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EXHIBIT N
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 2 of 12

JA NUA RY 18, 2017 3:00PM

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By B andLoganAlbright

ExecutiveSummary

DonaldTrumphasproposedeliminatingorseverelymodifyingtheDeferredActionfor
ChildhoodArrivals(DACA)program.ManyAmericansbelievethatthepresenceof
unauthorizedimmigrantsisharmfultotheeconomyandwouldliketoseestepstaken
toreducetheirpresence.However,arepealorrollbackofDACAwouldharmthe
economyandcosttheU.S.governmentasignificantamountoflosttaxrevenue.We
estimatethatthefiscalcostofimmediatelydeportingtheapproximately750,000
peoplecurrentlyintheDACAprogramwouldbeover$60billiontothefederal
governmentalongwitha$280billionreductionineconomicgrowthoverthenext
decade.

WearrivedatourestimatesbycomparingandadjustingthecharacteristicsofDACA
recipientstosimilarlywelleducatedimmigrantsadmittedthroughtheH1Bvisa
program,acohortthatnotonlyresemblesthepopulationofDACArecipientsbut
whoseowneconomicimpacthasbeenwellstudied.Weusetheestimatedbudgetary
andeconomicimpactofH1Bvisaworkersandadjustittoreflecttheageandearnings
differencesbetweenthetwogroupstocalculateourfigures.

Background
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 3 of 12
PresidentObamacreatedtheDACAprogramin2012viaexecutiveaction.DACAs
objectivewastoallowAmericanresidentswhoenteredthecountryillegallyaschildren
toreceivetemporaryprotectionfromdeportation,workpermits,andanincentiveto
investintheirownhumancapital.Theprogramonlyappliestothosewhohavelivedin
theUnitedStatesforfiveyearsorlongeranddonothaveacriminalrecord.
Essentially,thesearepeoplewhoneverknowinglybrokeanylawandhavebeen
productiveandpeacefulmembersofsocietysincetheirarrival.ThelogicoftheObama
AdministrationincreatingDACAisthatitmakeslittlesensetoexpendtimeand
resourcestryingtotrackdown,arrest,anddeportthesepeoplewhentheyhavenot
committedanycrimesaveforbeingunwittinglybroughtacrosstheborderbyothers.

ThereismuchlegitimatedebateintheUnitedStatesovertherolethatimmigration
bothlegalandillegalplaysintheeconomy,andwhatshouldbedoneaboutborder
security.Inseparablefromthisproblemisthequestionofwhattodowiththe
undocumentedimmigrantsalreadyinthecountry,asizeablepopulationthatis
estimatedtonumber11to12million.[1]

PresidentElectDonaldTrumphastakenanabsolutistpositionontheissue,vowing
notonlytobuildawallwiththeintentofgreatlyreducingillegalentryfromthe
Mexicanborder,butalsotounilaterallynullifyPresidentObamasexecutiveactions
dealingwithimmigration,includingtheactionwhichspawnedDACA.

Aswithanysuddenanddramaticshiftinanypolicy,thereareboundtobecosts
associatedwithimplementation,aswellasaftereffectsofthepolicy,notallofwhich
areimmediatelyintuitive.Itisthegoalofthispapertoexaminethecoststhatthe
wholesalerepealofDACAwouldimposeontheAmericaneconomy,bothintermsof
enforcementaswellasthesuddenlossofalargenumberofresidentsandtheir
contributionstothedomesticeconomy.

WhoAretheDACARecipients?

Althoughtherehavebeenmanypreviousstudiesonthecostsandbenefitsof
immigrationasawhole(werecentlyauthoredareviewofsuchstudies),itisimportant
tonotethatwecannotsimplyassumethatDACArecipientsconstitutearepresentative
sampleoftheimmigrantpopulation.Inadditiontotheaforementionedscreeningfor
criminalactivity,workersintheDACAprogramtendtobeyounger,bettereducated,
andmorehighlypaidthanthetypicalimmigrant.Toextrapolatefromthestudieson
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 4 of 12
immigrationingeneral,therefore,wouldsignificantlyunderestimatetheopportunity
costtotheeconomyofdeportingtheapproximately750,000programparticipants,
duetotheirhigherlevelofproductivity.

Weinsteadlookedforanothergroupthatmightmorecloselyresemblethe
demographiccharacteristicsofthoseintheDACAprogramwhoseeconomicand
budgetaryimpactsontheeconomyiswellestablished:therecipientsofH1Bvisas,
whichareissuedtoskilledworkerswhoareinvitedintothecountrytofulfillspecific
economicneeds.Thiscoincidenceisuseful.

TheaverageDACArecipientis22yearsold,employed,andearnsabout$17anhour.
[2]
Themajorityarestillstudentsand17percentarepursuinganadvanceddegree. By
contrast,mostrecipientsofH1Bvisasarebetween25and34andholdeithera
BachelorsDegreeoraMastersDegree.Inshort,theyappeartobeaclosereflectionof
whatDACArecipientswilllooklikeafewyearsfromnowastheycompletetheir
[3]
educations.

Whilethecomparisonisnotperfect,asnosuchcomparisoncanbe,calculatingcosts
undertheassumptionthatDACArecipientsaremorelikeH1BVisaholdersthanthe
generalpopulationofunauthorizedimmigrantswill,webelieve,yieldamoreaccurate
result.Andgiventhatweknowthedemographicandeducationaldifferencesbetween
thetwogroupswetakethosedifferencesintoaccountwhenestimatingthefiscaland
economiccostsofrepealingDACA.

EconomicCosts

AsofJune2016,U.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServiceshasreceived844,931
applicationsfortheDACAprogram.Ofthese,741,546wereaccepted,withtherest
[4]
eitherdeniedorpendingapproval. ItshouldbenotedthattheapplicantstoDACA
areaskedtopaytheadministrativefeesforbackgroundchecksandprocessing,sothe
administrativecostsofimplementingtheprogramitselfareminimal.Whilethe
ObamaAdministrationhadannounceditsintentiontoexpandtheprogramlastyear,
thisisunlikelytooccurundertheTrumpAdministration,sowewillacceptthese
numbersasrepresentativeoftheaffectedpopulation.
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 5 of 12
LittleresearchhasbeendoneontheeffectsofDACAitself,whichiswhywehave
chosentoextrapolatetheprogramseconomicimpactfromtheresearchdoneon
holdersofH1Bvisas,whoaredemographicallysimilartoworkersintheDACA
program,aswellasfromthenumerousstudiesontheeconomiceffectsof
undocumentedimmigrationgenerally.

OnestudyonDACAitselfwasconductedbyNolanG.Popeandpublishedinthe
JournalofPublicEconomicsin2016.NolanfoundthatDACAmovedbetween50,000
and75,000immigrantsintoemploymentfromeitheroutsidetheformallaborforceor
unemployment,andincreasedtheaverageincomeofimmigrantsinthebottomofthe
[5]
incomedistribution. Thisisapositivelabormarketoutcomeforanumberof
reasons:workingandearningahigherlevelofincomeintheformalsectormeansthat
theDACAworkerspaymoretaxes,boththroughpayroll,income,andsalesasaresult
ofgreaterconsumptionassociatedwithhigherincomes.TheOrganizationof
EconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)citedemploymentasthemost
importantfactorthatweighsonmigrantsnetfiscalcontributions,soitisclearthat
anyincreaseinimmigrantemploymentwilltendtoresultinapositivefiscalimpact.[6]

A2014surveyfoundthat59percentofDACArecipientsreportedgettingtheirfirst
job,45percentreceivedapayincrease,49percentopenedtheirfirstbankaccount,
[7]
and33percentgottheirfirstcreditcardduetotheirparticipatinginDACA. Allof
thesefactorscontributepositivelytotheeconomy.Butwhilethesurveyalsonotedthat
recipientswouldbeeligibleforhigherlevelsofeducation,Popesresearchcompleted
twoyearslaterfoundnocorrelationbetweenDACAparticipationandeducation,
althoughitispossiblethatsimplynotenoughtimehaspassedtoobserveaneffect.

Turningmoregenerallytothecostbenefitanalysisofunauthorizedimmigrationasa
whole,theevidencesuggeststhatthemerepresenceofundocumentedworkers,
especiallynoncriminalslikethosecoveredunderDACA,isnotnearlyasdetrimental
totheeconomyasmostpeoplesuppose,andmayactuallybeanetbenefit.Legalizing
unauthorizedimmigrantsandallowingthemtoparticipateinsocietyaslegalworkers
dramaticallyreducesgovernmentenforcementcostsandgeneratesbroadereconomic
[8]
benefits.

QuantifyingtheNetCosts
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 6 of 12
Quantifyingthecostsofanyactiononimmigrationpresentsenormousdifficulties,due
tothecomplexityandnumberofvariablesinvolved.

AlexNowrasteh,ascholarattheCatoInstitute,pointsoutthatwhiletheeconomic
impactofimmigrationislargeandpositive,thefiscalimpacttendstobeminimal.
Nowrastehalsostressestheneedtotakeintoaccountthelongtermeffectsof
immigration,meaningthecontributionsofimmigrantschildrenandgrandchildren,
[9]
whichtendtobemorepositivethanthoseoffirstgenerationimmigrants.

ThereareunquantifiablebenefitsfromDACAaswell,suchasprovidingincreased
accesstoprivatehealthinsurance,driverslicenses,andautoinsurance,allofwhich
generatespilloverbenefitstotherestofsociety.Thisanalysisalsoleavesoutthe
effectsofsimplyhavingmoreproductivemindsinthecountrycapableofproducing
innovationsandincreasinglaborproductivity.Thedatashowthatimmigrantsstart
[10]
theirownbusinessesandfilepatentsatgreaterratesthannativebornAmericans.

ThefiscalcostsofDACArecipientsarealsominimalandcomparabletothefiscalcosts
ofH1Bworkers.[11]Undercurrentlaw,DACArecipientsareineligibleformeans
testedwelfarebenefitsprovidedbythefederalgovernmentorfundedthroughfederal
matchinggrantstothestates.[12]AlthoughstatescanextendwelfarebenefitstoDACA
recipientsiftheychooseto,fewhavedoneso.DACArecipients,likeeverybodyelsein
theUnitedStates,areeligibleforemergencyMedicaid.Thus,DACAdoesnotboost
governmentwelfareexpendituresabovethelevelconsumedbyunauthorized
immigrants.

Toreiterate,weneedtoisolateDACArecipientswhotendtobemoreeducated,
younger,andlesspronetocriminalactivityfromthegeneralpopulationof
unauthorizedimmigrantstoderiveanaccurateestimateofDACAsimpact.Todothis,
webeginbycomparingthemtotheholdersofH1Bvisas,theworkpermitsissuedfor
highskilledlabor.Themaindifferencebetweenthetwogroupsisage,withH1Bvisa
holdersbeingonaverage3to12yearsolder.Withthisagegapalsocomesthe
concomitantdifferenceineducationandearnings,whichwecanadjustforinour
calculations.

ThomasChurch,aseniorfellowattheHooverInstitution,estimatesthatexpanding
theH1BvisaprogramoveratenyearperiodwouldincreaseGDPby$456billionand
taxrevenuesby$113billion,assumingthat660,000newH1Bimmigrantswould
[13]
 [13]
Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD
arriveoverthedecade. Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 7 of 12
ChurchobtainshisresultsbytakingthemeanwagesforH
1Bimmigrants,assuminganaveragewagegrowthof3percentperyear,andapplying
theappropriatetaxrates.

Churchalsoincorporatesincomeaccruedtocapitalfromtheseworkers,usingthe
relativelystablehistoricalaveragescalculatedbytheCongressionalBudgetOffice.
Multiplestudieshavebeenconductedontheimpactofimmigrationonnativewages,
andtheresultshavebeenbothpositiveandnegative,albeitsmallineitherdirection.
Thereisalsosomeevidencethatthepresenceofimmigrantworkerscanincrease
purchasingpowerbyreducingconsumerprices.Giventheseconflictingandminor
findings,Churchhasnotincludedwageorpurchasingpowereffectsinhis
calculations,andwehavedonethesame.

WetakeChurchsestimateasourbaselineandbeginbyadjustingittoreflectthe
741,546participantsintheDACAprogramwhichisabitmorethanhisH1B
expansioncalledforproducinganestimatedGDPgainof$512billionanda
budgetaryimpactof$127billion.

However,sincetheaveragewagesofDACAparticipantsarelowerthanH1B
immigrants,wecorrectedthesevaluestoreflecttherelativeyouthandinexperienceof
DACAimmigrants.DACAparticipantsearnanaverageof$34,000annuallyandH1B
participantsanaverageof$72,000annually,aratioof47percent.Applyingthisratio
totheeconomicandfiscalcostsaboveyieldsaneconomicimpactof$215billionanda
fiscalimpactof$60billion.

WefeelthisisaconservativeestimateduetothefactthatmanyDACAimmigrantsare
youngandstillacquiringeducationcredentialsthatwillboostwageslater.DACA
immigrantsarelesslikeH1Bimmigrantsathalfthesalary,andmorelikeyoungerH
1Bworkers.Additionally,thehighertaxbracketsassociatedwithhigherincomes
wouldincreaseDACAimmigrantsfiscalcontributionsatagreaterratethanthe
increaseinsalary.Inotherwords,doublingthewagesofDACAparticipantswould
morethandoubletheircontributionstostateandfederalbudgets.Thus,alifecycle
comparisonofthewagesofthetwogroupswouldproduceanarrowerdifference.

[14]
Forcomparison,aninfluentialstudybytheNationalResearchCouncil examined
thepresentvaluefiscalimpactofimmigrationintheUnitedStates,withanemphasis
onlongtermimpact.Thestudypointsoutthatimmigrantsbecomemoreproductive
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 8 of 12
overtimeastheylearnnewskillsandbecomemorefluentinEnglish.Theauthors
concludedthattheaverageimmigrantwillhaveanetlongtermimpactonstate,local
andfederalbudgetsof$80,000,whichincludestaxpaymentsaswellastheimpactof
thechildrenofimmigrants,whotendtobelesscostlyandhigherearningthantheir
parents.MultiplyingthisestimatebythenumberofDACArecipientsproducesan
estimatedfiscalimpactof$59.3billion,nearlyidenticaltothe$60billionfiscalimpact
wederivedfromtheHooverstudy.

WealsoneedtoaddtheactualcostofdeportationforcurrentDACArecipientstothe
fiscalandeconomicestimates.ForthisweborrowfromastudyfromtheCenterfor
AmericanProgressthatestimatesthemarginaldeportationcostsatjustover$10,000
[15]
perremoval. Thetotaldeportationcostwouldthenbe$7.5billion.

Summingthesenumbersproducesatotalcostestimateofimmediatelyeliminatingthe
DACAprogramanddeportingitsparticipantsof$283billionover10years.Inother
words,theUnitedStateseconomywouldbepoorerbymorethanaquarterofatrillion
dollarsifPresidentTrumpweretomakegoodonhisthreattorepealit.

Thereareothervariablesthatpotentiallyimpactboththecostsandbenefitsof
immigrantworkers,andthefurtherintothefutureweattempttoprojectsuchcosts
andbenefitsthemoredifficultaccurateestimatesbecome.Forexample,our
calculationusedonlythecurrentnumberofDACArecipients,butitisestimatedthat
therecouldbeanotheronemillioneligibleresidentswhohavenotyetappliedfor,or
[16]
received,membershipintheprogram. Wedonotmakeanyforecastregarding
whetherthiscohortwouldeventuallytakeadvantageoftheprogramandinstead
assumenoneofthemwoulddoso.

Likewise,assumingimmediatedeportationinsteadofatemporaryreversionto
undocumentedstatuschangesthecalculusaswell,consideringthecoststhatresult
frompeopletryingtoliveoutsidethelaw.Thiswouldneedtobetakenintoaccount.

AlexNowrastehofCatosuggestedthatitisprobablymorerealistictoassumethat
uponarepealofDACAthenewlyunauthorizedimmigrantswouldpredominantly
remainintheUnitedStatesandpursueemploymentillegally,atwages10percentto
20percentlessthantheyearnedlegally.Ifwecombinedthatwithasimilarreduction
inemploymentlevelsthentheresultingeconomicimpactwouldbeabitlessinthe
[17]
rangeof$60$100billionbutstillsignificant.
 Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 9 of 12
Regardlessoftheresponse,itisclearthatthereisasignificantfiscalandeconomic
costtotheimmediaterepealofDACA,onebornebyallofthenationsresidentsand
notjustbythosewhoseliveswouldbeupendedbysuchamove.Thissuggeststhatit
wouldmakemoresensetofocusimmigrationenforcementeffortselsewhereif
indeedtheaimistoprotectAmericannationalsovereignty,aswellasthelife,liberty,
andprivatepropertyofAmericans.

SmallGains,BigCosts

TherearevalidreasonstobeconcernedaboutunauthorizedimmigrationintheUnited
States.TheDACAprogram,however,screensoutanyonewithacriminalpastaspart
ofitscoreeligibilityrequirements.DACAparticipantsarenoteligibleformeanstested
welfarebenefitsorObamacaresubsidies.

SinceDACAapplicantspaytheirownprocessingfees,theprogramitselfdoesnothave
anadministrativecost,andsotheonlycostsweneedtoevaluatearethosethatstem
fromhavingthesepeopleinthecountryinthefirstplace.Wesubmitthatanysuch
costsarefaroutweighedbythebenefitsthatcomefromimmigrantswhoareableto
workopenlyandlegally,paytaxes,supportentitlementprograms,createjobs,
innovate,andsirechildrenwhowillonedaydothesame.

ThedeportationofDACAparticipantswouldcosttheAmericaneconomybillionsof
dollars,aswellasbillionsoftaxdollarsforegone,whiledoinglittletoaddressthetrue
concernsthatAmericansmayhaveaboutunauthorizedimmigrants.

[1]JeffreyS.PasselandDVeraCohn,UnauthorizedImmigrantPopulationStablefor

HalfaDecade,(Washington:PewResearchCenter,September21,2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/09/21/unauthorizedimmigrant
populationstableforhalfadecade/.

[2]
TomK.Wong,ResultsofTomK.Wong,NationalImmigrationLawCenter,and
CenterforAmericanProgressNationalSurvey,(Washington:NationalImmigration
LawCenterandCenterforAmericanProgress,June2015),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/DACA
Wong_NILC_CAPCodebookPDF.pdf.

[3]
[3]
Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 10 of 12
CharacteristicsofH1BSpecialtyOccupationWorkers,FiscalYear2014Annual
ReporttoCongress(Washington:U.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices,February
26,2015),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H
1B/h1Bcharacteristicsreport14.pdf.

[4]
NumberofI821D,ConsiderationofArrivalsbyFiscalYear,Quarter,Intake,
Biometrics,andCaseStatus:20122016,(Washington:U.S.Citizenshipand
ImmigrationServices,June30,2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%.

[5]
NolanG.Pope,TheEffectsofDACAmentation:TheImpactofDeferredActionfor
ChildhoodArrivalsonUnauthorizedImmigrants,JournalofPublicEconomics143
(2016):98114.

[6]OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,International

MigrationOutlook,(Paris:OECD,2013),p.161.

[7]
RobertG.GonzalesandAngieM.BautistaChavez,TwoYearsandCounting:
AssessingtheGrowingPowerofDACA,AmericanImmigrationCouncilSpecial
Report(Washington:AmericanImmigrationCouncil,June14,2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/twoyearsandcounting
assessinggrowingpowerdaca.

[8]
IkeBrannonandLoganAlbright,ImmigrationsImpactontheTexasEconomy,
TexasPublicPolicyFoundation(Austin:TPPF,March2016),
http://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/ImmigrationsImpactontheTexas
Economy.pdf.

[9]
AlexNowrasteh,TheFiscalImpactofImmigration,CatoInstituteWorkingPaper
(Washington:CatoInstitute,July23,2014),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/workingpaper21fix.pdf.

[10]
AmericanImmigrationCouncil,ValueAdded:ImmigrantsCreateJobsand
Businesses,BoostWagesofNativeBornWorkers,AmericanImmigrationCouncil
Factsheet(Washington:AIC,January2,2012),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/valueaddedimmigrants
createjobsandbusinessesboostwagesnativebornworkers.
[11]
Case 2:17-cv-00218-RSM-JPD Document 45-21 Filed 02/22/17 Page 11 of 12
RuthEllenWasem,NoncitizenEligibilityforFederalPublicAssistance:Policy
OverviewandTrends,CongressionalResearchService(Washington:CRS,September
27,2012).

[12]FrequentlyAskedQuestions:TheObamaAdministrationsDAPAandExpanded

DACAPrograms,NationalImmigrationLawCenter(Washington:NILC,March2,
2015),https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigrationreformandexecutiveactions/dapa
andexpandeddacaprograms/.

[13]
ThomasV.Church,EstimatingtheEconomicandBudgetaryEffectsofNewH1B
VisasintheSenateGangofEightsProposedImmigrationBill,HooverInstitution
(Stanford:Hoover,May7,2013),
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/aafs/2013/05/Estimatingthe
EconomicandBudgetaryEffectsofH1BReformInS.744.pdf.

[14]
JamesP.SmithandBarryEdmonston,editors,TheNewAmericans:Economics,
Demographic,andFiscalEffectsofImmigration,NationalAcademiesPress
(Washington:NAP,1997),p.346.

[15]
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/02/23/1069

[16]
PhilipE.Wolgin,WhatWoulditCosttoDeportAll5MillionBeneficiariesof
ExecutiveActiononImmigration?CenterforAmericanProgress(Washington:CAP,
February23,2015),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/02/23/106983/what
woulditcosttodeportall5millionbeneficiariesofexecutiveactionon
immigration/.

[17]
AlexNowrasteh,HeritageImmigrationStudyFatallyFlawed,CatoatLiberty,
April4,2013,https://www.cato.org/blog/heritageimmigrationstudyfatallyflawed.

Topics: International Economics, Development & Immigration

Tags: immigration, DACA, Trump

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