Plessy vs Ferguson

Facts of the case

The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and
whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy -- who was seven-eighths Caucasian -- took a seat
in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for
blacks and was arrested.

Question
Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional
infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion
Equal but separate accommodations for whites and blacks imposed by Louisiana do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by
Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their
decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites
satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase "separate but
equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended
to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory
to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.

The case came from Louisiana, which in 1890 adopted a law providing for equal but separate
accommodations for the white and colored races on its railroads. In 1892, passenger Homer
Plessy refused to sit in a Jim Crow car. He was brought before Judge John H. Ferguson of the
Criminal Court for New Orleans, who upheld the state law. The law was challenged in the
Supreme Court on grounds that it conflicted with the 13th and 14th Amendments.

By a 7-1 vote, the Court said that a state law that implies merely a legal distinction between
the two races did not conflict with the 13th Amendment forbidding involuntary servitude, nor did
it tend to reestablish such a condition.

The Court avoided discussion of the protection granted by the clause in the 14th Amendment
that forbids the states to make laws depriving citizens of their privileges or immunities, but
instead cited such laws in other states as a reasonable exercise of their authority under the
police power. The purpose of the 14th Amendment, the Court said, was to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law. Laws requiring their separation do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race. The argument against segregation laws was false
because of the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it.

The lone dissenter, Kentuckian and former slave owner Justice John Marshall Harlan, denied that
a legislature could differentiate on the basis of race with regard to civil rights. He wrote: The
white race deems itself to be the dominant race, but the Constitution recognizes no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. Harlan continued: Our Constitution is color-blind. In respect
of civil rights all citizens are equal before the law. The Courts majority opinion, he pointed out,
gave power to the states to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American
citizens.

Following the Plessy decision, restrictive legislation based on race continued and expanded
steadily, and its reasoning was not overturned until Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in
1954.

Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 349 US 294

Facts of the case

After its decision in Brown (1) which declared racial discrimination in public education
unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to
implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. Given the embedded nature of
racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had
been practiced, the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief.

Question
What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I?

Conclusion

The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions.
Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the
courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were to implement the
principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged
localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with
them "with all deliberate speed."

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a landmark United States
Supreme Court case in which the Court declared state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students to be
unconstitutional. The decision overturned the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896, which allowed state-sponsored segregation, insofar
as it applied to public education. Handed down on May 17, 1954, the Warren Court's unanimous (90) decision stated that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." As a result, de jure racial segregation was ruled a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This ruling paved the way for integration and was a major
victory of the Civil Rights Movement,[1] and a model for many future impact litigation cases.[2] However, the decision's fourteen pages did
not spell out any sort of method for ending racial segregation in schools, and the Court's second decision in Brown II only ordered
states to desegregate "with all deliberate speed".
Background

For much of the sixty years preceding the Brown case, race relations in the United States had been dominated by racial segregation.
This policy had been endorsed in 1896 by the United States Supreme Court case of Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that as long as the
separate facilities for the separate races were equal, segregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment ("no State shall ... deny to
any person ... the equal protection of the laws").

The plaintiffs in Brown asserted that this system of racial separation, while masquerading as providing separate but equal treatment of
both white and black Americans, instead perpetuated inferior accommodations, services, and treatment for black Americans. Racial
segregation in education varied widely from the 17 states that required racial segregation to the 16 in which it was
prohibited. Brown was influenced by UNESCO's 1950 Statement, signed by a wide variety of internationally renowned scholars,
titled The Race Question.[3] This declaration denounced previous attempts at scientifically justifying racism as well as morally
condemning racism. Another work that the Supreme Court cited was Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy (1944).[4] Myrdal had been a signatory of the UNESCO declaration. The research performed by the educational
psychologists Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie Phipps Clark also influenced the Court's decision.[5] The Clarks' "doll test" studies presented
substantial arguments to the Supreme Court about how segregation affected black schoolchildren's mental status.[6]

The United States and the Soviet Union were both at the height of the Cold War during this time, and U.S. officials, including Supreme
Court Justices, were highly aware of the harm that segregation and racism played on America's international image. When
Justice William O. Douglas traveled to India in 1950, the first question he was asked was, "Why does America tolerate the lynching of
Negroes?" Douglas later wrote that he had learned from his travels that "the attitude of the United States toward its colored minorities
is a powerful factor in our relations with India." Chief Justice Earl Warren echoed Douglas's concerns in a 1954 speech to the
American Bar Association, proclaiming that "Our American system like all others is on trial both at home and abroad, ... the extent to
which we maintain the spirit of our constitution with its Bill of Rights, will in the long run do more to make it both secure and the object of
adulation than the number of hydrogen bombs we stockpile."[7][8]

Case

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In 1951, a class action suit was filed against the Board of Education of the City of Topeka, Kansas in the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs were thirteen Topeka parents on behalf of their 20 children.[9]

The suit called for the school district to reverse its policy of racial segregation. The Topeka Board of Education operated separate
elementary schools under an 1879 Kansas law, which permitted (but did not require) districts to maintain separate elementary school
facilities for black and white students in 12 communities with populations over 15,000. The plaintiffs had been recruited by the
leadership of the Topeka NAACP. Notable among the Topeka NAACP leaders were the chairman McKinley Burnett; Charles Scott, one
of three serving as legal counsel for the chapter; and Lucinda Todd.

The named plaintiff, Oliver L. Brown, was a parent, a welder in the shops of the Santa Fe Railroad, an assistant pastor at his local
church, and an African American.[10] He was convinced to join the lawsuit by Scott, a childhood friend. Brown's daughter Linda, a third
grader, had to walk six blocks to her school bus stop to ride to Monroe Elementary, her segregated black school one mile (1.6 km)
away, while Sumner Elementary, a white school, was seven blocks from her house.[11][12]

As directed by the NAACP leadership, the parents each attempted to enroll their children in the closest neighborhood school in the fall
of 1951. They were each refused enrollment and directed to the segregated schools. Linda Brown Thompson later recalled the
experience in a 2004 PBS documentary:

... well. like I say, we lived in an integrated neighborhood and I had all of these playmates of different nationalities. And so when I found
out that day that I might be able to go to their school, I was just thrilled, you know. And I remember walking over to Sumner school with
my dad that day and going up the steps of the school and the school looked so big to a smaller child. And I remember going inside and
my dad spoke with someone and then he went into the inner office with the principal and they left me out ... to sit outside with the
secretary. And while he was in the inner office, I could hear voices and hear his voice raised, you know, as the conversation went on.
And then he immediately came out of the office, took me by the hand and we walked home from the school. I just couldn't understand
what was happening because I was so sure that I was going to go to school with Mona and Guinevere, Wanda, and all of my
playmates.[13]

The case "Oliver Brown et al. v. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas" was named after Oliver Brown as a legal strategy to have a
man at the head of the roster. The lawyers, and the National Chapter of the NAACP, also felt that having Mr. Brown at the head of the
roster would be better received by the U.S. Supreme Court Justices. The 13 plaintiffs were: Oliver Brown, Darlene Brown, Lena Carper,
Sadie Emmanuel, Marguerite Emerson, Shirley Fleming, Zelma Henderson, Shirley Hodison, Maude Lawton, Alma Lewis, Iona
Richardson, and Lucinda Todd.[14][15] The last surviving plaintiff, Zelma Henderson, died in Topeka, on May 20, 2008, at age 88.[16][17]

The District Court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, citing the U.S. Supreme Court precedent set in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which had upheld a state law requiring "separate but equal" segregated facilities for blacks and whites
in railway cars.[18] The three-judge District Court panel found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on negro
children, but denied relief on the ground that the negro and white schools in Topeka were substantially equal with respect to buildings,
transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers.[19]

Supreme Court review

The case of Brown v. Board of Education as heard before the Supreme Court combined five cases: Brown itself, Briggs v. Elliott (filed
in South Carolina), Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (filed in Virginia), Gebhart v. Belton (filed in Delaware),
and Bolling v. Sharpe (filed in Washington D.C.).

All were NAACP-sponsored cases. The Davis case, the only case of the five originating from a student protest, began when 16-year-
old Barbara Rose Johns organized and led a 450-student walkout of Moton High School.[20] The Gebhart case was the only one where a
trial court, affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, found that discrimination was unlawful; in all the other cases the plaintiffs had lost
as the original courts had found discrimination to be lawful.

The Kansas case was unique among the group in that there was no contention of gross inferiority of the segregated schools' physical
plant, curriculum, or staff. The district court found substantial equality as to all such factors. The lower court, in its opinion, noted that, in
Topeka, "the physical facilities, the curricula, courses of study, qualification and quality of teachers, as well as other educational facilities
in the two sets of schools [were] comparable."[21] The lower court observed that "colored children in many instances are required to
travel much greater distances than they would be required to travel could they attend a white school" but also noted that the school
district "transports colored children to and from school free of charge" and that "[n]o such service [was] provided to white children."[21]
In the Delaware case the district court judge in Gebhart ordered that the black students be admitted to the white high school due to the
substantial harm of segregation and the differences that made the separate schools unequal.

The NAACP's chief counsel, Thurgood Marshallwho was later appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967argued the case before
the Supreme Court for the plaintiffs. Assistant attorney general Paul Wilsonlater distinguished emeritus professor of law at
the University of Kansasconducted the state's ambivalent defense in his first appellate argument.

In December 1952, the Justice Department filed a friend of the court brief in the case. The brief was unusual in its heavy emphasis
on foreign-policy considerations of the Truman administration in a case ostensibly about domestic issues. Of the seven pages covering
"the interest of the United States," five focused on the way school segregation hurt the United States in the Cold War competition for
the friendship and allegiance of non-white peoples in countries then gaining independence from colonial rule. Attorney General James
P. McGranery noted that

The existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other
countries. Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills.[22]

The brief also quoted a letter by Secretary of State Dean Acheson lamenting that

The United States is under constant attack in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies as the United
Nations because of various practices of discrimination in this country.[23]

British barrister and parliamentarian Anthony Lester has written that "Although the Court's opinion in Brown made no reference to these
considerations of foreign policy, there is no doubt that they significantly influenced the decision."[23]

Unanimous opinion and consensus building

In spring 1953, the Court heard the case but was unable to decide the issue and asked to rehear the case in fall 1953, with special
attention to whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibited the operation of separate public schools for
whites and blacks.[24]

The Court reargued the case at the behest of Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, who used reargument as a stalling tactic, to allow the
Court to gather a consensus around a Brown opinion that would outlaw segregation. The justices in support of desegregation spent
much effort convincing those who initially intended to dissent to join a unanimous opinion. Although the legal effect would be same for a
majority rather than unanimous decision, it was felt that dissent could be used by segregation supporters as a legitimizing counter-
argument.

Conference notes and draft decisions illustrate the division of opinions before the decision was issued.
[25]
Justices Douglas, Black, Burton, and Minton were predisposed to overturn Plessy.[25] Fred M. Vinson noted that Congress had not
issued desegregation legislation; Stanley F. Reed discussed incomplete cultural assimilation and states' rights and was inclined to the
view that segregation worked to the benefit of the African-American community; Tom C. Clark wrote that "we had led the states on to
think segregation is OK and we should let them work it out."[25] Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson disapproved of segregation, but
were also opposed to judicial activism and expressed concerns about the proposed decision's enforceability.[25] Chief Justice Vinson had
been a key stumbling block. After Vinson died in September 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren as Chief
Justice.[25] Warren had supported the integration of Mexican-American students in California school systems following Mendez v.
Westminster.[26] However, Eisenhower invited Earl Warren to a White House dinner, where the president told him: "These [southern
whites] are not bad people. All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside
some big overgrown Negroes." Nevertheless, the Justice Department sided with the African American plaintiffs.[27][28][29]

In his reading of the unanimous decision, Justice Warren noted the adverse psychological effects that segregated schools had on
African American children.[30]

While all but one justice personally rejected segregation, the judicial restraint faction questioned whether the Constitution gave the
Court the power to order its end. The activist faction believed the Fourteenth Amendment did give the necessary authority and were
pushing to go ahead. Warren, who held only a recess appointment, held his tongue until the Senate confirmed his appointment.

Warren convened a meeting of the justices, and presented to them the simple argument that the only reason to sustain segregation
was an honest belief in the inferiority of Negroes. Warren further submitted that the Court must overrule Plessy to maintain its
legitimacy as an institution of liberty, and it must do so unanimously to avoid massive Southern resistance. He began to build a
unanimous opinion.

Although most justices were immediately convinced, Warren spent some time after this famous speech convincing everyone to sign
onto the opinion. Justices Jackson and Reed finally decided to drop their dissent. The final decision was unanimous. Warren drafted the
basic opinion and kept circulating and revising it until he had an opinion endorsed by all the members of the Court.[31]

Holding
Reporters who observed the court holding were surprised by two facts. First, the court made a unanimous decision. Prior to the ruling,
there were reports that the court members were sharply divided and might not be able to agree. Second, the attendance of Justice
Robert H. Jackson who had suffered a mild heart attack and was not expected to return to the bench until early June 1954. "Perhaps to
emphasize the unanimity of the court, perhaps from a desire to be present when the history-making verdict was announced, Justice
Jackson was in his accustomed seat when the court convened."[32] Reporters also noted that Dean Acheson, former secretary of state,
who had related the case to foreign policy considerations, and Herbert Brownell, the current attorney general, were in the courtroom.[33]

The key holding of the Court was that, even if segregated black and white schools were of equal quality in facilities and teachers,
segregation by itself was harmful to black students and unconstitutional. They found that a significant psychological and social
disadvantage was given to black children from the nature of segregation itself, drawing on research conducted by Kenneth
Clark assisted by June Shagaloff. This aspect was vital because the question was not whether the schools were "equal", which
under Plessy they nominally should have been, but whether the doctrine of separate was constitutional. The justices answered with a
strong "no":

[D]oes segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible"
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does. ...

"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The effect is greater
when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system." ...

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Brown II

In 1955, the Supreme Court considered arguments by the schools requesting relief concerning the task of desegregation. In their
decision, which became known as "Brown II"[74]the court delegated the task of carrying out school desegregation to district courts with
orders that desegregation occur "with all deliberate speed," a phrase traceable to Francis Thompson's poem, The Hound of Heaven.[75]

Supporters of the earlier decision were displeased with this decision. The language "all deliberate speed" was seen by critics as too
ambiguous to ensure reasonable haste for compliance with the court's instruction. Many Southern states and school districts interpreted
"Brown II" as legal justification for resisting, delaying, and avoiding significant integration for yearsand in some cases for a decade or
moreusing such tactics as closing down school systems, using state money to finance segregated "private" schools, and "token"
integration where a few carefully selected black children were admitted to former white-only schools but the vast majority remained in
underfunded, unequal black schools.[76]

For example, based on "Brown II," the U.S. District Court ruled that Prince Edward County, Virginia did not have to desegregate
immediately. When faced with a court order to finally begin desegregation in 1959 the county board of supervisors stopped
appropriating money for public schools, which remained closed for five years, from 1959 to 1964.

White students in the county were given assistance to attend white-only "private academies" that were taught by teachers formerly
employed by the public school system, while black students had no education at all unless they moved out of the county. But the public
schools reopened after the Supreme Court overturned "Brown II" in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, declaring
that "...the time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out," and that the county must provide a public school system for all children
regardless of race.[77]

Yick Wo v.Hopkins

Facts of the case

An 1880 ordinance of the city of San Francisco required all laundries in wooden buildings
to hold a permit issued by the city's Board of Supervisors. The board had total discretion
over who would be issued a permit. Although workers of Chinese descent operated 89
percent of the city's laundry businesses, not a single Chinese owner was granted a
permit. Yick Wo and Wo Lee each operated laundry businesses without a permit and,
after refusing to pay a $10 fine, were imprisoned by the city's sheriff, Peter Hopkins.
Each sued for writ of habeas corpus, arguing the fine and discriminatory enforcement of
the ordinance violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Noting that, on its face, the law is nondiscriminatory, the Supreme Court of
California and the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California denied
claims for Yick Wo and Wo Lee, respectively.

Question
Did the unequal enforcement of the city ordinance violate Yick Wo and Wo Lee's rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice T. Stanley Matthews, the Court
concluded that, despite the impartial wording of the law, its biased enforcement violated
the Equal Protection Clause. According to the Court, even if the law is impartial on its
face, "if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution." The kind of biased enforcement
experienced by the plaintiffs, the Court concluded, amounted to "a practical denial by
the State of that equal protection of the law" and therefore violated the provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), v JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD 40 PHIL 136

Facts:

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of
a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more
than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose
of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application
(Certificate of Philippine Regitry) was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the
Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue
the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands under Act No.
2761 which provides:

SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a vessel of domestic

ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be
issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the
taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a certificate

of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs is
satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be
engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such
ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.

Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of
the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and
because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their
stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly
without due process of law because by the passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with
the naked title to a boat it could not use.

Issue: Whether the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny registry of vessel with
foreign stockholders.

Ruling: Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation
having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-
process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of
Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to
corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the
Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class
legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized
exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not
offend against the constitutional provision.

The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The
word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the
scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. Classification with the
end in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made among
corporations, but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a
mere arbitrary selection.
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause
the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a
corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws.

To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain
a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of
citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing
Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the exceptions.

One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence
is, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to
interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources
and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a
special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts.
This is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court say "extends to so
dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare in of its people." For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine
Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest.

Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be
to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to
encourage Philippine ship-building.

People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera

5 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Probation Law

Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon

Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended
the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no
jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that
Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces
whether or nor to apply the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation
officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to the provincial
board to whether or not to apply the probation law however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the
provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon. They say that
the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically,
the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People of the
Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also
castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the
validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a law.
Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under
Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides
not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation
Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the respective
provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient
standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only
creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation. Probation
does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of
Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

United States Supreme Court

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER v. MISSOURI, (1914)
No. 166
Argued: April 29, 1914 Decided: June 8, 1914
Information in the nature of quo warranto, brought in the supreme court of the state, to exclude plaintiff in error from the corporate rights, privileges,
and franchises exer- [234 U.S. 199, 203] cised or enjoyed by it under the laws of the state, that they be forfeited, and all or such portion of its
property as the court may deem proper be confiscated, or, in lieu thereof, a fine be imposed upon it in 'punishment of the perversion, usurpation, abuse,
and misuse of franchises.'

The ground of the action is the alleged violation of the statutes of the state passed respectively in 1899 and 1909, and entitled 'Pools, Trusts, and
Conspiracies,' and 'Pools, Trusts, and Conspiracies and Discriminations.'

The facts alleged in the information are these: Plaintiff in error is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of agricultural
implements, binders, mowers, etc., and was licensed on the 5th of April, 1892, to do business in Missouri under the name of the Milwaukee Harvester
Company, and on September 18, 1902, became licensed to do and engaged in such business in the state. In that year in such business in the state. In that
year New Jersey was organized with a capital stock of $120,000,000 for the purpose of effecting a combination of plaintiff in error and certain other
companies to restrain competition in the manufacture and sale of such agricultural implements in Missouri, and the New Jersey company has
maintained plaintiff in error as its sole selling agent in Missouri. Before the combination the companies combined were competitors of one another and
of other corporations, individuals, and partnerships engaged in the same business in the state, and that thereby the people of the state, and particularly
the retail dealers and farmers of the state, received the benefit of competition in the purchase and sale of farm implements. The combination was
designed and made with a view to lessen, and it tended to lessen, free competition in such implements, and thereby the said corporations entered into
and became members of a pool, trust, combination, and agreement. In furtherance thereof, and for the purpose of giving the International Harvester
Company of New Jersey a [234 U.S. 199, 204] monopoly of the business of manufacturing and selling agricultural implements in the state, and for
the purpose of preventing competition in the sale thereof, plaintiff in error has compelled the retail dealers in each county of the state who desire to
handle and sell or act as agent for it to refrain from selling implements manufactured or sold by competing companies or persons. By reason thereof
competition in such implements has been restrained, prices controlled, the quantity of such implements has been fixed and limited, and plaintiff in error
has been able to secure, and for several years enjoy, from 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the business, all to the great damage and loss of the people of the
state, and by reason of its participation in the pool, trust, and combination, and by reason of the acts and things done by it, plaintiff in error has been
guilty of an illegal, wilful, and malicious perversion and abuse of its franchises, privileges, and licenses granted to it by the state.

The answer of plaintiff in error denied that it had become a party to any combination, or that, in its transactions, there was any purpose to restrain or
lessen competition, or that trade had been or was restrained.

The case was referred to a special commissioner to take the evidence and report his conclusions. He found, as alleged in the information, that the
International Harvester Company of New Jersey was a combination of the properties and businesses of formerly competing harvester companies, and
plaintiff in error being one of such companies, and thereafter, by selling the New Jersey company's products in Missouri, had violated the Missouri
statutes against pools, trusts, and conspiracies.

In exceptions to the report of the special commissioner plaintiff in error urged that the statute of Missouri violated the equality clause and due process
clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, '(1) because said statute arbitrarily discrim- [234 U.S. 199, 205] inates
between persons making or selling products and commodities and persons selling labor and service of all kinds: In that each section of said statute
applies only to articles of merchandise, and not to labor or services and the like, the prices of which are equally and similarly determined by competition,
and may be equally and similarly the subject of combination and conspiracy to the detriment of the public. (2) Because said statute arbitrarily
discriminates between the makers and sellers of products and commodities and the purchasers thereof: It prohibits manufacturers and sellers from
making contracts or arrangements intended or tending to increase the market price of the articles they make or sell, but does not prohibit purchasers
from combining to fix or reduce the market price of the commodities or articles to be purchased by them. (3) Because said statute, as construed by the
commissioner, unreasonably and arbitrarily interferes with plaintiff in error's right to make proper and reasonable business contracts, and deprives it of
property rights in respect thereto.'

These exceptions were urged and argued in the supreme court upon the filing of the commissioner's report. Judgment was entered upon the report, in
which it was adjudged that by reason of the violation of the statutes of the state, as charged in the information, plaintiff in error had forfeited the license
theretofore granted to it to do business in the state, and it was adjudged that the license be forfeited and canceled and the company ousted from its rights
and franchises granted by the state to do business in the state, and a fine of $50,000 was imposed upon it. It was, however, provided that upon payment
of the fine on or before the 1st of January, 1912, and immediately ceasing all connection with the International Harvester Company of New Jersey and the
corporations and copartnerships with which it had combined, and not continuing and maintaining the unlawful agreement and com- [234 U.S. 199,
206] bination with them to lessen and destroy competition in the sale of the enumerated farm implements, and giving satisfactory evidence thereof to
the court, the judgment of ouster should be suspended. The company was given until March 1, 1912, 'to file its proof of willingness' to comply with the
judgment. It was also adjudged that upon a subsequent violation of the statute 'the suspension of the writ of ouster shall be removed' by the court 'and
absolute ouster be enforced,' and to that end the court retained 'its full and complete jurisdiction over the cause.' 237 Mo. 369, 141 S. W. 672.

A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff in error in its answer simply denied that it had violated the antitrust laws of the state, and it is
contended that by not alleging in its answer that those laws violated the Constitution of the United States, it waived such defense. It is further contended
that because the Federal right was not asserted in the answer, the supreme court of the state could not have considered, and did not consider or decide it.
Decisions of the supreme court of Missouri are cited to sustain the contentions. The decisions declare the proposition that constitutional questions must
be raised at the first opportunity, or, as it is expressed in one of the cases (Brown v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 175 Mo. 185, 74 S. W. 973), 'the protection of
the Constitution must be timely and properly invoked in the trial court.'

In Dahnke-Walker Mill. Co. v. Blake, 242 Mo. 31, 145 S. W. 438, it is said: 'The rule of this court is that so grave a question [constitutional question] must
be lodged at the first opportunity, or it will be deemed to have been waived. If it can be appropriately and naturally raised in the pleadings, and thereby
be a question lodged in the record proper, such is the time and place to raise it;' and that it is too late to raise the question after judgment in a motion for
new trial. In Hartzler v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 218 Mo. 562, 117 S. W. 1124, it was held: 'The motion for a new trial was not [234 U.S. 199,
207] the first door for the question to enter, and in our later decisions we have ruled that a question of such gravity must be raised as soon as orderly
procedure will allow. This in order that the trial court may be treated fairly, and the question get into the case under correct safeguards, and earmarked
as of substance, and not mere color.'

It is manifest, we think, that the court only intended to express the condition of appellate review to be that in the trial court constitutional questions
should not be reserved until the case had gone to judgment on other issues, and then used to secure a new trial. The principle of the rulings is satisfied in
the case at bar. It is, as we have seen, an original proceeding in the supreme court, and upon the report of the commissioner which brought the case to
the court for decision of the issues and questions involved in it the Federal questions were made 'under correct safeguards and earmarked as of
substance, and not mere color.' It is true the court has not referred to them in its opinion, but we cannot regard its silence as a condemnation of the time
or manner at or in which they were raised. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

The assignments of error necessarily involve a consideration of the statutes. The relevant provisions are contained in 10,301 of the Revised Statutes of
the state of 1909, and 8,966 of the Revised Statutes of 1899

Section 10,301 provides that 'all arrangements, contracts, agreements, combinations, or understandings made or entered into between two or more
persons, designed or made with a view to lessen, or which tend to lessen, lawful trade, or full and free competition in the importation, transportation,
manufacture, or sale' in the state 'of any product, commodity, or article, or thing bought and sold,' and all such arrangements, etc., 'which are designed or
made with a view to increase, or which tend to increase, the market price of any product, commodity, or article, or thing, of any class or kind
whatsoever, [234 U.S. 199, 208] bought and sold,' are declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void, and those offending 'shall be deemed
and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and punished' as provided.

Section 8,966 provides that arrangements, etc., such as described in 10,301, having like purpose, and all such arrangements, etc., 'whereby or under the
terms of which it is proposed, stipulated, provided, agreed, or understood that any person, association of persons, or corporations doing business in' the
state, 'shall deal in, sell, or offer for sale' in the state 'any particular or specific article, product, or commodity, and shall not, during the continuance or
existence of any such arrangement , . . . deal in, sell, or offer for sale,' in the state, 'any competing article, product, or commodity,' are declared to be
against public policy, unlawful and void; and any person offending 'shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy to defraud, and be subject to the
penalties' provided.

By 10,304 of the Revised Statutes of 1909, it is provided that domestic offending corporations shall forfeit their charters and all or any part of their
property as shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, or be fined in lieu of the forfeiture of charters or of property.

Foreign offending corporations shall forfeit their right to do business in the state, with forfeiture also of property, or, in lieu thereof, the payment of a
fine.

In State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co. 218 Mo. 1, 370, 372, 116 S. W. 902, the supreme court held that the anti-trust statutes of the state 'are limited
in their scope and operation to persons and corporations dealing in commodities, and do not include combinations of persons engaged in labor pursuits.'
And, justifying the statutes against a charge of illegal discrimination, the court further said that 'it must be borne in mind that the differentiation between
labor and property is so great that they do not belong to the same [234 U.S. 199, 209] general or natural classification of rights or things, and have
never been so recognized by the common law or by legislative enactments.'

Accepting the construction put upon the statute, but contesting its legality as thus construed, plaintiff in error makes three contentions: (1) The statutes,
as so construed, unreasonably and arbitrarily limit the right of contract; (2) discriminate between the vendors of commodities and the vendors of labor
and services; and (3) between vendors and purchasers of commodities.

(1) The specification under this head is that the supreme court found, it is contended, benefit-not injury-to the public had resulted from the alleged
combination. Granting that this is not an overstatement of the opinion, the answer is immediate. It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which
forbid combinations of competing companies that a particular combination was induced by good intentions and has had some good effect. Armour
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 62 , 52 S. L. ed. 681, 684, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 ,
57 S. L. ed. 107, 117, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9. The purpose of such statutes is to secure competition and preclude combinations which tend to defeat it. And
such is explicitly the purpose and policy of the Missouri statutes; and they have been sustained by the Supreme Court. There is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which precludes a state from adopting and enforcing such policy. To so decide would be stepping backwards. Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co. 199 U.S. 401 , 50 L. ed. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 , 57 L. ed. 164, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.
66.

It is true that the supreme court did not find a definite abuse of its powers by plaintiff in error, but it did find that there was an offending against the
statute, a union of able competitors, and a cessation of their competition, and the court said: 'Some of the smaller concerns that were competitors in the
market have ceased their struggle for existence and retired from the field.' This is one [234 U.S. 199, 210] of the results which the statute was
intended to prevent,-the unequal struggle of individual effort against the power of combination. The preventing of the engrossment of trade is as
definitely the object of the law as is price regulation of commodities, its prohibition being against combinations 'made with a view to lessen, or which
tend to lessen, lawful trade or full and free competition in the importation, transportation, manufacture, or sale of any commodity, or article, or thing
bought or sold.' See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 , 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R. A.(N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Cr. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United
States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U.S. 106 , 55 L. ed. 663, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 , 57 L. ed. 333, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.)
325, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141.

(2) and (3). These contentions may be considered together, both involving a charge of discrimination,-the one because the law does not embrace vendors
of labor; the other because it does not cover purchasers of commodities as well as vendors of them. Both, therefore, invoke a consideration of the power
of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of the state. And we shall presently see that power has very broad range. A classification is not
invalid because of simple inequality. We said in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews,174 U.S. 96, 106 , 43 S. L. ed. 909, 913, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609, by
Mr. Justice Brewer: 'The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality in no manner determines
the matter of constitutionality.' Therefore, it may be there is restraint of competition in a combination of laborers and in a combination of purchasers,
but that does not demonstrate that legislation which does not include either combination is illegal. Whether it would have been better policy to have
made such comprehensive classification it is not our province to decide. In other words, whether a combination of wage earners or purchasers of
commodities called for repression by law under the conditions in the state was for the legislature of the state to determine. [234 U.S. 199, 211] In
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. supra, a statute of Iowa was considered which made it unlawful for two or more fire insurance companies doing business in
the state, or their officers or agents, to make or enter into combinations or agreements in relation to the rates to be charged for in surance, and certain
other matters. The provision was held invalid by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa on the ground of depriving of liberty of
contract secured by the 14th Amendment and of the equal protection of the laws. This court reversed the decision, saying, after stating that there was a
general statute of Iowa which prohibited combinations to fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity, or to limit the quantity of the same
produced or sold in the state: 'Therefore, the act in question does little, if anything, more than apply and work out the policy of the general law in a
particular case.' Again, 'If an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business, the Constitution embodies no prohibition of laws confined to
the evil, or doctrinaire requirement that they should be couched in all- embracing terms.' And, 'If the legislature of the state of Iowa deems it desirable
artificially to prevent, so far as it can, the substitution of combination for competition, this court cannot say that fire insurance may not present so
conspicuous an example of what that legislature thinks an evil as to justify special treatment. The imposition of a more specific liability upon life and
health insurance companies was held valid in Fidelity Mutual Life Asso. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 , 46 L. ed. 922, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662.' Other cases were
also cited in illustration.

Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. supra, is especially opposite. It contains the elements of the case at bar and a decision upon them. It will be observed that
the statute, which it was said declared the general policy of Iowa, was a prohibition against a combination of producers and sellers. There was the same
distinction, therefore, be- [234 U.S. 199, 212] tween vendors and purchasers of commodities as in the Missouri statute, and the same omission of
prohibition of combinations of vendors of labor and services as in the Missouri law. The distinction and omission were continued when the policy of the
state was extended to insurance companies. The law was not condemned because it went no farther, because it did not prohibit the combination of all
trades, businesses, and persons. We held that the omission was not for judicial cognizance, and that a court could not say that fire insurance might not
present so conspicuous an example of what the legislature might think an evil 'as to justify special treatment.'

We might leave the discussion with that and the other cases. They decide that we are helped little in determining the legality of a legislative classification
by making broad generalizations, and it is for a broad generalization that plaintiff in error contends,-indeed, a generalization which includes all the
activities and occupations of life; and there is an enumeration of wage earners in emphasis of the discrimination in which manufacturers and sellers are
singled out from all others. The contention in deceptive, and yet it is earnestly urged in various ways which it would extend this opinion too much to
detail. 'In dealing with restraints of trade,' it is said, 'the proper basis of classification is obviously neither in commodities nor services, nor in persons,
but in restraints.' A law, to be valid, therefore, is the inflexible deduction, cannot distinguish between ' restraints,' but must apply to all restraints,
whatever their degree or effect or purpose; and that because the Missouri statute has not this universal operation it offends against the equality required
by the 14th Amendment. This court has decided many times that a legislative classification does not have to possess such comprehensive extent.
Classification must be accommodated to the problems of legislation; and we decided in Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. [234
U.S. 199, 213] 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, that it may depend upon degrees of evil without being arbitrary or unreasonable. We repeated
the ruling in Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 , 52 L. ed. 236, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114, in Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 , 55 L. ed. 128, 31 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 190, in Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 , 56 L. ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529, and again in German Alliance Ins. Co.
v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 418 , 58 S. L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612. In the latter case a distinction was sustained against a charge of discrimination between
stock fire insurance companies and farmers' mutual insurance companies insuring farm property. If this power of classification did not exist, to what
straits legislation would be brought. We may illustrate by the examples furnished by plaintiff in error. In the enumeration of those who, it is contended,
by combination are able to restrain trade, are included, among others, 'persons engaged in domestic service' and 'nurses;' and because these are not
embraced in the law, plaintiff in error, it is contended, although a combination of companies uniting the power of $120,000,000, and able thereby to
engross 85 per cent or 90 per cent of the trade in agricultural implements, is nevertheless beyond the competency of the legislature to prohibit. As great
as the contrast is, a greater one may be made. Under the principle applied a combination of all the great industrial enterprises (and why not railroads as
well?) could not be condemned unless the law applied as well to a combination of maidservants or to infants' nurses, whose humble functions preclude
effective combination. Such contrasts and the considerations they suggest must be pushed aside by government, and a rigid and universal classification
applied, is the contention of plaintiff in error; and to this the contention must come. Admit exceptions, and you admit the power of the legislature to
select them. But it may be said the comparison of extremes is forensic, and, it may be, fallacious; that there may be powerful labor combinations as well
as powerful industrial combinations, and weak ones of both, and that the law, to be valid, cannot distin- [234 U.S. 199, 214] guish between strong
and weak offenders. This may be granted (Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 , 55 L. ed. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190), but the comparisons are not without
value in estimating the contentions of plaintiff in error. The foundation of our decision is, of course, the power of classification which a legislature may
exercise, and the cases we have cited, as well as others which may be cited, demonstrate that some latitude must be allowed to the legislative judgment in
selecting the 'basis of community.' We have said that it must be palpably arbitrary to authorize a judicial review of it, and that it cannot be disturbed by
the courts 'unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves
untouched.' Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 269 , 48 S. L. ed. 971, 972, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 90 , 54 S. L.
ed. 673, 677, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 179 , 54 S. L. ed. 987, 990, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644.
The instances of these cases are instructive. In the first there was a difference made between landowners as to liability for permitting certain noxious
grasses to go to seed on the lands. In the second, the statute passed on made a difference between businesses in the solicitation of patronage on railroad
trains and at depots. In the third, a difference based on the evidence of qualification of physicians was declared valid. clared valid.

In Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 218 U.S. 406 , 54 L. ed. 1088, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 220, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 59, 21 Ann. Cas. 815, a distinction
was made between common carriers in the power to limit liability for negligence. In Engel v. O'Malley, supra, a distinction between bankers was
sustained; and in Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 , 55 L. ed. 899, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1129, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 661, deposits in savings banks
were distinguished from deposits in other banks in the application of the statute of limitations.

Other cases might be cited whose instances illustrate the same principle, in which this court has refused to accept the higher generalizations urged as
necessary to the fulfilment of the constitutional guaranty of the equal pro- [234 U.S. 199, 215] tection of the law, and in which we, in effect, held
that it is competent for a legislature to determine upon what differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory classification between
objects otherwise having resemblances. Such power, of course, cannot be arbitrarily exercised. The distinction made must have reasonable basis.
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 , 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 , 44 L. ed. 392, 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 284; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 , 44 L. ed. 725, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 , 44 L. ed. 716, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666;
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 , 45 L. ed. 186, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 , 45 L. ed. 102, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43;
Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 , 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 466 , 55 S. L. ed. 290, 296,
31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U.S. 61, 79 , 55 S. L. ed. 369, 377, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Fifth Ave.
Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 , 55 L. ed. 815, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709; Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 , 56 L. ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 153, 32
Sup. Ct. Rep. 697; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 269, 270 , 57 S. L. ed. 216, 217, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 , 58
L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678.

And so in the case at bar. Whether the Missouri statute should have set its condemnation on restraints generally, prohibiting combined action for any
purpose and to everybody, or confined it as the statute does to manufacturers and vendors of articles, and permitting it to purchasers of such articles;
prohibiting it to sellers of commodities and permitting it to sellers of services, was a matter of legislative judgment; and we cannot say that the
distinctions made are palpably arbitrary, which we have seen is the condition of judicial review. It is to be remembered that the question presented is of
the power of the legislature, not the policy of the exercise of the power. To be able to find fault, therefore, with such policy, is not to establish the
invalidity of the law based upon it.

It is said that the statute as construed by the supreme court of the state comes within our ruling in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U.S. 540 , 46 L.
ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, but we do not think so. If it did, we should, of course, apply that ruling here.

Judgment affirmed.

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

68 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their
customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then
charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the
constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less
entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it
is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as
an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes
as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards
them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress,
with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Ramon Ceniza et al vs Commission on Elections, COA &

National Treasurer
Equal Protection Gerrymandering

**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair
advantage to the party in power. **

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in
chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and
component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a
component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that
cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to
Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of
voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives
were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of
Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,
close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of
Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885
insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for
the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no
factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of
a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in
character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based
upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a
relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or
industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income
need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of
provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other
component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in
one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter
of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage.

Nunez vs Sandiganbayan GR 50581 30 January 1982

Facts: Nunez was accused before Sandiganbayan of estafa. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds. Sandiganbayan denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence the petition for certiorari
and prohibition assailing the validity of Presidential Decree 1846 creating the Sandiganbayan. He contends that the creation of
Sandiganbayan is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioners right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became
minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of
the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to
CA and SC.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1846 creating Sandiganbayan violated equal protection right?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The classification satisfies the that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class. The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan
precisely in response to a problem dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court
ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the

Philippines
Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-
accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs
right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one
chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter
to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have
original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot
be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are
reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached
than other trial courts.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs Drilon GR

81958 30 June 1988
Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of
Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination
against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid
exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female
domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class
was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under
the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the
right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the
requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a
valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit
in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the
labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

Facts: DOLE enacted Department Order No 1, outlining guidelines of temporary suspension deployment of female domestic workers.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, engaged in the recruitment of overseas workers assailed the validity of the said order.
They contend that this is discriminatory against female domestic workers and does not apply to all Filipino workers but to domestic
helpers only.
Issue: Whether or not DO No 1 violates equal protection on the ground of sexual discrimination?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
same cannot be said of our male workers. It is the avowed objective of DO No 1 to enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a
ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Court finds the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to all Filipina workers is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban
been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. Not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of
such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

facts
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of
Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of
Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor
General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment
ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:

[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists
of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.

International School Alliance of Educators v Quisumbing 333 SCRA 13

Facts:

Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less than their
counterparts hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school contends that a foreign-hire
would necessarily uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take
the risk of devaiting from a promising career path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession
as an educator, but this time in a foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure
as well so the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain
competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field
of international education. The school's classification between foreign-hires and local-hires was in
the point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as local-hires. Petitioner claims
that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to
foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. On the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor
upheld the point-of hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. He also stated that The
Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the
former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and
have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School.

Hence the present petition.

Issue:
WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the classification made by
respondent-school.

Held:
Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"
25 "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado

227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from
certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal
service free of charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the
judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking
privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed
that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking
privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs.
The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the
judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the
loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is
true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different
because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection,
as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth
but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need
on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate
the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the
Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any
quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff
rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that
the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from
abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated
that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our
downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as
the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron,
Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It
erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and
Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart
before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy
disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil
industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a
competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being
observed by the latter.

Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)

February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all
productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax
equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and other foreign countries. The company
paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for
being unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.

Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enacted, the company was the only
sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to
the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied
upon.

Equal Protection

In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition
actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar
alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50)
in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in
the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a
latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf,
the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

MM Mayor Antonio Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

Equal Protection Delegation of Powers Administrative Bodies

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed
Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first
securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for
prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-
useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it
fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null
and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power.

Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.