N0720667 Alin G.

Diaconu

War and Human Nature a Realist approach

1. Introduction

This paper analyzes the extent to which war is, indeed, a product of human nature or not. Due to
the highly theoretical character of this thesis, a generally philosophical framework was used for
the development of the arguments, building on the views of scholars from the Realist spectrum
of analysis or using simple logic constructs. For the counter-argument, however, the Classical
Liberal approach was avoided, because that would have hardly left other choice than reiterating
the age old arguments of the great historical thinkers from two opposite ideological sides
Realist and Liberal. Instead, the chosen method is the one that I considered to be the most
interesting: by using the results of sociological qualitative and quantitative research, I attempted
to show how difficult it is to provide, with objective means, answers to problems of principle.

2. The Realist Argument

The realist school of thought views Man as capable of any action when his equilibrium is
disturbed. Hobbes claims that it is natural for humans to seek peace and to wish to maintain it for
as long as possible. This inherent desire for peace is what makes humans act violently, for it is
normal for a being to defend its natural state through any means necessary. 1 Even if Hobbes
himself uses the word war, it would be easy to argue that war is not just a mere act of violence
among peers, but a more complex mechanism which involves an array of factors. However,
Clausewitz would disagree; his definition of war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do
our will.2

Hobbes rhetoric and Clausewitzs short definition have major implications for our understanding
of war. By attributing this term to humans prior to the existence of states (or any state-like
construction), the theories claiming that war appeared only after their creation are rejected.
Moreover, it can be argued that states, as created and led by men, inherit their characteristics.
This corresponds to the Machiavellian view that republics seek war with the outside in order to
preserve their own peace.3 The absence of a world government or other superior structure
capable of imposing its authority over the nation state draws a direct parallel to the situation of

1 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2008, pp. 97-99

2 C. von Clausewitz, On War, trans. M. Howard and P. Paret, New Jersey, Princeton University
Press, 1989, p. 75

3 M. Fischer, Machiavelli's Theory of Foreign Politics, in B. Frankel, ed., Roots of Realism,

London, Frank Cass, 1996, p. 255

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the world a priori the creation of the latter.4 A solution to the unsustainable chaos of this type of
society, with its insecurities, restlessness and perpetual struggle for peace, was represented by the
emergence of tribes and other forms of organization. This revolution corresponds to the one in
IR, with the appearance of intergovernmental institutions and regional bodies, the creation of
which was triggered by the two World Wars, especially by World War II (which represented a
great threat for the European status quo). The fact that there are no real supranational bodies
(with the same top-down relation as the state has towards men) does not contradict this thesis,
but only shows that the process is still in development (a relevant example is that of the
European Union which, in only 65 years, evolved from a coal and steel common market to a
partly-supranational political entity with a strong voice on the international arena).

This argument shows that the presence of war on the global stage is a direct consequence of it
being embedded in our very nature and, thus, the only difference between wars (even massive
conflicts such as the World Wars) and minor acts of human violence is the difference in scale, the
reasoning being the same: our desire for peace and security.

3. Security Dilemma fear and counter-fear

Probably the clearest argument in favor of the thesis is the existence of the Security Dilemma.
This claims that a states measure aimed at increasing its security (gaining more military
strength, building alliances) will trigger insecurity in other states, which will seek to increase
their own security through similar means, producing growing instability.5 This dilemma creates a
paradoxical scenario, in which a conflict arises between two (or more) parties that want to avoid
it at all costs, but, in most cases, eventually resort to it because they fear the other, its motives
and judgment. This Hobbesian fear comes from the inability to feel or understand the others
counter-fear (the reasons for which they should be terrified or concerned with us).6 This
sentiment is exacerbated by mutual antagonisation: each one thinks about the other as the
aggressor, the one that triggered the strife. As a consequence, the conflict that results will be a
strong one, with important ideological disparities that intensify over time the reconciliation
between two such parties being, more often than not, a difficult endeavor.7 Butterfield claims that

4 D. Gauthier, The logic of Leviathan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969 in M. C. Williams,

Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration, International Organization, Vol. 50, No.
2, 1996, pp. 224-225

5 R. Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, Jan. 1978,
167-174

6 H. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, London, Collins, 1951, p.21

7 ibidem, pp.21-22

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this dilemma lies in the very geometry of human conflict. 8 This view is in harmony with the
writings of Hobbes, because it supports the point that human beings (and, therefore, states) seek
peace so vehemently that even the idea that this state of being is threatened makes them paranoid
and aggressive.

Analyzing the fairly recent large-scale, infamous conflicts of the European space provides
important evidence for the applicability of the Security Dilemma. The competition for colonies at
the end of the 19th century (which was not fueled by the desire of the European powers to change
the status quo but, rather, by their concern of not being excluded from this possibility for
consolidation), World War I (in which the strategic advantage of striking first was so great that
the alternative, that of passivity, was dangerous enough to trigger war) and World War II (in
which Frances obsession with maintaining Germany weak led, eventually, to nationalist
measures on the side of the latter which put the formers security in jeopardy) are classic
examples9 that prove the relevance of the Security Dilemma as a means of IR phenomena
analysis.

The way in which this argument justifies the thesis can be simplified through an Aristotelian
syllogism: if the Security Dilemma (or Hobbesian fear) results from the human nature and all
wars are caused by the Security Dilemma (following Butterfields train of thought and
acknowledging that war is a form of conflict), then it must be true that war is the result of human
nature.

4. The Diversionary Theory of War

The diversionary theory of war (or the scapegoat hypothesis) is one of the most interesting
theories that oppose the thesis of this paper, considering the amount of quantitative research that
it triggered. Often, this approach is generally linked to the in-group/out-group hypothesis,
borrowed from sociology.

Rather than identifying war as a general trait of human nature, the scapegoat hypothesis focuses
on its meaning as a tool, used by individuals/groups in positions of power in order to bring the
rest of the group together, gathered around an element of its identity, which, confronted against
the outside, is bound to consolidate the position of that particular leading individual/group in
critical domestic circumstances. This state-level situation would coincide with the individuals
tendency to project its conflict towards the outside.10

8 ibidem, p.20

9 R. Jervis, Perception and Misperceptionin International Politics, New Jersey, Princeton

University Press, 1976, pp. 66-67

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Scholars such as Wright view foreign conflict as an effective means of consolidating the position
of a ruling group (government, party, class etc.) 11 in a system of governance. Moreover, taking
into consideration the research of Simmel and Coser, who suggest that, generally, external
conflict might increase the internal cohesion of a group (but only if certain elements such as
the group identity or a threat that would endanger it in its entirety are met), a parallel with the
IR theory can be built: there is a clear connection between a fragile leadership position of a
person/group in an unstable environment (usually, state) and the pursuit of conflicts with the
outside.12 Extrapolating, it could be argued that, far from being characteristic to the human nature
itself, war is just a tool used by certain individuals to consolidate their position of power.

Nevertheless, there is not much empirical proof to back this affirmation, aside from the
aforementioned sociological researches (which are on a consistently smaller scale and, thus,
largely irrelevant for the matter at hand) and some isolated, historic cases (Crimean War, The
French Revolutionary Wars, Franco-Prussian War, The First World War etc.). 13 The
exceptionality of this theory lies in the fact that, although sustained by a keen academic
community and the theoretical common sense that projected it as valid, scientific evidence
proved the exact opposite.14 The studies of Rummel and Tanter which covered, together, 77
countries for a period of five years (1955-1960), using, as tools for analyses, indicators for both
domestic and foreign conflict, showed that there is generally no link between the two. This
finding was also confirmed by other scientists, such as Haas, Burrowes and Spector, Zinnes and
Wilkenfield, which shows, with substantial proof, that the scapegoat hypothesis cannot be
applied to the field of International Relations.15

10 S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. Joan Riviere, London, Hogarth Press, 1949
in P. James, Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature and Recommendations for
Future Research, Cooperation and Conflict, No. 21, 1987, p. 21

11 J. S. Levy, The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, in M. I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook

of War Studies, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 260

12 ibidem, pp.260-262

13 ibidem, pp. 264-265

14 P. James, Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature and Recommendations for
Future Research, Cooperation and Conflict, No. 21, 1987, pp. 22-23

15 J. S. Levy, The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, in M. I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook

of War Studies, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 264

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5. Conclusion

A state of Peace among men who live side by side with each other is not the natural state. The
state of Nature is rather a state of War16, wrote Immanuel Kant in the introduction of the second
section of his Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. The aforementioned arguments point to
this precise direction. The Realist approach that has been used, as well as the logical elements
and the proof of scientific research show clearly that war is, in fact, a result of human nature.
Even more than that, war is a paramount characteristic of it, which shapes us and helps us
survive as species. Due to the fact that, as it has been explained in my first argument, states
cannot have a different behavior on the international arena than humans had in their primordial
condition driven by fear, paranoia and an impossibility to understand the other, states have, on
their own, very few alternatives: either to become aggressive, to remain passive, consolidate its
defense mechanisms and hope for the best or to face dissolution.

However, using the same principle as men did tens of thousands of years ago, states have
recently discovered international, intergovernmental (for now?!) bodies with the purpose of
promoting peace, understanding and mutual assurance. The following period of time will be
crucial for our understanding of the problem discussed in this paper because, if the thesis is true
and the developed arguments are valid then, in the future, the international arena will have to
establish some form of global governance in order to maintain balance between the actors on the
global scene. Until then, we can just speculate.

16 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. M. C. Smith, London, George Allen
and Unwin, 1917, p. 118

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Bibliography

Butterfield, H., History and Human Relations, London, Collins, 1951

(von) Clausewitz, C., On War, trans. M. Howard and P. Paret, New Jersey, Princeton University
Press, 1989

Frankel, B. (ed.), Roots of Realism, London, Frank Cass, 1996

Hobbes, T., Leviathan, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2008

James, P., Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature and Recommendations for Future
Research, Cooperation and Conflict, No. 21, 1987

Jervis, R., Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, Jan. 1978

Jervis, R., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, New Jersey, Princeton
University Press, 1976

Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. M. C. Smith, London, George Allen
and Unwin, 1917

Midlarsky, M. I. (ed.), Handbook of War Studies, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989

Williams, M. C., Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration, International

Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1996