Case Digest

1. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171

Facts:
Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during WWII in the country. He was tried
before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under
Executive Order 68.

Petitioner assailed the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the

military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
The Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2
US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue:
WON EO 68 is constitutional?
WON American lawyers may participate in a case under a military commission
when they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines
HELD:

EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was

enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution
which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. It is in accordance with
generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and
Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN,
including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing,
waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of
war. Although, the Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that
time but the rules and regulations of both are based on the generally accepted
principles of international law.

As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest

because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner
was being charged. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military
tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of
court but the provision of this special law.

2. Lo Ching vs. Archbishop of Manila, 81 Phil. 601

FACTS:

The Archbishop of Manila through the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) leased a
farm to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co. located at de la Calle Hidalgo, Manila, under a
monthly income of P500 by the end of three years, extendable to two years (two years
upon agreement of the parties). The tenant took the property by setting it in a hotel.
Thereafter, the Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and delivered the
latter to German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the advent of the
liberation army.

The tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly rental fee. Before the end of
August of that year, the landlord required the tenants to vacate the property,
however, they refused. Therefore, the landlord filed for an application for eviction in
the Municipal Court of Manila. It is ordered the tenants to vacate the property and pay
its monthly rent of P625 from the first September 1945, plus damages in the amount
of P500 and legal expenses.

The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full
years, the occupation must be effective, and continuous material, which should not be
deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property, and the appellants are entitled to
deduct that period of three years, all the time that no longer have the lease available
to the Japanese army.

ISSUE:

WON Hague Convention of 1907 allows occupation and seizure of private lands. WON
Japanese soldiers occupied the farm in dispute.

RULING:

The Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private
property in the territory invaded. In contrast, states that: "Family honor and rights, the
lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated." (Article 46).

The farm is not even used as army barracks, and there is no evidence that it was
seized by military necessity, what can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers disposed
of the property, not in the legitimate exercise the authority of an occupying army, but
spurred on by uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire to take over other people.

3. Borovsky vs Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-4362 (1951)

FACTS:

Petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian

parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided herein ever since, if
the period of his detention be included.
The Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines has ordered to arrest the
petitioner for investigation of his past activities. A warrant for deportation was also
issued by the Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found to be an
undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard.

Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa because
he was not a national of China. He was therefore brought back to Philippines and was
confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. Thereafter, was granted provisional
release by the President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before
the expiration of that period, the Immigration department rearrested him and brought
him to Cebu for the purpose of placing him on board a Russian vessel carrying out the
deportation order issued against him. However, said deportation failed to materialize
as the captain of the ship refused to take him on board without permission from the
Russian government. As such, petitioner was again detained. The Immigration Officials
alleged that while in detention, they have been taking steps regarding the disposition
of those foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting availability of transportation
or arrangements to the place where they may be sent.

Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly on
the ground that such detention was merely temporary. Over two years had elapsed
since the decision was promulgated, but still the Government had not found ways and
means of removing the petitioner out of the country. Hence this second petition for
writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending deportation

HELD:
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein, even if they
are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy,
against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty,
without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy
aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in violation
of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is unable to
deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide.

Moreover, Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Philippine Constitution States provides that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of Nation. And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines
is a member. lt was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in
degree and rights.

4. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA

292

Facts:
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a letter-
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the operation of
the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to
its harmful effects on the residents and the environment. Also, it was found out that the City
Government (CG) has no documents required by law to maintain an open dump site.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the LLDA to completely halt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the CG. However, the dumping operation was
resumed after a meeting was conducted and the parties concerned failed to settle the
problem.

The LLDA issued another order reiterating its first order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the CG from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

Pending its motion, the CG filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of
injunction. The CG sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the
health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology
within its territorial jurisdiction.

The LLDA, countered and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals
and not by the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
WON the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws?

Ruling:

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done
in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,
cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its
express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution. Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever
order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan. However, it would be
a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the
order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance
of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.

An authority to issue a "cease and desist order" is not expressly conferred by law, there is
jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily
be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to
issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a
"toothless" paper agency.

5. Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner has signed in Manila the extradition Treaty between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

Thereafter, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S a
Verbale Note containing a request for the extradition of Jimenez to the United States.

On the same day, petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez
through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition.

ISSUE:
WON to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty

RULING:
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. Under this doctrine, rules of
international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action are needed
to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. It is also applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

6. Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115

FACTS
Petitioner entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities in the Philippines.
He and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market. However,
Congress passed the RA No. 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act. In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business.

Petitioner and other alien residents corporations and partnerships were adversely affected by
the enactment of Republic Act. No.1180. They had brought an action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, arguing that the act has violated international
treaties and obligations

ISSUE
WON the Act violates international treaties and obligations.
HELD
It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

All that a treaty guarantees is equality of treatment of aliens, subject to the same terms of
Filipino nationals in any other country. However, in the conduct of engaging into retail trade,
foreign nationals, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited to such conduct.

7. Agustin vs. Edu

FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of LOI No. 229
which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with
a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. He is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already
equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists.
And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is
redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is LOI is valid.
HELD:
Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive
because, the Philippines, being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968
Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400
meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway,
or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic.

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. Police
power is the authority of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state. The concept was set forth in negative terms as the inherent and
plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, to all the great public
needs.

8. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Corazon Aquino, G.R. No. 73748,
May 22, 1986
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued proclamation No.3 providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
The legitimacy of a government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. It is held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country. Furthermore, it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government.

9. Banco Nacional de Cuba vs. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398

FACTS:

A contract to purchase Cuban sugar from of a corporation which was organized under Cuban
law but was made broker of an American company. The agreement was for the American
corporation pay for the sugar in New York upon the presentation of the shipping documents.
After this deal, a law was enacted in Cuba which empowered the government to nationalize
forcefully, expropriation of property or enterprise in which American nationals had an interest.

Hence, the sugar was expropriated from Compania Azucarera. The American corporation,
however, entered into contracts which was similar to the one made with the Cuban
corporation, which was an instrumentality of the government. This was in order to obtain
consent from the Cuban government before a ship carrying sugar could leave Cuba. A bill of
lading which was also an instrumentality of the Cuban government was assigned by a Cuban
bank, who presented the bills and a sight draft as required under the contract. After Cuban
Corporation notified the American Corporation of its claim to the proceeds as rightful owner of
the sugar, the American corporation refused the documents.

This action resulted in a court order which appointed respondent as receiver the assets and
enjoined it from removing the payments from the state. A summary judgment was granted
against

Issue.
WON the judiciary has the authority to examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign even if the taking violated international law

Held.

The judiciary, in line with the Act of State Doctrine cannot examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government recognized by this country
in the absence of international agreements to the contrary, even if the taking violates
customary international law. Even in a situation whereby international law has been violated,
the clear implication of past cases is that the Act of State Doctrine is applicable because the
Act of State doctrine does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquire over a case. The
damages of adjudicating the propriety of such expropriation acts, regardless of whether the
State Department has it did in this case, asserted that the act violated international law are too
far-reaching for the judicial branch to attempt. Hence the judgment of the court of appeals is
reverse and the case remanded back to the district court.

10.Oetjenvs vs. Central Leather Co., 246 US 297

Facts:
A commissioned commander of the Carranza government conducted independent operations
which had then made much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution,
and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of
Mexico. The court notices judicially that the government of the United States recognized the
government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19,
1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917. Semble, that the Hague
Conventions, in view of their terms and international character, do not apply to a civil war, and
that the regulation annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military seizure and
sale of private property as is involved in this case.

Issue: WON the conduct of one independent government can be questioned in the court of
another involving title to property brought within the custody of a court as to the claim for
damages based upon act in the foreign country.

Held:
No, it cannot be successfully questioned by the court of another. Every sovereign state is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

11.People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887

FACTS:
Defendant, editor of LA NACION was accused of violation of Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code for publishing an article in La Nacion about the Philippine Senate and its members, and
was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. This
has led on the filing of an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that
Article 256 was not in force anymore.

ISSUE:
Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the
Philippines?

HELD:
Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. It is, however, the general rule of
Public Law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the Ceded region
are totally abrogated. A person accused of a law not anymore effective will be acquitted for
reason that law was already abrogated by the change sovereignty and is inconsistent with
democratic principle of government.

12.Vilas vs. City of Manila, 229 US 345

FACTS:
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission,
petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has
changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris,
December 10, 1898. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action against the city to recover
the sum of money owed to him by the latter upon the theory that the city, under its present
charter from the government of the Philippine Islands, is the same juristic person and liable
upon the obligations of the old city. The contention of the City of Manila, on the other hand,
now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
extinguished.

ISSUE:
WON, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, followed by a
reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city
incurred prior to the cession to the United States.
HELD:
The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense
the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of
the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental
functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the
new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the
creditors of the old City of Manila.

13.Holy See vs. del Rosario, 238 SCRA 524

FACTS:
A parcel of land was registered under the name of the Holy See which was contiguous to lots
registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Thereafter, said lots were sold
through Msgr. Domingo CirilosJr acting as agent, to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
Squatters of said land refused to vacate the lots, creating a dispute as to who has the
responsibility to evict the squatters from said lots. However, The same lots were then sold to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. This has resulted to the filing of a suit for
annulment of the sale of the three lots, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner.

The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit.

ISSUE:
WON Holy See can claim sovereign immunity from suit.

HELD:

As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of

International Law are adopted by our Courts and are deemed incorporated as part of the laws
of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. It was
noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic
envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety
in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of
the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise
clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit
or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.
 14.Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Opinion [WHO Case, IC] Rep.
1996 66

The legality of the possession of nuclear weapons

The court considered the legality of the possession, as opposed to actual use, of nuclear
weapons. It founds no treaty language that specifically forbade the possession of nuclear
weapons in a categorical way.
Under the UN Charter the legality of recourse to nuclear weapons in the light of the provisions
of the Charter. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific
weapon, including nuclear weapons. A weapon that is already unlawful per se, whether by
treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of its being used for a legitimate purpose
under the Charter. It must be examined whether there is any prohibition of recourse to nuclear
weapons. As part of the law applicable in situations of armed conflict it must relate to the
threat or use of force. In particular, with respect to "the argument that has advanced nuclear
weapons should be treated in the same way as poisoned weapons. It has been concluded that
the use of nuclear weapons can be regarded as specifically prohibited on the basis of the
provisions of the Second Hague Declaration of 1899. It was also argued by some that
the Hague Conventions concerning the use of bacteriological or chemical weapons would also
apply to nuclear weapons.

Customary international law provided insufficient evidence that the possession of nuclear
weapons had come to be universally regarded as illegal. Ultimately, it was unable to find
an opinio juris that nuclear weapons are illegal to possess. However, in practice, nuclear
weapons have not been used in war since 1945 and there have been numerous UN resolutions
condemning their use

15.Nicaragua vs. US, Communique 86/8, June 27, 1986

The Government of President Somoza collapsed following an armed opposition led by

the Frente Sandinista de Liberacibn Nacional (FSLN) which had installed a new government.
The new government began to encounter armed opposition from supporters of the former
Somoza Government and ex-members of the National Guard. The US provided for support but
stopped when it had found that Nicaragua was providing logistical support and weapons to
guerrillas in El Salvador. Thereafter the Nicaraguans accused the US for planning and
undertaking activities directed against Nicaragua.
Nicaragua also alleged that the US is effectively in control of the contras, the US devised
their strategy and directed their tactics and that they were paid for and directly controlled by
US personal and some attacks were carried out by US military with the aim to overthrow the
Government of Nicaragua. Attacks against Nicaragua included the mining of Nicaraguan ports
and attacks on ports, oil installations and a naval base. Nicaragua alleged that US aircrafts flew
over Nicaraguan territory to gather intelligence, supply to the contras in the field and to
intimidate the population.

ISSUES
WON the US breached its customary international law obligation

HELD:

The prohibition on the use of force is a principle that can be found in Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter and in customary international law (CIL). Use of force can be: most grave forms of the
use of force and less grave forms of use of force. The US violated the CIL prohibition on the
use of force when it laid mines in Nicaraguan ports and attacked its ports, oil installations and
a naval base. If however, the force was used in collective self- defence, then the US was
justified in the use of force. Also, US violated the CIL prohibition on the use of force when it
assisted the contras by organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces and
armed bands for incursion into the territory of another state and participating in acts of
civil strifein another State and when these acts involved the threat or use of force. The
supply of funds to the contras does not violate the prohibition on the use of force.

16.Republic of the Philippines vs. Marcos, 806 Fd. 344, US Court of Appeals

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines sought preliminary injunction barring the Marcoses, several real
estate holding companies and their alleged principal and managers as record holders of certain
properties in New York from transferring or encumbering properties, which were alleged to
have been purchase using ill-gotten wealth from the Philippines. A temporary restraining order
given and the real estate holding companies and alleged principals and managers were
ordered to vacate the said estates. The US Southern District Court of NY granted preliminary
injunction, but the defendants appealed the case with the Court of Appeals. It was held that,
among other rulings regarding the case, the act of state doctrine did not prohibit adjudication
in federal court of legality of acts of former President Marcos and his wife in that action purely
private acts by the president. This doctrine will also not apply even to public acts because the
Marcos government was no longer in power and danger of interference with executives
conduct of foreign policy.

Issue:
WON the acts of the Marcoses are insulated because they were acts of state, thereby, not
reviewable by US courts

Held:

The classification of certain acts as acts of state with the consequence that their validity will be
treated as beyond judicial review is a pragmatic device, not required by the nature of
sovereign authority and inconsistently applied in international law. The purpose of the device is
to keep the judiciary from embroiling the courts and the country in the affairs of the foreign
nation whose acts are challenged. Minimally viewed, the classification keeps a court from
making pronouncements on matters over which it has no power; maximally interpreted, the
classification prevents the embarrassment of a court offending a foreign government that is
"extant at the time of suit."

The continuing vitality of the doctrine depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution
of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign relations. A court that passes on the validity of an act of state intrudes into the
domain of the political branches.