Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures
shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a
written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals.
The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such notice.
Disini
them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.
- In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from
1989-1994. The petition for certification election by ACEC,
allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with DOLE
only on May 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the 60-
day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by the
existence of a valid and existing CBA. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the
petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the
ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by petitioner of the
ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo
Enterprises is misplaced since that case involved a legitimate
representation issue which is not present in the case at bar.
- Significantly, the same petition for certification election was
dismissed by the Labor Secretary.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION V
CA(GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION
INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION)
422 SCRA 514
QUISUMBING; February 11, 2004
Nature Petition for certiorari
Facts
General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union is the duly
certified bargaining agent of General Milling Corporation.GMC
and the union concluded a CBA which included the issue of
representation effective for a term of three years. A day before
the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA,
with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten
(10) days. Believing that the union,because of mass resignation
of its members, no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA,
GMC did not send any counter-proposal. GMC felt there was no
basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that
management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with
them on matters of common concern and was open to
suggestions on how the company may improve its operations.
Union officers disclaimed any massive disaffiliation or
resignation.
Issue
WON GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively
Held Yes.
Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No.
6715, states:
Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. – Any Collective
Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term
of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no
certification election shall be conducted by the Department of
Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later
than three (3) years after its execution....
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA
should last for five years. The relation between labor and
management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the
fifth year.
terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified
collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was
seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of
effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union’s
proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 220 Disini
from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of 3. VIOLATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to
negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-
AGREEMENT - 248 (G); 249 (F); 261
proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the
CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248
of the Labor Code,
ART.which
248.provides
Unfairthat:
labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
ART. 248. Unfair laborpractice:
labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for
an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. – The duty to bargain
ART.
collectively means the249. Unfair labor
performance of a practices of labortoorganizations.
mutual obligation meet and - It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers,
convene promptlyagents
and or representatives:
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
negotiating an agreement....

We have held that

ART. the261.
crucial question whether
Jurisdiction or not a Arbitrators
of Voluntary party has met or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from
the individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.
thefaith
Good faith or bad interpretation or implementation
is an inference to be drawn from of thethe Collective
facts. The Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement
effect of an employer’s of company
or a union’s personnelispolicies
actions individually referred
not the test of to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a
Collective
good-faith bargaining, Bargaining
but the impact of Agreement, exceptorthose
all such occasions which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
actions,
considered as apractice
whole.Bothandparties
shall be
are resolved
required toasperform
grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
their mutual
violations
obligation to meet of Collective
and convene promptly andBargaining Agreement
expeditiously shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
in good faith
for the purpose provisions
of negotiating an agreement.
of such agreement. The union lived up to this
obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within
three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not
its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by
questioning the entertain
existence disputes,
of the uniongrievances or matters
and the status under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
of its membership
Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration
to prevent any negotiation.
provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed
by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in
ensuring lasting industrial peace. Thus:

ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. – The following

procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written
notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other
party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such notice. (Underscoring supplied.)

GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the

union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union.
Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was
mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.

2. NEGOTIATION or ATTORNEY’S FEES –

248(H); 249(F)

ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its
officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in
collective bargaining or any other dispute;
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It
shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its
officers, agents or representatives:
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION v. PHILIPPINE
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS [PHILCOM CORP.]
495 SCRA 214
CARPIO; 2006
FACTS
-Upon the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU or
union, for brevity) and private respondent Philippine Global
Communications, Inc. (Philcom, Inc.) on June 30, 1997, the
parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July
1997. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed on October
21, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) – National Capital Region, a Notice of Strike, , due to
perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company). In
view of the filing of the Notice of Strike, the company suspended
negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file on
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 221
November 4, 1997 another Notice of Strike,, on the ground of bargaining
deadlock.
- On November 11, 1997, at a conciliation conference held at the
NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices
of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of the proceedings.
- On November 17, 1997, however, while the union and the company
officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers
and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the
entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the
main entrance of the building. The following day, the company
immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment
to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article
263(g) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE WON PHILCOM committed unfair labor practices
HELD NO.
Essence of ULP under Article 248
• UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE REFERS TO ACTS THAT VIOLATE
THE WORKERS’ RIGHT TO ORGANIZE. THE PROHIBITED ACTS
IN ARTICLE 248 ARE RELATED TO THE WORKERS’ RIGHT TO
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND TO THE OBSERVANCE OF A CBA.
WITHOUT THAT ELEMENT, THE ACTS, NO MATTER HOW
UNFAIR, ARE NOT UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES. THE ONLY
EXCEPTION IS ARTICLE 248(F), WHICH IN ANY CASE IS NOT
ONE OF THE ACTS SPECIFIED IN PEU’S CHARGE OF UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE.
• A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom
convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts
defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues
of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits,
non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate
transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of
implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the
CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure.
• Anent the allegation of PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX
service and position, these were done in anticipation of the company
to switch to an automatic PABX machine which requires no operator.
This cannot be treated as ULP since management is at liberty, absent
any malice on its part, to abolish positions which it deems no longer
necessary. Besides, at the time the company hired a temporary
employee to man the machine during daytime, the subject position
was vacant while the assumption of the function by the company
guard during nighttime was only for a brief period.
• With respect to the perceived massive contractualization of the
company, said charge cannot be considered as ULP since the hiring
of contractual workers did not threaten the security of tenure of regular
employees or union members. That only 160 employees out of 400
employees in the company’s payroll were considered rank and file
does not of itself indicate unfair labor practice since this is but a
company prerogative in connection with its business concerns.
• Likewise, the offer or promotions to a few union members is neither
unlawful nor an economic inducement. These offers were made in
accordance with the legitimate need of the company for the services of
these employees to fill positions left vacant by either retirement or
resignation of other employees. Besides, a promotion is part of the
career growth of employees found competent in their work.
• That the promotions were made near or around the time when CBA
negotiations were about to be held does not make the company’s
action an unfair labor practice. As explained by the company, these
promotions were based on the availability of the position and the
qualification of the employees promoted.
Disini
• On the union’s charge that management disallowed leave of
union officers and members to attend union seminar, this is
belied by the evidence submitted by the union itself. In a letter
to PEU’s President, the company granted the leave of several
union officers and members to attend a seminar
notwithstanding that its request to be given more details about
the affair was left unheeded by the union. Those who were
denied leave were urgently needed for the operation of the
company.
PAL v. NLRC [MICABALO,ENRIQUEZ]
283 SCRA 324
Puno;September 25, 1997
Issue:
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of or want of jurisdiction when it affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's decision that private respondents were illegally
dismissed
HELD: YES. NLRC acted with GAD in rendering the assailed
Resolution as the same is not supported by substantial
evidence. As correctly observed by the SolGen, the NLRC and
the LA committed GAD when they gave more credence to the
illogical suppositions and inferences proffered by private
respondents and disregarded the established evidence that they
committed falsification and diverted the cash payments made by
the passengers through the use of credit cards for their personal
gain and satisfaction. Private respondents cannot hide behind
the mantle of unionism for the mantle has never been conceived
to shield criminal acts of union officials perpetrated to pursue
personal gains.
-PAL presented concrete evidence of repeated wrong doings by
private respondents. The different entries in the box for the mode
of payment for the tickets purchased found in the audit coupon
and the flight coupon clearly showed the falsifications committed
by private respondents. Indeed, the private respondents
admitted these falsifications. Micabalo cannot pull a hat trick by
alleging "the discrepancy between the entries in the audit
coupon and flight coupon of the subject tickets was not intended
to conceal an irregularity, rather it was intended to reveal an
irregularity inadvertently committed." Enriquez was more candid.
He conceded that "while it might be true that there was some
sort of falsification, the same was done in good faith with no
intention at all to cause damage to anybody. . . . The change of
entry in the ticket from charge to cash was made only to facilitate
the return of the money to the card holder, never to cause
damage to any person or the company." It was only after these
irregularities were discovered and only after proper investigation
were the private respondents dismissed from service. Without
these irregularities, private respondents were not charged by
petitioner. The records do not show that before the case at bar,
private respondents have complained that they are the subject of
harassment by PAL for their union activities.
Violation of CBA
Thus, as of March 21, 1989, violations of collective bargaining
agreements were no longer deemed unfair labor practices -
except those gross in character - and were considered mere
grievances resolvable through the appropriate grievance
machinery, or voluntary arbitration provided in the CBA.
Jurisdiction over such violations was withdrawn from the Labor
Arbiters and vested in the voluntary arbitrator, the former
(including the Commission itself, its Regional Offices, and the
Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment)
being in fact enjoined not to "entertain disputes, grievances or
matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and ***
(instead) immediately dispose and refer the same to the
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 222
Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement."
PAL may not be regarded as precluded from impugning the jurisdiction
of the Arbiter and the Commission because, at the time that the
proceedings were initiated before the former, adjudged by him, and
thereafter appealed to and resolved by the latter adversely to PAL, the
law amending their jurisdiction (R.A. 6715) had not come into effect.
As already observed, it was only after PAL's motion for reconsideration
of November 21,1988 had been filed and was awaiting resolution before
the NLRC that said law became effective, on March 21, 1989. Under the
circumstances, no estoppel of the right to question jurisdiction can be
ascribed to
PAL.
Disposition: Certiorari Granted. Complaint for ID Dismissed.
8.4 EMPLOYER FUNCTIONS AND
ULP
PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION v. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL
COMMUNICATIONS [PHILCOM CORP.]
495 SCRA 214
CARPIO; 2006
FACTS
-Upon the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU or union, for brevity)
and private respondent Philippine Global Communications, Inc.
(Philcom, Inc.) on June 30, 1997, the parties started negotiations for the
renewal of their CBA in July 1997. While negotiations were ongoing,
PEU filed on October 21, 1997 with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) – National Capital Region, a Notice of Strike, ,
due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company). In
view of the filing of the Notice of Strike, the company suspended
negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file on November 4,
1997 another Notice of Strike,, on the ground of bargaining deadlock.
- On November 11, 1997, at a conciliation conference held at the
NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices
of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of the proceedings.
- On November 17, 1997, however, while the union and the company
officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers
and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the
entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the
main entrance of the building. The following day, the company
immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment
to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article
263(g) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE WON PHILCOM committed unfair labor practices
HELD NO.
RELATED TO THE TOPIC OF EMPLOYER FUNCTIONS AND THE
ULP
• THE COURT HAS ALWAYS RESPECTED A COMPANY’S
EXERCISE OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DEVISE MEANS TO
IMPROVE ITS OPERATIONS. THUS, WE HAVE HELD THAT
MANAGEMENT IS FREE TO REGULATE, ACCORDING TO ITS
OWN DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT, ALL ASPECTS OF
EMPLOYMENT, INCLUDING HIRING, WORK ASSIGNMENTS,
SUPERVISION AND TRANSFER OF EMPLOYEES, WORKING
METHODS, TIME, PLACE AND MANNER OF WORK.
Disini
• THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE LAW ON UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES IS NOT INTENDED TO DEPRIVE EMPLOYERS
OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE AND
ENFORCE SUCH RULES AS THEY HONESTLY BELIEVE
TO BE NECESSARY TO THE PROPER, PRODUCTIVE AND
PROFITABLE OPERATION OF THEIR BUSINESS
• Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some
provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same
was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic
provisions. THE LAW MANDATES THAT SUCH VIOLATIONS
SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES
SAN MIGUEL EMPLOYEES UNION V
BERSAMIRA
186 SCRA 496
MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 13, 1990
NATURE Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
- SMC entered into contracts for merchandising services with
Lipercon and D'Rite (L&D), independent contractors duly
licensed by DOLE. In said contracts, it was expressly understood
and agreed that the EEs employed by the contractors were to be
paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed EEs
or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee
relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one
hand, and SMC on the other.
- Petitioner SMCEU-PTWGO (Union) is duly authorized
representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file EEs of SMC.
Their CBA provides that temporary, probationary, or contract
EEs are excluded from the bargaining unit and outside scope of
CBA.
- Union advised SMC that some L&D workers had signed up for
union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC. Union alleged that this group of EEs,
while appearing to be contractual workers of supposedly
independent contractors, have been continuously working for
SMC for a period of 6 months to 15 years and that their work is
neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or
activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
SMC, and that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It
was then demanded that the employment status of these
workers be regularized. This was not acted upon by SMC, and
so Union filed a notice of strike, and then a second notice.
- Series of pickets were staged by L&D workers in various SMC
plants and offices. SMC RTC to enjoin the Union from:
representing and or acting for and in behalf of the employees of
L&D for the purposes of collective bargaining; calling for and
holding a strike vote to compel plaintiff to hire the employees or
workers of L&D, among others.
- Union filed a Motion to Dismiss SMC's Complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the case/nature of the action, which
motion was opposed by SMC, which was denied by respondent
Judge. And after several hearings, issued Injunction. RTC
reasoned that the absence of ER-EE relationship negates the
existence of labor dispute, so court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of SMC's grievance. Hence, this action.
ISSUE
1. WON RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the controversy
and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
HELD
1. NO
Re: Definition of Labor Dispute (p4 of Outline)
Ratio A labor dispute can nevertheless exist “regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of
employer and employee, provided the controversy concerns,
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 223
among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or
"arrangement" thereof” The existence of a labor dispute is not negatived
by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee. (A212 LC)
Reasoning Crucial to the resolution of the question on jurisdiction, is the
matter of whether or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection
with, or relates to a labor dispute. An affirmative answer would bring the
case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor tribunals to the
exclusion of the regular Courts. In this case, the matter re terms, tenure
and conditions of EE’s employment and the arrangement of those terms
as well as the matter of representation bring these issues within the
scope of a labor dispute. Hence it is the labor tribunals that have
jurisdiction and not the regular courts
Re: ER Functions and ULP (p30 of Outline)
- As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction
belongs to the labor tribunals. So, Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all
workers including: [a] unfair labor practice cases; [b] those that workers
may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment; and [c] cases arising from any violation of A265 LC,
including questions involving the legality of striker and lockouts.
- SMC’s claim that the action is for damages under A19, 20 and 21 of
CC is not enough to keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of
regular Courts. That claim for damages is interwoven with a labor
dispute. To allow the action filed below to prosper would bring about
"split jurisdiction" which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice.
- SC recognizes the proprietary right of SMC to exercise an inherent
management prerogative and its best business judgment to determine
whether it should contract out the performance of some of its work to
independent contractors. However, the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law
(S3, A13, 1987 Constitution) equally call for recognition and protection.
Those contending interests must be placed in proper perspective and
equilibrium.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED.
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK V CIR
21 SCRA 226
CASTRO; September 27, 1967
NATURE Appeal of CIR decision
FACTS
- Republic Savings Bank (now Republic Bank or RB)
discharged/terminated private respondents Resuello, Jola et al, for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter, tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and employees of
this bank, but also of your employer, the bank itself." Respondents had
written to the bank president, Ramon Racelis, a letter-charge,
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of
RB employees.
- CIR ruled that RB’s act of dismissing the 8 respondent employees
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment
of the Industrial Peace Act (RA 875). RB appealed. It still maintains that
the discharge was for cause.
- RB’s defense: CIR should have dismissed the complaint because the
discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with their union activities
as the latter in fact admitted at the hearing that the writing of the letter-
charge was not a "union action" but merely their "individual" act.
ISSUE
WON the dismissal of the 8 employees by RB constituted unfair labor
practice within the meaning and intendment of the Industrial Peace Act
HELD
YES.
Disini
- Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice. The
joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated.
- NLRC v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co is case in point.
Held: An insurance company was guilty of an unfair labor
practice in interfering with this right of concerted activity by
discharging two agents employed in a branch office. The agents
acts of meeting and joining in a letter to the home office
objecting to the transfer to their branch office of a cashier from
another branch, for further discussion, approval and signature, is
a concerted activity that is protected.
Re Employer Functions and ULP
It is for the Court of Industrial Relations, in the first instance, to
make the determination, "to weigh the employer's expressed
motive in determining the effect on the employees of
management's otherwise equivocal act" (NLRB vs. Stowe
Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226).
For the Industrial Peace Act does not undertake the impossible
task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each
incident which constitutes an unfair labor practice, rather, it
leaves to the court the work of applying the Act's general
prohibitory language in the light of infinite combinations of events
which may be charged as violative of its terms.
Disposition Appealed decision is AFFIRMED
FERNANDO, CONCURRING
- Collective bargaining presupposes the give-and-take of
discussion. No party adopts, at least in its initial stages, a hard-
line position, from which there can be no retreat. That was not
the situation here. Respondents as labor leaders were quite
certain that the President of RB had offended most grievously.
They wanted him out. There was no room for discussion.
- That for me is not bargaining as traditionally and commonly
understood. It is for that reason that I find it difficult to agree fully
with the view that their dismissal could be construed as a refusal
to bargain collectively. Moreover, they did not as adverted to in
the opinion of the Court, follow the procedure set forth for
adjusting grievances. It is my view therefore that the dismissal
amounted to "interference, restraint or coercion" as prohibited in
the Industrial Peace Act, and not refusal to bargain collectively.
8.5 MOTIVE: CONDUCT AND
PROOF
1. Employer Motive and Proof
VISAYAN BICYCLE MANUFACTURING CO. INC
VS NATIONAL LABOR UNION
14 SCRA 5
BENGZON; May 19 1965
NATURE
Review on certiorari of decision of Court of Appeals
FACTS
On November 3, 1958, workers in the Visayan Bicycle
Manufacturing Co., Inc. formed the Visayan Bicycle Employees
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 224
and Workers Union (VIBEMWU). Pedro Evangelista was its president.
On November 14, 1958, VIBEMWU and the company signed a collective
bargaining agreement. Among other things it provided for union security,
checkoff, wage increases, fifteen days vacation leave and fifteen days
sick leave.On February 21, 1959, Pedro Evangelista was again elected
president, for 1959. Felicisimo Rodiel was elected board member.For
the year 1960 VIBEMWU, on December 12, 1959, re-elected Pedro
Evangelista president and elected Fulgencio Besana and Felicisimo
Rodiel, vice-president and secretary respectively.
On February 27, 1960, through its executive board headed by Besana,
acting as president, VIBEMWU affiliated with the National Labor Union
(NLU). Subsequently, on March 4, 1960, the Constitution and By-laws of
VIBEMWU were amended. On March 9, 1960, another election was held
and Besana was chosen president thereby replacing Evangelista.On
March 17, 1960, the national secretary of NLU, by a letter, informed the
company of VIBEMWU'S affiliation to NLU, and demanded enforcement
of the collective bargaining agreement. The company, however, did not
accede to the demand. Consequently, on April 5, 1960, VIBEMWU filed
a notice to strike.
The Department of Labor's Conciliation Service held several hearings
on the union's demands and strike notice, but the company still refused.
On April 25, 1960, the company dismissed Besana and Rodiel after they
figured, on the same day, in a fight with two other employees, within the
premises and during working hours. Alleging unfair labor practice, NLU,
on behalf of VIBEMWU, as well as of Besana and Rodiel, filed on May
6, 1960 a complaint against the company in the Court of Industrial
Relations. The company answered it on May 23, 1,960. It stated that the
dismissal of Besana and Rodiel was due to violation of a company rule
that penalizes "Inciting or provoking a fight or fighting during working
hours or on company premises".The Presiding Judge of the Court of
Industrial Relations, after trying the case, rendered a decision on March
3, 1962 in favor of the complainant union. An unfair labor practice,
according to said decision, was committed by the company in dismissing
Besana and Rodiel due to their union activities. After receipt of copy of
the decision on March 13, 1962, the company filed on March 15, 1962 a
motion for reconsideration. It contained no argument but reserved the
"right" to file supporting memorandum within ten days from March 18,
1962. A motion, however, was filed on March 27, 1962, requesting for
15-day extension of time to file the memorandum.
Adhering to a "no extension" policy thereon, the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc denied, on March 28, 1962, the aforesaid motion for
extension to file memorandum. Accordingly, on April 6, 1962, it further
denied the motion for reconsideration.Following its receipt on July 6,
1962 of the last resolution, the company filed this petition for review on
July 16, 1962.
ISSUE WON the company's dismissal of Besana and Rodiel constitute
unfair labor practice
HELD YES
Ratio
The record shows that on April 25, 1960, Besana and Rodiel were
provoked by Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia into a pre-arranged
fight pursuant to a strategy of the company designed to provide an
appparently lawful cause for their dismissal. Reyes and Pacia were hired
only within that week. 2 Besana and Rodiel were not shown to have
previously figured in similar incidents before or to have violated
company rules and regulations in their many years with the company.. 3
The company did not investigate the incident, and its manager, Co Hing,
admitted that Besana was dismissed because he was a "hard-headed
leader of the union". It was this manager who had warned VIBEMWU'S
officers responsible for the affiliation that if they will not withdraw
VIBEMWU from theNLU, he would take " steps in order to dismiss them
from work."
The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations to the foregoing effect
are supported by substantial evidence. No reason obtains to alter the
Disini
conclusion that Besana and Rodiel were in reality dismissed
because of their union activities and not because of their
violation of a company rule against fights in the premises or
during working hours. Furthermore, the so-called violation of
company rules having been brought about by the company itself,
thru the recent employment of Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre
Pacia whoprovoked the fight as above indicated, the same
cannot be regarded as a ground to punish the aforementioned
employees.
Such being the case, the dismissal of Besana and Rodiel
constituted unfair labor practice under Section 4(a) (1) and (4) of
Republic Act 875:
SEC.4. Unfair Labor Practices. ?
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section three;4
(4) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization: ... .
Rothenberg has this to say:
... it can be established that the true and basic inspiration for the
employer's act is derived from the employee's union affiliations
or activities, the assignment by the employer or another reason,
whatever its semblance of validity, is unavailing. Thus, it has
been held that the facts disclosed that the employer's acts in
discharging employees were actually prompted by the
employers's improper interest in the affected employee's
improper interest in the affected employee's union affiliations
and activities, even though the employer urged that his acts
were predicated on economic necessity, desire to give
employment to more needy persons, lack of work, cessation of
operations, refusal to work overtime, refusal of non-union
employees to work with union employees, seasonal lay-off,
libelous remarks against management, violation of company
rules. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 400-401; emphasis
supplied.)
Since the only reason or basis for Besana and Rodiel's dismissal
was in fact their actuation as officers of VIBEMWU, the dismissal
is clearly discriminatory.It is this inconsiderate act of power that
makes a subordinate a rebel; it is this malicious tactic that forces
labor to dislike management; this unjustifiable conduct that
creates a gap between management and labor; and this attitude
that makes the laborer hate the officials of the company to the
detriment of all efforts to harmonize management and labor for
the benefit of both as envisioned by the Industrial Peace Act. So
plain from the record is the bad faith that attended the
company's deliberate and calculated act of unfair labor practice
that we find in the present appeal an obvious attempt to delay
and carry on a pretense which this Court can ill afford to let go
without stern disapproval.
DISPOSITION The decision and resolutions appealed from are
hereby affirmed, with treble costs against petitioner.
ME-SHURN CORPORATION v. ME-SHURN
WORKERS UNION
448 SCRA 41
PANGANIBAN; January 11, 2005
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 225
NATURE
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul the November 29, 2002 Decision of the CA
FACTS
- The regular rank and file employees of Me-Shurn Corporation
organized Me-Shurn Workers Union-FSM, an affiliate of the February
Six Movement (FSM). Respondent union had a pending application for
registration with the BLR.
- Ten days later, petitioner corporation started placing on forced leave
all the rank and file employees who were members of the union’s
bargaining unit.
- Respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Election with the
Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. The corporation filed a comment
stating that it would temporarily lay off employees and cease operations,
on account of its alleged inability to meet the export quota required by
the Board of Investment.
- While the Petition was pending, 184 union members allegedly
submitted a retraction/withdrawal thereof. The med-arbiter dismissed the
Petition. DOLE Undersecretary granted the union’s appeal and ordered
the holding of a certification election among the rank and file employees
of the corporation.
- Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner corporation
on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal lockout and union busting).
- Chou Fang Kuen (alias Sammy Chou, the other petitioner herein) and
Raquel Lamayra (the Filipino administrative manager of the corporation)
imposed a precondition for the resumption of operation and the rehiring
of laid off workers. He allegedly required the remaining union officers to
sign an Agreement containing a guarantee that upon their return to
work, no union or labor organization would be organized. Instead, the
union officers were to serve as mediators between labor and
management.
- The union reorganized and elected a new set of officers. Respondent
Rosalina Cruz was elected president. Thereafter, it filed two Complaints
charging petitioner corporation with unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages and deficiency in separation pay, for
which they prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.
- The corporation countered that because of economic reversals, it was
compelled to close and cease its operations to prevent serious business
losses; that under Article 283 of the Labor Code, it had the right to do
so; that in August 1998, it had paid its 342 laid off employees separation
pay and benefits in the total amount of P1,682,863.88; and that by virtue
of these payments, the cases had already become moot and academic.
It also averred that its resumption of operations in September 1998 had
been announced and posted at the Bataan Export Processing Zone, and
that some of the former employees had reapplied.
ISSUE
1. WON the dismissal of the employees of petitioner Meshurn
Corporation is for an authorized cause.
2. WON the respondents can maintain a suit against petitioners.
HELD
1. NO. The reason invoked by petitioners to justify the cessation of
corporate operations was alleged business losses. Yet, other than
generally referring to the financial crisis in 1998 and to their supposed
difficulty in obtaining an export quota, interestingly, they never presented
any report on the financial operations of the corporation during the
period before its shutdown. Neither did they submit any credible
evidence to substantiate their allegation of business losses.
- Basic is the rule in termination cases that the employer bears the
burden of showing that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.
Otherwise, the dismissal is deemed unjustified. Apropos this
responsibility, petitioner corporation should have presented clear and
convincing evidence of imminent economic or business reversals as a
form of affirmative defense in the proceedings before the labor arbiter or,
under justifiable circumstances, even on appeal with the NLRC.
2. YES. The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union
were not a legitimate labor organization within the meaning of the Labor
Code. Under this Code, in an unorganized establishment, only a
legitimate union may file a petition for certification election.[34] Hence,
Disini
while it is not clear from the record whether respondent union is
a legitimate organization, we are not readily inclined to believe
otherwise, especially in the light of the pro-labor policies
enshrined in the Constitution and the Labor Code.
- Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own
name in order to challenge the unfair labor practice committed
by petitioners against it and its members. “It would be an
unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through
formation of labor associations if thereafter such collective
entities would be barred from instituting action in their
representative capacity.”
- Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed by
petitioners against respondent union prior to the holding of the
certification election-- acts that included their immediate grant of
exclusive recognition to another union as a bargaining agent
despite the pending Petition for certification election -- the results
of that election cannot be said to constitute a repudiation by the
affected employees of the union’s right to represent them in the
present case.
Re: Employer Motive and Proof
All these factors strongly give credence to the contention of
respondent’s that the real reason behind the shutdown of the
corporation was the formation of their union. Note that, to
constitute an unfair labor practice, the dismissal need not entirely
and exclusively be motivated by the union’s activities or
affiliations. It is enough that the discrimination was a contributing
factor.
If the basic inspiration for the act of the employer is derived from
the affiliation or activities of the union, the former’s assignment of
another reason, no matter how seemingly valid, is unavailing.
Concededly, the determination to cease operations is a
management prerogative that the State does not usually
interfere in. Indeed, no business can be required to continue
operating at a loss, simply to maintain the workers in
employment. That would be a taking of property without due
process of law.
But where it is manifest that the closure is motivated not by a
desire to avoid further losses, but to discourage the workers from
organizing themselves into a union for more effective
negotiations with management, the State is bound to intervene.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
2. Totality of Conduct Rule and
Effect of Failure of Act
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS THE INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD
37 SCRA 244
CASTRO; January 30, 1971
NATURE
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en
banc of the CIR
FACTS
- The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-
NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while
still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered
into separate CBA’s with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and
the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
- Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and
Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of
the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 226
the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW
and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no
avail.
- Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the
Anti-Dummy Board of the DOJ. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia
as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal
Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more
than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired as personnel
manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the
Unions.
- In a letter, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for
a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts
which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties
mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon
retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
- In September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the
Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue
of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958
a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several
conciliation conferences were held wherein the conciliators urged the
Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the
said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for
union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies
did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the
Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money
benefits if this was done.
- Thereupon, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-
NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to
answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular
Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a
letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the
Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security
demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider
themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits
retroactive to October 1, 1957." The remaining two petitioner unions
likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was
set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.
- From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor
demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter
of salary increases. The Unions demanded from the Companies final
counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary
increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the presented facts and
figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which
would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial
position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in
protest against what they considered the Companies' ULPs.
- Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without
increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on
in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the
Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
- the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building
- the Companies through their acting manager and president, the
respondent Jose M. Olbes, sent to each of the strikers a letter: We
recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you
may: 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your
intention to do so. 2. Take your meals within the office. 3. Make a choice
whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office
where comfortable cots have been prepared. 4. Enjoy free coffee and
occasional movies. 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of
eight hours. 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. The
decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the
strike or in the fairness of the Management.
- The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few
unionists
- From the date the strike was called until it was called off, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Garcia and
Abella tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life
Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the
Disini
placard of a picketer; a fight ensued between them, in which
both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads
of employees, including a photographer, who with the said
respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in
front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the
picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance
offered by some picketers.
- Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of
photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal
charges against the strikers. During the pendency of the said
cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition
for injunction with damages with the CFI which, on the basis of
the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking
members of the Unions, issued an order restraining the strikers,
until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding,
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies'
gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons
and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.
- the Companies, again, sent individually to the strikers a letter:
Our position remains unchanged...We do not know how long you
intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for
long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so
with or without you. If you are still interested in continuing in the
employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal
charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June
1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you
have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your
replacement.
- Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed
against the members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by
the fiscal's office and by the courts. These 3 cases involved
"slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion"
against two others.
- At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the
Companies, the striking employees decided to call off their strike
and to report back to work.
- However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies
required them not only to secure clearances from the City
Fiscal's Office but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enaje and Garcia.
The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with
pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending
criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident
were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being
required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office.
Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured
clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted
only some but refused readmission to 34 officials and members
of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground
that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly
committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately
notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively
as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks, while
others up to now have not been readmitted although there have
been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
- the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for ULP against the
Companies. The complaint specifically charged the Companies
with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to concerted action; and (2) discriminating
against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to
work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and
degree of participation in the strike.
- the Companies denied all the material allegations of the
complaint
- After trial on the merits, the CIR, through Presiding Judge
Arsenio Martinez, rendered a decision dismissing the Unions'
complaint for lack of merit
ISSUES
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 227
1. WON the lower court erred in not finding the Companies guilty of
unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters
(Other issues: 2. WON the lower court erred in not finding the
Companies guilty of ULP for discriminating against the striking members
of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;
3. WON
the lower ART. 212. Definitions. –
court
erred in
(e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any
not labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.
finding
the Companies guilty of ULP for dismissing officials and members of the
Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by
them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike.; 4. WON the lower It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
court erred in not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of
the Unions, with full back wages.)
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating
under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to
negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in
the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual
bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the
employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the
employees' bargaining representative
Reasoning Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and
attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and
occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of
eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking
and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is
equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer
reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement
are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work
would be.
- The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced
employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the
employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under
section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence
that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of
threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union
conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-
organization and collective bargaining.
- Besides, the letters should not be considered by themselves alone
but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent
circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted
according to the "totality of conduct doctrine," ... whereby the
culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only
on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised
against the background of and in conjunction with collateral
circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an
employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were
held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they
were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations
or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an
established collateral plan of coercion or interference.
Disposition The decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside, and
another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed
members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively
similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of
their actual reinstatements.
Disini
8.6 ENFORCEMENT, REMEDIES
AND SANCTIONS
1. Parties Against Whom ULP
Committed
ART. 212. Definitions. –
(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an
employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of
a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states.
result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained
any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.
(g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of
employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose
of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
ART. 248. Unfair
concerning terms labor practices of
and conditions of employment.
employers. - It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or
an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall
withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by
union members when such will interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization, including
the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall
stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized
collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment,
except those employees who are already members of another
union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who
are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent
may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and
other fees paid by members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the
benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided,
that the individual authorization required under Article 242,
paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members
of the recognized collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate
against an employee for having given or being about to give
testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by
this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its
officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in
collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding,
only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or
partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or
ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 228
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It
shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its
officers, agents or representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization. However, a labor organization
shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee, including discrimination
against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the usual terms and
conditions under which membership or continuation of
membership is made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively
with the employer, provided it is the representative of the
employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or
deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other
things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services
which are not performed or not to be performed, including
the demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees from
employers as part of the settlement of any issue in
collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
Disini
- The Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the order affecting the
strikers but struck down the provisions relating to Curtis and
Daugherty.
ISSUE
Whether an employer subject to the National Labor Relations Act
may refuse to hire employees solely because of their affiliations
with a labor union
HELD
NO. Workers cannot be dismissed from employment because of
their union affiliations.
Ratio Discrimination against union men at the time of hiring
violated its declared policy that 'The right of workers to organize
in trade-unions and to bargain collectively shall not be denied,
abridged, or interfered with by the employers in any manner
whatsoever'. Such a policy is an inevitable corollary of the
principle of freedom of organization, basic to the attainment of
industrial peace. The effect of such discrimination is not confined
to the actual denial of employment; it inevitably operates against
the whole idea of the legitimacy of organization.
Reasoning Section 8(3) of the Act states “It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer ... By discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.”
- We have seen the close link between a bar to employment
because of union affiliation and the opportunities of labor
organizations to exist and to prosper. Such an embargo against
employment of union labor was notoriously one of the chief
obstructions to collective bargaining through self-organization,
the removal of which was the driving force behind the NLR Act.
The prohibition against “discrimination in regard to hire” must be
applied as a means towards the accomplishment of the main
object of the legislation.

(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. Disposition The decree below modified, remanded.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph 2. Parties Liable for Acts

notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing
boards, representatives or agents or members of labor a. Employer
associations or organizations who have actually
participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices ART.
Art. 248 (last 289.
par) TheWho are liable
provisions when
of the committed
preceding by other than
paragraph
shall be held criminally liable. naturalonly
notwithstanding, person. - If and
the officers the agents
offense is committed by a
of corporations,
associations or partnerships
corporation, who
trust, havepartnership,
firm, actually participated in,
association or any
PHELPS-DODGE CORP. v NATIONAL LABOR authorizedother
or ratified
entity, unfair labor shall
the penalty practices shall be upon
be imposed held the guilty
RELATIONS BOARD criminally liable.
officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm,
313 US 177 partnership, association or entity.
FRANKFURTER; MARCH 11, 1941 ART. 212. Definitions. –
(e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an
NATURE employer, ART.
directly290. Offenses.
or indirectly. The -term
Offenses
shall notpenalized
include anyunder this
Petition by the Phelps Dodge Corporation and a cross-petition by the
Code and
labor organization theof its
or any rules andorregulations
officers agents except issued
when pursuant
NLRB (Board) to review a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
acting as employer.
the Second Circuit which enforced the order of the Board with All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be filed
modifications ART. 288.withPenalties. - Except as agency
the appropriate otherwisewithin
provided
onein(1)
thisyear from
Code, or unless
accrualtheofacts
suchcomplained of hinge
unfair labor on a otherwise,
practice; question of they shall
FACTS interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an
be forever barred.
existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the
- Strike by the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers at
Phelps Dodge’s Arizona Mine at Phelps Dodge’s copper Queen Mine, provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in
Bisbee Arizona. During the pendency of the strike, the National labor nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One
Relations Act came into force. Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand
- The company refused employment to some 40 workers on the basis of Pesos (P10,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than three
their affiliation with the said union. 38 were strikers, and 2 (Curtis and months nor more than three years, or both such fine and
Daugherty) were no longer company employees before the strike took imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
place, but sought employment after its close. In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty shall be
- The Board ordered the Corporation to offer Curtis and Daugherty jobs summarily deported upon completion of service of sentence.
and to make them whole for the loss of pay resulting from the refusal to Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
hire them, and it ordered thirty-seven of the strikers reinstated with back criminal offense punished in this Code, shall be under the
pay, and the other striker made whole for loss in wages up to the time concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or City Courts and the
he became unemployable. Courts of First Instance. (As amended by Section 3, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 70).
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 229 Disini
b. Labor Organization

c.

Art. 249 (last Par.) -The provisions of the preceding

paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members
of governing boards, representatives or agents or
members of labor associations or organizations who
have actually participated in, authorized or ratified
unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.

ART. 288. Penalties. - Except as otherwise provided in

this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinge on a
question of interpretation or implementation of
ambiguous provisions of an existing collective
bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of
this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature
shall be punished with a fine of not less than One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or imprisonment of not
less than three months nor more than three years, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty shall
be summarily deported upon completion of service of
sentence.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
any criminal offense punished in this Code, shall be
under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or City
Courts and the Courts of First Instance.

ART. 289. Who are liable when committed by other

than natural person. - If the offense is committed by a
corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or any
other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
guilty officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm,
partnership, association or entity.

ART. 290. Offenses. - Offenses penalized under this

Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be
filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year
from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise,
they shall be forever barred.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 230 Disini
3. Prosecution and
Art. 247 (last Prescriptive
par.) Period under this Title may be instituted without a final judgment finding that an unfair
No criminal prosecution
3.1. Civil Aspect
labor practice was committed, having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. During the pendency of such
administrative proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized shall be
considered interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in the administrative proceedings shall not be binding
ART. 247. Concept of unfair
in the criminal labor
case norpractice and procedure
be considered for prosecution
as evidence thereof.
of guilt but merely as- proof
Unfairof labor practices
compliance violate
of the the
requirements therein
constitutional set
right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
forth.
management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom
and mutual respect,
ART. 290.disrupt industrial
Offenses. peace and
- Offenses hinder the
penalized promotion
under this Codeof healthy
and the and stable
rules andlabor-management
regulations issuedrelations.
pursuant thereto shall
prescribe in three (3) years.
Consequently, Allunfair
unfairlabor
laborpractices are not from
practice arising only Book
violations of the
V shall civil rights
be filed of appropriate
with the both labor and
agencymanagement
within onebut
(1)are
yearalso
from accrual of
criminal offenses
suchagainst the State
unfair labor which
practice; shall be subject
otherwise, to prosecution
they shall and punishment as herein provided.
be forever barred.

Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers vested in them by
Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases
involving unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are
submitted for decision.

Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.

No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted without a final judgment finding that an unfair labor practice was
committed, having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. During the pendency of such administrative
proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized shall be considered
interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in the administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the
criminal case nor be considered as evidence of guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the requirements therein set
forth.

ART. 290. Offenses. - Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall
prescribe in three (3) years.
All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual of
such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.

CCLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION et

al v NLRC (E.G. GOCHANGCO, INC)
161 SCRA 655
3. 2. Criminal Aspect SARMIENTO; May 30, 1988
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 231
FACTS
- Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress
(CLLC), a legitimate labor federation duly registered with MOLE, while
the individual petitioners are former employees of private respondent
who were officers and members of the union. Private respondent (firm)
is a corporation engaged in packing and crating, general hauling,
warehousing, sea van and freight forwarding,
- in January 1980, majority of the rank and file employees organized the
e.g. Gochangco Workers Union as an affiliate of the CLLC. On January
23, 1980, the union filed a petition for certification election. The MOLE
Region 111 office set the hearing for the petition on February 27,1980.
- On February 7,1980, the CLLC national president wrote the general
manager of the firm informing him of the organization of the union and
requesting for a labor management conference to normalize employer-
employee relations.
- On February 26,1980, the union sent a written notice to the firm
requesting permission for certain member officers and members of the
union to attend the hearing of the petition for certification election. The
management refused to acknowledge receipt of said notice.
- On February 28, 1980, private respondent preventively suspended the
union officers and members who attended the hearing. The common
ground alleged by private respondent for its action was "abandonment of
work on February 27, 1980." On the same date, all the gate passes of all
the above-mentioned employees to Clark Air Base were confiscated by
a Base guard.
- Claiming that private respondent instigated the confiscation of their
gate passes to prevent them from performing their duties and that
respondent firm did not pay them their overtime pay, 13th month pay
and other benefits, petitioner union and its members filed a complaint for
constructive lockout and unfair labor practice against private respondent.
- On March 12, 1980, private respondent filed an application for
clearance to dismiss the employees.
- On April 22,1980, petitioner Ricardo Dormingo who was preventively
suspended on April 17, 1980 filed a complaint for unfair labor practice.
- On April 30, 1980, the services of nine more union members were
terminated by private respondent on the ground that its contract with the
U.S. Air Force had expired. The rune employees filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against private respondents.
- On May 9, 1980, private respondent filed with MOLE, Region III, a
Notice of Termination of Contract together with a list of employees
affected by the expiration of the contract, among them, the 39 individual
petitioners herein.
- The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision denying the firm’s application for
clearance and ordering it to reinstate the suspended/ dismissed
employees without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with full
backwages, or payment of separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
possible due to closure of establishment.
- Private respondent appealed to the NLRC, which set aside the
decision and ordered the dismissal of the complaints for lack of merit,
and granted the application for clearance to terminate the services of
individual complainants.
ISSUES:
1. WON private respondent’s appeal was file out of time, hence
should be dismissed.
2. WON private respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice
HELD:
1. YES
Petitioners submit that the motion for reconsideration, treated
subsequently as an appeal, of the private respondent had been filed
beyond the ten-day period prescribed by the Labor Code, in the absence
of any statement thereon as to material dates. As a matter of practice,
and in connection with ordinary civil cases, the Court has assumed a
stance of liberality towards the application of the material data rule, if it
in be otherwise verified from other evidence that the appeal had been
perfected within the time prescribed. The petitioners themselves can
offer no proof, other than vague inferences from circumstances, of the
belated appeal they allege.
2. YES
It is no coincidence that at the time said respondent issued its
suspension and termination orders, the petitioners were in the midst of a
certification election preliminary to a labor management conference,
Disini
purportedly, "to normalize employer-employee relations." It was
within the legal right of the petitioners to do so, the exercise of
which was their sole prerogative, and in which management may
not as a rule interfere. It is not only an act of arrogance, but a
brazen interference as well with the employees right to self-
organization, contrary to the prohibition of the Labor Code
against unfair labor practices.
- In finding the petitioners' suspension illegal, with more reason
should it be held that their subsequent dismissal to be illegal.
The respondent firm's argument that final termination should be
effected as the contract has expired is not persuasive. The
petitioners were regular employees and as such, their tenure did
not end with the expiration of the contract.
- There is no merit in the claim that the petitioners' terms were
coterminous with the duration of the contract. There is nothing in
the records that would show that the petitioners were parties to
that contract. They were not contract workers whose work terms
are tied to the agreement, but were, rather, regular employees of
their employer who entered into that contract.
Disposition the petition is GRANTED
4. Compromise
AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOC INC V AFP
MBAI-EU, LAURENTE ET AL, CIR
97 SCRA 715
GUERRERO; MAY 17, 1980
NATURE
2 consolidated petitions assailing the validity of the CIR
resolution
FACTS
-Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.
Employees' Union (AFP MBAI-EU – Union for short) and 34 of its
employees filed ULP case against AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOC INC (AFP Assn for short) for alleged illegal and
discriminatory dismissals of the said 34 individual complainants.
-Union said: all individual complainants were dismissed by AFP
Assn for no other reason than their being members of the Union
and active in connection therewith; that only members of the
Union were dismissed and that as a result of such unfair labor
practice acts, complainants were compelled to declare a strike.
- AFP Assn said: the dismissal of the complainants were due to
lawful and justified causes (reduction of personnel by reason of
suspension and/or abolition of some of its operations); that some
of the individual complainants have already ratified the validity of
their dismissals and have waived whatever rights to
reinstatement and/or other benefits that may accrue to them as a
result of the filing of the instant case…
- AFP Assn. filed a "Motion to Dismiss" the case for 19
complainants on the ground that they voluntarily withdrew from
this case by freely executing under oath quitclaim papers.
- CIR (upon the recommendation of Hearing Examiner) said: 1)
Respondents guilty of having committed the unfair labor practice
acts complained of, for having dismissed the individual
complainants by reason of their union affiliation and activities
and are therefore ordered to cease and desist from committing
the same or similar unfair labor practice acts, 2) reinstate
complainants Lucila Laurente and 14 others to their former or
substantially equivalent positions with backwages, with all the
rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto, including
seniority, less whatever earnings they have made elsewhere
during the period of their dismissal, 3) The case should,
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 232
however, be ordered dismissed insofar as complainants Victoria Alvarez
and 18 others are concerned.
- The AFP Assn. and the individual complaints filed separate motions for
reconsideration. Complainants: receipt of separation pay and quitclaims
cannot absolve the Association from the consequences of the unfair
labor practice. Association: individual complainants are not entitled to
reinstatement nor backwages. The CIR denied both motions.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the AFP Assn. is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing 34
of its employees by reason of the suspension and or abolition of some of
its operations; and
2. WON the TC erred in dismissing the complaint against individual
complainants who executed "Quitclaim and Complete Release."
HELD
1) YES
- Under the law, an employer may close his business provided the same
is done in good faith and is due to causes beyond his control. To rule
otherwise would be oppressive and inhuman.
-the Supreme Court in a number of cases has recognized and affirmed
the right of the employer to lay-off or dismiss employees because of lack
of work caused by a considerable reduction in its business, or that their
continued employment will only result in further losses in the operation
of its business due to lack of work and considerable reduction in the
volume of his business. Such acts of dismissal do not constitute unfair
labor practice.
HOWEVER,
matters regarding the financial condition of a company to justify the
closing of its business and whether a company is losing in its operations
are questions of fact.
In the case at bar, report submitted by Chief of the Examining Division of
the Court shows that the current or working capital ratio of the
respondent Association is more than the standard or average ratio. The
alleged financial losses or poor financial condition as a consequence of
the implementation of the New Minimum Wage Law and the cessation of
the four aspects of its operation are belied by the fact that in their
Plantilla, salaries of the officers and other personnel were increased,
which was implemented thereafter.
-Also, there is evidence which is substantial that the Association, in
entering into collective bargaining contract, did not have the honest
intention of complying with all the provisions thereof.
2) YES
- unfair labor practice acts are beyond and outside the sphere of
compromises such as quitclaims, release and settlements.
- the dismissal of the complaint insofar as the other nineteen (19)
complainants are concerned on the ground that they have voluntarily
desisted and withdrawn from the case is not warranted because their
desistance or withdrawal is not only voluntary but also illegal, being
contrary to public policy. And since the dismissal of the employees
constitutes an unfair labor practice, it is immaterial whether some have
executed quitclaims and releases or not.
-In labor jurisprudence, it is well-established that quitclaims and/or
complete releases executed by the employees do not estop them from
pursuing their claims arising from the unfair labor practice of the
employer. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or
complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and void.
The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of the right
to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts.
-In Cariño vs. ACCFA, Justice Sanchez, said:
Disini
"Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel.
The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not
stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to
the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because,
out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus
found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then,
is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however,
is that petitioners did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They
are deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio
non praesumitur."
Disposition decision of the CIR modified. The AFP Assn
ordered:
a. To reinstate ALL the individual complainants to their former
employment at current rates, without loss of seniority and
privileges
b. To pay complainants the equivalent of three (3) years
backwages at the rates actually received by them before their
dismissal without deduction or qualification.
CCLG G.E. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION,
ET. AL. V NLRC (E.G. GOCHANGCO, INC.)
161 SCRA 656
SARMIENTO; May 30, 1988
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission
FACTS
- Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor
Congress (CLLC), a legitimate labor federation duly registered
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), while the
individual petitioners are former employees of E.G. Gochangco
who were officers and members of the petitioner union.
- E.G. Gochangco, Inc. is a corporation engaged in packing and
crating, general hauling, warehousing, sea van and freight
forwarding.
- January 1980 - Majority of the rank and file employees of
respondent firm organized the E.G. Gochangco Workers Union
as an affiliate of the CLLC.
- January 23, 1980 - Union filed a petition for certification
election. The MOLE Region III office set the hearing for the
petition on February 27,1980.
- February 7, 1980 - CLLC national president wrote the general
manager of respondent firm informing him of the organization of
the union and requesting for a labor-management conference to
normalize employer-employee relations.
- February 26, 1980 - Union sent a written notice to respondent
firm, requesting permission for certain member officers and
members of the union to attend the hearing of the petition for
certification election. The management refused to acknowledge
receipt of said notice.
- February 28, 1980 - Private respondent preventively
suspended the union officers and members (10 individuals) who
attended the hearing. The common ground alleged by private
respondent for its action was “abandonment of work.” All the
gate passes of all the employees to Clark Air Base were
confiscated by a Base guard.
- Petitioner union and its members filed a complaint for
constructive lockout and unfair labor practice against private
respondent claiming that the latter instigated the confiscation of
their gate passes to prevent them from performing their duties
and that respondent firm did not pay them their overtime pay,
13th month pay and other benefits.
- March 12, 1980 - Private respondent filed an application for
clearance to dismiss the employees involved.
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 233
- April 30, 1980 - Services of 9 more union members were terminated by
private respondent on the ground that its contract with the U.S. Air Force
had expired. The nine employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against private respondents.
- May 9, 1980, - Private respondent filed with MOLE a Notice of
Termination of Contract together with a list of employees affected by the
expiration of the contract.
- July 2, 1982 - Labor Arbiter Bernardo rendered a decision which
granted the petition of the complainants and denied respondent's
application for clearance. The decision ordered:
- The reinstatement of the employees concerned to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, with full backwages.
- Payment of their full backwages and cost of living allowance
if reinstatement is no longer possible
- Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which set aside the decision
of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the petition of the complainants for
lack of merit.
- The records show that a "Waiver of Claims, Rights and Interest' was
filed by above-named petitioners stating, among other things, that said
petitioners are waiving their claims, rights and interests against the
respondents.
ISSUES
WON the respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice
HELD
YES
Ratio Unfair labor practice cases are not, in view of the public interest
involved, subject to compromises.
Reasoning
- The alleged waivers executed by the employees involved were not
given any weight by the court.
- These alleged waivers do not appear to have been presented in the
first instance. They cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal.
- At the time the company issued its suspension and termination orders,
the petitioners were in the midst of a certification election preliminary to
a labor-management conference, purportedly, “to normalize employer-
employee relations.”
- The company suspended the petitioners on the ground of
“abandonment of work” on the day the pre-election conference had been
scheduled.
- Petitioners were regular employees whose employment did not
terminate with the expiration of private respondent's contract with the US
Air Force.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the NLRC is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
REFORMIST UNION OF R.B. LINER, INC. V NLRC
(R.B. LINER, INC.)
266 SCRA 713
DAVIDE; January 27, 1997
FACTS
- Petitioner Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. is composed of drivers,
conductors, and mechanics of private respondent R.B. Liner, Inc. Private
respondents all surnamed Dejero, are the incorporators of R.B. Liner,
Inc.
- Petitioner union was organized "by affiliating itself with Lakas
Manggagawa sa Pilipinas." Lakas filed a notice of strike because of
alleged acts of unfair labor practice committed by the private
respondents. Despite conciliation hearings, the parties failed to reach an
agreement.
- Later, another act of unfair labor practice allegedly committed by the
private respondents impelled Reformist, with the authorization of Lakas,
to go on strike even as conciliation proceedings continued.
- Secretary Franklin Drilon of the DOLE certified the dispute to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration and issued a return-to-work order.
Disini
- The certified case was dismissed after the union and the
company reached an agreement providing, among other
matters, for the holding of a certification election.
- A certification election was held were Lakas won as the
collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
- The petitioners filed NLRC Case charging the private
respondents with unfair labor practice, i.e., illegal lock-out. The
private respondents countered with NLRC Case which sought to
declare as illegal the union's strike, as well as other "work
stoppages/boycotts" staged by the petitioners.
- The two cases were consolidated and simultaneously tried.
- Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of Reformist for Unfair
Labor Practice (Illegal lockout) for lack of merit; declared the
strike by the Reformist as Illegal and that all the Offices and
Members of the Reformist to have lost their employment status
for participating in an Illegal Strike.
- On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
but allowed reinstatement of the dismissed employees:
- Reformist and its members moved to consider the NLRC
decision, which was, however, denied . Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON respondents can still contest the legality of the strike.
HELD
NO.
- The dispute or strike was settled when the company and the
union entered into an agreement where the private respondents
agreed to accept all employees who, by then, had not yet
returned to work. By acceding to the peaceful settlement
brooked by the NLRC, the private respondents waived the issue
of the illegality of the strike.
- The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement
binding upon the private respondents, for compulsory arbitration
has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor
disputes by a government agency which has the authority to
investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the
parties," and as mode of arbitration where the parties are
"compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through
arbitration by the a third party."
- The Labor Code provides that the decision in compulsory
arbitration proceedings "shall be final and executory ten (10)
calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties."
- The parties were informed of the dismissal of the case and
while nothing in the record indicates when the said letter was
received by the parties, it is reasonable to infer that more than
ten days elapsed hence, the NLRC decision had already
become final and executory before the private respondents filed
their complaint with the Labor Arbiter
- A final judgment is no longer susceptible to change, revision,
amendment, or reversal. Neither the Labor Arbiter nor the
NLRC, therefore, could review the same issue passed upon in
NLRC and their decisions to the contrary have been rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
- The agreement entered into by the company and the union,
moreover, was in the nature of a compromise agreement, i.e.
"an agreement between two or more persons, who, for
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties
by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and
which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced
by the danger of losing." Thus in the agreement, each party
made concessions in favor of the other to avoid a protracted
litigation. While we do not abandon the rule that "unfair labor
practice acts are beyond and outside the sphere of
compromises." the agreement herein was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, thus it binds the parties.
- The Labor Code bestows finality to unvitiated compromise
agreements:
LABOR LAW 2 A2010 234
Art. 227 Compromise agreements Any compromise settlement,
including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the
regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and
binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations
Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues
involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if
there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained
through fraud, misrepresentation or coercion.
- The agreement in this case complies with the above requisites, forged
as it was under authority of the Labor Secretary, with representatives
from both the union and the company signing the handwritten
agreement to signify their consent thereto. The private respondents
never alleged in their answer to the petitioners' complaint before the
Labor Arbiter, nor in their complaint, that the petitioners did not comply
with the agreement. The binding effect of the agreement on the private
respondents in thus unimpaired.
- The private respondents' cause likewise fails in light of Article 2037 of
the Civil Code, which gives compromise agreements "the effect and
authority of res judicata" upon the parties to the same, even when
effected without judicial approval. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
therefore erroneously reviewed an issue which had already been laid to
rest by the parties themselves and which, applying the principle of res
judicata, they could no longer re-litigate.
Disposition Petition GRANTED.
Disini
2. Penal Remedies
ART. 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and
procedure for prosecution thereof. – (2nd – Last Par)
Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only
violations of the civil rights of both labor and
management but are also criminal offenses against
the State which shall be subject to prosecution and
punishment as herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers
vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code,
the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor
practices, which may include claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s
fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters
shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution
of all cases involving unfair labor practices. They shall
resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days
from the time they are submitted for decision.

Recovery of civil liability in the administrative

5. Remedies and Sanctions
1. Civil Remedies
ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter
are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only
on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part
of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.
No criminal prosecution under this Title may be
instituted without a final judgment finding that an unfair
labor practice was committed, having been first
obtained in the preceding paragraph. During the
pendency of such administrative proceeding, the
running of the period of prescription of the criminal
offense herein penalized shall be considered
interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment
in the administrative proceedings shall not be binding
in the criminal case nor be considered as evidence of
guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the
requirements therein set forth.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal

by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent
to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at
the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
i. Penal
execution for reinstatement providedRemedies
herein.
To6.discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission
or the Labor Arbiter shall impose reasonable penalty,
including fines or censures, upon the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the
Part 9
memorandum of appeal to the other party who shall file an
answer not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof. CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20)
calendar days from receipt of the answer of the appellee. The
decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission in
the enforcement of decisions, awards or orders.
 LABOR LAW 2 A2010 235 Disini

ART. 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and (A288 cont’d)

procedure for prosecution thereof. - Unfair labor practices
violate the constitutional right of workers and employees
to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests
of both labor and management, including their right to
bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in
an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt
industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and
stable labor-management relations.
In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty
shall be summarily deported upon completion of
service of sentence.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
any criminal offense punished in this Code, shall be
under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or
City Courts and the Courts of First Instance.

Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only

violations of the civil rights of both labor and
management but are also criminal offenses against the
State which shall be subject to prosecution and
punishment as herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers
vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the
civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices,
which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other
affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters shall give utmost
priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases involving
unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such cases
within thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are
submitted for decision.
ART. 289. Who are liable when committed by other
than natural person. - If the offense is committed by a
corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or
any other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the guilty officer or officers of such corporation, trust,
firm, partnership, association or entity.
ART. 290. Offenses. - Offenses penalized under this
Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be
filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year
from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise,
they shall be forever barred.

Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings

shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.

No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted

without a final judgment finding that an unfair labor
practice was committed, having been first obtained in the
preceding paragraph. During the pendency of such
administrative proceeding, the running of the period of
prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized shall
be considered interrupted: Provided, however, that the
final judgment in the administrative proceedings shall not
be binding in the criminal case nor be considered as
evidence of guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the
requirements therein set forth.

ART. 288. Penalties. - Except as otherwise provided in

this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinge on a
question of interpretation or implementation of
ambiguous provisions of an existing collective bargaining
agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code
declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be
punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than three
months nor more than three years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.