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ARTICLE 114. TREASON

People vs. Villanueva The accused formed a unit of the Makapili organization, of which he was the chief. Said unit was engaged in patrolling
the town and looking for guerillas and persons suspected of helping the underground movement against the Japanese.
Some of the members wore uniforms similar to those used by the Japanese, and army bands with Japanese
characters. They were entitled to the respect and protection of the local authorities, and the people were obliged to
bow to them. (Treason )

People vs. Villanueva Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give
said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force.

Defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in the detective force of
the Japanese Army may not be believed on his lone and self-serving testimony if there is not an iota of proof that he
was in fact compelled or coerced by the Japanese. (Possible defense for Treason)
People vs. Delgado Adherence to the Japanese forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover
man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and
disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully established. (Treason )

The appellant may be convicted only for treason, and the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed by him may
not be separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts performed in the commission of the
treason, although, "the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance."
Crisologo vs. People Where it appears that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is the same, that the military court
had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out
by the military court to the defendant should be a bar to defendant's further prosecution for the same offense in the
Court of First Instance. (Concurrent Jurisdiction over Treason Cases, Decision of Military Court constitutes a bar to
further prosecution for the same offense in civil courts)

Where the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance is treason, the fact that the said
information contains an enumeration of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the
military courts is immaterial where the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a new and distinct
offense from that of treason but constitute ingredients thereof.

ARTICLE 115. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON

US vs. Bautista The fact that one accused of "conspiracy" to overthrow the Government has actually and voluntarily accepted
appointment by the conspirators as an officer of armed forces raised or to be raised for the furtherance of the designs

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of the conspirators, may be taken into consideration as evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with the
conspiracy.

The crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason
US vs. Cabola By means of the pacto de sangre, organized a Katipunan Society, which had for its object the destruction by force of
the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the establishment by said defendants of another
government in the form of a military organization wherein they were officers or members. (Meaning: Pacto de sangre =
Blood Compact)

ARTICLE 122. PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS OR IN PHILIPPINE WATERS
ARTICLE 123. QUALIFIED PIRACY
People vs. Tulin Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high
seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act
No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters."
On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces
any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence,
passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. Republic Act No. 7659
neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect
the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the
"whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

Section 4 of PD 532 - Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery
brigandage. Presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates
and derived benefit therefrom.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was
later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off- loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was

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done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates
of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in
Philippine waters.
People vs. Lol-lo Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility. (Meaning: Animo Furandi - Intent to steal)

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crime has no territorial limits. (Meaning: hostes humani generisi -
enemy of mankind)

It does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

"Thought the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political

condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and
property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they before the occupation.
People vs. Catantan Under the definition of piracy in P.D. No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the RPC, case falls
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan, Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony
of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. To
sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing
vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons.
ARTICLE 124. ARBITRARY DETENTION
Astorga vs. People The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not
involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear
in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own
actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes,
detained against his will.

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Padilla vs. CA It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been
set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or
take action. The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the
raining nighttime all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable"
suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE: "(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . .
police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus
delicti."

Voluntary surrender of the alleged illegal items which are in his possession incidental to his arrest constitutes a
waiver of right against illegal search and seizure.

Seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest
(first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of
the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within
the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The
products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule.

Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is
constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the
hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds
of some criminal offense.
ARTICLE 125. DELAY IN THE DELIVERY DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
Agbay vs. Ombudsman Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without
informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail.

The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested
with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, 'the Supreme Court and other inferior courts as may be established by law."'

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In the Sayo case, the Court even made a pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person "is a legal one and
consists in making a charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of
Court of First Instance in provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts
after an investigation if the evidence against said person warrants."

Soria vs. Desierto
In the case at bar, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, satisfied the intent behind Art. 125
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his
application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to
order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position
of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
An election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the
filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco,
125 Phil. 313.) [NOTE: Saturdays and Sundays are also excluded in the computation of the period]

For the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than the hours prescribed

by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such
as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the
necessary information, must be taken into consideration. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police)
ARTICLE 128. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
ARTICLE 129. SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED
ARTICLE 130. SEARCHING DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESSES
Moncado vs. People "To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."

The main, if not the sole, purpose of our constitutional inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, was to
place a salutary restriction upon the powers of government. That is to say, we believe the framers of the constitutions
of the United States and of this and other states merely sought to provide against any attempt, by legislation or
otherwise, to authorize, justify, or declare lawful, any unreasonable search or seizure. This wise restriction was
intended to operate upon legislative bodies, so as to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the people
expressly stipulated could in no event be made lawful; upon executives, so that no law violative of this constitutional
inhibition should ever be enforced; and upn the judiciary, so as to render it the duty of the courts to denounce as
unlawful every unreasonable search and seizure, whether confessedly without any color of authority, or sought to be

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justified under the guise of legislative sanction.

The right of the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence, but to recover the
possession of articles which were wrongfully taken from him. That right exists entirely apart from any proposed
use of the property by the State or its agents.
Galvante vs. Casimiro The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches which are under Art, 129 and 130.

The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article 32, in relation
to Article 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated
ARTICLE 131. PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS
Evangelista vs. The right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one: When the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the
Earnshaw constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws,
and the existence of the State." (People vs. Perez)

Respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite the
people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government," did only the right thing under
the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit previously issued by him to said Communist
Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law.

(Note: The principal ideal of the Communist Party aim is not to strengthen the capitalist government but to
engender as it cannot be avoided the war of the classes and to bring about its downfall)

A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment
as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting

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Gonzales vs. COMELEC
until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption
of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public
peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress
the threatened danger in its incipiency. (People vs Llyod)
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent

This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez, of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction.
Clear and Present Danger Rule - means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to
be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented .

Dangerous Tendency Rule - If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if
the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.

The test, the "clear and present danger" rule, as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger
or evil of a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger
of the substantive evil arising from the utterance question. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified
with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.

Our Constitution recognizes the freedom to form association for purposes not contrary to law.
ARTICLE 134. REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
ARTICLE 134-A. COUP DETAT
ARTICLE 135. PENALTY FOR REBELLION, INSURRECTION OR COUP DETAT
ARTICLE 136. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT COUP DETAT, REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
People vs. Hernandez When, as alleged in the information, performed "as a necessary means to commit rebellion, in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the . . . purpose" of the rebellion
constitutes neither two or more offenses, nor a complex crime, but one crime that of rebellion plain and simply,
punishable with one single penalty, namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. (Note: Must be of political character to

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be absorbed under rebellion, if common crimes are committed during rebellion then they are separate and distinct
offenses)

Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.

Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code "any person, merely participating or executing the commands of others in a
rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The penalty is increased to prision mayor and
a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who,
while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein":
1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",
2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
4. "exacting contributions or"
5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated".

Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and
are, altogether, subject to only one penalty. Thus for instance, a public of officer who assists the rebels by turning over
to them, for use in financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for
malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
malversation of public funds. The reason is that such malversation is inherent in the crime of rebellion committed by
him. In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds.

Fundamental reason why when common crimes (without political character) are committed during rebellion they are
punished separately: If Art. 48 would be applied, In the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty
could not be imposed upon him. Since one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other, the evil
intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are unrelated to each other, because,
in such event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal designs and of carrying the same into execution.
Umil vs Ramos In the case of Dural, the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of undergoing
medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in his sickbed, engaged in the
continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification, the Court says that the arresting officers acted
on "confidential information" that he was in the hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is
supposed to have validated the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the
absence of a warrant. Justice Cruz's own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify
the issuance of a warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge

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issuing the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.

Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership is
penalized, and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense,
thus:
"The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude . . ."

RULE 113 SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it

The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which, according to Webster, means "a very short time
ago." The arrest must be made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion
of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.

"Personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest.

The courts should not expect of law enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth
in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent
and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the
arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention

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Mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in
these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting
peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the
arrests.
Enrile vs. Ramos Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion

WARRANT REQUIREMENT IN "PERSONALLY" DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE: It is

also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining
the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation
of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.
ARTICLE 139. SEDITION
People vs Hadji Sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against
persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the
general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U. S. vs. Abad (1902), 1 Phil.
437).

Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at common law is
where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with
malice aforethought, express or implied. "The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder
are perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact.

The rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and
independent acts separable from sedition. (People vs. Cabrera)
People vs Umali The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under rebellion.
The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by
means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of a public official, namely, Punzalan who was then Mayor of Tiaong.

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ROBBERIES COMMITTED AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT: The purpose of the raiders was to kidnap or kill the mayor and
destroy his house. Robberies were committed by only some of the raiders, presumably because of the opportunity
offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the houses. Held: For these
robberies only those who actually took part therein are responsible.

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