Responding to

WATER Contamination
Threats Planning ahead is the key to
dealing with potential terrorism.
ANTHONY FERNANDEZ

M ATTHEW L . M AGNUSON
STEV EN C. ALLGEIER
U.S. EPA
BART KOCH
RICARDO DE LEON
METROPOLITA N WATER DISTRICT OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RONALD HUNSINGER
EAST BAY MUNICIPAL UTILIT Y DISTRICT
W
ater terrorism—through intention-
al or threatened contamination of
a drinking-water system— can un-
dermine public health, economic
well-being, societal functioning,
and the environment. Not only can consumers be-
come ill or die, but water contamination could also
cut off water needed for other vital uses such as food
preparation, sanitation, fire fighting, agriculture,
and industry. Although some goals of water terror-

© 2005 American Chemical Society APRIL 1, 2005 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY ■ 153A
 ism could be accomplished merely by threatening
contamination, terrorists could also actually intro-
duce a broad range of contaminants into the water
supply—from widely available industrial chemicals
to exotic, engineered microorganisms. Accordingly,
an extensive range of affected groups, including the
U.S. government, water utilities, and the general pub-
lic, are increasingly aware that drinking water is a
critical and interdependent component of the na-
tion’s infrastructure. In 2003, a presidential directive
on homeland security designated the U.S. EPA as re-
sponsible for protecting the nation’s drinking-water
and water-treatment systems (1). In 2004, a second
directive required EPA to establish surveillance and
monitoring systems that safeguard water quality (2).
Traditionally, drinking-water safety has been
linked to water quality. The possibility of terrorism
directed against the drinking-water supply has em-
phasized the link between water safety and water
security (3, 4). The traditional paradigm in solving
water-quality problems is to develop or adapt envi-
ronmental technology, whether for prevention, re-
mediation, control, analysis, or other goals.
Can technology continue to provide us with the
answers we need to respond to water terrorism? At
first glance, the very reasonable answer would be
a resounding “yes”, because responding to an in-
tentional water contamination threat or incident
seems to be straightforward and purely technologi-
cal: The “event” is captured through appropriate
sample collection, and the response follows direct-
ly from sample analysis. However, no reliable tech-
nology on the market today can rapidly and reliably
provide the substantial amount of water-quality
information needed to make a response decision
based solely on analytical data.
PHOTODISC
In lieu of the perfect technology, EPA developed
the Response Protocol Toolbox (RPTB) (5). This non-
binding guidance based on existing technology is
designed to help water utilities and other organiza-
tions address the complex, multifaceted challenges
encountered during planning for and responding
to the threat or act of intentional contamination of
drinking water. EPA developed the RPTB as part of
its Water Security Research and Technical Support
Action Plan (6) with the help of a working group,
which included water utility professionals and of-
ficials from the American Water Works Association
154A ■ ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / APRIL 1, 2005
and other major water supply organizations. Regu-
latory, public health, and water utility officials as
well as representatives from federal, state, and lo-
cal drinking-water laboratories and organizations
served as technical reviewers. Because the RPTB
is a consensus document, it integrates many view-
points. Thus, although specific opinions may differ,
the RPTB is a unique source for providing practical,
collective insight into how to respond to drinking-
water terrorism.
In the toolbox
The RPTB is divided into six modules. Each discuss-
es a different aspect of the response process. Not
every contamination threat or incident requires
the use of all six modules. The modules can be
used separately or in combination by groups such
as water utilities, analytical laboratories, emer-
gency responders, state drinking-water programs,
source water protection programs, public health
officials, EPA and other federal agencies, and law
enforcement. Because it is important that all us-
ers be informed about the overall response process,
modules aimed at a specific user group also briefly
discuss relevant response aspects that are more ful-
ly described in modules tailored toward other user
groups.
Although the RPTB does not necessarily assess
or recommend technologies from specific manu-
facturers, it lists a mixture of the currently avail-
able types, ranging from low- to high-tech. In addi-
tion, desired characteristics of emerging environ-
mental technologies are discussed. For the sake of
this article, low- and mid-tech approaches repre-
sent applications of fairly mature, reliable technol-
ogies, while high-tech methods involve cutting-
edge engineering and science. Furthermore, “no-
tech” refers to an approach that has no technology
or uses technology in a simple manner.
Water Utility Planning Guide. Module 1 is a wa-
ter utility planning guide, which describes the ac-
tivities that a utility could undertake to prepare for
contamination threats and incidents (7). Most of
these planning activities, which are summarized in
Table 1, involve no- or low-tech approaches from an
environmental technology standpoint, but modern
electronic, information, and telecommunications
technology can enhance planning.
The planning activity of understanding a water
system in terms of its construction, design, opera-
tion, personnel, and critical customers illustrates
potential benefits of higher-tech approaches. Spe-
cifically, the use of high-tech geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) and hydraulic models may benefit
some systems. Setting up a baseline-monitoring
program is a planning activity that may rely on
mid-tech analytical environmental technology. If
such a baseline is not established, a normal fluctua-
tion may be mistaken for a water contamination in-
cident. Baseline monitoring can rely on the diligent
application of existing, mid-tech analytical envi-
ronmental technology. However, a high-tech base-
line-monitoring program could be developed with
online devices to monitor potentially contaminated
 TA B L E 1 ing EPA responsibilities
under the homeland se-
curity presidential di-
Planning activities and associated technology requirements rectives (1, 2).
Planning activity Technology level required To successfully re-
Establishing a communication and no- May use information and communica- spond to all types of
tification strategy to predefine com- tion technology crises, decision makers
munication pathways and notification have historically relied
systems on the principles of care-
Establishing an incident command sys- May use information and communica- ful planning and eval-
tem to delineate leadership and chain tion technology uation of available infor-
of command prior to an actual threat mation. Module 2 ex-
or incident (Ref. 21) tends these tried-and-
Performing training and conducting Little or no environmental technology true principles to water
desk/field exercises to properly apply contamination threat
any emergency plans management, which in-
Enhancing physical security to signif- Little or no environmental technology; volves several interre-
icantly reduce intrusions and false may use low- to high-tech security lated activities: planning
alarms that would otherwise expend technology a management response
utility resources prior to an incident, eval-
Developing an information management Some environmental technology, mostly uating the threat’s cred-
strategy to provide timely and accu- to reduce data to useful information ibility, and making de-
rate information for evaluating the cisions regarding appro-
credibility of a threat and taking steps priate actions to take in
to protect public health as necessary response to the threat.
Updating emergency response plans to Little environmental technology Figure 1 on the next page
cover terrorist threats, including in- represents these interre-
tentional contamination lated activities and illus-
Developing streamlined response guide- Little environmental technology trates the fact that re-
lines to support responders and deci- sponse actions intensify
sion makers in the midst of a crisis as threat credibility in-
Establishing a program to monitor the Mid-tech environmental technology for creases. As described in
baseline, which accounts for normal most cases; high-tech needed if per- the following few para-
fluctuations in water-quality data or formed through online monitoring graphs, crisis manage-
consumer complaints and which may ment activities do not
indicate a potential problem necessarily inherently
Understanding water-system construc- Little environmental technology in most require technology, al-
tion, design, operation, personnel, and cases; high-tech hydraulic and geo- though contamination
critical customers; applying this in- graphic information system modeling threat management may
formation to assess vulnerabilities to may be helpful call upon the technolo-
contamination threats gies described in other
Using and understanding data from High-tech activity, especially in under- modules of the RPTB.
online monitors of water-quality standing both water monitoring sys- The first activity is
parameters, such as pH, chlorine tem fundamentals and the relationship planning a response to
residual, and turbidity, to warn of between water-quality fluctuations and unknown threats—a
potential water contamination the presence of specific contaminants daunting task because
such an immense num-
ber of potential biologi-
water that rapidly travels through a system. Online cal, chemical, and radiological contaminants exist.
monitors are appealing, but experts debate their ef- Fortunately, as described by the World Health Orga-
fectiveness, costs, and benefits as a contaminant nization, it is neither possible nor necessary to plan
warning system (8, 9). Many organizations, includ- for an attack by all possible contaminants; rather,
ing EPA’s National Homeland Security Research planning and preparation to counter the effects of
Center (10) through its Distribution System Re- such an attack can provide the capabilities to deal
search Consortium, are actively engaged in research with a wide range of possibilities (13). Accordingly,
to advance the goal of online monitoring (11). Module 2 presents management planning activi-
Contamination Threat Management Guide. ties, such as establishing roles and responsibilities
Module 2 is the centerpiece of the RPTB (12). It pre- of various parties under different scenarios. These
sents the overarching framework for managing parties must answer vital questions about who will
contamination threats to the drinking-water sup- perform response activities at a particular location.
ply. Because appropriate management is integral Management must also take the appropriate steps,
to solving any water crisis, the response principles such as those outlined in Module 1, to improve pre-
discussed in Module 2 can guide activities beyond paredness and responsiveness at a particular water
the primary focus of the RPTB, such as implement- system.

APRIL 1, 2005 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY ■ 155A

 FIGURE 1 ing the benefits of the particular decision with the
consequences. For example, isolating a potentially
contaminated storage tank from a water system
Overview of threat management could keep people from becoming ill, but then that
activities water may not be available for fire fighting and
sanitation.
Module 2 emphasizes careful planning and evalua-
Site Characterization and Sampling Guide.
tion of available information and is considered the
Module 3 describes how to gather information from
centerpiece of the Response Protocol Toolbox. Build-
the site of a suspected contamination incident at a
ing on the strategies presented in Module 2, this dia-
drinking-water system (14). Site characterization ac-
gram shows how response actions expand as threat
tivities include site investigation, field safety screen-
credibility increases.
ing, rapid field-testing of the water, and sample
collection for in-depth laboratory analysis. Most of
Planning and preparation the sampling activities described in Module 3 do not
use advanced technology but rely on classic field-
work techniques. One exception is a field sample
Threat warning concentrator for microbiological species, which is
currently in development and testing (6). This mid-
tech device uses routine technology but applies it to
Initial threat evaluation
overcome the unique challenges of collecting rep-
resentative samples from the site of a suspected wa-
Is threat
ter contamination incident.
possible? As an example, consider a waterborne pathogen
with an infectious dose of 10–100 organisms, which
might be consumed in 500 mL of water. The techno-
Threat evaluation process

Immediate operational logical challenge is to sample a 250,000-gallon tank

response actions
in a manner that can provide a meaningful result
Site characterization and about whether the water is safe to use. The proposed
sampling solution includes using a field concentrator to sam-
Expanded response actions

ple a large volume of water and concentrate any or-

Is threat
credible?
Public health response
actions
Sample analysis
Is incident
confirmed?
Remediation and recovery
Evaluating the credibility of a threat, the sec-
ond management activity, is a process that consid-
ers available information to determine whether a
threat is possible, credible, or a confirmed incident.
The time frames for determining each of these stag-
es are 1 h, 8 h, and up to several days, respectively.
Therefore, decisions frequently must be made with-
out complete information, leaving threat manag-
ers to rely on a preponderance of evidence, not only
from analytical technologies but also from careful
evaluation of sources of information, such as law
enforcement, the public health community, and ob-
servations at the suspected contamination site.
In parallel to threat evaluation is the third man-
agement activity: making decisions regarding ap-
propriate actions in response to the threat. Making
these decisions effectively means skillfully balanc-
ganisms present by several orders of magnitude.
Field safety screening can detect environmental
hazards that might pose a threat to the site charac-
terization team. For example, radioactivity can be
monitored as the team approaches the site. Rapid
field-testing involves water analysis during the site
characterization to tentatively identify contami-
nants or unusual water quality. Table 2 lists the ge-
neric types of available field-screening and rapid
field-testing kits. The target parameter for screening
and rapid water testing may be a specific contami-
nant; a contaminant class; or a general indicator,
such as chlorine residual, of potential changes in
water quality.
The core kit includes the equipment necessary to
conduct the recommended minimum level of field
safety screening and rapid water testing (Table 2).
Note that these technologies are fairly well estab-
lished, are considered highly reliable, and may be
classified as low- to mid-tech. Additional, less-prov-
en, higher-tech approaches that might be used for
expanded field-testing are also listed in Table 2.
One unfortunate characteristic of the high-tech
expanded field-testing technologies is that they can
have propensities for false positives and false nega-
tives. An example is a recent study of rapid toxicity
assays, which will not detect many contaminants of
concern and yet respond to compounds such as cop-
per and chlorine (15). Another study of field-testing
technologies for drinking-water security investiga-
tions highlighted the need for further research and
testing (16). Thus, the better available technology for
field safety screening and field-testing can actually be
low-tech, because high-tech solutions can create ad-

156A ■ ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / APRIL 1, 2005

 TA B L E 2

Core and expanded field-testing kits

Core kit
Environmental
Target parameter Purpose technology Comments

Radioactivity (, , ) Primarily a Geiger–Müller probe May be expanded to water

safety screen and meter testing with a special probe
Cyanide Water testing Colorimetric or ion- Tests water for cyanide ion but
selective electrode not combined forms
Chlorine residual Water testing Colorimetric Absence of residual may indicate
a problem
pH/conductivity Water testing Ion-selective electrode Abnormal pH or conductivity may
indicate a problem
Expanded kit
Environmental
Target parameter Purpose technology Comments

General hazards Safety screen Hazard categorization Should be performed by a trained

Volatile chemicals
Schedule 1 chemical weapons
(VX, sarin, etc.) (Ref. 22)
Water quality parameters
Pesticides (organophosphates
and carbamates)
Volatile organic compounds
and semivolatile organic
compounds
Biotoxins (ricin, botulinum, etc.) Water testing
Pathogens (tularemia, anthrax,
plague, etc.)
Toxicity
kits (explosives, hazardous materials responder
oxidants, etc.)
Safety screen Sniffer-type devices Detect chemicals in air
Safety screen, Enzymatic/colorimetric Many kits may also detect certain
water testing pesticides
Water testing Variable (e.g., ion Kits available for a variety of
probes, colorimetric) common parameters
Water testing Immunoassays Quick and simple to use
Water testing Portable gas chroma- Expensive but expands field
tography/mass spec- capability for chemicals
trometry
Immunoassays Quick and simple to use
Water testing Immunoassays and Preconcentration will increase
polymerase chain sensitivity
reaction
Water testing Inhibition of biological Need to establish a baseline
activity

ditional problems and uncertainties in the analysis.
Analytical Guide. Module 4 shows an approach
to the analysis of samples collected from the site of
a suspected contamination incident (17). It is not
a detailed, prescriptive protocol but rather a flex-
ible framework for developing a technological ap-
proach for the analysis of water samples containing
an unknown contaminant. The framework is also
designed to promote the effective and defensible
performance of laboratory analysis.
Table 3 (on the next page) lists the types of ana-
lytical environmental technology that may be the
most useful for water security samples. As part of
the overall analytical framework, Module 4 com-
bines a number of highly reliable, low- and mid-tech
approaches into a battery of standardized analyti-
cal methods designed to screen for contaminants of
concern. Additional contaminant coverage is pro-
vided by the various test kits and high-tech handheld
detection equipment for the chemicals, polymerase
chain reaction (PCR), reverse transcriptase PCR,
and sequencing of microbiological contaminants.
These high-tech approaches often must be custom-
ized to specific contaminants of concern, increas-
ing the technological complexity of the analysis
and, frequently, the uncertainty of the result.
Public Health Response Guide. Module 5 deals
with the public health response measures that
could be used to minimize public exposure to po-
tentially contaminated water (18). Specifically, it ex-
amines the role of the utility during a public health
response action, as well as the interaction among
the utility, the drinking-water primacy agency, the
public health community, and other parties with a
public health mission. The public health response
has five major components: planning, including
conducting drills and simulations; determining
public health consequences of contamination; im-
plementing any necessary response actions; no-
tifying the public if appropriate; and providing an

APRIL 1, 2005 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY ■ 157A

 TA B L E 3 lizing alternative water supplies for
fire fighting could take time; there-
fore, during that period of time, it may
Analytical environmental technologies used to screen for be necessary to extinguish fires with
various classes of contaminants contaminated water. The appropriate
use of contaminated water for this or
Contaminant type Analytical environmental technology any other purpose should be carefully
evaluated in terms of its benefits and
Organic Gas chromatography (GC) with various detectors, GC/
risks, along with any measures need-
mass spectrometry (MS), liquid chromatography
ed to minimize those risks.
(LC) with various detectors, LC/MS, immunoassay
Remediation and Recovery Guide.
test kits
Module 6 describes the planning and
Inorganic Ion chromatography, graphic furnace atomic absorp- implementation of remediation and
tion, cold vapor atomic absorption, inductively cou- recovery activities that would be nec-
pled plasma (ICP), ICP/MS essary following a confirmed con-
Cyanides Ion-selective electrode, wet chemistry tamination incident (19). The reme-
diation process involves a sequence
Biotoxin Immunoassay test kits, GC/MS, LC, and LC/MS of several activities, including system
Radiological Gross , , and ; radionuclide-specific technology; characterization, selection of reme-
handheld meters and equipment dy options, provision of an alterna-
Schedule 1 chemical GC/MS with direct injection, purge and trap, solid- tive drinking water supply during re-
weapons (VX, sarin, phase extraction/solid-phase microextraction, test mediation activities, and monitoring
etc.) (Ref. 22) kits, handheld equipment to demonstrate that the system has
been remediated.
Bacteria Culture in selective media, biochemical and serological The goal of remediation and re-
tests, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), sequencing covery is to return the water supply
Bacteria–spore-forming PCR, immunoassay, sequencing system to service as quickly as pos-
sible while protecting public health
Protozoa Immunomagnetic separation, immunofluorescence
and minimizing disruption to normal
assay microscopy, sequencing
life (or ensuring business continuity).
Viruses Mammalian cell culture, plaque neutralization, PCR, During the remediation and recovery
reverse transcriptase PCR , sequencing stage of the threat management pro-
cess, the urgency of the situation has
passed, and the magnitude of the re-
alternative domestic water supply, if needed. Public medial action requires careful planning and imple-
health response is an important subset of the over- mentation. Although rapid recovery of the system is
all threat management (Module 2). crucial, it is equally important to follow a system-
Information-sharing technology may be valu- atic process that establishes remedial goals accept-
able in terms of notifying the public, and high-tech able to all stakeholders, implements the remedial
approaches such as hydraulic and GIS models may process in an effective and responsible manner, and
be useful to predict the spread of the contaminant demonstrates that the remedial action was indeed
through the water system. In addition to these so- successful.
phisticated models, simpler approaches, such as In many respects, the model for remediation and
hydraulic maps, may be helpful. In many cases, how- recovery presented in Module 6 resembles a Super-
ever, the information necessary to assess potential fund program (20), although a contaminated water
health consequences may be unknown or poorly system probably would not be classified as a Super-
characterized in the relatively short time frame in fund site. Why use the Superfund model? First, the
which public health decisions must be made. This approach and technology are familiar to a wide
reinforces the need for implementing Module 2’s variety of people in the United States, including
crisis management approach. state and federal regulators and remediation pro-
How alternative water supplies are provided may fessionals who would probably be involved in the
also vary with respect to the level of technological response action. Second, the Superfund model is a
sophistication, depending on the particular situa- scientifically sound and defensible process. Many
tion and whether short- or long-term water supplies of these remediation activities rely on traditional
are needed. In either time frame, many of the better environmental techniques—and are not necessar-
solutions may be inherently low-tech, such as haul- ily cutting-edge technologies—but are applied
ing water to consumers; connecting to a neighbor- according to carefully thought-out practices for es-
ing, uncontaminated utility; or simply providing tablishing remedial goals (e.g., determining “how
bottled water. Higher-tech solutions involve por- clean is clean”) specific to each contaminant of
table water treatment systems, complete with their concern. Applying these traditional environmen-
own power sources, storage capacity, and waste- tal technologies to the remediation of the contam-
stream management components. Activities that inants of concern may present specific challenges
demand large amounts of water, such as fire fight- in terms of destroying or deactivating the contam-
ing, can complicate the situation. In reality, mobi- inants and disposal of any residuals from their

158A ■ ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / APRIL 1, 2005

destruction or deactivation. However, several or-
ganizations, such as the American Water Works
Association Research Foundation and EPA’s Distri-
bution System Research Consortium, are actively
engaged in research to solve important problems
in the remediation and recovery of drinking-water
distribution systems (11).
The bottom line
As with other environmental problems, decision
makers may inherently tend to rely on environmen-
tal technology when responding to a contamination
threat or incident. However, the RPTB illustrates
that technology alone is not the solution. In fact,
over-reliance on current technology can create
its own problems, such as false positive respons-
es from high-tech analysis. On average, the level of
technology in the RPTB as a whole could probably
be characterized as low, with many response activ-
ities that require no technology at all. The technol-
ogy included in the RPTB is appropriate because it
is generally quite reliable. High-tech, cutting-edge
approaches could be of immense value during the
response to a contamination threat if they were suf-
ficiently reliable, but they are not necessarily criti-
cal to or appropriate for the successful application
of the RPTB today.
We hope that environmental technology will
eventually become so advanced that it will be able
to provide timely, objective, and complete answers
during a contamination threat or incident at a
drinking-water system. To achieve this goal, much
more work is required. At present, however, if we
were to operate under the usual belief that high-
tech solutions are by themselves capable of solv-
ing the problems, our response might be tragically
ineffective. The bottom line is that for a timely re-
sponse to a threat or incident, decision makers need
to rely on careful planning and skillful evaluation
of available information; these are tried-and-true
techniques for responding to crisis. Technology of
any variety is only one tool in this effort.
Matthew L. Magnuson is a research chemist with the
EPA Water Supply and Water Resources Division in Cin-
cinnati, Ohio. Steven C. Allgeier is an environmental
engineer with the EPA Water Security Division in Cin-
cinnati, Ohio. Bart Koch is the Water Quality Labora-
tory Chemistry Unit manager and Ricardo De Leon is
the Water Quality Laboratory Microbiology Unit man-
ager with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California. Ronald Hunsinger is the Manager of Water
Quality with the East Bay Municipal Utility District in
Oakland, Calif. Address correspondence regarding this
article to Magnuson at magnuson.matthew@epamail.
epa.gov.
Acknowledgments and Disclaimer
The authors thank the RPTB working group and technical
reviewers, along with the many other individuals who pro-
vided additional support. Any opinions expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re-
flect the official position and policies of EPA. Any mention
of products or trade names does not constitute recommen-
dation for use by EPA.
References
(1) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Pro-
tection, 2003, www.counterterrorism.org/homeland-
security-presidential-directive-7.asp.
(2) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: De-
fense of United States Agriculture and Food, 2004,
w w w.cou nter ter ror ism.org/homela nd-secu r it y-
presidential-directive-9.asp.
(3) Rose, J. B. Water Quality Security. Environ. Sci. Technol.
2002, 36, 246A–250A.
(4) Luthy, R. G. Bioterrorism and Water Security. Environ.
Sci. Technol. 2002, 36, 123A–123A.
(5) Response Protocol Toolbox: Overview and Application;
Document No. EPA-817-D-03-007, U.S. EPA: Washing-
ton, DC, 2003, www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/
pubs/guide_response_overview.pdf.
(6) The Water Security Research and Technical Support Ac-
tion Plan; U.S. EPA: Washington, DC, 2004, www.epa.
gov/nhsrc/pubs/bookActionPlan031204.pdf.
(7) Module 1: Water Utilities Planning Guide; Document
No. EPA-817-D-03-001; U.S. EPA: Washington DC, 2003,
www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/pubs/guide_
response_module1.pdf.
(8) International Life Sciences Institute. Early Warning
Monitoring to Detect Hazardous Events in Water Sup-
plies; ILSI Press: Washington, DC, 1999, www.ilsi.org/
file/EWM.pdf.
(9) Hargesheimer, E., Conio, O., Popovicova, A., Eds. Online
Monitoring for Drinking Water Utilities; American Water
Works Association Research Foundation and CRS PRO-
AQUA: Denver, CO, 2002.
(10) U.S. EPA National Homeland Security Research Center,
www.epa.gov/nhsrc.
(11) Herrmann, J.; Janke, R.; Rubiou, G. Achieving Water Se-
curity through a Collaborative Approach: The Distribu-
tion System Resource Consortium. In Proceedings of the
American Water Works Association Water Security Con-
gress, Charlotte, NC, April 26–28, 2004, www.epa.gov/
nhsrc/index.htm.
(12) Module 2: Contamination Threat Management Guide;
Document No. EPA-817-D-03-002; U.S. EPA: Washing-
ton, DC, 2003, www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/
pubs/guide_response_module2.pdf.
(13) World Health Organization. Public Health Response to
Biological and Chemical Weapons: WHO Guidance; 2004,
www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochemguide/en/
index.html.
(14) Module 3: Site Characterization and Sampling Guide;
Document No. EPA-817-D-03-003; U.S. EPA: Washing-
ton, DC, 2003, www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/
pubs/guide_response_module3.pdf.
(15) ETV Advanced Monitoring Systems Center—Advanced
Monitoring Systems (Water) Rapid Toxicity Testing Sys-
tems; U.S. EPA: Washington, DC, 2003, www.epa.gov/
etv/verifications/vcenter1-27.html.
(16) States, S.; et al. Rapid Analytical Techniques for Drink-
ing Water Security Investigations. J. Am. Water Works
Assoc. 2004, 96, 52–64.
(17) Module 4: Analytical Guide; Document No. EPA-817-
D-03-004; U.S. EPA: Washington, DC, 2003, www.epa.
gov/safewater/watersecurity/pubs/guide_response_
module4.pdf.
(18) Module 5: Public Health Response Guide; Document No.
EPA-817-D-03-005; U.S. EPA: Washington, DC, 2003,
www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/pubs/guide_
response_module5.pdf.
(19) Module 6: Remediation and Recovery Guide; Document
No. EPA-817-D-03-006; U.S. EPA: Washington, DC, 2003,
www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/pubs/guide_
response_module6.pdf.
(20) U.S. EPA. Welcome to Superfund, www.epa.gov/superfund.
(21) FEMA IS-195 Basic Incident Command System: EMI In-
dependent Study Program; Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency: Washington, DC, 2003, http://training.
fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is195.asp.
(22) Chemical Weapons Convention. CWC Regulations, Sup-
plement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals, www.
cwc.gov/Regulations/cfr-15/part-712-s1_html.
APRIL 1, 2005 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY ■ 159A