After Crimea, Sweden Flirts With Joining NATO

Officials worry that the Swedish military is woefully unprepared for a Russian attack.

A warship of the Royal Swedish Navy on patrol in 2002. Claus Gertsen/Reuters

MATT FORD - MAR 12, 2014

It's a good time to have friends in Eastern Europe.

Leaders in the region, who have reacted to Russia's occupation of Crimea by expressing fears that
they could be next, are now taking solace in their alliances. "Thanks be to God, we are NATO
members," exclaimed Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite last week. This month, Norway is
hosting 16,000 NATO soldiers for previously planned cold-weather training exercises on the Russian
border, much to the Russians' displeasure. Among those participating in Operation Cold Response
are 1,400 Swedish troops under the Nordic nation's limited partnership with the alliance.

Non-aligned since the early 19th century, Sweden's "splendid isolation" has endured two world wars
and even the five-decade superpower slugfest that dominated the late 20th century. That could
change, however, in the wake of Russia's intervention in Ukraine. Last week, Swedish Finance
Minister Anders Borg indicated that the defense budget, to which he had recently announced cuts,
would be increased as a result of the crisis. Deputy Prime Minister Jan Bjrklund also publicly floated
the idea of Swedish membership in NATO, warning that Russia could attempt to seize Gotland, a
strategically located Swedish island province in the Baltic Sea, if it chose to attack the Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Sverker Gransson, the supreme commander of Sweden's military,
has rejected Bjrklund's call for a change to the country's defense doctrine.

Gotland, the largest island in the Baltic Sea, is roughly 56 miles off the Swedish coast and only 155
miles from Kaliningrad, a major Russian exclave in Europe with a large military base. The island's
position in the south Baltic gives it immense strategic value if a conflict were to break out in the Baltic
Sea. "Today's modern air missiles and anti-ship missiles can hit targets in the order of 300-400
kilometers," wrote Karlis Neretnieks, a retired Swedish major general, for the Royal Swedish
Academy of War Sciences last week. "Anyone who can group such systems on Gotland will be able
to make it very difficult for an opponent to operate on and in the Baltic Sea. From Bornholm in the
south to the land Islands in the north, from the Swedish mainland in the west to the Baltic states to
the east."
Sweden's top general estimated in 2013 that the country could only defend itself for a week if
attacked.
Russia briefly seized Gotland from Sweden in 1808 during the Napoleonic Wars, but Swedish forces
expelled them one year later and have controlled it ever since. Unlike Crimea, there are no ethnic
Russians on Gotland, but the island is still closely tied to Moscow's interests. Russia's Gazprom
conglomerate owns Nord Stream, an $11-billion pipeline running along the Swedish island
that pumps 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year to Western Europe. Russian President
Putin vowed to defend the strategically vital pipeline with the Russian Navy in 2006, and in one March
2013 incident reminiscent of the Cold War, two Russian heavy bombers and their fighter
escorts skirted Swedish airspace and simulated a bombing run against the island. NATO's Baltic air
patrol responded. Sweden's did not.

The Crimean crisis has renewed the ongoing debate in Swedish political circles about the country's
dilapidated military defenses. Military budget cuts by successive post-Cold War Swedish
governments grew so severe that Gransson, the country's supreme commander, publicly estimated
in January 2013 that Sweden could only hold out for a week if it were attacked. A Swedish military
college later confirmed Gransson's analysis in a report titled "Can We Defend Ourselves For A
Week?" and said that international help would be required because "the military does not have a
credible ability to defend all of Sweden." (NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen later
remarked that Sweden cannot count on military support from NATO unless it becomes a member
state.)

In response, a Russian TV program broadcast a parody music video in which a Gransson

impersonator bemoans, to the tune of ABBA's "Mamma Mia!", Sweden's military weakness. "It's very
scary! Really! Let us join NATO already," the impersonator sings at one point, "Otherwise Russia will
conquer us all right the next week!" (Watch the full skit below with English subtitles.)

Sweden's military isn't necessarily idle. Two hundred and seventy Swedish soldiers are currently
deployed in Afghanistan alongside NATO, and the country's air force helped enforce the UN-
authorized no-fly zone over Libya in 2011. Swedish soldiers have also joined UN peacekeeping
missions in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But its home defenses are what causes
the most concern among some Swedish officials, leading Sweden to increase its defense-cooperation
efforts with non-aligned Finland shortly before the Crimean crisis erupted.

The idea of joining NATO has also gained traction among Swedes in recent years. A 2013 poll found
that popular support for becoming a member had jumped 9 percent in two years, even though it still
falls short of a plurality. "Sweden must realize that we can no longer defend ourselves alone. NATO
membership must be debated seriously. It is the best long-term option for our defense and security,"
said Christian Democratic spokesman Mikael Oscarsson last January after the coalition government
to which his party belongs announced a formal review of Swedish military capabilities. "With
significantly higher spending on defense and material acquisitions, we will see better equipped and
trained Russian troops in this region. This strengthening requires a credible response by Sweden,"
Oscarsson added.

Swedish membership in NATO would leave Finland as the last non-aligned Scandinavian state, but
the Finnish people are warier about picking sides. A February 24 Helsinki News poll, conducted prior
to Russia's occupation of Crimea, found that 64 percent of Finns oppose NATO membership, 60
percent oppose forming an EU common-defense policy, and 60 percent oppose a proposed defense
alliance between Finland and Sweden. Given Finland's proximity to the Russian border, one can
hardly blame them for embracing non-alignment. Henry Kissinger opined in The Washington Post that
the new Ukrainian government should follow Finland's example. "That nation leaves no doubt about
its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional
hostility toward Russia," he wrote approvingly.
 A Russian threat to either country isn't immediate, and so far, talk of joining NATO remains just talk.
Last year, after Gransson's claim that the military could only defend the country for a week, Swedish
Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt stated that, despite their build-up, Russian armed forces have
"neither the will nor the capacity to attack Swedish territory."

But Crimea's example might force some in the Swedish government to reassess the threat's
likeliness. "You have to build up your fire brigade to the same dimension as the risk of a fire,"
Bjrklund told reporters last week. "How many people thought that Russia would go into Crimea? The
same argument could hold true for the Baltic states."
SOURCE: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/after-crimea-sweden-flirts-with-
joining-nato/284362/

How strong is the Nato military alliance?

18 February 2015

Image copyrightGETTY IMAGES

War in Ukraine and the threat of conflict in the Baltics raise fundamental questions about the
West's military alliance. What is Nato - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - for? And is it up
to the job?

Do would-be aggressors still believe that - as stated in Article 5 of Nato's founding treaty - an attack
on one Nato member would be treated as an attack on all?

Four expert witnesses including Anders Fogh Rasmussen - who led the organisation until a few
months ago - share their insights with the BBC World Service's The Inquiry.

'Dangerous decline in defence spending': Professor Alexander Matelaar

Research Professor Alexander Matelaar from the University of Brussels argues that defence
spending among Nato members must be restructured.
 Image captionProfessor Alexander Matelaar fears
declining defence expenditure puts Nato's effectiveness at risk

"I think there is a dawning realisation that the downward trend in defence expenditures needs to
bottom out at some point. In the middle of Europe, they're sort of bottoming out, and they're still
declining in western Europe."

This year, only five of Nato's 28 members reached the target of spending 2% of GDP on defence.

But it's not just cuts to defence budgets that are causing concern. It's what that defence budget is
being spent on. Take Belgium.

"At present, nearly three-quarters of the budget goes on personnel spending [with] 24-25% going on
operating costs for current operations and training.

At a glance

Image copyrightGETTY IMAGES

Founded: 1949

Membership: 28 nations

Nato co-operates with a number of international organisations and countries

Aspirant nations: Georgia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro

Profile compiled by BBC Monitoring

"But that leaves... at present less than 1% for signing new contracts for purchasing new kit, and
modernising the equipment.

"And of course on that basis, you can keep things afloat for a short period, but it's an absolute killer
over the longer haul."
It's a similar picture across many of Nato's member-states. Entire divisions and weapons systems
have been dismantled over the past few decades.

But why not cut defence? After all, Nato was founded to block Soviet expansion into Europe - so with
the collapse of the Soviet Union, hadn't it served its purpose?

"As the Cold War started softening up in the late 1980s, there was a justifiable call for reaping the so-
called peace dividend, and reshuffle government spending away from defence to other policy areas.

"That established a trend of decreasing defence expenditures that has now carried through roughly
three decades."

'Identity crisis': Professor Rebecca Moore

Nato expert Rebecca Moore is professor of political science at Concordia College in Minnesota, and
has written widely about the alliance. She argues Nato embraced a new more political mission after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, but may have lost its way in recent years.

Image caption Rebecca Moore fears the enlarged alliance has lost sight
of its ultimate political purpose

"The idea was that Nato had a critical role to play in uniting and democratising the European
continent and that there was an opportunity now to create a new European security order, a security
order that would be based on liberal democratic principles rather than spheres of influence or blocs or
the balance of power."

Professor Moore says this unity was summed up by a book she heard about while travelling in the
late 1990s - a collection of folk-tales gathered from Nato member-states.

"It was actually being distributed in Prague at the time that I was there by a Czech ministry of defence
official to schoolchildren, and was quoted as having said that 'the book was important to teach people
that Nato is not just about armies, it's about a broader relationship between countries'.

"That would be... a harder case to make today than it was at that time."
The key reason? Nato's size. At the end of the Cold War, the alliance had 16 members. Now it has
28.

"I would say that there is perhaps a lack of a really common vision, as to what the alliance's ultimate
political purpose is."

Some want the alliance to perform a more global role, conducting training and crisis-management
missions such as those Nato carried out in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Others say it should return to
its original goal - defending Europe's borders.

"I think that's probably the disagreement that's been the most pronounced and that's had greatest
impact on Nato decision-making in recent years."

'Putin exploiting Nato's weakness': Former Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark

US General Wesley Clark was Nato's supreme allied commander in Europe. Before air-strikes began
in Kosovo in 1999, he threatened Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic that he would "bomb him,
and bomb him good," if he didn't withdraw his forces. Gen Clark says it's that readiness to take action
which gives the organisation its strength:

Image copyrightAPImage captionGen Wesley Clark fears the Russians

are exploiting the West's reluctance to use force

"Every country who signs the Nato pledge when it joins says that an attack on one is an attack
against all. So Nato is conceptually the strongest alliance that's ever been built."

But he acknowledges that strength isn't realised if aggressors don't believe that Nato will act when a
member is attacked:

"Western democracies always have, traditionally, been slow to respond to these kinds of threats. It
was after all France and Britain who failed to respond to Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in
1936.

"Today the democracies have a difficult time coming to grips with the challenge of military force... and
they don't want to admit that Putin, while he's trying to broker peace [is] a main proponent of war."
Gen Clark argues President Putin is exploiting this hesitance.

"He's playing the politics. He's playing the media, he's playing the economic card and he's
manoeuvring.

"He understands the way western democracies work. Europe had two devastating wars in the 20th
Century [and] nobody wants another one. He's learned that because Western democracies don't want
to use force that he can get away with it."

And with shrinking defence budgets, and war-weary populations Gen Clark says politicians need to
work harder to get the public onside.

"It's the political leadership in member-states who have to help shape public opinion, and they have to
see the situation clearly and call it as it is, not run from it. So Western leaders can't be so shy that
they're intimidated by the bluster of a Vladimir Putin."

Others say Western leaders are being justifiably cautious.

How do you decide what constitutes an attack when the nature of warfare has changed: no longer
state on state warfare, but little green men - Russian special forces in unmarked military uniform -
crossing the border, and supporting separatists?

"The little green men are no different than the ploy that Hitler used to start World War II's attack
against Poland where he dressed up German soldiers in Polish uniforms and had them attack a
German radio station and kill a bunch of people, and claimed that was a provocation and used it for
an attack.

"So there have always been tricks and ruses. These little green men are nothing more than Russian
Special Forces people and the evidence is right in front of your face but we couldn't bring ourselves to
admit it because we didn't want to admit the implications of direct Russian aggression."

'Russian aggression is a wake-up call': former Nato Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Anders Fogh Rasmussen's first speech as Nato secretary-general in September 2009 focussed on
the importance of the Alliance's relationship with Russia. But when he left Nato in October after five
years at the helm, his great dream for a new partnership with Russia was unrealised.

"On a personal basis I am indeed very disappointed. I think we had... a generational obligation to
include Russia in a constructive partnership.
 Image copyrightGETTY IMAGESImage captionAnders Fogh Rasmussen:
Nato Secretary General 2009 - 2014

"The crash of communism and the Soviet Union offered a new opportunity for Europeans to realise
the dream of a Europe whole, free and at peace, so I think we did the right thing to try and include
Russia in this vision. However, Russia didn't share that vision.

"I think we are now entering a new era that could be very much similar to the Cold War.

He says that the Baltic states are right to be worried about Russia's ambitions:

"Our Baltic friends and allies are concerned about the Russian behaviour, not least because one of
the Russian doctrines is that Russia preserves the right to intervene in other countries, to protect
what they consider the interests of Russian-speaking communities in other countries.

"And as we all know, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, we have significant Russian speaking
minorities."

And he argues Russia's provocations aren't just aimed at the Baltic states: they're also targeting Nato
itself.

"Russia is constantly testing Nato resolve. We have seen a number of attempts to violate Nato
airspace. We have seen very unfortunate incidents, for instance the capture of an Estonian military
officer, the detention of a Lithuanian vessel, just to mention a couple of examples.

"We are now faced with this new hybrid warfare... so we have to adapt to improve our capability to
address [it]."

Does Russia's use of hybrid warfare make it harder, then, for Nato to decide what constitutes an
attack on a member state?

"Yes it makes it more difficult, and that's also I think the single most important purpose of this Russian
hybrid warfare to try to circumvent the activation of Nato's Article 5. But we are prepared for that and
they won't succeed.

So how do you then define when an attack has happened which breaches Article 5?
"We never answer that question, because it is part of our deterrence that a potential aggressor never
knows how and when an activation of Article 5 will be triggered."

But he says there's something else that Nato needs to make more obvious - and that's its resolve to
respond once Article 5 has been triggered.

"We need to make it clearer. We have learned lessons from the Russian attack on Ukraine, we have
seen that the Russians can act very fast. The single most important thing is to increase Nato
presence in the east, and strengthen our collective defence so that the Russians know that if they
were to attack a Nato ally they would cross a red line and they would meet not only troops from that
specific country but from all Nato allies.

"The Russian aggression against Ukraine is a wake up call for everybody and Nato must adapt to that
new situation."

The Inquiry is broadcast on the BBC World Service, Tuesdays from 13:05 GMT. Listen online or
download the podcast.

CORRECTION, 19 Feb 15: An earlier version of this piece referred incorrectly to "applicant" nations -
that has now been corrected to read: "Aspirant nations: Georgia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro".

SOURCE: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31503859

THE POLITICS OF 2% (PDF) SOURCE: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/09/02/politics-of-2-percent-

nato-and-security-vacuum-in-europe-pub-61139

The world's most powerful military alliance just added a new member
Alex Lockie
May 19, 2016, 12:14 PM

(L to R) Minister of Defense of Montenegro Milica

Pejanovic and Foreign Minister of Montenegro Igor Luksic and NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg take part in a Foreign Affairs meeting at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on
December 2, 2015.REUTERS/John Thys/Pool
NATO has officially invited the Balkan nation of Montenegro to join the alliance, the Associated Press
reports.
The agreement will be the first step toward making Montenegro the 29th member of NATO, and it
marks only the seventh time in history NATO has sought to expand.
"It is an historic day for the alliance, for Montenegro and for the stability of the Western Balkans,"
Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels, the AFP notes.
"The enlargement of NATO with Montenegro confirms that NATO's door is open."
Montenegro's membership still hast to be ratified by all 28 other member states, as well as the US
Senate, but until then it will be a party to NATO meetings, like July's coming Warsaw summit, as an
observer.
Montenegro would be the third Balkan state in NATO, joining Croatia and Romania.
"I expect we will soon see 29 allied flags flying outside the NATO headquarters," Stoltenberg said.
NATO's expansion comes after Russia illegally annexed Crimea and used a form of hybrid warfare to
destabilize Ukraine by backing anti-Western rebels.
Russia has repeatedly threatened military actions to counter the buildup of NATO, but top NATO
officials say that Russia will have absolutely no say in Montenegro's decision.
"The fundamental principle is that every nation has the right to decide its own path ... including to
decide what security arrangements it wants to be part of," Slotenberg said.

NATO
"Any sanctions or reactions from Russia will be absolutely unjustified, because it's about respecting
the sovereign decision of a sovereign nation, Montenegro, to decide on its own path and that should
be respected by everyone," Stoltenberg continued.
Additionally, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine have expressed interest in joining NATO.
SOURCE: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worlds-most-powerful-military-alliance-just-reached-its-
arm-out-to-another-nation-2016-5

NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?

Ivo H. Daalder Thursday, April 1, 1999

As the nineteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contemplate the future of
the Alliance in the next century, they are confronted with a notable paradox. Following initial doubts
and debate in the years following the cold wars demise, it is now widely agreed that NATO is the
premier security organization in Europe. In contrast to the European Union (EU), the Organization for
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and even the United Nations (UN), the Atlantic Alliance is
viewed by members and non-members alike as Europes go-to organization in those cases where
the threat or use of force is deemed appropriate in and around Europe. NATO attained this status by
outperforming the other organizations in bringing peace, albeit belatedly, to the Balkansfirst in
Bosnia and later in Kosovo. It also proved to be more adept at meeting the needs and aspiration of
central and eastern European countries yearning to become a recognized part of the west. While the
EU concentrated on expanding its membership by initially incorporating rich, formerly neutral
European countries, NATO opened its doors to the east, inviting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland to join while affirming that membership would remain open to all qualified European countries.
Get daily updates from Brookings
Notwithstanding NATOs leading status today, the fundamental purpose of the Atlantic Alliance in the
post-cold war world remains essentially contested. Its membersold and new alikehave yet to fully
agree on what a military organization born and raised in response to an overwhelming military threat
emanating from the Soviet Union ought to do now that this threat has disappeared. Should its primary
purpose remain to defend the territory of its members against direct attack, which, though less likely,
remains a possibility in an uncertain and unstable world? Alternatively, should the Alliance aim to
extend security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, accepting new members that meet
the basic standards of market democracy, the rule of law, and a commitment to resolve internal and
external disputes by peaceful means? Or should NATO extend its reach both geographically and
functionally, defending not just the common territory but also the common interests of the Alliance
members wherever these might be threatened? Depending on how NATOs members answer these
fundamental questions about the Alliances purpose, specific policy decision relating to its new
strategic concept, its command and force structure arrangements, and the extent of its future
enlargement will necessarily differ.
SOURCE: https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-in-the-21st-century-what-purpose-what-missions/

NATOs purpose
Last updated: 13 Oct. 2015 15:46

NATOs essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members
by political and military means. Collective defence is at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of
solidarity and cohesion among its members.

NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty,
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Since the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond the
borders of NATO member countries can jeopardize this objective, the Alliance also contributes to
peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships. Essentially, NATO not
only helps to defend the territory of its members, but engages where possible and when necessary to
project its values further afield, prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and
support reconstruction.

NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is tied to the
security of Europe. It is an intergovernmental organization which provides a forum where members
can consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and
military matters affecting their security. No single member country is forced to rely soley on its
national capabilities to meet its essential national security objectives. The resulting sense of shared
security among members contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATOs fundamental security tasks are laid down in the Washington Treaty. They are sufficiently
general to withstand the test of time and are translated into more detail in strategic concepts.
Strategic concepts are the authoritative statement of the Alliances objectives and provide the highest
level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these goals; they remain
the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a whole.

During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the protection of its members from
potential threats emanating from the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with
the rise of non-state actors affecting international security, many new security threats emerged. NATO
now focuses on countering these threats by utilizing collective defence, managing crisis situations
and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

SOURCE: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm

Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon
19 Nov. 2010 -
Last updated: 23 May. 2012 16:16

Preface
We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will
continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This
Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATOs evolution, so that it continues to be effective in
a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including
against new threats to the safety of our citizens.

It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations,
including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United
Nations and the European Union.

It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a
substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons
but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a
nuclear Alliance.

It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies
that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a
Europe whole, free and at peace.
 It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance,
so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.
The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces
where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners
around the globe. While the world is changing, NATOs essential mission will remain the same: to
ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared
values.

Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATOs fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its
members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of
stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of
individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed
to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington
Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO
since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as
important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of
NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it
together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the
security of NATOs territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must
and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to
safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

1. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in
accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and
binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against
emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual
Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

2. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military
capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises before, during and after conflicts.
NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help
manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they
escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and
to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-
Atlantic security.

3. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security
developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance
international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international
organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and
 disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all
European democracies that meet NATOs standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that
affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to
the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common
approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible,
Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO
territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic
integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the
world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with
consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict.
This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the
Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means
of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the
next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the worlds most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to
international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and
in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat
and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear,
chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by
fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms,
narcotics and people.

12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage
that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also
transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold
that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries
and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be
the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on
which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater
international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO
countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on
foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of
world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed
to disruption.
 14. A number of significant technology-related trends including the development of laser
weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space appear poised to
have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water
scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in
areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and
operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our
populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does
not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATOs resolve if
the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a
core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons
might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces
of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces
of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the
overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend
against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

o maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;

o maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller
operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;

o develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out
both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliances expeditionary operations, including
with the NATO Response Force;

o carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information
exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging
security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all
Allies;

o ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on

nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and
consultation arrangements;

o develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile
attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible
security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with
Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
 o further develop NATOs capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;

o develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-
attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate
national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber
protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with
member nations;

o enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including
through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the
development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to
fight terrorism themselves;

o develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical

energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and
consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency
planning;

o ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging
technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;

o sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are
sufficiently resourced;

o continue to review NATOs overall posture in deterring and defending against the full
range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international
security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATOs borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance
territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to
prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western
Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is
necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other
international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis,
planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and
effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually
monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate,
take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage
ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the
unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led
operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to
international conflict management efforts.
 24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued
support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to
contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever
possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:

o enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur,
and how they can best be prevented;

o further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including
counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;

o form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more
effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led
operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian
activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other
actors;

o enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,

o develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local
authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international
assistance;

o identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid
deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military
personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;

o broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both
on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished
security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control
and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass
destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:

o We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world
without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of
undiminished security for all.

o With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have
dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our
reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for
further reductions in the future.
 o In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase
transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from
the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity
with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

o We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability,

transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability.
We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis
of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.

o We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to
international efforts to fight proliferation.

o National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the
security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as
necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.
Open Door

27. NATOs enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of
further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe
more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be
best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-
Atlantic structures.

o The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which
share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the
responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to
common security and stability.
Partnerships

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner
relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a
concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATOs fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing
international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATOs
operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships
will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners
together across and beyond existing frameworks:

o We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations
and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful
international relations.

o We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common
concern.

o We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions
on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
 o We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial
contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political
dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed
in 2008, including through:

o enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;

o more regular political consultation; and

o enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are

engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic
area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations
share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values.
NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We
welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for
strengthening the EUs capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies
make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO
and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and
should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace
and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable
circumstances through which we will:

o fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual
openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and
institutional integrity of both organisations;

o enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from
coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;

o broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to
share assessments and perspectives;

o cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise

cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common

space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we
want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act
accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the
NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of
democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in
the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced
that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive
partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our
security. We are determined to:
 o enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of
shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics,
counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;

o use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with
Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of
Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and
cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop
the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and
stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:

o enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council;

o continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-
Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the
Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or
aspiration of each of the countries;

o facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure
lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good
neighbourly relations;

o deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be
open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;

o develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to
welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together
in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military
command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford
individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources financial, military and human to carry out its
missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those
resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:

o maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the
field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATOs usability targets;

o ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary

duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;

o develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a

manifestation of solidarity;
 o preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding
that bind us together;

o engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working

methods and maximise efficiency.
An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it
is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed
to preserve its effectiveness as the globes most successful political-military Alliance. Our
Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual
liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and
enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and
objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity,
solidarity, strength and resolve.

SOURCE: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm

NATOs capabilities

Last updated: 02 Sep. 2016 10:28

NATO constantly reviews and transforms its policies, capabilities and structures to ensure that it can
continue to address current and future challenges to the freedom and security of its members.
Presently, Allied forces are required to carry out a wide range of missions across several continents;
the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable, and capable of
sustained operations.

Highlights

NATOs modern defence posture is based on an effective combination of cutting-edge

capabilities and forces trained to work together seamlessly.
 The 2010 Strategic Concept identifies collective defence, crisis management and cooperative
security as the essential core tasks that NATO must continue to fulfil to assure the security of its
members. In the Strategic Concept, deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear,
conventional and ballistic missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of NATOs overall
strategy.

Allies agreed to develop and maintain the capabilities needed to carry out all associated
missions, where appropriate using multinational approaches and innovative solutions.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allied leaders confirmed that the NATO Defence Planning
Process would continue to be the primary means to identify and prioritise required capabilities and
to promote their development and acquisition,

At the 2014 Wales Summit, at a time of continuing difficult global financial conditions, Allies
agreed to further enhance their ability to meet these commitments and introduce a range of
measures to respond to the new and emerging geo-strategic security environment.

At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allied leaders confirmed their commitment to delivering heavier
and more high-end forces and capabilities, as well as more forces at higher readiness.
Meeting immediate and long-term challenges
The Allies provided political guidance in 2015 to refine further the overarching aims and objectives of
the 2010 Strategic Concept by establishing what they expect the Alliance to be able to do in broad
quantitative and qualitative terms, especially in the prevailing geo-strategic security environment. By
setting the related priorities, this guidance mandates the delivery of the required capabilities through
the NATO Defence Planning Process.

The NATO Defence Planning Process

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) aims to harmonise national and Alliance defence
planning activities; it details how the aims and objectives of the Alliance as set out in the political
guidance are to be met. By setting targets for implementation by Allies, either individually or together,
it guides both national and collective capability development.

In the course of planning and carrying out operations, operational commands may identify capabilities
that are required immediately. These urgent operational requirements are not dealt with through the
NDPP, but are fast-tracked through the Military Committee and relevant budget committees, and
finally submitted for consideration by the North Atlantic Council, NATOs principal political decision-
making body.

More information

Current objectives
With the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept, Alliance leaders committed to ensuring that NATO
has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and
security of Allies populations. Therefore the Alliance will:

o maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;

 o maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller
operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;

o develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out
both its Article 5 responsibilities and expeditionary operations, including with the NATO
Response Force;

o carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information
exchange for assuring its defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security
challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;

o ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on

nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation
arrangements;

o develop the capability to defend NATO European populations , territories and forces
against ballistic missile attack as a core element of its collective defence, which contributes to
the indivisible security of the Alliance;

o further develop its capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons;

o further develop further its ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from
cyber attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate
national cyber defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralised cyber
protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member
countries;

o enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including
through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with partners, and the
development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train partner forces to fight
terrorism themselves;

o develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical

energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations
among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;

o ensure that it is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging
technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;

o continue to review its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of
threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security
environment.
Prioritising capabilities
Given the evolving geo-strategic environment, Alliance leaders are continuously assessing and
reviewing the capabilities needed to conduct the full range of NATO missions.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Alliance leaders made a pledge to improve the NATOs planning
processes and specific capabilities in pursuit of the NATO Forces 2020 goal. The vision for NATO
forces in 2020 and beyond is one of modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised
and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. New
initiatives were introduced to aid the realisation of this goal, including the delivery of required
capabilities using the multinational approaches of Smart Defence and the use of the Connected
Forces Initiative to ensure that the Alliance remains well prepared to undertake the full range of its
missions and address future challenges.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Alliance leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to
collective defence and to ensuring security and assurance for all Allies; they agreed a coherent and
comprehensive package of measures the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to meet the need for
assurance and to adapt the Alliances military strategic posture to respond to changes in the geo-
strategic security environment. They also pledged to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets.

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, Alliance leaders committed to continuing to deliver on key
capabilities, including Ballistic Missile Defence, Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance,
and Alliance Ground Surveillance. They also recognised cyberspace as a new operational domain, in
addition to land, air and sea, to enable better protection of our networks, missions and operations.
Allies pledged to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructure,
and committed to boosting their resilience to improve civil preparedness.

Smart Defence

In light of growing military requirements, developing capabilities becomes more complex and
therefore in many cases more expensive. As a result, multinational cooperation offers a viable
solution to deliver critical capabilities in a cost-effective manner. For certain high-end key capabilities
Allies may in fact only be able to obtain them if they work together to develop and acquire them.
Smart Defence is NATOs approach for bringing multinational cooperation to the forefront of Allies
capability delivery efforts.

Developing greater European military capabilities through multinational cooperation will continue to
strengthen the transatlantic link, enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of
the burdens, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, NATO works
closely with the European Union, utilising agreed mechanisms, to ensure that Smart Defence and the
EU's Pooling and Sharing initiative are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Concurrently, Smart
Defence also contributes toward maintaining a strong defence industry in Europe by making the
fullest possible use of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance. Moving forward NATO will
continue to support Allies in their endeavour to exploit the full potential multinational capability
delivery offers.

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Connected Forces Initiative

The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) is essential to ensure that the Alliance remains well prepared to
undertake the full range of its missions, as well as to address future challenges wherever they may
arise. The implementation of CFI is one of the key means to deliver NATO Forces 2020 and to
enable the training and exercise elements of the RAP.

More information
Framework Nations Concept

NATO defence ministers agreed a Framework Nations Concept in June 2014, which sees groups of
countries coming together for two purposes. Firstly, to maintain current capabilities and to act as a
foundation for the coherent development of new capabilities in the medium to long term. This builds
on the notions of multinational development of capabilities that are at the heart of Smart Defence and
the ideas associated with groups of countries coming together to produce them. Secondly, as a
mechanism for collective training and exercises in order to prepare groupings of forces. For example,
those Allies that maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities provide a framework for other Allies to
plug into.

Countering improvised explosive devices

As seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have proven to be the
weapon of choice for non-conventional adversarial forces. NATO must be prepared to counter IEDs in
any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a
paramount priority. Institutionalising counter-IED lessons learned across the last two decades of
operations, NATOs ambitious Counter-IED Action Plan has increased its focus on capabilities for
attacking threat networks behind these destructive devices. Although developed in the counter-IED
context, such capabilities can also contribute to counter-piracy, counter-proliferation and counter-
terrorism operations.

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Improving air- and sealift capabilities

Air- and sealift capabilities are a key enabler for operations and allow forces and equipment to be
deployed quickly to wherever they are needed. While there is significant procurement nationally,
many Allies have pooled resources, including with partner countries, to acquire new capacities
through commercial arrangements or through purchase, to give them access to additional transport to
swiftly move troops, equipment and supplies across the globe.

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Collective logistics contracts

To improve effectiveness, NATO is examining procedures for the development and administration of
rapidly usable contracts, including for medical support, for repayment by countries when used. More
broadly, collective logistics is being implemented during redeployment from theatres of operation,
such as Kosovo or Afghanistan, to optimise the use of multinational capabilities. In June 2015,
Exercise Capable Logistician brought together a large number of logisticians from member and
partner countries to work on improving interoperability.

Missile defence

In the context of a broader response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems, NATO has been pursuing an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
Programme since 2005. This Programme aims to protect deployed Allied forces against ballistic
missile threats with ranges up to 3,000 kilometres. In 2010, it delivered an interim capability to protect
troops in a specific area against short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders decided to expand this Programme to include protection of
NATO European populations and territories, and at the same time invited Russia to cooperate on
missile defence and to share in its benefits. The dialogue with Russia on missile defence cooperation
is currently suspended.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allies declared an Interim NATO ballistic missile defence (BMD)
capability as an initial step to establish NATO's missile defence system, which will protect all NATO
European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of
ballistic missiles.

At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allies declared Initial Operational Capability of NATO BMD, which offers
a stronger capability to defend Alliance populations, territory, and forces across southern NATO
Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack.

More information

Cyber defence

Cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated, and damaging. The Alliance is
faced with an evolving, complex threat environment. State and non-state actors can use cyber attacks
in the context of military operations. In recent events, cyber attacks have been part of hybrid warfare.

NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliances core tasks of
collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

NATO needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication
of the cyber threats and attacks it faces.

Allies reaffirmed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit NATOs defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace
as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land
and at sea.

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Stabilisation and reconstruction

The Alliances experience with crisis-response operations has shown the importance of stabilisation
and reconstruction activities undertaken in fragile states or in conflict or post-conflict situations to
promote security, development and good governance in key sectors. The primary responsibilities for
such activities normally lie with other actors, but the Alliance has established political guidelines that
will help to improve its involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. It will be important in
this context for the Alliance to seek, in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan,
unity of effort with the other members of the international community, in particular its strategic
partners, the United Nations and the European Union.
 To this end, NATO must have the ability to plan for, employ, and coordinate civilian as well as military
crisis-management capabilities that countries provide for agreed Allied missions. NATOs defence
planning therefore also includes non-military capabilities and expertise to complement the military
support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts. These non-military capabilities are
sought from existing and planned means in national inventories of those countries that are willing to
make them available.

Critical long-term enabling capabilities

Information superiority is a key enabling element in the battlespace and helps commanders at every
level make the best decisions, creating the circumstances for success at less risk and greater speed.
NATO will therefore continue to develop and acquire a range of networked information systems
(Automated Information Systems) that support the two Strategic Commands. They cover a number of
domains, including land, air, maritime, intelligence, logistics and the common operating picture, with a
view to enabling more informed and effective holistic oversight, decision-making and command and
control.

Federated Mission Networking

The Afghanistan Mission Network is a single federated network, which improves information-sharing
by easing the information flow and creating better situational awareness among countries contributing
to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan. This is seen as the model for future multinational networking.

Taking into consideration best practices and lessons learned from its implementation, a Federated
Mission Networking framework is now being developed, which will underpin the Alliances ability to
connect its information systems and operate effectively together, including with partners, on training,
exercises and operations.

More information

Air Command and Control

NATO is implementing a fully interoperable Air Command and Control System (ACCS), which will
provide for the first time a fully integrated set of tools to support the conduct of all air operations in
both real-time and non-real-time environments. ACCS will make available the capability to plan,
direct, task, coordinate, supervise, assess and report on the operation of all allocated air assets in
peace, crisis and conflict.

The system is composed of both static and deployable elements with equipment that will be used
both within the NATO Command Structure and in individual Allies. With the further inclusion of
command and control functionality for ballistic missile defence, a fully integrated system for air and
missile defence at the tactical level will be fielded.

More information

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

NATO needs a Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capability to support the
coordinated collection, processing, and sharing within NATO of ISR material gathered by the future
Alliance Ground Surveillance system, the current NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
 (NAEW&C Force) and Allies own ISR assets. In early 2016, NATO defence ministers declared an
initial operational JISR capability centred on enhancing the situational awareness of NATOs highest
readiness forces. An enduring JISR capability is now being developed in a phased approach; ongoing
work will further improve on and build synergy in the management of Allies diverse inputs and
capabilities for NATOs 360 degree situational awareness. This capability will become operational in
2017 and will be complemented in some cases by Allies contributions in kind.

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Alliance Ground Surveillance

The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is a key element of transformation and an essential
enabling capability for forces across the full spectrum of NATOs current and future operations and
missions. AGS will be an airborne, stand-off ground surveillance system that can detect and track
vehicles, such as tanks, trucks or helicopters, moving on or near the ground, in all weather conditions.
The AGS airborne vehicle acquisition contract was signed during the 2012 Chicago Summit;
production of the first AGS aircraft began in December 2013 and its first flight was successfully
conducted in December 2015.

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NATO Airborne Warning & Control System

As one of the most visible and tangible examples of what cooperation between Allies can achieve, the
NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) provides NATO-owned and operated airborne
command and control, air and maritime surveillance, and battlespace management capability.
AWACS has continuously proven itself a critical asset over Libya and Afghanistan, and most recently
safeguarding the Alliances eastern perimeter.

More information

Other initiatives
NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land,
air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly
to wherever it is needed. It has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military
response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response
operations. In light of the changing security environment to the east and south of the Alliances
borders and following up on initiatives taken at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014
defence ministers decided on 5 February 2015 to enhance the NRF by creating a spearhead force
within it. Known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), it is able to begin deployment
at very short notice, particularly on the periphery of NATOs territory.

More information

Aviation modernisation programmes

The Alliance will continue to develop its capabilities in the field of air traffic management (ATM) and
engage in civil aviation modernisation plans in Europe (Single European Sky ATM Research) and
North America (NextGen). The aim is threefold, namely to ensure safe access to airspace, effective
delivery of services and civil-military interoperability, in order to safeguard military mission
effectiveness at global level and the ability to conduct the full range of NATO operations, including the
airspace integration of unmanned aircraft systems.

Energy security

Allies recognise that a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and
energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance. While
these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international
organisations concerned, NATO contributes to energy security in various ways. NATO raises strategic
awareness through political discussions and intelligence-sharing, further develops its competence to
contribute to the protection of critical energy infrastructure, improves the energy efficiency of military
forces, enhances its training and education efforts, and engages with partner countries and other
international organisations.

More information

Reforming NATOs structures

The Alliances military command structure is being transformed into a leaner, more effective and
affordable structure. Agencies reform aims to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of
capabilities and services, to achieve greater synergies between similar functions and to increase
transparency and accountability. In line with the 2010 Strategic Concept, over the last few years the
Alliance has been engaged in a process of continual reform by streamlining structures, improving
working methods and maximising efficiency.

The new structure reached initial operational capability in December 2013, opening the way to an
entity that is more agile, flexible and better able to deploy on operations, including Article 5
contingencies.

A major reform of NATOs agencies was conducted with a view to consolidating and rationalising
various services and programmes and ensuring more effective and efficient service and capability
delivery.

NATO Headquarters has also been reformed, including with regard to a smaller but more efficient
International Staff, intelligence-sharing and production, and a significant reduction in the number of
committees. Furthermore, the transition to the new NATO headquarters will enable further
improvements to efficiency and effectiveness of the Alliance.

Resource reform in the area of programming, transparency, accountability and information

management has also helped make NATO resource and financial management more efficient.

At the Wales Summit, further work was tasked in the areas of delivery of common-funded capabilities,
reform governance and financial transparency and accountability.

More information
Maritime security

Alliance maritime capabilities have an enduring value and an important cross-cutting contribution to
Alliance security. In January 2011, NATO adopted the Alliance Maritime Strategy. Consistent with the
2010 Strategic Concept, the Strategy sets out ways in which NATO's unique maritime power can be
used to address critical security challenges. It sets out the four areas in which maritime forces play a
key role: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime
security. In the current security context, the Alliances naval forces provide essential contributions to
assurance measures and situational awareness.

The Alliance continues to implement its maritime strategy through capability development, an
extensive programme of maritime exercises and training, and the enhancement of cooperation
between NATO and its partners, as well as other international actors, including the European Union.
NATOs activity in the Aegean Sea and NATOs maritime presence in the Mediterranean more
generally through Operation Active Endeavour (which will soon transition to a broader non-Article 5
Maritime Security Operation) are examples of how NATO's naval forces contribute to helping address
numerous security challenges.

SOURCE: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49137.htm

Examples of NATO's accomplishments in recent years

BY JAMES STAVRIDIS, ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS

From James Stavridis, Allied Command Operations: A few of the accomplishments of this great
Alliance while I was lucky enough to be on the team:

Afghanistan - Our top mission, with well over 100,000 troops throughout the four years. Watch the
movie; don't just look at the snap shots. Afghan Security Forces are nearly fully in the lead - 90% of
Afghans are now protected by their own security forces as opposed to virtually none four years ago.
Improvement across the spectrum of activity: Education (8 million children in school, 4 million girls),
Connectivity (16 million cell phones), Health Care (65% now have access), Economy (8% growth
annually and the promise of $2 Trillion in strategic minerals). Responsibility in Afghan hands (350,000
security forces trained by the coalition) but partners across the globe standing strong and committed
to support. Afghanistan is now connected to the strength of the Alliance and partners around the
world.

Libya: Fastest deployment in the history of NATO. Incredible teamwork in the service of the people
of Libya at the specific request of the United Nations Security Council. Evidence of the positive and
powerful reach of NATO.

Balkans and Kosovo - Kept the peace in our mission to help maintain a "safe and secure
environment" and "freedom of movement;" and made the space for the political process to work.
Agreement now signed. Future looks more promising than ever as governments pursue EU
membership. We've come an amazing distance from the disasters and horrors of the previous
decade.
 Piracy off the coast of Africa - Strong success. Down more than 35% in past 5 years, down 75%
since 2011. Opening the passages, making the global commons safer, underpinning economic growth
that leads to greater security for all. Strengthening the connections of global trade.

NATO Bureaucracy / Command Structure Reduction - Economies/Efficiencies. From 11 major

Headquarters to only 6. Streamlining, in stride with business world. More agile, more effective.
Responsive to economic realities, leveraging technology for efficiency. Clean alignment - Land, Sea
or in the Air responsibility is clear. Connected internally and externally for better situation awareness
and agility.

Excerpts from "At Voyage's End, Some Final Thoughts..." by Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe; Commander, US European Command. (photo: HNLMS Rotterdam)

SOURCE: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/examples-of-natos-accomplishments-in-
recent-years

Operations and missions: past and present

Last updated: 21 Dec. 2016 14:13

English
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Russian
Ukrainian
NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. It
promotes democratic values and is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, if
diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis management operations,
alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organisations.
 Highlights

NATO is a crisis management organisation that has the capacity to undertake a wide range of
military operations and missions.

Approximately 18,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world,
managing often complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment.

Currently, NATO is operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Mediterranean.

NATO is also supporting the African Union and conducting air policing missions on the request
of its Allies. Furthermore, NATO is assisting with the response to the refugee and migrant crisis in
Europe and has Patriot missiles and AWACS aircraft deployed in Turkey. It also carries out disaster
relief operations and missions to protect populations against natural, technological or humanitarian
disasters.

The tempo and diversity of operations and missions in which NATO is involved have increased
since the early 1990s.
Current operations and missions
NATO in Afghanistan

NATO is currently leading Resolute Support, a non-combat mission which provides training, advice
and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. Resolute Support was launched on 1
January 2015. It includes approximately 13,000 personnel from both NATO and partner countries and
operates with one hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif (northern Afghanistan),
Herat (western Afghanistan), Kandahar (southern Afghanistan) and Laghman (eastern Afghanistan).

Key functions include: supporting planning, programming and budgeting; assuring transparency,
accountability and oversight; supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good
governance; supporting the establishment and sustainment of processes such as force generation,
recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel.

The legal basis of the Resolute Support Mission rests on a formal invitation from the Afghan
Government and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and Afghanistan, which
governs the presence of Allied troops. Resolute Support is also supported by the international
community at large. This is reflected in United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2189,
unanimously adopted on 12 December 2014. This resolution welcomes the new Resolute Support
Mission and underscores the importance of continued international support for the stability of
Afghanistan.

Resolute Support is a follow-on mission to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF
was under NATO leadership from August 2003 to December 2014. It was established under a request
for assistance by the Afghan authorities and by a UN mandate in 2001 to prevent Afghanistan from
once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. In addition, ISAF was tasked to develop new Afghan
security forces and enable Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country in order
to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the
establishment of the rule of law.
The mission in Afghanistan constitutes the Alliances most significant operational commitment to date.
Moreover, beyond Resolute Support and ISAF, Allies and partners countries are committed to the
broader international communitys support for the long-term financial sustainment of the Afghan
security forces. NATO leaders have also reaffirmed their commitment to an enduring partnership
between NATO and Afghanistan, by strengthening political consultations and practical cooperation
within the framework of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed in 2010.

NATO in Kosovo

While Afghanistan remains NATOs primary operational theatre, the Alliance has not faltered on its
other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, approximately 4,500 Allied and partner troops
operate in Kosovo as part of NATOs Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian
disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory.

Following Kosovos declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue to
maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It has since helped to
create a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force, which is a lightly armed force
responsible for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police. Meanwhile, progress has been
achieved in the European Union-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The
normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is key to solving the political deadlock over
northern Kosovo.

Securing the Mediterranean Sea

NATO operations are not limited only to zones of conflict. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
NATO immediately began to take measures to expand the options available to counter the threat of
international terrorism. In October 2001, it launched the maritime surveillance Operation Active
Endeavour, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. The operation
was terminated in October 2016 and was succeeded by Sea Guardian, a flexible maritime operation
able to perform the full range of maritime security operations tasks.

Sea Guardian is currently performing three tasks in the Mediterranean Sea: maritime situational
awareness, counter-terrorism at sea and support to capacity-building. If decided by Allies, it could
also perform other tasks such as upholding freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction tasks and
protecting critical infrastructure. More generally speaking, it is helping to maintain a secure and safe
maritime environment while supporting the Alliances three core tasks: collective defence, crisis
management and cooperative security.

Supporting the African Union

Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its
peacekeeping missions on the African continent.

Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift
support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed
to extend its support on several occasions and continues to do so. NATO is also providing capacity-
building support, as well as expert training support to the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AUs
 request. The ASF is intended to be deployed in Africa in times of crisis and is part of the AUs efforts
to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. ASF represents the AUs vision for a continental, on-
call security apparatus with some similarities to the NATO Response Force.

Air policing

Since Russias illegal military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been taking extra
reassurance measures for its Allies. Among these is the boosting of NATOs air policing missions.

Air policing missions are collective peacetime missions that enable NATO to detect, track and identify
all violations and infringements of its airspace and to take appropriate action. Allied fighter jets patrol
the airspace of Allies who do not have fighter jets of their own. NATO has deployed additional aircraft
to reinforce missions over Albania and Slovenia, as well as the Baltic region where NATO F-16s have
intercepted Russian aircraft repeatedly violating Allied airspace.

This air policing capability is one of three NATO standing forces on active duty that contribute to the
Alliances collective defence efforts on a permanent basis. They also include NATOs standing
maritime forces, which are ready to act when called upon, as well as an integrated air defence system
to protect against air attacks, which also comprises the Alliances ballistic missile defence system.

Terminated operations and missions

Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa

Responding to a request from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided
escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the
Gulf of Aden, where growing piracy threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in
Africa. The NATO-led Operation Allied Provider was conducted from October to December 2008 and
involved counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia.

Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union (AU), these same NATO naval
forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundi contingent deployed
to the AU Mission in Somalia.

From March to August 2009, NATO ran Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy operation, to
improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation off the Horn of Africa.
The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to deter and suppress piracy and
armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of communication and economic interests.

Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO, Operation Ocean Shield

focused on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by
the North Atlantic Council, this operation contributed to international efforts to combat piracy in the
area. It also offered, to regional states that requested it, assistance in developing their own capacity
to combat piracy activities. There were no successful piracy attacks from May 2012 onwards, but
even though Somalia-based piracy was suppressed, it had not been eliminated. During the periods
without surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft continued to fly sorties, and links to situational
awareness systems and counter-piracy partners remained in place. In this effort, the NATO Shipping
Centre played a key role. Ocean Shield was terminated on 15 December 2016 after having achieved
its objectives.
Operation Active Endeavour

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was initiated in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. It helped to
secure one of the busiest trade routes in the world and was among eight initiatives launched by the
Alliance in 2001, in solidarity with the United States. It was an Article 5 operation, i.e., a collective
defence operation that, initially only involved NATO member countries until it started accepting non-
NATO countries participation in 2004.

OAE hailed merchant vessels and boarded suspect ships, intervened to rescue civilians on stricken
oil rigs and sinking ships and, generally, helped to improve perceptions of security. NATO ships also
systematically carried out preparatory route surveys in choke points, as well as in important
passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

2010 was a turning point for OAE, when it shifted from a platform-based to a network-based
operation, using a combination of on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces. In
addition to tracking and controlling suspect vessels, it helped to build a picture of maritime activity in
the Mediterranean by conducting routine information approaches to various vessels.

Active Endeavour was succeeded by Sea Guardian in October 2016.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

Established under the request of the Afghan authorities and a UN mandate in 2001, the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was led by NATO from August 2003 to December 2014.

Its mission was to develop new Afghan security forces and enable Afghan authorities to provide
effective security across the country in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of
democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law, with the aim to prevent Afghanistan
from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

ISAF also contributed to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. This was done primarily
through multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) led by individual ISAF troop-
contributing countries securing areas in which reconstruction work could be conducted by national
and international actors. PRTs also helped the Afghan authorities progressively strengthen the
institutions required to fully establish good governance and the rule of law, as well as to promote
human rights. The principal role of the PRTs in this respect was to build capacity, support the growth
of governance structures and promote an environment in which governance can improve.

ISAF was one of the largest international crisis management operations ever, bringing together
contributions from up to 51 different countries. By end 2014, the process of transitioning full security
responsibility from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police forces was completed and the ISAF
mission came to a close. On 1 January 2015, a new NATO-led, non-combat mission, Resolute
Support, to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions was launched.

NATO and Iraq

NATO conducted a relatively small but important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to 2011 that
consisted of training, mentoring and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces. At the Istanbul Summit in
June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part of the international effort to
help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The NTM-I delivered its training, advice and mentoring
support in a number of different settings. All NATO member countries contributed to the training effort
either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. In parallel and
reinforcing this initiative, NATO also worked with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation
framework to develop the Alliances long-term relationship with Iraq.

NATO and Libya

Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, in February 2011, the
UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in support of the Libyan people,
condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights. The resolutions introduced active
measures including a no-fly zone, an arms embargo and the authorisation for member countries,
acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to take all necessary measures to protect
Libyan civilians.

Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly zone and then, on 31 March 2011, NATO took over sole command
and control of all military operations for Libya. The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector had three
distinct components:

o the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent
the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya;

o the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian
targets; and

o air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack
Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.
The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011
after having fulfilled its objectives.

Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian
situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. From June 2005 to 31
December 2007, NATO provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel, as well as trained
and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While NATOs support to this mission ended when AMIS was
succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Alliance immediately expressed its
readiness to consider any request for support to the new peacekeeping mission.

Pakistan earthquake relief assistance

Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on 8
October 2005, killing an estimated 53,000 people, injuring 75,000 and making at least four million
homeless. On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO assisted in the urgent relief
effort, airlifting close to 3,500 tons of supplies and deploying engineers, medical units and specialist
equipment. This was one of NATOs largest humanitarian relief initiatives, which came to an end on 1
February 2006.
Over time, the Alliance has helped to coordinate assistance to other countries hit by natural disasters,
including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal. It does this through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre.

Hurricane Katrina

After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the United States on 29 August 2005, causing many
fatalities and widespread damage and flooding, the US government requested food, medical and
logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to stricken areas. On 9 September 2005,
the North Atlantic Council approved a military plan to assist the United States, which consisted of
helping to coordinate the movement of urgently needed material and supporting humanitarian relief
operations. During the operation (9 September-2 October), nine member countries provided 189 tons
of material to the United States.

Protecting public events

In response to a request by the Greek government, NATO provided assistance to the Olympic and
Paralympic Games held in Athens with Operation Distinguished Games from 18 June until 29
September 2004. NATO provided intelligence support, provision of chemical, biological radiological
and nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft. This was the first operation in which
non-Article 4 or 5 NATO assistance was provided within the borders of a member country.

In the same vein, NATO responded to a request made by the Latvian government for assistance in
assuring the security of the Riga Summit in November 2006. NATO provided technical security,
CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive device (IED) detections,
communications and information systems, and medical evacuation support.

The second Gulf Conflict

During the second Gulf Conflict, NATO deployed NATO AWACS radar aircraft and air defence
batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey in an operation called Display Deterrence. This operation
started on 20 February 2003 and lasted until 16 April 2003. The AWACS aircraft flew 100 missions
with a total of 950 flying hours.

NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Responding to a request from the Government in Skopje to help mitigate rising ethnic tension, NATO
implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March 2003.

First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the country.

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors overseeing the
implementation of the peace plan.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory elements to
assist the government in ensuring stability throughout the country.

These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrated the strong inter-
institutional cooperation between NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and
 Co-operation in Europe. NATO remains committed to helping the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, NATO Headquarters Skopje was
created in April 2002 to advise on military aspects of security sector reform; it still operates today.

NATOs first counter-terrorism operation

On 4 October 2001, once it had been determined that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington DC had come from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the
United States. On the request of the United States, the Alliance launched its first-ever counter-
terrorism operation Operation Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002.

It consisted of seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States;
in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that
NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina

With the break-up of Yugoslavia, violent conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. The
Alliance responded as early as summer 1992 when it enforced the UN arms embargo on weapons in
the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the Western European Union from 1993) and enforced a no-fly-
zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during the monitoring of the no-fly-zone that NATO
engaged in the first combat operations in its history by shooting down four Bosnian Serb fighter-
bombers conducting a bombing mission on 28 February 1994.

In August 1995, to compel an end to Serb-led violence in the country, UN peacekeepers requested
NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air forces, but failed
to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UNs demands to withdraw. This led to Operation
Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control installations and ammunition
facilities. This NATO air campaign was a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and
ending the war in Bosnia.

With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, NATO immediately deployed a UN-
mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. This operation (Operation
Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilisation
Force (SFOR).

In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace-support operation to a conclusion
in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation Althea. The
Alliance has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a number of specific tasks
related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures.

From 1949 to the early 1990s

During the Cold War

When NATO was established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to act as a powerful deterrent
against military aggression. In this role, NATOs success was reflected in the fact that, throughout the
entire period of the Cold War, NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement. For
much of the latter half of the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared.
After the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s came great changes to the international security
environment. The Alliance witnessed the emergence of new threats and the resurgence of old but
familiar ones.

With these changing conditions came new responsibilities. From being an exclusively defensive
alliance for nearly half a century, NATO began to assume an increasingly proactive role within the
international community. Before engaging in its first major crisis-response operation in the Balkans,
NATO conducted several other military operations:

Operation Anchor Guard, 10 August 1990 9 March 1991

After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft deployed
to Konya, Turkey, to monitor the crisis and provide coverage of southeastern Turkey in case of an
Iraqi attack during the first Gulf Crisis/War.

Operation Ace Guard, 3 January 1991 8 March 1991

In response to a Turkish request for assistance to meet the threat posed by Iraq during the first Gulf
Crisis/War, NATO deployed the ACE Mobile Force (Air) and air defence packages to Turkey.

Operation Allied Goodwill I & II, 4-9 February & 27 February 24 March 1992
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the collapse of its centrally-
controlled economic system, NATO assisted an international relief effort by flying teams of
humanitarian assistance experts and medical advisors to Russia and other Commonwealth of
Independent States nations using AWACS trainer cargo aircraft.

Operation Agile Genie, 1-19 May 1992

During a period of growing Western tension with Libya after the UN Security Council imposed
sanctions designed to induce Libya to surrender suspects in the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over
the town of Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, NATO provided increased AWACS coverage of the Central
Mediterranean to monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral. NATO AWACS aircraft
flew a total of 36 missions with a total of 2,336 flying hours.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

SOURCE: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm

"10 Years After NATO Expansion: Successes, Challenges, Expectations" Conference

This year we celebrate important anniversaries. Not only 10 years since the Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary joined NATO. But also 60 years since the Alliance was founded and 20 years since the
fall of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, these numbers symbolise how the world is spinning faster.
How quickly our successes become a thing of the past. How quickly new challenges pop up. How
quickly we must again and again reevaluate our expectations. From the standpoint of the global
security balance, more happened in the 10 years after the fall of the Evil Empire, than happened in
the last half century. And in the decade after our joining, this development has continued to speed up.
I have no ambition to appear before you here with an expert lecture. Other security experts are only
now creating, or must create, NATO's new strategy. The words successes, challenges and
expectations appear in the the theme of this conference. I think one word joins all three of these
terms. Liberty. The main success of the Alliance is the defence of liberty. The challenges of the future
lie in the defence of liberty. And without a successful defence of liberty, NATO has no prospects for
the future.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is without a doubt the most successful defence grouping in
history. NATO has succeeded in its main mission, the one it was founded for. It won the Cold War,
which was caused by the launching of iron curtains across the European continent. The result and
confirmation of this success is precisely the membership of former communist countries in the
Alliance.

NATO's success in the Cold War was so clear-cut that some called for its cancellation, because it had
fulfilled its purpose. But in the defence of liberty, the Alliance is not and cannot be a tool for one use.
There was no end of history, either, and it is not ending, liberal democracy is not a definitive victor in
history, and the world is no safer than at the time of the two rival blocs. Maybe it's on the contrary. In
some ways, NATO today is back at the beginning. Its basic mission the defence of liberty remains.
Liberty is the alpha and omega of NATO's existence, the reason for its birth and its guarantee of
survival. But tools and methods leading to this goal are far less certain than they were 60 years ago.

The free world proved to be more powerful economically than the communist evil empire. And of
course, more politically-consolidated and stable as well. The latter must not be forgotten. Even if
NATO is above all a defence alliance, one whose military strength depends directly on economic
potential, it has really always achieved its goals due to the right political decisions. To its citizens, the
free world was worth defending, and what's more, it also attracted inhabitants from the enemy's
countries. In reality, no direct military confrontation of both blocs took place during the Cold War.
Conflicts took place in marginal areas, and despite all the arms races, it was above all a political
rivalry.

Policy is important today as well, when we no longer have one main clearly-defined military threat,
behind which is a unifying ideology with a predictable and, in its way, conservative behaviour. A
simple implication is also no longer valid: The free world equals economic superiority equals military
advantage. We can also not rely on the idea that it's enough to remove the tyrants and people living
in a country which threatened the world will welcome us as liberators and take care of the rest
themselves, as was the case with citizens of the Warsaw Pact states.

These factors will definitely not weaken the importance of the defence of liberty. Of course, it makes
the mission more demanding, more subtle and more multidimensional. The Alliance cannot change
by giving up its founding ideals. It is still true that NATO's military strength depends on economic
potential, and that on the amount of liberty in the Euro-Atlantic grouping. It is also still holds true that
without political stability, without a permanent strong will for the defence of liberty, as united the
Alliance at the time of the Cold War, its military units are only an empty shell, a paper tiger.

The Alliance therefore must not change internally. I am convinced of that. But it must adapt its
presence to a changed global environment. And it is already doing so, even if it is somewhat ad hoc.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, NATO reached beyond its borders as never before in history. In a
situation where de facto only one combat-ready worldwide military force remained, the standard
arguments were heard about why not to take a stand in defence of liberty. Just as in the case of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. After the Cold War, one couldn't say "We won't help you, because we cannot
irritate the Soviet Union." And when someone is the only one who can do something, then they simply
must do it. As Thomas Jefferson said: All tyranny needs to get a foothold is for people of good
conscience to remain silent.

The Alliance has suddenly found itself before a number of conflicts which previously were resolved on
the basis of efforts to maintain the status quo. Today, nothing of the sort exists, and the global
balance and order can be fatally disrupted either by regional powers such as Iran, or by relatively
small and weak, but sufficiently determined entities, such as those of a sub-state character. I am
convinced that from a purely military standpoint, NATO has passed muster in these conflicts and
missions. Even if it has shown that the structure of the Alliance must adapt to the new character of the
threats. And I must thank the Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, for starting these reforms of
NATO for the 21st century. And at the next anniversary summit, under his leadership, he will tell us
more.

In any case, NATO has carried out a mission that corresponds to the definition of a just war. It has
always been about fighting in defence of liberty, winnable in a reasonable amount of time, and carried
out in such a way as to cause less suffering than the suffering it sought to prevent. What is far more
consequential is that the Alliance was not adequately politically prepared for the new types of conflicts
after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Which is not even its fault, as a result of the unpreparedness of the
entire Free World.

The new enemies of liberty cannot simply be scared off by nuclear arsenals, and it is not even
enough to defeat them militarily. The Soviet empire collapsed as a result of an inability to sustain the
arms race. As a result, democratic institutions, which had traditions in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, were renewed. Iraq and Afghanistan represent societies of a different type. After a
military victory, after "hard power, what follows is a need for "soft power" - a far longer and very
difficult stage of building civil institutions.

Yes, it is still about the same goal as 60 years ago: The defence of liberty. But not only about
defending our liberty from an external enemy, but about the positive effort to build a free society in an
area where it has never functioned. This is now not just a military problem. It is not even only a
political problem, but literally philosophical. I am not one of those who argues that liberty and human
rights are a Western invention, one which can easily be forced upon the rest of the world.
Undoubtedly, every human being desires liberty from the time of their birth. But it simply isn't possible
to implement civic law and the structures of civil society within a couple of years somewhere else,
when ours has been formed over centuries and especially not by force.

Solutions to this problem exceed the possibilities of NATO's military structure. Here is where a wide
field opens up for cooperation with the EU, which represents precisely this "soft" civilian power. It has
been confirmed that both Euro-Atlantic institutions are in no way competing, but are on the contrary
complementary the EU represents economic and NATO security cooperation. The EU does not
have the resources to achieve a victory for liberty and the Alliance does not have the resources to
maintain it. It makes no sense to have one without the other, and the future of the Euro-Atlantic space
as a zone of liberty, security and prosperity, as well as peace and stability in the world, depends on
both.

The topic of Afghanistan will be one of the main points of the NATO summit in Strasbourg/Kehl at the
beginning of April. It is key that we succeed in this complicated mission. A civilian loss in Afghanistan
would turn the entire military victory into dust. On the other hand, the country's reconstruction must be
secured by an adequate number of soldiers. I welcome the new American administration's decision to
strengthen the contingent in Afghanistan, and will do everything I can so that the Czech Republic
does its part.

The need for cooperation between NATO and the EU does not just relate to foreign missions, but to
our own civilisation space as well. The new character of threats places us not only before the need to
plan complex military-civilian actions abroad, but also before the need to prevent mass and ruthless
attacks on defenceless and unsuspecting citizens. If at the introduction I said that NATO's basic
mission remains the defence of liberty, but under new terms the fulfilment of this task is a more subtle
concern, then it is precisely here where the most sensitive point lies. The question is: How much may
we ourselves preventively limit citizens' liberty in order to prevent them from a treacherous attack? It
is hard for us to find the answers, but we must not lack good will in this.

In its essence, it is far easier to make a decision on building an anti-missile shield which will protect
our civilians from the threat of attack, but as opposed to air traffic control or an anti-terror legislation, it
in no way limits our liberty. On this issue, NATO has decisively shown its will toward common
defence, a will to not allow the part of the Alliance that is overseas to enjoy a higher level of security
than in Europe. For this reason, in the future I do not expect a more emphatic discussion on the issue
of the radar, and I consider the current one to be a tempest in a teacup. We must constantly and
deeply discuss the battle between civil rights and security, as this topic deserves.

While it is immensely complicated to find military answers to new threats lurking both tens of
thousands of kilometers away and right on our streets, despite this I consider the issue of terrorism to
be a problem primarily on the political level. We must be cohesive. We must know the meaning of
both liberty and security. Our democracies must show the will to defend ourselves and each other.
Our political system is and may be exposed to difficult tests of stability. Our enemies know that they
cannot defeat us militarily, but fear is their ally. Fear that leads to the denial of liberty, and with it, the
hollowing out of democracy. On Wednesday we commemorated the sorrowful anniversary of five
years since the bloody attacks in Madrid, whose goal was nothing less than to influence free
elections.

For this reason it is supremely important that the entire political scene be unified. As it was after
September 11, when the Alliance for the first time in history put Chapter 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
on common defence, into effect. Democratic politicians who scare citizens with arguments that the
defence of liberty destroys their security actually become allies of the terrorists. As Benjamin Franklin
said: They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty
nor safety.

Adapting NATO to new acute threats both outside our borders and within them is only one part of the
problem, because we must seek a solution both in the short and medium term. Its second part is a
reaction to changes in the world's power map, which is a question in the middle to long term. It will
soon no longer be true that NATO represents the grouping of the economically most-powerful
countries in the world. The Alliance has not only lost a clearly-defined enemy, but concurrently, in a
relatively short time, its economic foundation for its strategy could come into question. Together with a
shift in economic power to Asia, to countries such as China and India, political and military dominance
will also move from the USA and Europe.
As I said in the introduction, our world is going through major changes. In those 20 years that have
passed since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the bipolar world has become unipolar. The world has shown
itself to have one dominant superpower, but with a number of asymmetric threats. Now we are on the
path toward a multipolar world, in which, aside from NATO and the USA, Russia, China and India will
play important roles This world cannot be dictated to from one headquarters. But in no way does
this mean we should give up our basic mission: The defence of liberty. It is right. It serves all
inhabitants of the planet and we simply must find a way how to convince other important players of
the importance of these values. It may not be us who will clearly dominate the new world. But we
must do everything so that the idea of liberty continues to dominate.

Some questions are clearer, others less so. It is certain that we must complete the security integration
of our own Euro-Atlantic space. The states of the Western Balkans are heading toward the Alliance
and that is good. With it, the last flashpoint of permanent tension on the old continent disappears. The
Balkans will no longer be the "soft underbelly of Europe," as Churchill called it.

The question hangs over the partnership and possible membership of countries such as Ukraine or
Georgia. For both, Russia's sharp opposition is unmistakable. And this is a fundamental opposition,
not a played one, as is the case with the radar. This is again a conflict between liberty and security.
No third country can have the right of veto in the question of a free decision to join NATO. And on the
other side, the safety of the world to a large part depends on cooperation between Euro-Atlantic
civilisation and Russia. Even if we are competitors in many things, we have common basic interests:
The fight against terrorism, the maintenance of the global order and the global political-security
balance.

Relations toward the former main enemy will be key for the creation of NATO's security strategy in
coming years. Of all the important powers, Russia is closest to the Euro-Atlantic space. Not just
geographically, but also in terms of values. I believe that our common interests will in the end prevail
over disputes, and that the Alliance, together with Russia, will create the backbone of world security.
Cooperation on foreign missions and in the fight against terrorism will create a good foundation
toward this.

In my presentation, I explicitly did not mention the importance of trans-Atlantic ties. Of the need for
cooperation between Europe and the USA, something I speak about frequently. But I am convinced
that it is not necessary here. I do not doubt that everyone in this hall knows: Without the cooperation
of the United States and Europe, NATO and the EU, the defence of liberty is a lost thing. With our
experience in two world wars and one cold war, we see it absolutely clearly. We must defend liberty
against all its enemies. We must defend it at home and in the world. We must defend it for us, as well
as for our children and grandchildren. We must defend it against fear, even if that fear leads us to
extravagant security measures, or on the other hand to resigning our will to defence. And last but not
least: We must defend liberty against the paralyzing belief that it was been won, once and for all. In
the words of Thomas Jefferson: The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood
of patriots and tyrants.

SOURCE: https://www.vlada.cz/en/clenove-vlady/premier/vyznamne-projevy/10-years-after-nato-
expansion-successes--challenges--expectations-conference--54898/

JULY 26, 2004 8:00PM EDT

Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities
Reform of Security Structures Needed as New U.N. Administrator Takes Office

The NATO-led Kosovo Force and U.N. international police failed catastrophically to protect minorities
during the widespread rioting in Kosovo in March, Human Rights Watch said today in the first
detailed report on the attacks.

The 66-page report, Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, documents
the widespread attacks against Serbs, Roma, Ashkali (Albanian-speaking Roma) and other minorities
that took place in Kosovo on March 17-18. Human Rights Watch details the near-complete collapse
during the crisis of Kosovos security institutionsthe NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), international
civilian police from the U.N. Interim Administration Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK), and the locally-
recruited Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Based on numerous interviews with minority victims and
security officials, the report provides a detailedand previously unavailableaccount of what
happened in dozens of communities during the riots.

This was the biggest security test for NATO and the United Nations in Kosovo since 1999, when
minorities were forced from their homes as the international community looked on, said Rachel
Denber, acting executive director of Human Rights Watchs Europe and Central Asia Division. But
they failed the test. In too many cases, NATO peacekeepers locked the gates to their bases, and
watched as Serb homes burned.

On March 17, at least 33 riots broke out in Kosovo over a 48-hour period, involving an estimated
51,000 protesters. Nineteen people died during the violence. At least 550 homes and 27 Orthodox
churches and monasteries were burned, and approximately 4,100 persons from minority communities
were displaced from their homes.

Human Rights Watch research found that ethnic Albanian crowds acted with ferocious efficiency to rid
many areas in Kosovo of all remaining vestiges of a Serb presence, and also targeted other minority
communities, including Roma and Ashkali. In many of the villages affected by the violence, in attacks
both spontaneous and organized, every single Serb, Roma or Ashkali home was destroyed.

In the village of Svinjare, all 137 Serb homes were burned, but neighboring ethnic Albanian homes
were left untouched. In nearby Vucitrn, all 69 Ashkali homes were destroyed, while in Kosovo Polje,
more than 100 Serb and Roma homes were burned, as was the post office, the Serbian school and
the Serbian hospital. Even the tiniest Serb presences became targets: in Djakovica ethnic Albanians
besieged the Serbian Orthodox Church that housed the towns remaining Serbs, five elderly women.
The women had to be evacuated.

Although NATO-led KFOR troops and UNMIK international civilian police are specifically mandated to
provide security for minorities in Kosovo, they both failed to protect minorities during the rioting, often
leaving besieged Serbs and others at the mercy of large ethnic Albanian crowds for hours before
responding. In Svinjare, a large ethnic Albanian crowd walked right past the main French KFOR base
on its way to the village, before burning every minority home. KFOR failed to come to the assistance
of the Serbs, even though Svinjare is located just a few hundred meters from the base. French KFOR
similarly failed to respond to the anti-Ashkali rioting in Vucitrn, even though the village is located near
two French KFOR bases.

German-led KFOR troops in Prizren failed to deploy to protect the Serb population and its historic
Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries, despite repeated calls for assistance from German
UNMIK police officers based in the town. The village of Belo Polje, adjacent to the main Italian KFOR
base, was burned to the ground. In the capital Pristina, Serbs were forced to barricade themselves
into their apartments, while ethnic Albanian rioters shot at them and looted and burned the
apartments below. It took six hours before KFOR and UNMIK came to their assistance.

The violence was sparked by a series of events, notably sensational and ultimately inaccurate reports
that Serbs were responsible for the drowning of three ethnic Albanian boys. Other catalysts included
anger among ethnic Albanians over the blocking of the main Pristina-Skopje road by Serb villagers to
protest the shooting of a Serb teenager by unknown assailants, and a March 16 demonstration
organized by groups of veterans and others linked to the disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army who
protested the arrest of former KLA leaders on war crimes charges.

The violence should be a wake-up call to NATO and the United Nations, said Denber. Rhetoric
alone cant protect minority communities or help create a multiethnic Kosovo. Whats needed here is
genuine reform of the international security structures.

Human Rights Watch called for a full, independent review of the response of KFOR, UNMIK police
and KPS to the violence. The report also recommends riot-control training and equipment for KFOR
and UNMIK police, and a more centralized command structure for KFOR.

SOURCE: https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protect-minorities

Published on
Friday, May 04, 2012
by
Common Dreams
NATO: A Twenty-First Century Failure
by
Renee Parsons
For the first time in more than a decade, representatives from NATO's 28 member nations will meet in

Chicago on May 21 for a two day conference.

With the European continent devastated at the end of WWII and an ominous Russian presence in
eastern Europe, the emergence of two superpowers with radically different political and economic
agendas gave birth to an era of tensions and confrontations dubbed the Cold War -- a non-shooting
conflict that dominated global politics for the next forty years. By early 1949, the Soviet Union had
detonated its first atomic bomb and in an effort to halt the spread of communism, nip nationalistic
militarism in the bud and encourage political integration amongst European nations, the United States
and eleven western European counties formed NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Its charter, known as the Washington Treaty, included the admirable goals of settling "any
international dispute... by peaceful means... that international peace and security and justice are not
endangered and to refrain... from the threat or use of force... inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations."

From its earliest days, NATO remained a largely benign presence coordinating humanitarian aid and,
most importantly, standing as a symbolic reminder to the USSR. NATO's original goals were largely
accomplished when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 eliminating any threat of a Soviet invasion of
Europe. With the addition of central and eastern European countries, NATO's membership stretched
beyond the Balkans to include Bulgaria and Turkey. As the Soviet block disintegrated, rather than
accept the glory of Mission Accomplished, NATO justified its continued existence as it adopted a
curiously prescient Strategic Concept policy which identified 'complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic
peace and security."

NATO's first 'crisis management' operation did not occur until 1995 in support of a UN Resolution with
5,000 peacekeeper troops from fifteen nations on the ground in Bosnia as NATO conducted air
strikes against Serb artillery to protect civilians from further massacre and attacks on designated 'safe
areas' in Sarajevo and elsewhere.
The NATO mission of 1949 turned a significant corner in response to the 9/11 attacks as it moved
with lightning-fast speed to adopt a resolution on Sept. 12th invoking Article 5 of the Treaty for the first
time, triggering an extraordinary premise for military action. Less than a month later, intent on
dismantling Al Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power, U.S. and NATO troops invaded
Afghanistan on October 7th without any credible evidence that Afghanistan was responsible for the
attack.

While its origins remain murky, a fundamental NATO principle enshrined in Article 5 is that of
'collective defense' which proposes, not unlike Alexandre Dumas' Three Musketeers, a "one for all, all
for one" concept. Article 5 states that "any armed attack against one or more nation shall be
considered an attack against all" NATO nations and that any such response may include the "use of
armed force to restore and maintain the security."

Not unlike the Musketeers' petty quarrels, bruised egos and imagined slights that culminated in
continuous duels and conflicts, Article 5 creates a fraternity of omnipotent nations, bound together by
an almost effortless ability to make war. Current odds favor that, given an unprecedented proliferation
of weapons sales as a highly profitable global business, increased international geopolitical tensions,
economic catastrophes and a diminished commitment to diplomacy, Article 5 will provide the rationale
for a constant state of combat guaranteed to spawn global empire-building. As the Alliance renounces
the war-as-a-last-resort option, Article 5 is embedded as standard operating procedure. A remnant of
the Cold War, a 'collective defensive' strategy might have once been appropriate for the Musketeers
or the Hatfield-McCoy clans or the Mafia but it is hardly an appropriate tactic for 21st century
international policy.

The NATO Summit in 2010 provided yet another evolutionary shift for NATO into a "fundamentally
operational" alliance with an integrated command structure, according to U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Ivo Daalder. That operational structure reaffirmed NATO's commitment to a presence in Afghanistan
until 2014 as Daalder reported during a recent speech at George Washington University. Daalder
referred to broad elements of what became President Obama's recently signed post-2014 transition
agreement with Afghan President Karzai that will establish and maintain an enduring US occupation
until 2024. Explaining that NATO expects to transfer all security in the country to Afghan security
forces by mid-2013 with the transfer complete in 2014, the Ambassador stressed that 'success in
Afghanistan is essential to success of NATO's 21st century alliance." Details of the agreement
regarding immunity for U.S. troops, funding the post-2014 occupation and the future of drone attacks
within Afghan borders have not been disclosed.

Daalder reported on other NATO missions such as its active pursuit of eliminating the 'pirate menace'
to global commerce in the Gulf of Aden, that NATO owns seventeen AWAC Boeing E-3 Sentry
airplanes and that the Alliance, as Daalder proudly announced, is about to make a 'major' acquisition
of unmanned vehicles (drones) thereby providing NATO with a new global surveillance and
reconnaissance capability which will transmit data to NATO owned and operated data centers. It has
been reported that the Pentagon has committed to purchase six drones for NATO at a cost of $1.2
billion.

Daalder went on to predict that since Afghanistan, with a $1 billion budget, cannot carry the financial
burden of its own security, the 'international community' will need to step up to the plate. Costs for
maintaining Afghan security forces post-2014 have been estimated at $4.1 billion annually. In 2011,
combined U.S. and NATO expenses for training Afghan troops was estimated at $12 billion with the
U.S. spending $20 billion on training between 2003 and 2009 and spending that same amount in the
last two years on training.
It should come as no surprise that the Congressional Research Service document "NATO: Common
Funds and Burden Sharing" concludes that U.S. taxpayers provide an inordinate share of funding and
support for NATO missions. Member nations contribute to NATO with monetary donations based on a
percentage of GDP. The U.S. contribution, with the world's highest GDP, to its civil (administrative)
budget was $90 million in 2011. NATO's military budget including military staff received $462 million
and its National Security Investment Program (NSIP) including military infrastructure and NATO's
mission in Afghanistan and Iraq received another $258 million for a total of $810 million in 2011. This
may not seem like a hefty piece of change until the requirement for each member nation to 'deploy'
assorted personnel and weapon systems is factored in, the exact costs which the CRS says are
"difficult to assess."

During a recent visit with President Obama, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen referred to
the upcoming Chicago Summit as a "crucial summit at a crucial time' with progress in Afghanistan
and 'future security challenges" essential agenda items.

SOURCE: http://www.commondreams.org/views/2012/05/04/nato-twenty-first-century-failure

BOSNIA

Are We About to Repeat NATOs Greatest Failure?

The excuses, indifference, and utter callousness that met genocide in the Balkans sound eerily
familiar in Barack Obamas Washington.

JAMES BLOODWORTH

07.09.15 12:00 PM ET

As well as representing a bloody monument to the bankruptcy of ethnic nationalism, the 1995
genocide at Srebrenica stands, or at least it ought to stand, as a sordid reminder of how the
international community should not respond to mass killing. Indeed, the murder 20 years ago this
month of 8,372 Muslim men and boys over the course of three days by Bosnian Serb forces under
the command of Ratko Mladic was eminently preventable. Worse, the conduct of several European
nations prior to the slaughterBritain in particularcreated a situation propitious to mass murder.

Despite the continued relativism and genocide denial of someRussia has this week vetoed a UN
resolution which would have condemned the Srebrenica massacre as a crime of genocidethe
wars in the former Yugoslavia had a single identifiable cause: fascistic Serb nationalists who, once
the writing was on the wall for communism, threw off the cloak of Marxism-Leninism and replaced
materialist certainties with the grim mystique of blood and soil nationalism. For Bosnian Serb leaders
the purpose of the war was straightforward: to ensure that Serbs and only Serbs lived in Serb-
occupied territory. The humanitarian disaster which culminated in the Srebrenica massacre was not,
as Cambridge scholar Brendan Simms puts it, the by-product of war or civil breakdown. Rather,
ethnic cleansing was the purpose of the war.

As such there was no moral equivalence between the Bosnian government and rampaging Serb
nationalists, who precipitated the breakup of Yugoslavia by using the apparatus of Marshall Titos old
communist state to push their own brand of nationalistic racismas a result encouraging Croats,
Bosniaks, and Slovenians to seek independence. Nor were Bosniaks killed at Srebrenica, as a
number of revisionist historians still grotesquely claim, because they were guilty of provoking the
Serbs (a bit like the claim that rape victims provoke their attackers). For the first time in Europe
since the World War II, men and boys were rounded up and killed on an industrial scale simply
because of their ethnicity. While Bosniak menfolk were slaughtered, concentration camps were
established for the rape of young girls and women and villages were reduced to embers. In
classifying the events at Srebrenica as an act of genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia described the events unequivocally:

They [members of the Bosnian Serb army] stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and
civilian, elderly and young, of their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and
methodically killed them solely on the basis of their identity.

Two decades later and what rankles most apart from the killing itself is the fact that the Bosnian Serbs
were given the green light for their brutal onslaught by the cynicism of Westernlargely British
politicians. A one-sided arms embargo on the region, imposed by the European Community and its
member states in 1991, ostensibly to prevent escalation of the bourgeoning conflict but in practice
entrenching the military advantage of the Serbs (who controlled the fourth largest army in Europe)
remained in place until near the end of the war because the British government of Prime Minister
John Major sabotaged all attempts to lift it. Majors government justified the embargo by sticking
steadfastly to the filthy lie of moral equivalence, hiding in the language of warring sides and
complexity where all sides were equally guilty and nothing could be done. We should remember,
Majors Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind told parliament, that the Serbs in Bosnia are not
uniquely guilty.

DADO RUVIC/REUTERS

When British diplomats could no longer halt the imposition of a NATO no-fly zone to protect Bosniak
civilians, the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who former Tory Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher said would make Neville Chamberlin look like a warmonger, sank deeper into the moral
sewer by trying to obstruct its implementation. As the first democratically elected Prime Minister of
Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, observed in 1993: Any time there was a likelihood of effective action, a
particular western statesman [Hurd] intervened to prevent it.

Britain wasnt going to help because, as Hurd put it in a gruesome parody of Thatchers domestic
mantra (though to her credit she supported lifting the embargo and hitting the Serbs), there was no
such thing as the international community. Once news of the bloodbath at Srebrenica began to leak
out via the news media, the British state switched overnight from obstinate block on humanitarian
action to revisionist historian. According to the journalist John Sweeny, the British Ministry of Defence
went on the offensive working to deny and play down evidence of the massacre.

The besieged Bosniaks got little help from the United Nations, either. The genocide occurred in one of
the UNs so-called safe havens, with 400 lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers deployed to protect
Bosnian Muslims. Yet when Bosnian Serb forces under the command of Ratko Mladic reached the
town, Dutch forces capitulated immediately. Worse, in an echo of Dutch wartime collaborationthe
Netherlands saw one of the highest levels of collaboration of any Nazi-occupied country during the
HolocaustDutch peacekeepers denied Bosniak fighters the return of weapons they had
surrendered, forced them out of a UN military base in the town and handed them over to Bosnian
Serb troops. The Dutch had apparently received assurances from the would-be murderers. The
soothing peace talk had come from General Mladic, who three days earlier had amicably dined on
suckling pig with the commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR),
General Bernard Janvier.

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inRead invented by Teads

None of this should have come as a surprise, perhaps, considering the rot at the UN went to the very
top. Sounding more like a resentful humanities student than the leader of an international
organization, UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali had previously dismissed the conflict in
Bosnia as a white mans war. Boutros-Ghali had even considered it appropriate to use a visit to the
Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, in 1994 to lecture locals on the plight of black Africansthe insinuation
being that, dying with full stomachs unlike the African brethren, Bosniaks should think themselves
lucky and not have the cheek to ask for outside help.

After Srebrenica British foot-dragging ceased to matter. In August 1995, with thousands of Bosniaks
already dead, NATO finally launched Operation Deliberate Force, the massive bombing of Bosnian
Serb targets which forced the latter to the negotiating table for the Dayton peace agreement, reached
in November 1995. Yet by any measure decisive military intervention had come altogether too late
(the British had made sure of that) and could not bring back life to the bullet-riddled bodies tossed in
unmarked graves; nor assuage the pain of grieving relatives.

The horror at Srebrenica has parallels with the carnage in Syria today. As with Bashar al-Assads war
on his own people, over Bosnia foreign policy realistsconcerned more with the supposed balance
of power than with living and breathing human beingslinked arms with resentful anti-colonialists
and told the victims of mass murder that because the West could not do everything it was better if it
did nothing. While Bosnia descended into hell, its own government turned to Islamic countries for
practical assistance and radicalized paramilitaries duly swept in, allowing isolationist onlookers in
Britain and America to slander the Bosniaks as extremists and mince superciliously about both sides
being as bad as each other. Sound familiar?

A few years before the tragedy at Srebrenica a ludicrous end of history had been declared and the
realist right and the pacifist left got the world that both wanted. The Cold War had come to an end
and, while Western nations cut back on military spending, the age of intervention appeared to be
over. Yet history failed to stick to the script and the corpses carried on piling upin Rwanda, in Iraq,
in Somalia and in Bosniaregardless of whether or not the West had a dog in that fight, as George
H. W. Bushs secretary of state, James Baker, haughtily put it.
Twenty years later and ill-advised hubris of the interventionists in places like Iraq has certainly tainted
the reputation of the something must be done crowd. Yet the 20th anniversary of the genocide at
Srebrenica should demonstrate that the world rarely looks back kindly on those who stand uselessly
on the sidelines while innocents are put to the sword. Bosnia, as one observer noted as Douglas
Hurd squirmed uselessly in a session of parliament at the height of the Balkan wars, will be on
Douglas Hurds tombstone.

There is a good chance Syria will be on Barack Obamas.

SOURCE: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/09/are-we-about-to-repeat-nato-s-greatest-
failure.html